DIY Hijack prevention

[Bally Heck]

Saw this on BBC News.

DIY Hijack Prevention (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1980000/1980325.stm)

Looks like a good idea to me. Perhaps starting a few more of these "schools" would be a safety enhancement.

[RatherBeFlying]

I've been saying much the same thing and I'm really pleased that somebody has the organisational skills to get it rolling.

So far, there's always several times more passengers than hijackers -- and we are always hearing that a proportion of weapons leak through "security".

As before said, the bad guys only have to win once and we have to win every time.

[Bluebaron]

Virgin have been training their crews with a company called 'React' for years.
I'm not sure if they offer a course for the public but i'm sure they will soon if they don't already.

Bluebaron

[Ignition Override]

Bally Heck: Thanks for the excellent link. I will put it on board in pilot lounge.

[Capt. Crosswind]

It is an indictment of the Aviation Industry that Pax need to be trained to protect the acft.
We know how to make the acft so secure the hijack becomes too risky to attempt, it just requires some political will & decision making.

* multiple layer security on the ground, and this must include a politically incorrect version of CAPPS ( Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System ). seeNote.

* a fortified & armed flight deck ( to make it fail safe - NO security system is 100% effective)

It's that simple.

Note: CAPPS was in use well before Sept /11 but not allowed to use racial profiling as an element of the system as this is politically incorrect. Some are of the opinion that a racial profiling system would have resulted in the highjackers being given a more thorough security screening which may have detected the weapons carried on board.

[christep]

Note: CAPPS was in use well before Sept /11 but not allowed to use racial profiling as an element of the system as this is politically incorrect. Some are of the opinion that a racial profiling system would have resulted in the highjackers being given a more thorough security screening which may have detected the weapons carried on board.

Why is it that despite it being repeated time and time again, it simply fails to penetrate some peoples' brains that there was no breach of the rules on carry-on items on Sept 11.

The box-cutters used were at the time perfectly legal for carriage in the cabin. Some of them at least were almost certainly detected on the scanners at the airports, but the rules said they were OK.

[RatherBeFlying]

Inevitably some day a new way will be found to get weapons past security or circumvent flight deck security procedures.

When that happens, I'd rather the SLF jump the bad guys ASAP than make like docile sheep (and am I alone in thinking that some crew cultures, like the hijackers, prefer docile sheep to switched-on take charge types?).

Today the security types trumpet the effectiveness of their new and sometimes undisclosed precautions, but eventually the threat levels go down, the budget cutters go back to work and the security precautions become a victim of their own success... until the next outrage.

Budget cuts took out an effective air marshal force and will do so again: See Armed and Anonymous in the current issue of Air and Space (http://www.airandspacemagazine.com/asm/mag/latest.html)

[Capt. Crosswind]

Thanks for the comment Christep.

You are correct with regards box cutters, which were said to be okay at Logan.
My info & my experience is that what is /is not an approved carry on item varied from airport to airport, and the company contracted to do the screening.
Regardless of this point, what the proponents of a comprehensive CAPPS are pointing out is that such a system would have put up no less than four red flags on each of the hijackers. When you have five pax with highjacker profiles being thoroughly screened and each carries a potential weapon ,is it not likely that this would have raised the alarm?

Initially, the CAPPS was capable of being comprehensive but the White House Commisssion on Aviation Safety & Security ( Report Feb 12 1997) found that a system using racial profiling is discriminatory.
The key terrorist profiling indicators of race,gender,nationality etc were not allowed to be used.

[Capt. Crosswind]

Ratherbeflying:
No argument with what you say whatsoever.
That is why the fortified & armed flight deck is essential as the protection of last resort.

[RatherBeFlying]

Capt. Crosswind: Fortified is good as long as a martial arts trained bad guy can't jump a pilot coming back from a lav break, close the door behind and take on the remaining pilot, likely before he even gets his hand near his weapon, let alone use it effectively. With a single fortified door, this scenario can/will happen someday -- then we'll put in double doors with an interlock.

And the other problem with weapons is that your own side gets killed much more than the bad guys. Gun accidents kill far more family members than iintruders.

[Capt. Crosswind]

RBFlying: Thanks for your input.
I agree. The fortified flight deck must have a double door with interlock & CCTV scanning the cabin.
I believe El Al have had a double door for some time.

The risk of pax or crew being accidentally shot in an attempted hijack is a risk that has to be taken,considering what is at stake.
Also bear in mind that if airline security is made water tight, it may
result in airliner highjacks no longer being attempted.