Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub [Archive] - Page 12

SilsoeSid

27th Mar 2014, 08:44

You are stlll all skating around my question. What do those bl**** control room tapes reveal? And why are they cloaked in silence? I suspect that they do reveal or give a good indication, as to what really happened to that aircraft, and that someone for some reason does not want us to know.

I pray that that is not the case, because if it is. Someone is betraying the rights of those who died that night both in the air and on the ground. let us not forget that.

Aaah, the good old conspiracy theorist :ugh:

Answer me this tigerfish, what is your 6 letter word beginning with 'bl'?
Are you hiding something from us? Is there some kind of code in that 6 letter word? What do you know that you're not telling us?
:suspect::suspect::suspect:

You accuse us of avoiding your question, do you really think we 'line minions' have been told that information :rolleyes:
Like us, wait for the report!

mickjoebill

27th Mar 2014, 09:44

tigerfish

27th Mar 2014, 11:16

SS No Conspiricy theory just frustration. There is nothing hidden about my use of the word Bl****. Its just that I dont like to swear especially in print so I'm sure that you can work it out, - (mild swear word!)

Seriously, & Ive said it before, that as a Senior Investigating Officer , on internal investigations, the first thing that I would do on dealing with such matters would be to seize those tapes and go through them very carefully.

Now like everyone else I fully understand the need for care in handling such matters. But what would be wrong with a statement like " Careful examination of all recorded communication between the accident aircraft and the respective control rooms have allowed investigators to form a likely understanding what happened in the last few minutes before the accident occurred". "Nothing more will be added until the full accident report is submitted in due course."

The Policy of saying absolutely nothing merely fosters the absolute rubbish that many of the contributors to this thread have contributed. The subject has just been going round and round, fueled I think by the belief that the whole thing remains a complete mystery. Maybe it is, but if it is not then a brief note to that effect might help.

TF

Boudreaux Bob

27th Mar 2014, 11:40

Tigerfish has a very good point.

As I remember the Shetlands Interim Reports, there was ample mention of CVR Callouts.

So why not any mention whatsoever of the content of Police Radio content?

The absolute lack of any mention does make you wonder why!

HeavyMetallist

27th Mar 2014, 12:33

The absolute lack of any mention does make you wonder why!

Perhaps it makes conspiracy theorists wonder, but for those of us with some understanding of how the AAIB is going about its business it just means that they haven't found anything in any police radio logs that they think is relevant to the accident. To date they've only been publishing factual interim reports, not the analysis that'll be in the final report. They're not obliged to play whack-a-mole with every bit of speculation that pops up on t'internet.

manrow

31st Mar 2014, 20:56

Surprised no comment on early reports that double engine failure was the problem?

Support Monkey

3rd Apr 2014, 12:31

Babcock International announces imminent plans to purchase Avincis | Business | The Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/mar/27/babcock-international-announces-plant-purchase-avincis)

Babcock will be picking up the potential damages claims as part of the acquisition of Avincis

Art of flight

3rd Apr 2014, 17:19

Just read the AAIB report on G-LBAL, the thing that's made that report possible in such a short time that's missing here is the CVR. Perhaps it's now time to make sure all PT aircraft have them fitted.

SilsoeSid

3rd Apr 2014, 23:03

Art of flight;
Just read the AAIB report on G-LBAL, the thing that's made that report possible in such a short time that's missing here is the CVR. Perhaps it's now time to make sure all PT aircraft have them fitted.

SPAO incident on 29 Nov, 4 page special bulletin issued 9 December, 10 days later.
LBAL incident on 13 March, 3 page special bulletin issued 3 April, 21 days later.
:confused:

Art of flight

4th Apr 2014, 09:52

Sid, the GLBAL report seems to proved very detailed information on the flight profile and performance of both the aircraft and the crew actions from before takeoff to point of impact and beyond, the GSPAO gives vey little apart from fuel starvation being the reason the engines stopped? That was my point about CVR/FDR.

500e

12th Apr 2014, 20:30

Don't know if I missed this
Air Accidents Investigation: S2/2014 Eurocopter EC135 T2+, G-SPAO (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/april_2014/s2_2014_eurocopter_ec135_t2___g_spao.cfm)

talkpedlar

13th Apr 2014, 12:32

1 Eye-witness account and AAIB reports state MR and TR not turning prior to, and at point of, impact. (Seemingly no attempt at auto-rotation)

2 Double engine-failure confirmed but post-accident analysis showed engines, fuel-system and transmission serviceable.

3 Fuel in main tank but little/none in supply tanks and filters... and transfer-pump switches off.

4 Shed-bus switch found in "Norm" But restoration of non-essential services following double engine (and thus double generator) failure at lowish level above a built-up area probably rejected by pilot

5 Other similar aircraft in fleet not grounded.

I knew David to be a very professional and cautious aviator and can not reconcile for a moment him not instantly entering auto-rotation the very instant that the 2nd engine failure became apparent... but I am not blind to the fact that humans make mistakes - sometimes as a result of incapacitation .
If and when the AAIB determine the cause of the double engine failure I believe that other questions will remain unanswered.

Regards, TP.

airpolice

13th Apr 2014, 12:55

(Seemingly no attempt at auto-rotation)

Or a very early flare leading to the blades stopping.

I don't see where you get the idea that there is anything to support the idea that no attempt at auto rotation was made.

chopjock

13th Apr 2014, 13:05

I don't see where you get the idea that there is anything to support the idea that no attempt at auto rotation was made.

What about the eye witnesses that saw the aircraft "tumbling". If it was in auto rotation then presumably this would not happen? More likely RRPM was lost causing this?

talkpedlar

13th Apr 2014, 13:26

.for your supporting comment.

Airpolice.. I used the word "seemingly" for good reason; I have only the eye-witness statement and AAIB reports to go on.

With respect however, early flare? What at 600-700' ? And, as chopjock implies, how do you reconcile the aircraft "tumbling with main-rotor blades not turning"

Rgds

TP

jimjim1

9th Aug 2014, 08:13

Pilot's family hire engineering expert for Clutha crash probe | Herald Scotland (http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/transport/pilots-family-hire-engineering-expert-for-clutha-crash-probe.24953447)

"Pilot's family hire engineering expert for Clutha crash probe

Tuesday 5 August 2014

A VETERAN air accident investigator who led the probe into the Mull of Kintyre helicopter crash has been hired by lawyers involved in the Clutha disaster.
...
Tony Cable, a former senior investigator at the Air Accident Investigations Branch (AAIB) has been engaged by the legal team representing the family of pilot David Traill.
...
The decision by the Traill *family's lawyers to recruit Mr Cable could suggest that they are anticipating an FAI and the likelihood of having to argue against human error in favour of mechanical failure."

serf

9th Aug 2014, 08:37

[Pilots cannot manually override Fadec if it malfunctions. If Fadec fails, the engines fail. However, investigators have found nothing to indicate a software glitch on the Clutha helicopter.

Really.....

Sir Niall Dementia

9th Aug 2014, 09:25

Funny old thing;

I did an LPC/OPC/IRR on a 135 on Tuesday and I'm sure I remember doing manual throttle drills in a simulated FADEC failure, but maybe the journalist knows more about the aircraft and its' checklists than I do...............

SND

EESDL

9th Aug 2014, 14:54

I guess Babcock will also pick up the tab for the tragic NS accident where the mrh detached?

cyclic

9th Aug 2014, 17:20

I guess Babcock will also pick up the tab for the tragic NS accident where the mrh detached?

The one where our colleagues and passengers were tragically killed - tab:rolleyes:

dervish

11th Aug 2014, 15:25

Looks like the journalist has just got mixed up with the Chinook FADEC. What she says applies to that aircraft and I reckon she's pretty close on the rest. A minor error compared to some of the rubbish we read in the press. I think the underlying story is important though.

G0ULI

11th Aug 2014, 22:58

So the inference to be drawn from the Herald story is that the family have been given advance notice that the AAIB report will conclude that pilot error was the main cause of the accident? I can't see any point in engaging an independent accident investigator for any other reason.

dervish

12th Aug 2014, 06:34

The inference I draw is that one party, with financial wherewithal, has engaged legal and technical people and been making noises about cause and liability. And given the many contradictions another has reacted by employing someone one to check the evidence. Good move IMO.

tigerfish

7th Oct 2014, 17:16

Have been out of touch/area for a while so might have missed it, but any news on this one?
TF

MightyGem

7th Oct 2014, 20:43

Not that I've heard.

SilsoeSid

12th Oct 2014, 17:12

Hi Gents, Ladies,

I can't remember if it has been mentioned before and I can't see it anywhere, but with the acknowledged 'dodgy CAD', could it be that the numerical fuel indication was somehow 'tripped' to make it show in lbs and not kgs?

"CPDS
A fault relating to one of the display systems was recorded and further work is being undertaken to establish the meaning and possible causes of the fault."

In this scenario with 47/43 lbs indicating, there would only be 21/19 kgs in the tanks. By the time this may have been fully, if at all realised and the warnings came on (late?), a dirty dash back to base may have been the only reasonable course of action at the time.

Just another thought :confused:

toptobottom

12th Oct 2014, 19:38

could it be that the numerical fuel indication was somehow 'tripped' to make it show in lbs and not kgs?

FFS... :ugh:

SilsoeSid

12th Oct 2014, 20:24

toptobottom;

FFF...:ugh:

Says the person that previously told us;

"Haven't there been problems with the EC135 suffering from fuel gauge issues recently? I understood there to have been a number of complaints to EC about this. I appreciate tech logs should show correct uplift/consumption, but it wouldn't be the first time a helicopter had less fuel in it than the PIC thought and if the gauge wasn't reading correctly, it would hide the issue until too late. I believe both engines flamed out when they ran out of fuel before the Low Fuel warning lamp came on."
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/528850-police-helicopter-crashes-onto-glasgow-pub-19.html#post8193456

toptobottom

12th Oct 2014, 21:20

Yep - thanks for reminding us all SS. Not a bad guess at all, even though I say so myself; he ran out of fuel...

Can't believe all the bull$hit that comes from your over-active brain (sic) :=

Tandemrotor

12th Oct 2014, 21:25

Tony Cable is a top, top guy. The family of Dave Trail have picked absolutely the right man to explain the truth. Anyone wishing to simply blame the deceased pilot at an FAI better have their sh1t in one pile.

I wonder if I can guess which solicitor the family have engaged?

SilsoeSid

12th Oct 2014, 21:57

toptobottom;
Yep - thanks for reminding us all SS. Not a bad guess at all, even though I say so myself; he ran out of fuel...

Can't believe all the bull$hit that comes from your over-active brain (sic)

So, ttb, you are totally ignoring the recorded fault in the display systems?

If the value of the fuel display can be changed by using electronics, why couldn't a fault in the system reproduce that change in value? After all, the FLM tells us that the numerical display is the primary source of fuel value.

toptobottom

12th Oct 2014, 22:34

Silsoe - don't you realise what an amateur nerd you sound like? Ignorant speculation is not attractive. Put it down, move on and get a life mate, before you embarrass yourself again...

SilsoeSid

12th Oct 2014, 23:35

Sorry to have upset you so much to drive you to insults ttb :(
As I said, just a thought.

In my 'ignorant world', wiggly amps do funny unexpected things sometimes. If lbs were the value indicated it would bring along a different kettle of fish, including to cause the main tank contents to read '34'. Of course as you would undoubtably know, in forward flight this is a figure that a knowledgeable pilot would realise to be unusable. I'll leave you to work out the significance of this.

I would move on as you demand, however unlike you I cannot believe that this is a simple 'run out of fuel' situation. To have your opinion that they knowingly ran out of fuel, may suggest your insults are unwarranted.

I'm not going to argue this one way or the other, just putting it out there for discussion. If you can explain why this cannot occur, please do. At the moment you are unable to explain otherwise, you don't even know if a lbs indication configuration is possible or not, otherwise you would have told me why this scenario is impossible.

That's my current set of cards on the table. Would you like to take a seat and join in, instead of rudely commenting out of the audience!

All the best.

MightyGem

13th Oct 2014, 15:25

SilsoeSid

13th Oct 2014, 16:51

Don't you just hate it when a quote isn't related to a name!!!!

MG, you've quoted my explanation about the supply tanks!
The indication may have been 47/43 (lbs) ; low but above the minimum if the indication was in kilos, and base was only a short hop away. However there would actually only be 21/19 kgs in the tanks which of course would not be enough. But of course as you've quoted this you must have already read it!

Maybe with an indication of 167 (lbs) on the main tank display, (but there only actually being 76 kgs in it), the main tank was not a concern and maybe the pumps being off were also not a concern as a low speed portion of the flight was being undertaken at the time and maybe the cautions came on requiring the pumps to be off.

Of course if the fuel indications were in lbs, ie reading higher than actual, and the CAD went u/s what fuel values do you go on?

As I said, just a thought.

(p.s. I didn't say the other quote, ttb!)

SilsoeSid

13th Oct 2014, 16:52

MG;
Doesn't explain why the Supply tanks were empty with fuel in the Main and the Transfer Pumps switched off.

What does?

RVDT

13th Oct 2014, 17:26

SS,

Interesting conjecture and the graphics of course would still be relevant.

Although I would have to wonder about the hypothesis when the PIC had over 5K total and ~ 650 on type whether he would have surely noticed based on the numbers that the fuel burn had apparently halved miraculously?

DOUBLE BOGEY

13th Oct 2014, 18:34

The issue of the numbers is irrelevant. The MLA is the compelling issue. Even if SID is right the AC is still below the MLA at the point of flameout.

Operating a helicopter this close to the fuel limits in open flight is hazardous.

Just because its hard to believe an experienced pilot can make a mistake does not mean it did not transpire this way. The Brent Spar, AF447, Cormorant Alpha, Sumburgh L2. All experienced crews doing inexplicable things.

If that AC had a history of fuel contents problems why were the pilots not recording, chasing the issues. This too is poor culture if SIDS statements are true.

Operating a MEH over a city with very little fuel in the tanks, pumps incorrectly configured, seems the most likely scenario. Poor knowledge, poor culture, poor decision making. After all a police helicopter is not directly saving lives. Why take such risks. Culture?

Agaricus bisporus

13th Oct 2014, 20:33

Operating a MEH over a city with very little fuel in the tanks, pumps incorrectly configured, seems the most likely scenario.

Much as we all want to deny the possibility of the obvious (Mull of Kintyre, Battersea crane) and vehemently deny the guy(s) in question were even remotely fallible the fact remains that what looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck almost certainly is a duck.

Unpalatable as it is, logic suggests that it is by far (I'd hazard 98%) the most likely scenario.

jayteeto

13th Oct 2014, 20:40

Fortunately, Accident Investigation don't decide by what logic suggests. They try to find out what actually happened. Just like the Mull enquiry made logical assumptions, luckily we have moved on

MightyGem

13th Oct 2014, 20:42

MG, you've quoted my explanation about the supply tanks!
Well yes. You're talking about false readings in them when they were empty.

What does?
Nothing so far explains why the Supply tanks were empty and the Transfer Pumps were switched off.

SilsoeSid

13th Oct 2014, 20:49

DB, I tiptoed at 'culture' back in March. http://www.pprune.org/8387541-post2743.html

I don't really want to press this particular 'cultural' line of thought at the moment, although this may well prompt further discussion.
When I do a duty at a different unit, during the brief I say to the crew that if I do something that is different than the other pilots or they aren't sure what I am doing, or have any other concern, please bring it up at the time.

I like to think that this firstly breaks the CRM ice and hopefully empowers them to question what this unknown pilot that has appeared on their doorstep is doing. It's ok for everyone to be CRM'd, but as much as we try to make the cockpit an 'open environment', to actually say something to or to question a pilots actions, especially in the cockpit with a totally unknown or even a very well known pilot, takes a lot when you're 'out of the classroom'.

Back at the normal duty base, this train of thought still has to be maintained. The TFO's must feel that they can speak up when they feel something is different, unusual or not quite right. However, each unit is different in its 'culture' and there may be many reasons why TFO's may not feel they are in a position to challenge or question their pilot, their actions or any particular setting or situation that may develop in the cockpit.

My point, is that despite all the CRM training we complete, the classroom is a totally different place than the cockpit on a dark wet night, with an unfamiliar, familiar or overfamiliar crew with varying levels of confidence, security, arousal, situational awareness and cognitive abilities .

This is in no way directed at any particular unit or operation, but a general ramble of things CRM, out of the classroom that may or may not be relevant here.

SilsoeSid

13th Oct 2014, 21:03

Well yes. You're talking about false readings in them when they were empty.

MG, I'm talking about the indications over-reading by more than double the true amount (lbs not kgs) and when this was realised it was far too late to do very much about it.

A very very wild stab, but what's to say that when this was indeed realised, (21/19) an attempt was made to land in the road at the junction, but unfortunately the fuel quantity just wasn't enough to allow this to happen?

You're without doubt absolutely correct that 'nothing so far explains why the supply tanks were empty and the transfer pumps were switched off', which is why some of us wish to discuss the possibilities no matter how 'extreme or unlikely' they may appear.

MightyGem

13th Oct 2014, 21:11

It's ok for everyone to be CRM'd, but as much as we try to make the cockpit an 'open environment', to actually say something to or to question a pilots actions, especially in the cockpit with a totally unknown or even a very well known pilot, takes a lot when you're 'out of the classroom'
Very true. I used to the phrase, "I will kill you because you will let me". That got them thinking. :eek:

Boudreaux Bob

13th Oct 2014, 21:42

If both engines had stopped on me I would have been reaching for those prime pump switches as well.
Maybe its time to increase operating and transit heights to above 1500 AGL not the normal low ops.

I would have been concentrating on getting the lever down, picking the best spot available, and if time permitted yelling out a Mayday call.

Re-starting an engine at that altitude, at night, over a City, single pilot on Emergency lighting.....are you kidding?

Reely340

14th Oct 2014, 21:12

I would have been concentrating on getting the lever down, picking the best spot available, and if time permitted yelling out a Mayday call. That exactly were my thoughts as soon as i saw the exact location of the pub.
There appears to be a huge traffic intersection right in front of it.
I'd have autorotated right into there, accepting any oncoming traffic as bad luck, acceptable at night, me thinks.

MightyGem

14th Oct 2014, 21:19

And the wheel turns slowly round and round. :ugh:

chopjock

15th Oct 2014, 10:30

I'd have autorotated right into there, accepting any oncoming traffic as bad luck, acceptable at night, me thinks.

Or perhaps better still the river and pop the floats.

Helilog56

15th Oct 2014, 19:49

Ah yes...the armchair quarterbacks have spoken yet again....:ugh:

Sky Sports

16th Oct 2014, 13:16

The CAD and VEMD have huge memories, only a fraction of which can be retrieved by post flight screen button pressing in either maintenance or config mode. The rest of the memory can only be accessed 'on the bench'.
The fuel quantity could have been switched from Kgs to Lbs via the config mode or by an internal fault. Either would have been recorded in the memory.
If it was an internal fault, we would have known about it by now via a service bulletin or possibly an AD.
Seeing as config can't be accessed in flight, a human switching would have had to have taken place before flight.

SilsoeSid

16th Oct 2014, 13:59

Intriguing, thanks Sky;

The fuel quantity could have been switched from Kgs to Lbs via the config mode or by an internal fault. Either would have been recorded in the memory.
If it was an internal fault, we would have known about it by now via a service bulletin or possibly an AD.

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/AAIB%20S2-2014%20G-SPAO.pdf

"The Central Panel Display System (CPDS) displays cautions and fuel status information to the pilot. It also records internal display system faults but no information relating to its indications. The displays did record flight duration and work is being carried out to link this duration, and the conditions required to start and stop this recorded duration, to the flight path of the helicopter. A fault relating to one of the display systems was recorded and further work is being undertaken to establish the meaning and possible causes of the fault."

It'll be interesting to find out what that fault was.

jimjim1

26th Nov 2014, 05:36

Extensive article in Telegraph today (online anyway, no idea about paper version) focusing on victims. The crash was just over a year ago.

'As the band played, the helicopter fell from the sky like a stone' - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/11221113/As-the-band-played-the-helicopter-fell-from-the-sky-like-a-stone.html)

The Telegraph lets you read a number of articles without paying.

Almost no aviation discussion, human interest, I think they call it, only really.

airsound

28th Nov 2014, 10:40

Several weeks are still required to complete the draft final report and it is expected that this draft will be circulated to ‘interested parties’, as defined by the Regulations, for comment early in 2015.
The final report is expected to be published in the middle of 2015.

Air Accidents Investigation: Investigation update - EC135 T2+, G-SPAO, Glasgow (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/latest_news/investigation_update___ec135_t2___g_spao__glasgow.cfm)

Cabby

28th Nov 2014, 11:59

2015 is the latest update, thats a long time after the Glasgow crash.

It would help investigators if all commercial flights had some form of black box fitted.
There are new satellite data recorders which may be better than the normal boxes.
The Flight-Data Recorder?s Slow Evolution - The New Yorker (http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-flight-data-recorders-slow-evolution)
All police aircraft should have them fitted, and cost shouldn't be a reason not to fit them.

Bravo73

28th Nov 2014, 12:14

It would help investigators if all commercial flights had some form of black box fitted.
There are new satellite data recorders which may be better than the normal boxes.
The Flight-Data Recorder?s Slow Evolution - The New Yorker (http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-flight-data-recorders-slow-evolution)
All police aircraft should have them fitted, and cost shouldn't be a reason not to fit them.

I suspect that this will be one of the AAIB's Safety recommendations in light of this crash.

John R81

28th Nov 2014, 12:34

It would help if all aircraft had them.

Cost is an issue
So is weight
So is the design of retrofitting installation

The question is whether the penalties are worth the gain. As a general rule, the crash investigators do get to the root cause of accidents in light helicopters without the aid of flight data and cockpit voice recorders. Where is the body of evidence that shows the potential gain and weighs this against the negative sides?

Don't forget, when you say "all commercial flights" (Cabby) then you are including sight-seeing tours in an R22 or a G2.

My personal view - call for black box is a knee-jerk reaction; "we must be seen to do something". Had they been carried on this flight it would still have crashed, and I have difficulty to see that we might know more than we do now about why it crashed.

gasax

28th Nov 2014, 14:01

The AAIB update states that effort has been put into retrieving the data. Well that suggests they have it, and that it has allowed them to draw a number of conclusions which in the scheme of things they have to gain a level of stakeholder acceptance to.

So the black box - if it was fully and appropriately configured might have yielded the same information, in a more easily retrievable format.

The crash would have still occurred, the report would have been a little quicker - we are a year on and the AAIB are suggesting it will take 6 months of stakeholder engagement to get a final report. So the right black box might have reduced the time to a report from 18 months to 12 months.

Given the modest number of people exposed to the risk and the eye watering cost of retro-fitting this type of equipment it seems an very inappropriate use of the money.

Much more cost effective to sort the mechanical/electrical issues if there were any and then move the training / competency requirements to try and stop it recurring?

Devil 49

28th Nov 2014, 18:41

"All police aircraft should have them fitted, and cost shouldn't be a reason not to fit them. "

It's easy to spend somebody's money especially when it's nobody's money, in other words- taxes.
Organize a non-profit and solicit voluntary contributions to equip all copper choppers with black boxes, or just buy them yourself, if you want. I can think of a lot of other things that law enforcement needs before black boxes, stuff that would make a difference in the present and not a hypothetical future.

Cabby

28th Nov 2014, 19:05

Re data recorders.
All valid points, but it has taken a long time to get to what is not the final report.
I suspect the AAIB have had their work cut out on this crash.

The new electronic versions mentioned in the news piece have simpler solid state equipment which is lighter and cheaper to operate Similar to the MH370 data bursts.

Maybe it should be something along the lines of HUMS.

My point is the length of time taken to reach what is not a final conclusion.
If a FDR had been fitted it should have allowed the a/c maker to look at the problem area if it was something apart from the fuel gauges.

Have the police been told what the problem was or are the makers surmising what they think happened............

TeetPongPlug

28th Nov 2014, 19:36

Cabby

Your tone of post I recognise from somewhere else, so I feel I must comment, I cannot quite put my finger on it yet but it will come to me where.

You appear hell bent on adding these bits of kit to police helicopters, which in the UK have an excellent safety record per number of movements. This passion you have given the current strains on finances and the need to work smarter and conserve budgets, will cost large amounts of money.

And to be perfectly honest, I cannot see it getting off the ground (excuse the pun) unless you got yourself elected into Parliament and push it through yourself.

Good luck

Ginger. :)

zorab64

28th Nov 2014, 21:28

Devil & TPP - you both make most valid points, at the end of the day the public purse is paying for what?

Once the accident's happened, and it's been fairly comprehensively determined that the aircraft systems are not significantly at fault (and that any potential system faults have already, and fairly immediately, been addressed by extra operational &/or maintenance procedures, as they have in this case), does it really make any difference if the report appears 12 or 18 months after the event?

Fitting CVRs to all aircraft, including C150s etc, would be the icing on the cake, but I'd suggest compulsory mode C transponders would come far higher up the priority list, for every day benefit, from a safety point of view. Police aircraft in the UK have an excellent safety record, especially given the hours, weather conditions and endlessly flexible tasking flown.

Suggest CVRs if you like, but concentrate on what's done well and ensure best practice is shared. The current modus operandi does not require a knee-jerk, health & safety driven, sledgehammer - the nut doesn't need cracking, though it might benefit from a little polish!

Capvermell

29th Nov 2014, 05:24

Poor reporting on BBC Radio 4 this morning (Saturday 29th November 2014 - I think on their news bulletin at 6am) where they stated that it was a year on today from the Glasgow Police helicopter crash the cause of which was that it "ran out of fuel".

No mention at all that the final AAIB report is not yet out and that the reasons why it crashed have still not been definitively determined.:eek::=

EDIT:- This news report from yesterday morning on the BBC Scotland website at www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-30244060 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-30244060) seems to possibly partly explain the confused and inaccurate cut down version of the same on Radio 4 this morning.

Yet the Beeb's very own website news article of yesterday morning still quite clearly stated that "The AAIB said both engines failed but has yet to set out the cause"

FURTHER EDIT:-

Just heard the 7am Radio 4 news bulletin and it now says there are demands for all helicopters to be fitted with black boxes and that conclusions on why both engines stopped have not yet been reached by the AAIB. So it appears the Beeb must had some negative feedback on their earlier report and now adjusted it accordingly.

Pittsextra

1st Dec 2014, 06:49

What might be money better spent is a significant increase in the amount of funding / resourcing of the AAIB.

Whilst professional aviators might not give two hoots that it might take 18 months to conclude a report it does seem odd to everyone else, especially if the conclusion might very well ultimately be "it ran out of fuel".

SilsoeSid

1st Dec 2014, 08:31

Pittsextra;

What might be money better spent is a significant increase in the amount of funding / resourcing of the AAIB.

Whilst professional aviators might not give two hoots that it might take 18 months to conclude a report it does seem odd to everyone else, especially if the conclusion might very well ultimately be "it ran out of fuel".

But it didn't 'run out if fuel' did it!

If you would give respect to all those that died, their friends & family, all those that are affected by the incident and all those trying desperately to find out what happened that night, you'd possibly appreciate these investigations take time and not everything is about money.

Should you care enough to read the update from the AAIB, apart from mentioning the multi national manufacturers, authorities and representatives (a hint one of the many reasons as to why these investigations take so long) it says;

"As a result, significant work was required to extract and analyse the contents of non-volatile memory (NVM) from micro-chipped equipment known to record data. This, together with further examination of the aircraft and subsequent tests, has now been completed, to the extent that the investigation team may reach its conclusions."

Hopefully this data analysis may give an indication as to how the ac came to be configured as it was in the moments prior to the incident. Your simple uninformed and rushed conclusion of 'it simply ran out of fuel' is not only factually incorrect, it is also highly disrespectful to not only all those involved in the investigation, but to all that died that night.

The families need the answers and more importantly, the correct answers, no matter how long that may take. Shame on you Pittsextra.

Pittsextra

1st Dec 2014, 08:58

SS - I'm not sure why that prompted a rant up.

I know it is easy to play the "think of those that died... show some respect" card but frankly I didn't rush to anything.

In fact it is you that has been "interested" by a host of theorem throughout this thread, and if I merely quote your last comment on this thread [your own bold]:-

"A fault relating to one of the display systems was recorded and further work is being undertaken to establish the meaning and possible causes of the fault."

It'll be interesting to find out what that fault was. "

Perhaps you might even agree that finding the reasons for any accident is better sooner than in 18 months??

zorab64

1st Dec 2014, 09:14

Sorry Pitts, but where is all this money going to come from to fund an increase in expert engineers & analysts who already do a difficult job, with impressive results? I don't like to criticise, but I'm afraid your statement What might be money better spent is a significant increase in the amount of funding / resourcing of the AAIB. appears a little simplistic given the really very small number of accidents, the constant drive for improved safety, and the significant improvements in both manufactured & affordable add-on technology that allow pilots greater awareness, whilst at the same time often result in interrogate-able evidence by AAIB.

The EC135 remains a 3rd generation helicopter with a modern & comprehensive warning suite of imminent or potential failures. As someone who flies them, and who daily reviews reactions in the event of failures and, possibly more importantly, systems knowledge & understanding, I have full confidence that the belt & braces warning systems will provide me with enough information to greatly assist a keep-us-alive decision. The actions / interim reports need to satisfy the pilots; operators; customers; press; & public, pretty much in that order - IMHO they have done, until the proper report appears. I'm happy to wait.

This accident, due to its tragically unique landing point and stopped rotors has, not surprisingly, drawn considerable interest from more than just professional aviators. The resultant report, therefore, should surely concentrate on getting it as right as they possibly can, leaving no stone unturned (as has been intimated), rather than providing a sop to a generally non-understanding media and a minority of armchair experts.

On a separate note, and looking at your non-existent profile, I was intrigued by your prolific pprune posting rate of 0.64. It's not bettered by many of the most prolific on rotorheads (just sampling SS; TC; JTT & MG as examples), just SS at 0.87 who, with the ability to restrict rants &/or condense more than one item in a post, might fall below yours! :ok: {Tongue in cheek, SS, in case you were planning a rant, we're on the same side. . .}

Thomas coupling

1st Dec 2014, 09:36

It seems the AAIB have reached a conclusion w.r.t this unfortunate incident and they expect the results to be promulgated within weeks. I forecast end of January.
Look for: CVR's and also comments relating to synthetic training requirements. Further down the list of recommends perhaps we might even read about another 'pop' at IR pilots perhaps? (All speculation you understand - :suspect:)

Pittsextra

1st Dec 2014, 10:58

So the layman may yet just say it simply ran out of fuel then? (all speculation in summing up prior speculation of course)

zorab64

1st Dec 2014, 11:49

So the layman may yet just say it simply ran out of fuel then? . . only if prompted by people who are too ignorant or lazy to explain the difference between "engines being starved of fuel", which appears to have been the case, and "the aircraft/airframe running out of fuel", which was patently not the case. The remaining fuel was enough to get back back to base (albeit below MLA), but was reported as not being in a tank from which it could reach the engines, and it's the reasoning & sequence that led to it that is testing the AAIB, I'd suggest. :ugh:

tigerfish

2nd Dec 2014, 14:11

Much is still being said about the lack of a Black Box, and like many others I have doubts whether this would have made a great deal of difference in this case.

I spent 30 years as a Police Officer the last 15 of which were closely involved with Police Air Support. Then on retiring from the Police went on to work for one of the aircraft suppliers. - So I do have a bit of knowledge of the systems involved. But what I do not understand, and cannot accept is this. Given that all Police radio transmissions are closely monitored and recorded why has there been no comment what so ever about Police Radio transmissions both to and from that aircraft on the flight in question.

Are we expected to believe that the aircraft took off and flew one or more missions in the 2 hours plus that it was airborne, until the accident itself, and yet no one, either the crew or the control room, said anything either to or from the A/c, or gave instructions or remarked on anything? Or why when the A/C must have been aware that due to its elapsed flight time that it was at least low on fuel, yet it appears to have deviated from its direct in flight path, to then fly overhead the pub. So was it sent there by control? - or did it go there of its own volition? Once again nothing has been said about the Police Radio involvement in this dreadful incident.

When serving as a member of internal investigations in my own force, and very often following a Police motor accident, the first thing that I did was to seize the radio logs. They always contained a wealth of info. So what has the investigation revealed in this case?

Obviously and for security reasons I do not expect the full contents of the logs to be revealed, but I would have expected them to have been remarked on as having been checked in detail and the relevance noted.

tigerfish:(

tigerfish

4th Dec 2014, 23:43

gsa

5th Dec 2014, 05:49

No response in 48 Hours! So I take it then, that we are all prepared to accept that there was no relevant radio traffic between the Police Helicopter and its control room base, not only during that 2 Hour plus flight but more importantly during the last 20 minutes of flight?

I just do not buy that!

We lost a good crew that night, yet I've got a horrible feeling that someone is quite happy to let them and the pilot carry this one. Something isn't right! It's not all coming out.
So when you investigate an accident you let the public know all the information you know when you know it before you've finished your investigation? The last radio message I heard of an accident went something like "F*ck hang on!" What do you expect to hear?

AnFI

5th Dec 2014, 06:42

BB dont stop d accident happen

an'

BB dont tell you the cause, I blame society, some might blame Type Rating Training regulation

zorab64

5th Dec 2014, 10:52

gsa - as Tigerfish knows, there WILL have been some Police communications, since all UK Police Forces & PNAS have had policies in place, for many years, that will have REQUIRED 15 or 20 min Ops Normal check calls with the Police Control Room, notwithstanding other discussions about the tasks in hand.

I'd suggest that AAIB will have had access to recordings, but possibly don't follow this thread (and certainly wouldn't post) while they finalise the report. Whilst it would be nice to hear confirmation that any recordings have been supplied, we can neither demand confirmation, or details, on a public forum. I find it very difficult to believe, in the established era of "recording for training & quality purposes", that AAIB have not been supplied with any/all recordings! :ok:

Pittsextra

5th Dec 2014, 12:49

zorab - what I don't understand in recent posts is the push back when people merely seek clarity or more timely actions, especially since in your last post to me was to play semantics over the a point of the fuel. Now perhaps I misunderstand the motive for this but I read that as you making the point that the pilot may have played less of a role in the accident? (a similar point that Silsoe was trying to make.)

Otherwise isn't it just a similar incident to that which befell G-CIAS or G-BDNP? i.e the AAIB conclude with some comment that includes the line "the mismanagement of the aircrafts fuel system...??"

I'm just surprised before everyone cries out for data recording of all and sundry (which as we have seen from North Sea incidents has its own particular holes) and yet we can't be comfortable with running more frank assessments earlier in the process when it would seem pretty obvious where things are leading.

For example when you get this:-

Hopefully this data analysis may give an indication as to how the ac came to be configured as it was in the moments prior to the incident. Your simple uninformed and rushed conclusion of 'it simply ran out of fuel' is not only factually incorrect, it is also highly disrespectful to not only all those involved in the investigation, but to all that died that night.

The families need the answers and more importantly, the correct answers, no matter how long that may take. Shame on you Pittsextra.

and then this:-

The EC135 remains a 3rd generation helicopter with a modern & comprehensive warning suite of imminent or potential failures. As someone who flies them, and who daily reviews reactions in the event of failures and, possibly more importantly, systems knowledge & understanding, I have full confidence that the belt & braces warning systems will provide me with enough information to greatly assist a keep-us-alive decision. .

or

only if prompted by people who are too ignorant or lazy to explain the difference between "engines being starved of fuel", which appears to have been the case, and "the aircraft/airframe running out of fuel", which was patently not the case. The remaining fuel was enough to get back back to base (albeit below MLA), but was reported as not being in a tank from which it could reach the engines, and it's the reasoning & sequence that led to it that is testing the AAIB, I'd suggest

these people seem to be living in denial.

airpolice

5th Dec 2014, 14:03

I'm reluctant to trawl back through this long thread for references, so please forgive the lack of detail.

My recollection is that when the second engine runs down, the generator drops out and there is no facility to transmit from the Police radios on board. Nor would there be time to get a radio out of where it is stowed.

Secondly, and I am on tiptoe here, all the talk of voice recorders overlooks the fact that if only some people know that things are wrong, only some people can talk about it.

In this particular incident, then a voice track would establish if the crew discussed the fuel state at any stage of the flight. A good series of data tracks would record the time that various events occurred and were presented to the crew.

None of which would necessarily explain why a serviceable aircraft, apart from thrust, failed to end up in the river, on floats.

I point you back to the Dyfedd Powys incident. A proper briefing by an experienced ex military captain, keeping his crew informed and when, from only 400 feet, both engines quit, they shout for help on the way down and all walk away from the aircraft.

Tigerfish, I am surprised at your input here, Sir.

We might never know, we all need to get over that.

tigerfish

5th Dec 2014, 23:40

Zorab, & Airpolice.
Of course I understand the proper way these investigations are handled. and as I said in my last post, I am not expecting detail here, merely an indication on how the investigation is going. But I am increasingly concerned at the time this one is taking!

The accident occurred within a relatively short time of the merging of all the Scottish Forces into one big one. AND as a result, of the aircraft being expected to cover a huge territory instead of being confined to just one force area. Much as since NPAS, a much reduced fleet of aircraft are covering an area in England and Wales, previously covered by many more.

I have always believed that there is an inherent danger in spreading the resource so thinly, that not only is efficiency reduced, but the danger of crew fatigue is increased as well. I don't know, but I am worried, and that is my only driver in this matter.

So I seek assurance that the greater range responsibility of what was once only the Strathclyde aircraft, played no part whatsoever in what happened that night.

It would be doubly unfortunate if the eventual publication of the report were to clash with a very busy news period and get swallowed up as a result. Clearly that would be in no ones interest.

Tigerfish

Pittsextra

13th Feb 2015, 08:13

BBC News - Clutha crash: Sturgeon concern over AAIB investigation delay (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-31304247)

paco

13th Feb 2015, 11:17

Who cares what she thinks? It takes whatever time it takes. Get used to it.

The greatest respect you can give to all involved is get the facts right. Or as right as possible.

Phil

Sky Sports

13th Feb 2015, 16:07

However, the first minister's letter said the final report was now not expected until "mid 2015", thus delaying the work of prosecutors in Scotland.

lack of respect for and understanding of the obligations of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service
risks delay in any decision about criminal proceedings
What she is saying is, can you rush out the report so the lawyers can start coining it in!

helimutt

13th Feb 2015, 17:51

She should keep her mouth shut. AAIB will be ready when they are ready. Just leave the lawyers waiting for now. Dear me!!!

Pittsextra

13th Feb 2015, 17:56

Have you lost the plot??

Isn't it odd how the first thing that gets thought of is the financial reward for a a lawyer engaging in his profession and that its a personal interest of the Scottish first minister!!

Why do you think of those things before the victims? and "rush out a report" really rush???

Your line Phil, it takes as long as it takes, etc is similar to those shouting from the tops of their voices "wait for the report...show some respect, etc." that is the usual response in these matters. And fair enough. Absolutely fair enough.

However I remember talking about this accident in the springtime of 2014 with an employee of the CAA and an examiner at an airfield following an LPC and back then the CAA guy was very confident it was fuel mis management.

No doubt there are some further analysis, details since that time but surely the process here could have given further updates beyond the last special bulletin of Feb 14th 2014 (almost a year exactly!).

If there has been so much detailed work to do in the interim period why not talk to people about what that is? Isn't that also respectful of the families who lost lives?

One aspect of this that people find huge mystery in is that "why, following the double engine failure, an autorotative descent and flare recovery was not achieved."

Well maybe because people are not perfect all the time? Bit like the example I used when people snear at a R22 low time pilot... Even the very best can make errors, even in good VMC!

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/service-inquiry-incident-involving-gazelle-xz936-on-2-june-2014

paco

13th Feb 2015, 19:17

I haven't lost the plot at all. In fact, I have kept out of this thread because I got fed up looking at all the nonsense from people who either haven't done a type rating course on the machine or, if they have, were playing with their ipads at the time.

Actually, I think he must have done some sort of proper landing, otherwise the helicopter would have squished everyone in the pub straight away. My feeling is that he landed, having pulled everything possible (because people in the pub just heard a slight thump) and then the roof gave way. But then, what do I know? I don't know what the official cause of death for the people in the machine was.

Pre-empting the report, one problem that should be addressed is that engine offs in twin are not practised - yes, you have two engines, but both have been known to fail, as with Jeremy Howe's 355 way back when. Even if it's not the same machine, some practice is better than none. Considering that, I think it is entirely possible that the pilot did a good job, however the situation was arrived at. I say this having had a real engine failure at night in a single and not bent the machine.

If there is one organisation in this world who are apolitical and should be left to get on with their job it is the accident investigation people. AAIB, NTSB or whoever. I do appreciate that some people require "closure" but sometimes you just have to wait.

Rant over.

Phil

Pittsextra

13th Feb 2015, 21:06

That's a great post phil. I'm just not sure why the aaib - in doing their excellent and independent work - can't publish an update inside the 1 year of all that detailed investigation, especially given all the lives that have been affected by this accident. I don't think it's surprising at all that others seem to share that view.

DOUBLE BOGEY

13th Feb 2015, 21:58

Pitts as usual you take the provocative line. Paco, keep your powder dry bud and wait for the report. Don't let Pitts draw you in!

Sky Sports

13th Feb 2015, 22:43

Pitts,
If you actually read the BBC link you will see that the last update was given on 11 Dec 2014, and not 14 Feb 2014.

G0ULI

14th Feb 2015, 01:21

Why am I not surprised that a final report will not be released until after the General Election and a new budget has been set?

The details already released and speculated upon indicate that this incident is going to result in a very large compensation bill. There just isn't any money put aside in the budget to pay.

Police forces and most large organisations don't have insurance policies. They deposit a bond with the Royal Courts of Justice (or Scottish equivalent) promising to pay any compensation awarded, because they are underwritten by the government, or have corporate assets to cover any likely sums awarded.

Since the government doesn't have any money apart from income derived from taxation, it is the taxpayer that is going to end up ultimately footing the bill, as always.

Look at it this way, the longer it takes, the more opportunity you have to save for the inevitable tax hikes that are on their way to pay for it all.

paco

14th Feb 2015, 04:58

You are assuming that the operator is responsible. If you want conspiracy, certain manufacturers are well known for weaselling out of situations like this. I, for one, trust the AAIB to resist pressure like that. I wouldn't trust many others.

Phil

MOSTAFA

14th Feb 2015, 05:08

Hear hear Paco very well said.

OvertHawk

14th Feb 2015, 08:13

G0OULI

Whilst this aircraft was contracted to the police, it was operated by a commercial operator who provided its' pilot.

Compensation will be a matter for that operator and their insurance company unless it can be established that some action by the Police was the cause of the event - unlikely it would seem.

So the overburdened taxpayer is off the hook on this one - sorry to ruin your most creative conspiracy theory. (And in the case of Police units that do / did operate their own aircraft they were NOT self insured - they were the subject of specific insurance policies as required by legislation).

OH

rantanplane

14th Feb 2015, 09:09

Looks like Scotland wants to get some big compensation from an English company. In this respect the delay from the AAIB might be a bit political and perhaps they try to find evidence to reduce compensation

El Grifo

14th Feb 2015, 09:23

"Scotland" as in the entire nation ? Sweeping statement is it not. Care to elucidate ?

El G .

G0ULI

14th Feb 2015, 09:43

OvertHawk

I am convinced that the AAIB report will be an unbiased summary of the facts established and free from political interference, other than delay in publishing the final report.

There is an inevitable political aspect to this enquiry, no matter what the eventual findings. Depending on the amount of any compensation eventually awarded, a private company or insurer could seek protection in bankruptcy, which is where the taxpayer will end up footing the bill. No conspiracy required.

There are obvious implications for NPAS in respect of reducing the potential for future accidents while overflying populated areas and perhaps the deployment of unmanned drones in support of police operations. So maybe another tranche of major investment needed to improve safety levels? That certainly isn't covered in the current NPAS budget.

rantanplane

14th Feb 2015, 09:46

Well if Scotland's first minister is asking to spool up for compensation claims..
Scots tend to say "Scotland" when talking about individual aspects.
It will be a very complicated case with many different aspects, claims, parties and interests. Is Police Scotland asking for compensation from the service provider, or the other way round? Has Police Scotland some general responsibility in this case? Any little minor faults within the aircraft and its system, which could relate to the accident?

Bravo73

14th Feb 2015, 09:50

Depending on the amount of any compensation eventually awarded, a private company or insurer could seek protection in bankruptcy, which is where the taxpayer will end up footing the bill. No conspiracy required.

Do you know anything about the company involved? Judging by your unsubstantiated comments and conspiracy theories, I'm guessing not.

Bond Air Services is the largest provider of Air Ambulance services in the country. They are now owned by Babcock International Group, a FTSE 100 listed company with a market cap of approximately £5bn. Neither company is going to be filing for bankruptcy over this. :hmm:

G0ULI

14th Feb 2015, 10:39

Bravo73

It doesn't matter who provides the service, whether by PFI or direct funding. Any compensation awarded or increased safety regulations and costs will need to be recouped by increasing the cost of new contracts. The taxpayer still ultimately ends up footing the bill. Still not a conspiracy theory, just sound business management.

Vendee

14th Feb 2015, 10:51

Well if Scotland's first minister is asking to spool up for compensation claims..

I've read the First Ministers remarks in the BBC report referred to above and I can't find the word "compensation" anywhere.

rantanplane

14th Feb 2015, 11:32

I've read the First Ministers remarks in the BBC report referred to above and I can't find the word "compensation" anywhere.

quite right, from the letter:

"That risks delay in any decision about criminal proceedings and the holding of a Fatal Accident Inquiry which I am sure you will agree is an unsatisfactory position."

Surely nothing to do with compensation?
There is an other aspect too. People, inclusive victims, want to get over it and want to move on. It is frustrating for them if the report is delayed for unknown reasons.

SilsoeSid

14th Feb 2015, 12:12

Whilst this aircraft was contracted to the police, it was operated by a commercial operator who provided its' pilot.

Compensation will be a matter for that operator and their insurance company unless it can be established that some action by the Police was the cause of the event - unlikely it would seem.

Really?
Access to a company ops manual or the old 612, more specifically in detail part 2, may offer a differing view. (I don't know which OM was in use at the time)

Just another piece of this massive jigsaw.

Bravo73

14th Feb 2015, 13:13

It doesn't matter who provides the service, whether by PFI or direct funding. Any compensation awarded or increased safety regulations and costs will need to be recouped by increasing the cost of new contracts. The taxpayer still ultimately ends up footing the bill. Still not a conspiracy theory, just sound business management.

You are just demonstrating your ignorance again. This has got nothing to do with PFI.

Vendee

14th Feb 2015, 13:42

quite right, from the letter:

"That risks delay in any decision about criminal proceedings and the holding of a Fatal Accident Inquiry which I am sure you will agree is an unsatisfactory position."

Surely nothing to do with compensation?

I note you have left large gaps between your lines or perhaps its just that I can't read between them in the same way you must be doing?

rantanplane

14th Feb 2015, 16:53

I note you have left large gaps between your lines or perhaps its just that I can't read between them in the same way you must be doing?

Vendee,

Good hint, perhaps I should make the gaps even larger ..

Albeit no guarantee they will be filled in with evidence in black on white.
Regarding previous information, I understood the AAIB and the aircraft manufacturer tried to read out information stored in electronic components. Have not heard the outcome yet. Perhaps the sequence of fuel pump usage can be recovered in some way or the other (logged amp figures?) which could give a clearer picture of the switch settings during the flight. Have the switches been shifted in relation to what was indicated on the panel? Maybe an (earlier) panel fault could have caused some wrong understanding of the situation and fuel management. Some outcome could change the set up of the :yuk: legal battle.

SilsoeSid

14th Feb 2015, 19:46

Of course, we are all assuming it was the pilot that switched the prime pumps on, but what if .....

Pittsextra

15th Feb 2015, 17:03

Pitts,
If you actually read the BBC link you will see that the last update was given on 11 Dec 2014, and not 14 Feb 2014. Sky that would of course be entirely relevant but for the fact Nicola Sturgeon's letter was dated December 3rd. [to be fair to you that isn't reflected in the BBC story but it is in the Herald Scotland story of the same here (http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/clutha-sturgeon-had-concerns-about-investigation.1423417381)

Perhaps therefore it was her letter that encouraged the meeting on Dec 11th?? Who knows.

Pitts as usual you take the provocative line. Paco, keep your powder dry bud and wait for the report. Don't let Pitts draw you in! Come on, provocative line, actually yes maybe. Got to say I don't think the AAIB have been timely at all over the recent fatal helicopter accidents. You might have a different view and if you do then fine, but at least say it and why.

As has been said elsewhere companies that operate these machines are often part of multi billion dollar corporations. If (for example) funding was an issue at the AAIB then given investigators (if you take the recent advert in Flight international for an investigator as and example) are a £70k-ish resource it becomes hard to understand how that kind of funding can not be raised.

If of course we even think that might / could be of issue.

I personally find it difficult to understand how it can take so long to come to a reasonable conclusion in the current timeframe and if it does why the issues can not be communicated effectively.

Its just a view however and in the grand scheme of whats happened here I'm not sure where the term "keep your powder dry and wait for the report" fits. Whatever the outcome I'm not sure it matters who is right first and it certainly isn't the motivation of my postings. This is an internet forum.....people have differing views... some of them utter ****e... that cant be a surprise.

Of course getting the handbags out over EC135 fuel pumps isn't new...starting post 80 here (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/189945-ec135-4.html) over 10 years ago

Self Loading Freight

28th Apr 2015, 23:38

The Scottish Review said today in a long piece about the Clutha crash that it has asked the AAIB (http://www.scottishreview.net/KennethRoy11a.html?utm_source=Sign-Up.to&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=8427-338672-Wall+of+silence%3A+the+Clutha+Bar+mystery) when the preliminary report, promised to be out within weeks of November 2014, 'in early 2015', was going to be available, and what had happened to it.

The AAIB said in reply "For your information AAIB is expecting to publish the final report in the middle of 2015", and nothing else.

So - no preliminary.

tigerfish

29th Apr 2015, 00:06

Its now probably more a case of waiting for a suitable other ultra newsworthy occurrence, under cover of which to launch this critical report.

I am sure that it will be nothing to do with a Govt that a few months previous to the accident combined all Scottish forces into one, and thereafter expected a resource that previously covered a single force now covered a whole country! Nothing to do with a mission that pushed the average relatively short mission duration to beyond the capability of the A/C

No nothing at all similar to NPAS style of operations previously undertaken by plus or minus 30 helicopters soon to be undertaken by about 15!

TF

Pete O'Tewbe

29th Apr 2015, 13:01

SLF

What do you mean by "no preliminary"?

212man

29th Apr 2015, 13:28

What do you mean by "no preliminary"?

Quite - the actual AAIB response was regarding the draft final report, a preliminary report has been published. Does anybody seriously think a draft report should be put into the public domain? :ugh::ugh:

BossEyed

29th Apr 2015, 16:08

Its now probably more a case of waiting for a suitable other ultra newsworthy occurrence, under cover of which to launch this critical report.

I think that is a wholly unwarranted slur on the integrity of the AAIB. I further think you should consider withdrawing it.

Pittsextra

29th Apr 2015, 17:38

Why is it a slur? Lets take this BBC news story as a line in the sand.

AAIB ready to publish report on Clutha helicopter crash - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-30244060)

In November 2014 the statement from the AAIB was:-

The statement said: "This, together with further examination of the aircraft and subsequent tests, has now been completed, to the extent that the investigation team may reach its conclusions.

"Several weeks are still required to complete the draft final report and it is expected that this draft will be circulated to 'interested parties', as defined by the Regulations, for comment early in 2015.

"The final report is expected to be published in the middle of 2015."

So describe the process that now follows and maintains the highest level of integrity that befits the AAIB. I struggle to see how an independent board investigating the facts of the matter need to circulate drafts...

Either the team were able to reach conclusions or as it has published many times in the past it is unable to conclude matters.

dervish

29th Apr 2015, 18:44

Does anybody seriously think a draft report should be put into the public domain?

Correct. Interested parties only. The final report will be quite different to the draft! See the mil threads on here.

HeliComparator

29th Apr 2015, 20:06

I struggle to see how an independent board investigating the facts of the matter need to circulate drafts...

You are struggling because you are attempting to analyse and pronounce on areas of which you have no knowledge.

The short answer is that circulating the draft report to involved parties for comment is required by ICAO annex 13. All countries' accident investigation departments (who are members of ICAO) have to comply with that. If you disapprove I suggest you write to ICAO and explain that you think they are doing it all wrong.

The purpose of the process is to allow comments to be received. These comments may or may not be used to amend the report, that is up to the reporting body. It helps prevent misunderstandings or minor factual inaccuracies from making it into the final report.

HeliComparator

29th Apr 2015, 20:11

Correct. Interested parties only. The final report will be quite different to the draft! See the mil threads on here.

No, not really interested parties (after all, the press would be most interested!) but involved parties such as the operator, manufacturer of airframe and engines, and regulator

BossEyed

29th Apr 2015, 20:26

Why is it a slur?

Because tigerfish is not so subtly suggesting that the AAIB might publish their reports to a timescale dictated by national politics; specifically in order that the public will be distracted from the contents of those reports by more 'newsworthy' stories.

It's an unpleasant assertion without supporting evidence.

Where has there ever been a credible example of the AAIB behaving in such a manner? (Outside of the strange mind of Ms Sturgeon, of course.)

Pittsextra

29th Apr 2015, 21:46

The purpose of the process is to allow comments to be received. These comments may or may not be used to amend the report, that is up to the reporting body. It helps prevent misunderstandings or minor factual inaccuracies from making it into the final report.

The comments stem from the timescales... 4-5 months to engage with parties that have likely already been involved in the process that generated the draft..

I doubt in this case minor factual inaccuracies will make a hill of beans difference to the reasons for the crash or the people who have been most affected by the events, do you??

HeliComparator

29th Apr 2015, 22:47

4-5 months to engage with parties that have likely already been involved in the process that generated the draft..

I doubt in this case minor factual inaccuracies will make a hill of beans difference to the reasons for the crash or the people who have been most affected by the events

I really think you should familiarise yourself with ICAO annex 13 before launching these criticisms of the AAIB. The annex requires the reporter to allow at least 60 days for comments to come back. It can't really do much until all comments have been received since it is quite likely that the comments will be conflicting. Only after 60 days can it start to evaluate the comments to see whether they should be incorporated into the report or merely included as an appendix (ie "we received this comment, but decided not to modify the report as a consequence").

Although the report does not aim to apportion blame, it is often inevitable that blame becomes apparent from the report and so the fine detail of the wording is often argued over by the various interested parties (who of course are trying to protect their own arses). It is therefore not hard to see how another 60 to 90 days might pass before the report is ready for publication.

I have participated in an accident report (serious, though fortunately not fatal) - as an advisor and fortunately not as one being investigated - and this whole process does take a long time. In my case it was a foreign Board but I am sure it's the same the world over including UK.

Once the final report is published it's pretty hard to backtrack on a point or make a correction and so a lot of time is spent making sure that not only has the Board evaluated the accident correctly, but also that they have communicated their findings unambiguously - that latter part is no trivial task.

dervish

30th Apr 2015, 05:27

No, not really interested parties (after all, the press would be most interested!) but involved parties such as the operator, manufacturer of airframe and engines, and regulator

You are right but I used that term because it has a legal meaning in this context.

DOUBLE BOGEY

30th Apr 2015, 06:33

Helicomparitor, great posts!

Pitts, bow down to the greater knowledge and understanding of your intellectual superiors!

DOUBLE BOGEY

30th Apr 2015, 06:45

Tiger fish, if you believe the assumed extension of mission time caused by combining Police Force areas is to blame for this accident then I am assuming you have decided that a low fuel state caused the accident.

The later may be the case, as yet we do not know. if low fuel state is the issue it could be caused by a technical or human error. again we do not know.

However, to suggest the increased mission lengths created this situation is a one dimensional approach to this complex issue. It rather implies that flying with the potential for running out of fuel is ok as long as the client does not ask to fly too far.

Let the AAIB do their impartial work.

As an aside I have flown Police an HEMS in UK. Whilst there are some awful realities about this tragedy, such as it was a public service helicopter supposed to help the public and of course the exact reverse happened, it is actually just another accident to AAIB. All accidents carry the spectre of litigation by someone against somebody. This accident is no different in these respects so I suggest you kerb the conspiracy theories and accept that for the AAIB, its business as usual.

Pittsextra

30th Apr 2015, 07:05

tigerfish

30th Apr 2015, 07:40

DB, Normally I would be one of the most strident in saying what you have. But don't you think that this one has gone on far longer than is reasonable given all the circumstances?
TF

HeliComparator

30th Apr 2015, 09:14

DB - helicomparitors posts are very good and no doubt he has a good mind... 60 days he says, it's been over 150 days since it was reported they were distributing drafts..

Just saying.

If you actually read what I said, it was a 60 day wait to get the comments back, and then a further significant period to process and maybe incorporate the comments. And then in reality checking the modified draft with the commenters.

We always want the report out "yesterday" but in practice we should bear in mind a few things:

AAIB have limited resources and this accident is just one of many, many they have to look at. They have to prioritise and a case can easily be made that it is more important to concentrate on a "near miss" accident to an airliner with 100s of passengers in order to prevent a repeat that does turn into an accident, than it is to prioritise this "small fry" accident, despite of course the impact the accident had on those involved.

Secondly it will be a difficult accident to analyse with the absence of FDR/CVR. This leads to "balance of probability" type analysis and that presents lots of scope for challenge by involved parties with arses to protect, some of whom are large government bodies.

Just be patient, it will be out when it is out and nothing you say will change that.

RomeoTangoFoxtrotMike

30th Apr 2015, 12:31

DB - helicomparitors posts are very good and no doubt he has a good mind... 60 days he says, it's been over 120 days since it was reported they were distributing drafts (which makes note of the early 2015 timeframe they themselves gave).

Of course there could be all kinds of reasons for snags and hold ups but then if that is the case why not just communicate them? Not willing to engage seems Ivory tower.

Just saying.

In 2008, in the aftermath of the BA38 incident at Heathrow, I posted this, in response to the insistance on "instant gratification", and much the same calls for "report, now!":-

I've just crunched the data on published formal reports by the AAIB back to 2006 (as far back as I could be bothered to go). The average length of time from incident to final report publication is 25.6 months, i.e. a little over two years. This does not and has not stopped them issuing recommendations, where appropriate, before the final report.

I'm quite happy for AAIB to resist the rabid frothing of the news media for sensational information to fill their 24-hour outpourings, and instead concentrate on trying to work out exactly what happened...

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/340666-ba038-b777-thread-42.html#post4043766 The latter paragraph was applicable to the circumstances pertaining at the time.

While there are significant differences between the two events, the tragic deaths being the most obvious, I still prefer that the AAIB ensure that their enquiries is entirely focused on estblishing the facts, as far as it is possible to do, than responding to the demands of "the media"...

Just saying... :rolleyes:

212man

30th Apr 2015, 13:27

The AAIB are positively meteoric in their response compared to some boards, e.g. Report on serious incident near Gullfaks B at Tampen HTZ 1. April 2010 with Sikorsky S-92A, LN-OQE operated by CHC Helikopter Service AS | aibn (http://www.aibn.no/Aviation/Published-reports/2015-02)

5 years to report that: "It was discovered that the seat had detached from the rails because the forward slide stops were missing"

tigerfish

30th Apr 2015, 16:35

RTFM,
Thank you! I have to say that I am surprised and would have expected the average to have been about 12 months less than that. But happy to be proved wrong and accept without question that the important thing is to get it right. So end of spin from me.
Guess its just a bit close to home base for me.
TF

M609

30th Apr 2015, 19:08

The AAIB are positively meteoric in their response compared to some boards, e.g. Report on serious incident near Gullfaks B at Tampen HTZ 1. April 2010 with Sikorsky S-92A, LN-OQE operated by CHC Helikopter Service AS | aibn

5 years to report that: "It was discovered that the seat had detached from the rails because the forward slide stops were missing"

Given the fact that the total number of staff of the AIR part of the Norwegian AIBN is - 8 - .......I think they do well. There has not been a shortage of helo accidents and incidents the last few years unfortunately. That the Tampen case got put on the back burner is not surprising.

jimf671

6th May 2015, 12:33

Clutha helicopter crash: AAIB completes draft report (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-32607159). BBC a few minutes ago.

msmfi

6th May 2015, 16:14

https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib-investigation-to-eurocopter-ec135-t2-g-spao-special-bulletin-s2-2014

Pete O'Tewbe

6th May 2015, 16:36

For the avoidance of doubt, the link provided by msmfi is not the draft report referred to in the BBC report today. Rather, it is the second Special Bulletin on the accident, this one being issued by the AAIB on 16 December 2014.

Pittsextra

12th May 2015, 08:22

Tell us what you know, plead Clutha survivors | News | The National (http://www.thenational.scot/news/tell-us-what-you-know-plead-clutha-survivors.2869)

SilsoeSid

12th May 2015, 12:41

As seen in the rotor heads video thread;

xvVjfzn2QYU

Interesting!

Remember: "Rotorheads A haven for helicopter professionals to discuss the things that affect them"

dervish

12th May 2015, 16:39

Not sure if this has been posted but the Herald ran this on the 8th.

Pilot error 'not the cause' of Clutha crash | Herald Scotland (http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/pilot-error-not-the-cause-of-clutha-crash.125428877)

SilsoeSid

12th May 2015, 17:17

dervish;
Not sure if this has been posted but the Herald ran this on the 8th.

Imho, nothing but a low life scum reporter trying to get in early with a scoop based on his reading of the Feb 2014 Special report.
https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/54897f81e5274a428d0002b4/S2-2014_Eurocopter_EC135_T2___G-SPAO_04-14.pdf

The giveaway is the strap line, "PILOT error was not to blame for the Clutha helicopter crash, it is understood an interim report into the disaster will reveal."

The reporter was told by the AAIB that this wasn't the final report, yet over a year later with the final report looming, he now reports a self proclaimed 'finding'.

Pretty disgusting behaviour from the reporter & editor considering the demand from the families, friends, colleagues & SMP's for answers.
:=

G0ULI

12th May 2015, 21:43

Pilot error and mishandling of the aircraft are most certainly contributory factors in this incident. There may well be extensive mitigating circumstances explaining why the pilot was unable to conduct an autorotation, misreading instruments, faulty fuel sensors, startle factor, loss of situational awareness, etc., etc.

The fact remains that the preliminary reports indicate that the aircraft was essentially airworthy and had sufficient fuel to reach its base. The aircraft could have entered autorotation had the pilot reacted correctly at the time of the dual engine failure. It is debatable whether this would have affected the final outcome when overflying an urban area at night.

Unless the final report reveals some so far unreported catastrophic flight control or structural failure, then pilot error/mishandling has to be the primary cause.

paco

13th May 2015, 04:32

It is my opinion that a proper autorotation (and a landing) was carried out, otherwise the machine would have gone through the roof immediately, rather than the people inside hearing a slight thump and then having the roof fall in a little later. Faulty fuel sensors are hardly pilot error.

Those preliminary reports are very carefully worded.

Phil

Thomas coupling

13th May 2015, 10:46

Paco - where have you been for the entire thread on this? Everyone knows it wasn't auto'd onto the roof. It fell at an enormous speed - fact. There was NO auto of any kind, the blades were all intact and the Tail rotor had stopped turning also. Auto???:mad:

paco

13th May 2015, 12:08

"where have you been for the entire thread on this?"

Most of it is fairly useless and not worth the time taken to read it, to be quite honest.

I was wondering why didn't it go straight through the roof and take more people with it? If the speed was that enormous, shirley it wouldn't have been in that good a condition?

I was taking exception to the poster above who was quoting pilot error based on speculation, when the correct term should probably be human factors in any case.

Phil

G0ULI

13th May 2015, 14:13

Paco

As has already been covered earlier on this thread, the roof timbers of the Clutha Pub were made of 14 inch square timber beams designed to hold up five floors of industrial warehousing that were previously built above the premises.

There are video, eye witness accounts and radar plots to substantiate the fact that the aircraft did not enter autorotation. The main rotor blades stalled and neither the main rotor or tail rotor were turning at the moment of impact.

No structural defects have been noted to date that would affect the effectiveness of the flight controls.

All documented and officially reported.

Given all the above, pilot error and/or mishandling of the aircraft are highly likely to have been the most significant factor in this incident. Given the published flight profile, the pilot was apparently unconcerned about the fuel state and the dual failure of the engines would have been unexpected, to say the least. Total engine failure in twin engine helicopters was regarded as an event so unlikely that virtually no training was undertaken to cover such events, although that may have changed now.

So there may well be a case to make that the pilot was faced with a situation for which he had received little or inadequate training. However there is nothing to suggest that if the correct control inputs had been made immediately the engines flamed out, that the aircraft would not have entered an autorotative state. While a successful autorotation might not have resulted in a "safe" landing, this flight effectively ended as soon as the main rotor was allowed to stall, many hundreds of feet above the ground.

oggers

13th May 2015, 15:01

Total engine failure in twin engine helicopters was regarded as an event so unlikely that virtually no training was undertaken to cover such events, although that may have changed now.

Not so in the British military G0ULI. All pilots are thoroughly trained in case of double engine flameout. There was even a case in the '90s where an RAF SK (or possibly Wessex- can't recall off the top of my head) had one, went into full auto and then got the donks restarted. Only makes this accident all the more difficult to comprehend, and I agree it's hard to see how pilot error wasn't a significant factor, but I am keeping an open mind until the final report is out.

B407

13th May 2015, 15:30

IIRC, S-76 C+ Initial training at CAE about 18 months ago included 6-8 autos with both engines failed. Not requiring superhuman skills even for a student with no multi helicopter experience, but then it was in a simulator and I knew it was coming.

CharlieOneSix

13th May 2015, 15:38

Total engine failure in twin engine helicopters was regarded as an event so unlikely that virtually no training was undertaken to cover such events, although that may have changed now.

You must be joking! In every twin I ever flew in nearly 40 years of flying helicopters, training covered double engine failure. It was then practiced/examined every six months on a VMC base check, both by day and by night and also on every IMC base check under the hood - the latter with a simulated ground level at altitude and the former with a low level recovery.

Many years ago the late Dougal Douglas had a double engine failure in IMC at 4000ft in a 332 near Peterhead due to icing and managed to get an engine going again whilst in auto.

B407

13th May 2015, 17:00

managed to get an engine going again whilst in auto.

Now that IS superhuman! :ok:

SilsoeSid

13th May 2015, 17:17

From 2011
Double engine failure on German Chancellor's helicopter

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/446214-double-engine-failure-german-chancellors-helicopter.html

G0ULI

13th May 2015, 17:45

Okay, double engine failures happen, but they are not that common compared to the number of flights undertaken.

cyclic

13th May 2015, 17:52

Lapsed PPL who has an interest in aviation...

Please don't feed the troll:ugh:

SilsoeSid

13th May 2015, 19:16

Please don't feed the troll :ugh:

Aw, but it's just opened itself up for supper :E

What our lapsed ppl friend is saying is that the complete crew ignored a whole host of both aural and visual indications, cautions & warnings, let alone 'the sense & feel' of the aircraft itself.

The lay troll gives itself away with the comment;
"Given all the above, pilot error and/or mishandling of the aircraft are highly likely to have been the most significant factor in this incident. "

I say 'bollix' to that generalisation and realising that we will be revisiting a whole chunk of this thread, ask G0ULI why they think it was that everyone on board the aircraft would ignore everything that was, or was not, going on with the displays that evening!
:ok:

DOUBLE BOGEY

13th May 2015, 20:06

Sid, I am hesitating to post this cos I know this thread is very close to you, but......just wait for the report. We need an open mind on this one!

G0ULI

13th May 2015, 20:52

SilsoeSid
While police officers are naturally an inquisitive bunch, they are trained to keep their mouths shut and their eyes and ears open when on a job. The place for questions is on the ground, not in the air when the pilot is concentrating on doing his job and the police observers are doing theirs.

If the expert (pilot) says, "Nothing to worry about." Then the observers would be expected to just accept that and save any further comment for the canteen afterwards.

Too much deference to the authority of an expert? Perhaps, but that is the way the Job works or used to work.

Yes I have a lapsed PPL. Yes I have an interest in aviation. Yes I have been involved in a fatal air accident investigation. Yes I have known close friends and colleagues who have been involved in a police helicopter crash - all survived but the aircraft was written off. Yes I have been directly involved with police aviation. No I don't want to give specific details for reasons of personal privacy and official secrecy.

I more than most appreciate the desire to exonerate all on board from any blame whatsoever, but the published evidence to date is not looking too good on that front. I could not read the Herald report without commenting that it contradicted pretty much all the official data published to date.

Thomas coupling

13th May 2015, 21:22

Have I missed something here. Apologies if I have mis-read Charlie16 and oggers posts but No-ONE - not the military , nor civvies teach double engine failure practice and this has been the case for ages. I was one of the last people to ever fly a double engine off to land in a Seaking in the 80's. And unless there has been a re-introduction since 2008 when I last flew civvy twins, the same applies to GA/commercial. It is deemed too risky and too expensive if errors creep in.
You may be referring to AUTO (engines @ flight idle....or simulator trips, but definitely NOT EOL's.
With that in mind, I think Gouli (with or without his "lapsed PPL") is onto something we all are thinking about but may prefer to keep quiet. The pilot flew twins in the mil before flying twins for the police. He had never flown a genuine double EOL - possibly (POSSIBLY) for decades.
The last radar return showed the cab @ 400'. He was in the approach to his base and possibly descending further when the sequence of engine failures commenced. It may be that he was around 200-400' when he lost the remnants of his flyable Nr. Can he ever have recalled what that felt like? Methinks - probably not. The cab demolished 14" thick solid hardwood beams. That tells you something about his terminal velocity.
Perhaps this report, when it comes out - is going to generate a LOT of soul searching amongst pilots who can't remember or don't know how to fly a twin safely onto the ground without both engines. :sad:

SilsoeSid

13th May 2015, 21:37

Amazing what conversations crop up when you supper with a troll ;-)

No-ONE - not the military , nor civvies teach double engine failure practice and this has been the case for ages

Utter tosh!
Having been away from the military for a while, I can't speak for the present, however we certainly practised double engine failures back in 2002 when I last flew a check ride in Lynx. In addition and more pertinent, I can certainly say that I and I'm sure a fair few other 'civvies' have practised a double engine failure ... within the last 6 months, and each 6 months for the last 12 years!

albatross

13th May 2015, 21:47

Thomas:
The company I work for practices double engine failures in the sim on all our helicopters every 6 months. 139, 225, 76, 92 ect. In pre sim days we practiced them to a power recovery at least once a year in the 212 and 76.
One must remember that a tail rotor failure can also lead to a dual engine shutdown.
In any case the rule in any type be it single or twin should be to lower / raise collective as required to maintain RPM in the green. If that is all you have time to do is that then that is the first and only priority. No RPM = a very bad outcome.
I have followed this thread since it's tragic beginning and have no idea or theory as to what happened.
In single engine times we practiced "full on" outos in 204s, 205s, 206s all models, 350s, 500s and, dare I speak of them, 47s every year. We never bent a machine in practice. Perhaps we were just lucky in having great training pilots.

DOUBLE BOGEY

14th May 2015, 07:18

Double engine failure to EOL is routinely practised in FFS for most heavy helicopter types in CAT operations in UK and in so far as I know, worldwide.

The risk of damaging the helicopter in doing this exercise in the real helicopter are just to great when considered against the chances of it ever happening for real.

As a result of reent fatal accidents the methodology and emphasis on NR monitoring after the first engine has failed has improved along with the CRM aspects of running a relight drill.

TC is probably technically correct, that no one is doing real EOLs in MEHs. However the value of completing this exercise in a good FFS cannot be understated and is the best compromise to preparing crews well and protecting live airframes.

Coconutty

14th May 2015, 07:24

If the expert (pilot) says, "Nothing to worry about."
Then the observers would be expected to just accept that
and save any further comment for the canteen afterwards.

Really ? :ugh:Which Police Aviation CRM Courses has GOULI been on ?

Coconut

SilsoeSid

14th May 2015, 08:16

Which Police Aviation CRM Courses has GOULI been on ?

I particularly like;
"While police officers are naturally an inquisitive bunch, they are trained to keep their mouths shut and their eyes and ears open when on a job. The place for questions is on the ground, not in the air when the pilot is concentrating on doing his job and the police observers are doing theirs. "

Closely followed by;
"No I don't want to give specific details for reasons of personal privacy and official secrecy."

http://files.gamebanana.com/img/ico/sprays/totallynotaspy_veiw_2.jpg
G0ULI

SilsoeSid

14th May 2015, 08:17

No-ONE - not the military , nor civvies teach double engine failure practice and this has been the case for ages.

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/SRG2138Issue05.pdf

2.6 Autorotative descent
2.6.1 Autorotative landing (SEH only) or power recovery

5.7 IMC Autorotation with power recovery

All Mandatory

TC, bearing in mind your words, have you read the False Representation Statement on the form?

SilsoeSid

14th May 2015, 09:09

How the fuel situation got to where it was is one thing, but what everyone needs to think hard, very hard about when coming up with their version of events, post flames-out, is how;

Two tonnes of helicopter,
Falling at a speed in excess of 100 kts,
Ended up in in a hole no larger than the aircraft itself,
With the transmission stopped the moment just before impact.
And the aircraft remaining in one piece.

:confused:

DrinkGirls

14th May 2015, 10:01

Mmmmmmmmm, I don't know... oh, possibly:

Autorotate...... 150', flare flare flare, check!! Level!! Cushion!! Bleed lever bleed lever, sh1t!! Lever fully up and we still have 40ft to go!!

Not a certainty by any means....... just a thought

DrinkGirls

14th May 2015, 10:07

Last time I did autos in the simulator, they were pretty realistic. I am confident that my EOL skills are sufficient to get me down safely in a normal area.

paco

14th May 2015, 10:07

More or less my point exactly.

phil

DrinkGirls

14th May 2015, 10:23

People here are not arguing to exonerate the crew!! They just want the truth to come out. WHAT information did the pilot see versus WHAT was ACTUALLY happening. Both may or may not be the same.
The families will be angry it is taking so long, I know that I would be. However, the families will want the investigation to be thorough and accurate as well. I can only imagine what they are going through.

Here is a question for you all out there: What do YOU want from this investigation??? Someone to blame? The exact events? or possibly to make sure the likelihood of a repeat ever happening is reduced?

We all want to see all of the above, but different groups prioritise in a differing order. It takes as long as it takes.

oggers

14th May 2015, 12:09

TC
Have I missed something here. Apologies if I have mis-read Charlie16 and oggers posts but No-ONE - not the military , nor civvies teach double engine failure practice and this has been the case for ages. I was one of the last people to ever fly a double engine off to land in a Seaking in the 80's. And unless there has been a re-introduction since 2008 when I last flew civvy twins, the same applies to GA/commercial.

But but... I was always under the impression that when I heard the key words "Practice double engine failure...GO" I was training for, er, well, you tell me? Yes the training was simulated engine off (BZ for noticing that - rumour has it that the RAF have awarded medals for less).

Not practicing 'double engine failure in the Seaking to a landing with both engines actually off' is very far from supporting the statement that "virtually no training was undertaken for double engine failure". It is abundantly clear that lots of training was and still is undertaken. That was my point. Maybe the report will identify shortcomings there. We shall see.

[email protected]

14th May 2015, 12:14

Just to clarify - TC does only mean twin-engine EOLs are not practiced in the real aircraft. His previous job in a FFS for the mil gave him lots of time to see pilots carrying out EOLs there (I should know, he flamed out both engines on me enough times):)

Practice double engine failures/PFLs are a staple of twin-engine helicopter training but will terminate in either an overshoot/go around or a full flare recovery to the hover/hover taxi.

Any training is better than no training where EOLs are concerned.

Thomas coupling

14th May 2015, 20:19

Silsoe - is it your age or early onset dementia with you? Please read again and concentrate. I was specific and careful with my wording. Pay attention.
The same goes for the others who jumped down my throat - it is obvious they too are unable to read and digest at the same time.
EOL's are VERY VERY DIFFERENT from practice double engine go failures and from FFS failures. On most of the latter, you are expecting it anyway and prepared.
There is NO-ONE here on Pprune who has done a full EOL in a twin (other than their own aircraft perhaps) to a landing - in the last 20+ years. :eek:

When both engines fail FOR REAL, it costs the average pilot around 1 to 3 seconds to react to the circumstances because they simply cannot comprehend what is going on for that miniscule moment. That will have cost them a major proprotion of their 'useable' and remaining Nr. They will then have to set the cab up into wind, at the correct speed, in balance. This will cost them further Nr decay if they aren't smooth with the controls.
They will also need lots of height to prepare for the inevitable. ANY incursion below minimum Nr will mean an early exit from this life - invariably.

I purposely checked out about a dozen experienced RAF pilots, current on type (twins) in the FFS after the Strathclyde crash. I sprung the double engine failure on them (a) unexpectedly and (b) at low level (400 feet). I kept them in day mode for the exercise. Every single one of them failed to carry out the manouevre successfully. Most lost control of Nr within seconds of it decaying because they simply did not believe it was happening to them at such a low level.
ALL of them noted that the Nr decay was noticeably quicker during a double EOL than it was for a reduction to FI.
Many disclosed that it was the change of 'note' coming from the rotors together with the accompanying silence from the engines......
make of this what you will.

Now add night time, add over a city centre, add lack of experience,:uhoh::uhoh: Dare I say more.

Read carefully before you pipe up in future all of you :ugh:

puntosaurus

14th May 2015, 20:49

https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/agusta-a109a-g-dnhi-9-october-2006

SilsoeSid

14th May 2015, 21:36

Silsoe - is it your age or early onset dementia with you? Please read again and concentrate. I was specific and careful with my wording.

TC, your specific and careful wording says;

"No-ONE - not the military , nor civvies teach double engine failure practice and this has been the case for ages."

IgnQZdcFJBU

4JqmoWAhv5g

G-r5kDF3W84

4UBlWOyC68s

airpolice

14th May 2015, 21:41

TC Wrote:

There is NO-ONE here on PPRuNe who has done a full EOL in a twin (other than their own aircraft perhaps) to a landing - in the last 20+ years.

I know a guy.....

He descended the aircraft to a height of 400 feet agl and reduced the airspeed to 80 KIAS in order to retain good visual contact with his main reference feature, which was a dual carriageway

After the aircraft entered the snow shower, the FUEL PUMP 2 caption on the EDU began to flicker and then remained on. The pilot considered that the No 2 fuel booster pump had also failed and informed the passengers that they would continue the short distance to the operating base. He explained that the engine driven pumps had sufficient suction to draw fuel from the tanks and thereby maintain an adequate fuel supply to the engines. A few seconds later both engines ran down and the rotor RPM decayed. The pilot realised he had suffered a double engine failure and lowered the collective pitch lever in order to try and restore the rotor RPM. He warned the passengers that they would make an emergency landing and saw a clear field ahead, selected the landing gear down and started to transmit a MAYDAY distress call. Near the ground he flared the aircraft and raised the collective pitch lever in order to cushion the touchdown but this appeared to have little effect. The aircraft landed heavily with low forward speed but with a high rate of descent. It remained upright, the tail boom having detached and the main and tail rotor blades suffered major damage.

[ARCHIVED CONTENT] Agusta A109E, G-DPPH (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040317173619/http://www.odpm.gov.uk:80/stellent/groups/dft_avsafety/documents/page/dft_avsafety_508162.hcsp)

Fortyodd2

14th May 2015, 21:58

"There is NO-ONE here on PPRuNe who has done a full EOL in a twin (other than their own aircraft perhaps) to a landing - in the last 20+ years."

Lynx at Hixon, 1996?? Lynx at Leeming, early 2000's??

SilsoeSid

14th May 2015, 22:04

And finally for TC with his specific and careful words of;

"No-ONE - not the military , nor civvies teach double engine failure practice and this has been the case for ages."

Published on 28 Mar 2013
EC135 Type Rating at Bond Training Services, Gloucestershire, UK

2:30 & 3:55
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B407

14th May 2015, 22:56

I visit this forum infrequently but when I do I am invariably reminded of the old saying, "Often wrong, but never in doubt." Cant figure out why. ;)

Thomas coupling

14th May 2015, 23:04

First I'll deal with Airpolice / FortyOdd: I apologise, my comments related to "practicing".
I was not inferring "no-one has ever experienced a double engine failure ever, anywhere"?? The guys you talk of - experienced the real McCoy FFS. I am talking FOR PRACTICE - ready for the real McCoy. I thought you understood that?

Now onto someone with special needs:

Silsoe - what is it with you? Are you being purposefully obstinate, or what.
So for the benefit of SilSoe Sodding Sid, I will shout:

ALL YOUR SODDING EXAMPLES ARE EITHER SIMULATORS OR AUTO ROTATIONS. I MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR IN MY FIRST POST AND THEN RE-ITERATED IT IN MY SECOND POST THAT SIMULATORS AND AUTO ROTATIONS ARE NOT ENGINE OFF'S.
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SIMULATED EOL'S / AUTOROTATIONS TO THE DECK and ENGINES OFFLANDINGS?
If not - I suggest you go back to Argos where you got your PPL from and ask for your money back. :ugh::ugh::ugh::mad::mad:

SilsoeSid

15th May 2015, 01:10

Sorry TC, but as you told us, your words were quite specific and specially chosen.

"No-ONE - not the military , nor civvies teach double engine failure practice and this has been the case for ages."

Those words are just as specific as the words 'Double Engine Failure - Autorotation' as seen in the EC135 Type Rating video at 2:36, a point in the video when double engine failure is being practised. Maybe the words 'Simulator Double Engine Failure' aren't clear enough in the HeliFlight video. Maybe the autorotation of the BO105 wasn't clear enough to be recognised as Double Engine Failure Practise :ugh:

ALL YOUR SODDING EXAMPLES ARE EITHER SIMULATORS OR AUTO ROTATIONS. I MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR IN MY FIRST POST AND THEN RE-ITERATED IT IN MY SECOND POST THAT SIMULATORS AND AUTO ROTATIONS ARE NOT ENGINE OFF'S.
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SIMULATED EOL'S / AUTOROTATIONS TO THE DECK and ENGINES OFF LANDINGS?

Is that all of the sodding examples ... apart from the S-92 and Viper videos? :rolleyes:;)

This one not count either?
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SilsoeSid

15th May 2015, 01:51

TC, as you seem to agree with G0uli about there being no autorotation, I would put it to you both that given the final circumstances described in my post yesterday at 10:09, that an autorotative landing attempt cannot be ruled out, in fact the indications would suggest that there was indeed some form of 'controlled' flight, right until the end.

Here are my observations on his earlier post, the one where you think he's onto something;

There are video, eye witness accounts and radar plots to substantiate the fact that the aircraft did not enter autorotation. The main rotor blades stalled and neither the main rotor or tail rotor were turning at the moment of impact.

There is no video.
How can a radar plot possibly tell if an ac was in autorotation or not?
Eye witnesses heard engine popping and the ac cartwheeling & spinning, how can it be then, as the transmission had stopped, that there is no damage to the blades and transmission system and the ac was in one piece?

No structural defects have been noted to date that would affect the effectiveness of the flight controls. All documented and officially reported.
Correct, so the ac was 'flyable'

Given all the above, pilot error and/or mishandling of the aircraft are highly likely to have been the most significant factor in this incident.

Only if the instrumentation was displaying correctly and you assume that every warning, caution etc was ignored by everyone on board. (This of course does not get around the pilot/crew appreciation of the amount of time in the air with the take off fuel load)

Given the published flight profile, the pilot was apparently unconcerned about the fuel state and the dual failure of the engines would have been unexpected, to say the least.

Agreed, very strange given the length of time 'on tasking.'

Total engine failure in twin engine helicopters was regarded as an event so unlikely that virtually no training was undertaken to cover such events, although that may have changed now.

Apart from every six month on OPC's, both previously and now.

So there may well be a case to make that the pilot was faced with a situation for which he had received little or inadequate training. However there is nothing to suggest that if the correct control inputs had been made immediately the engines flamed out, that the aircraft would not have entered an autorotative state.

Possibly, but given the experience level of the pilot, an autorotative profile wouldn't have been strange, however the location wouldn't be the most ideal for a favourable outcome either way.

While a successful autorotation might not have resulted in a "safe" landing, this flight effectively ended as soon as the main rotor was allowed to stall, many hundreds of feet above the ground.

I would suggest that if the transmission 'stalled' many hundreds of feet above the ground, there would have be a far greater mess than there was and there certainly would have been a lot more damage to the aircraft.

Because of that last paragraph, I would suggest that the ac was indeed under some form of control, right up to the point at which it was a few feet above the roof with the transmission stopped.

Simply out of interest, I for one would like to see a 135 tied down, pulling pitch and the engines chopped, seeing how the blades react to an ever increasing collective input, including through the collective pitch override stop, and to see how that transmission ends up stopping.

My only special need TC, is to understand :(

John Eacott

15th May 2015, 03:09

Because of that last paragraph, I would suggest that the ac was indeed under some form of control, right up to the point at which it was a few feet above the roof with the transmission stopped.

I have no dog in this unedifying fight between SS and TC, but the issue of overpitching and running out of Nr before the skids are on the ground happened to me. I pulled the collective so hard trying to arrest the RoD that I snapped it a couple of inches up from the pivot point.

Hard landing, ripped the roof off, but we survived. Had it been at night, trying to judge the height above the unknown landing area, then an early pull could have well ended in a similar fashion to this accident.

paco

15th May 2015, 04:38

When [both] engines fail FOR REAL, it costs the average pilot around 1 to 3 seconds to react to the circumstances because they simply cannot comprehend what is going on for that miniscule moment. That will have cost them a major proprotion of their 'useable' and remaining Nr. They will then have to set the cab up into wind, at the correct speed, in balance. This will cost them further Nr decay if they aren't smooth with the controls. They will also need lots of height to prepare for the inevitable. ANY incursion below minimum Nr will mean an early exit from this life - invariably.

That's not specific to twins, that's the scenario for any helicopter pilot with a complete engine failure if they are not awake. I say that having had three engine failures in a 206/L with no damage to any machine, one at night.

You don't necessarily have to be into wind either and neither do you need lots of height. You can do a lovely vertical in a 206 from 400 feet (top of the H/V curve).

Phil

Thomas coupling

15th May 2015, 07:21

I haven't got time to read your diatribe SSS.
Paco - don't be a di*k. Doing EOL's from 400 feet pre warned during the day is NOTHING compared to what David experienced that evening.

I simply see the accident this way:

Two phases: Captions/fuel management phase moments before the final descent onto the roof...is one. I will leave this scenario and decision making process that went thru David's mind to the AAIB, David and his maker.

Second phase:

Radar last saw the cab @ 400'. Assuming the pilot was making for his base in a gradual descent on long finals, the captions must have either been on then or were coming on. This distracted him while continuing the descent. Shall we say passing thru 350 feet?
One engine flames out, check down very slightly on the lever - passing 300 feet. Will he continue with his final approach or turn into wind? Passing 275 feet...............second engine fails, passing 250 feet. Into wind??
Flare hard, check down on the collective....does he turn into wind...perhaps no time. Speed is now way back. Passing thru 175 feet, can't see the ground due to minimal visual clues. Speed now zero or minimal fwd speed. Anticipate the surface...passing 100 feet. Raise collective to cushion touchdown....no Nr....passing 75 feet.....................................................

SilsoeSid

15th May 2015, 08:02

Paco;
I say that having had three engine failures in a 206/L with no damage to any machine, one at night.

TC;Paco - don't be a di*k. Doing EOL's from 400 feet pre warned during the day is NOTHING compared to what David experienced that evening.

Well, I think that sums up the cut of TC's jib :=

SilsoeSid

15th May 2015, 08:21

TC, your second phase may be flawed.

According to the S2/2014 Special Report;

"The helicopter’s altitude as it approached the area of the accident was approximately 1,000 ft amsl and its average groundspeed was approximately 105 kt. The last radar return reported an altitude of approximately 400 ft amsl, when corrected for ambient air-pressure."

The crash site is 2.5 miles away from base, so for you to assume that they were at 400' descending with 3 miles to run when suddenly both engines stopped, is a little too much for me to accept. At that range, I would have thought the recorded height of 1000' more realistic and that last radar ping giving 400' was on the final fateful descent.

What you are saying is that the AC was flying over the city less than 200' above the buildings, with over three miles to run.
I don't believe that to be the case at all!

And now that autorotative action that you continue to scoff at seems more likely, doesn't it?

airpolice

15th May 2015, 09:13

Guys, this point scoring is not helping anyone.

Can't you just accept that you have both been wrong in some of your statements?

We might never know what happened that night.

76fan

15th May 2015, 09:41

.... and please don't shout .... I hope that wasn't a new technique taught at CFS when TC went through. I do pity his poor RN students though.

Lonewolf_50

15th May 2015, 12:12

.... and please don't shout .... I hope that wasn't a new technique taught at CFS when TC went through. I do pity his poor RN students though. In the main, flight students are not discussing this accident, seasoned pilots are. That may be the root of TC's frustration with elements of the discussion.

SS points out that "we are not quite sure" problem with the altitude at initiation of the event. Sid expressed my interest in this tragic accident perfectly, which is: I want to understand.

The point I agree with TC on (strongly) is the surprise and reaction time problem between a real loss of both engines, unexpected, and the practice exercises one does to prepare for "the real thing." I too have, a few decades ago, run crews through sim sessions and occasionally toss in an unscripted power loss or malfunction. It really shows the crews where they are "on" and where they are vulnerable. Valuable training, and a use of the sim that can't really be done in the aircraft.

The case of the forced landing cited above, in the snow, reads like the desired "gradual degradation" mode. The pilot saw that things were beginning to go wrong, and thus he was already mentally taking care of what to do if they kept going wrong. When they did, he was on top of it. :ok:

The big unknown for this accident is "how rapidly did things go wrong in sequence" and thus place the pilot (David) in a game of "catch up to the aircraft" over an urban area at night with precious seconds ticking away.

paco

15th May 2015, 12:54

You get even less warning with your head out of the door ;) My second one was at around 200 feet, just hopping over the runway at Manchester. Compressor blade decided to give up.

The thing is with these beasts, you must be continually running through a checklist in your head ALL THE TIME and be VIGILANT (sorry for shouting, but I just want to make the point clear). That's why the Canada Labour Code equates longlining with hard labour.

Phil

Non-PC Plod

16th May 2015, 09:26

A key point to note, I think, when comparing experience of real engine-off landings is the design of modern rotor systems. I was at a briefing by a couple of test pilots earlier this year, who were describing some of the flight testing they do in order to produce the rotorcraft flight manuals etc. All engine failure scenarios apparently assume a pilot reaction time of 1 sec. If you don't react within 1 sec, then all bets are off! With modern rotor systems, some of them can decay in Nr extremely rapidly (compared perhaps to B206 and similar). That is one reason why you will only ever practise double engine failures in a simulator. In the simulator, I often see Nr decaying below 80% with a non pre-briefed double engine failure, on an aircraft which has a minimum power-off Nr of 90%. The test pilots tell me that if the Nr goes below 80%, you are probably toast, as it will be irrecoverable!

jimf671

16th May 2015, 15:10

... ... With modern rotor systems, some of them can decay in Nr extremely rapidly ... ...

When you refer to 'modern rotor systems', do you know what the key characteristics are that cause this behaviour?

Is this about the profiles that enable transmission of more power to the air under the aircraft that correspondingly produce more drag?

Flying Bull

16th May 2015, 15:28

Hi all,
it really can be a problem, if you never experienced the differences between power recoverys and real engine offs.
We´ve trained with both engines in ground idle on Bo105 and BK117.
But it is still different, when an engine quits, giving you a lot of captions and sound
Seen the damages, which engines can have (i.e. a loose generator) you really should prepare for loosing the second engine within seconds - but if prepared, the 1 sec reaction time shouldn´t be really a problem.
I´m lucky, that I can spend some hours every year in a simulator (Helisim) and that there we´re not only practice the normal failures, we also do that in the working enviroment, i.e. low level, heavy, confined area and so on.
Seening the differences in chances of survival between flying "Jackie-Boy" or doing it along the manuals has effect in real life.
Still - double engine failure at night over a city is nothing I want to experiance.

terminus mos

17th May 2015, 01:28

Sid

This one not count either?

I think that is a 205, single engine?

SilsoeSid

17th May 2015, 02:54

I think that is a 205, single engine?

Actually its a 210 terminus; and you are correct, it's single engine (and it would count as a full EOL) ;)
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/192516-bell-210-a.html

Non-PC Plod

17th May 2015, 08:24

When you refer to 'modern rotor systems', do you know what the key characteristics are that cause this behaviour?

Is this about the profiles that enable transmission of more power to the air under the aircraft that correspondingly produce more drag?

Jim,
I'm not 100% sure - I was trying to research it on the net without much success. I am guessing its the combination of rotor profile and inertia which gives the characteristics of that transition from powered flight to autorotative state. I have certainly seen on all the more modern helicopters which I have flown that the Nr is much more sensitive in autorotation (engines on) than ii was in older cabs like the Gazelle or Sea King. It can be very difficult to keep the Nr from rising out of limits if you enter autorotation too abruptly. I would imagine it is the same characteristic which means the Nr will drop rapidly following a power failure if you do not reduce collective pitch or flare quickly enough.

[email protected]

17th May 2015, 10:50

chopjock

17th May 2015, 12:36

Well if you compare say the R22 (relatively new design) with an older design, say a B47, you will see the newer design puts "engine on" performance above engine off performance.
A narrower, smaller,lighter blade is generally easier to turn under power and hence maximise performance. (Especially if you have a small engine).
Generally customers will want better performance figures when the machine is working normally, over good auto rotational performance when the machine goes wrong.
With two engines especially (where the machine is supposed to go wrong less often), carrying around all that extra fuel and the spare engine, a light inertia rotor system leads to better sales / performance figures.
Compare a B212 rotor with an EC135 and you will see what I mean.

AAKEE

17th May 2015, 22:24

My suggestion would be the increased disc loading in modern helicopters.

More powerful engines allow designers to have smaller diameter rotors that just have to work harder to shift enough air downwards - rotor rpms are higher than older helos and so Nr will tend to decay quicker due to the extra drag.

Add in cambered aerofoil sections - high lift usually incurs drag penalties - and the very responsive nature of semi-rigid rotor systems and you have a reasonable recipe for lively Nr characteristics.

Yes, increased disc load and less inertia in rotor system.

Done a hundreds of full Power of autos with Bo105, the decay of rotor rpm isnt very Quick, but without knowing what is going to happen you could easily loose one more second, and be in serious trouble.

The EC135 has about the same rotor diameter but 25% more weight ?

For the Super Puma, I've only done full autos in the sim but I was surprised how quick the rpm was lost if both Engines was lost at the same time. I was a bit skeptical about the reality about that so I did the math for the rpm loss - it actually is that quick. I'd say, if not prepared for it, you dont make it.

SilsoeSid

17th May 2015, 23:48

I'd say, if not prepared for it, you dont make it.

... adding in a possible coupled autopilot and some in cockpit housework distraction such as pre-landing checks, that reaction time increases further.

Looking down at the city here this morning at 1000' agl, thinking where one would go if both donkeys suddenly quit, makes this incident all the more puzzling.

zorab64

18th May 2015, 07:45

AKEE/Chop/Crab all make sense but, in simple form, the understanding is that modern (EC 135 certainly counts) twin engine helicopters utilise rotor systems that are optimised for powered flight, not autorotative flight, due to the ever reducing risk of getting into that regime with modern engine reliability. Comparing modern types with Seakings or 105s is not comparing like with like.
Comparing twins with singles, whilst both turbine & piston engines benefit from modern reliability, is another non-comparison. A single engine pilot flies with an autorotative mindset, in the event of single engine failure, where a twin engine pilot flies with a powered mindset . . . which must be immediately reset to an unfamiliar autorotative one the moment they shutdown/lose one engine.

None of the above absolves a pilot of flying i.a.w. the FLM at all times, as well as maintaining a comprehensive knowledge of systems and the vagaries of indications, something that's already been discussed in some detail on this forum, of course.

Non-PC Plod

18th May 2015, 07:58

SilsoeSid

18th May 2015, 08:30

A very informative and thought provoking part of this thread.:ok:

Having had a 'Land as Soon as Possible' over the city at night recently was interesting enough, at least I had a degree of choice of landing site! The double donkey stop situation restricts that generally to whatever is in the area roughly between your knee and ankle .... Now!!! :eek:

I'm of the thought that for the sake of +/- 30' at the bottom end the outcome may have been different either way :(

DOUBLE BOGEY

18th May 2015, 15:56

Non PC Plod - I am a bit mystified by your comments in relation to MEH Rotors and the belief that SEH Pilots have a mindset that you seem to think insulates them from mishandling when their sole engine fails. There are quite literally thousands of worldwide examples of SEHs ending in smoking heaps due to unexpected engine failures.

All helicopter rotor systems are designed for power off and power on flight. They each have different characteristics due mainly to the rotors inertia, the AUW, and the density altitude prevailing. However, failing to lower the lever and at least resist the change of attitude, or indeed flare, will ultimately result in a catastrophic decay in NR.

Double engine failures in flight in an MEH are in themselves very very rare events BUT the easiest way to produce one is through fuel starvation. Mishandling fuel system contents to the point of starvation in possible on many helicopters including SEH.

In this case it is not yet clear what caused the engines to stop but from the photographic evidence indicating clearly that the blades were not turning at impact and the initial AAIB report suggesting the transmission was not defective I think to any informed helicopter pilot it suggests a strong possibility that the pilot did not achieve a successful autorotation. I personally believe, indicated by the eyewitness statements, that the catastrophic NR decay occurred at a significant height.

Having spent many hours over cities at night I feel that if it happened to me and I achieved a successful entry into auto, that at least some sort of survivable forced landing could be achieved. The aircraft may not look too decent afterwards but a half baked flare and cushion should get me and my pax safely back on the ground. Again the world is littered with examples of a successful auto leading to an EOL where the helicopter goes to hospital but the pax and crew survive intact.

Whatever transpired that night was probably not expected.

Blame or criticism of the pilot is not appropriate but we may learn some lessons from how he managed the situation if the AAIB have enough evidence to form a clear picture of what happened.

Also, in my experience, MEHs are no more difficult than SEHs to autorotate and EOL and in many cases they are significantly easier when they have a good AFCS to assist with the descending flight path control.

Non- PC Plod. I feel your comments on MEH rotors are not relevant or significant in a global context.

DB

SilsoeSid

18th May 2015, 16:53

The initial evidence indicated that the helicopter struck the flat roof of the single story building with a high rate of descent and low/negligible forward speed. Preliminary examination showed that all main rotor blades were attached at the time of the impact but that neither the main rotor nor the fenestron tail rotor were rotating.

The ac hit the roof level, at least laterally anyway, which would indicate to me that there was some form of control. If the consensus was to the contrary, surely by now we would have been be discussing at which point an aircraft would start to roll and pitch as the blades slowed down and any control lost. This in turn leads to the question of how the blades managed to stop in mid air and the aircraft fell level and vertically, perfectly balanced ... if it wasn't under any form of control.

The road junction, like many I have looked at over the last few nights over the city, would be the obvious choice of landing area given the circumstances. I still go with the theory that an autorotative landing was being made to that lit junction and that the roof of the bar wasn't recognised as a roof until the last moment, where everything left was pulled early resulting in the situation of low forward speed, high rod, the blades with no energy remaining and the last thirty feet to go.

https://www.nasa.gov/topics/aeronautics/features/helodrop-mar2010.html#.VVoRdHCkqK0

EsiYEXt_Iok

http://www.abc.net.au/news/image/5126862-3x2-700x467.jpg

dangermouse

18th May 2015, 17:07

The CS29 section that applies is this

The rotorcraft, after failure of one engine, in the case of multi-engine rotorcraft that meet Category A engine isolation requirements, or complete power failure in the case of other rotorcraft, must be controllable over the range of speeds and altitudes for which certification is requested when such power failure occurs with maximum continuous power and critical weight. No corrective action time delay for any condition following power failure may be less than:
(1) For the cruise condition, one second, or normal pilot reaction time (whichever is greater); and
(2) For any other condition, normal pilot reaction time.

I believe that the assumption used nowadays is that for a modern twin (or more) engine aircraft (ie one that is engine isolation compliant) for the cruise condition the 'normal pilot IDT' is used (assumed by the military at least to be 2 seconds) whilst the 1 second intervention time is only applicable for the next engine failure as the pilot is attentive after the first engine failure and 'expecting' the subsequent one.

I dont know if the EC135 meets the Cat A engine isolation case, if not the IDT would be 1 second for a simultaneous double engine failure, if it does, the intervention time logic above may well have been used as the chance of a true simultaneous twin failure is regarded as smaller than 10e-9

anybody from Airbus flight test care to comment?

edited as I saw SS post above whilst typing this, the scenario he postulates does seem very credible and may well account for all the factors we know of.

DM

SilsoeSid

18th May 2015, 19:25

We should find out the exact time between events, and answers to many of our discussions & questions, if the detail in this report from the Sept 2007 T2 incident is anything to go by.

https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422f825ed915d13710006a9/Eurocopter_EC135_T2__G-IWRC_09-08.pdf

FADECs
Both FADECs were returned to the engine manufacturer where they were tested and the internal memory downloaded. The tests established that both FADECs were serviceable and that during the flight the Training and Manual modes were switched off as is normal.
The data from the download revealed that at 4,039 and 4,040 seconds (approximately 1 hour 7 minutes) after the power to the left and right FADECs was turned on, both engines went into One Engine Inoperative (OEI) mode for a period of 0.36 seconds. During this event the left and right engines N1 were, respectively, 93.71% and 91.26%, N2 were 105.23% and 98.13%, and the torques were 63.6 dNm and 65.74 dNm. The OEI event was recorded because the torque from each engine went above the normal limit of 59.52 dNm. The difference in the recorded values for each engine is believed to be due to the sampling frequency of the FADECs.
Engines
Both engines were tested by the engine manufacturer with the FADECs that were fitted to the helicopter during the accident flight. Both engines ran normally and their performance was considered to be within normal in- service limits.

The warning unit was returned to the equipment manufacturer and the data contained in its internal memory was downloaded. There were 31 warnings recorded in the memory; all occurred during the last flight. The oldest warning was generated by the autopilot when the main rotor rpm went above 112%. This warning would have illuminated the AP A TRIM red warning light and caused the ROTOR RPM red warning light to flash. A permanent audio tone, which could not be cancelled and which would remain on while the rotor speed was high, would also have been generated. Successive warnings indicated that the main rotor rpm fluctuated between about 106% and 112%. During this period the AP A TRIM remained illuminated and the ROTOR RPM caption would have flashed whenever the rpm exceeded 106%. In this speed range the permanent tone would have changed to a gong which, unless cancelled, would sound every three seconds. The AP A TRIM warning light then extinguished and the ROTOR RPM flashing warning and gong would have been generated each time the rotor rpm exceeded 106%.
During the last nine warnings the AP A TRIM red warning light illuminated then extinguished before the LOw FUEL warning illuminated. The ROTOR RPM red warning light then illuminated as the rotor rpm went below 95%, which would have also generated a pulsed tone. The final warning was the AP A TRIM, which occurred when the rotor rpm was below 95%.

Engine off landings
In order to perform a normal engine off landing in a helicopter, the pilot must first flare the helicopter at a specific height above the ground. The exact height, which must be carefully judged, depends on the helicopter’s weight and the wind conditions on the day. If the pilot flares too high he looses the benefit of the flare effect and he will land heavily. If he flares too low, then the pilot risks either striking the tail, or landing hard and fast. This manoeuvre is not normally practised by pilots of twin engined helicopters. When it is practised, it is with the SAS engaged; the manoeuvre would be more difficult to fly with the SAS disengaged.

We also need to take into account, as danger mouse says, that "the 1 second intervention time is only applicable for the next engine failure as the pilot is attentive after the first engine failure and 'expecting' the subsequent one."

In the case of SPAO, this second failure would most certainly be expected within the next minute ... if the cause of the first was realised and the displays were operating normally.

Maybe, just maybe, the first failed the cause identified, and a powered immediate approach to the junction was made with the second engine failing in the last couple hundred feet with the power demand high.

The FADECs should bring up the sequence of events to piece it all together.

PLEASE TAKE NOTE:
THE REPORT QUOTED IN THIS POST IS FROM AN INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED IN 2007

G0ULI

19th May 2015, 11:38

I also note that the report comments on the fact that modern augmented stability system helicopters are regarded as more difficult to fly that older types in event of failure of such systems.

Comment was also made to the effect that pilot reaction time responding to such failures needed to be quicker than on older unstabilised airframes. The reaction times were not considered to be beyond the abilities of an average pilot, at least by the manufacturers.

Both points seem to have been confirmed by recent posts in this thread.

In this 2007 incident sudden disengagement of the autopilot resulted in a thud sound above and behind the cabin, which would undoubtably distract attention from the instrument panel for a second or two while a quick scan was made above and behind, a natural and instinctive reaction. Engines spool down, and almost simultaneously a loud bang or thud is heard/felt, ample opportunity for a few seconds of confusion in the dark.

Some of the best, insightful and considered posts of the thread over the last few pages.

terminus mos

19th May 2015, 13:21

Comparing modern types with Seakings or 105s is not comparing like with like

You must have flown a different 105 to me, single engine and in auto, I found it to be quite unforgiving.

SilsoeSid

22nd May 2015, 21:38

I put it to the thread, that the double engine failure and autorotation, (or not) scenario that has been discussed in so much detail recently is a huge red herring. Both engines wouldn't, shouldn't, couldn't have stopped at the same time due to fuel starvation.

Looking at what we have in front of us, imho at 1000' and 100-ish kts the first engine flamed out due to the lack of fuel in it's supply tank. Once it was realised that the other engine was shortly about to follow suit, a single engine powered approach to the junction at the Clutha was made.

Allowing 5 seconds to realise the cause of the first flame out, accept that the other was about to go and to make the decision of where to land immediately, I would suggest that at the 55 second point of this approach the collective would be being applied in order to bring the power in to arrest the descent and complete the final touchdown phase.

With the second engine flaming out that that 55 second point (<100'), the collective would quickly end up in the proverberal armpit, there would be little control or choice of exact landing point and the Nr would be rapidly decaying.

At around 30' the blades had just about stopped due to the factors mentioned previously, the fall from that height wasn't enough to allow for the airframe to roll, but the impact from that height was enough to cause the damage and injuries that it did.

Of course, that's just my opinion, anyone got a simulator? :8

paco

23rd May 2015, 05:37

That makes sense to me. It always bothered me that both engines quit at the same time - even the 355 is arranged so that the engines would go one after the other, fuel wise. I can't see them missing that out on a more modern machine.

Phil

R.E. Porter

23rd May 2015, 09:09

SS,
You say the aircraft hit the roof level and therefore you feel there was some semblance of control during the early part of the descent. Whilst I am not disagreeing, as this may well have been the case, I have seen video of an R22 who lost all RRPM at height due to mismanaging of the lever. This subsequently falls in a level attitude over some considerable time period (especially for the poor souls inside) until the ground. Obviously individual W&B will play its part.

The discussion on Single/twin engine mentality to failures has so many variables I do not think we can tell how anyone will perform. How many hours has the pilot got on singles and how long ago. How quickly and successfully upon losing one engine can you make the mental switch to single engine attitude?

I would venture though that in a modern twin most of our engine failures in training and testing are seen when flying profiles and the reaction of a failure is to pull until she tops then back off a little. Once one engine is gone this training needs to be discarded instantly. Should the second follow very quickly whilst you are still processing the first then this instinctive action even if followed by a corrective lowering of the lever may have sealed your fate. On a twin our muscle memory is being trained to pull up when it goes wrong in comparison to a single.

SilsoeSid

23rd May 2015, 10:01

RE;
You say the aircraft hit the roof level and therefore you feel there was some semblance of control during the early part of the descent.
I'm saying that I think there was control in all of the descent, up until the point at which the Nr had decayed so much that any control was impossible, this could have been somewhere around 50'

Whilst I am not disagreeing, as this may well have been the case, I have seen video of an R22 who lost all RRPM at height due to mismanaging of the lever. This subsequently falls in a level attitude over some considerable time period (especially for the poor souls inside) until the ground. Obviously individual W&B will play its part.
That may well be, however if the Glasgow aircraft fell level from any great height, the impact damage to the aircraft itself would have been greater.

The discussion on Single/twin engine mentality to failures has so many variables I do not think we can tell how anyone will perform. How many hours has the pilot got on singles and how long ago. How quickly and successfully upon losing one engine can you make the mental switch to single engine attitude?
The approach would have been performed on the remaining single engine, the handling of which is practised at least every 6 months.

I would venture though that in a modern twin most of our engine failures in training and testing are seen when flying profiles and the reaction of a failure is to pull until she tops then back off a little. Once one engine is gone this training needs to be discarded instantly. Should the second follow very quickly whilst you are still processing the first then this instinctive action even if followed by a corrective lowering of the lever may have sealed your fate. On a twin our muscle memory is being trained to pull up when it goes wrong in comparison to a single.
As I said earlier, the double engine failure at the same time is, imho, a red herring.

SS

R.E. Porter

23rd May 2015, 10:15

I agree that the approaches are practiced 6 monthly but prior to this incident, and possibly since, the exercise ends with the return to the pad or fly away depending which side of the decision point you are on.

Achieve segment one and two profiles check for fire etc, not often do we discuss and practice the second donkey stopping halfway through this process. The assumption has always been weighted to only one power failure.

We may discuss actions on two fuel filter captions, ensuring the approach will permit a safe entry to auto but for the whole twin pilots up until now, and with good statistical reason, do not expect to be left with no engines at all.

SilsoeSid

23rd May 2015, 12:37

The waters have become murky in the twin/single debate particularly on this thread. Neither of the engines failed as we would normally call it with that debate, they were starved of fuel.

I think the only comparison on this threads situation would be for a single engined ac to be making its approach when the donkey stops just as the power is progressively being brought in at around the 50' point. What do you do? Hoik in all you can to cushion the landing as best as you can and accept what is underneath you, after all it isn't an expected event is it? Is that scenario practised on a single engined ac check?

An example, the engine stops at the 23 second point of this video, what's the outcome likely to be;

vsVKxErciQ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-vsVKxErciQ

We may discuss actions on two fuel filter captions, ensuring the approach will permit a safe entry to auto but for the whole twin pilots up until now, and with good statistical reason, do not expect to be left with no engines at all.

You forget the FUEL PRESS captions, again a situation in which to prepare for engine failure(s),
the actions for which I would like to add, are to switch on the Prime Pumps.

... or perhaps the ENG CHIP captions, again a situation in which to be prepared for engine failure(s).

... or perhaps the FUEL VALVE captions, another situation in which to be prepared for engine failure(s).

So perhaps you can see that twin pilots are not always in this mythological state of mind that some people are spouting, in which only the one engine is going to stop during 'an episode'! Besides, I think you'll find many of us still fly around thinking "Where would I go if it all goes quiet?" (without captions) :eek:

To finish any further debate here on single v twin ( it has its own thread);
for the whole twin pilots up until now, and with good statistical reason, do not expect to be left with no engines at all.
You could say exactly that for modern singles! :ok:

SilsoeSid

23rd May 2015, 13:00

Perhaps the last special led us up the garden path on this a little, with its 'double engine' failure line.

https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422f20340f0b613460003fd/AAIB_S2-2014_G-SPAO.pdf
Ongoing investigation
The AAIB investigation continues to examine all the operational aspects of this accident and to conduct a detailed engineering investigation.
In particular, the investigation will seek to determine why a situation arose that led to both the helicopter’s engines flaming out when 76 kg of fuel remained in the fuel tank group, why no emergency radio transmission was received from the pilot and why, following the double engine failure, an autorotative descent and flare recovery was not achieved.

blackdog7

23rd May 2015, 15:33

Interesting thread.

Noted recently that it is more common than expected to have well over 100 litres in the main tank and have the supply tanks running low to the point where the amber FUEL light illuminates. Have never got to the point where the red FUEL warning light illuminates but it certainly catches your attention how quickly you can "attitude" transfer fuel with the 135. In specific attitudes, you can go from a full supply tanks to less than 50% fuel in the supply tanks in less than 3 minutes. During this process you will also note the quantity of fuel in the main tank increasing.

We can do this very consistently when flying poles, particularly downhill.

BD

Non-PC Plod

23rd May 2015, 19:15

DOUBLE BOGEY: I in turn am mystified as to how you inferred anything from what I posted about the mindset of SEH pilots. I never even mentioned single pilot helicopters!
I agree that rotor systems all have different characteristics, and that delay in lowering the lever is not good. The point that I am trying to make is that modern twins may behave a lot worse that we hope they will at the moment of (second) power failure, and that we don't know this, beacause obviously we never actually chop the throttles. You may not find this relevant, but it seems to me to fit the circumstances we are all discussing.

Non PC Plod - I am a bit mystified by your comments in relation to MEH Rotors and the belief that SEH Pilots have a mindset that you seem to think insulates them from mishandling when their sole engine fails. There are quite literally thousands of worldwide examples of SEHs ending in smoking heaps due to unexpected engine failures.

All helicopter rotor systems are designed for power off and power on flight. They each have different characteristics due mainly to the rotors inertia, the AUW, and the density altitude prevailing. However, failing to lower the lever and at least resist the change of attitude, or indeed flare, will ultimately result in a catastrophic decay in NR.

Double engine failures in flight in an MEH are in themselves very very rare events BUT the easiest way to produce one is through fuel starvation. Mishandling fuel system contents to the point of starvation in possible on many helicopters including SEH.

In this case it is not yet clear what caused the engines to stop but from the photographic evidence indicating clearly that the blades were not turning at impact and the initial AAIB report suggesting the transmission was not defective I think to any informed helicopter pilot it suggests a strong possibility that the pilot did not achieve a successful autorotation. I personally believe, indicated by the eyewitness statements, that the catastrophic NR decay occurred at a significant height.

Having spent many hours over cities at night I feel that if it happened to me and I achieved a successful entry into auto, that at least some sort of survivable forced landing could be achieved. The aircraft may not look too decent afterwards but a half baked flare and cushion should get me and my pax safely back on the ground. Again the world is littered with examples of a successful auto leading to an EOL where the helicopter goes to hospital but the pax and crew survive intact.

Whatever transpired that night was probably not expected.

Blame or criticism of the pilot is not appropriate but we may learn some lessons from how he managed the situation if the AAIB have enough evidence to form a clear picture of what happened.

Also, in my experience, MEHs are no more difficult than SEHs to autorotate and EOL and in many cases they are significantly easier when they have a good AFCS to assist with the descending flight path control.

Non- PC Plod. I feel your comments on MEH rotors are not relevant or significant in a global context.

DB

DOUBLE BOGEY

23rd May 2015, 22:51

Non PC plod, I think we are not understanding each other.

SPH = Single Pilot Helicopter
SEH = Single engine helicopter.

I probably confused you.

theclockworkorange

24th May 2015, 00:46

I noted the helicopter over head on the way home from work. Saw it search near where I live then depart east. watched the telly for a fair bit, And then noted when it came back and searched again.

As an interested amateur under their regular routes and aware of when they are heading for home, I did think at the time that was an unusually long time they were away.

Then I saw the crash news arrive live via facebook.

The crash orientation heading up the road suggested some control.

I guess a human made a mistake and can't believe aircraft have no automatic things to prevent what seems pretty basic. We may actually never know. The bar moves forward though and is refurbing/fundrasing and will open again soon.

DrinkGirls

24th May 2015, 08:38

R E Porter, you insult me.
I have thousands of hours, the majority on twins but a significant amount on single as well.
You tell me what my mindset/thinking is? You tell me I am conditioned for only single engine failures?
Utter Guff! I react the same in any aircraft, something doesn't sound right and the lever is INITIALLY going down whilst my eyes scan for information, starting with the Nr gauge, then other information as required.
Many years ago, I had an engine run down at a very inopportune moment in a large military twin, the other engine was very slow to pick up, I was already autorotating into a winter North Sea. I managed to fly away from 200'asl. It was a very high workload situation.
If that had been a double engine failure, I would have coped, as would most of the experienced people here. There is nothing wrong with the regular testing/training that I receive at the moment from a totally professional major player in the uk onshore industry.
SOMETHING will come out of this report (I hope) that should help us all understand what happened. I am guessing by saying there may be mitigating circumstances for the pilot involved. Who knows, none of us can state fact about the accident.... can we??

Non-PC Plod

24th May 2015, 09:24

Sorry, my typo. I meant single engine, not single pilot!

Non PC plod, I think we are not understanding each other.

SPH = Single Pilot Helicopter
SEH = Single engine helicopter.

I probably confused you.

Helilog56

24th May 2015, 16:18

Porter....if you where trained to pull up on an engine failure on a twin, I would really take a look at that mindset as being a fatal mistake. I fly cranes.....even with the wealth of power available OEI, we do "not", and I repeat do not pull power......where on earth did you ever get your training?

The simple mantra with helicopters no matter what the configuration...."rpm is life, and life is rpm"....:ugh:

Ennio

24th May 2015, 16:41

Quote. By DrinkGirls.
"Many years ago, I had an engine run down at a very inopportune moment in a large military twin, the other engine was very slow to pick up, I was already autorotating into a winter North Sea. I managed to fly away from 200'asl. It was a very high workload situation."

It may be worth pointing out that once you enter autorotation it might appear the other engine is slow to pick up as there is no power requirement for it.
I am sure you are fully aware of this and just wanted to point out to those who have not experienced what you have, that pilots can believe the other engine is not available when it's sat there churning away waiting for the pilot to pull the lever and put it to good use. :ok:

Helilog56

24th May 2015, 17:59

Yes Ennio....that is true, i will clarify that it's not about dumping the collective to enter an auto immediately.

Flying Bull

24th May 2015, 19:30

@Helilog56 - Porter is not totally wrong in saying, in modern twins you pull collective.
It depends on the situation and type flown.
Done it in the sim quite often - drop the Nr down to 330 (or just the low rpm warning coming on/off/on/off), with the remaining engine in Hi-Mode, later stages low mode)
Sometimes its the only way to get out a situation, if you want to fly and not crash into the trees.
But that is normaly done close to the ground, i.e. fly away after or before decision.
In cruise, depending on the height, you might also consider to gain altitude for the event of the other donk quitting - but you have to be quick to keep Nr then - probably have to flare to keep it while lowering the collective.

DrinkGirls

25th May 2015, 07:00

Ennio, correct. The Nr dropped to min limits so autorotation was required, I didn't just do it because I felt like it. The aircraft was close to MAUM (full of cases of German Beer) I had 3 goes of gentle pulling before the other engine responded properly. The FCU was changed on the failed engine and the 'good' engine was airtested and eventually rejected. If I had crashed, I probably would have been ripped apart here for 'pilot error'.
The moral I am trying to get across is that there are always circumstances where people don't have the full story, but are prepared to judge fellow pilots without facts.
I am ALL for theories being voiced on PPrune, even if wrong, they may trigger a thought with someone and save lives. However I don't like people stating 'facts'. It WAS pilot error here????? They DID NOT autorotate at all??? It might be true, but YOU DONT KNOW, YOU JUST THINK

SilsoeSid

25th May 2015, 09:59

Quite agree, we here have very few facts available, facts that will only be available to us once the final report comes out. What we do have however is an awful lot of 'shoulds', even with some of the released facts (https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422f20340f0b613460003fd/AAIB_S2-2014_G-SPAO.pdf) appearing to back up the shoulds, until the final report is issued we still only end up with shoulds, such as;

Should:
We all know the fuel system is designed so that No2 should run out of fuel first, once that engine has flamed out due to fuel starvation, No1 should have enough fuel remaining to run in theory for up to another two minutes.

Fact:
"It was found that the main fuel tank contained 76 kg of fuel, whilst the No 1 supply tank (left) contained 0.4 kg of fuel and the No 2 supply tank (right) was empty. It has also been confirmed, by examination and measurement of the internal design features, that this was the fuel disposition at the time of the accident."

"Preliminary analysis of the FADEC data indicates that the right engine flamed out, followed, a short time later, by the left engine also flaming out."

Just how long was that 'short time'?
Is that 0.4 kg remaining in the No1 supply tank possibly due to the change of attitude at the end of the powered approach, moving it to the rear of the supply tank away from the prime pump/fuel pick up, which pictorially is in the centre of the tank?

"This Special Bulletin contains facts which have been determined up to the time of issue. It is published to inform the aviation industry and the public of the general circumstances of accidents and serious incidents and should be regarded as tentative and subject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available."

... so until we have the final report with the FADEC data and relative timings etc, we still end up with all those 'shoulds' and more questions.

SilsoeSid

25th May 2015, 10:03

"Is that 0.4 kg remaining in the No1 supply tank possibly due to the change of attitude at the end of the powered approach, moving it to the rear of the supply tank away from the prime pump/fuel pick up, which pictorially is in the centre of the tank?"

http://i118.photobucket.com/albums/o95/ichris7/Pagesfrom2013-12-19_EC135_fuel_system-1_zps324cd9d5.jpg

With a more level approach, could the engine have continued to run long enough to make that landing?

Fuel consumption;
twin 3.5kg/min
single c.2kg/min = 1kg/30 secs = 0.33 kg 10 secs

paco

25th May 2015, 10:59

I don't fly this particular machine, but isn't that arrangement very similar to the Longranger where, if there is a blockage between the main and supply tanks, you would get an indication of low fuel yet with enough remaining on the fuel gauges?

Phil

Flying Bull

25th May 2015, 20:08

Hi Paco,
to make things clearer for the ones not familiar with the EC135:

http://www.polizeifliegerstaffel.de/test/135/135_1.jpg

http://www.polizeifliegerstaffel.de/test/135/135_2.jpg

http://www.polizeifliegerstaffel.de/test/135/135_3.jpg

so with everything going according to plan, one should have an idea, where how much fuel is and if the supplys are going empty with fuel still in the main tank.
B U T ....
things can go wrong - and information gathering can be be difficult, when busy with other things....
Lets see, what the final findings are and what we can learn from that.

SilsoeSid

22nd Jul 2015, 21:47

Anyone heard of any updates/releases?

Rigga

23rd Jul 2015, 22:43

When the report is fanally released I'm sure it'll have its own wings and we'll all know about it within minutes.

tucumseh

24th Jul 2015, 07:50

I'm told The Clutha re-opens to the public today. I suspect many a glass will be raised.

tigerfish

22nd Oct 2015, 17:02

I wonder if any consideration was given to tasking and the effects of fatigue?

The tragedy occurred not long after the machine was changed from having a solely Strathclyde responsibility to one covering the whole of Scotland.

Until that change took place, the machine & crew would have flown typical UK Police missions of relatively short duration, mainly less than one hour.

But the accident happened after a flight of well over two hours, and which ever way you cut the argument they would have been critically short of fuel - even if there was, as has been said some fuel remaining.

So could crew fatigue have affected the way the problem was managed?

I am sure that this aspect will have been considered, but if not why not?

This whole aspect of range effectiveness and mission duration has been sidelined since NPAS came to rule and must not be forgotten. And yes I do realise that the accident aircraft was not an NPAS machine and was operated on behalf of Police Scotland. But type duration applies both side of the border!

TF