Practicing manual flying in jet transport ops.

[Centaurus]

Some may have already seen this FAA SAFO. But it raises the question of various limitations that prevent manual flight practice.

SAFO
Safety Alert for Operators
U.S. Department SAFO 13002
of Transportation DATE: 1/4/13
Subject: Manual Flight Operations
Purpose: This SAFO encourages operators to promote manual flight operations when appropriate.

Background: A recent analysis of flight operations data (including normal flight operations, incidents, and accidents) identified an increase in manual handling errors. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) believes maintaining and improving the knowledge and skills for manual flight operations is necessary for safe flight operations.

Discussion: Modern aircraft are commonly operated using autoflight systems (e.g., autopilot or autothrottle/autothrust). Unfortunately, continuous use of those systems does not reinforce a pilot’s knowledge and skills in manual flight operations. Autoflight systems are useful tools for pilots and have improved safety and workload management, and thus enabled more precise operations. However, continuous use of autoflight systems could lead to degradation of the pilot’s ability to quickly recover the aircraft from an undesired state.

Operators are encouraged to take an integrated approach by incorporating emphasis of manual flight operations into both line operations and training (initial/upgrade and recurrent). Operational policies should be developed or reviewed to ensure there are appropriate opportunities for pilots to exercise manual flying skills, such as in non-RVSM airspace and during low workload conditions.

In addition, policies should be developed or reviewed to ensure that pilots understand when to use the automated systems, such as during high workload conditions or airspace procedures that require use of autopilot for precise operations. Augmented crew operations may also limit the ability of some pilots to obtain practice in manual flight operations. Airline operational policies should ensure that all pilots have the appropriate opportunities to exercise the aforementioned knowledge and skills in flight operations.
............................................................ ............................................................ ................................................

After reading that lot, and keeping in mind it is almost one year since the FAA published this SFO, the absence of any CASA advice on the subject suggests that in Australia at least, there is no official (CASA) interest in pushing operators to encourage manual flying under any conditions, let alone in good weather.

Allowing for obvious limitations in Australian airspace, such as RVSM and RNP operations, during what stages of a typical airline flight would the opportunities for manual flying practice be available to pilots if they choose to accept the FAA SAFO recommendations? And disregard personal preferences where some pilots simply cannot be bothered to conduct manual flight (apart from take off and short final for landing). From what I have observed there is no shortage of excuses among airline pilots to avoid practicing hand flying. That includes captains discouraging their first officers from keeping their hand in under suitable conditions

[Check Airman]

What are the peculiarities of Aussie airspace that makes manual flying opportunities difficult? During a typical flight, I find it plenty of opportnity to turn off the AP/FD.

[TRY2FLY]

Why would any airspace stop you from flying manually. You are a pilot for gods sake. Disconnect the automatics and enjoy it

[gordonfvckingramsay]

Most if not all airlines have a "no unnecessary manual flight" policy.

In my organisation, it came from a lack of discipline i.e. Some guys not knowing when to knock it off and consequently fvcking it up.

Airlines don't allow enough sim time to actually practice hand flying and instrument scanning, apparently it is too time and cost intensive.

Another case of safety costs being managed by non-pilot accountants.

[engine out]

Without a reference on me I'm pretty sure RVSM airspace mandates you need a working altitude holding device Try2Fly.

[The Bullwinkle]

If the weather's nice, I encourage having a hand fly.
Remember, it's just an aeroplane!

[Wally Mk2]

'OE' that is indeed correct, only A/C with cert Alts & auto-flight systems & serviceable can operate in RVSM. Hand flying in RVSM airspace wouldn't ordinarily be acceptable. If yr auto flight system fails (same as hand flying) then you are required to vacate RVSM airspace as you no longer can comply.It's damned hard work keeping in tolerance at say 39000' for extended periods of time.
I believe under certain circumstances manual flight up to say the trans level would be acceptable & even then the work load is higher for the PNF which means the level of safety afforded by an AP is reduced & the whole reason why we have such sophisticated AP systems in the first place is to remove the lowest common denominator, the pilot:-)

Hand fly an ILS with A/T off, that's a challenge at times.


Wmk2

[drpixie]

I'm sure most of you have seen it before, but for those who haven't, here's where you can find "Children of the Magenta". Very sensible advice - and only 10 years old, about time the authorities promoted it:
Children of the Magenta on Vimeo
(Doesn't seem to play on all computers - if it doesn't work, try a different browser, or go to vimeo.com/64502012)

Re RVSM airspace: Shirley it's reasonable to do T/O, climb, and descent by hand.

[The Bullwinkle]

Re RVSM airspace: Shirley it's reasonable to do T/O, climb, and descent by hand

That's the way I see it too!

[Conductor]

I'm all for practising the hand flying but it sucks up most of your SA which, quite often needs to be elsewhere.

[compressor stall]

I'm all for practising the hand flying but it sucks up most of your SA which, quite often needs to be elsewhere.


Sounds like I was incredibly lucky to survive my 3000 odd hours without an Autopilot then... :ugh:

[Buttscratcher]

Sure, if you want to load up the other guy, go right ahead!

[Lord Spandex Masher]

Why would he be more loaded up than with the AP in?

[Buttscratcher]

He has to manipulate the MCP for the pilot flying, as well as do the normal radio and such

[The Bullwinkle]

Of course the other guy would be loaded up more than when the Auto Pilot is engaged, but that's good to practice too!

So you pick appropriate times to hand fly eg. fine weather.
You don't hand fly holding patterns in IMC in the middle of a storm etc.

At least then, when the Auto Pilot or Auto-throttle does drop out one day, you won't even blink an eye when reverting to manual control.

[compressor stall]

I'm not sure if Buttscratcher is joking but in case he isn't...

He has to manipulate the MCP for the pilot flying, as well as do the normal radio and such


If my FO can't do that, he shouldn't be there.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

He has to manipulate the MCP for the pilot flying, as well as do the normal radio and such

So twiddling a couple of knobs occasionally is difficult. How would you cope with a pilot incap?

I take it you'd refuse to dispatch with a u/s AP, allowable under the MEL, in that case?

[Blueskymine]

I hand fly all departures to transition and any approach in VMC from 3000.

I do a manual thrust approach every roster publication or when it's a fine day.

[Buttscratcher]

Fair enough.... It's just non-normal, that's all
Brief it and do it if you wish, but my advice is keep it at a low traffic environment
Don't hate, just saying, but this isn't where we are at today.

[The Bullwinkle]

It's just non-normal, that's all

But isn't that the point?!

Wouldn't you prefer to practice hand flying at an appropriate time of your choosing rather than having to do it for the first time in a non-normal situation when the automatics have fallen over?

[zanthrus]

The Jet driver gods don't lower themselves to hand fly the aeroplane, because they have lost this skill.

Single pilot IFR in a light twin is way more difficult than cruising in VMC at 40000ft in an Airbus or Boeing and watching the automatics fly.

Yet we continually get told prop drivers cant transition to jets its too hard you need 20000 hours space shuttle time and five moon landings to be considered for a type rating let alone a command.

What a load of S#$*.

[The Bullwinkle]

The Jet driver gods don't lower themselves to hand fly the aeroplane, because they have lost this skill.

Single pilot IFR in a light twin is way more difficult than cruising in VMC at 40000ft in an Airbus or Boeing and watching the automatics fly.

Yet we continually get told prop drivers cant transition to jets its too hard you need 20000 hours space shuttle time and five moon landings to be considered for a type rating let alone a command.

What a load of S#$*.

Okay, now you've had your rant, go have a Bex and a lie down!

For what it's worth, I transitioned from a Twin Otter to a Boeing 737 and I don't remember anybody "continually" telling me it's too hard.
In fact I don't know of any pilot who didn't fly a prop before they flew a jet!

[Check Airman]

What's all this talk about high workload for the PNF?

If you can't set the bugs while accomplishing the rest of your duties, perhaps you'd be better suited to another line of work. I don't ever recall being in a situation where I felt overloaded because the other guy was hand flying.

Re the "nice day" comments...what defines a "nice day"? I hope you're not limiting it to daytime VMC. With few exceptions (thunderstorms and other severe weather) I don't have a problem with someone turning off all the automation, regardless of the weather.

[Not Nightowl]

Answering Wally_mk2; Exactly right, especially doing an ILS with no A/T.

[Not Nightowl]

Sounds like I was incredibly lucky to survive my 3000 odd hours without an Autopilot then... :ugh:

Yes...you're very clever. Nevertheless it is against the rules to hand fly in the cruise in RVSM.

[Hobo]

Hand fly an ILS with A/T off, that's a challenge at times.

You have to be kidding Wally Mk2 (...I hope).

[Not Nightowl]

You have to be kidding Wally Mk2 (...I hope).

Nope, he's not, get no practice at it except in a very occasional sim.

[Hobo]

care to tell us which airline this is NN?

[Not Nightowl]

care to tell us which airline this is NN?

Nope..........

[Bula]

It's curious how the briefing of the expected level of automation was a rock solid part of an approach briefing. Then it became the expectation of manual flying, an now it's seems to be the expectation of the level of manual flying. Maybe this is a sign that things are changing for the better. That there if a cultural change within mature organisations to make manual flying "Normal" and I for one believe this to be a good thing.

I somewhat feel that inappropriate guidance and training is focused on pilots and their ability to monitor and maintain appropriate levels of situational awareness during supporting roles. This is usually the domain of the Trainers and Checkers in the fleet who have to master this skill. For everyone else, it is a throw back to previous experience which keeps them in the loop. But what about our cadets, or low time pilots? What about those with only single pilot experience? With humans naturally being poor monitors of systems, is the flaw in the system not in ones ability to fly the aircraft, but an individuals training to fulfill the pilot monitoring role which makes pilots and airlines nervous about manual flying on the line?

[Wally Mk2]

I think some of you guys are missing the point here & letting yr bravado be the focus. Pilots in general have a wide variation in skill level so there's no one singe answer or mind set to all this hence we train to a specific level with CAR 217 with tolerances for the candidate etc.
Some also don't seem to understand the increased level of workload for the PNF when the AP system is removed. Not only does the PNF have to set pretty much everything for the PF he has to have a higher situational awareness as his time is now reduced keeping an eye on the PF's tolerances whilst having a more broad range of his thinking. The PF brings his SA down to a smaller range.
It's almost akin to SP Ops bar for not actually manipulating the controls for the PNF.

'Hobo' Airline names have nothing to do with it here & no I wasn't joking re hand flown ILS being challenging at times.

Wmk2

[Global Aviator]

The chicken or the egg?

No hand flying between sims then expected to fly a beautiful raw data single engine ILS, no stress but fair go.

Cessna/ Boeing/ Bus what's the difference when ya switch off automatics and fly? Principle is all the same push the noise makers forward go faster, pull the stick/ yoke back the sky gets bigger...

Nothing more satisfying than a nice annual visual approach in the bus, makes ya remember what flying is.

Now the truly scary thing is the guys that seem scared to go manual or genuinely don't want to do a visual app.

True a little hamstrung by OMs but still...

So many MEL procedures that we simply don't practice, how comfortable would one feel with some of them when you simply haven't done any for so long?

Bring back SIM sessions for some practice.


:8

[bdcer]

Come on guys/gals, we're professionals. Yes, our hand flying skills erode & yes, it makes the sims harder.

It's up to us to look for opportunities to hand fly (The early morning arrival in VMC, or the 'occasional' 2 sector day when we're not stuffed). I reckon we need to practice manual flying at least once a month (& get the AT out too). It's good practice for PNF too, stretch the SA bubble.

[A37575]

If you can't set the bugs while accomplishing the rest of your duties, perhaps you'd be better suited to another line of work. I don't ever recall being in a situation where I felt overloaded because the other guy was hand flying.


I know this will attract immediate snorts of derision from the nay-sayers, but let's be a bit realistic about all this scary talk about the PNF being up to his neck in alligators with a heavy work-load if the other guy is poling the aircraft. Yours truly and many other newly graduated 21 year old RAAF pilots were posted to Williamtown to fly single seat Vampire jet fighters. All of our course had only 240 hours in our log books. We flew Mustangs at 210 hours. This is not boasting bar talk nonsense but simply a cold statement of fact in those days. Things are different now.

There were no dual Vampires then and of course no simulators. On my second or third 40 minute flight (the endurance on single seat Vampires was a bit over one hour), it was a formation take off into cloud at 1000 ft and a climb in formation in cloud to 30,000ft plus. We stuck within 10 metres of the formation leader who was usually an experienced former operational fighter pilot just back from the war in Korea. That is no mean feat in thick cloud.

We had one VHF set in the Vampire with four channels and very basic pressurisation giving a cabin altitude of around 18,000 ft, so you were on oxygen. There was no ejection seat in those early single seat Vampires so you had no hope of getting out if something went wrong at high speed. We had no radio aids. We relied almost totally on VHF/DF and GCA to get us back home. The second trip on the same day included introduction to Mach runs up to compressibility critical Mach Number at 30,000ft in order to experience the rather nasty Mach tuck which had killed several pilots on previous courses.

During the Mach tuck experience, it was realised we did not have the experience on type (after all we only had two 40 minute trips under our belt by then) to recognise the rapid onset of compressibility. So the formation leader would formate on our Vampire and talk us into the dive via VHF. As soon as the formation leader felt the onset of compressibility and his aircraft started to bunt over due to loss of elevator effectiveness, he would instruct us to throttle back and extend the speed brakes to avoid further compressibility loss of control. That done, he would take the lead again and maybe go into a tail chase depending on weather.

Eventually we would return to the aerodrome still in close formation and sometimes penetrate cloud while being radar vectored until breaking out of cloud at 1000 ft for either a visual circuit or GCA instrument approach. All this on our second or third trip in a jet fighter. There was no such term as "work-load" as far as I recall. You had a brand new pilot's brevet on your uniform under your flying suit and it was expected of you to handle the fighter without bleating about workload.

I have deliberately gone into detail in full anticipation of it generating heat and not much light. We never considered what we did as being work overload. Which is why it never fails to astonish me that some of today's generation of airline pilots claim to get all uptight when someone decides to do a spot of hand flying in cloud or good weather and the PNF is asked to turn a knob or two and keep normal situational awareness by watching the magenta Line. Believe me it didn't hurt one bit to fly a single seat jet fighter when we only had just over 200 hours in the log book. Why should it be any different in a two pilot jet transport equipped with so much automation?:ok:

[spelling_nazi]

Hand fly and request visual approaches regularly, and encourage my offsider to do the same. It's fun.

It's not dangerous .

It doesn't load up anyone.

I still know how to fly a plane

[maggot]

well there you go A37575. In one post you comment about other airmen being killed by the situation you refer to as doing 'the right stuff' and 'just managing'... I guess you can't figure out why things have moved on so?

As for the PM getting loaded by the PF hand flying - yes the PM's workload will increase, how much will depend on the overall situation. In general I wouldn't expect the other guy to 'have a fly' until on approach if it was a particularly busy spot - ie. holding/vectors/weather into somewhere like london or dubai when it's pretty busy and everyone is knackered. When it starts to get quiet and all's well on base or wherever, knock yourself out.
Like everything, there is a time and place!
As for manual thrust - was standard to take it out when hand flying the maggot but current type has levers that couldn't be of a poorer design for manual thrust :ugh:

[Check Airman]

I don't think he was suggesting not to use the AP. He's saying that the "workload increase" argument is BS. Occasionally, I have to fly with no AP. Sure I'm a bit more tired at the end of the day, but I don't feel overloaded- even in night IMC.

[Ollie Onion]

Geeze guys, why make it so hard. If the conditions are suitable and you feel like it then hand fly the aircraft.

I have no set schedule of when I will handfly, but I do so quite regularly, normally because I get so bloody bored that I disconnect everything to give me something to do.

I wouldn't hand fly in RVSM airspace / in bad weather / with certain FO's because that is what my employer directs and after all it is their trainset. As professionals we all should know when it is appropriate to hand fly and when it is not. SIMPLE

[Angle of Attack]

Ill hand fly to and from Transition several times a month, weather and traffic permitting of course, bad weather and OCTA I think it is good Airmanship to leave the A/P engaged, in CTAF's I wont disconnect until traffic is no issue and established in the circuit. Even better is to get rid of that flight director, and get back to Attitude flying, after all its not that hard to follow a FD.....The RNP approaches are good from a safety standpoint but really take the headwork out of an approach, all you need to do is stay in LNAV and VNAV and push and pull the thrust levers and you will end up aligned with some tarmac ready to land...Its a balancing act but suffice to say it must be much harder for Longhaul Pilots doing only a few sectors a month compared to domestic doing
heaps....

[maggot]

a few a month is a bit generous...

[PENKO]

What some posters do not understand, notably the ex-air force, is that the modern cockpit environment is different from strapping on a jet fighter or a Cessna.

To start with you have hundreds of passengers behind you, think passenger comfort.

More importantly, a few knots too fast, a glide dot too high, a bank angle more than 25 degrees...there is no room for error. Not because we might fall out of the sky but because our OPS department is watching our every move. We have to operate to very strict limitations with regards to handling the aircraft and strict limitations with regards to the energy state and flight path. So add to that mix a rusty hand flown approach and no one who has any experience in modern commercial jets will doubt that the workload goes up quite a bit for both PF and PNF.

So no, flying a 320 or a 737 manually is not difficult, but the work conditions set by our employer and the fact that passenger comfort is also a factor make hand flying more challenging than in a Cessna or dare I say, a fighter jet.

And do not forget that in one month we fly more IMC approaches than any typical jet fighter or Cessna pilot in a whole year!
So yes, when conditions are suitable, I hand fly. Maybe once or twice a week (one week averages 16 flights).

[haughtney1]

First things first, some of us are not allowed to do any "practice" with fare paying passengers, its written into our Ops manuals…so we don't have the choice.
That is not to say hand flying isn't allowed, merely that it should be carried out in an operational setting that is appropriate.
To all those that roll their eyes and thump their chests ought to try flying for 14hrs across 10 time zones..and then figure out if a no FD/AT hand flown approach is a sensible thing to do..:ugh:
For those who think its easy for the PNF when the other guy is poling it about…try launching out of Moscow, Beijing, LHR, or half a hundred other complex airports and watch the PNF slowing lose the plot.
I will quite happily hand fly out of LAX, JFK, SFO as ATC have a sensible "fly runway hdg…climb 8000' " mentality.
The tough guy mentality has NO place in transport airplanes, yes you do what needs to be done (including visual approaches, manual flight etc) but the reality is that if you don't use a skill you lose it, my operator has instituted manual flying sims into the training syllabus.

[Wally Mk2]

"H1" well put there:ok:
You will always get chest beaters on these pages on any subject.

Simply put, hand fly when it's suitable, low work load, alert & enthusiastic & BOTH pilots are okay with it, let the Sims take care of the rest.

Wmk2

[AerocatS2A]

I have never been one to "practice" hand flying. I will sometimes hand fly if I am bored or if I think I can do it better than the autopilot (it's not a great autopilot), but I don't do it with the intent of improving my skills. I won't specifically do it before I go to the sim for instance.

The following is just my observations from flying short haul jet transport ops, your milage may vary.

In my experience hand flying lowers the workload of the PF and increases the workload of the PNF. It also reduces the situational awareness of the PF. Although hand flying is a more natural and physically connected process I think it tends to focus your attention a bit more on what you are doing and reduces your ability to absorb what's going on around you. I know that contradicts my statement that it lowers the PFs workload. I suppose what I mean is that the PF has less to do but uses more of their brain to do it.

On the other hand the PNF workload is necessarily increased. Whether or not that matters depends on what their workload was to start with. If there is a lot going on, lots of radio instructions, lots of SOP chatter, in a busy unfamiliar environment then a small increase in the PNF's workload might be detrimental to safe flight. If the PNFs workload is low to start with then it doesn't matter if they've got a few more jobs to do. It all comes down to doing it at the right time and place.

In the space of a month and a half I found myself having to fly 6 full sectors by hand due to autopilot failure. I can't say that more practice would have helped. I didn't feel I was any better at it at the end of the flight than I was at the start of the flight. I did do a better job than the autopilot, but that says more about the autopilot than me.

Ultimately I think that those who tend to do a bit of hand flying here and there probably don't really need to. Those who avoid it are the ones who need the practice, and they're the least likely to get it.

[FlareArmed]

A37575....I like your thinking.

There was a similar debate on PPRuNe two or three years ago where there was a similar clash between the various generations currently flying in the airlines.

IMHO, there were some reasonably naive statements such as, "The days of switching off the F/D and A/T on a visual approach are long gone", and, "You old farts going on and on about manual skills....blah blah", and, "Flight management is the new world...blah blah", etc remain like a hot-iron in my side. I personally cannot fathom the ignorance of the importance of basic flying skills whether it's flying an A320 or a Vampire jet trainer.

I recall vividly flying an Ansett A320 as the F/O on an NDB approach into Kalgoorlie at night with a ****e-ton of information leaping out at me (from all that crap whizzing around on the PFD and ND) , and choosing to focus on attitude, snap-shot track (that's a bonus instead of heading!), altitude and the ADF needle with the F/D off (the youngish Captain was ready to transmit a mayday on that fact alone, I'm sure).

There are two points: the first is that I was relaxed because I knew the attitudes to achieve the desired performance (we learned those in Ansett way back then) and had that crazy old thing called a 'scan' (the whizz kids might need to google that); the second point is that if I tried to fly the approach with the A/P and F/D, I would have been like the proverbial 'one-armed-paper-hanger': even worse, if I hand-flew and had the PNF twiddle knobs, we would have both been loaded up more than needed.

One of the best things I heard from an old-bold was that Flight Director Bars are 'Suggestion Bars' – never a truer statement (particularly on a Boeing).

These days, I have a varied diet from ILS, LPV and EVS (google it, whizz kids) to totally manual circling approaches – and I love it.

My message is – embrace your inner pilot and fly manual attitude and power whenever you can safely do so; make it the norm when you are cleared to Angels 28 out of Sydney (and take note of the numbers) – the knowledge will serve you well when it hits the fan one day. All the digital stuff complicates the fact that power + attitude = performance. Your job is to know the first two bits; the rest is for show.

[sheppey]

Ultimately I think that those who tend to do a bit of hand flying here and there probably don't really need to. Those who avoid it are the ones who need the practice, and they're the least likely to get it.

Never a truer statement. I think that sums up the whole discussion.

[HOMER SIMPSONS LOVECHILD]

So you're downwind at 4000', gin clear day, number 1 in no traffic and the runway is firmly in sight to both of you. A/P, A/T and F/D's off.
Can someone explain what all this furious knob twiddling is that's required of the PNF , apart from maybe wazzing the heading bug to point in roughly the right direction?

[ABusboy]

4000 ft,clear day.No 1..? Where that..can't remember last time that privilege except when diverted into Kilimonjaro,,

[AerocatS2A]

I recall vividly flying an Ansett A320 as the F/O on an NDB approach into Kalgoorlie at night with a ****e-ton of information leaping out at me (from all that crap whizzing around on the PFD and ND) , and choosing to focus on attitude, snap-shot track (that's a bonus instead of heading!), altitude and the ADF needle with the F/D off (the youngish Captain was ready to transmit a mayday on that fact alone, I'm sure).

I'm sure this is not the case, but based on what you've written I would suspect that you didn't know the automation side of your aeroplane properly and hence found it easier to hand fly. I don't see a big difference between that and not being able to hand fly properly and therefore finding it easier to use the autopilot. When you're really on top of an aeroplane you can use the automation to its fullest extent on a dark and stormy night and know exactly what's going on, you can also turn everything off if you need to and also know what's going on. I don't know the A320 but surely you can fly an NDB on the A/P in HDG and VS without becoming a one armed paper hangar?

The newest FOs I fly with are very quick to turn off the automation on an approach. It's not because they are great at hand flying though, it's because they don't have a handle on the automatics and get scared into turning them off. As they get better at it they are able to manage the automatics better and aren't forced to revert to single pilot GA twin mode. I have actually heard the words "this is too hard" muttered under the breath one time just prior to <click click> hand fly time!

Big mitigating factor, it is an old autopilot that doesn't have niceties such as being able to select a defined VS or do a nice localiser intercept at much more than 180 knots. I fully understand that to people new to the aeroplane the A/P actually significantly increases your workload times. But as you come to learn to use the A/P you do get to the point where it decreases your workload. So although I think the new FO who turns off the automatics when he can't get them to do what he wants is doing the right thing for the situation, I also think it is a symptom of not knowing the aeroplane well enough.

So you're downwind at 4000', gin clear day, number 1 in no traffic and the runway is firmly in sight to both of you. A/P, A/T and F/D's off.
Can someone explain what all this furious knob twiddling is that's required of the PNF , apart from maybe wazzing the heading bug to point in roughly the right direction?
Yep, you've described a situation where the PNFs workload is largely unaffected, well done. Maybe we're referring to other times when you are either flying a SID or flying a STAR that doesn't give you the luxury of a visual approach from 4000' on downwind.

[FlareArmed]

Aerocat...I had about 2000 hours on the A320 at the time and about 7000 total. I'm not saying I was the ace of the base, but I certainly embraced the automation. However, I also had the experience to know when A/P was not the best option – the autopilot does not know the meaning of NOW; it is great on a coupled approach, but my fear is that the average airline pilot these days is a servant of automation: I let it give me a helping hand but go back to basics as soon as it mis-behaves. If you delve into the books of Airbus and Boeing, it will say that very thing one way or another.

If any pilot does not have the ability to fly stress-free without an F/D, A/P and A/T, they should look for another job – you simply aren't cut-out to be a pilot. Harsh, I know, but true. Look no further than AF447.

[Lookleft]

However, I also had the experience to know when A/P was not the best option – the autopilot does not know the meaning of NOW; it is great on a coupled approach, but my fear is that the average airline pilot these days is a servant of automation:

Well said FA, sometimes disconnecting the A/P is the appropriate level of automation. Watching someone try to recover an approach using the A/P, from being left too high or not getting it slower earlier is excruciating. When you tell them to disconnect and handfly its like you have told them they have to walk through the terminal naked!

[RENURPP]

However, I also had the experience to know when A/P was not the best option
Don't take this the wrong way please, BUT, we don't know what we don't know. (I am not suggesting you would do as described below, I hope not)

On many occasions I have flown with people who are not good managers of their aircraft nor are they particularly talented at hand flying, however as soon as the workload increases, like intercepting the LLZ on an average day, off goes the autopilot and hand flying starts.

They believed that was appropriate. The dismal display indicated otherwise.
These same people consider themselves experienced and are now training and passing on these little gems to their trainees.

[sheppey]

I recall a post from several months back where a 737 F/O asked the captain would he mind if she disconnected the AP as she had an IR coming up and needed some hand flying currency (ie "practice").. They were about 15 miles from touch down slightly off set and on an intercept track to hit a Sydney 16 localiser at around 9 miles I think. Weather CAVOK.

Captain said no problem, fill your boots (or similar expression). F/O says "thanks - most captains I fly with don't like to hand fly"

Approaching LLZ intercept the captain remarked that F/O still had the AP engaged and when are you going to hand fly? Not yet says the F/O - I'll wait until the AP turns me on to the LLZ in case I overshoot the centreline. Captain shakes his head in wonderment. Now on final, F/O switches off the AP but leaves the FD on. Captain says when are you going to switch off the FD and fly raw data like in your CIR renewal?

F/O says she will leave the FD on just in case she has to do a GA. Captain says you don't need a FD for GA. Captain later asks where did you do your type rating, as he was concerned that the F/O had been brain-washed into automatics instead of balanced view of the need to hand fly.

That story is true. It suggests that sort of experience is common in Australian domestic operators ie reluctance to disengage AP even in appropriate conditions.

[maggot]

no excuses in a shorthaul jet. And doesn't the 737 have FD 'pop-up' when TOGA is pushed? (its been a while)

[Jimothy]

One day you may be on the receiving end of "Murphy's Law" and be served up a turd sandwich...You may then have no choice but to Hand fly with "No Automatics" and plenty of other distractions to be managed...There are plenty of incidents even quite recently where this has happened. At the end of the day, this is what we are paid for.

I do acknowledge that there is a push by the airlines industry wide to encourage the maximum use of automation. However, Flying an aircraft is our bread and butter, and it behoves us all to maintain these "skills", whether that be in the aircraft or if SOP's do not allow in the Simulator. I do believe the Airlines Training departments should be dedicating more time in the Simulator to maintain and hone basic flying skills.

[Lookleft]

And doesn't the 737 have FD 'pop-up' when TOGA is pushed? (its been a while)

Been a while for me but I do remember having to switch the F/D off on final when the A/P was disconnected. Pressing the TOGA button brought them back up.(Airbus you push for TOGA, Boeing you press:ok:)

[C441]

I do acknowledge that there is a push by the airlines industry wide to encourage the maximum use of automation..........
I do believe the Airlines Training departments should be dedicating more time in the Simulator to maintain and hone basic flying skills.
Not sure about other carriers, but the training department of my mob have recently made it plain that future training will involve a lot more manual flying as a result of trends being identified in incidents worldwide over the last few years.
That, combined with a greater emphasise on training scenarios in the simulator should go some way toward improving our manual manipulation skills -especially for those of us who do very few sectors (not by choice I'll add).

[maggot]

Been a while for me but I do remember having to switch the F/D off on final when the A/P was disconnected. Pressing the TOGA button brought them back up.(Airbus you push for TOGA, Boeing you press)

Looked into it and it seems my memory was right, it does have TOGA FD pop up so the story related by Sheppey is even more ridiculous with the Captain obviously not know a basic AF function of his aircraft in accepting the p!ss weak excuse from the F/O. :ugh:

Although we all have our learning curves, we weren't all born Aces of the Base. I distinctly remember my training on the 737, half way through the sectors, upon receiving track-shortening again, I went to disconnect and turn onto base, keen to show my trainer how well I'd learnt to fly the a/c. He told me to not do so and use the automatics "you need to be able to do everything with both".

Time and a place.

[A37575]

it does have TOGA FD pop up so the story related by Sheppey is even more ridiculous with the Captain obviously not know a basic AF function of his aircraft in accepting the p!ss weak excuse from the F/O.

Have lost count the number of times seen in the simulator (737) where the approach is manual flying on final with AT switch off as per Boeing advice and for whatever reason the pilot decides to go-around.

He presses the GA switch expecting the thrust levers to automatically go to GA thrust position. Having already simultaneously called for flap 15 as part of the GA procedure, he is surprised to see no throttle movement even though the FD may pop-up. Frantically presses TOGA again as speed drops off rapidly until he realises something is seriously amiss. Then the penny drops and he shoves open the throttles usually over-boosting in the process.

In my book, for a GA with manual throttles, it is prudent to first push open the throttles to approx. GA position while pitching to 15 degrees and calling for Flap 15. That is the priority. Then if you need FD guidance for GA (not important at that stage of the flight) then press TOGA. Blind reliance on pressing TOGA expecting the AT to give you GA power, is like crossing a road without checking all clear left and right. Not a wise move.

[maggot]

^^^ on that note, I like the airbus TOGA mode activation; slam em forward. does the thrust and AF mode.
not a big fan on the airbus AT system overall but that is nice

[Lookleft]

Having already simultaneously called for flap 15 as part of the GA procedure, he is surprised to see no throttle movement even though the FD may pop-up. Frantically presses TOGA again as speed drops off rapidly until he realises something is seriously amiss. Then the penny drops and he shoves open the throttles usually over-boosting in the process.

I think you have just described what happened with the Asiana 777!

[haughtney1]

I think you have just described what happened with the Asiana 777!

Errr no, on the 777 if you hit the TOGA switches (in the same place as the 737NG) with the auto throttle arm switches in the arm position (normal) you will get GA thrust.....of course an aviator will have one hand on the thrust levers and one the yoke..just in case:ok:
The FD will pop up and give you GA guidance, but will disappear again when you select another mode....which is why...regardless of SOP's I always ensure I have my FD back on by 300 AGL on a visual approach...as it's going to help me not f@@k up the ensuing low level GA that will invariably be required when I least expect it whilst hand flying.

[HPSOV L]

I've noticed in this discussion pilots tend to be ego centric and not think outside their own sphere. There is no single answer because there are so many different types of operation. As others have pointed out; aircraft types have different levels of automation, air force is different to airline, short haul is different to long haul, expat is different to legacy, Europe is different to Australia etc etc etc. The matrix is large.
At this stage of my career I've done them all and in my current operation the airlines policy of maximum use of automation suits me just fine.
New gen airliners are actually easy to fly manually, and I will postulate that when you really drill down into the causes of most recent accidents, the ability to accurately fly an IFR approach or departure was irrelevant.
I don't expect pilotless airliners for a couple of generations but the automatics are going to get progressively better. Sooner or later the insurance actuaries will have a case that the accident rate is lower if you eliminate manual flight altogrther. There will be a slight risk but it will be judged to be outweighed by the advantages.
We're not there yet but it's close...

[Keg]

Sooner or later the insurance actuaries will have a case that the accident rate is lower if you eliminate manual flight altogrther. There will be a slight risk but it will be judged to be outweighed by the advantages.

I wonder who will tell the passenger's families that the deaths of their loved ones were as a result of the 'safest option' being not to allow the pilots to actually practise their skills and that regretfully, the automatics just weren't up to it on the day. I mean things like the QF32 engine failure NEVER happen do they. Oh, wait.... :ugh:

[Capn Bloggs]

I will postulate that when you really drill down into the causes of most recent accidents, the ability to accurately fly an IFR approach or departure was irrelevant.
Let's not mention Asiana or AF447 (or the Turks)...

[sleeve of wizard]

The Asiana accident was more to do with a lack of understanding about the auto throttle system and mode awareness, also a lack of applying the correct technique to capture the 3 degree profile from above. Using FLCH is not the Boeing FCTM recommended technique. :=

[ANCPER]

WTF did pilots do before the AT and FDs were so good? For the life of me I cannot understand all this "it's too dangerous to fly with the AP and AT off in IMC, especially anyone on an Airbus. Now, I agree not always, but ****! To me this is nothing but an indication to how low hand flying and instrument scans skills have degraded.

Yes, I know, I'll be graded as a hairy chested chest thumper, but it wasn't that long ago when I started it was expected you could handle that.

[Capn Bloggs]

The Asiana accident was more to do with a lack of understanding about the auto throttle system and mode awareness
No it wasn't sleeve, they had no flying ability; they didn't have the speed in their scan because they probalby never did any handflying. Pure and simple. If you can't hand-fly, you can't truly monitor the performance of the automatics if you stuff up the settings you put in to the AFS.

[V1rhot8]

Comes full circle to the idea that when the aircraft is not doing what the pilot wants, lower the level of automation. I guess that does assume correct interpretation of the instruments. The Asiana accident is shocking, once the speed deteriorated below the command airspeed bug with no reversal, that was the clue to do something. Even had they thought the AT was engaged, they could have at least used the muscle memory to click the AT disengage, then advance the thrust levers. What is more disturbing is that this happened after Turkish Airlines 1951 where they got to 83 kts. I know that this was originally about how does one find an opportunity to hand fly, but it would appear the problem is not so much the ability to hand fly, but rather the interpretation of what the instruments are telling the pilot. The AF447 pilot did not understand that had he maintained pitch, wings level and a set thrust, the airspeed, heading and altitude would have been about what he wanted (again basic instrument skills lacking). The long and the short of it all, you cannot properly hand fly an aeroplane without understanding the instruments.

[LeadSled]

No it wasn't sleeve, they had no flying ability; they didn't have the speed in their scan because they probalby never did any handflying. Pure and simple. If you can't hand-fly, you can't truly monitor the performance of the automatics if you stuff up the settings you put in to the AFS.

Bleeding hell, what's the world coming to, when I agree with something posted by Bloggs??
Tootle pip!!

[Capn Bloggs]

Bleeding hell, what's the world coming to, when I agree with something posted by Bloggs??

Don't worry Leddie, I'm sure it won't last long! :D :} :)

[maggot]

WTF did pilots do before the AT and FDs were so good?

well... they crashed. So they made better AF.

and here we are... :hmm::ugh:

[Capn Rex Havoc]

An interesting article in Flight International recently, commented on airbus making changes to the FD logic to cater for slow speed flight with Auto thrust off. Airbus does not recommend flying in mixed modes e.g. Auto thrust off and FDs on. The article said, in wake of numerous Alpha floor protections activating resulting from crews not monitoring speed and with the A/T off, they are thinking of changing the logic of the FDs to remove them as speed decays below a certain point, because at present they indicate higher pitch to maintain Altitude, and certain crews are merely following the FD's blindly.

[Wally Mk2]

'Rexy' that's interesting that Airbus are considering such a move when there is already a warning in place when the speed gets too low by way of 'Speed Speed' being screamed out, that ought to be enuf to wake up the driver/s.

Automation has it's place I mean we now live in a very automated world in pretty much everything we do, some in place as we are the laziest species on the planet these days & the other in place under the umbrella of 'safety'.
We started out with SE Bi-Planes as the main flying machines (yes I now there where multi's as well), we then progressed to Mono-planes with multiple power-plants all for safety. Modern materials, Multi crew, redundancy systems, heating, cooling, pressurization, navigation all for safety/comfort & the last area where safety is now paramount & going full steam ahead is auto-flight systems & this is where we are today.
I think understanding the Auto Flt system is more important these days due the complexity of it all.
Personally I don't enjoy manual flight anymore oh I used to but it's just a job to me now although it's not rocket science I see little point in making it harder for ones self than it need be. The cyclic Sim stuff shows area's of weakness, in flt is not the place. As has been mentioned most Co's would rather you use the highest level of automation commensurate with the stage of flight.



Wmk2

[Capn Rex Havoc]

Wally -As you know SPEED SPEED SPEED only triggers at 2000ft or below plus u need to be configured.

There have been a number of incidents e.g. an a320 (Air france) recently was above profile and the PF moved the thrust levers to idle, disconnecting the A/T (He stated it was to help him get down - Useless since in open descent the thrust is already at idle), then when he levelled off (clean) the speed decayed and then he raised the attitude IAW with the FD's until ALPHA Floor activated and sent them to TOGA.

[Wally Mk2]

Yes am aware that it's a low Alt event but that's where it's most important anyway & what I was making ref to, when within a couple of thou to the end of yr life if steps are not taken to arrest the decaying energy of the machine.
The event as you mention above (A320 AF) purelty boils down to lack of understanding with regards to the A/T system.

Wmk2

[Capn Bloggs]

well... they crashed. So they made better AF.
Bit simplistic there, Maggot.

Disregarding things like GPWS, VNAV, Profiles for approaches, good approach charts, how many early-day prangs were caused purely by pilots stuffing up, for example, speed control or during Go Arounds or Takeoffs?

There are plenty or recent-day examples where pilots have pranged the aeroplane because they can't hand-fly; it is currently the biggest killer of people in aeroplanes.

There are plenty of things that have improved aviation safety over the years; I contend using the autopilot all the time isn't one of them. It's use is now obviously causing accidents because when those auto-dependent pilots are forced, for whatever reason, to handfly, they can't do it.

You can run, but you can't hide...

[maggot]

yes, very simplistic and probably over dramatic too. I think I replied from a phone, too hard to make too much sense :bored:

but my point is that AF was developed to help pilots and we have (a while ago?) reached a point where it hinders.

Obviously lots of things have improved since chucking some kid in a spitfire with nada time, but thats not the topic.

[Ollie Onion]

I would argue that the reason that pilots of the Asiana / Airfrance / Lion Air breed have crap hand flying skils is because they never had any to start with. Pilots with a few thousand hours of which 99.9% of them are on airliners using the autopilot means that they have no base to work from. I would also say that in the airliner with paying passengers is not the place to 'learn' these skills, maybe we need to rethink the training path taken by some of these pilots today.

Have you guys looked in these modern DA42 type trainers, the glass cockpit is more advanced that any airliner I have flown. Couple that with the very rigid airline SOP type training and then hundreds of hours in the a320 or 737 simulator to qualify and we are 'producing' generations of 'competent' airline pilots with next to no hand flying skills.

One of my check captains said to me recently that he doesn't feel the need to 'practice' lots of hand flying as he thinks it is a skill that once learned only required minimal practice to keep proficient. I have to say that I kind of agree. I went flying the other day in a C172 for the first time in 15 years, my first circuit was a bit rough and by the time I had done 3 they were pretty good, so 30 - 40 minutes of hands on time was all that was required after 15 years of not having flown an aircraft with a yoke or trim wheel.

[LeadSled]

One of my check captains said to me recently that he doesn't feel the need to 'practice' lots of hand flying as he thinks it is a skill that once learned only required minimal practice to keep proficient

Folks,
Gawd help us if that is not a windup. I can always pick who has kept their scan up by regularly hand flying, versus the A/P watchers, it really shows at license renewal time.

From a number of accidents, it is clear to me that a good old fashioned proper scan is becoming a thing of the past --- with a percentage of the current generation.

It staggers me that anybody can let a airspeed on approach get 20-30 knots below bug without noticing ---- less than 5 knots below bug should be the cue for instant action.

As to being a "bit rough" but sorted after 3 circuits, I hope you get a few practice runs before your next engine failure on takeoff ---- a rare but real event that can't be handled by A/P.

Tootle pip!!

[LeadSled]

I don't recall working with anyone (16 years of multi-crew ops) that has less ability yet he's so quick to remind me that he's got "1500 hours on type". Offer any advice and he runs to management complaining about the 'bastard captain' which I most definitely am not.

With all due respect, that is just an incompetent who probably shouldn't be on the flight deck --- not an argument for flying on A/P.
If the passengers can tell the difference between the A/P and hand flying, that is a measure of how somebody's hand flying skills have deteriorated or were not good enough in the first place.

Tootle pip!!

[Humbly Reserved]

Got this from the guy himself. I was introduced to him in SIN a few days ago. He is a Boeing instructor now on their 787 sim in SIN.

Cheers

HR

"After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the 400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, its a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don't think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all got it and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce normal standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt compute that you needed to be a 1000 AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldnt pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued to fly while talking about how unfair Captain "Brown" was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested Radar Vectors to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then Cleared for the approach and he could have selected Exit Hold and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to Extend the FAF and he couldnt understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was Hold at XYZ. Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just cant change 3000 years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. Its actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they dont trust the people to not start WWIII by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they dont get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I'll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250 after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800 after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real flight time or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, its the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck."

(signed)

[sleeve of wizard]

would appear that it's not limited to Asian carriers,
Incident: Jetstar A320 enroute on Mar 12th 2014, alpha floor activation (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=47196b94&opt=0)

[Tee Emm]

Captain with well known Middle Eastern carrier operating wide-bodies turned off his flight director to keep his hand on raw data VMC climb after passing 10,000 ft.


Having done 10 minutes of this he re-engaged the FD and went on as usual. Some time later was hauled in for tea and no bikkies by senior management and told that the recording system recorded the fact he had his FD off for 10 minutes and an explanation demanded. He replied it was a nice day and perfectly safe. He was warned not to switch off the FD at anytime in flight otherwise disciplinary action would be taken against him.


How absolutely pitiful is the scared reaction by management. Automatic monkeys now rule the air - no doubt about it.

[Lookleft]

would appear that it's not limited to Asian carriers,

I doubt this incident would happen in an Asian carrier as it involved disconnecting the A/P and the A/T and operating the speedbrake at high altitude! This seems to be a situation when you shouldn't be practicing your manual flying skills. There is a memory item to cover this situation, the crew should just have followed that.

[oicur12.again]

JQ A320

"..noticed the airspeed was increasing"

"The crew reduced thrust to idle, extended the speedbrakes and disengaged the autopilot"

Why would the crew respond in this fashion? Who trained them to do that?

[hoss]

.....who said they were even trained for this situation?
Perhaps it may have been discussed about 5 years ago during endorsement/line training and never thought about after.

One thing that stands out to me these days is the "training down " element rather than "training up", a legacy of inexperience in all areas if you'll excuse the expression.

Jetstar are not alone.

[AnQrKa]

Who said you should be trained for such an event?

Leave the A/P engaged. Just ask a KA pilot what can happen if you don't.

[bazza stub]

Trained? Just read your FCOM, I can't think if a single case where a potential overspeed should be dealt with by disconnecting the A/P. My aircraft FCOM specifically states not to.

[Con Catenator]

"The crew reduced thrust to idle, extended the speedbrakes and disengaged the autopilot"

Why would the crew respond in this fashion? Who trained them to do that?

Try the Airbus A320 QRH overspeed checklist

[Lookleft]

Try the Airbus A320 QRH overspeed checklist

Might suggest you do the same, this is what it states;

OVERSPEED RECOVERY

Applicable to: ALL
As soon as the speed exceeds VMO/MMO, apply the following actions:
AP : KEEP ON
SPEED BRAKES LEVER....................................................... ............................. FULL
THRUST REDUCTION................................................... ............ MONITOR

[oicur12.again]

Lookleft, thankyou.

[Dale Hardale]

Lookleft,

Instead of being such a smarta*se with your comment :=, I wonder if the previous post might have been a reference to the speed brakes bit.

Rarely is anything black and white.

[Lookleft]

I wonder if the previous post might have been a reference to the speed brakes bit.

Or it might have been a reference to the autothrust and autopilot bit! The question he was quoting was:

Why would the crew respond in this fashion? Who trained them to do that?

He seemed to be suggesting that the crew were trained IAW the Overspeed checklist which, as I posted, is the complete opposite.

The original poster replied to me in this fashion Lookleft, thankyou. whereas you have gone with Instead of being such a smarta*se with your comment

Bouquets and brickbats I suppose but I still stand by what I wrote based on what was written by CC! If CC wants to clarify what he wrote fine, I'm not sure that your intrepretation of my intepretation of what CC interpreted of oicur12.again's post has actually added anything to the conversation.:ugh:

[Samba Anaconda]

Captain with well known Middle Eastern carrier operating wide-bodies turned off his flight director to keep his hand on raw data VMC climb after passing 10,000 ft.


Having done 10 minutes of this he re-engaged the FD and went on as usual. Some time later was hauled in for tea and no bikkies by senior management and told that the recording system recorded the fact he had his FD off for 10 minutes and an explanation demanded. He replied it was a nice day and perfectly safe. He was warned not to switch off the FD at anytime in flight otherwise disciplinary action would be taken against him.


How absolutely pitiful is the scared reaction by management. Automatic monkeys now rule the air - no doubt about it.

Good on him to only have to endure tea and biscuits with a warning...in Korean Air, he will be filling out applications and sending out resumes!

[Des Dimona]

The QRH overspeed checklist should really include a statement about the effect of selecting max speed brake at high level near the REC MAX altitude.

[Centaurus]

TV Channel 7Two in Melbourne Tuesday 25 March 9.30pm.

This crash was the archetypal lack manual flying skills versus automation dependency - a subject frequently discussed over recent years in Pprune. The 737 departs on an uncomplicated SID at night over water. The captain gets disorientated, the co-pilot is no help at all, the aircraft eventually stalls and spirals into the sea off the cost of Lebanon with the crew not having a clue how to recover. If ever this was proof that manual raw data flying skills are vital for airline pilots, then see this particular Air Crash Investigation.

Having said that, although I have read the original accident report, there is no guarantee the accident depicted in this TV series, is a faithful reproduction of what really happened in the cockpit. Expect the usual screaming passengers of course.

[Centaurus]

The 737 FCTM has this to say if the overspeed occurs in high altitude cruise flight:

'When correcting an overspeed during cruise at high altitude, avoid reducing thrust to idle which results in slow engine acceleration back to cruise thrust and may result in over-controlling the airspeed or loss of altitude. If autothrottle corrections are not satisfactory, deploy partial speed brakes slowly until a noticeable reduction of airspeed is achieved. When the airspeed is below VMO/MMO, retract the speed brakes at the same rate as they were deployed. The thrust levers can be expected to advance slowly to achieve cruise airspeed; if not they should be pushed up more rapidly"

[Derfred]

... which is interesting because the "overspeed" checklist doesn't mention speedbrakes, only thrust and attitude.

[oicur12.again]

Bottom line, a brief overspeed is not the end of the world. The wings dont pop off 3 knots into the red on a modern jet.

[LeadSled]

Folks,
If you need to consult the QRH to handle an overspeed, might I suggest you should not be on the flight deck.
At the risk of stating the bleeding obvious, going a bit fast has nothing like the hazard of going "too slow".
Upsets happen at low speed, not high speed. We have come a long way since B707 days, "mach tuck" is no longer a big issue.
Tootle pip!!

[Centaurus]

"mach tuck" is no longer a big issue.

Puzzled on that remark. Is that because of the protection against natural mach tuck, and which are now built in to the design features on todays jet transports?

[Lookleft]

If you need to consult the QRH to handle an overspeed, might I suggest you should not be on the flight deck.

Its not a question of your suitability for flight deck duties but in this day and age you won't be considered suitable to be on the flight deck if you don't consult the QRH (if its not a memory item)! A bit like the tailpipe fire-do you do it from memory or read the procedure form the QRH? All good unless you stuff it up then the first question asked will be "Did you follow the procedure as laid out in the QRH?" I am not disagreeing with you Leadie but if you start following any procedures other than whats been laid out then the limb you are out on will not be supported by the rest of the tree.

[Mstr Caution]

I've never failed a check flight or simulator session for the following.

FMC scratchpad message: "MORE DRAG REQUIRED"

Common sense tells me to fly the aircraft where I want it to be flown & correct the flight path, speed or configuration. Maybe even ask for a speed waiver.

If I do that, the message will disappear.

However my QRH CHECKLIST INTRODUCTION chapter or company procedure indicates I should be calling for the "FMC MESSAGE NON NORMAL CHECKLIST".

Same logic applies to a overspeed, fly the aircraft first.

MC

[LeadSled]

Folks,
Firstly, let me say that I have only flown Boeing large aircraft, not Airbus, and only worked for airlines that expected the pilot in command to be the pilot in command, and a pilot.
However, I doubt that Airbus says much different to Boeing. ie: Read the fine print for the "let out" statements empowering the PIC.
Every manual/QRH of every Boeing that I have ever used is very clear, the pilot in command is not limited, in carrying out action that he or she deems appropriate, by any statement that this is limited to those items that have recall items, and is limited to those recall items only, or, for that matter, limited to only procedures in the QRH.
I repeat, if a pilot cannot arrest an overspeed (or underspeed), having determined the reason, without reference to a QRH. should not be on the flight deck and certainly not be the PIC.
Any management that produces purported policies that seek to limit the authority of the pilot in command, particularly if they are contrary to the AFM, and as described by some of you, is not fit to be in an executive management position in an airline.
Some years ago, twice, Qantas had A330 suffer sever altitude excursions (with cabin crew/passenger injuries), the proper immediate actions were to disconnect the AP and regain control of the aircraft.
There was criticism, at the time, of the PIC's actions, the usual armchair pundits and Monday morning were critical of the crews not "using the QRH".
Is anybody here seriously suggesting that the crews, in such circumstance, should leave the AP/AT engaged while the aeroplane is horsing around all over the sky, while they dig out the QRH, to see what it says???
Needless to say, in each case, the pilots were confident in their abilities to hand fly the aeroplane anywhere in its flight envelope ---- that only comes from practice hand flying at all altitudes.
In another example, speaking of personal experience, a pilot mishandles reverse in gusty crosswinds, resulting in a stall and rapidly rising EGT ---- what are you going to do?? Let the engine cook. while you slow down enough to even think of digging out the QRH, which does not have a recall item, but does have a procedure that leads to shutting the engine down?? Or just shut the engine down ?? Having done the latter, I limited the EGT overtemp. to nothing more than an inspection on next base maintenance visit. To have "followed the procedure" would have resulted in an engine change.
Also speaking of personal experience of engine failures, I have always opted to disconnect the AP/AT early in an asymmetric approach, to make certain all the trims are where I want them and I am physically "plugged in", in both cases an engine out AP Autoland was not an option (one was the IGS at Kai Tak ). Not a good time to find out your personal flying skills are not up to date.
Things like this might only happen once (or never) in a career, but if they do, it is a very poor show if the PIC is found wanting for skills adequate for the situation.
Tootle pip!!

[thorn bird]

Agree with you whole heartedly Leadie, but
Spare a thought for GA operators, who lack the legal department or funds, who are obliged to set in cement in their ops manuals that the PIC has no perogative to do anything but blindly follow the QRH.
To disagree with the FOI's opinion results in the "Not fit and proper person" threat being marched out, or your manual not approved so your CEO is left with a few Million bucks worth of machinery he cant use.
How much of this is being pushed by our "Safety" regulator??

[oicur12.again]

Airbus FCOM is "for guidance only".

It is not written in stone.

[Prince Niccolo M]

Our friends at CASA have made an art form of insisting that the guidance is indeed cast in stone! :ugh: :ugh: :ugh:


Otherwise, they would have to search for some intellect and some understanding of what "not unreasonable" actually means... best of luck on that! :{ :{ :{

[HPSOV L]

Are we missing the point?
Surely that is to follow the correct procedures, whether from memory or by reference.
The only exception being in rare circumstances where published procedures do not cover the situation.

[Lookleft]

My understanding is that the Boeing preamble of this:

Every manual/QRH of every Boeing that I have ever used is very clear, the pilot in command is not limited, in carrying out action that he or she deems appropriate,

is in relation to this:

The only exception being in rare circumstances where published procedures do not cover the situation.

Such as the 777 pilot facing a simultaneous overspeed/underspeed which Boeing said could never happen.

Leadie your A330 scenarios pre-date the QRH procedure now specified for an overspeed. One of the A330 altitude excursions was to do with flight control software problems and not a simple overspeed. So like your EGT overtemp experience a unique circumstance and one where PIC experience and judgement is required, I am not disagreeing with you on that point. All manufacturers and operators expect you to follow the published procedures in the first instance. Airbus state that with an overspeed your first action is extend the speedbrakes to full. If you're going to start disconnecting the A/P and A/T and cock it up then you really have no where to go in defending your actions. Merely stating that "I was the PIC and felt that I could handle the situation in a manner different to that specified by the manufacturer." leaves the CP shaking his head muttering "Another test pilot wannabe."

[Derfred]

Leadsled, relax.

The overspeed checklist I refer to in the Boeing 737NG QRH is a memory checklist. It specifically says to correct an overspeed by adjusting thrust, and if necessary attitude. It does not say to use speedbrake.

If I subsequently use speedbrake to arrest an overspeed when I could have just used thrust/attitude, and the resulting turbulent airflow causes damage the the elevator trim tab, I may have to explain why I acted contrary to the FCOM. (The early Boeing 737NG had issues with high speed speedbrake use on the elevator trim tab which needed an AD to address.)

The "out" which is referred to in a post above is available if the PIC believes that following the FCOM will result in a reduced safety outcome, or if the PIC believes that an alternative course of action will result in an increased safety outcome.

Sound knowledge of the FCOM and the experience of when to follow it or not is what determines who should be on the flight deck. It's not just WWII stick and rudder skills anymore. But yes, you do need to know how and when it is appropriate to hand fly the aircraft, and practice same when conditions are appropriate.

[thorn bird]

Leadie,
I recall a B767 in Thailand I believe had a thrust reverser deploy on climb.
The impossible happened, the engine maintained climb thrust, by the time the crew woke up to exactly what had happened the aircraft was on its back heading down.
We tried to reproduce the event in a simulator, had to dodgy up the software to get it to do it, but in all instances where the crew took immediate manual control the situation was recoverable, those that remained on auto pilot crashed.
I do believe with the best will in the world you can't write procedures to cover every event that may happen. At the end of the day it must come down to a judgement call by the PIC. If thats to be taken away, then automate the whole thing and do away with pilots altogether.

[Capn Rex Havoc]

Leadsled,

The post further back was to do with the mishandling of an overspeed by the crew on an A320.

As posted - the QRH actions for an AIRBUS for overspeed CLEARLY state

AP:KEEP ON
SPEED BRAKES LEVER .... FULL
THRUST REDUCTION .... MONITOR

Whilst not officially a memory item - it essentially is- because you don't have time to consult the qrh when encountering an overspeed.

The Jetstar crew handled this extremely poorly, of which I can only assume it is due to a lack of training in the sim of overspeed events.

There is no place for handling a big jet at 41000 ft manually. Humans just can't do it as well as an autopilot to handle the reduced longitudinal stability at high altitude.

[Oakape]

The overspeed checklist I refer to in the Boeing 737NG QRH is a memory checklist. It specifically says to correct an overspeed by adjusting thrust, and if necessary attitude. It does not say to use speedbrake.

Just a point of order. My QRH for the B737NG does not have 'overspeed' as a memory item. In fact it now has no actions at all! Also, there is a current bulletin titled 'Reduced Engine Response Times' that recommends the use of speedbrake when experiencing a sudden increase in airspeed, in order to avoid large thrust reductions.

The industry is quite dynamic & constantly changing, so it is often wise not to be too dogmatic about some issues.

I also agree with LeadSled. A pilot who knows how to actually fly, rather than just manage, would know what to do in order to slow the aircraft down safely & should not have to refer to the printed word.

[LeadSled]

I recall a B767 in Thailand I believe had a thrust reverser deploy on climb.

ThornBird,
As a matter of interest, a good mate of mine was the Captain of that Lauda flight into Bangkok, a problem with the thrust reverser was evident on that previous flight, and logged. It manifested itself as non-normal rudder trim inputs on climb. As a captain on functionally identical B767 at the time, my interest was more than casual. I agree entirely that the situation was recoverable by disconnecting the AP/AT, and hand flying, we tried just about every possible combination in the sim.

is in relation to this:

Lookleft,
Not so, it was a general statement, not quite Mr. Boeing's exact words.

Such as the 777 pilot facing a simultaneous overspeed/underspeed which Boeing said could never happen.

I would take a small bet that there is no statement in a B777 manual that could be reasonably interpreted as meaning the above.

Indeed, although not quite in these words: "If it can happen, it will", there is a statement in the Boeing aircraft I have flown, that tells the crew that Boeing do not claim to cover all possible eventualities, in (hopefully) rare cases, a properly trained and experienced crew will have to make it up as they go along.

Re. the two A330 incidents (accidents??) I mentioned, I am well aware of the details, and the eventual cause determined, the (Northrop??) ADCs were fitted to a variety of aircraft.

I find the difference between the Boeing and Airbus checklists interesting re. use of speedbrake. It always seems to me that Airbus logic in this area is a little strange. A bit like putting a foot on the brake, without taking your foot off the accelerator on a car.

Boeing has long cautioned the use of speedbrake, going back to the B707, the turbulent wake caused cumulative damage to the horizontal stab. Later model Boeing aircraft I have flown suppress inboard spoilers to limit turbulent air over the horizontal stabs.

I recall some of the logic in the A-310, where such as a flap overspeed with AP/AT engaged was "controlled" with an auto-trim pitch up, instead of a power reduction. This was in part the reason for the loss of an A-310 at Nagoya, and a spectacular loss of control over Paris, only a very smart pilot, handflying, recovered control. REcovery on AP was not possible.

Both accident reports are well worth reading, particularly those of you who doubt the value of keeping your hand flying skills 100% up to scratch.

Remember, it is modern "glass" aircraft that gave rise to significant additions to flightdeck vocabulary, being: "I haven't seen that one before" and " What's the bastard doing to us now". And: "Now I can't fly for sh1t, but I can type 100wpm". Make certain you can still fly.

As Asiana didn't realise, mode confusion can be a really seriously dangerous problem, hardly a new discovery. The guaranteed solution, in flight is: "Eliminate the suspect mode(s)" --- which will often mean hand flying.

Tootle pip!!

[oicur12.again]

Useful debate, good reading. Learning lots.

I find it interesting that in the past 12 months we have seen several events unfold as the result of inappropriate use of automation.

The obvious one being Asiana.

But the 744 and the 737 that landed at the wrong airports in the US could also be considered the result of inappropriate use of automation, albeit under reliance versus over reliance. Both events could well have had fatal outcomes and both were probably the result of completely ignoring the assistance that onboard systems were providing. Indeed the 744 was conducting a GPS approach at the time and the crew must have completely botched some crossing heights to arrive at the pavement several miles short of where the ND was telling them where to go.

Just goes to show that although Southwest pilots hand fly more than most others (encouraged to and MANY sectors flown) it still doesn’t mean we get a good result every time.

[Lookleft]

I would take a small bet that there is no statement in a B777 manual that could be reasonably interpreted as meaning the above.

Absolutely correct no Boeing manual does but it is certainly suggested in this article in Aero 8 from 1999.

The unreliable airspeed procedures supplied in the nonnormal section of the QRH have been expanded significantly for the 747-400, 757, and 767 and will eventually be expanded for other current-production models. The procedures contain a reference to indications, which can be individual discrete indications or engine indication and crew alerting system (EICAS) messages that basically point out the evidence of unreliable airspeed/Mach. Other examples of this evidence are provided in the QRH, such as

Speed or altitude information not consistent with pitch attitude and thrust setting.
Airspeed/Mach failure flags.
Blank or fluctuating airspeed displays.
Variation between captain and first officer airspeed displays.
Amber line through one or more PFD or ADI flight mode annunciations.
Overspeed indications.
Simultaneous overspeed and stall warnings.

The 777 system is a complex design that addresses these malfunctions. With only one bad source or failure, the system automatically switches away from that source, and the crew will not notice any difference.

My bolding. But we are in furious agreement on the need for pilots to practice their manual flying skills and for PICs to exercise their responsibility when the need arises.

[Capn Bloggs]

The 777 system is a complex design that addresses these malfunctions.
Obviously not complex enough... :cool:

[AileronsNeutral]

Just to clear something up with the Lauda Air accident, this is one of the findings from the accident report
Simulations of a 25 percent lift loss resulting from an in-flight deployment of the left engine thrust reverser indicated that recovery from the event was uncontrollable for an unexpecting flight crew.
Boeing had never modelled a thrust reverser deployment at high speed and it was only after extrapolating from low speed testing that any model was input into the simulators. Only by using extreme control inputs within a 4-6 second window could the situation be recovered by Boeing test pilots.

I seem to remember that Nikki Lauda had to put a lot of pressure on Boeing to admit that it was a design fault in the reverser system and not pilot error.

[LeadSled]

Only by using extreme control inputs within a 4-6 second window could the situation be recovered.But that is what you have to do in extreme situations, use the limits of the control available. 4 to 6 seconds is a lifetime in a critical situation.
All procedures for deployment of reverse in flight have the same starting point, thrust to idle, then shut down the offending engine, having confirmed it is the correct engine to shut down
Where asymmetric thrust is an immediate problem, get rid of the asymmetry.
I am not, for one moment, suggesting pilot error was the cause of the accident, but it was recoverable, and there was at least some advanced warning of a reverser problem.
At least some B767 simulators, at the time, had a model for reverse thrust in flight, but I have no idea of the parameters.
Tootle pip!!

[Centaurus]

There is no place for handling a big jet at 41000 ft manually. Humans just can't do it as well as an autopilot to handle the reduced longitudinal stability at high altitude.


I am sure you are right. On the other hand it makes you wonder how RAF and RAAF pilots coped with flying Canberra bombers regularly at 45,000 feet and even up to 50,000 ft in IMC with no autopilot, no first officer and no weather radar and a tendency for both engines to flame-out unexpectedly at these altitudes due to compressor stalls.

Considering some of these youngsters pilots had less than 1000 hours total time, it says a lot for their basic instrument flying skills and of course manual flying skills. Could it be that your point "there is no place for handling a big jet at 41,000 ft manually" is not that it is potentially dangerous as you imply, but simply because pilots of big jets spend 98% of their time on automatics leaving little else to do but monitor the progress page.

With many operators today actively discouraging any form of hand flying both in the real thing and in simulator training, is it any wonder that hand flying a big jet at high altitude is actually beyond the capabilities of the average airline captain and certainly beyond the capabilities of the average new hire MPL.:ok:

[Wally Mk2]

'Centy' am sure that was the case re Canberra Bombers being hand flown at night IMC SP but would they be doing so with the tolerances of what would be expected of today's drivers in say the ML-SY corridor @ 39K?
Also perhaps the design of the old girl thick wing lots of lift not as pitch sensitive for Eg as against today's rather delicately balanced swept wing machine was quite a bit different. I know having hand flown a LR35 at 39K was bloody hard work keeping it within +/-500ft even for short periods of time, besides as we know any Airliner experiencing equip failure in the order of no auto-flt systems means yr going down regardless to lower Alts out of RVSM airspace & a better environment for hand flying.
Personally I see no joy or real need to sustain accurate hand flying skills of a transport Cat jet at Alt,they where not designed to be reg flown like that nor are the drivers of today.
Hand flying a circuit in reasonable wx conditions is the only place to be getting any 'stick time' outside of a Sim.

Wmk2

[maggot]

Oh centaurus, we are not worthy!
:rolleyes:


I dont like the look of those teenagers

[Angle of Attack]

With any airliner maintaining FL380 in level flight even blind freddy could see there could be only one possibility with thrust at idle and full speedbrake deployed, and it ain't an over speed.

[The Bullwinkle]

I enjoy hand flying the 737 at appropriate times, and I also encourage my F.O.'s to hand fly when appropriate.

And funnily enough, Centaurus was the one who gave me my 737 endorsement.

Coincidence?

[Lord Spandex Masher]

I regularly hand fly the 737 at high altitude on check flights. Even in manual reversion it's pretty easy to maintain +/- 50', +/- 1knot and zero heading change (which is what is required for the check) . So;

- There is a case for high altitude handling of big jets,
- It ain't dangerous,
- Even with degraded flying controls it's achievable with accuracy,

[Capn Rex Havoc]

Lord Spandex- The 737 is not a big jet.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

If you don't want it to be a big jet then that's fine but I'd recommend some Androgel for you.

Me, I'm not bothered now big it is.

[LeadSled]

Capt. Rex Havoc,
There is no appreciable difference between the high level handling of a B737 and a B747 Classic or -400. If anything, the various B737 models are marginally less stable.
The high level handling of the B747 was a big improvement over the B707, the -400 a big improvement over the Classic. The B707-120, and the even shorter QF -138, with Yaw Damper off, really took concentration, but the B707-300/320 with the Yaw Damper off were not so keen to dutch roll. With Yaw damper on, just concentrate ever so slightly less.
The B757/767 at high levels are interesting, because of the relatively low wing loadings, you have to work at it.
I have, over the years, regularly practiced hand flying at high levels, up to FL410, and any pilot who is not competent to hand fly an aeroplane throughout its flight envelope is not, in my opinion, fit to be on the flight deck.
Hand flying at high level, just straight and level does wonders for your scan, makes sims a pushover.
Today, we have the luxury of multiple autopilots, but it was not always so, how do you think we got on if the A/P was U/S ----- hand-fly all the way. Three of us did it SIN-JKT-PER-SYD one night, slept well when I got home.
Tootle pip!!

[Capn Rex Havoc]

Lord Spandex - I was not having a go at you flying a 737.

LeadSled- I will have to disagree with you. Physics would have to dictate that a 380 at FL410 will have more inertia in any moment arm direction, therefore will be harder to accurately hand fly especially after a disturbance.

I know nothing of Boeing checklists- But the Heavy/Super airbus checklists call for the Autopilot to remain connected when in severe turbulence.

In my company- anecdotally, when there have been pilot disconnects of the Autopilot at High cruising altitudes due to overspeed's (twice over the the himalayas), serious Altitude busts occurred.

The message that the training department says - is

"Leave the autopilot in at High Altitude"

[porch monkey]

Rex, Leaddie is giving you the benefit of his experience having actually flown the aircraft he speaks about. Yes, by hand. Not second hand. Inertia is only one factor in controllability, there are a few other factors that can influence each type.


Having said that, I'm in firmly in The Bullwinkle's corner, too. Thanks for your time and tuition in my past as well, Centaurus.

[Angle of Attack]

747-400 and 737 flown at high altitude, well there's hardly any difference, if anything the jumbo was easier probably due to better yaw damper elevator feel hydraulics etc.. But not by much, still an aeroplane.....

[sleeper]

I regularly fly a B777 to cruising altitude. It gets a bit more pitch sensitive, but that is all. Somebody said it was difficult to keep it within plus or minus 500 feet!? If so, you shouldn't be in a cockpitseat. it is easy to stay within 50 feet.

[Capn Rex Havoc]

Gentlemen, - I think there may be a bit of confusion here.

Firstly - I am not talking about smooth conditions Autopilot off and maintaining straight and level.

I am talking in the event of an upset be it from an Overspeed event or wake turbulence or some such disturbance.

There is a key difference in Airbus from Boeing Heavy jets. (Again not wanting to start a boeing/Airbus feud)

The key difference is this-

All Wide body modern airbus have a trim tank that uses fuel. Fuel is pumped to the rear of the aircraft during the climb to move the centre of gravity aft to make the trim drag in the cruise less. This results in a marked decrease in longitudinal static stability. So as I have stated should one experience an upset at high altitude, best you leave that Autopilot engaged. :ok:

[LeadSled]

Folks,
There is no question that it is preferable to leave the A/P in during turbulence --- and the major reason is physiological, in sever turbulence your eyes are subject to "eyeball bounce", actually the liquid in you eyeballs becoming turbulent and decreasing your visual acuity ---- and moderate turbulence might turn into severe without warning.
But, and it is a big but, if the autopilot can't handle it (admittedly a rare thing with modern autopilots) you better be ready to, and your best has to be good enough.
Old single channel analogue were a horse of a different colour.
Being a devout coward, I put a lot of effort into avoiding severe turbulence over the years, but fly enough hours for enough years --- and you will find bad turbulence --- no matter how hard you try not to..
Worst TS/CB I have come across was one night coming down to Luanda from Isle de Sal, worst non-TS/CB a toss up between down range from the Rockies, and a bad day over the Atlantic, or a bad day on the edge of a jetstream over Japan in winter.
Tootle pip!!

PS: A hint for those still flying B747 Classics --- even in light turbulence, take out the altitude hold and just use the A/P on attitude, if you haven't found this out already, you will be surprised how much of the turbulence was the elevators pumping, chasing altitude.

[LeadSled]

Folks,
It is worthwhile having a look at the "Flight with unreliable Airspeed" on the Tech forum.
Seems both Boeing and Airbus are quite keen on the idea of manual flying with the A/P--A/T and FD off.
Tootle pip!!

[Gnadenburg]

I'm new to the debate and I'm sure my strong position for raw data efficiency has been voiced by others.

I'll just quickly add, that I fly with MPL's & Cadets who seem to have had their raw data training cut so far to the bone, that when I encourage them to hand-fly, the standard is so rough and woeful that I ensure the seat belt is fastened for passenger safety.

This is how quickly the industry has run with what's deemed as acceptable skills erosion for cost cutting and training short cuts. I'm shocked at how quickly the problem has further manifested itself over the last few years in my part of the world.

It now seems acceptable too, for training captains to struggle with raw data proficiencies. This seems to be a betrayal from within, with a percentage of training pilots behaving like FCOM bureaucrats instead of instilling strong fundamentals.

[Blueskymine]

Trim drag? In a jet with THS? Interesting.....

Here is me thinking it's because with an aft c of g there is less force required on the tailplane, which in turn produces less drag and as a consequence less fuel :)

I must be wrong :)

[Capn Rex Havoc]

LeadSled-
Seems both Boeing and Airbus are quite keen on the idea of manual flying with the A/P--A/T and FD off.

Unreliable Airspeed and Severe Turbulence are two completely different checklist actions.

The Autopilot,FD and Auto thrust, probably aren't going to work to well without an accurate speed input are they?

Blueskymine- You are correct, but it is the concept of the reduced drag and reduced stability that I was pointing out.