NH90

[Savoia]

French Army's NH90 TTH helicopter conducts initial naval trials

The French Army Aviation's (ALAT) NH90 tactical transport helicopter (TTH) has successfully conducted its initial naval trials onboard the second Mistral Class amphibious warfare ship, BPC Tonnerre.

http://farm3.staticflickr.com/2835/11088579565_618fed3de8_b.jpg

Carried out at an undisclosed location, the trials enabled the helicopter's maximum take-off weight to be uprated to 10.6t, while additional trials, which are planned for March 2014, will lead to the helicopter's clearance for shipboard missions.

The helicopter's initial operational capability (IOC) is planned for mid-2014, when four NH90s will be available for operations.

Around 27 NH90 Nato frigate helicopters (NFH) were also ordered by the French Navy to replace its Lynx and Super Frelon helicopters, which perform anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare missions.

The helicopters have been ordered by other NH90 members, including Australia, Belgium, Greece, Norway, Oman, Sweden, Spain, Finland and Italy.

French Army's NH90 TTH helicopter conducts initial naval trials - Army Technology (http://www.army-technology.com/news/newsfrench-nh90-initial-naval-trials)

[Jack Carson]

First flight of the NH-90 was 15 Dec 1995. IOC is now achieved in 2014. Nineteen years and already it is ready for service. The cycle of development has gotten out of hand. The C-130 proposal was signed 2 July 1951. The prototype first flew in August 1954 with deliveries beginning in 1956. Production continues today. The Comanche program began in 1982 with LHX, progressed to a first flight of the RAH-66 in 1995 and program was canceled in 1996 after spending $7 billion. It is truly mid boggling.

[500 Fan]

Some may have read previously that the NH90 was suffering a little with a floor that wasn't able to stand up to the wear-and-tear of troops and equipment being loaded and unloaded. The Finnish NH90 helicopters are now fitted with 20mm thick sheets of domestic plywood fitted over the cabin floor to make up for the original floor's shortcomings. That's 42 kilos of extra equipment before you load your helicopter with any useful load. The NH90 is going to be a fine aircraft in time but having to fix a state-of-the-art helicopter with pieces of wood is embarrassing for the manufacturer, no doubt. Helicopters are marvels of engineering but surely it shouldn't take 19 years to get it off the drawing board and out the factory door.

The December 2013 issue of AirForces Monthly magazine has a 28 page article on the NH90 that is well worth a read if this machine is of interest.

500 Fan.

[tottigol]

Is that pressure treated plywood?

[Savoia]

The December 2013 issue of AirForces Monthly magazine has a 28 page article on the NH90 that is well worth a read if this machine is of interest.


Mamma mia! That's sounds like quite an article, although I wonder how many of those pages are taken-up with photographs?

If anyone ends-up reading the said article and happens upon anything of interest .. please feel free to post a synopsis.

[500 Fan]

The 28 pages on the NH90 are broken down into features on the NFH NH90 in service in The Netherlands, licensed production in Finland, the NH90 Caiman in Aeronavale service, the Italian Army's UH-90A in Afghanistan and the NH90 in New Zealand. Yes, there are plenty of photos but the articles are quite interesting and bring things up-to-date on the NH90 as the full-spec NH90s are now being delivered to customers. It is refreshing to see a significant article on a helicopter in this magazine as it is usually dominated by yet another article on the Typhoon, Super Hornet, F-35 or Flanker. Consider this magazine an early Christmas present to yourself!

500 Fan.

[lowfat]

!9 years development ?

Its not state of the art more state of the ark surely?

[blakmax]

I would like to preface the following comments by saying that many of the issues I raise also occur on MANY other aircraft types, but I have specifically examined the MRH 90 repair manuals and so the comment is made here.

I have looked at the MRH 90 repair manuals provided to the RAAF and to be absolutely frank, they are pathetic. I can not believe that in the 21st century there are so many fundamental deficiencies that have been known for decades to produce very poor structural outcomes and yet they are here again in the approved SRM.

Even a cursory assessment show that they still use a scuff-sand and solvent clean process for surface preparation with blind rivets into sandwich structure, and this was abandoned by RAAF for F-111 before 1992 because it always disbonded and caused corrosion in the skin and/or core as well as disbonding. This has been a known deficiency since Noah tried to repair the Ark. So why do we find it in a repair manual for a modern aircraft? It was scrapped on F-111 before 1980 and upgraded in 1992. Since 1992, the repair failure rate on F-111 was reduced from 43% to less than 0.07% by adopting improved repair methods.

Then there is the use a heater blanket at 100C (212F) on composite or sandwich structure without first undertaking a drying process. That has an incredibly high probability of either blowing the core from the face sheets or blowing the core cells apart or delaminating the composite skins if ANY of the structure exceeds 100C (212F). Consider this when you read the next paragraph.

Next is the use of a single heater blanket to heat the structure for repair irrespective of the presence of heat sinks under the blanket. This is combined with the fact that only ONE thermocouple is used. There are only two possible outcomes depending on the location of the thermocouple; either the adhesive is under-cured over the heat sink if the thermocouple is located over thin structure away from the heat sink, or the structure adjacent to the heat sink will be over-heated while the heater tries to supply sufficient heat for the heat sink as dictated by the thermocouple. Overheating will result in delamination of laminated composites and/or skin-to-core disbonding or blown core.

The correct procedures are outlined in http://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/artn0657.pdf where the MULTIPLE heaters are configured to match heat sinks and MULTIPLE sensors are used to ensure each heated zone remains below a temperature which would cause damage, while other sensors provide assurance of adhesive cure. That publication also provides guidance on evaluating surface preparation procedures and I can assure readers that scuff-sand and solvent clean would never in a million years meet those standards. I doubt that any of the approved MRH 90 repair method would meet these requirements.

The correct procedures were also contained in a RAAF publication DEF (AUST) 9005 which was an engineering standard on composite and adhesive bonded repairs. Recently RAAF downgraded the status of that standard so that OEM approved repairs such as these would no longer have to meet the requirements which delivered the significant reductions in repair failure rates outlined above.

I would be happy to discuss these issues with the OEM or any user, including RAAF rotary wing personnel.

Kindest regards

Blakmax

[Harry the Hun]

But it is a fun to fly it!

[Doors Off]

Blakmax,

that does that mean that the ADF helicopters have gone back to the RAAF? Here is hoping! They deserve to be in an adult organisation.

[blakmax]

No. Rotary wing aircraft still belong to the Army or Navy as the case may be. The airworthiness authority resides with RAAF in DGTA.

Regards

Blakmax

[Ascend Charlie]

Having choppers in Ronnie RAAF was good fun, but they spent 80% of their time supporting the army.

The lads in green got a bit pooey when they rolled out their swags to spend the night in the cool of a Rockhampton bush July, while the RAAFies flew back to town and their comfy motel with hot food and cold beer.

The complaining forced the RAAF pilots, on the next exercise, to be housed in a tent on the airfield, and on future exercises, with the grunts in the field - which led to a serious accident at night killing 8 in Adelaide.

So, the end result is, the RAAF don't need no stinkin' green helicopters full of stinkin' green people.

[blakmax]

The upshot was that the RAAF told Army to take over helicopters and Army refused to maintain airfield defence capability which RAAF had to adopt. So now we have an Army with its own Air Force and an Air Forcer with its own Army.

The driving force behind dropping the Engineering Standard was that the alternative repairs were cheaper and faster to perform than more rigorous "repair for life" repairs. But if you save five hours to put on a crap repair which falls off in a year or two and you have to repeat it again and again, is it really cheaper? And when the repair fails and corrosion or further disbonding starts, it is certainly not cheaper. Then as the repair gets bigger and bigger, you need engineering disposition with even more cost until you have to replace the part.

But the initial repair is faster and cheaper!!

Regards

Blakmax

[slow n low]

Blakmax,

that does that mean that the ADF helicopters have gone back to the RAAF? Here is hoping! They deserve to be in an adult organisation.

Doors Off, please qualify this statement. I would be interested to hear your in depth analysis as to why the RAAF are an "adult" organisation as compared to what ? Navy and Army?

A juvenile statement on a public forum, please feel free to PM me if you like. Unlike you, I am open to to discussion and idea's on the best way way to employ ADF rotary wing assets. If there is a strong (researched) case for Army/Navy rotary wing forces to be succeeded to the RAAF then I would support it. Until then, please, keep your inflammatory comments to yourself, or if you really see the need, pm me with your thoughts. Personally I have had enough of single service rivalry rubbish which does nothing to contribute to our national military power.

No. Rotary wing aircraft still belong to the Army or Navy as the case may be. The airworthiness authority resides with RAAF in DGTA.

blakmax,

You may want to check on this, as there is Op Airworthiness and Tech Airworthiness, the two (as I understand) reside with different authorities. Please define your terms of reference before making such statements, again this does nothing to recognise the hard work of the other services in making ADF aircraft "airworthy"

Your obvious expertise in composite repair would be a great asset to the MRH 90 community, please, front up and help US get this machine into better shape so us aircrew can be continue to operate the cab in support of our ADF (whoever that may be, who knows that may even be the RAAF ;))

Having choppers in Ronnie RAAF was good fun, but they spent 80% of their time supporting the army.

The lads in green got a bit pooey when they rolled out their swags to spend the night in the cool of a Rockhampton bush July, while the RAAFies flew back to town and their comfy motel with hot food and cold beer.

The complaining forced the RAAF pilots, on the next exercise, to be housed in a tent on the airfield, and on future exercises, with the grunts in the field - which led to a serious accident at night killing 8 in Adelaide.

So, the end result is, the RAAF don't need no stinkin' green helicopters full of stinkin' green people.

Ascend Charlie,

Sir, this stinks of sour grapes and unsubstantiated hearsay, RAAF and AAAVN (should) try to manage crew endurance, and other issues, internally, plus authorising officers should have the maturity to veto any flights which put the crew/pax in danger after analysis of ALL the facts – including accommodation arrangements. (Its no fun, we get that, we would love to have a beer and a hot meal too) But guess what? YOU were in support of the Australian fighting man, YOU, whether you like it or not, are fighting under the same flag as the rest of the "team" mate. Please do not denigrate our soldiers the way that you have, its unbecoming.

The accident you speak of, linked solely to being housed in tents or under hootchies , is tenuous at best. Again I would be willing to read any evidence (The ASOR maybe?) as to why this accident lays at solely the feet of "the complaining force"

I am a little perplexed as to why an (presumably) ADF Officer would post such inflammatory statements on a public forum. Last time I checked we were all fighting for the same government. How about we start acting like it?

[blakmax]

S'n'L

A cursory examination of my comments would reveal that there is nothing about operational airworthiness in my posting, so I guess it is obvious that I am talking technical airworthiness.

With regards to working with YOU (US?) I'll PM you, but I suspect you will be "guided" from above.

Regards

Blakmax

[slow n low]

blakmax,

Yes, point taken. I was pointing out that there is the hard work (airworthiness wise) outside of the the RAAF and DGTA.

No I am not being "guided" from above. Research my previous posts...

I am just a line driver who is trying to make the best of this situation. The F111 and Mirage had problems too I seem to recall. The Australian spirit and ingenuity (BTW I trust our engineers with my life...) got us through... And can do again.

It burns me to see the flippant comments WRT non RAAF engineers/aircrew/sms/(insert grievence here) on a public forum without some hard evidence. Go to the source - give them (us) the info

If we are absorbed into RAAF tomorrow, sweet so be it.

For the mean time, we have the thing, get the clever folks (like yourself) pay them a shedload if we have to (DMO got us into this, so they should pay..)
and make the blasted thing work..

PM me, would be great to hear of your experience, I may learn a thing or two...After all its in my best interest...

Regards,

S&L

[500e]

Try this
Adhesion Associates (http://www.adhesionassociates.com/)
or this
Publications - Max Davis - Adhesion Associates (http://www.adhesionassociates.com/publications.html)

[blakmax]

Thanks for the reply SnL. I have sent you a PM.

Interesting to see you mention Mirage and F-111. I was directly responsible for development of the repair application methodologies for both of these repairs and that is where I developed my understanding of how to (and more importantly how NOT to) implement repairs for on-aircraft applications.

I can understand that in an operational environment there may be a need for quick and dirty repairs, but these need to be seen for what they are. They are not terminating actions and there needs to be directives to replace those repairs at the next servicing. The MRH90 SRM seems to treat these as terminating actions.

The example for the MRH90 is only one of many where the OEM procedures are deficient. I firmly believe that there is a total lack of regulatory guidance on what actually constitutes an acceptable repair procedure. In the commercial fixed-wing aircraft world there is a body (Commercial Aircraft Composite Repair Committee) which has developed guidelines for bonded repair methods but their work only addresses off-aircraft rebuilds, not on-aircraft repairs. I think that there is a screaming need for guidance such as an Advisory Circular that sets out minimum standards for on-aircraft repairs. Sadly, the ADF had one (DEF (AUST) 9005) but they have chosen to relegate this to the status of interesting reference material.

Regards

Blakmax

[Ascend Charlie]

Slow and Low, a bit tetchy there, sport.

Sir, this stinks of sour grapes and unsubstantiated hearsay, RAAF and AAAVN (should) try to manage crew endurance, and other issues, internally, plus authorising officers should have the maturity to veto any flights which put the crew/pax in danger after analysis of ALL the facts

Sour grapes? Hardly. Unsubstantiated hearsay??? Horsefeathers. I was there at the time, 1968-1982, at Rocky in the motel one year, the tent the next year, and luckily at 2FTS instructing the following year when they were in the field.

The Adelaide accident, the flights were authorised by the CO who was the captain of the crash aircraft. Yes he had maturity, being a Vietnam era pilot and returned for his umpteenth tour. But this was a new situation, they had little opportunity to sleep during the day in a noisy army camp, and then flew VFR at night and simply forgot what the briefed approach back to the camp was - the other aircraft in the formation stayed up, and wondered what the heck N0. 1 was descending early for. But he's the boss, so nobody is game to question him on the radio, and SPLAT-BOOM oh jeez, we should have said something.

A lot of thinking took place AFTER this incident, which has probably led to the procedures in place now.