Russian B737 Crash at Kazan.

[Captain_Snape]

@SkyNewsBreak: AFP: Russian news agencies say a Boeing plane has crashed in Russia killing 44 people

[Clear_Prop]

Has anybody heard any further news of this?

B737 crashed at Kazan International Airport, Tartarstan, Russia at 15:25z today. 44 feared dead. No carrier named but flight op from DME.

44 feared dead as passenger jet crashes in central Russia ? RT News (http://rt.com/news/passenger-plane-crash-kazan-866/)

[5 APUs captain]

After two go-arounds, on 3rd attempt.... (Roumors) :-(

[kbrockman]

737-500 from Tatarstan

[Clear_Prop]

From the flight boards it looks like the only 73 operating in that arrival window is a B735 operating a codeshare flight as AK BARS AERO flight 2B 363 / Tartarstan Aircompany U9 363

[5 APUs captain]

UWKD 171600Z 24008G12MPS 5000 -RASN OVC008 03/03 Q0993 R29/2/0055 NOSIG RMK QFE734/0978
UWKD 171530Z 23008G11MPS 5000 -RASN OVC007 03/03 Q0993 R29/2/0055 NOSIG RMK QFE734/0979


VQ-BBN Tatarstan Air Boeing 737-53A - cn 24785 / ln 1882 - Planespotters.net Just Aviation (http://www.planespotters.net/Production_List/Boeing/737/24785,VQ-BBN-Tatarstan-Air.php)

6 crew + 44 PAX

[Captain_Snape]

Fifty-two people died as a passenger Boeing crashed while landing in the city of Kazan in central Russia on Saturday, according to the Emergencies Ministry.

The passenger aircraft Boeing 737-400 operated by the regional Tatarstan airline exploded after crash-landing in the airport of Kazan at 15:25 GMT, according to Interfax. The flight was coming from Moscow Domodedovo airport.

Reports of casualties vary. According to a spokeswoman from the Emergencies Ministry, 52 people were on board the plane and all are feared dead. Another report from the Federal Air Transport Agency said that 50 people - including six crew members - were on board, all of whom were killed.


The plane caught on fire after the crash landing. The flames were extinguished one hour into the disaster, ITAR-TASS reported.

An emergency services source told Interfax that the pilots made a mistake when entering the second lap, causing the plane to crash. However, the source added that there is a possibility that it was a technical failure.

The Federal Air Transport Agency, on its behalf, said the plane attempted to land three times before crashing.

All the forces of the Volga Regional Emergency Center are on high alert.

[luoto]

RT has, as you would expect, much on this but one of their correspondents is already promoting the "crew error" line - no doubt being fed it by their sources but nonetheless a little "early" to push a certain line when the bodies are not even cold. A quick listen seems to show an otherwise fairish line being taken by the male programme lead.

Weather initially not thought to be at fault, claims the channel, some mixed messages about explosion etc but as everyone knows, most initial reports are garbled with such incidents.

[Sunamer]

confirmed dead 46 pax + 6 crew members :(

соrrection - 44 pax + 6 crew

[Old King Coal]

People, before launching into print could you please do yourself (and us all) a favour and check some basic facts:

Fact #1: Sunset today in Kazan was at 16:33 local time (http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/astronomy.html?n=354) (in Kazan).

Fact #2: The crash is reported to have occurred at 19:25 local time (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20131117-0) (in Kazan).

Conclusion: The crash occurred approximately 3 hours after the sun had set, i.e. it was pitch :mad: dark,... and so, at this point in time, posting pics & videos of (other) events, shown in day time, could not possibly be of this event, could they? doh!!!

Lord give me strength !!! :ugh:

And speaking of facts, and fwiw, I've just had a look at my (Lido) Instrument Approach Charts for Kazan (KZN/UWKD) - it's a destination that I also fly to/from - and it shows the following minima for a Cat C aircraft:

nb. HAT = Height Above Threshold

Runway 11:

ILS DME: DH = 200 ft HAT / 550m RVR or 800m visibility.
VOR DME: MDA = 290 ft HAT / 750m visibility.
RNAV GNSS (LNAV): MDA = 340 ft HAT / 800m visibility.
NDB (BL) DME (KZN): MDA = 450 ft HAT / 1,400m visibility.
NDB (BL): MDA = 510 ft HAT / 1,600m visibility.

Runway 29:

ILS DME: DH = 200 ft HAT / 550m RVR or 800m visibility.
VOR DME: MDA = 340 ft HAT / 800m visibility.
RNAV GNSS (LNAV): MDA = 450 ft HAT / 1,400m visibility.
NDB (BL) DME (KZN): MDA = 450 ft HAT / 1,400m visibility.
NDB (AM) DME (KZN): MDA = 450 ft HAT / 1,400m visibility.

All the above instrument approach angles are based upon 3º (aside from the R11 VOR DME which is 3.1º). All the approaches are directly aligned with the relevant runway QDM, and the final descent from the platform altitude occurs at 3.9 Nm (from the threshold of the respective touchdown end) for all the instrument approach types. Imho, from an instrument approach perspective, there's nothing of note, i.e. any of those approaches should be a veritable 'no-brainer'.

In practical terms, if following a 3º descent profile, and with the cloud ceiling reported as 700 ft, they should have been able to see the runway lights when approximately 2Nm from touchdown; and especially that the Met Visibility (5,000m) equates to 2.7 Nm (and also remembering that it's night time, so the Met Vis could be factored as x2). I.e. once they came out of the base of the cloud, they should have been able to see the runway lights in front of them and they would still have approximately 1 Nm to fly (and continue descending) until they reached the MDA of either of the VOR approaches, and even further still to reach the DH position of either of the ILS's.

Given the METAR at the supposed time of the crash, the weather seems far from being limiting and, as far as I can tell, a trawl through the NOTAMS for Kazan (https://pilotweb.nas.faa.gov/PilotWeb/notamRetrievalByICAOAction.do?method=displayByICAOs&reportType=RAW&formatType=DOMESTIC&retrieveLocId=UWKD&actionType=notamRetrievalByICAOs) does not suggest any known outages of the approach aids, though it is now showing the airfield as being closed:

A4677/13 NOTAMN
Q) UWKD/QFALC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/5536N04917E005
A) UWKD B) 1311171820 C) 1311180800
E) AD CLSD DUE TO TECR

[Shaman]

...and there is an ILS on both 11 and 29.

[fergineer]

OKC the only pics I can see ARE in the dark.

[BOAC]

fergin - OKC refers to the fact that some buffoons had posted the video of the 747 freighter crash in crash at Bagram. - now removed.

[kuzukuzu]

http://i43.tinypic.com/15yw87d.jpg

Says something like:
"I was a passenger of the flight on the very same plane 4 hours before, from Kazan to Moscow. Don't let those :mad: fool you that it was weather related or a pilot mistake, the airplane was broken, we almost crashed on landing at moscow."

[NickBarnes]

If it was apparent it was broken surely they wouldn't have taken off again :/

[Sunamer]

kuzukuzu,

it is enough that russian media is spreading tons of this BS, I don't think there is a reason to repost it here...
I remember, last time when Perm 737 crashed, they were talking about broken planes, wings and engines set on fire, and about how old the plane was and about terrorist act, and about conspiracies....
:ugh:

[tutu]

My step daughter may have been on that flight.

[eu01]

If it was apparent it was broken surely they wouldn't have taken off again :/
What country we are talking about?
My step daughter may have been on that flight.
Just check the passengers list (link) (http://www.tatarstan.aero/company/news/502/).

[Sunamer]

on one of russian aviation groups (in vk.ru based group) there is a picture of a passenger list although I can't confirm that it is the one.

passenger list (http://vk.com/topic-5751308_29281749?z=photo-5751308_315790000%2Fpost-5751308_44864)

[AucT]

According to latest news - pilots reported aircraft not being in "landing configuration" approx 4km away from runway. A go around was initiated by pilots and reported to controller as controller clearly marked time for a go around to be 19:24. Two minutes later while a go around manuevre the aircraft came in contact with ground and exploded.

?????? ?? ??????? ???????? ? LIFE | NEWS (http://lifenews.ru/#!news/122854)

Btw dew point was reported to be -2C'.

[tutu]

eu01
Many thanks for that, it doesn't appear she is on it so hopefully she got an earlier flight.
I didn't know you could get a pax list like that. It has certainly eased my concerns some.

[Mongolf]

News reports talk about 3'rd attempt to land and accident occurring at 3rd go around. How extraordinary would one interpret the chain of events, if this is true?

I'm baffled.

[AucT]

Aircraft debris spread around large area suggests a high speed impact.

http://s11.postimg.org/4ll1zx9wf/image.jpg (http://postimg.org/image/4ll1zx9wf/)

[AucT]

Mongolf

Only one go around was initiated and aircraft came in contact with ground on go around.

[Sunamer]

http://cs412817.vk.me/v412817811/3649/I71BM7RNsKE.jpg
http://cs412817.vk.me/v412817811/3652/OLiG8xb85ns.jpg
http://cs412817.vk.me/v412817811/3637/m_xeUXZoiKg.jpg
http://cs412817.vk.me/v412817811/362e/wWgqt2KUwUE.jpg
http://cs412817.vk.me/v412817811/3625/jWrWAc0A-_M.jpg
http://cs7003.vk.me/c412817/v412817811/361d/uHMGe5DrQ1A.jpg
http://cs7003.vk.me/c412817/v412817811/360b/x4XS6On-yJk.jpg
http://cs412817.vk.me/v412817811/3603/E0BaKUbCCXM.jpg
http://cs412817.vk.me/v412817811/35fb/9F6pBRZBiTI.jpg

[Old King Coal]

A two engine go-around in the B737 can, for a number of reasons, turn into a complete balls-up, much dependent upon the pressing (or not) of various buttons and / or the movement (or not) of various levers!

[Karel_x]

экипаж доложил диспетчерам, когда еще самолет находился за 500 метров до торца полосы, о непосадочном положении. Скорее всего, это может говорить о том, что была неисправна та или иная техника, какая именно, экипаж не уточнил", - отметил источник.

Он добавил, что после сообщения о неготовности к посадке экипаж попытался зайти на второй круг, однако, уже находясь над взлетно-посадочной полосой, пролетев примерно километр, самолет рухнул, ударившись носом о землю.

500m before THR the crew reports to ATC "no landing configuration". Probably some system was not prepared - the crew dont say what.

After that, already above RWY, the crew requests for GA. The plane flew approx 1km above RWY and than it hits the ground by its nose.

[flarepilot]

one of the problems, besides the tragedy itself, is the poor translations.


could it be the crew wasn't in the configuration really means: they couldn't get the landing gear down?

and while screwing around trying to get the gear down, someone forgot to fly the plane first and stalled?

(all recall eastern airlines L1011).

and maybe the shaking reported by passengers on previous flight was a flap problem that only showed itself in a lowered flap configuration...and that instead of a gear problem it was a flap problem?



again, language makes me speculate to the above

[NickBarnes]

eu01
Quote:
Originally Posted by NickBarnes
If it was apparent it was broken surely they wouldn't have taken off again :/
What country we are talking about?


Yes I suppose was a silly thing to put, passengers from the flight to Moscow earlier in the day reported strong vibrations before landing then a very hard landing. But on a 23 year old aircraft vibrations and rattles can be quite common I'd of thought

[Mongolf]

Several Swedish news report third go around attempt, when crash occur. It seems to be "over the top" to me.

I have to assume that PPRuNe is more correct in the details.

[flarepilot]

regarding older planes and shaking


I had the pleasure of flying some older transport jets, but they were exceptionally well maintained and didn't shake or rattle.

its all about spending the money on maintenace of planes, training of pilots


money...its the answer to the question of why did this, or any, plane crash?

[achobg]

If it was apparent it was broken surely they wouldn't have taken off again :/

2 years ago that same airline let 6 passengers travel on foot on a nearly 5 hour flight because of overbooking.

[lomapaseo]

Aircraft debris spread around large area suggests a high speed impact.



more a flat impact than high speed. Of course everything is relative. So far I don't see a clue in this as yet.

[VFD]

and maybe the shaking reported by passengers on previous flight was a flap problem that only showed itself in a lowered flap configuration...and that instead of a gear problem it was a flap problem
With little else to go on that would surely come up high on the list.
There maybe been an asymmetry problem that occurred on previous flight due to a broken part that just got reset or did not show itself on the ground with no loading and inadequate inspection.

Suddenly losing a flap panel during extension somewhere between 0 and 25 would cause some serious control issues without time to recover that close to terra firma.

Only speculation of course.

[misd-agin]

Vertigo? Acceleration causing vertigo resulting in crashes just past the departure end of the runway was a known factor in IMC fighter departures/go-arounds.

[Machinbird]

Do not know if it is applicable in this case, but the quickest way to plant an aircraft on its nose is to lose control in the roll direction-for whatever cause.

You would have to work hard to stuff the nose down on an accelerating aircraft that does not autotrim.

There seem to be somewhat larger pieces of the tail section visible in one of the night photos I've seen. Most everything else visible is broken up pretty well.

[vovachan]

The phrase "непосадочное положение" (non-landing position if translated literally) simply means they were not lined up correctly (too low too high off to the left/right)

[JanetFlight]

Waiting patient for the first official and preliminary report issued by the competent investigation teams, what i really could foresee now its some dark clouds hovering above the Tatarstan Airlines roofs...having in mind all the previous Russian Accidents&Incidents with other Russian Airline(rs), i cannot see any deviation here by the MAK and Rosaviatsia policy on the crash aftermath...lets hope im wrong, just my 2 cents.
TAK its already starting slowly their new Airbus fleet for some time.

[paulmoscow]

Well it was gusting upto 30 at the time of landing in DME.

Also the old concrete runways at DME are in horrendous state.

[Mark in CA]

According to the NY Times, "President Vladimir V. Putin ordered officials to set up a commission to investigate the crash, his spokesman, Dmitri S. Peskov, told local news agencies."

Isn't this a bit unusual? Isn't there already an agency in Russia like the US NTSB whose responsibility it is to investigate the causes of these crashes?

May this be due to the two political passengers on board, who happen to be "Aleksandr V. Antonov, 56, the regional head of Russia’s Federal Security Service, known as the F.S.B., as well as Irek Minnikhanov, 24, a son of the president of the Tatarstan region, Rustam Minnikhanov," according to the Times?

[Karel_x]

Isn't this a bit unusual? Isn't there already an agency in Russia like the US NTSB whose responsibility it is to investigate the causes of these crashes?
Investigations in a causes like this is usually done by MAK. I suppose that MAK provides investigation in this case too. Putin has tried hard for long time to change to improve safety level in Russia. I think that the participation of minister in the commission is intended for emphasizing of high importance. And if they find cause at the Tatarsan Airlines, it won´t be surprise for me, if they lose their AOC in the moment. Surely, the death of the son of president surely affected Putin´s decision.


The crew start to provide GA - was it stall and was it caused by low airspeed or high AoA? Or flap problem?

[Sunamer]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EPsJQhOPrYQ
video of the crash site

[Old King Coal]

Many moons ago, when OKC was a young & spritely First Officer (I did say it was many moons ago :rolleyes: ), one recalls doing a go-around (in a B737-300), during which the aircraft started shaking quite dramatically, i.e. in a manner very akin to the aerodynamic buffet one might expect if one were approaching a stall, but which struck me as weird because, if anything, at that particular moment, the aircraft was going so damned fast that we were more at risk of tearing the flaps off the wing than of stalling (this being caused by the bloke in the LHS being new on type, and the two-engined performance of a lightly loaded, B737 somewhat getting the better of him, and that he failed to press the TOGA button, shoved the thrust levers to the firewall, had turned his Flight Director fully off, and likewise failed to pull the nose high enough to temper the rapidly increasing airspeed, and then forgot to call for flap retraction as the airspeed increased)... but, why did the aircraft shake as it did?

Well, it turns out that what he'd also done, prior to landing, was to 'release the brakes' (you might like to guess at his previous type ;) ?) and apparently that then set in motion a sequence of events that would only occur during a go-around (and which was a known bug in the system and admitted to by Boeing) which seemingly then caused the hydraulic system to start 'pulsing', and that in turn caused the rudder to 'wiggle', and that in turn (due the secondary affect of yaw) caused the wings to start wobbling, and the whole thing felt just like the approach to a stall. Well it certainly got my attention and I was glad it was during a nice clear day over the desert and not at night in a cloudy & snowy sky!

The B737 in a two-engine go-around, if not properly managed, can be a real handful !

[Sunamer]

Seems like that's the moment of crash...

Although, the websource has a very questionable reputation. :\


?????? ?? ??????? ???????? ? LIFE | NEWS (http://lifenews.ru/#!news/122878)

[Trackdiamond]

Perhaps crew announced they were unstabilized during G.A.
Was ANC applied or was it CNA this time?Aviate Navigate Communicate...and the most important part of Avigate is TOGA and safe Pitch GA attitude..and reconfigure on schedule..perhaps too much lift was removed too soon?Perhaps there was crew transition confusion during PF/PNF duty swap during the GA? We shall find out in due time..let us hope!

[egon.olsen]

There's a video showing moment of crash... look at the angle... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=koUV3xRIraU

[Sunamer]

according to media/ATC report - the crew's last communication was -
"We are going around. We have non-landing configuration"

[5 APUs captain]

Go around due to not stabilized approach ..... It is a fact.
What had been done wrong DURING a go-around???
Wait for FDR!!! On available video only stall could be suspected... But the reason???

[The Ancient Geek]

From the above, a credible possible scenario :-

Flap problems so crew attempts a flapless landing.
Flapless landing misjudged, too deep so go around. (easily done)
Go around without flaps is not a good idea = stall/spin. (very easily done)

[Sunamer]

MAK(Russian NTSB) reported that both FDR and CVR have been found and they are substantially damaged

[Una Due Tfc]

Before we get the usual "Russian Cowboys" comments going, let's wait for an initial report. The Pm's comment about "not being configured" or however he worded it are a little cryptic, but if they had a flaps/slats issue in gusting conditions then they were in a tight place. 3 landing attempts, maybe PIC thought their situation needed a nice long runway (3,700m meters) was necessary, maybe wx at alternates was terrible.. Lets wait before throwng them under a train

[Skyjob]

Ladies and Gentlemen, the video of security camera's on site are horrific.

Please beware before watching, this is not a nice scene...

Surveillance cameras recorded on video Boeing crash in Kazan (http://lifenews.ru/#!news/122878)

On the record, at the disposal of Life News, shows the plane (his silhouette in the dark is difficult to discern, but clearly visible sidelights) vertical cut into the ground, and then the neighborhood illuminates a powerful explosion. Burning wreckage of the ship were scattered over an area of ​​250,000 square meters.

[MrSnuggles]

How about this...

1) Improper maintenance leading to

2) Vulnarable* control surface(s) which combines with

3) Gusty and/or strong winds and maybe maybe

4) Some element of human factors

and when all of that combines during a night approach you get the worst case of nosedive captured on camera. Brrr, that little snippet was really something...

*By vulnerable I here take into account what the previous passengers said, and pair it with the expertise on flaps/slats settings and also the age of the aircraft. "Vulnerable" meaning "subjected to stronger than expected/designed for forces during some period of time, leading to failure(sp?) of one or more vital pieces of design". A lot of assumptions made here as you see.

[flarepilot]

the one bit about releasing brakes and rudder wiggling is sure news to me

esp after the rudder hardover near pittsburgh


subsequent device to reduce hydraulic pressure based on radio alt (700feet)

we shall see

gusty winds, even to 30 knots if closely aligned with runway shouldn't be too much for plane and pilot.

please post exact winds both steady and gust at times of approach.

[MrSnuggles]

Is this what you're looking for?
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/527997-russian-b737-crash-kazan.html#post8158580

[VFD]

Skyjob

The assessment from the video seems spot on.
From the camera angle the aircraft comes down near vertical straight into the ground.

It would be hard to transition from a normal approach and get to a vertical attitude in a 737 in 700 ft at approach speed without rolling into a vertical attitude.

Even with a flap asymmetry that stops transition of flaps should not leave you in a situation that lets the aircraft be uncontrollable.
Giving the benefit of the doubt to the pilots, it sure looks like a control panel issue.

[gonebutnotforgotten]

Any ideas out there what might be the cause of the bright flash about 1 sec before hitting the ground (00:04 after start)? Cut through electricity cables, rolling such that landing light faces camera briefly, etc? Not a pretty sight.

[Christodoulidesd]

Or bright aileron strobe? they show a couple of times before that anyway (1st as a camera reflection).

Anyway, would vertical rudder / yaw problems a la flash airlines possible cause this nose-dive?

[Agaricus bisporus]

It would be hard to transition from a normal approach and get to a vertical attitude in a 737 in 700 ft at approach speed without rolling into a vertical attitude.

I'm not so sure about that.

Go-around, TOGA power, counter the pitch up, inattention to attitude, huge pitch-up, grab thrust levers back to aid pitch down, stall (Or minor variations on that theme) would do it. Classic 737 pitch-couple trap.

[DOVES]

We have at last an unquestionable document of that fantastic ball of fire witnesses claim to have seen just before impact in almost all aviation accidents.
According to my humble opinion, because:
1) It is easy to estimate that the aircraft had an absurd attitude of c.ca -90° in the last few seconds of flight.
2) At 00:05 video time a strong lightning, likely a sign of an explosion, is clearly visible.
3) Two major political figures were on board
I seriously suspect tha it was a terrorist attack.
I'll be happy to be contradicted

[er340790]

The security video does look disturbingly reminiscent of the NTSB recreations of the US 737 rudder hard-over incidents though...

Board Meeting Animations - Uncontrolled Descent and Collision with Terrain USAir Flight 427 Boeing 737-300, N513AU, Near Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, September 8, 1994 (http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/1999/aliquippa_pa/animation.html)

[YRP]

DOVES:

Regarding your point 2, no the flash at 4s is not an explosion. As someone pointed out already it is just a strobe light on the plane. You can see a previous flash at 2s into the video, reflected from the ground.

I'm sure someone might know the 737 strobe interval, but 2s is about right compared to this video: Airplane Strobe Light Rain Effect: Southwest Boeing 737-700 - YouTube

Any explosion is not going to be so brief (single frame) even at the low frame rate of the video.

[GF4RCE]

VFD:
The assessment from the video seems spot on.
From the camera angle the aircraft comes down near vertical straight into the ground.

It would be hard to transition from a normal approach and get to a vertical attitude in a 737 in 700 ft at approach speed without rolling into a vertical attitude.

Even with a flap asymmetry that stops transition of flaps should not leave you in a situation that lets the aircraft be uncontrollable.
Giving the benefit of the doubt to the pilots, it sure looks like a control panel issue.
even if you were to roll inverted and suddenly pull back on the yoke do a splits-s it would be hard for 73 to get into that attitude below 1000' unless the aircraft were to enter the initial stages of a spin ( incipient spin ) or some sort of catastrophic structural failure..

[con-pilot]

If the video being shown is the correct video showing the actual accident, no reason to believe it is not, it reminds me of the old rudder hard over accidents involving 737s years ago.

The two I remember the best was the one at Colorado Springs and the one at Pittsburgh (I think) as I flew over both accident sites.

The rudder hard over caused accidents were near vertical impacts.

I thought that Boeing had fixed that problem. Something to think about anyway and I'm not saying that is the cause of this accident.

[RAT 5]

The rudder hard over caused accidents were near vertical impacts.

So did SE go rounds with no rudder: lets' wait and see then add wise contributions instead of speculations. The FDR should be quite modern; CVR also.

[FlightCosting]

BBC talking about vertical landing and journalist talking about vibrations when landing at Moscow on previous leg. Crap concrete runways do tend to give some vibration on landing. Vertical landing suggests it was a bloody helicopter not fixed wing. I do wish the instant expert reggie spotters would STFU and let the pro's get on with the real job of finding out what really happened. Uninformed speculation does not help. Just think that there are thousands of other 737 crews and passengers out there flying the same aircraft
Rant over.

[kenjaDROP]

OK, I'm not a flying expert, however I know enough about aerodynamics and the outline capabilities of a B737-sized aircraft.
Given that this aircraft was initiating a GA went everything went really pear-shaped (following the unstable approach that is), then how the dickens does it end with such a high (apparently from the brief video) almost 90deg nose dive into the ground?? I mean, I wouldn't expect that it could be achieved by anything other than an astonishingly savage pull up, to near vertical climb to stall, wing over and dive....especially to remain anywhere near the vicinity of the airport security cameras?

edit: .....or stall, tumble and dive?

[lochias]

Dramatic footage: Kazan Boeing crash caught on camera - YouTube

AS FAR AS I CAN SEE THAT A NOSE DIVE!!!!

[Captaintcas]

As far as I can gather from this footage, the aircraft is in a steep dive, and wings in a steep angle of bank...

[deSitter]

From the motion of the security camera it's clear that the wind was howling even near the ground. Likely a go-around handling mistake.

[con-pilot]

lets' wait and see then add wise contributions instead of speculations

I agree one hundred percent, that is why I posted this;

Something to think about anyway and I'm not saying that is the cause of this accident.

Never the less, by studying past similar accidents we can sometimes solve new accidents if there are similar patterns/events. I know, been to the school, read the books, watched the films, took the tests and passed them.

If I was assigned to this accident, the rudder issue would be one of the first things looked at, if for no other reason than to dismiss it as a cause as soon as possible.

I'm sure we will hear the probable cause sooner or later, hopefully.

[kenjaDROP]

and wings in a steep angle of bank...

What bank? All I see (after several pause/rewinds) is a level nose-dive.....tail square-on to camera? Have I missed something?

[flyingchanges]

At 90 degrees nose down, bank angle is pretty irrelevant.

[safelife]

Me too, bank would also result in some kind of rolling during the dive.

To me it looks like the stabilizer suddenly let go his downward force, due to whatever reason (separation? tail stall?).
I find it hard to come up with another scenario which would result in such a sudden dive.

[pattern_is_full]

I mean, I wouldn't expect that it could be achieved by anything other than an astonishingly savage pull up, to near vertical climb to stall, wing over and dive....

While it obviously doesn't happen every day, it is a notorious characterisitic of aircraft with under-wing (below center of gravity) thrust lines to pitch up significantly if TOGA power is applied. It has happened before (fortunately, usually with prompt corrective action from the crew). c.f. TAROM Flight 381, 1994, Paris-Orly.

Extended lift devices (slats, flaps) can exacerbate the pitch-up tendency.

especially to remain anywhere near the vicinity of the airport security cameras?

The 747 at Bagram managed to take off, climb, stall and crash within the airport boundaries. Given that a go-around likely began well before reaching the runway threshold, I don't see why a 737 could not end up with the same results well within the airport boundaries.

I'm not saying that that is what happened in Kazan - I'm just pointing out that it is well within the realms of possibility.

One other factor I haven't seen noted yet is that Kazan is undergoing major reconstruction, with one large runway partially built, and the other perhaps a former taxiway being used as a runway (cf Google maps).

No reason this would lead to a crash directly - but the airport layout (combined with weather/visibility problems) could have contributed to confusion and the need for a go-around or multiple go-arounds (whichever turns out to be the fact.)

[olasek]

I came not only to respect the competence of the crews....Given the utmost professionalism of MAKGood to know however personal experiences go only so far. Russia (and the area of the former USSR) still has triple the aircraft accident rate compared with the rest of the world. And like the 2008 crash of another Boeing 737 in Russia (also landing) at Perm can show a breath-taking level of incompetence among the crew. But I full agree about the MAK - very competent accident investigation team.

[Una Due Tfc]

The airport in question had 2 parallel runways. One is currently being converted into a taxiway, that's the reason for the construction equipment

[RAD_ALT_ALIVE]

It actually reminds me of the 2 A300 crashes (Taipei and Nagoya maybe) that resulted from the crew fighting the autopilot after engaging (at least on one occasion inadvertently) GA mode on short final.

They kept pushing on the column as the AP wound in nose-up trim. When the AP finally disconnected, the trim setting could not be overcome and the aircraft went near-vertical before crashing with little forward speed on/near the runway.

I think the airline involved was China Airlines.

Perhaps a similar scenario happened on this occasion. I feel the flap thing is a red herring. I also don't think the rudder hardover theory carries much weight - Boeing's interim fix was to mandate a reduction in speed; and as this crash happened at or near final approach speed it didn't have the basic elements that the hardover accidents did.

[awblain]

It seems to be hitting the ground at 0.08 in the RT video, first appearing about 5 aircraft lengths back at 0.04, assuming that the fainter trailing light is the lit fin, and the ground position comes from the location of the flash on impact. That's only covering about 150m in 4s, so it's not hitting very fast: about 80 knots.

[Added note 18:00UT on 19th: there are subsequent suggestions that the RT video is slowed to 1/4 speed. This seems a bit odd given the pair of strobe flashes seen in the 4s to impact, but strobes can be aliased to the video rate. A quarter speed video would mean a much faster ~320kt almost-vertical impact, that tallies with the reported impact speed from the MAK in post 124.]

Pointing nose down from stationary, a free falling slippery shape will hit the ground from 150m up in just over 5 seconds, although you would see it accelerate.

I would bet that the video is foreshortened, and there's a significant unseen line-of-sight component to the speed in the video.

Caveat: for the Red Wings Tu 204 crash my video time/speed counting was worse than useless.

[olasek]

about 80 knots.
In my opinion it could be anywhere 80-120 kts since it is so hard to estimate the exact length of the aircraft from this video. Where the tail is it is obvious but the rest is hard to judge.

[md80fanatic]

Why the huge fireball anyway? How much contingency fuel does this flight normally carry? Just wondering.

The descent looks near vertical from the camera perspective. I am thinking though it was traveling away from the camera also, so not quite vertical. I agree with the commenter who claimed extreme banking (near 90 deg).

[Machinbird]

In my opinion it could be anywhere 80-120 kts since it is so hard to estimate the exact length of the aircraft from this video. Where the tail is it is obvious but the rest is hard to judge. My accident investigation experience is with smaller jets, but from the degree of fragmentation, I'd be inclined to offer up something in the vicinity of 200-250 knots at impact.

[olasek]

The explosion could easily account for the fragmentation, the speed is probably secondary here.

Why the huge fireball anyway?Plenty of fuel left (say 1- 4 t.) to cause such a fireball.

[flarepilot]

first off, any judgement of speed is GROUND speed and not airspeed.

second, flying an airplane is hard, at least its hard to do well

[Machinbird]

The explosion could easily account for the fragmentation, the speed is probably secondary here.What explosion? All I see is a big fireball.

Explosions cause shock waves. Do you see evidence of that?

[olasek]

I see (even larger) pieces of aircraft flying apart, that's plenty. It is a rather poor video anyway I doubt you would see shock waves. But what's even more important your 200-250 kts can't be supported by the geometrical velocities observed in the video, not even assuming worst case for errors (post #86 above).

[Sunamer]

Why the huge fireball anyway? How much contingency fuel does this flight normally carry? Just wondering.

It was reported by RBC (russian business/news TV station) that the company had some financial problems and they were fueling up their AC in DME(Moscow) where they were still allowed to do that.
So, they fuel up tanks in order to carry fuel back to kazan instead of simply fueling AC at Kazan. That might explain long post crash fire..

[Massey1Bravo]

Anyway does anyone still remember China Airlines CI676 at Taipei - the A300 botched go-around accident?

Online Report (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/Research/Rvs/Misc/Additional/Reports/taipei/taipei.html)

flight path diagram (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/Research/Rvs/Misc/Additional/Reports/taipei/CI676.gif)

[Big Pistons Forever]

Russian aviation is still the wild west. Too many airlines flying junk and operating on a shoe string, flown by cowboys in total disregard of good operating practices or even the most basic common sense.

How many accidents will it take before the root causes are addressed ?

[freespeed2]

There is another possibility other than mechanical failure or incorrect use of the slats/flaps etc that can happen to a perfectly serviceable aircraft:

The video looks from my previous experience as though the crew may have succumbed to somatographic illusion during a severe go around manoeuvre. The angle and speed of the final seconds would result from this effect.

A similar event happened in this report (link (http://www.aaiu.ie/sites/default/files/upload/general/13426-REPORT_2011_016-0.PDF)). Look at page 43 of the report (under somatographic illusion) and the FDR data. The false climb sensation experienced by the pilot resulted in a steep dive that was only identified upon breaking out of the cloud into visual conditions. This was too late to recover the dive.

Again, I understand that this is only speculation. I am only trying to include that there is a possibility that is not caused by a wrongly configured aircraft, broken component or airport/approach aid failures. These illusions can be overpowering in their effect on the pilot, and a recognition of them often only occurs when VMC is re-established, which in this scenario would have been unlikely. The basic principle of 'trust your instruments' can be easily disregarded during high stress situations.

[flarepilot]

I saw another video today on NBC tv...wow...maybe the stall scenario is right...

I do remember that cargo 747 that stalled, it had some rotation to it...but this russian plane is NOSE DOWN like a lawn dart.

[olasek]

A similar event happened in this report (link (http://www.aaiu.ie/sites/default/files/upload/general/13426-REPORT_2011_016-0.PDF)).
Of course, there were number of similar accidents. Flash Airlines flight 604 in 2004 is another good example.

[freespeed2]

Flash Airlines flight 604 in 2004 is another good example.

This was an example of spatial disorientation for sure, but slightly different from the false climb effect that can occur from a rapid increase in pitch followed by a sudden control input to check the increase in pitch attitude. At this point the pilot thinks that the aircraft is going into a loop and pushing forward on the stick will actually exacerbate the situation initially as the difference in pilot-perceived aircraft attitude versus the actual aircraft attitude diverges further.

[oldbag]

Could have suffered a heart attack and slumped against the control ??

[tdracer]

But what's even more important your 200-250 kts can't be supported by the geometrical velocities observed in the video,


olasek, you're assuming the video is being shown 'real time'. I see various artifacts in the video that suggest it's not - that it's been slowed down.

As noted, the video quality is poor enough that it's very difficult to be sure, but I certainly wouldn't put money on that video being shown at the actual event speed.

[xyze]

Attitude at time of crash consistent with stall => dive, as in the Bagram accident and the Airbus accidents at Nagoya and Taipei.

Won't be surprised if the sequence turns out to be something like this (but with progression to a full stall and then dive):

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/3-2009%20G-THOF.pdf

[paulmoscow]

I see various artifacts in the video that suggest it's not - that it's been slowed down.
There's a full frame version of the video which clearly indicates that it's at quarter speed.

[Skyjob]

Only speculation, but this seems likely:

- High Fuel Load as Tanking Fuel into airport causing more then normal aft CG
- Pressure to land aircraft (fuel, weather, approach type, ...)
- Go-Around initiated
- Due location of engines (737 design) a high pitch is normal
- Possibly due to the fair amount of additional fuel carried and moving to an aft CG (fluid dynamics) an usually high pitch up occurs
- Possibly using Full TOGA instead of reduced TOGA causing additional nose up tendency
- Very high nose up instance established
- Rapid Speed Decay occurs in this attitude
- Large Forward Control column pressure to overcome high nose attitude
- Speed Decay results in stall with associated wing over
- Nose drops vertical, earlier nose down input would aggravate recovery efforts for crew
- No recovery height available for regaining speed and control
- Impact on ground vertical position unavoidable

[NOLAND3]

Jazz hands - where did you find tht video and transcript? If that is even remotely accurate then I am stunned beyond belief.

[Sunamer]

words of a person participating in the investigation:

...actual GA was initiated at outer marker. They climbed up to 900m and then the airspeed started to decrease. Pitch started to change to negative and they started to fall being at 800m from the threshold of 11 apprx with angle of 75-80 degrees.
AC came into contact with the ground at 500m from inner marker of 11.

location is on the map
http://cs7003.vk.me/c7007/v7007828/cfdd/CVUh4ETPwj0.jpg

[flarepilot]

if you know how to do a go around in a 737, yes the nose comes up with max /go around thrust.

then you push forward and TRIM forward (nose down), manipulating the trim either manually or with the yoke mounted switch (elec).

the sound that the rotating trim wheel is pretty famous in the boeing world. could anyone hear the trim wheel moving?


I guess I've never seen anything even near this in LINE operations and am befuddled.

I could understand a rudder hardover, but it doesn't seem to be the case here.


I could understand a failure of flight controls, but it doesn't seem to be the case here.


I could understand not reading the attitude gyro right as the russian gyros are not the same as US and someone might get confused


someone posted something about additional fuel...I am pretty darn sure that additional fuel would not have caused a problem unless for some reason the fuel was not balanced between wing tanks...that is, someone was crossfeeding fuel from one tank to both engines and finally passing the limit of difference between tanks.


I could even understand if everyone in the plane ran to the tail


but I would like to think that the worst pilot in the world wouldn't let this happen.

[Skyjob]

someone posted something about additional fuel...I am pretty darn sure that additional fuel would not have caused a problem unless for some reason the fuel was not balanced between wing tanks...that is, someone was crossfeeding fuel from one tank to both engines and finally passing the limit of difference between tanks.

Centre Fuel...
That was the fuel I was referring to.

In case of tankering into this airport as only allowed to tank in Moscow (as suggested by this thread) would the crew have taken so much fuel to land with a remaining considerable amount of centre tank fuel?
This could cause a large shift in CG at high nose up attitudes, adding to inherent 737 design problem of its low engines.
Remember this practise is not recommended: landing with CTR fuel.
So my question was would they have considered it if the fuel limitation as described was in effect for their carrier? If so it could be a contributory factor

[vovachan]

The head of Russia civ aviation agency announced the airplane was performing a go around, during a steep climb it lost forward speed stalled and fell.

[flarepilot]

fuel


normally, at least after initial takeoff climb(lets say above 3000') , center fuel is used first.


I really don't think fuel movement caused this crash

maybe rotten instrument flying skills, but not fuel movement.

[Javadreaming]

WOW there is some pretty wild speculation here from guys/girls that have never flown a jet aircraft (especially the 737). To clear a few things up, several posters have suggested that the aircraft may have been flying at a speed around 80kts when it impacted. Well the 737 won't fly at 80kts or even 100kts. At these speeds it would have been stalled.

Secondly, to the posers who have suggested that an additional fuel load may have somehow contributed to the accident...this is also not correct (especially the part about carrying centre tank fuel). On the 737 the fuel is always used from the centre tank first (if carried). This is because the fuel pumps operate at a higher pressure.

I guess if you haven't flown the 737 it is impossible to understand the handling characteristics of the aircraft. Having many thousands hours on type I can honestly say that it is a beautiful aircraft that a trained crew following SOPs should have no problem handling during a go around.

I won't speculate, but instead wait for the report.

[flarepilot]

javadreaming is quite right


even when practicing stalls in simulator (incipient ) and one goes to firewall power/thrust on the engines, the nose up tendency is easily overcome by the control yoke

I cannot see this crash happening for any competent crew, even if the capt had become incapacitated.

did he go around and misjudge his pitch attitude leading to low airspeed and then a stall?

was there any stick shaker sounds on the tape?

did one of the pilots retract all flaps/leading edge devices without the knowledge of the other pilot?

crazy

[Skyjob]

On the 737 the fuel is always used from the centre tank first (if carried)

Fully aware of this as flying the type, but also very aware about the limitation not to land with centre fuel (I wonder why Boeing ever put that limitation in...)

I think we all expect the aircraft to have stalled...

Problem is, how did it get into that scenario, and what contributory factors were there.

[Mr Optimistic]

The BBC's current take on the matter....

Russian aviation experts say the pilots of a Boeing 737 jet which crashed in Kazan on Sunday carried out a manoeuvre that put the plane into a dive.

During a second attempt to land, the pilots switched to manual control and made a correction when the plane lost speed, the investigators said.

But the jet then nose-dived and crashed on to the tarmac, killing all 50 people on board.

According to the initial findings, the jet did not have any technical faults.

Presume the last sentence means that no faults were reported: can't see much information coming from that debris field just yet.

[llagonne66]

Probe of near-vertical 737 crash reveals faulty crew maneuvers | Boeing news | The Seattle Times (http://seattletimes.com/html/boeingaerospace/2022288542_apxrussiaplanecrash.html)

[Javadreaming]

Skyjob, It is a structural limitation. Just the same as why the main tanks have to be full if centre tank fuel is uplifted (although there is a small amount of centre tank fuel that is allowed to be carried provided that the weight of this fuel when combined with the ZFW does not exceed the Maximum ZFW).... It call all be found in the Fcom

[Sunamer]

there is an update from MAK

During approach, the crew didn't achieve proper parameters of standard approach that was specified in the documentation. Had assessed AC's position as non-landing in relation to the runway, the crew reported this and initiated GA using TOGA mode. During this phase, one of autopilots that had been used during approach, was disconnected and from this moment piloting was done in manual mode.

Engines reached thrust mode that was close to TO. The crew changed flaps setting from 30 to 15 degrees. Because of the engine thrust, pitch started to increase and AC started to climb. Pitch angle reached 25 degrees.
IAS started to decrease, then the crew retracted the gear.

From the moment of initiating GA, to this moment the crew had not attempted to actively control the AC with a yoke input.

After IAS decreased from 150 to 125 kt, the crew started to use control column in order to obtain nose down attitude. That led to the arrest of climb, and subsequent descend with increase of IAS. Maximum AoA didn't exceed operational limits.

AC, after reaching alt of 700m, started to descend with negative pitch angle, that reached -75 degrees at the end of the recording. AC came into contact with the ground at high speed (more than 450 kmh ) and with large negative pitch angle.

From the moment of GA to the end of recording 45 sec had passed and the descend took 20 secs.

Engines performed as expected until the moment of impact, and there was no indication of any failures or abnormal operations in any of the AC systems

The analysis and interpretation of DFR continues.
MAK notes that upon finding and opening the container with CVR, the inner container as well as the tape mechanism of CVR was not found inside of the casing. Search for CVR is continued.

[shortfinals]

I think that link to the Seattle Times has the basic truth. I have just heard that the investigators said the time between initiating go-around and impact is 45sec. That's a long time. More thoughts here: Not an ordinary crash - Learmount (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/2013/11/ordinary-crash/)

[Yancey Slide]

Illusion: Bunch of times.
You're welcome.

[Max182]

from MAK website (loose translation from Russian):

Due to unstabilised approach, missed approach has been initiated. TOGA -> autopilot off -> manual flight. Engines have achieved thrust close to take off thrust. The crew retracted flaps from 30 deg to 15 deg. The aircraft began climb due to pitching up moment and reached pitch attitude about 25 deg. Airspeed began to fall. The crew retracted gear. This was the first time the crew made manual inputs since the start of missed approach procedure. After the airspeed decayed from 150kt to 120kt the crew began transition to dive with the yoke inputs. This stopped the climb, and caused the aircraft to dive and the airspeed to increase. The angle of attack was within limitations. Upon reaching 700m the aircraft began a rapid dive with the pitch attitude reaching -75 deg towards the end of the flight (the end of recording). The aircraft collided with the ground with high speed (more than 450 km/h) and large negative pitch attitude. It took 45 sec from the start of missed approach till the end of recording and descent took about 20 seconds. Engines worked fine, no faults registered on the data recorder. CVR has the tape/recording unit
missing (details are a bit unclear from the text).

[NWstu]

Link (http://www.twincities.com/breakingnews/ci_24553159/russian-crash-probe-reveals-faulty-crew-maneuvers).

The pilots of a Boeing 737 that plunged to earth at the Kazan airport, killing all 50 aboard, lost speed in a steep climb then overcompensated and sent the plane into a near-vertical dive, according to a preliminary report released Tuesday by Russian aviation experts.

The Moscow-based Interstate Aviation Committee, which oversees civil flights in much of the former Soviet Union, said the plane's engines and other systems were working fine until the moment the plane hit the ground Sunday night.

It said the plane's two pilots had failed to make a proper landing approach on the first attempt and then began a second run.
They put the plane's engines on maximum power, raising the plane's nose up at a sharp angle, causing a quick loss of speed.

At an altitude of about 700 meters (2,200 feet), the crew then tried to gain speed by taking the plane into a dive but it hit the ground at a near-vertical angle in a spectacular crash.Seems awful quick to get a preliminary cause.

[eu01]

CVR has the tape/recording unit missing
As incredible as it may seem... What if the recording unit were dismantled already days or weeks before the impact and therefore missing?

[F14]

Low speed on approach, go-around initiated, rather than speed recovery. Pitch up uncontrollable, 737, basically run out of elevator. Like this one:-

Report: Thomsonfly B733 at Bournemouth on Sep 23rd 2007, disconnected autothrottle on approach results in 44 degrees pitch up (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=419f2f9e&opt=0)

Another option is blocked pitot, as you descend speed appears to drop, so you push forward to increase speed. Alternatively instrument failure of PFD, like this in 1999:-

ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 747-2B5F (SCD) HL7451 Great Hallingbury (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19991222-0)

[vovachan]

Here is a google translate

"During the approach the crew failed to make the approach in accordance with the established regulatory documentation scheme. Assessed the position of the aircraft relative to the runway as" neposadochnoe ", the crew reported to the dispatcher and started a go-around mode TOGA (Take Off / Go Around. Takeoff / missed approach). At the same time involved in the process of approach autopilot was disconnected and a further flight took place in manual mode ", - told the press service .
"Motors took to the regime close to the take-off. Crew moved the flaps from position position 30 ° to 15 °. Under the influence of pitching moment of the thrust, the plane went into the climb and reached a pitch angle of about 25 °. Airspeed began to decrease. Crew retracted the chassis. Since the start of the missed approach until then the crew took no active actions with the control column"- added to the department.
After reducing the speed from 150 to 125 knots crew began a column wheel control actions to transfer the aircraft into a dive, which led to the termination of the climb, beginning of descent and the growth speed of the instrument. Maximum angle of attack during the flight does not exceed the operating limits.
The plane, reaching a height of 700 m, has started intensive dive with the angle of pitch, reached the end of the flight to -75 ° (end of recording). The aircraft collided with the ground at high speed (over 450 km / h) and a large negative pitch angle, - the MAC.
"From the start of a go-around to finish the recording took about 45 seconds, descent took about 20 seconds. Propulsion worked until the collision with the ground. Single commands describing the failures of systems and engines the results of the preliminary analysis did not reveal" - said the press service.

[flash8]

very tricky as a low weight -400/-500 run out of elevator at low speed during landing, this is pretty well known unlike the -300 (and -200), don't know about any other later variants.

what MAK states is pretty much what I expected, and the final report I reckon will mirror exactly this.

still, that was pretty damned fast.

[Machinbird]

collided with the ground at high speed (over 450 km / h) Which converts to 243 knots.

[Aviaservice]

Комиссия отмечает, что при вскрытии контейнера самописца речевой информации защищенный контейнер с лентопротяжным механизмом отсутствовал.

The committee noted there is no tape in the CVR.
:confused:

[Capt H Peacock]

I'm with Gobonastick.

Somatogravic.

[vovachan]

Not quite. Upon opening the CVR container they did not find the crash container w tape module inside. Still looking.

[DOVES]

UWKD 171600Z 24008G12MPS 5000 -RASN OVC008 03/03 Q0993 R29/2/0055 NOSIG RMK QFE734/0978
UWKD 171530Z 23008G11MPS 5000 -RASN OVC007 03/03 Q0993 R29/2/0055 NOSIG RMK QFE734/0979

Which on Rwy 29, means a Xw comp.= c.ca 8G12 Kts. Not a big deal.

AC, after reaching alt of 700m, started to descend with negative pitch angle, that reached -75 degrees at the end of the recording. AC came into contact with the ground at high speed (more than 450 kmh ) and with large negative pitch angle.
From the moment of GA to the end of recording 45 sec had passed and the descend took 20 secs From the moment of GA to the end of recording 45 sec had passed and the descend took 20 secs.


From 700 m (2200 ft) to zero in 20 secs, means 6600 ft/min???

Given that the stabilizer was almost for sure, as usual in that phase of flight, toward the final end of ANU, as soon as the plane had regained a bit of speed would also have had a strong pitch up moment.
The only maneuvers I can imagine for a plane to assume such an attitude are:
- A spin (to which would favor the low speed and the high rate of descent)
- An Hammerhead
- A loop
And since the last two above mentioned manoeuvre have to be excluded, only one possibility remains:
The loss of the elevator or the whole tail separation.
My two cents

[Aviaservice]

Still looking.do they have a chance?

[Karel_x]

Upon opening the CVR container they did not find the crash container w tape module inside

I am not sure, but I suppose that better translation could be:

"When CVR was found the protected container with tape transport mechanism was absent."

It could be detached by impact so MAK search for it at crash site.



CPT - 2.500hr on type, 3 years ago retrainig from navigator
FE - 1.900hr, 2 years ago retrainig from FE

Their first GA in real conditions

[flarepilot]

seems to me that the pilots didn't properly control the plane either in the approach or the go around.

and folks, if you go to max thrust on a go around and the nose comes up and the yoke doesn't make it go down

try reducing thrust.

but, the 737 has done thousands of go arounds and a normally competent crew can handle it.

as to illusions...use instruments.

[vovachan]

http://russian.rt.com/data/7/a/6/7a63ae2b047b2edf31dbdeefb3cd229b3b496e13.jpg

I suppose they do - it's a pretty big debris field to comb through. The outer container which was shown is a flimsy looking orange box which they pried open with the help of some cutters and a hammer. The inner container is a much more serious looking smaller box and this is what they need to find.

[MountainBear]

Not quite. Upon opening the CVR container they did not find the crash container w tape module inside. Still looking. Does it matter? If the casual observer is to believe the videos on Youtube we already know what it says:

Pilot: Cuss word.
PNF: What are you doing?
PF: Cuss word. Here, you take it!
PNF: I don't want it! I have no idea what to do.
PF: Cuss word.
PNF: (operates some random object that has nothing to do with anything)
PF: Cuss word.
PNF: Cuss word.
PF: Cuss word.

tape ends

[eu01]

@MountainBear

It's very tragicomical, but very likely...

[Pin Head]

maybe boeing should now consider an automatic go around with one AP engaged rather than full AP disconnect.

we have had a lot of guys come off the 756 with that automation onto the 738 and a lot of training focus on manual G/As.

[DOVES]

Oh! I forgot the gem:
What about MANUAL REVERSION?
Yes I know the Landing gear was ordered to be retracted, but...was it?
I left the B73 more than 6 years ago and was sim checked on such an Emergency Proc only once.
I remember that it was very difficult to obtain a minimal excursion of Flt Controls (elev, aileron & rudder) although both of us made a considerable effort.

[olasek]

we have had a lot of guys come off the 756 What is 756?:rolleyes:

In all Boeings go-arounds are initiated manually though you can engage A/P soon after. The go-around is such a basic air manoeuvre that if you can't do manually you have no business getting even close to a cockpit.

Which converts to 243 knots. Your original speed estimate was spot on.

[Chronus]

The video footage shows vertical high speed dive into solid terra firma. So reminiscent of the 1991 UA 585 at Colarado Springs. Could this be another PCU failure.

[olasek]

Could this be another PCU failure.
Discussed before, post #85 and before.

[Old King Coal]

Dove: the position of the trim could be much dependent upon whether they were using a dual auto-pilot (coupled) approach and were also below 400ft Rad Alt (or not) when they pressed the TOGA button (which is assuming they did indeed press the TOGA button), as that 'auto land' scenario can dramatically effect the position of the stabiliser trim, depending upon ones height above the ground.

And / or in the event of a go-around, what of Power / Attitude / Trim, along with appropriate & timely selection of flap & landing gear? And was the Auto-Throttle selected 'Off' or was it in the (non-approved, by Boeing) 'Speed-Off' mode? And what of FMA mode awareness? And following (or not) of ones Flight Director (all aside from potential somatogravic illusions,... err, what about follow your instruments, etc)?
All of these can play their part in setting an aircraft up for an 'unusual attitude' event.

And let me be so bold as to provide just ONE scenario of a poorly flown go-around in a B737....

With dual autopilots engaged in ILS Approach Mode, and captured to the ILS. A go-around is actioned when below 400ft Rad Alt. The autopilot(s) have at that point wound in nose-up stabiliser (i.e. ready for the autopilot to either flare the aircraft as part of the landing, or else primed for a go-around), and the Flight Directors are still switched on. Then, instead of pressing the TOGA button (and therein letting the 'automatics' fly the go-around), the Pilot Flying disconnects both the Autopilot & Auto-Throttle, and shoves the thrust levers fully to the firewall, i.e. electing to fly the go-around fully manually.

A likely outcome is those actions - at that point in time - would be that the aircraft would pitch dramatically nose-up... that said, if the TOGA button is not pressed then the Flight Director guidance is still to follow the ILS (and indeed the aircraft is not 'aware' that TOGA mode and all associated acceleration & combined flap retraction modes are to be utilised)... and, assuming that they are following a split-axis (cross hairs) based Flight Director, then the pitch bar of the FD will be fully 'fly down' (the queue to the active mode is being given by the FMA). Now go figure what happens next?!

And that just one example of a f-up to be had in a 737 during a go-around that I can think of... and there are lots more !

olasek: wrt "In Boeings all go-arounds are initiated manually though you can engage A/P soon after.".... yes, that's ostensibly true, but what happens next very much depends upon the point in space when the TOGA button was pressed (and which assumes that the TOGA was indeed pressed... see explanation above), and / or was one utilising either a single or dual auto-pilot approach prior to initiating the go-around (either manually and / or via TOGA)?!

Also, if one initiates a go-around (via a press of the TOGA button) when utilising a single autopilot based ILS approach, the first thing that happens is that the autopilot disconnects, if one then (re-)engages an autopilot (i.e. when now in TOGA mode) it then cancels the TOGA mode, and does a number of other things too, which I'll trust you are aware of ?!

[flash8]

Does it matter? If the casual observer is to believe the videos on Youtube we already know what it says

You are confused with VP-BKO I'm afraid, and you do this crew no justice.

[ajd1]

756 = 757/767

[Denti]

In all Boeings go-arounds are initiated manually though you can engage A/P soon after.

It can be, but it doesn't have to be. If we fly a autoflight ILS it is always dual channel and therefore the go around is flown by the autopilot. Of course one could argue that it is initiated manually by manually pressing the TOGA switches. Automatic go around while nice is not the main reason for dual channel approaches though, it is a fix for some very nasty aileron hardovers flown by one faulty autopilot on one of our early classics, dual channel approaches will prevent that.

However, if already in manual flight that is of course a moot point, still not a difficult procedure if the training department does now how to do its job.

[Frosch]

I'd suspect an out of trim condition during G/A. G/A-Thrust might lead to STAB-Trim ending up full-nose-down (esp since flaps extended, trim moves quickly), which may lead to this type of "descend" when Thrust is reduced during "level-off" after the G/A due to the resulting nose-down moment. Difficult to solve without applying thrust.... Happend before.

[macdo]

Our Training Dept has recently been putting out internationally collated info about the high number of mis-handled GA's.
Its all very well saying its a basic manouvre, but it is one I do for real, on average, once a year. Often there is the 'startle factor' where a perfectly normal day turns into an unexpected flurry of action during an unexpected GA.
Added to that the Boeing can be a bit of a handful if the GA is not executed well.
Terrible video to watch, thoughts to the crew,pax etc.

[DOVES]

OKG
I'll give you my most sincere congratulations. You are really good at beating around the bush.
Let me ask you a question: are you a professional pilot or a lawyer?
You claim that they had dual autopilots engaged in ILS Approach Mode.
The first exception that comes to my mind is that given the windy conditions that was not the best option.
I have perhaps some other objection that better demolish your thesis, but before formulating them, I have to study more about what you say and the current conditions of efficiency of the airport.
As to the position of the stabilizer in the various phases of flight, I encourage you to check your stab trim ind which while during cruise is close to zero, and it could only be like that for drag reasons, while during the approach, in landing configuration, at the correct speed it is very much ANU.
Regards

[liider]

As already mentioned, 3 years ago none of the guys in the cockpit was a pilot - one was a Tu 154 navigator and the other a Tu 154 Flight engineer.

Where do you think they could have manual flying skills, if they actually started to fly at the age of 45?

[vovachan]

@Mountainbear

I'll put my money on the following tape:

PNF: Where are we supposed to go now?
PF: Dunno. Did you program the go around into the computer?
PNF: No. Did you?
PF: No. Cuss word. Where is the expletive map?
(sound of rummaging around)
PNF: BTW, we are on autopilot right?
PF: Cuss word!
PNF: Cuss word!
PF: Cuss word!

tape ends

[noooby]

Cut and paste from MAK statement on Avherald:

On Nov 19th 2013 the MAK reported that first read outs of the flight data recorder revealed that the crew did not follow the standard approach profile, went around due to considering the approach as unstable (attitude not within stable approach parameters), the engine thrust levers were moved to TOGA and the autopilot disconnected, the aircraft was under manual control for the remainder of the flight. While the engines accelerated to near takeoff thrust, the flaps were reduced from 30 to 15 degrees, the gear was retracted and the aircraft pitched up to about 25 degrees nose up, the indicated airspeed began to decay. Only after the airspeed had decreased from about 150 KIAS to 125 KIAS the crew began to issue control inputs to counter the nose up, the climb was stopped while the nose was lowered by control inputs. The aircraft reached a maximum height of 700 meters (2300 feet and began to rapidly descend until the aircraft impacted ground at a nose down attitude of 75 degrees at a speed of 450 kph (242 knots) about 20 seconds after reaching the maximum height of 700 meters. The engines were operating nominally until impact, the flight data recorders did not reveal any system malfunction. The cockpit voice recorder was not found inside its container, the assembly is missing and a search is under way.

[ampclamp]

Kazan plane crash: Pilot error led to Russian airliner plummeting into tarmac, killing 50 - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-20/pilot-error-led-to-russian-plane-crash-which-kllled-50/5103898)

[Tee Emm]

The autopilot(s) have at that point wound in nose-up stabiliser (i.e. ready for the autopilot to either flare the aircraft as part of the landing, or else primed for a go-around),

I am not sure of my facts here but I doubt if the 400 ft wind back of the stabiliser trim on a dual autopilot ILS is to specifically aid the go-around as such. The application of high thrust at the initiation of the go-around produces a strong pitch up. You don't need additional back trim which has already occurred at 400 ft on a dual channel approach.

Interestingly in the simulator at least, a single channel autopilot autoland does a quite smooth touchdown. On single channel the 400 ft wind back of the stabiliser trim does not occur. Again from observations in the simulator a well executed (in other words, safe) manual go-around on all engines in IMC in the 737 varies greatly with pilot skill and competence. Some really botch it up while other pilots know exactly what they are doing.

What does sometimes happen on a go-around in IMC and which has caused grief in the simulator, is inadvertent premature flap retraction by the PNF without being asked. The PF is busy flying on instruments and not keeping a close eye on monitoring the flap position indicator. For example the PNF selecting Flap 1 inadvertently rather than flap 15 at the instant of power application on an all engines GA.

Now pitch up to 15-25 degrees caused by the strong nose up trim change with underslung engines at high power, and couple that with some pilots blind adherence to the flight director needles instead of proper cross reference to airspeed, attitude, altimeter and IVSI. Believe me with an incompetent instrument pilot it doesn't take long for things to rapidly get out of hand.
I have seen that happen countless times during simulator training to the point of stick shaker application. When that happens an incompetent pilot can make grossly over-controlled pitch down movements in fright and next minute the aircraft is seriously diving. It is all to do with lack of instrument flying skill in manual IMC flight. Surprisingly common. Thank goodness for flight simulators:ok:

[jolihokistix]

Interesting comment in ampclamp's linked article above:

Aksan Giniyatullin, chief executive officers of Tatarstan airlines, which operated the jet, told a news conference: "The lead pilot had never made a second landing attempt under real flight conditions."

[lomapaseo]

Interesting comment in ampclamp's linked article above:

Aksan Giniyatullin, chief executive officers of Tatarstan airlines, which operated the jet, told a news conference: "The lead pilot had never made a second landing attempt under real flight conditions."

I'm not sure that 9 out of 10 successes is any better than 0 out of 1. The idea is to train for 10 out of 10 (or some such) in a simulator before trying out under real flight conditions.

Let's see what the investigation turns up in this regard

[Airbubba]

In all Boeings go-arounds are initiated manually though you can engage A/P soon after.

Don't know who told you that one but you can certainly leave the autopilot on for a go-around on the 757 and all later Boeing models. It is the recommended procedure for a low-vis missed autoflight approach in my experience.

[Old King Coal]

Doves: As to the position of the stabiliser in the various phases of flight, I encourage you to check your stab trim ind which while during cruise is close to zero, that statement alone shows in inherent lack of understanding of the B737.

Aside from considerations for it being 'windy', as you put it, on the matter of using a dual-channel approach mode (i.e. both autopilots engaged). There is nothing to stop one from using that mode (see: Boeing FCOM1 / Amplified Procedures / Landing Procedure ILS) even if ones intention might ultimately be to make 'manual landing' (i.e. to disconnect the autopilot(s) at some point during the approach) but wherein (prior to an autopilot disconnect) one then has the facility for an auto-pilot flown go-around (which one does not with a single-channel approach) and / or, putting it in simple terms, just because one engages both autopilots does not mean that one will necessarily be letting the autopilot(s) do the landing, but if one then elects to initiate a go-around (by disconnecting the autopilot and flying it yourself) and doing so when below 400ft Rad Alt, you can expect the said same (dual-)autopilots to have wound in nose-up stabiliser, and which you'd better be ready for when the autopilots relinquish control to the yolk.

[Sergey Tachenov]

was one utilising either a single or dual auto-pilot approach prior to initiating the go-around A quote from the МАК site (boeing 737-500 investigation (http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigations/2013/boeing-737-500_vq-bbn.html)): В процессе захода на посадку экипажу не удалось выполнить стандартный заход в соответствии с установленной нормативной документацией схемой. Оценив положение самолёта относительно ВПП как «непосадочное», экипаж доложил диспетчеру и начал уход на второй круг в режиме TOGA (Take Off / Go Around. Взлёт / Уход на второй круг). При этом, задействованный в процессе захода на посадку один из двух автопилотов, был отключён и дальнейший полёт осуществлялся в ручном режиме. During the approach, the crew failed to execute standard approach in accordance with the plan defined by the normative documentation. Having assessed the aircraft position relative to the runway as "not acceptable for landing", the crew reported to the ATC and started executing a missed approach in the TOGA mode. At that moment one of the two autopilots activated for the landing was disengaged and the rest of the flight was being carried manually. Sorry for my lame English (especially when it comes to aviation terms), but it should be pretty clear that they were using only one of the autopilots during the approach, or else how would disengaging one of them put the aircraft into manual flight mode?

[Sergey Tachenov]

I understand almost nothing about aviation, but I am Russian. The МАК site says that "one of the autopilots that was used during approach was disengaged and the rest of the flight was being carried manually" (задействованный в процессе захода на посадку один из двух автопилотов, был отключён и дальнейший полёт осуществлялся в ручном режиме). So why all the talk about dual autopilots?

[direct ortac]

From airwise.com..

Russian Crash Pilot Pushed Plane Into Nosedive (http://news.airwise.com/story/view/1384903572.html)

The pilot of an airliner that crashed near the Russian city of Kazan killing 50 people had pushed the steering column to pitch it into a nosedive, crash investigators said on Tuesday, citing data recorder analysis.
The Interstate Aviation Committee, which oversees civil aviation in the former Soviet Union, offered no explanation why the pilot of the Boeing 737 might have performed the maneuver, at a height of 700 meters, after aborting a first attempt to land.
Aksan Giniyatullin, chief executive of Tatarstan Airlines which operated the jet, told a news conference: "The lead pilot had never made a second landing attempt under real flight conditions."
Video of the crash showed the aircraft, approaching Kazan in the region of Tatarstan on a flight from Moscow, plummeting headlong into the tarmac and exploding.
"After a speed decrease from 150 to 125 knots (144 mph) the crew started maneuvering activities with the steering column to put the plane into a nose-down pitch, which resulted in the end of altitude gain and the start of descent," the committee said in a statement.
Both engines were running and no malfunctions were detected by the flight data recorder. The tape from the voice recorder could not be recovered at the crash site, the committee said.
RUSSIAN SAFETY RECORD
Sunday's crash raised new concerns about Russia's poor safety record as it prepares to host the Winter Olympics in the southern city of Sochi in February.
Russia and the Soviet republics combined have one of the world's worst air traffic safety records, with a total accident rate almost three times the world average in 2011, according to the International Air Transport Association.
"I know lots of people who don't fly with these small airlines in Russia anymore, they're scared..." said Leila Sibgatullina, who came to place flowers at the site of the crash.
"This kind of thing just shouldn't be happening. What a tragedy."
Mourners paid respects at a makeshift memorial set up at the gate to the runway. Candles burned around a table piled with red and white flowers and teddy bears.
The son of the president of the oil-rich province of Tatarstan and the regional head of the FSB intelligence service were named among those killed. The dead also included two foreigners, a Briton and a Ukrainian.
The committee said investigators were studying the level of crew training and technical condition of the jet among other aspects.
An independent aviation expert who did not want to be named suggested the decline in speed might itself have caused the plane to stall and nosedive.
"The abrupt transition from ascent to descent can signify that the crew, possibly, failed to keep track of the speed decrease, which resulted in the jet losing controllability and falling," he said.
(Reuters)

[flarepilot]

about the dual ch autopilot and nose up trim


since the plane didn't go below 400', why even mention it?

[deadcut]

Don't fly any other airline in Russia except for Aeroflot, Transaero and S7 and you will be fine.

Huge lack of pilots in Russia is causing these "backwater" operators to turn to "converting" flight engineers and navigators. Their training will consist of going up in a light aircraft and the instructor signing them off saying "You guys are pretty much pilots you already know all this basic stuff"

These "pilots" cocked up a go around, then failed to save a recoverable aircraft and not only killed themselves but took 50 innocent lives with them.

[Jwscud]

Pushing TOGA on the 737 with a single AP engaged automatically disengages it and you're into a hand flown go around. Equally, a single push of TOGA will not give you full beans GA thrust, but reduced thrust that will give you around 1000-2000ft fpm roc to avoid this kind of situation, and the FMA will reflect that, indicating GA not N1. You have to push TOGA twice to get full GA N1.

As for the NU stab trim, I thought it was part of the fail passive protections - ie if the autopilot chucks it at 100ft the aircraft will tend to pitch up and away from the ground?

[up_down_n_out]

"Don't fly any other airline in Russia except for Aeroflot, Transaero and S7 and you will be fine."

That sounds like a good recommendation when it was Aeroflot was 100% responsible for the poor training and CRM of the Aeroflot flight SU821 accident in Perm, then the infamous video from last winter when they refused to sanction the pilot last winter for taking off with snow on the wings...then,-

S7 Flight 778 screw-up at Irkutsk....and of course Transaero's infamous record of flying on time. :rolleyes:

Just do you have any idea what you are talking about or what you are up against with ref to Russian aviation?

They're all in the snake pit together, and this crash is just the tip of a very large iceberg.

Trying suing AFL or S7 for any sort of poor behaviour...
(Eg. being 8hrs late ???!!)

We have tried, on 2 occasions.
AFL just LIED & LIED in court time after time, deny everything, hire crap lawyers and outgun every single "normal" legal procedure by every means "in the book" or "out of the book".

In Russia if anything goes pear shaped, the old soviet style education clicks in:-

1/ Deny everything.
2/ Exonerate the company/state
3/ Blame the customer/equipment/crew

It was exactly the same on the Sayano–Shushenskaya Dam accident.
It will always be the same in a country replete with an overt culture of lying, false law degrees, innate corruption & accountancy abberations.

S7 went into denial on our 2nd court case.
Everyone asked us "why do you bother to waste your time & money"?

You want to view the correspondence?
It's an eye opener! :ooh:

[Brenoch]

During the years, I've trained a fair few crews from both Transaero and S7. Most of them doing conversion training onto their first western built jet. In an ideal world they would have been given 30 or so sessions in the FFS to get a basic understanding of the philosophy of a "modern" western aircraft. Most of they guys came from a 4 or more crew flight deck. However, the training department of said airlines were, too say the least, unwilling to fork out that amount of money and custom built a training program that would focus solely on items covered on a skill test. These crews where then trained for 8 sessions doing nothing but single engine approaches and go arounds. After said 8 sessions they were competent enough to carry out this manoeuvre to pass a skill test.
There where of course exceptions, mainly crew members whom had previous experience on western built jets but they where few and far between.

I raised my concerns about this with head of training and was given the option to "get with the program or resign" I resigned.
The training organisation I was with is one of the largest and most well respected in the world today.

Needless to say, it will be long before I let my family or anyone else I care about for that matter travel with any of these airlines.

[deadcut]

All I am saying is that at least Aeroflot is flying newer aircraft compared to these other operators. They are changing for the better.

As for being late. Those delays have nothing to do with this accident. Anyway why would you even bother to "sue" such big companies in RUSSIA?!? Ты че мужик? Нюх потерял?

[phiggsbroadband]

The difference in attitude is alarming... From 25 degrees up to 75 degrees down is a pitch change of 100 degrees.. This would not have happened in the blink of an eye.

There is a lesser known equation that trades height for speed, and it is..
9 ft / kt / 100 kts.

ie at 100kts if you wish to gain or loose 10 knots you will need to trade 90ft.

So in this case if the pilot wished to increase speed by 25 knots he would have needed to just loose 280ft. From 2200ft this would easily be done by 1900ft... So why did he descend further? (And this totally ignores any positive effect that the engine thrust makes.)

[up_down_n_out]

"I am saying is that at least Aeroflot is flying newer aircraft compared to these other operators. They are changing for the better.

As for being late.... Anyway why would you even bother to "sue" such big companies in RUSSIA?!? Ты че мужик? Нюх потерял?"

It's funny how this comment illustrates yet again the yawning gap between your reality & those lying, twisting corporate entities.
The fact is, a company is a company.

This nonsense from Medvedev (as per usual) blaming old aircraft for the high accident rates, was as we all know complete total b..llox.

In reality the old TU154 variants, are/were known for an excellent safety record, and only replaced for lack of space and high fuel costs, while the vast majority of fatal accidents, Red WingsFlight 9268, S7-Irkutsk, AFL, Utair-Tyumen, Sukhoi SSJ-100-95 etc, were invariably down to brand new modern aircraft, pilot error, CRM, a culture of poor safety or mixtures of all at once.

As for the laws,- You should be entitled to AT LEAST the minimum of what (weak) Russian law says is your rights.

The mere fact someone turns to sue AFL, is the start of what actually made consumer protection law in the rest of the world what it is today.

Using your attitude as an example the EU commission would never have lobbied for changes in the law for mobile phone roaming or penalties for lengthy delays for airlines throughout the EU. (for example).

EU - Air passenger rights - Your Europe (http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/travel/passenger-rights/air/)

I have a problem with people who just sit back, do nothing and remain aloof and complacent.
The fact is just ONE woman attacked AFL for the loss of her daughter on SU821.
She got awarded 7.7m roubles.

The others represented by your post would have just sat around saying..."oh well we just accept the 2m offered" (which is not even enough to buy an average flat), and that is that.
It was in fact the same in France over the terrible Mont St Odile ordeal, EADS and AF.

The fact is, if people stuck up for their rights in Russia (and the EU even), sued those abusive companies EN MASSE, the sheer quantity of litigation would make those companies lose so much money they would be forced to change.

QED.

[Hotel Tango]

All I am saying is that at least Aeroflot is flying newer aircraft compared to these other operators.

Sorry, but you will find that it's nothing to do with old versus new aircraft, but a lot to do with the competence levels of the crews involved.

[ZFT]

These crews where then trained for 8 sessions doing nothing but single engine approaches and go arounds. After said 8 sessions they were competent enough to carry out this manoeuvre to pass a skill test.
There where of course exceptions, mainly crew members whom had previous experience on western built jets but they where few and far between.

I raised my concerns about this with head of training and was given the option to "get with the program or resign" I resigned.
The training organisation I was with is one of the largest and most well respected in the world today.

May I assume that you don't respect them (I assume from a cold place)?

[Agaricus bisporus]

As said above the 737 can be a bit of a handful on a g/a, esp a 2 engine g/a mainly due to the speed at which things happen and the pitch-couple.

In the last 3 companies I've flown the 737 for it has been recognised that the most commonly cocked up "normal" procedure is the 2 engine g/a, even among experienced, well trained Eu crews.

Why? We hardly practice them. We do loads of s/e g/a's, lots and lots, but two engine? Plenty few. We have increased the frequency in the sim but even so it is not a common manoeuvre, and one that tends to catch you unawares.

With (if true, 3 yr experienced flight engineers at the controls) it is even more likely to end in tears.

Pitch to 25 deg and speed loss to 120Kts before any recovery action was taken speaks of a very large helping of paralysys followed by a slo-mo "Oh Christ, Oh S***, Oh dear!", the aircraft rapidly getting away from the pilot - something you MUST not let a 737 do in a g/a, followed by a boched scramble to recover an aircraft on the brink of - or in an incipient stall with a pilot 1000ft behind the aircraft in the vertical profile. That is simply a recipe for disaster.

Sequence goes a bit like this...

G/a, TOGA, a/c pitches up strongly. Pilot fails to push hard enough (its very physical with 2 engines and if you're out of practice it can easily run away with you) Pitch is increasing. Other pilot taken by surprise. Eventually flap 15 is called and achieved but the delay hasn't helped the acceleration, if any. Eventually someone remembers the gear. The crew now completely out of their comfort zone as its already completely pear-shaped and over-maxed mentally. Airspeed already approaching 120 with 25' pitch, P/F pushing as hard as he can now, thumb on fwd trim too, fixated on pitch, trim wheel spinning hard. (We'll hear "Go down you bastard!" through gritted teeth on the CVR here) Sees airspeed reducing further (I bet 120 was nowhere near the minimum) so keeps pushing and trimming. Pitch finally reducing at 700m - 2200ft. About where you'd expect in this scenario. Power stays on and nose lowered below horizon - perhaps a bit too much in the panic - in incipient stall recovery, height reducing, speed increasing fast, pitch trim still running because he's still pushing real hard. Thrust levers slammed closed as speed rockets so a/c pitches forcefully down as pitch-couple is removed. With plenty of fwd trim by now and no thrust-pitch couple you'd then get straight from max effort push to max effort pull in a second or two resulting in exactly what we saw in the video.

I think 737 sim instructors will recognise this scenario.

[DOVES]

Post 133
From 700 m (2310 ft) to zero in 20 secs, means 6930 ft/min???
It means 126 Km/h and 70 Kts

Post 85
It seems to be hitting the ground at 0.08 in the RT video, first appearing about 5 aircraft lengths back at 0.04, assuming that the fainter trailing light is the lit fin, and the ground position comes from the location of the flash on impact. That's only covering about 150m in 4s, so it's not hitting very fast: about 80 knots

I agree with this theory. Since in the movie the aircraft takes about 1 second to travel its length.

Post 103 and 126
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...9%20G-THOF.pdf
It takes time and patience, but worth reading
Pg 34:
It is recommended that Boeing clarify the wording of the Boeing 737 300-500 approach to stall recovery Quick Reference Handbook Non-normal Manoeuvres to ensure that pilots are aware that trimming forward may be required to enhance pitch control authority. (Safety Recommendation 2009-045)

A SPIN
Shown that the stabilizer was for sure, as per that phase of flight, toward the extreme ANU, when a GA was initiated, either due to the strong pitch up moment caused by the engines and the vertical upward component of traction or 'apparent lift', which decreases the stall speed, it was not easy, or even impossible, to stop the rapid attitude increase if not by trimming down or reducing engine thrust.
It’s very difficult to share the opinion that the pilot caused that shocking vertical dive by pushing the control column

From Post 133
The only maneuvers I can imagine for a plane to assume such an attitude are:
- A spin (to which would favor the low speed and the high rate of descent)

So with:
-High-pitch attitude
-Slow-speed, near or even below stall
It's just a little rotation (some rudder, some aileron, different thrust on the engines) on the yaw-axis to cause a spin.
Remember what's the difference between the spiral and the spin?
The airspeed is high and increasing in the first and very low in the other.

[9gmax]

just a thought...trying to discuss it with people in the know.... Could it be a case of Vestibular/somatogravic illusions? Pilots were probably visual, then decide to go-around, climbed and attained 25 degrees angle, entered clouds with loss of external reference points, airspeed decays, pilots push stick forward and became victim to 'inversion illusion' (from Wiki : An abrupt change from climb to straight-and-level flight can stimulate the otolith organs enough to create the illusion of tumbling backwards, or inversion illusion. The disoriented pilot may push the aircraft abruptly into a nose-low attitude, possibly intensifying this illusion.) Anybody wants to comment?....

[Gulfstreamaviator]

I suspect that he followed the "flight Director" Russian style.....
so instead of 12 up he went 12 down...... and followed it down...and down...

Just thinking out loud....

[BOAC]

Forgive me if this has been covered already, but I keep seeing people talking about 'Russian instruments' and possible problems caused thereby. I would be very surprised if any airline went to the trouble to re-instrument their Boeings, so surely the instrumentation is 'standard'?

[fa2fi]

Wasn't the Aeroflot Nord 733 crash blamed on loss of SA due to misinterpreting the instruments? That flight ended up vertically too.

[barit1]

BOAC:

The problem is the Russian instruments they were trained on before transitioning to western cockpits. See Prior thread (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/10337-artificial-horizon-russian-style.html)

[BOAC]

OMG:eek: Thanks, barit1.

[ATC Watcher]

BOAC : I think that what they said was that both crew are reported to come from Tu154 where, on old types the typical Russian AI is inverted .
Of course it is "normal" on a B737 ADI , hence the possible "reversal to old habbits" during stress. (happening before in former East Block countries when converting from Mig to F16...)

[DozyWannabe]

Not just inverted in terms of colour scheme - on old Russian instruments, it was the "bird" that was mobile and the "horizon" that held true - not vice-versa.

[MountainBear]

The problem is the Russian instruments they were trained on before transitioning to western cockpits. See Prior thread (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/10337-artificial-horizon-russian-style.html)Psychologically there is a difference between training and conditioning. Under stress, a person often falls back on what they are conditioned to do and not what they have been trained to do. Do reading, for example, on the topic of learned helplessness.

Whether this truth is enough in a specific situation for a pilot to misread the instruments is difficult to forecast. It depends on the strength on the underlying conditioning, the strength of the training, the passage of time, the level of stress etc. It is not the type of data that shows up on the FDR and it is improbable that any hint of it shows up on the CVR.

So is this type of concern a theoretical possibility? Yes. Is it probable? I have no idea. My own initial opinion is that an illusion is more probable. Perhaps the CVR, if found intact, will shed more light on the topic.

[liider]

If they were navigator and flight engineer on soviet aircrafts, they didn't need the AH, so they couldn't get used to it so much.

The CVR tape was found today.

[John Farley]

9gmax

While 9g is much too much for me your comments on the somatogravic illusion are interesting. As you probably know the illusion is caused by a long sustained longitudinal acceleration that causes someone sitting down to think the force on their back means they are laying on their back and so very nose up.

To suffer from it (as well as needing the sustained accel) one needs to reject all other cues to one's attitude to say nothing of not look at or believe the (probably) three attitude indicators.

Many problems with ones pink body, which are of little consequence when sitting watching the TV, can be quite off-putting - even serious - when flying especially if they are asymmetric. Blocked or sticky sinuses and Eustachian tubes, hard wax scraping at an ear drum and of course any infection of the inner ear balance organs, can lead to a remarkable level of confusion if at the same time you can't see out. Normally the messages from one's eyes are so powerful that they kill stone dead confusion (manifesting perhaps as a touch of dizziness) from these other sources.

But when you can't see..............

[olasek]

From 700 m (2310 ft) to zero in 20 secs, means 6930 ft/min???
It means 126 Km/h and 70 KtsIt only means that average vertical speed was 70 kts, it says nothing about their final speed at the time of the crash.

hat's only covering about 150m in 4s, so it's not hitting very fast: about 80 knotsAgain, this assumes the video is shown to us in real-time speed, it doesn't have to be the case. Also, their final speed as registered by FDR was around 245 kts - so I would stick with this.

[Clandestino]

Excuse me guys, but which part of this:Под действием кабрирующего момента от тяги двигателей, самолёт перешёл в набор высоты и достиг угла тангажа около 25°. Приборная скорость начала уменьшаться. Экипаж произвёл уборку шасси. С момента начала ухода на второй круг до этого времени активных действий по штурвальному управлению самолётом экипаж не предпринимал. После уменьшении скорости со 150 до 125 уз экипаж начал управляющие действия колонкой штурвала по переводу самолёта в пикирование, которое привело к прекращению набора высоты, началу снижения самолёта и росту приборной скорости. Максимальные углы атаки в процессе полёта не превышали эксплуатационных ограничений.
Самолёт, достигнув высоты 700 м, начал интенсивное пикирование с углом тангажа, достигшим к концу полёта -75° (концу записи).
Самолёт столкнулся с землёй с большой скоростью (более 450 км/ч) и большим отрицательным углом тангажа. ...you don't understand?

Aeroplane pitched up on her own to 25°, no pitch input on yokes was recorded. Only when speed dropped to 125 kts someone in the cockpit pushed the nose downward to 75° just before impact which occurred at speed above 450 km/h. There was no stall, oh-so-severe-pitch-up-with-underslung-engines was not just contained but killed and Soviet AH are different from usual ones in roll, not pitch.

Could it be a case of Vestibular/somatogravic illusions?From the limited info we're so far given, quite probably.

[mercurydancer]

The problem comes when you book with Aeroflot for connecting flights, you may get Donavia or other companies without much information or little opportunity to change flights.

S7 scares me badly as they really dont appear to have much of a safety culture at all. I have flown with them a few times and have been a bit worried about taking off with snow on the wings, and some very uncomfortable landings. Far worse landings than I have had with any other airline, I can accept a go around when it is required, but seeing the wing tip get only a couple of meters from striking the ground in a crosswind landing is frightening.

[mercurydancer]

As SLF I cant really critique your analysis, but judging by two factors, your very sensible, reasoned and logical previous posts, and obvious experience it sounds quite plausible.

I found the video clips really disturbing as I was shocked by the angle in which the aircraft hit the ground. I have studied transport accidents as part of my masters in risk management and investigation, so the combination of errors which led to Kegworth, Potter's Bar, Everglades, Ladbroke Grove disasters are very familiar. The Swiss cheese lined up in a certain way, but the errors were subtle and deceptive. What I struggle with is that an aircraft can impact at such an angle.

[ohnutsiforgot]

"The problem comes when you book with Aeroflot for connecting flights, you may get Donavia or other companies without much information or little opportunity to change flights."

One word. Colgan.

[mary meagher]

Mercury Dancer, the way we teach landings (in gliders) is to aim at the ground and then miss. If you fail to perform correctly the second part of this procedure, the aircraft will then stick in the ground like a dart. This more or less holds true for approach and safe landing in most types.

[Agaricus bisporus]

Jeez! Why do all the theories have to be to most complex and least probable?

Look at the simplest reason for loss of control and you'll "probably" have the "right" answer.

All this :mad: about somatogravic xyz or flap fail/fuel imbalance (certain balls) is all very well The most likely cause is quite simply overpitching due to a mishandled g/s and botched recovery, I'd be astonished if it were anything else.

if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck....

[fireflybob]

if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck....

ab, with you all the way.

Am surprised nobody's started bleating about Boeing should change the autopilot logic etc etc:ugh:

[Clandestino]

if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck....... then it is someone who has not read MAK's information about FDR readout.

[olasek]

if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck....
Yeah, but any such "duck" often has a fair amount of pilot's disorientation in it. "Botched" recovery at night with little outside reference is often directly related to inattention to instruments which often has root cause at some sensory illusion. I think this Pilatus' crash may be a highly relevant example regardless if you attach some fancy name to it like somatogravic.

[fireflybob]

So if we regard the somatogravic illusion as a potential "threat" how should this be managed?

[olasek]

So if we regard the somatogravic illusion as a potential "threat" how should this be managed? This is what they teach during a typical IFR course: do not get yourself into unnecessarily drastic manoeuvres in an IFR environment, don't make too steep turns, control your pitch within limits, trust your instruments, etc. In this example a 25 deg pitch up was completely uncalled for and significantly outside what was required. It was enough for them to follow the FD guidance (assuming of course it was correctly configured).

[freespeed2]

9gmax

Could it be a case of Vestibular/somatogravic illusions? ...Anybody wants to comment?....

We did; in posts #96, 98 & 99.

All this *** about somatogravic xyz or flap fail/fuel imbalance (certain balls) is all very well The most likely cause is quite simply overpitching due to a mishandled g/s and botched recovery, I'd be astonished if it were anything else.


I think you are correct in saying that the overpitching and botched recovery is the direct cause but it oversimplifies the wider cause that needs to be recognized. An aircraft should recover within the available altitude considering that a high power setting was already achieved. The stall would be broken quite quickly. The only reason to continue to pitch forward is because the pilot thought that he was still increasing his pitch. He did not believe his instruments. Look at the report linked in post #96. In the Annex is an excellent explanation of somatographic illusion. The rapid pitch up or the stall did not cause the illusion. It usually begins when an upward pitching motion is abruptly checked around 20-30 degrees nose up, so in this case it began when he tried to recover from the stall. This is what sends the semicircular canals spinning and causes the false pitch up sensation.

It is impossible to demonstrate this effect in a simulator during training due to the lack of 'g' effects. This pilot may not have even been aware of the phenomenon judging by the previous comments about how the training and qualifications are achieved.

[misd-agin]

Quote:
Could it be a case of Vestibular/somatogravic illusions? ...Anybody wants to comment?....
We did; in posts #96, 98 & 99.




....post 39...

[The Ancient Geek]

It is impossible to demonstrate this effect in a simulator during training due to the lack of 'g' effects. This pilot may not have even been aware of the phenomenon judging by the previous comments about how the training and qualifications are achieved.
But easily taught under the hood in a light aircraft.
Which is where, IMHO, all pilots should learn about recovery from unusual attitudes.

A few hours per year in an aerobatic trainer should be part of maintaining currency and is not expensive.

[Dan Winterland]

The somatogravic illusion (SI) cannot be taught in the air. The standard IF syllabus demonstrates the corilis effect and the somatogral illusuion, but the SI cannot be taught in either aircraft or simulators. To induce it, you need a sustained peripd of acceleration and experience shows that if you are expecting it, it's not going to happen to you. It can only be taught in the groundschool phase with advice on how to counter it. Mitigating strategies such as making sure you stay on instruments and don't descend on take off or during a go-around can be introduced in night and IF syllabi, but demonstrating it effectively has so far eluded the flying training systems.

I have been conducting some research into the SI and have come up with some interesting facts.

First, it's nearly impossible to adequately train for in practical terms. This, is mentioned above.

Second, it's been killing people for years and it continues to. I have details of about 200 crashes where the SI is a probable cause of a crash, but there are undoubtedly many more, as the SI is often not understood or identified by accident investigators, and for the sobering statistic that the fatality rate for SI accidents is about 85%. Pilots don't generally live to tell the tale!

Third, many pilots are aware of the illusion, but fail to recognise it when it happens to them. This is because it is a dim and distant memory from their Human Factors and Performance syllabus - if they did it! Don't forget, HPF was only really introduced as a mandatory subject in the early 1990s.


In my opinion, this crash is a classic SI case.

[misd-agin]

A light airplane doesn't have the thrust to weight, speed, and acceleration of a jet aircraft. So it's better than a simulator but the inability to generate the acceleration of an airliner on a G/A makes it a poor comparison.

Worst vertigo was a light weight, night, 757 ferry flight LGA-JFK. Max power for windshear in the area(SOP). LGA 13. Tremendous acceleration. Right turn to 175 immediately after liftoff. In the turn tower changes it to left to 060 and level off at 2000'. In the turn, leveling, power coming back, unloading from high rate of climb ... and we go into the clouds ... and moderate turbulence. Bam! Perfect storm. Vertigo. Big time. SOP is to call it out "I've got vertigo". FO - "I do too." :sad: Tough stuff when you're fighting it. Experience and training is key.

[Dan Winterland]

You don't need much acceleration to generate the somatogravic illusion. As it's pure geometry it can be calculated. An acceleration of 30kts over a period of 10 seconds is equivalent to 1.54m/s², which translates into a perceived pitch up of 9°. As many aircraft climb at a lesser angle than this, the aircraft can conceivably enter a descent if the illusion is not correctly countered.

This means that pilots of low powered GA aircraft are just as susceptable as jet pilots. And the staistice reflect this. Somatogravic illusion accidents either tend to occur during go-arounds for airliners, but GA aricraft it's usually on take off at night in VMC at airfields in spasrely populated areas where there are few visual clues.

[olasek]

This means that pilots of low powered GA aircraft are just as susceptable as jet pilots. And the staistice reflect this.
Correct. Actually this sort of accidents are fairly common place in GA, rather rare among professional airline pilots. I don't think a type of aircraft has much to do with it, just pilot training and experience.

[Prada]

There is a nice Article about piloting illusions. Good to read.

Sensory illusions in aviation - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensory_illusions_in_aviation)

[jimjim1]

The Ancient Greek sagely mentioned:
A few hours per year in an aerobatic trainer should be part of maintaining currency and is not expensive.

My feeling is that if all airline pilots did this then some would likely die in the process since GA flying is quite a bit more hazardous that airline flying. It might reduce the total deaths from air travel but at the expense of increasing the occupational hazard of being an airline pilot.

Would that be an acceptable trade off?

[olasek]

then some would likely die in the process since GA flying is quite a bit more hazardous that airline flyingNo, GA is more hazardous primarily because of GA pilots making poor flight decisions so I have hard time with the premise of your argument that a professional ATP pilot flying in GA airplane is automatically at much higher risk level, there are many safe pilots who fly GA their whole life and never get into any trouble. Yes, some pilots will always die - for example crashing while driving to the airport. :bored:

[fireflybob]

Am sure SI exists and occurs with pilots.

Question is why/how do some crews sort it (viz example in B757 above) but others don't?

I've had disorientation on several occasions when airborne but lived to tell the tale,

The answer is thorough crew training and procedures - plenty of a/c do GAs in potentially disorienting situations but do not come to grief.

Ref this being "common place " in GA a/c accidents - can you supply statistics?

[jaja]

I am not trying to speculate on what might have happened here, but have a read about the ICELANDAIR B-757 that was very close to crash during a go-around at Oslo Gardermoen in 2002 .

Shocking to see how quickly a well trained north-european crew nearly lost it during a standard procedure in an fully operational aircraft.

Pitch - 49 degrees, and lowest RA 321 !

REPORT ON THE serious incident to icelandair BOEING 757 (http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/pentagon/analysis/theories/aaib_757incident.html)

[DOVES]

Somatogravic Illusion (SI)?: I know because I've mentioned her several times in my classes; but in 45 -plus years of honest profession, mainly in the commercial Sector, conduct, thank God , without even getting a scratch on my plane , I never met her.
And in any case on the liner as everything that is fungible and redundant , even the pilots are 2 and it is not 'statistically' possible that both have simultaniously the same illness.
As for the gruesome accident in question, maybe we better wait the results of the investigation.
But let me express.
Given the increasing number of incidents/accidents occurring during a go-around with all engines operative , as we perform derated TO, why do we use max thrust, and the weight is certainly lighter, and we are not provided a reduced thrust for GA?

[Denti]

Actually, the 737 uses reduced thrust for G/A. At least as long as you only press the TOGA buttons once.

[aaben]

Yesterday I found a preliminary report issued on 19th Nov by Norwegian AIB. It describes incident on a B738 in Finland. During intermediate approach horizontal stabilizer moved to position full nose up, a/c pitched up +38,5 deg, KTAS dropped to 118. Fortunately crew was able to recover.

During investigation it has been found that at certain conditions de-icing fluid can ingress into tail cone compartment and it is possible that it freezes, blicking PCU input arms. This concerns all B737.

Abovementioned report: http://www.aibn.no/Luftfart/Rapporter/13-18?iid=14939&pid=SHT-Report-Attachments.Native-InnerFile-File&attach=1

[A37575]

Anyone who wants to experience the power of somatogravic illusion only needs to sit inside a full flight simulator during take-off - the sense of acceleration is created by using the illusion in reverse.

.

Interesting that. Done lots of simulator sessions but haven't struck that problem. Have seen airsickness especially when taxiing and doing a 180 on the runway. The fix for airsickness was to close your eyes before starting the turn and don't open them until taxiing straight. You need a kind and understanding instructor, though. Also happens when coming out of reverse when slowing up after landing.

[Sergey Tachenov]

It may be a lame question, but why nobody implemented a system which could override pilot's action just before the moment when the collision becomes imminent? It looks like a kind of silly that a fully operable plane with all the modern sophisticated computers can fly into terrain just because pilots suffered some kind of illusion.

[BOAC]

A37575 - JH is simply describing a form of SI used all the time in simulators - not 'a problem' - and you will have experienced it on every detail. It is the use of a tilt of the box to simulate a longitudinal acceleration, that's all. It 'stimulates' all the body's acceleration sensors including the inner ear. As an example of the power of SI, it is extremely convincing, as we all know. The point JH is making is that if you 'reverse' the 'illusion' it can be equally convincing.

[Sunamer]

but why nobody implemented a system which could override pilot's action just before the moment when the collision becomes imminent

because that system is not 100% fail proof and when it fails in such a way that it still can override but the logic of that system is erroneous, it overrides pilot's actions and crashes the plane. now what? :=

[Sergey Tachenov]

Well, if the probability of a system error is significantly lower than the probability of a pilot error, isn't that still a good thing? What's worse, 10 planes crashing because of a pilot error or 1 plane crashing because of a system error? Not to mention that it is actually possible to fix the system error after the first accident so that it never happens again (although a different error can still happen), but you can't 100% "fix" all the pilots, even though you can give them better training. And as I understand, there are already similar systems. For example, I remember NGE's Mayday episode Pilot vs Plane, where the pilot pulled up and the nose went down because of the Alpha Protection or something, in order to prevent stalling. The plane still crashed anyway, but it was determined that the crash would be worse if the plane obeyed the pilot's command and crashed after stalling.

[The Ancient Geek]

Wihout getting into a stupid Boeing vs Airbus war PLEASE.

ISTM that the envelope protection of an A320 could possibly have prevented this. Or possibly not ?

[DOVES]

Thank you so much Jazz Hands and BOAC
I'm really ignorant on the subject.

And so I have to change my sentence:
...but in 45 -plus years of honest profession, mainly in the commercial Sector, conduct, thank God , without even getting a scratch on my plane , I've never met her in the real world. ...

So I experienced unknowingly the SI thousands of times.
As a matter of fact, often my students said they had felt unwell during certain maneuvers in the simulator.

[Lonewolf_50]

In my opinion, this crash is a classic SI case.
If the only tool you have is a hammer, it all looks like a nail.

If you are at night, and trying to visually acquire the airport, and realize "this is AFU" and call for a Go Around, the first thing you do is GET ON THE GAUGES! You set GA attitude as power comes on and you, or the dear old Otto, holds it. Since these guys were in manual, the objective is to set the go around attitude, and hold it. As your C/P changes configuration via flaps or gear up in due course, you still fly on the gauges, and your primary reference is your pitch and roll indicating instrument, with cross check on your airspeed and VSI to make sure your GA is within bounds.

I don't know how well trained this crew were in doing a go around, but I saw Agricus' post and believed his point: pilots behind the aircraft shortly after GA decision. Flying visual wasn't a choice, flying with a proper instrument scan is the ONLY choice in IMC missed appproach, and Night IMC missed approach. It appears from the information that their condition was night/IMC.

If you don't stick to the basics, you'll get behind the plane. If behind the plane, it is possible to overcontrol when trying to correct.

Dan, the issue is Instrument Scan. Is the devleopment and application of one not considered a core competency of a professional pilot? Does the pilot force of a given airline get sufficient reps in instrument flying to keep the scan skill current, and not rusty?

You mitigate the problems of those illusions by flying on your instruments, regardless of what you "feel" in the seat.

EDIT:

I don't know enough about 737 to guess intelligently, but IF they had a malfunction in the pitch trim motor/system, and had a trim hardover or runaway during this maneuver, how easy is it for FDR to figure that out? :confused:

[island_airphoto]

Light aircraft CFI/II/MEI here.
I have seen something like this when transitioning pilots from a very light airplane - like say a C-150 or J-3 size - to a "big" airplane like a C-182. A C-150 can be flown pretty well without ever touching the trim. Then you get that pilot in a C-182 and get him to start using trim. Coming down final with 2 aboard you'll be trimmed pretty much full back if you don't want to land nose first. Say Go Around and now you have a plane headed for the moon and a panicked pilot pushing full forward with many times the force his previous airplane ever needed. Even worse - hop in a C-208 with one big 600 or so HP engine out front and you really better be trimming it right.

As for the various illusions, I do everything I possibly can do to get my students to develope vertigo. You cannot imagine how hard it is to overcome your brain screaming WE ARE DIVING LEFT OMFG :eek: when the plane is really climbing to the right or vice versa until you have to do it for real. IMHO winning this mental battle reduces the brainpower left for any other task by a lot. The "black hole" issue is pretty common in GA. You take off with good visual reference - you think - on a dark overcast night and rotate. Now your world is pitch black. Or you break out on the ILS, switch to looking outside, and then go around. Suddenly your world disapears, the plane is loud and changing pitch and flaps need to come up and you can't see anything and it can get away from you with only 150-300-600 HP to manage. Can't imagine what a half-trained pilot in a 737 would be going through.

[fireflybob]

Lonewolf 50, excellent post which says it all - thanks for bringing us back to the basics.

[island_airphoto]

Lonewolf:
Every plane I have flown with a coupled autopilot can leave you with a big mess if it gets out of hand. You notice it going bad, kick it offline, and now you are hand flying with a badly out of trim airplane and sometimes the actions you took to kill Otto also take the electric trim offline. That said, it doesn't really look like this is the case here from my casual reading.

[The Ancient Geek]

Then you get that pilot in a C-182 and get him to start using trim. Coming down final with 2 aboard you'll be trimmed pretty much full back if you don't want to land nose first. Say Go Around and now you have a plane headed for the moon and a panicked pilot pushing full forward with many times the force his previous airplane ever needed.

Heh - and the other C182 gotcha, short field approach with flaps 40, instructor say go around, full power and push forward --- Eeek it wont climb.
Slow realisation - you still have flaps 40 = DUH.

[Lonewolf_50]

island, agreed that "catching" up when auto systems transition to your control can take some work.

I noted earlier in the thread that CVR does not appear to be intact. :( While we can guess what went on in that last few minutes, it would be better to know what was said between the two on the flight deck.

[olasek]

probability of a system error is significantly lower than the probability of a pilot error, iNot necessarily, you would have to prove that, it is not going to be easy to demonstrate that your 'new system' (not the 'current system') is actually safer. Also the more stuff you put in like the more you risk pilot's complacency and reliance on automation unless you want to completely remove pilots from the cockpit.

[Old King Coal]

Denti: Wrt: Actually, the 737 uses reduced thrust for G/A. At least as long as you only press the TOGA buttons once.
Err, yes & no, wherein what you've stated is not exactly how it works (and being that the two-engine go-around in the B737 is one of the most balls'd up manoeuvres, I hope you won't mind if we dot the I's and cross the T's on the matter?!)

A single press of the TOGA button will command an N1 that would provide a reduced level of thrust for a go-around, but only on the assumption that the pilots then move the thrust levers to match the demanded N1 (that is unless they're doing a dual-channel approach with a functional Autothrottle; or unless they're utilising the 'Autothrottle ARM mode' ?).

On that latter point, some airlines allow (and / or require) their pilots to fly an approach using the 'Autothrottle ARM mode' (a procedure which is also sometimes referred to as 'Speed Off' mode) and wherein, to cut a long story short, the principle behind that 'Autothrottle ARM mode' is that, the pilot can move the thrust levers at will with the Autothrottle in 'ARM' but, on the press of a TOGA button, the Autothrottle will re-activate and automatically advance the thrust levers to the relevant N1 thrust position (the demanded amount of N1 being based upon whether it was either one or two presses of the TOGA button... and / or also inject some thrust if the speed generally gets too low during the approach), BUT... and this is an important 'BUT'... that 'Autothrottle ARM mode' procedure is not recommended by Boeing (see also the Boeing B737 NG FCTM: Autothrottle ARM Mode; and there was also an FCOM Notice of Errata Bulletin about it too... though for the life of me I can't seem to locate it?!).

And, fwiw, amongst some of the other reasons that Boeing don't recommend the use of the 'Autothrottle ARM mode', is because the Autothrottle can come in too aggressively, i.e. when the TOGA button is pressed (especially relevant if it is re-activated when close to the ground, i.e. thus risking of a tail strike... which apparently has happened, so Boeing say), and that an Autothrottle malfunction (particularly a failure to advance the thrust levers) when the TOGA button is pressed would see a FD demand a pitch increase but without a corresponding increase in thrust (i.e. if the pilots were relying on the Autothrottle to move the thrust levers?!).

Needless to say, with a single-channel approach and / or manually flown approach (with both assuming that the Autothrottle is fully switched off), a click of the TOGA button will not advance the thrust levers automatically, but it will command the N1 bugs to an appropriate thrust demand... a demand which the pilot(s) can then match via manually moving of the thrust levers, and which will then attempt to give the desired rate of climb that you describe, based upon the number of TOGA button presses (as you describe).

[flash8]

Would be interesting to know the reason for the initial G/A.

[Clandestino]

ISTM that the envelope protection of an A320 could possibly have prevented this. Or possibly not ?Without going into details: absolutely not. Two 320s and a 330 were lost in similar manner.

I don't know enough about 737 to guess intelligentlyNeither you know enough Russian to realize what you and Agaricus Bisporus have speculated about runs against the FDR readout.

[olasek]

spoke to maintenence
They spoke to tower, not 'maintenance'.

[Old King Coal]

Here's an aid memoir (for the PF) for the vital actions of a go-around in a B737:

Say It = "Go Around, Flap 15"
Do It = Push thrust levers up, and pitch to the go-around attitude.
See It = The FMA had better say 'TOGA' (which proves that you've pressed the TOGA button), the thrust mode says 'GA' (ditto) and the thrust position matches the demanded N1.
Now follow the FD and if above 400 ft AGL ask for a roll mode, and when above AccelAlt (and if the ASI is above white bug), ask for "Flap 5" and keep on accelerating (by moving the flap lever) until the flaps are 'Up' and / or Altitude Acquire occurs (at which point the MCP speed window will open... requiring you to then set the your airspeed bug yourself). Now engage autopilot & auto-throttle.

Nb. If, prior to Altitude Acquire, you touch anything on the MCP (aside from a roll mode) you will then cause the TOGA mode to cancel (watch your FMA), and the MCP speed window will then open up (at the airspeed that you are doing at that precise moment, and the ASI bug will move to that same speed) and the ASI bug is then yours to set.

You'll note that I don't mention the landing gear because, on two engines, there's usually so much power available that - even leaving the gear down - it will not effect proceedings all that much... just so long as the PF remembers to do those basic items listed above!

And that's all there is to it - simple & safe - Say It; Do It; See It !

[mary meagher]

flash 8 brings up the question: what was the reason for the original go around?

The conversation presented in a previous post with graphic presentation of the ultimate dive, including all usual strong language, reminded me of the Polish President's crash into a Russian airfield. In that case the advice given by the tower was unfortunate; informing the Polish pilots that they were on track. Yes, perhaps, but trees got in the way.

Is it still the custom in Russia that the controller tells the pilot what to do?
Is it the practice in the US for the tower to order a pilot to go around?

[olasek]

Is it the practice in the US for the tower to order a pilot to go around?
Yes, it can happen, for example if tower spots that runway is still occupied or there is some other impediment to safe landing. Pilots are also capable of declaring go-around for their own reasons.

[armchairpilot94116]

IIRC the EVA 77W flight to SFO was ordered to go around when found to be LOW on final.

Or was it only a suggestion?

[liider]

Very similar incident happened with Transaero B737 in April 2010 in Krasnoyarsk. Going around - pitch up to 45 degrees - speed dropping almost to 0 - banking 80 degrees right - rapid descent/fall from 4000 ft and stabilized at 400 ft after getting visual reference.

However, though this incident was discussed on public forums and most of B737 Russian pilots know about this incident, it has never been officially investigated and no official info ever appeared.

[deSitter]

I am really mystified here. What I'm hearing is that you punch a button that brings on sudden power that results in tricky pitch changes at low altitude.

So how did people do it in a 737-200 in the 1960s? I never remember reading about GA screw-ups until lately. Even the ones with a happy ending must be awful for the passengers.

I mean, what do you do? Level off, gear up, gradually put on power and reduce flaps - how hard can it be??

[fireflybob]

Desitter, it's not a "sudden power" increase, it's quite smooth and the pitch trims changes are not "tricky" to a competent pilot.

Ref 737-200 which I also flew - pilots were used to doing a lot more manual flying then. These GA incidents are further evidence of pilots diminution in handling skills due increased use of automation.

To a competent and well practised pilot the GA should be a routine manoeuvre.

[Denti]

@Old King Coal,

of course i was answering, and my reply must be read in regards to the original thing i commented on:

Given the increasing number of incidents/accidents occurring during a go-around with all engines operative , as we perform derated TO, why do we use max thrust, and the weight is certainly lighter, and we are not provided a reduced thrust for GA?

And of course, the 737 does exactly that if one wants it. Flying manually the issue is a moot point as thrust is used manually and one can easily use less than full GA thrust as long as obstacles are not an issue.

Of course i do have a certain mental bias from flying the 737 for around 13 years now using the ARM feature and flying every ILS dual channel until the automatics are switched off, both provide better go around control and make life in that particular case quite easy. Interestingly enough the outfit i fly for does both for the last 30 years now without any problem or incident.

All in all a go around is quite a benign thing in the 737 if flown right, but apparently training in many companies is only done to the bare regulatory minimum and that can be a bad thing if the last two engine go around was flown years back during initial type rating.

[fireflybob]

Perhaps pilots have too many options these days.

Harking back to the B737-200 we knew that ALL Go Arounds had to be manually flown also with no autothrottle (well on all the ones I flew) and a very basic flight director. Flying a manual Go Around was all part and parcel of the job.

Now we have the option for Auto Go Around (a la Cat 2/3 and both autopilots engaged), manually flown Go Around but with Autothrottle (with variation in one click/two click etc), manually flown Go Around with manual throttle or even auto go around with manual throttle - all with a more "sophisticated" Flight Director.

So maybe pilots are faced with choice overload?

A totally manual Go Around with no Flight Director (raw data) is from a handling point of view quite simple - power up to circa 90% (but don't look at N1 guages since a) correct thrust lever movement should be known and b) PNF should set accurately, simultaneously selecting 15 deg NU and trimming as we go - obviously we need to configure etc but fundamentally this is all we need to do to get the a/c climbing away from the ground safely.

Am assuming all engines operative of course.

[maxred]

Perhaps this....

Pilots Rely Too Much on Automation, Panel Says - WSJ.com (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304439804579204202526288042)

[armchairpilot94116]

Scary for us passengers to think that pilots may not be able to do a Go Around in a perfectly working airplane or land visually with competence in good weather. That it could even be a problem.

Due to man/machine interface, fatigue and other factors.

Incidents are still few in view of how many flights were landed visually and how many Go Arounds are done. But one likes to think that Go Arounds and landing visually are as easy as getting the milk out of the fridge and pouring it into a bowl for pilots.

I think , as mentioned previously by others, that new complexities and choices of arming this, dis-arming that. Proceeding on half auto or full manual or full auto makes things unnecessarily complex at critical times and leads to mistakes being made.

Complexity kills. Keeping it Simple should be the rule, because it works.

[MountainSnake]

Wihout getting into a stupid Boeing vs Airbus war PLEASE.

ISTM that the envelope protection of an A320 could possibly have prevented this. Or possibly not ?


Absolutely. TO/GA pitch up tendency is counteracted by the "fbw" system on an A320.

[DOVES]

And as far as I know she has an automatic pitch trim too...
But...

[island_airphoto]

You don't need an airliner to get into trouble with frost or ice on the wings. Not sure what the relevance is to this crash?

[pulse1]

Here's one which pitched up 44 degrees with IAS reducing to 82 knots as the pitch reduced to 33 degrees. How close did that come to the Kazan accident?

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/875.pdf

[fireflybob]

Here's one which pitched up 44 degrees with IAS reducing to 82 knots as the pitch reduced to 33 degrees. How close did that come to the Kazan accident?

Not good but the difference is this crew recovered the aircraft from an extreme situation - until we get all the facts about Kazan it's impossible to know what and why happened - have they found the CVR yet?

[Clandestino]

Old King Coal, thank you for your very good advice :ok:

Absolutely. TO/GA pitch up tendency is counteracted by the "fbw" system on an A320.

And as far as I know she has an automatic pitch trim too...
But......there is always pilot to override whatever FCS does and pitch down until contact with Black Sea, Persian Gulf or Libyan Desert.

have they found the CVR yet?Already answered on this very thread.

How close did that come to the Kazan accident?Eight degrees but the causes and mechanism of the occurrences are fairly different.

[fireflybob]

Already answered on this very thread.

Thanks Clandestino - I feel suitably chastised

[olasek]

How close did that come to the Kazan accident?Not as close as this one:

REPORT ON THE serious incident to icelandair BOEING 757 (http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/pentagon/analysis/theories/aaib_757incident.html)

in which aircraft attitude pitch during a go-around went from +21 to -49.

I bet this is a template for what happened here in Kazan.

These Icelandair pilots only recovered because they had sufficient altitude but they recovered real low - about 300 ft AGL. The aircraft was pulled out of service and underwent complete C-check and full inspection for damage, passengers were terrified and they were positive they would die.

[DOVES]

fireflybob
http://www.pprune.org/8163703-post175.html
Your
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/875.pdf
Was
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...9%20G-THOF.pdf
And now is no longer available
'Vuolsi così colà dove si puote ciò che si vuole e più non dimandare'
'There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamed of in your philosophy.'
To Clandestino
I didn't mean absolutely to criticize your beloved plastic plane.
I was indeed praising her

[fireflybob]

I know little credence can be put on media reports but this makes interesting reading:-

Kazan (http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_11_20/Tape-from-crashed-Boeings-cockpit-voice-recorder-found-IAC-2214/)

Plane crash in Russia: commander of Boeing had no go-around experience

The commander of a Boeing-737 flight that crashed in Kazan killing all 50 people on board had probably never previously made a go-around maneuver in a real flight, Aksan Giniyatullin, General Director of Tatarstan Airlines, told reporters on Tuesday.

"Probably not," he said when asked whether the pilot had had any previous go-around experience.

The pilot-in-command had 1,000 hours of night flights, he said.

The company complies with all pilot training requirements, Giniiyatullin said.

The crew of the Boeing-737 that crashed in Kazan on November 17 had been properly trained, Aksan Giniyatullin, General Director of Tatarstan Airlines, told a press conference.

"The pilot-in-command had 2,500 hours of flight and the second pilot had 1,900 hours," he said.
Read more: Tape from crashed Boeing's cockpit voice recorder found - IAC - News - Russia - The Voice of Russia: News, Breaking news, Politics, Economics, Business, Russia, International current events, Expert opinion, podcasts, Video (http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_11_20/Tape-from-crashed-Boeings-cockpit-voice-recorder-found-IAC-2214/)

[olasek]

Plane crash in Russia: commander of Boeing had no go-around experienceThis is a very old piece of news and I believe was mentioned before in this thread.
But apart from that like everything from Russia this piece of info is suspect. What does it mean? He had no experience in a real aircraft or he never even performed it in a sim session? I suspect there may be some pilots who never performed a go-around in real life (in a transport aircraft) but have done it hundreds of time in a training session. Really, the way this info is presented is almost meaningless.

[fireflybob]

olasek, I agree but the experience level of the Captain, if correct, is minimal to say the least compared to my part of the world.

[A-3TWENTY]

"The pilot-in-command had 2,500 hours of flight and the second pilot had 1,900 hours," he said.

2500 ??????? Not only he never did a go around as he didn`t experienced a lot more things to give him enough airmanship to be a Captain.

I know it is legal , but upgrading someone with 2500 is criminal in my opinion.I`m saying 2500 because it what he had at the time of the accident , but he might well be upgrade with a lot less than that.

In Asia we have first officers who only fly as PNF, and one day are moved up. They become Captains with 150 landings in their lives and 2700 TT.

It`s really scary !!!

[flash8]

I'm not sure that TT is a great indicator of airmanship, in fact i know it isn't.

Having flown with 5K TT and 20K TT Captains I can say that I have seen a wide variety of abilities and skills not time commensurate. Sometimes the 5K guy is far more on the ball.

Certainly training is a far better quantifiable quality, many accidents equating to pilot error seem to me directly related to the underlying training given (or lack thereof)., gaps that only show during non-normal situations when suddenly everything falls apart like clockwork.

[mary meagher]

Thanks to Fireflybob for the link to the interesting article from The Voice of Russia...

It mentions that the US is to send a team of experts to help Russian investigation of the Boeing 737 crash. Would these be US government AAIB investigators, or experts from the Boeing Company?

Also, with the rather low hours of experience quoted for the aircrew involved, would ex pat crews be hired by Russian airlines? I know that airline jobs in the west are still pretty scarce; imagine you would have to be rather desperate to sign up with Tartarstan, if indeed it survives this event.

[Skyjob]

Has anyone already considered that the initial upset could've been resultant of malfunctioning PCU's due deicing fluid?

I'm particularly referring to this in light of the recently published Norwegian PRELIMINARY REPORT ON SERIOUS AIRCRAFT INCIDENT report into LN-DYM dated 19-11-2013
Prior to the flight in question the aircraft had been parked outdoors for three days at low temperatures. A snow layer of approximately 25 cm had accumulated on the fuselage, and in order to remove the snow, the aircraft was de-iced using type I 30-60 % glycol de-icing fluid. A total of 1,807 liters of warm water and 1,136 liters of type I glycol was used during de-icing. The company that carried out the de-icing has informed that their personnel was experienced and adhered to standard procedures for de-icing. The temperature at the airport during de-icing was -17 °C.
LN-DYM had a normal take-off, climb, en-route flight and initial descent. NAX5630 was established on a straight-in ILS approach to runway 34 in Kittilä with configuration: Flaps 5, gear up, autopilot channel A in use, Auto Thrust engaged and established on localizer. When the aircraft was about to enter the glide path at an altitude of approximately 3,250 ft, the elevator/stabilizer trim started actuating for approximately 12 seconds. The trim moved towards Nose Up. As a consequence of the elevation of the nose of the aircraft and the ensuing loss of airspeed, the aircraft Auto Thrust System initiated full engine power. The high engine thrust contributed to a further elevation of the aircraft’s nose followed by rapidly decreasing airspeed. When the aircraft nose position rose above +20° both pilots started pushing with full force on the control column. The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) shows that the pilots used a combined force of 207 lbs in their attempt to take the aircraft out of the ascending path. The aircraft was at this time in clouds. The nose position eventually reached +38.5° and the airspeed dropped to 118 kt (TAS) before the nose position slowly started to decrease again. While control was being regained, the aircraft’s Stick Shaker and Stall Warning actuated for four seconds. Calculations afterwards show that the stall at 1G for the given configuration is 121 kt. The reason why the aircraft still didn’t stall was that the load on the wings was somewhat less than 1G. During the first phase, while the aircraft’s nose went up unintentionally, no attempt was made to disengage the aircraft’s autopilot, Auto Thrust System or to actuate the stabilizer trim towards Nose Down manually. One or more of these measures would have improved the situation.

As a part of the examination of whether de-icing fluid can ingress into the Tail Cone Compartment in the direction of the total of four input arms of the PCUs on LN-DYM, the AIBN performed extensive simulated de-icing from different angles on the aircraft’s horizontal stabilizer and elevator. The examination showed that at times even quite considerable amount of fluid ingress into the compartment. Under certain circumstances it is possible that the input arms may be exposed to fluid which in turn freezes solid and blocks the PCU input arms. Aircraft manufacturer Boeing was not aware that significant amounts of fluid could ingress into the compartment in question before the AIBN’s examination revealed this.
In view of the above, the AIBN has further conducted similar tests on another B737-800 Next Generation (NG) and a B737-300 Classic. The examinations showed that there had been ingress in the Tail Cone Compartments of all the aircraft and that this therefore is an issue concerning not only LN-DYM, but any B737.
In a cold chamber test rig, aircraft manufacturer Boeing applied de-icing fluid onto a Power Control Unit and was able to simulate a comparable blocking of a PCU through de-icing fluid freezing solid on the input arms, thereby preventing them from having the freedom of movement that is necessary.
Furthermore, the AIBN has conducted additional tests to determine the significance of different horizontal stabilizer trim positions for fluid ingress. The current procedure (published by Boeing and adopted by the airline) prescribes that the trim should be set in full forward position during de-icing. The AIBN’s examination showed that by changing the trim position to the middle position (the one used during take-off), fluid ingress was reduced.
In view of the AIBN’s examinations, Boeing in October 2013 altered procedures in the Boeing 737 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) so that application of de-icing fluid should be carried out at an angle from the front and not from the side. Boeing also introduced new procedures into the Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) prescribing that all B737 operators during de-icing should set the stabilizer trim to take-off position.

[deadcut]

As far as I know you have to be a Russian national (resident) to be able to be part of the flight crew.

So that is part of the reason for flight crew shortage.