UH-72 to Rucker ? What's the Army thinking?

[Stinger10]

I have never flown a UH-72 (EC-145) but its a twin with a rigid rotor system and non-standard tail. I have no first hand experience on the aircraft. Will this really make a good primary helicopter trainer? Does anyone else in the world fly it in this role as an initial trainer? I am having a hard time understanding the logic of a complex, twin engine helicopter in this role.

[Ian Corrigible]

From last month's Rotor & Wing (http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/military/utility/U-S-Army-Aviation-Leaders-Proactively-Prepare-Budget-Cuts-to-Head-Off-Salami-Slicing-by-Sequesters_81152.html):

Training Role for Lakotas

“The TH-67 fleet has no dollars to sustain it,” revealed [Maj. Gen. Kevin Mangum, commanding general of U.S. Army Aviation], “so we need to do something different.” The way he had asked the [Army's joint budget planning team] committee was to think in terms of how Army Aviation was comprised – and that came to no single-engine aircraft. “Flight school has not changed significantly since the 30 years I went there,” said Mangum, referring to the actual flight training not the synthetic systems, which have seen dramatic improvement. “If we don’t have a single-engine aircraft in the fleet, how many touch-downs and auto-rotations do we have to do? The [Airbus Helicopters] UH-72 Lakota will fit if we change our flight school model and the digital cockpit will help our young pilots transition to the digital cockpits they will have to fly [when they reach their units].”

But these new aircraft would have to be taken from both the active and reserve components to fill the Fort Rucker, Ala., requirement (Army Aviation Center of Excellence). “The good thing is that they are bought and paid for. This will reduce logistics support for the distributed fleet and the op tempo we will put on the fleet will reduce the dollars per hour in the long run,” he said. The plan was to take half of the requirement each from the Army and National Guard, although the 100 LUHs equipped for border guard missions would stay where they are.

Does anyone else in the world fly it in this role as an initial trainer?
No (the USNTPS has five, but not for Initial); the closest is probably the German Army, which uses the BO105 as its initial trainer (likely to be replaced by the EC135 as the 105 retires). The Australian Defence Force is also about to replace the Kiowa with a twin (reportedly the EC135 (http://www.janes.com/article/32109/boeing-thales-australia-chosen-for-aud1-billion-adf-helicopter-training-contract)) as its sole RW trainer, following in the footsteps of the JMSDF, which is in the process of replacing its OH-6Ds with the TH-135 (http://www.beckerusa.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/13-06-24_Press_Release_10th_Japanese_TH-135_DVCS.pdf).

I/C

[Bravo73]

No (the USNTPS has five, but not for Initial); the closest is probably the German Army, which uses the BO105 as its initial trainer (likely to be replaced by the EC135 as the 105 retires). The Australian Defence Force is also about to replace the Kiowa with a twin (reportedly the EC135 (http://www.janes.com/article/32109/boeing-thales-australia-chosen-for-aud1-billion-adf-helicopter-training-contract)) as its sole RW trainer, following in the footsteps of the JMSDF, which is in the process of replacing its OH-6Ds with the TH-135 (http://www.beckerusa.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/13-06-24_Press_Release_10th_Japanese_TH-135_DVCS.pdf).

I/C

Doesn't the RNZAF now use the A109 as it's basic rotary trainer?

RNZAF - A109 Light Utility Helicopter (http://www.airforce.mil.nz/projects/a109luh/)

[Ian Corrigible]

Good catch.

I/C

[HeliHenri]

.

Swiss army

20 EC635

Basic training and utility

.

[chopper2004]

Like the rumor I heard at HAI 2013, and confirmed in the article a few months back,

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/cd482ee4bf70

Going back to an article in Shephard Press, Defence Helicopter several years ago, a training special about the DHFS. The then CO who was AAC, aired out that graduates go onto multi-engined platforms and potentially the School could just have a sole multi engined trainer as with the current Bell 412. He also stated in his day, as with the Gazelle, he did all his primary and advanced on the type he went to after competing the APC.

Going back even further to the German Heeresfliegerwaffenschule at Buckeberg, in the late 90s, who went a radical way changing their training. They retired their Alouette II, and went into more emphasis on PC based and the 4 axis flight simulators and EC135. Their view was with the introduction of the NH90 and Tiger, the pilot' / gunner would become more of a mission manager.

W.R.T to the RNZAF (here's my pic from Farnborough '10 ) was a (first) NZ exchange instructor pilot to Buckeberg a few years back

http://i57.photobucket.com/albums/g209/longranger/DSC09649.jpg

in the art of learning to tech M/E so he could take the experience home in preparation for the Power and NH90 entering service.

Cheers

[The Sultan]

They are not thinking. This is the Utility and Attack PM's protecting their programs which are under threat of being downsized at the expense of the warfighter. No one can deny the 206 is the best entry level trainer and no one can deny the 58D has shown to be the best ground troop support helicopter in the Army. With the new laser guided 2.75's there is really no need for the 64 unless someone can find a few hundred tanks to launch an attack. If they do they will probably have an easy time as the 64 will be in system checks while the front line is overrun.

Those who care about the warfighter should try to save the 67, the 58D and tell the Air Force to save the A-10.

The Sultan

[Um... lifting...]

No one can deny the 206 is the best entry level trainer

You must travel in some limited circles.

Other than the 67, how many semi-rigid underslung rotor systems is the Army flying these days, Sultan?

How many steam-gauge helicopters is the Army flying these days, Sultan?

You could make the same argument for the 57 at Whiting and you'd be equally wrong.

Both those machines have been overtaken by technology, no matter how robust the airframes and how good the customer support from Bell.

The entire training model needs to be reviewed, because the 206 variants are no longer cutting it, because you can't train how you fight in them, in any service.

I'm guessing you never worked in a training command, but you've been at Bell a long time.

[GoodGrief]

Sorry, Lifting, I think you're completely off on this one.
This is not about dog fights but basic training, i.e. learning to hover etc, etc.
Even an R44 would suffice.

$3000 of tax payers money per hour for hover practice ?:ugh:

[SansAnhedral]

Both those machines have been overtaken by technology

Suppose we ought to throw out all the AT-6s for fast mover pilot training, as the USAF doesnt have a single front line turboprop fighter aircraft!

Someone with experience in "training command" should understand the value of "steam gauges" and simple airframes/rotors to teach basic rotary wing airmanship (without spending a fortune on flight time and risking hugely more expensive assets with zero-hour RW pilots)

[Lonewolf_50]

Sorry, Lifting, I think you're completely off on this one.

This is not about dog fights but basic training, i.e. learning to hover etc, etc. Even an R44 would suffice.

$3000 of tax payers money per hour for hover practice ?:ugh:
Bingo. GoodGrief got it in one.

Navy and Army have to decide how to do their instrument training and primary rotary wing training, if the venerable 206 is getting long in the tooth and support costs continue to go up.

Problem is, do you buy a "one size fits all trainer" as the Navy has now gotten? The TH-57 used to be a VFR only bird, with the TH-1E/TH1L being the instrument / advanced bird. In the 80's the Navy got a mod to some the TH-57's for instrument training. IIRC, it was a military cert.

Getting a civil certified instrument bird to replace the TH-57 will be an interesting exercise in both acquisition and requirements re-definition, but I think that's where the Navy has to go as the support for that old version of 206 fades, or just gets too expensive per hour.

Since Army has a platform already bought and paid for, and is trying to save money by eliminating an entire TMS (and since Bell and other vendors are not exactly supporting the old airframe with any enthusiasm) their decision makes sense from the level of "don't need to go through that acquisition cycle again." Their biggest issue will be long term, and the cost per hour increase GoodGrief mentioned. That and how many sims to buy, what mix, etc.

I imagine one could get into a two tiered training system, with the first 10 or 15 or 25 hours in a Robinson to teach people how to hover and do basic helicopter flying things ... then off into the land of turbine driven twins.

But I don't think the Army wants to buy another new line of aircraft, so Mr Robinson's order book probably won't get that massive spike such a move would see.

[Ian Corrigible]

$3000 of tax payers money per hour for hover practice
That of course being a fully-burdened O&S figure in line with DoD FMRs, hence the S-92-like cost. The EC145's variable cost ($1390/hr (http://www.conklindd.com/CDALibrary/ACCostSummary.aspx)) is still twice that of the JetRanger, but not quite into "Mercedes-Benz (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/452880-mercedes-benz-helicopters.html)" territory.

Mr Robinson's order book probably won't get that massive spike such a move would see.
Robinson Sr. was always very proud (http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/general-news/20111110/torrances-robinson-helicopter-marks-delivery-of-10000th-chopper) of not being seen as sucking on the government teet. (Well, other than indirectly through the Maverick (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/251341-r22-hellfire-pics.html) and Renegade (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/217848-r-22-uav.html) programs...)

I/C

[Um... lifting...]

I certainly could be wrong, I often am.

LW covers a few of my thoughts on procurement and some other things I thought about as well in his post that appeared while I was hammering out this abomination. I too think the solution for the Navy will be off-the-shelf. I also think it will be a single-engine turbine, and it will be bigger than the 206 and less than 7000 pounds, articulated or rigid head, with skids. The cabin will be able to seat 4. It will have at least some glass in it. There's my prediction.

GoodGrief-
Sorry, but you're mistaken there. The reasons are too many to put here, but it's not going to be Robbies across the board, and I'd be happy to lay a few hundred €, £, $ or other legal tender of your choice (or a splendid dinner) on it. The airframes are simply not robust enough and the drive train on the recips are too flimsy. If you know the physical training model (where the airfields are located, maintenance model, fueling locations, and other logistics), there are a dozen other reasons why Robbies won't be chosen. These are not sleepy flight schools with a half-dozen aircraft. These are airfields with 100+ airframes putting out 250-300 helicopter sorties per day using a system of stage fields scattered over a broad area.
Now you could be partly right, but only if a two-tier curriculum as LW mentions is developed for the purpose of teaching basic helicopter airwork, perhaps by civilian instructors. I suppose that's possible, but I couldn't say how likely that might be. My guess would be not likely, but that's only a guess.


Sans-
I am personally somewhat in agreement and sympathetic with you here, but the facts don't really care whether you and I agree. Steam is very nearly dead in Naval Air, and that is a major consideration, rightly or wrongly. The 53D is done, the 46 is done, all the Marine Corps machines are now partly or mostly glass. The Navy is all glass in the 60 community, mostly glass in the 53E. All new fleet procurements are glass. Whatever new trainer goes to the Navy (and probably the Army) will have some form of glass in it.

When I was fresh out of the training command as a student, I likely would have been more in agreement with each of you as to what was needed, because that was what I knew. When I had spent some time there many years later, I recognized that fleet needs had changed and were not being met (though nothing actually changed substantially in fact during my time there).


I can't speak in an informed fashion to Army needs, but my guess is that the Army is thinking somewhat along similar lines, but also probably has a surplus of UH-72s they can't quite figure out what to do with and they're coming up with justification for a twin because that's what they have on hand and they know very well how long the procurement process takes. What they may do with their TH-67s is a good question, as they are somewhat younger than the Navy's TH-57s.

I quite deliberately didn't say what machine I thought was best (or if I even have an opinion), but I do know what's being looked at, and it's not the R-44, and I seriously doubt they'll spin up the 206 production line again with all the powertrain and other grounding issues the TH-57 has been having.

As to the T-6, I have a passing familiarity with the T-6 and know why it was chosen and the compromises that were made during the process by the two very different primary customers in the interest of a common airframe. I know who wanted a jet, and who wanted a turboprop and why. Lots of heated arguments during that process by intractable parties. Nobody got all they wanted.

The TH-57 is the ONLY current primary or advanced training aircraft in Naval Air that is not glass and doesn't include a FMS, to include the T-6. Just because the T-6 has a spinner on the nose doesn't mean it's not a big technological leap from the T-34. It is. The TH-57 is also the only turboprop or turboshaft in the Navy training mix that is not PT-6 powered.

Rotary is the only pipeline where the students make a retrograde technological step when they move to advanced training.

In the U.S., fast-mover training prior to award of wings involves two distinct aircraft (three, actually). Helicopter training in the Navy system involves two distinct airframes, only one of which is a rotorcraft. That rotorcraft is currently configured in two different ways. One is a basic VFR configuration, the other is a non-conforming and uncertifiable IFR configuration that is running out of spares.

A significant portion (about 7%) of the curriculum is tied up in transitional flights between helicopter airframes, and a significant portion of the FRS for fleet helicopters is tied up in familiarization with FMS and glass because a very large portion of the advanced rotary curriculum has to be retaught in the fleet. The rotary curriculum also involves a fair bit of time in the cruise transitioning to a number of stage fields in a helicopter that can carry two pax at best.

Anyway, all that transition & familiarization stuff has to be done somewhere, in something. So you can pay for that with a ground trainer, sims, and a moderately expensive aircraft at the training command or you can do that at the fleet level with a larger pilot pool making use of the order-of-magnitude more expensive hardware. But you do have to pay for it at some point. It's just a question of when and what it will cost.

Not all these issues are resolved, so far as I am aware, and my finger is definitely not right on the pulse, but that's how I see it shaping up. Again, I could be totally wrong. I guess in a few years we'll see if any of us are right.

But at the end, if you don't know what the end customer (Naval or Army Air) wants, you can't back track to determine the appropriate tool to deliver that end product in the form of an aviator.

[AAKEE]

...the closest is probably the German Army, which uses the BO105 as its initial trainer (likely to be replaced by the EC135 as the 105 retires).

German army uses EC135/635 for basic training. The Bo105 is only used for the emergency training block (autorotation).

I dont think it's a bad idea to use this level of complexity if you not are going to fly older 'analog' helicopters at all. You'll miss some of the handling training, like secondary effects on the controls.
A modern heli is supposed to be easy to fly, is it possible that it 'masks' a weaker student by being so easy to fly ?

[Stinger10]

With the Bell 206 out of production, there are a lot of good single on the market for less than $1000/hr.....Bell 407Gx, AW119Kx, AS-350, EC-120, Bell SLS ..... just to name a few. Starting to sound like the Army needs a home for the Lakota and is putting a square peg into a round hole just to make their aviation re-alignment plan work out; at the taxpayers expense.

The TH-57/67s are tired and somewhat irrelevant to DoD fleet helicopters anymore. For example; All naval aviators start out in T-6B which is a glass environment, same as 95% of DoD helicopters and tilt-rotors, and then go backwards to analog just to get through the helicopter syllabus. Not to mention the characteristics of a two-bladed rotor system, which are no longer in DoD service either, are significantly different than a multi-bladed rotor system. Both are negative learning points. So the current aircraft are an anachronism going forward.

So the Army is going to do full contact autos, and let guys with 0 hrs learn to hover in a complex helicopter that cost 5x more per/hr to fly? :ugh:

[Lonewolf_50]

Stinger, I went from a TH-57 to a Huey to an SH-2F.
What people do nowadays is go from the TH-57 to, for example, the CH-53E.
No intermediate step at a Huey. Oddly enough, they seem to figure it out.

The monkey skill adjustment for me was the AFCS and the weight, and the significantly worse visibility from Huey to SH-2F.
I later went to the SH-60B, and cannot say I liked to fly that as much as the SH-2F, and that is due to the trim response on the Seahawk being less agile than on the SH-2F ... just as the Force Trim system in the Huey was more agile than the AFCS on the SH-2F. You do adapt to any new aircraft, of course.

T-6 as a primary trainer (when I was working JPATS issues) moved quite a few instrument flights into simulators, with good results.

Any new Army or Navy follow on to the 206 based trainer would be well advised to invest money in robust sims to move some of the instrument training into the the sim and out of the aircraft. Back in the day, helicopter sims were Crap. They have improved in the last generation or so.

[Um... lifting...]

I went from a TH-57B to a TH-57C to a HH-65A, which had a starflex rotor that turned the other direction, a fenestron, real AFCS, crude FMS, Marconi gauges, and a wee bit of primitive monochrome glassy stuff. Other than being appallingly underpowered, it had little in common with the TH-57.

Yes, one does adapt, but the learning curve was fairly steep, as it was for my contemporaries going into Sikorsky products. It's steeper now.

The jump from a clapped-out TH-57C directly to a 60 variant or a new H-1 is fairly huge.

Sims I suspect and hope will be a big part of any new training procurement. I need to jaw with the sim boss at exciting Whiting. He owes me a beer anyway.

AAKEE makes a good point about the possibility of an easy-to-fly modern machine masking weak handling skills. I would think that will be a real issue. So too may be a loss in the ability to fly raw data from needles and DME unless it is explicitly taught, which remains a necessary skill set for lots of stuff, such as SAR and mucking about with TACANs, if such crude devices still be used.

[SASless]

I went from the TH-55A to the UH-1 B/D/H to the CH-47A/B.

The step up to the Huey was ok....particularly the UH-1B.....with the side step into the D/H much easier....but it was a giant leap into the Chinook. The first time I picked the ol' Girl up to a Hover....it was intimidating. But within just a few hours it was a done deal. We have to remember we are training Pilots who will be Co-Pilots for Years...sometimes many Years before they are given command.

I will admit the hundreds upon hundreds of EOL's we practiced paid off handsomely later on. Are the Lakota's going to hold up to that kind of punishment? If they do....at what Cost?

Basic handling skills are just that....basic to helicopter flying....skip over some of them....omit some of them....and you are headed for disaster in the long run.

US Army Student Pilots never "Solo" a helicopter....they go with another Student and call it "Solo"....that is not a good thing in my book.

Simulators are fine for Instrument Training....even the old SFTS worked fine despite having no Visual Display at all. Little time in the real aircraft is needed for training....but some is needed for real world exposure but only as a validation of the training.

If the Army wants to use the excuse "but we have all these Lakota's you see....and since we got them....well you know....." then they have shed loads of Kiowa's of all models. Why not SLEP them back to Trainer Mod's and use the excuse...."but we have all these Kiowa's you see....and since we got them....well you know....".

In the time of tight budgets....the Army is going to try to convince Congress operating the Lakota's is cheaper than operating Jet Rangers (Kiowa's).:D

[Thax]

Ref Post #9.

Not many organisations (especially those on a budget) would propose spending $3000 per hour on hover training. As noted, the RNZAF has introduced the A109LUH as it's basic and advanced RW trainer (and we have never been noted as being careless with our cash). What makes this affordable is the use of simulation. If you accept that an advanced trainer is required (as we did), you will probably also accept that simulation is a neccessity. The hourly simulator direct operating costs are lower than the dry lease cost of an R44 (I did the math). It therefore makes sense to use the simulator (which we have already paid for) to conduct basic training, as well as to support advanced (emergency, IFR, mission) training.

Had we elected to employ a separate basic trainer, we would have incurred the cost of ownership of a second fleet (or at least the operating cost of a leased fleet). Having done so, it is likely we'd only have saved about 15 hours off the current all-through course. We couldn't justify that to our taxpayers. Further, by selecting a platform that could also provide a light utility and observation capability, we got even more bang for our buck (by which, of course, I mean 'Pacific Peso').

[Ian Corrigible]

a complex helicopter that cost 5x more per/hr to fly
Where do you get that number from? The highest figure quoted by the Army so far has been $2,500, with the service "think it can lower that cost to $2,100 per hour (http://insidedefense.com/Inside-the-Army/Inside-the-Army-01/06/2014/national-guard-advocates-question-armys-proposed-aviation-restructure/menu-id-78.html)." As stated above, that $2,500 is a fully burdened cost, with the TH-67 hourly being over $1,000 using the same metric.

Starting to sound like the Army needs a home for the Lakota and is putting a square peg into a round hole just to make their aviation re-alignment plan work out; at the taxpayers expense.
No, the Army was always planning to replace the TH-67s with a twin ("TH-XX").

In the time of tight budgets....the Army is going to try to convince Congress operating the Lakota's is cheaper than operating Jet Rangers (Kiowa's)
The only cost argument made so far is that replacing the KW with the Apache is more affordable than funding CASUP or AAS. Yes, the Apache's hourly costs are significantly higher, but AMCOM's argument is that the $10 Billion (http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1374) spend on CASUP (and/or the $6 - 8 Billion (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/usa-army-helicopter-idUSL2N0DG25J20130430) spend on AAS) is avoided, or at least [I]deferred until an FVL-L is available. The only argument presented for the switch from the Creek to the Lakota has been that it meets the service's pre-existing plans to switchover to a glass equipped twin for its training needs. I doubt Rucker would try to portray it as a cheaper solution, save that it avoids the need for a brand new purchase of twins.

Why not SLEP them back to Trainer Mod's
$7 Billion (http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1374).

$3000 per hour on hover training
Again, unless we're hiring Gisele Bundchen (http://i1.r7.com/data/files/2C92/94A4/2457/8A67/0124/5875/8CCC/0FF1/Gisele1-g-20091015.jpg) to do the training, it's not going to be $3,000 per hour.

German army uses EC135/635 for basic training
Thanks for the update - interesting to know that the switch has already been made for BHT I. I knew the 105 is due to soldier on at Celle until 2017 but that makes sense, given that the active fleet is already down to 47 BOs (out of 79 on paper).

I/C

[tottigol]

With the Bell 206 out of production, there are a lot of good single on the market for less than $1000/hr.....Bell 407Gx, AW119Kx, AS-350, EC-120, Bell SLS ..... just to name a few.

...But only one of those has "power by Pratt & Whitney"...

[Jack Carson]

Coming from an era of aviation similar to SASLess and LW50, I felt compelled to comment. Our services should look to exactly what they are attempting to achieve with their pilot training curricula. My era we flew 4 different aircraft each more complex as we progressed through each phase. During basic training in the T-34 we were not even required to communicate on the radio. We then advanced to the T-28B/C where I believe the task was intimidation. (i.e. blower shift going through 12,000 ft IFR under the hood) was more than intimidating. Then on to helicopters. The TH-57A humbled an aviator with almost 100 flight hours but achieved a transition to an ability to hover. We finished up with the TH-1L. Many like me flew the UH-1D. This provided a feel for an operational machine, while also providing IFR training. Yes, IFR in a machine with only a stab bar. The UH-1D didn’t even have a turn needle and ball in front of the instructor. This system met the requirements of the times.

Today is different. The entire fleet is comprised of only heavy multi-engine complex machines. The curricula has not kept pace with this transition. Look to Lufthanza’s facility in Phoenix. They provide very specific training in machines specifically equipped to meet their operational requirements. The US government needs to follow this model. By comparison, the operational costs of most fleet machines, machines like the EC-135/145, Bell 412/429 or even an S-76 are a drop in the bucket when compared to the cost of operating any aircraft in the fleet. The end product would be better equipped to handle today’s fleet with less time required at the final transition.

[The Sultan]

Who can claim Bell doesn't support the 206's? Bell support of its products is still #1 in world.

Basic training is suppose to be how to fly not manage glass. Going to the 72 which has crappy autorotation capability will result in auto's not being needed because of hull losses. So what do you get? A bunch of AF447 pilots who look for the glass to save them instead of the drilled in training to make auto's in their sleep. Do not need to auto in a twin? Tell that to those killed in Glasgow!

The Sultan

[busdriver02]

The Air Force primary helo trainer is essentially a souped up UH-1H. While the addition of glass and its management is a bad thing in my opinion (primary helo training should be heavily focused on clock to map to ground type skills) and I think the exposure to actual touch down autos was valuable, the "simple" rotor system is a detriment. The under-slung, high inertia rotor system teaches bad habits. A young guy who can hover the Huey by shaking the crap out of the cyclic will make me vomit once you toss him into a Blackhawk.

The issue I see with something like the Lakota is the rigid rotor and breaking things when a young kid who can barely hover tries to set it down, and suddenly all those forces get instantly applied to the mast once the skids hit the ground and the fuselage can't move.

But it is what it is, there is no money for a new acquisition, the current trainers are apparently unsustainable and the Army has these "extra" aircraft hanging around. Maybe square peg round hole but it's probably cheaper given the frame of mind that they'd be operating the Lakota anyway, whether it's in a pilot training role or whatever the Guard does with them.

As to the concept that the Kiowa is better at supporting the troops than the Apache, harrumph, it's more complex than that.

[Um... lifting...]

Who can claim Bell doesn't support the 206's? Bell support of its products is still #1 in world.

Basic training is suppose to be how to fly not manage glass.

The maintenance personnel at NAS Whiting Field can claim that. And do.

We've all read the R&W surveys and know what they say.

Many people agree with you on the purpose of basic training, however, those who are determining future fleet direction are typically not among them. That may be unpleasant to hear, but it happens to be supported by the facts.

If you believe the future of Naval or Army helicopter training remains a steam-gauge 206, go ahead and float that proposal.

[Stinger10]

DoD rates for 2013 show the TH-67 around $700/hr , and UH-72 around $2500/hr. Again. Is there a benefit to learning to fly on a complex , twin that is worth 3x more the hourly costs when you fly over 100k flt hours annually? The TH-XX, I have never heard of before, and as of 6 months ago, the Army's postition was they didn't need a new trainer. The Navy, who frankly would have more reason than the Army to train with a twin, doesn't want or require a twin either. There is no good justification for it.

I still contend this is the tail wagging the Army dog. The Army needs to find a home for Lakotas so the rest of their re-alignment works, so they are creating requirements to justify the HIGH hourly costs to operate them.

[Stinger10]

Understand the acquisition money excuse, but if you fly 100k flt hours a year, and the Lakota costs 3x as much per hour, how many years would you have to fly to pay for a new fleet at $3M per for a good SE helicopter? Its about total ownership costs.

The commercial helicopter industry understands this and has figured out a way to make it into a REAL business. Hence the boom over the past 10 years. Its TIME DoD learned a few lessons like this. Acquisition costs are only the begining and typically smaller than the total lifecycle costs. JSF is a perfect example. The big aquisition number will seem small compared to what it costs to operate and maintain them over +30 years.

All the services are geared toward the easiest solution instead the best solution, which may actually take some inginutiy and work to accomplish. But its only taxpayer $$$$ right?

[diethelm]

The military outsources just about everything else, why not just send the accepted students to the local rotorcraft school where the taxpayers could drop $12,000 and the students would have a private certificate plodding around in an R22. Just the basic flying and navigating skills.

Feel free to train them in anything they want after that, but for the basic hovering and flying skills, why have a new airframe acquisition and maintenance program when all that already exists in dozens of places throughout the US now?

I get the whole "the military is better" fever, but the military would then have plenty of time to indoctrinate the student into the "military" way.

[Lonewolf_50]

Diethelm:

You are invited to review the results of the IFS program that the USN instituted back in the early 2000's to answer your question.

[busdriver02]

Actually the USAF still uses an IFS program, a contract company teaches basic flying and the AF way of structured learning in I believe DA-20s. Then those who can learn the way the way the AF teaches, don't get sick and don't quit because it isn't what they thought it would be, go to UPT.

But once again, you're talking about spending money on something new vs something already bought and while new might cost less in the long run something already bought is a possible solution that already has programmed costs budgeted for, and less uncertainty.

Ain't government spending screwy?

[Hughes500]

Is it surprising mil aviation costs so much money ? Surely you start on a simple cheap trainer, it is hard enough for most pilots to grasp flying let alone how a complicated glass cockpit twin engine helicopter works when you first start! What's the chop rate on a US army course ? When Brit army taught me we started on a chipmunk fixed wing, of 13 starters 3 were chopped before we got near a helicopter, basic rotary on a 341 another 3 went, By the end of advanced rotary another 2 had gone. That is 8 from 13, now if that was in a helicopter, an expensive twin wow that's a lot of money to show 60% of course is not suitable

[Lonewolf_50]

busdriver, I was referring to the NAVY IFS, not the Air Force IFS, which programs are NOT conducted in the same manner.

Just having a program may or may not produce the results you seek. (See the T-3 deal at USAFA of a few years ago as an example).
How you implement such a program makes a significant difference. The Air Force IFT (which was linked to a PPL as a performance objective) seems to have answered the mail on UPT failures when it was in place. Won't comment on the USAF IFS as it stands now.

I see in this thread quite a bit of hand waving about 'send 'em to civvy school' and so on, but if you don't structure the program right, you aren't furthering the development of your budding military aviator. Providing that there are performance standards and the ability to fail, one should be able to weed out the unmotivated early on, and the unable by the time it is over.

Is government spending screwy?
Is water wet? :ok::}

EDIT:
Early in the Navy program's life (circa 2006) Navy Post Graduate School in coordination with the Naval Air Training Command looked at IFS as the Navy conducted it (http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&cad=rja&ved=0CG0QFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fget-tr-doc%2Fpdf%3FAD%3DADA457331&ei=KxIGU6zTMaPA0QGQwYC4BQ&usg=AFQjCNHC2BFlCmGfGeLnjK9qbgQFw95gdA&bvm=bv.61725948,d.dmQ) and found it to require significant improvement.
ROI wise, it wasn't cost effective. Is it cost effective now?
I'll see what I can find out.

How does this relate to the thread?

At 2500 dollars per flight hour, the UH-72 is an expensive primary trainer. The ROI numbers for the T-34C were just under 400 dollars per hour, for the T-37 Tweet about 1100 dollars per hour, and for the T-6 were (last I recall) about six hundred dollars per flight hour. (Will try to get some better numbers on UPT/T-6 costs, that may be off by a bit).
First hit: $2,235 per flight hour for the T-6??? Not sure if that is calculated the same as for the Tweet ...

I'd say there is ample room for a program that will give an ROI for introductory helo training, depending upon how the Army structures the program. I'd go to the USAF for advice on this one, as their approach seems to me to be more effective than how the Navy has proceeded. (It galls me to say that, as a Navy man, but results matter).

[tottigol]

Is it just DOC costs you are considering or are you rolling the DACs in there LW?
The T-34Cs were around for about 30 years, and their acquisition costs were much lower then than a comparable type is today.

2500$ hourly cost for a -72 seems a bit high, but even 2000$ would be.

[SASless]

Do Airline Pilots start their training on 737's or Challengers?

Last time I checked they started on small single engine piston airplanes and then progressed to more sophisticated and complex aircraft.

The point about using a "cheap" simple helicopter to "weed" out those deemed unsuitable for continuing training would have a lot of merit before putting the successful candidates into the more expensive aircraft.

[Lonewolf_50]

Tottigol, I am pretty sure the accounting rules changed between the time that T-34C was being put together to replace the T-28B/C, and the time that T-6 was to Replace both the Tweet (T-37) and the T-34C.

Back in the late 90's, I think the number I saw tossed around for "cost per flight hour, (burdened) for the Tweet was between 1100 and 1200 dollars, and that was from discussing JPATS issues with folks at AETC. At the time, the cost per flight hour for T-34C was around 350 per flight hour. The projection I saw for T-6, at the time, was 700-800 dollars per flight hour. Don't know what the actuals are. (Best I can estimate, these were DOC).

I don't think that either of those figures accounted for amortizing the initial cost of the aircraft, (DAC) but represented the annual O & M budgeting figure to get gas and maintenance funded to keep them in the air. (If someone has folded in recurring program cost factors for depot level repairs, that might explain some of the numbers).

As the price of fuel has gone up, numbers like the ones I was dealing with back then probably make no sense: since fuel prices have just about tripled since the late 1990's / early 2000's.

Also, my numbers are some years out of date.

A link to a USAF listing of numbers for a whole load of aircraft, from B-2 to T-6 are hopefully apples to apples comparisons, and only include the annual O & M funding lines required to keep them flying. That was where the 2300 or so per hour for a T-6A was grabbed.

When trying to represent the cost to operate, I am pretty sure one should not roll in Acquisition costs (DAC): you are mixing different colors of money. I recall from some classes many years ago that that you are not allowed to mix the streams. :E APN-1 and major acquisition money is not to be mixed with O & M money.

Then again, rules do change over time. I am not in that realm any more, and may have missed some rule changes on costing and estimating.

This leaves me scratching my head on cost per flight hour figures for a givne airframe. I'll keep looking, keeping in mind how expensive fuel is these days.

[busdriver02]

Lonewolf, wasn't meant to poke, just to point out the IFS concept is still alive somewhere in the DoD. I don't actually know too much about the current system as I went through the previous IFT program. As you said, it needs to be standardized, my experience was with a AF base flying club with mostly retired military pilots or maintenance NCOs (who subsequently earned a CFI) as the primary IPs, and they were excellent. However, I know guys who ended up training with a mom and pop organization and while they got a PPL within the required 50 hours (very easy when that is your only job) it did little to prepare them for military style and pace of instruction.

I don't agree with the continual "it's too complex for a basic trainer" mindset, as if two engines is some monumental shift, but it definitely is more expensive and there is probably a cheaper way to do business.

[Freewheel]

IIRC, the md902 was passed over in favour of the 145 for the 72 requirement. I wonder if that was such a wise choice, then much less now?

[tottigol]

Yes it was, it is.

[Lonewolf_50]

IIRC, the md902 was passed over in favour of the 145 for the 72 requirement. I wonder if that was such a wise choice, then much less now?
Given the requirement upon which the award was based, it was a "good enough" choice.
Lonewolf, wasn't meant to poke, just to point out the IFS concept is still alive somewhere in the DoD.
Indeed it is. As you pointed out, at a certain cost per flight hour for the "entry trainer" a "pre entry" basic course has shown that it can be of some value. (The IFT program showed for a while a reduced primary / UPT attrition for USAF).
The results of IFS for the Navy showed mixed results, at best.
I have been advised that the link I provided was as pretty a picture as could have been painted of the program, based on what it was believed would be achieved by putting it into place in the early 00's. This is from someone who is much more familiar with the program than I.

What the Army has to sort out is whether or not they can save hours, dollars and fatigue life on the UH-72 via a well structured IFT sort of program in ... Robbies? Enstrom? Schweizer? Jet Rangers?

When you look at the volume of pilots they may be running through a system, HOW one puts that program into place and maintains standards is non- trivial problem to solve.

Your point on just who is providing this IFS (and standards) is spot on.

[Stinger10]

No offense, but I think you guys are missing the point. IFS or no IFS, Army flys between 80-100k flight hours a year. That will not change dramatically ovet the next 10 years and by using the UH-72 it will cost , at a minimum, 150-200% more per hour. The will literally spend all the savings of not replacing the Kiowa on flight hours at Rucker? Why ? Because the UH-72 needs a home? They will also be, with the exception of German 105s and now EC-135s, the only ones to employ an EC-145 as a primary trainer. There has to be a smarter more pragmatic solution.

[Lonewolf_50]

Stinger, that is a point well made, :ok: and informs the thought of suggesting something like IFS at a lower cost per hour be adapted (if possible) to mitigate your grim cost picture for helicopter training.

[Smackhawk]

One nuance which I would offer up for consideration - with ever more advanced line aircraft (CH47F, MH60M, AH64E etc) which are glass cockpit and quite expensive to fly, you need a light twin trainer that can prepare crews for that environment.

If that light twin is able to be close enough to the line aircraft that it is able to significantly reduce the amount of transition hours flown on those advanced platforms before a pilot is operationally ready, then that becomes part of the business case in favour of the more advanced trainer.

[Stinger10]

More square peg, round hole arguments........

UH-72s can’t do touch down autos, have a significant limit to the mast moment (should be about as common as TH-57 over-torques now, when the students start wiping out the cockpit while learning to fly)........and cost $2500/hr.

The simplest maneuvers from the Army's Lakota ATM have cautions regarding "mast moment". Touchdown auto and anti-torque maneuvers are PROHIBITED. :ugh:

[Stinger10]

By all means Army, make the same mistake......:ugh:

Auto-rotation training drives German army light-twin requirement

Germany is to acquire a fleet of five light-twin rotorcraft to make up for a problem discovered with its 14 Airbus Helicopters EC135 basic trainers that leaves them unsuitable to perform certain crucial training maneuvers.
Speaking at an event at the German army's aviation training school in Bückeburg near Hannover, Lt Col Guido Krahl said the requirement had been created specifically to fulfill a need for auto-rotation training.
The EC135s, he says, are unable to be used for the task as the service requires auto-rotations to be carried out to the ground, in order to adequately prepare pilots for combat scenarios.

"When you do it a lot you get a vibration with the rotor blades, and it doesn't allow the user to do it so much or so often in a short sequence," Krahl says. He says the issue could cause "small cracks" in the blades, which would then need to be replaced. The service has been aware of the issue since it began operating the helicopters in 2010.

"Today our defense ministry is in close connections with helicopter manufacturers to get new aircraft for auto-rotations," he adds.
For its part, Airbus Helicopters insists there is no problem performing the maneuver in the EC135 "even to the ground, as it is part of the certification". However, the potential for costly damage to be incurred may make the aircraft unsuitable for entry-level students, it adds.

[Ian Corrigible]

Army: Lakota flight costs to shrink when helicopter used as trainer
Inside the Army (https://defensenewsstand.com/component/option,com_ppv/Itemid,288/id,2475455/) - 06/30/2014

While some projections have suggested that the operation and maintenance cost per flight hour for a Lakota is about $2,500, vs. $600 an hour for the TH-67, Col. John Lindsay, director of aviation G-3/5/7, told ITA in a June 18 interview at the Pentagon that those estimates are not accurate.

Lindsay said that the TH-67 actually costs about $1,200 per flight hour -- $560.58 for parts and $704.37 for support maintenance per flight hour -- while he believes the Army can reduce the projected cost of the Lakota. "Conservatively, the Army has estimated that we will bring the cost per flying hour for the LUH-72 down to $2,100 an hour," he stated.

The service may be able to reduce the cost per flight hour down to $1,900, narrowing the gap between the cost of the TH-67 and the LUH-72, he contended. "It's certainly not five times (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/534271-uh-72-rucker-whats-army-thinking.html#post8326297) more expensive to operate the LUH-72, as some would have you believe," Lindsay said. "This is the estimate that was put together, that was vetted by Army staff and also folks up at [the Office of the Secretary of Defense]."

Other savings could be realized through by reducing training hours. This could entail eliminating certain maneuvers more necessary for single-engine helicopter training, like autorotations to the ground -- which the Army calls "crash and bangs," Lindsay noted.

I/C

[Stinger10]

That's all wishful thinking by the Army.

The training environment at Rucker is actually much tougher on the airframe and will require more maintenance, not less.

Do those costs include the additional $800M to buy 90 more UH-72s?

Bottom line is there has been no analysis done to see if the UH-72 was a good fit for as an INITIAL trainer. Not a helicopter used at a training center like Ft. Irwin then just saying its been used as a trainer like the Army has tried to allege already.......

This is simply a case of the Army making it all fit because it makes the ARI work and the Army won't look bad in the short run for not having a use for fairly new helicopters. In the long run they WILL, correction the tax payer WILL, pay more, training WILL suffer, and the Army will end up looking for a more appropriate INITIAL training helicopter. Just like they did when they replaced the Hueys with TH-67s. All will be forgiven because the people that came up with this silly plan in the first place will have moved on, and up. Never to be held accountable for a bad decision based on very little analysis.

I am glad the Army staff and OSD vetted it...... Rucker, at the instructor level, is already is scratching their heads at this one.:eek:

[arismount]

The Army Aviation establishment had a fairly good handle on requirements and procurement for same in 1972; knowledge and common sense have been dropping steadily since then, at a geometric rate.

The aviation procurement process for DoD in general, and Army Aviation most particularly, is now oriented around politics, enrichment of manufacturers (two factors which go hand in hand), and unreality.

McClellan in the early days of the Civil War said America needed a dictator and while that proved untrue, I would opine that military procurement in America might benefit from a Soviet-style politburo handing down decisions to design bureaus.

The sorry facts as we see them are ample proof that, in this regard, "free enterprise" isn't working for much except to impoverish the taxpayers, enrich some corporations, and turn Army Aviation activities into an ill-equipped, indecisive, confused and antic parody of the Keystone Cops.

[Stinger10]

I am hearing that during Sec. Hagel's visit to Ft. Rucker, the Army was briefing that they should take over all of helicopter training and make it a joint at Ft. Rucker.:confused:

So let me get this right.

The Army makes a poor decision without any analysis and decides to be the only operator on the planet to try and use the UH-72 (EC-145) as an initial training helicopter (which it is not suited for) because they have no other use for it, and now wants to share the wealth of that poor decision with the Navy who at least following the proper path and doing some analysis to determine what the right (TH-57) replacement helicopter should be?

DoD tried to drive primary flight training together with the USN & USAF for the T-6 (Texan II) and both have since walked away vowing not to do it again.

Navy better find their voice or based on the fact that the Sec. Def has already bought everything the Army has sold him so far, this could be the beginning of the end of helicopter training in Pensacola.:mad:

[PhlyingGuy]

I predicted this before.... I still think it's going to happen. JSF, JMR, etc.... training aircraft should be the most "consistent" across all platforms... at least among civi's who don't know any better.

[Lonewolf_50]

The Navy, as it has fumbled the TH-57 replacement, has in one sense played into the Army's hands.

However, if you look at how JPATS worked out, this "it's all Joint" BS died like plains buffalo. I expect this grandstanding by the Army to likewise die. I'll suggest to you that tis is another of those "roles and missions" scraps that we saw after Dester Storm. Same crap, different day.

Army flight training: the old pattern was high school to flight school to the grave. :E They have improved since then, of course. Got a peek about ten years ago as Rucker restructured their top to bottom program when they moved the Huey from the progression .. well that was the plan. About then Air Force came crying to the Navy to glom onto our Helo Training pipeline, and brought a bunch of unfunded requirements with them. Short answer was: no thanks, guys, you either accept our product as is or go and figure it out.

They went elsewhere.

Army aviation had some good ideas that the Navy might have taken a closer look at than they did. Maybe we'll see some plagiarism ongoing as Navy figures out their way ahead. Would not hurt, IMO.

The sheer volume of Navy rotary wing production argues for more than one base even when you look at all of the Services' requirements. (I am still under that NDA from the early 2000's BRAC meetings I "got to go to." (I went kicking and screaming!!!!)

There are limits to what any one facility can provide, and you should not set up a single point of failure system. Been out of that business too long to comment further.

[Boudreaux Bob]

.....and turn Army Aviation activities into an ill-equipped, indecisive, confused and antic parody of the Keystone Cops.

That's the Army I remember!

I am certainly glad the old Traditions are being upheld!

[Stinger10]

Post-Hagel visit:For instance, the Army will be able to train pilots using night-vision goggles in the Lakota. They are currently trained to use night-vision goggles once they graduate to Chinook or Black Hawk choppers, which are far more expensive to fly. There is not enough time under the current training syllabus to train on night vision since students must be trained on two training aircraft, the general said.
Lundy said moving night-vision goggle training into the Lakota will save the Army about $30 million per year.


So the cost savings the Army is claiming to save is by using the UH-72 instead of the H-60 and not even against other alternative training aircraft.
Think of the money (a lot more than $30M) they would save with a more suitable, less than 50% cost per hour, single engine trainer that can do everything the Lakota can do. Especially with the cost to acquire 100 ADDITIONAL Lakotas factored in........:ugh:

No wonder the Army doesn't want to produce any sort of AoA data, and do math in public.

[Lonewolf_50]

Stinger, I am not sure if the Army had fitted their trainer 206's with provisinos for an NVG friendly cockpit. I do know that some of the OH-58 birds were so fitted, but that was field units, not trainers.

Navy was undertaking a new cockpit lighting scheme for TH-57 beginning a bit over 10 years ago, with the idea of fitting some of the TH-57's with AN/AVS 9 nvgs to put a few of the nvg flights into the helo syllabus. Not sure how that finally worked out, but I had not heard great news on that front. (Will take a peek and see what I can figure out).

Why the Lakota becomes attractive just because of NVG friendly set up is a bit of a mystery to me. I'd need to get a look at how the final version of Ruckers first to last training pipeline is built to get a handle on that. Again, been a few years since I had my hands on such things, so I'm a bit out to lunch on details.

EDIT: looks like the Navy NVG syllabus has been alive and well as far back as 2011, maybe before, with both sims and flights included. Progress! :)

[chopper2004]

Lakota contractor signs contract on building in Daleville - The Southeast Sun: News (http://www.southeastsun.com/daleville/news/article_15c63af4-2323-11e4-bbd3-0017a43b2370.html)


In other news, have seen on Airbus Helicopters Inc, FB page, a series of photos depicting the UH-72A Lakota being taken by sea from Germany back to the states. Have the cuts already taken place and the CMTC are losing some of their Lakotas (not the OPFOR ones painted)?

Cheers

[Ian Corrigible]

The Hohenfels fleet isn't affected by the ARI.

I/C

[OFBSLF]

Only DOD would suggest that you can save money training helicopter pilots by replacing a light, single-engine helicopter with a complex, medium, two-engine helicopter.

[Lonewolf_50]

Only DOD would suggest that you can save money training helicopter pilots by replacing a light, single-engine helicopter with a complex, medium, two-engine helicopter.

If your simlulator is good enough, you can get a lot of training value and maybe (I said MAYBE) reduce some hours per student in the cockpit.

Of course, that kind of sim is bloody expensive, and ups your program cost ... but not the airframe operating costs. ;)

As usual, I suspect DoD is playing a shell game with how money is counted agianst what ... an old game :mad: played since long before I ever got involved in such things.

[GreenKnight121]

Only those who either ignore or are unaware of the cost of maintaining a maintenance capability for a single type that no longer has any commonality with anything else in the military logistics chain would suggest that keeping a "orphan" aircraft type could be cheaper than utilizing an existing type for an extra mission-set.


Start with training the maintenance personnel (you will need more for a separate type than for a few more of an in-service type), then add in the costs of upkeep on maintenance equipment particular to that type, the costs of parts (most of which are no longer commercially made) for that equipment (resulting in having to buy new equipment to do the job), the costs of parts for the helos (some of which are no longer made, thus requiring a modernization program to replace those systems with ones that are still made/supported), and the other costs associated with a singular aircraft type.


Compare that to the costs for a type that is already in service that you are simply using for a different mission-set instead of what you would be using them for.

[chopper2004]

CAE delivers first mission ready UH-72A flight simulator to US Army - Army Technology (http://www.army-technology.com/news/newscae-72a-flight-simulator-4459952)

[Boudreaux Bob]

So tell me about the commonality of the Lakota to any other helicopter in the US Army Fleet of Aircraft.....or any other Branch of the Military for that matter?

Now if you were referring to Black Hawks then perhaps you would have a point.

We are not talking about a complex aircraft here....they are Jet Rangers no matter what the Army calls them.

Are the aircraft being replaced any more unique than the 72's in reality?

The 72 program was a Rum Deal to begin with and has not gotten any better over the Years.

[mixing lever]

Another factor is the abysmal level of maintenance that civilian contractors at Rucker have always had. "Why do today what you can put off until tomorrow?" should be the mission statement for the civilian workforce.
The availability will be very poor, on a good day.

[Boudreaux Bob]

Contract performance or the lack of is an Army problem....not the Contractor's problem. Write the Contract properly, enforce the terms of the Contract, and those kinds of problems go away.

Of course if you do that....you ruin any chance of post retirement employment by.....a Contractor don't you?

[Lonewolf_50]

Another factor is the abysmal level of maintenance that civilian contractors at Rucker have always had. "Why do today what you can put off until tomorrow?" should be the mission statement for the civilian workforce.
The availability will be very poor, on a good day.
Dear Sir:

Your generalized statement cannot go unchallenged.
When I was on active duty, I got to see some of the contract maintenance at work.
Some was pretty good, some not so much.
As BB says, how good it is has two prime factors:
1. How well the contract was written
2. How effective the oversight is
a third factor is
3. How the funding lines on the contract and on parts were integrated into the overall support plan. Again, that varied depending upon which operation I saw and got to be supported (or badly supported) by.

[MC5Wes]

I hear this all the time' "Contractors aren't getting the work done"


I tell the Active Duty guys I will stay all night to get this aircraft that you broke fixed. Call the O-5 and get my overtime approved.


First thing the Officer says is he's not staying late you are.


The units budget is for me to work 40 hours a week. That's it. They don't want to hire anyone to work nights or on the weekends. That's what they have Active Duty for.

[NickLappos]

Lots of focus here on cost per hour. Not much on the effectiveness of the training:
1) The soft teetering head on a Jet Ranger is totally different than the responsive H72, Black Hawk and Apache. I spent a good part of my career trying to break the sloppy stick habits of pilots who thing a cyclic can be wiggled without moving the helicopter, who then blame a nimble helicopter for being "unstable". The H-72 is much more instructive in this regard, and closer to creating the stick habits for the Army fleet.
2) Twin engine housekeeping and diagnostics. Managing and diagnosing power failures is the #1 cause of acccidents (after CFIT) and absolutely unteachable in a single engine helo.
3) The real cost is the loss of $25 million worth of Apache or Hawk for an accident. Save one pilot error accident, pay for flight school for a few years.

[Boudreaux Bob]

However did we survive ?:E

Teaching folks over the years about Engine problems from simple failures to some confusing kinds of failures, one thing was plain and that was very few folks understood how to trouble shoot the failures.

The Engineering thought that put Torque Gauges into Helicopters failed to consider how dependent (sometimes way too improperly) Pilots become on that particular device.

I wish the Torque gauges were smaller in size and lower in the stack of engine gauges than the N1/Ng gauges. It would sure have helped in figuring out which engine had the problem.

Of all the Engine instruments I see the Torquemeter as being of the lesser value than the Nr and N1/Ng gauges during trouble shooting engine problems.

One Man's Opinion of course.

[GreenKnight121]

So tell me about the commonality of the Lakota to any other helicopter in the US Army Fleet of Aircraft.....or any other Branch of the Military for that matter?

Now if you were referring to Black Hawks then perhaps you would have a point.

The Lakota is, and will continue to be, in the US Army inventory no matter what happens with the TH-57/Jet Ranger fleet.

So the Army will always have the UH-72 fleet cost, but why force it to keep paying the TH-57 fleet cost as well?


The choice is between TH-57+UH-72 or UH-72 only.

UH-72 only will have much lower cost than TH-57+UH-72.


And, as NickLappos says, UH-72 training is much more appropriate for UH-60/AH-64/UH-72 operation than is TH-57 training.

[Boudreaux Bob]

So we replaced Kiowa's with Apaches....similar thinking is it Green?

[GreenKnight121]

Exactly - there were no new Apaches being bought, they just got rid of the Kiowa Warriors instead of keeping some and getting rid of some Apaches, which was the other choice.

The writing was on the wall - there was going to be a reduction in the number of Army helicopters, both combat and utility - it was up to the Army to decide how to keep as much capability as possible in the process.

The decision was made to keep the most-capable helos possible - and to eliminate whole types to reduce the maintenance/supply/training burden in the process.

While AH-64s will be over-spec'ed in the recon helo role, OH-58Ds would be underspec'ed (and therefore less-efffective and more vulnerable) in most CAS missions, where the AH-64s would be perfect.

[Boudreaux Bob]

Will the 64's be as effective in the Scout Role as are the Kiowa's?

It sounds like the Army is trying to copy the Air Force which is once again trying to do away with the A-10 in favor of F-16's.

[Stinger10]

Initial helicopter training was never about # of engines. It was about getting student pilots in the air frequently, and learning the necessary skills like full-autos (which can be the result of several emergencies, not just engine failures) to save them and their crew one day.....

Army saying they can do it all in a sim is doing the students a dis-service. Am glad the Navy isn't going down the same misguided path. Even the FAA feels there is a distinct value in these maneuvers and still requires them for a rotorcraft rating.

Any modern commercial helicopter is going to feature a cockpit that will translate better to modern combat helicopters. That' s far from unique to the UH-72.


January 2015 Rotorcraft Pro Article "Going Vertical!" (http://content.yudu.com/A3c881/January2015/resources/index.htm?referrerUrl=)

[chopper2004]

Airbus Helicopters (http://www.airbushelicopters.com/website/en/press/Airbus-Group-delivers-first-new-UH-72A-Lakota-for-Army-initial-entry-trainer-mission_1734.html)

[Corax]

I have no doubt that different departments of the military will provide explanations to justify their own ideas of how to manage their budgets and sometimes there may well exist some very spurious calculations or at least some illogical math models.

So essentially one department or entity can justify any fleet.

What we found in Canada was that in the end we finally did introduce a twin for pilot training but retained the single for the beginning of pilot introduction to helicopters.

The thought process being that without any singles in the fleet no one could see the point or justify the need to maintain strictly a single engine trainer. But no one was willing to let go of the essential skills and foundation that it provides. So a mixed fleet was retained of Bell 206 and 412.

Pilot do their initial training up to their first basic handling test which includes autorations to touchdown. They then move on to the twin where we introcude crew concept, IFR, NVG and earn their wings in an environment they will see at their units.

The advantage has been that the squadrons and their respective type schools receive a much better candidate and the costs savings have shown up there. So there can be a savings passed on which can justify the loss of the single in the basic phase.

It's becoming more and more common that militaries do not have singles anymore so if that is the case, why spend so much time and money training on one. In the case of training only on singles the units inherit candidates that are simply not ready. Type schools or squadrons spend too much time on larger aircraft training them to fly in a crew, hone their IFR and learn NVG. Having a twin or mixed fleet with a twin during the basic portion to graduate pilots with those skills can save a lot of money at the unit end of the production line. We have found this is a better model for a modern military.