Bomber Command/8th Air Force tour of operations

[PPRuNeUser0139]

I was asked this morning by a Spanish historian (a long story) about what constituted a tour of operations in Bomber Command in WWII.
I duly trotted out: "About 30 operational sorties.." but then he asked what then? What happened to the few who escaped the chop..?
I replied that many were posted back into training..
And when they'd completed that posting, what were the options? Firstly, did they have an option or was a posting back to operational flying a given? Was it mandatory?
And for those who'd been shot down over occupied Europe and had returned to the UK via an escape line, were they allowed to return to operational flying? I'd always understood that they didn't.. and yet I have personal knowledge of a Halifax pilot who was shot down on his first operation, successfully evaded and on his return to the UK went on to complete 30+ operational sorties.
My historian friend has the same questions for the USAAF.
All answers gratefully received.
Thanks

[Hipper]

If you read the story of Guy Gibson, he seems to have completed a tour (of thirty) and then gone on to fighter command, and then back to bombers. That was his choice it seems.


My father joined up in 1937 as an Armorer, became an Air Gunner but didn't go on Bomber Command ops until May 1942, first as an Air Gunner then Air Bomber. He competed his thirty by February 1943, went on various courses (Bomber Leader, Squadron Bombing Leader then seems to have become an instructor. In May 1945 he was back in an operational squadron, possibly preparing for Tiger Force, the attack on Japan.

[rolling20]

Bomber Command standard tour was 30 ops, but this was sometimes shortened if training requirements dictated a need for instructors. 2Group did 20 ops due to the hazardous nature of daylight ops. A 2nd tour could be undertaken after the 6 months of 'rest' at a training establishment. Again though this didn't always have to be a strict limit. A 2nd tour of 20 ops and a crew couldn't be called upon again. However, it was uncanny how many crews were lost early on a 2nd tour. The chance of surviving a 2nd tour was 1 in 40. Pathfinders did a double tour of 45 ops! As for evaders, if they had been assisted in evading its doubtful they would return to ops. Due to the knowledge they had acquired of the people and routes, it would be unwise for them to return, in case they fell next time into enemy hands.

[PPRuNeUser0139]

Was the second tour optional? Was it on request - or was it mandatory?

As for the evaders question - I agree with you that they shouldn't have been posted back to "Ops" for all the reasons you gave - but a few of them were. Here are two that I have personal knowledge of.. George Duffee (http://www.cometeline.org/fiche143.html) (Halifax) and Bob Barckley (http://www.cometeline.org/fiche117.html) (Typhoon).

[rolling20]

As far as I understand it a second tour was pretty much mandatory. Air gunners were fairly assured of going back bang on six months. There were of course exceptions if needs were elsewhere. Australian aircrew were in the mid part of the war only required to do one tour, as their government requested their return home to assist against the Japanese. Again however, there were exceptions.

[54Phan]

Martin Middlebrook gives a good breakdown of Bomber Command tour lengths in "The Nuremburg Raid". IIRC, Miles Tripp in "The Eighth Passenger" also mentions a period when Bomber Command tour lengths were set at 35 operations. Raids after D Day in Occupied Europe originally counted as 1/2 an op unless they crossed a certain longitudinal line, although I believe that later changed. Of course, in any case an operation had to meet certain requirements in order to "count". Interesting point about the losses among crews starting out on a second tour, too. We could have a great discussion about that.

An 8th Air Force tour was 25 missions.

Hope this helps a bit.

[DC10RealMan]

During the Battle of Berlin in the winter of 1943 my friend and his crew on 50 Squadron at Skellingthorpe were approaching the end of their tour of operations of 30 when they were asked by Hamish Mahaddie to join the Pathfinders and go straight into a second tour.

The younger members of the crew were very keen because "You got an extra bob (5p) per day and an enamel Pathfinder badge which was ideal for chatting up the girls in the pub.

My friend, being older and wiser counselled caution and time to think about it and the Pathfinder option was never mentioned again although he did say that if his crew had insisted he would have gone along with it although they never would have survived the extended tour.

Interestingly, he told me that he survived because they didn't go straight onto a Pathfinder tour during that lethal winter and that his Captain had refused to accept the installation of the H2S ground mapping radar onto the aircraft which unknown to him the Luftwaffe nightfighters were homing on to to attack the RAF bombers.

[rolling20]

The French ops were 1/3 of a trip, so you can imagine if you had done 20+ ops with the end in sight, you were now faced with the possibility of up to 30 ops more. After Mailly le Camp on May 3rd 1944 a loss ratio of 11.3% saw that scrapped. One has to remember that there were plenty of aircrew who did complete two and in some cases three tours. There were often spare bods on a station who would fly as and when they were needed and thus amassed more ops than the standard tour. Experienced men, whatever their aircrew trade were always welcomed by inexperienced crews. For most crews however , just getting to 30 ops was a miracle. Again different times of the war could affect survival rates. Mid 43-until spring 44 was a particularly brutal time.

[PPRuNeUser0139]

DC10RealMan:
that his Captain had refused to accept the installation of the H2S ground mapping radar onto the aircraft which unknown to him the Luftwaffe nightfighters were homing on to to attack the RAF bombers.
At the risk of taking my own thread off-topic, was the SOP for H2S to leave it in continuous "transmit" mode or did they only select "transmit" as required for fixing?

Thanks to those who have contributed thus far..:ok: I'm sure their inputs will be welcomed by my Spanish historian friend.

[rolling20]

By early 44, Bomber Command ordered that H2S be switched off or used briefly over enemy territory. Naxos was developed by the Germans to home in on H2S. Monica, which was a device that alerted crews that they were being tracked by nightfigthers,also worked against them. This tracker was called Flensburg. Interestingly enough, even until 1942 some Squadrons still believed that by having IFF on over enemy territory it disrupted enemy radar. In fact it acted again as a homing device.

[DC10RealMan]

I believe that RAF Bomber Command were unaware of both Naxos and Flensburg and only became aware of these installations when a defecting Luftwaffe crew landed at Dyce and their JU88 night fighter was inspected by technicians.

This JU88 is the one on display at the RAF Museum at Hendon.

[rolling20]

Seeing as main force crews were still being equipped with H2S in late 43, it would seem odd that they werent told about the potential homing potential of the device. It wasn't until July 44, that another captured aircraft revealed more secrets and the fact tbat Monica was trackable.

[5645andym]

Re H2S, Naxos & etc. there is a very interesting chapter all about the electronic warfare side of the Bomber war in a very interesting book by R V Jones called Most Secret War - He was head of Scientific Inteligence at the Air Ministry and was the chap who worked out how the Germans were using radar to control thyeir night fighters.