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View Full Version : ANZ Erebus crash 28 November 1979 - 34 years later.


Paragraph377
13th Nov 2013, 04:08
On the 28 November 1979, Air New Zealand Flight TE901crashed into Mt Erebus killing 237 passengers and 20 crew. 34 years has passed, but not forgotten.

I post this thread not on behalf of anybody else, just me. So if it offends, appears biased or doesn’t interest you then that is fine, you are welcome to go elsewhere.

My thoughts are with the families and friends of those killed, as well as with those indelibly scarred by what they experienced in the recovery work. My thoughts are also with those who were wronged, ostracized or disadvantaged by their honesty and integrity during the investigation and subsequent enquiry. I will hold back from making statement about the chief investigator, ANZ management, the then Prime Minister and the CAA. They don’t deserve any further mention.

My thoughts in particular are with;

The family of Captain Thomas James Collins (Jim)
The family of First Officer Gregory Mark Cassin (Greg)
The family of Flight Engineer Gordon Barrett Brooks
The family of Flight Engineer Nicholas John Maloney (Nick)
The families and friends of all crew and passengers whose lives were lost

My utmost respect is paid to;

Justice Peter Mahon (recipient of ‘Jim Collins Memorial Award’ by New Zealand Airline Pilots Association)
Captain Gordon Vette ONZM
Inspector Greg Gilpin


R.I.P

framer
13th Nov 2013, 05:18
So if it offends, appears biased or doesn’t interest you then that is fine, you are welcome to go elsewhere.
It doesn't offend me, but it does interest me and statements like . I will hold back from making statement about the chief investigator, ANZ management, the then Prime Minister and the CAA. They don’t deserve any further mention. leave no doubt as to your bias. I know I'm welcome to go elsewhere but as the wife is busy cooking tea and nightly news is boring me I will stay and join you in posting personal opinions for the indescriminate masses to read and make comment on.
I think the family of the chief investigator is wronged by folk who hold your opinion. I also think that assassinating his character a year or so after his death was low and said more about Paul Holmes than it did about anything else. I wouldn't have minded if it was factual, but it was 99% emotional rant.
As Chief Investigator he had clear guidelines as to what his duties were and he fulfilled them in my opinion. The Industry is different now, a modern day Investigator in the same position would have much more scope to delve into causal factors other than the primary. Personally I think he was hard done by.
Here comes dinner, hopefully some other random Internet surfer will also comment so we can continue the conversation you started and go over it again and again and again, and then meet back here next year and continue blowing on the coals.
Cheers,
Framer
Edited to say I think your post would have been nice if you had resisted having a dig.

Paragraph377
13th Nov 2013, 05:43
Framer, your own personally biased retort, in the open spirit of the thread, is more than welcome. That is what life is about, we all have our own personal opinion, beliefs, and biases. Go for it.
As for the subject coming up year after year, 257 lives were lost. Should we forget and move on, really? And if so, why then should we commemorate ANZAC day, or pause on 9/11 every year? It's just lives, all in the past, can't turn back the clock, we know all the reasons why these things occurred. Sorry, I can't agree with you on that point mate.

P.S You mentioned Mrs Framer cooking dinner, that got me hungry. What did you have? (No hidden agenda in my question, just curious).

haughtney1
13th Nov 2013, 06:50
Oh goodness, whats done is done :ugh:
Are we from a flight safety perspective going to learn anymore?
By all means remember the dead, but please please please let us not dwell or delve in the past....
I'm surprised the 89 strike hasn't been mentioned yet....or Air NZ destroying AN:ugh::hmm:

Jack Ranga
13th Nov 2013, 06:56
A truly sad event. RIP.

Count yourselves lucky the politically correct & morally gutless ATSB didn't investigate.

747-419
13th Nov 2013, 07:17
Interesting this one.

One of the basics of airmanship is situational awareness and the PIC is ultimately responsible for this in a given airspace.

However to recognise this and make an informed decision the PIC needs to have the necessary training in the first place.

So where does "whiteout" fit into this tragic accident?.

As an aside Ansett destroyed itself with it's strong unionism. It didn't need Air NZ's help!!.

framer
13th Nov 2013, 07:47
Good stuff.
I see where you're coming from. I guess to me it feels like whenever we discuss it we go around and around in circles and a lot of mis- information ends up being posted by peolpe who have read one book and then formed an opinion.( I'm not suggesting you fall into that category and do share most of the sentiment in your original post.).
Have fun, Framer
Ps, Mexican for tea tonight.

4Greens
13th Nov 2013, 08:25
I worked with the Chief Investigator and can assure all who read this that he was a man of complete integrity.

Paragraph377
13th Nov 2013, 10:10
747-419, whiteout did indeed play a part in this. There is to much research on the subject, including what was undertaken during and after the accident investigation, to document here, but yes whiteout played a part.

haughtney1, raising 89 and AN's collapse is not the topic of discussion here. 257 dead souls being remembered is.

Framer, very understanding post. Cheers. And as for Mexican, nice one. I am partial to a good feed of Mexican washed down by some Corona's :ok:

4Greens, 'assurance' is a large statement, and myself along with other knowledgeable acquaintances who are either no longer with us or who are not inclined to speak or write publicly don't concur. However this is a democracy, free speech and all that stuff, so you are welcome to your opinion.

haughtney1
13th Nov 2013, 11:06
Paragraph,
I don't doubt your sincerity when it comes to the subject at hand, moreover I am old enough to remember the devastating effect on families after the loss of 3 people my father knew well through his business dealings.
It is also a mark of respect that we take a moment to pause and reflect on those who through no fault of their own met an untimely end.
The rest of it I'm afraid has been regurgitated in various guises over the years on PPrune, so in that sense your statement in effect saying.."if you don't like my post bugger off" merely reinforces dogma attached to this tragic episode in NZ aviation.
If you are unable or unwilling to make that connection or are not savvy enough to garner from the search function, then I feel sorry for you.
My comments relating to AN and 1989 are merely a reflection of other similarly polarizing threads that inevitably descend into name calling and recrimination.
If you choose to use PPrune as your own personal device to express an opinion thats fine, but don't expect the rest of us to view your opinions/views/statements in a way that suits your agenda.

VH-MLE
13th Nov 2013, 13:19
haughtney1,

Well said...

Kiwiconehead
13th Nov 2013, 13:39
haughtney1 - I was 8 at the time and distinctly remember one of our teachers in tears because an aunt and uncle had been on the flight.

HEATHROW DIRECTOR
13th Nov 2013, 14:16
My wife and I and our young sons were nearly on that flight, but someone was watching over us. I'll never forget the tragic event; it'll stay with me for ever

Ken Borough
13th Nov 2013, 21:49
This tragic event occurred a long time ago. I'm sure lessons have been learnt.

Surely the blame game should come to an end and we just remember those who died and the families and friends left behind who mourn?

prospector
14th Nov 2013, 02:34
Paragraph 377,


My thoughts in particular are with;

And then you name the crew. You do not mention F/O Lucas who was apparently down the back at the critical time of the descent. Is it because reasons for him being down the back have been postulated in various threads regarding this "accident" that have influenced your post?

Paragraph377
14th Nov 2013, 03:43
Prospector, firstly I worded my post exactly the way I wanted to word it. I couldn't care less what you think. But considering you are potentially clouded by emotion and feel there may be something sinister or mischievous in my not mentioning First Officer Graham Neville Lucas, I will explain my reason for not including his name - He was indeed not on the flight deck at the point of impact. As a result of that, his good name was not besmirched and tarnished, unlike the others who sat at the pointy end at the time of impact. Simple explanation mate.
Secondly, I said;
The families and friends of all crew and passengers whose lives were lost
That comment is inclusive of First Officer Lucas, the 15 cabin crew and the passengers. You may notice I also didn't mention the name of Peter Mulgrew who was also up front. He didn't get blamed for the accident because he was not part of the crew, hence my not personally mentioning his name.

Lastly, I really don't care what has been posted on other threads over the years. Any prior comments, hypothesise, postulations etc etc that others have made has no bearing or connection whatsoever to what I think or write. Full stop.

Capn Bloggs
14th Nov 2013, 07:39
Love ya work, Paragraph. Create an arguably provocative thread and then rip into all and sundry who disagrees with you. Is that a Kiwi thing? :confused:

prospector
14th Nov 2013, 07:44
paragraph 377,

Indeed it has no bearing on what you write and think in a public forum, but in this same public forum those of us who disagree with your thoughts are also free to air them. There is no dispute about remembering those who lost their lives in this "accident", but there will always be dispute about the cause of the accident. Your post was certainly not from a neutral corner and therefor you must expect different points of view to be expressed.

Paragraph377
14th Nov 2013, 07:46
Bloggs, I'm not ripping in to anybody. All I have done is respond to assertions made towards my post. I have kept my responses measured and have never set out to provoke anyone. I felt my reply to prospector was quite reasonable under the circumstances.
I have no problem with others opinions, but if they make an untrue statement towards me I will simply correct it.
Your comment about a 'Kiwi thing' is actually offensive in itself.

Prospector, you are more than welcome, and others to reply, it doesn't bother me. In your case you made a remark about my not mentioning F/O Lucas, and I cleared up the reason for you. That doesn't mean I am in anyway saying people can't make posts. You made a comment and I responded with a clarification.
Are some of you really that touchy?

prospector
14th Nov 2013, 07:48
. Is that a Kiwi thing?

Do not know whether it is a kiwi thing, it would certainly appear to be a new world touchy feely thing. The Captain is not the captain when the **** hits the fan, he is only the captain on payday.

prospector
14th Nov 2013, 08:05
Even Wikipedia spells it out
\
The pilot in command (PIC) of an aircraft is the person aboard the aircraft who is ultimately responsible for its operation and safety during flight. This would be the "captain" in a typical two- or three-pilot aircrew, or "pilot" if there is only one certified and qualified pilot at the controls of an aircraft. The PIC must be legally certified (or otherwise authorized) to operate the aircraft for the specific flight and flight conditions, but need not be actually manipulating the controls at any given moment. The PIC is the person legally in charge of the aircraft and its flight safety and operation, and would normally be the primary person liable for an infraction of any flight rule

And you, paragraph 377, still try to put the blame on a computer operator, an accredited Aircraft Accident Inspector, perhaps because you read that emotional claptrap the Paul Holmes wrote called "The daughters of Erebus"??

framer
14th Nov 2013, 08:47
Emotional claptrap is accurate. At the time I was surprised that he wasn't called to task on it. The NZ media seemed to be comfortable with it. I thought it was particularly low.

Paragraph377
14th Nov 2013, 08:52
Prospector, Wikipedia? Hmmm. As for Holmes, interesting book, but not a patch on Justice Mahons work and his subsequent book. But hey, each to his own belief. But it is interesting how the people on here criticising me as being biased have a completely biased opinion themselves?
Personally I don't need books or Wikepedia to guide my decisions or thoughts.
My knowledge of the accident lays much deeper than from online reading.

haughtney1
14th Nov 2013, 09:01
Oh dear.....it is as I feared....let combat commence :ugh::ugh::ugh:

Jack Ranga
14th Nov 2013, 12:08
You started it bro with your bull**** & childish 89 & Ansett dig. you could have ignored it & moved on but in your usual style you throw the hand grenade in & smirk like a 15 year old girl. Well done :ok:

prospector
14th Nov 2013, 16:53
Justice Mahon apparently laid no importance on the three requirements that were very clearly laid down by the Company and CAA before a descent could be commenced.
1. Had to be identified on Radar
2. Had to be locked on to the DME
3. Had to be in VHF contact.
None of these requirements were met. If just one of them had been met there would have been no accident.

4Greens
14th Nov 2013, 21:13
Prospector - Correct

framer
14th Nov 2013, 23:22
But it is interesting how the people on here criticising me as being biased have a completely biased opinion themselves?
Just for the record, I'm not criticising you at all, just floating my own opinion which differs from yours.
Personally I don't need books or Wikepedia to guide my decisions or thoughts.No but you do need information. That info can be reliable and factual or otherwise, there can be a lot of it or insufficient amounts, it can be emotionally driven or technical and emotionally removed. Each of us has chosen what info to hang our opinions on, personally I try and avoid fixating on info that suits my position. As a pilot it would suit my position to lay the blame at the feet of the company, completely, but I can't do it, there were contributing factors both on the ground and on the flight deck.That is the unpalatable reality in my mind.
The above paragraph is not a dig at you, the crew,or anyone else Para, it's what I observe to be true. I appreciate that others will have different opinions. I have no idea what you base your opinion of RC on but it must be different information than what I use.
I hope you're all having a good day, Framer.

noooby
15th Nov 2013, 00:10
It is a shame that Ron is still attacked, even after his untimely death at the hands of an inattentive car driver.

He was a man of intelligence and integrity who did not suffer fools.

On the first day of my Accident Investigators Course, he kind of chewed me a new one for not being as interested in his course as he thought I should be :E

In the end, it was a very interesting course and all through it he emphasised the fact that Investigators need an open mind all the way until the draft report becomes the final report and even after that if new evidence comes to light.

He also mentioned numerous investigations where he would try to physically bar Police from entering an accident site for the purpose of a "possible criminal investigation". He was extremely idealistic and did not ever believe that a criminal case should come from an Air Accident as that would hinder the collection of facts and statments in the future.

The one last thing I remember from his course all those years ago was a statment he made "your job is not to apportion blame to any one individual or cause. Your job is to find, to the best of your ability and the evidence at hand, what the true causes of the accident were, so that it may never happen again". Not quite word for word, but it was a very powerful statment and is still burned in my brain.

That really was what he was about. Preventing the same accident from happening over and over again.

Was he a very confident/borderline arrogant man? You bet, but he knew his :mad: too. He aso had to be confident in the face of intense media scrutiny for most of his working life.

I wonder if he were a bit more friendly and a bit more approachable, he would be seen in an entirely different light.

Whether you like it or not, that report is still the only factual legal document produced.

Did you know that up until the time of his death, and maybe even to this day, he would get hate mail on the anniversary of the accident. Seriously people, don't blame the messenger, he was just doing his job, to the best of his ability, with what he had to go on.

I know other Inspectors in other high profile investigation who are also victimised for the perceived targeting of certain people/groups in their investigations.

It really is a very sad state of affairs.

A very sad day in the history of New Zealand aviation.

haughtney1
15th Nov 2013, 08:24
Noooby, for me your summation gets it in one...

Jack..who moi? agent provocateur? say it ain't so....but please refer your good self to my clarification..
My comments relating to AN and 1989 are merely a reflection of other similarly polarizing threads that inevitably descend into name calling and recrimination.

As for 15 year old girls...thats just illegal...just

Old Fella
15th Nov 2013, 09:10
Having operated into and out of McMurdo during the summer of 1978 I can claim to have some first hand knowledge of the perils of operating in the area. As I recall we kept HF skeds with McMurdo getting an update on the Viz and Horizon definition conditions prevailing. If the trend was toward a White-out we returned to Christchurch before reaching PNR.

Whilst I do not claim to recall in detail the sequence of events which led to the loss of TE901 I believe, as been stated previously by others, that the aircraft was allowed to descend below MSA without meeting the criteria laid down. As sad as it is it seems to me that the accident was a clear case of CFIT which was aviodable. We can never bring back those lost but we can, and should, all learn from this tragic event.

It does none of us any credit to continue to denigrate the reputation of any involved in either the accident or the investigation of it. It is 34 long years ago, let it rest.

4Greens
15th Nov 2013, 09:46
Never known Ron to be a little off - maybe because we were the same vintage. Good man and glad he is now getting support on this forum.

Paragraph377
27th Nov 2013, 18:35
In remembrance today, November 28 1979.
R.I.P

Dark Knight
27th Nov 2013, 22:42
Not this hoary old chestnut again? Been done to death several times; get over it and get on with life.

Mods; time for the lock again!

Tarq57
28th Nov 2013, 07:51
Dark Knight,
I take issue with your casually dismissive attitude regarding those who would want to pay their respects, or otherwise remember the casualties resultant from this chapter of history.

Although not directly affected, I know several people who were. It's probably fair to say that most of them are "over it"; it's also fair to say that nobody has forgotten it. Nor should they.

Man doesn't have a great track record of learning from the past. We tend to keep repeating it, in different, re-invented versions.

So who are you to say that anybody should not remember this? If you don't want to read the thread, don't read it. And please don't comment on it again.

gulfairs
29th Nov 2013, 01:22
I understand that the cvr that was transcribed was edited.
It commenced 30 min prior to the prang,
with lucas speaking loudly that he did not agree, and jim could stick his ideas up his ar##e, followed by the slam of the flight deck door.
The rest was publically aired.

Paragraph377
29th Nov 2013, 08:05
I understand that the cvr that was transcribed was edited.
It commenced 30 min prior to the prang,
with lucas speaking loudly that he did not agree, and jim could stick his ideas up his ar##e, followed by the slam of the flight deck door.
The rest was publically aired.
What an absolute crock of ****e. You understand wrong. Lucas was down the back, having a rest most likely, judging from the timeline. But of course nobody is alive today to deny or confirm your ridiculous assertion. Furthermore, had what you say been correct, then '4 greens' favourite investigator, Mr Chippendale, would have had the smoking gun he so desperately wished for. He could have nailed Jim and Co to the wall. At no time has any supposed CVR recording as you mention made the light of day, nor did Ron produce any such 'smoking gun'. 34 years later and you post a sledge like that, shame on you.

Shot Nancy
29th Nov 2013, 09:52
Congratulations Dark Knight. You are number 35 on my ignore list.
Professional Pilots only please.

Eastwest Loco
29th Nov 2013, 13:59
Haughtney

NZ was nailed to the wall by SQ with the collapse of AN.

They wanted AN, the Australian domestic feeder network and more importantly their access to the trans Pacific ex Australia money pit that AN had rights and access to.

SQ with their 2 members on the NZ board at the time had decided to rescue Ansett and ride in on a white charger and save the day. To just buy Ansett out they realised they would have to cauterise the top 3 layers of management which would have cost a fortune in redundancies and contractual payouts.

Hence the most logical way to get the job done was collapse the compny and then come in and rescue it therefore taking the spoils.

With their plants on the NZ board they knew that NZ at that time couldn't hope to manage a bowel movement much less the Ansett beast which by that time was chasing its tail after having been cash raped by Abels and Murdoch years earlier who sold off all the owned aeroplanes and leased a new fleet, the profits being stripped out of the operation and lost into the TNT/News empires.

The SQ program was right on track but a bunch of camel shaggers flew aeroplanes into structures 24 hours prior to the fold of Ansett. The industry went into meltdown right there and then and the Lion got cold paws.

No exposure = no loss of face. That is precisely why the blind was there in the first place. SQ melted into the delightful oblivion of their blind and I would not be amazed if they actually drove the Linfox push to allegedly resurrect the Airline only to pull out after the resources of the staff policy ran out of funds.

I was at the time running my own Travel Agency and still am but was in close contact with mates in upper positions with many airlines. These are the inside details I have gleaned,

The NZ tragedy was something that hangs heavy over me to this day. I was working at TAA Burnie at the time and we had the wife of the Port of Burnie Authority on the aeroplane. That has sat cold on my heart ever since.

I feel it is time to let this tragic end to a wonderful experience lie at rest. God bless the good crew and let us hope their loss has taught lesson to all.

Best regards

EWL

zkdli
29th Nov 2013, 16:40
I had forgotten that TE901 had flown in to Mt Erebus on the 28th of November.
For me as a keen young pilot just getting in to aviation, it was a massive thump in the chest to realise that people I looked up to for their achievements in flying had been found to be mortal. (Initially the crew, then as the events unfolded another hit from the Airline and the investigation findings)
This accident changed the way the world thinks about aviation safety and for that reason it is remembered and argued about now 34 years later,
For me it changed my life as I became deeply interested in aviation safety and am today an investigator.
But for a few minutes I will remember the people who are not here any more.
RIP

Dark Knight
30th Nov 2013, 22:02
Nothing dismissive about my attitude at all; professional pilots and airline management learn from the lessons of the past, move on and improve the profession attempting to avoid repeating these.

Far from being on an ignore list one wonders whether it is understood what a professional pilot is?

Nor does one wish to see the continuous attempts at rewriting history to suit some individuals differing point of view!

prospector
3rd Dec 2013, 21:33
Nor does one wish to see the continuous attempts at rewriting history to suit some individuals differing point of view!


Not this hoary old chestnut again? Been done to death several times; get over it and get on with life.

Why do you not follow your own advice??

As to rewriting history, that would appear to be the national trend, in all things, not just Erebus.

Fantome
2nd Jan 2014, 01:22
It is certainly an accident that will endure in the minds of many. It is too facile to say stop rehashing the past. There will be always aspects of TE901 that will fascinate and exercise the minds of those who have the time and interest to make a thorough study of it. The accessible material is vast. I do not think anyone should make critical comment who has not made their own review. Gordon Vette certainly made his own in depth study of every shred of evidence. His book 'Impact Erebus' was hailed as unbiased, intimate assessment of the key elements.

Whether you think Jim Collins was foolhardy in the last thirty minutes of the flight or not, he was at no time until the GPWS went off uncertain of what he believed his position to be. Furthermore, as Captain Vette tellingly wrote, drawing on firsthand knowledge, Captain Collins was an outstanding pilot without a shred of the gung-ho in his makeup.

Relevant here is the fact that some seem to forget that previous flights to the ice for sight-seeing had made early descents and that other captains had elected not to follow the strict letter of company SOPS, believing they had more than adequate safety margins.

TE901 was led into a trap, the complexities of which will be debated as long as there are those of us for whom air accident investigation holds a special interest.

Biggles78
3rd Jan 2014, 14:43
As someone who was at the terminal that Wednesday waiting for the 10 to land, I remember it well. I also remember that despite all the blame that was thrown around:
New Zealand 1953 Civil Aviation Regulations, Part 51 (part and sub part forgotten) stated:
The Pilot in Command is responsible for the safety of his passengers, crew and aircraft (strangely not aeroplane and no mention of being responsible for ones' own safety either).

Despite the cover-ups, the atlas (which was exactly the same as the one I had used at school several years earlier) that was used as a "chart", Collins house being broken into and "items removed in the wee small hours" plus all the other cockups made with regard to this flight, Part 51, IMO, lays the blame right where is should. I take nothing away from the man as a pilot but he made a bad decision and the cheese certainly punished him and all those sitting behind him that fateful day.

One of the more sadder aspects of this accident for me was the RNZAF C130 that flew the same flight path as 901 but a mere 500 feet higher and it cleared Erebus.

Can any DC-10 pilots out there tell me how many seconds earlier would it have required for climb power to be applied for the aeroplane to have also cleared the peak and not resulted in CFIT. It seemed to me that from the "whoop whoop pull up" on the CVR transcript it took a long time to react and advance the levers to the forward position and begin to raise the nose. I got the impression Collins may have thought he was being warned of gentle raising terrain and the not the steep incline of a mountain. After all, he did have NO IDEA of where he was.

NigelOnDraft
3rd Jan 2014, 16:35
Can any DC-10 pilots out there tell me how many seconds earlier would it have required for climb power to be applied for the aeroplane to have also cleared the peak and not resulted in CFIT. It seemed to me that from the "whoop whoop pull up" on the CVR transcript it took a long time to react and advance the levers to the forward position and begin to raise the nose. I got the impression Collins may have thought he was being warned of gentle raising terrain and the not the steep incline of a mountain. After all, he did have NO IDEA of where he was. It doesn't take a DC-10 pilot to say that it is not "power" initially that will clear a mountain, but pitch - especially if (as you say) it only needed 500'.

From the report:1.16.3 The performance of the GPWS was evaluated and it was assessed that the warning was in accordance with the expected performance in the “terrain closure” and “flight below 500 feet without flaps and undercarriage extended” modes of the equipment (modes 2A and 4 respectively). The profile of the terrain prior to the impact was reconstructed in Air New Zealand’s DC 10 simulator and the performance of the aircraft was evaluated to determine if the collision could have been avoided in response to the warning and that the warning was in fact given at the maximum time before impact that could be expected.

1.16.4 The flights in the simulator indicated that experienced pilots would not have avoided a collision and that the warning given was in accordance with the design specifications of the GPWS.
With sufficient rehearsal it was possible to fly the aircraft away from the approaching slope when an extreme manoeuvre was initiated in response to the onset of the GPWS warningwhich I interpret as realistically the GPWS was never going to save the day... My guess is the much more modern EGPWS would if it had the correct terrain database (NB the Norwegian C130 accident with EGPWS was not helped by no data N of 60N where it was)

NoD

prospector
4th Jan 2014, 05:26
Relevant here is the fact that some seem to forget that previous flights to the ice for sight-seeing had made early descents and that other captains had elected not to follow the strict letter of company SOPS, believing they had more than adequate safety margins.


Also relevant, the weather at McMurdo was well below that required for an instrument let down. That was not the case in the previous flights you mention. The only other flight that struck such weather conditions carried out the pre planned sightseeing to the Dry Valley area, and returned to NZ, the pax had been briefed that if weather conditions were not suitable this is what would happen, and in hindsight, and in my opinion, foresight, it should have happened on the flight in question.

Ornis
23rd Mar 2014, 01:00
Forget the rules and regulations, let's sit in a hangar and talk. How many pilots would descend in an area they didn't know, where they fully expected to see a mountain close by but couldn't, if they absolutely didn't need to?

The PIC had a mindset and didn't adjust his thinking as circumstances changed. Even when he descended and still couldn't see the mountain he didn't sense the danger (FE did). He relied totally on instruments but was flying VFR.

Was the flight doomed when it left NZ? Most pilots wouldn't have done what Collins did, I hope, even those who "feel" he was blameless.

The PIC was put in a bad place by others but he stuffed up too. Would have helped if he'd done some navigation on the way down: AINS output on chart.

Remember the dead, yes, make excuses for human frailty, yes, but starting another argument you can't win?

Paragraph377
23rd Mar 2014, 03:01
Remember the dead, yes, make excuses for human frailty, yes, but starting another argument you can't win?
My intention was never to 'start an argument I couldn't win'. My intention was to start a thread and make comment about what I thought and felt. This was for my own soul soothing, not for argument. My thoughts were and are still with those who carry the scars for this accident. My disgust and contempt with what ANZ and the NZ Government did all those years ago will never reside. Their actions will and can never be excused, regardless of whether one thinks the Pilots of the day were responsible.
Those lives will not be forgotten. R.I.P

I also started this thread;

http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/531604-way-we-were-ansett-taa-qantas-18.html

Again, not to create arguments about which airline was best blah blah blah, but for those who are interested, a chance to reminisce about what some of us perceive to be the good ol airline days!

Ornis
23rd Mar 2014, 03:49
Paragraph377 My disgust and contempt with what ANZ ...

How do you feel about the fiasco at Perpignan? AirNZ didn't have the manual from Airbus Industries or understand the basics - like the gear must not be down. Slowing to see if the aircraft stalls - a factory pilot test - and on an approach, just to tick boxes. Were you pleased AirNZ could wriggle and let the poor German pilots take the blame? Did you resign in protest?

Mahon didn't have a clue about flying but AirNZ antagonised him and he flew off the handle.

The accident report was right. The proximal cause was pilot error.

The kindest and most respectful way to remember Collins might be to say that he was a good pilot and a decent man who would have accepted responsibility for what he did.

Tosspott
23rd Mar 2014, 10:18
Ornis you are 70 years Paragraph 377 is 61 years old.Maybe we could set up a Boxing match and you guys could slug it out.And maybe get it out of your system.

Paragraph377
23rd Mar 2014, 12:33
How do you feel about the fiasco at Perpignan? AirNZ didn't have the manual from Airbus Industries or understand the basics - like the gear must not be down. Slowing to see if the aircraft stalls - a factory pilot test - and on an approach, just to tick boxes. Were you pleased AirNZ could wriggle and let the poor German pilots take the blame? Did you resign in protest?
You are comparing apples with oranges old friend. Ornis, this thread is about TE901 and the souls lost on the side of Erebus, so I am totally not interested in drifting into the Perpignan accident here. Happy to discuss some of the issues pertaining to Perpignan on another thread if you wish to start one?

Cheers

Fantome
23rd Mar 2014, 15:44
ahhh .. . toby TP . .. . .I'll drink to that........

The one thing that pains and is a source of enduring disappointment
is the limited amount of compassionate understanding ,
an appreciation at more than a superficial level of the human
frailties that coloured nearly every aspect of the aftermath.
All that running for cover. All that resorting to the blame game.

When the emotion is removed only then do the essentials of dispassionate
examination of the multifarious strands of the history of the case come to the fore.

So much defending the indefensible. You could list a dozen key points as
to the findings and you would find heated disagreement persists about every one , between the advocates of one line of analysis compared with that held to be the truth by the other camp.

prospector
23rd Mar 2014, 19:16
The kindest and most respectful way to remember Collins might be to say that he was a good pilot and a decent man who would have accepted responsibility for what he did.

Exactly, well said.

compressor stall
23rd Mar 2014, 22:02
Yes, well said.

Sadly no one else (people or organisations) accepted responsibility for their contributory actions.

framer
24th Mar 2014, 00:15
You are comparing apples with oranges old friend.
Yes and no.
Both cases had a minimum altitude set down in the books and in both cases that minimum altitude was not adhered to. An argument could be made that in both cases a cultural environment existed whereby pilots believed there was not a strong expectation from the powers that be that they would adhere to those minimum altitudes. Who is responsible for the development and maintenance of that airline culture? Pretty hard to nail that one down, is it the janitor? a junior line F/O? A line Captain? The chief pilot? The CEO?
Personally I did see similarities in the two crashes.
For Erebus,little was known about safety cultures and it came down to individual pilots as to their own take on the rules and regs etc, that was not the case by the time the A320 crashed. I have seen an airlines safety culture go from dismal to disciplined with the change of one key person. Incident information shared with tech crew combined with clearly stated expectations and refocused training directly impacts line pilot attitudes within months not years.
Looking to the individual pilots won't prevent further occurrences. Looking to the folk filling key roles where management meets operations can.
In my mind these are the people who could do with more training. When was the last time the management from the CP up were rostered classroom training on how to manipulate their own companies safety culture? Or do we just take it as read that they were born with that skill?
Framer

Ornis
24th Mar 2014, 07:17
Paragraph377

It is the arrogance of AirNZ - framer discusses culture - that I alluded to. The company was completely out of its depth flying to Antarctica and equally out of its depth testing Airbus flight envelope protection.

But my point was this: You express anger that the company tried to wriggle out of accepting (some) responsibility for Erebus, but did you complain that the very same ignorance, incompetence and self-indulgence led to Perpignan, but the German pilots copped the blame - foreigners you didn't know?

The problem is this, Captain. You didn't merely remember the dead, you covertly praised Mahon and scorned Chippindale, and that was unwarranted and provocative. As prospector intimated, some of us value truth - as we see it - above all else. Depressing, really!

You may well feel AirNZ let Jim Collins down, but remember Captain Collins let AirNZ down too. Not only did he break the rules written to safeguard his passengers, he showed poor airmanship - on the day.

We are all deeply flawed. We all need luck and we all need forgiveness.

Paragraph377
24th Mar 2014, 12:29
Ornis, yet again you bang on about Perpignan! Why? I am not interested in either making posts or starting threads about that topic. Much the same way I am not interested in posting or making comments on this thread about Pan Am over Lockerbie, the Concord crash, Amelia Earharts missing plane or any other number of bizarre aircraft mishaps off the coast of Bimini.

After 34 years it is fair to say that you Ornis, me, Prospector and some others on here wouldn't change our minds and personal opinions even if our very lives depended upon it, so let it go mate, you've made your point. It is what it is.

gaunty
25th Mar 2014, 09:08
prospector, stallie and Paragraph,

what Ornis said.
The kindest and most respectful way to remember Collins might be to say that he was a good pilot and a decent man who would have accepted responsibility for what he did.

grummanavenger
31st Mar 2014, 23:15
From a previous.
Also relevant, the weather at McMurdo was well below that required for an instrument let down. That was not the case in the previous flights you mention. The only other flight that struck such weather conditions carried out the pre planned sightseeing to the Dry Valley area, and returned to NZ, the pax had been briefed that if weather conditions were not suitable this is what would happen, and in hindsight, and in my opinion, foresight, it should have happened on the flight in question.

The previous flight that diverted went to the South Magnetic Pole area.

tartare
1st Apr 2014, 00:05
Well said Ornis.
I was 10 years old when 901 hit Erebus and remember it well.
Awful.
Many years later having worked at NZ at a senior level, I regrettably concur with the previous poster; at the time I was there its corporate culture was defined by arrogance.
One colleague described it as being like a cult; it had a sense of entitlement and importance far out of proportion to its true status and relevance... reaching it's peak under the previous CEO.
I've struck the same thing at Telecom, Chorus, Telstra to name a few.
However, how that might flow through to flight operations I can't speculate.
My sense was that those who flew were much more pragmatic.

framer
1st Apr 2014, 06:32
Interesting Tartare.
I have never been in management ranks so my thoughts/ opinions/ knowledge come straight from the line. I would love to know if the folk you were working with ( in your opinion) realised that their attitude towards flight safety directly impacted the attitude towards flight safety on the flight decks of their airline?
Do you think they knew that their airlines safety culture was never static and was influenced by the messages, both direct and indirect, that came down from on high?
I'd love to know.
Framer

prospector
1st Apr 2014, 21:07
The previous flight that diverted went to the South Magnetic Pole area.

That is correct, my mistake. On the flight in question though the crew were advised by Scott Base that the Wright and Taylor dry valleys area's were clear and would make a better prospect for sightseeing than Ross Island.

Apologise for the memory lapse.

tartare
2nd Apr 2014, 07:45
Hello Framer, thanks for your reply.
I must admit that it concerns me deeply to hear you say that executive level messaging affects flight safety on the line.
When I went out to the base at Auckland airport in my management white shirt and tie, I used to breath a sigh of relief (inhale some Jet A1 fumes!) and think to myself "these guys are too sensible to let any white collar management bollocks affect flight safety."
That was certainly the experience I had - corporate stuff was met with a wry smile from the grey heads up on the flight deck.
My sense was that airline pilots were a little like doctors in that respect.
Management can say all they like, but when you're up in the air with a couple of hundred souls down the back, you are in charge, and your `oath to safety' so to speak overides anything else.
Does that answer your question?

framer
2nd Apr 2014, 09:57
Thanks for the honest response.
It answers my question. Pretty scary really.

Not Nightowl
5th Apr 2014, 07:06
Interesting this one.

One of the basics of airmanship is situational awareness and the PIC is ultimately responsible for this in a given airspace.

However to recognise this and make an informed decision the PIC needs to have the necessary training in the first place.

So where does "whiteout" fit into this tragic accident?.

As an aside Ansett destroyed itself with it's strong unionism. It didn't need Air NZ's help!!.

Well said, on all counts.

framer
20th Apr 2014, 19:29
Tartare,
A poster called SafetyPee posted a link to a study that was completed in 2001 in another thread. I was reading the Executive Summary of the report and one sentence reminded me of what you posted here so I'll copy it in.
A link between a negative organisational culture and negative attitudes and behaviour was established which would not necessarily be mitigated by the high level of professionalism of flight crews.
Basically, even though flight crew have high standards etc, what management does and says can over ride that in a negative way. The professional culture can be ( and normally is ) affected by the attitudes and beliefs of the current management. That makes sense because otherwise we wouldn't need any talk of leadership....management would be relegated to managing.
Have a good day,
Framer

Ornis
26th Apr 2014, 00:44
Not Nightowl ... basics of airmanship is situational awareness ... to make an informed decision the PIC needs to have the necessary training ... where does "whiteout" fit ...

Had this PIC been tasked to land that would have been an entirely different matter, the balance of blame might have shifted to AirNZ - "necessary training". But he had received (1) sufficient training for overflight and (2) explicit instructions about descent below MSA, which he disobeyed without sufficient knowledge, cause or care.

Had the AINS not been reprogrammed he might have got away with it. That wouldn't have made him right, it would have made him lucky.

rjtjrt
26th Apr 2014, 01:09
Tartare wrote My sense was that airline pilots were a little like doctors in that respect.
Management can say all they like, but when you're up in the air with a couple of hundred souls down the back, you are in charge, and your `oath to safety' so to speak overides anything else.
Very true. It is easy to have learned opinions about how things should be done if you don't also have the responsibilty for the outcome.
I always listened to their views, but got a bit irritated when a paramedical told me how to do something in an insistent way, when they did not carry the can for it when or if it went wrong for the patient.
That is where the responsibility of command in flying is very similar.

I have followed the Mt Erebus accident closely over the years, and read the Mahon and Vette books, and the Royal Commision and original accident reports. Gordon Vette and Justice Mahon were courageous and decent men.
All I can say is "there but by the grace of God go I" to anyone who chucks armchair opinions about the crew.

Fantome
26th Apr 2014, 02:13
Interestingly found a signed copy of 'Impact Erebus' in an oppie y'day.

GV had signed it to one 'Mervyn' who seems to have been a pro aviator in some capacity, as there were quite a few related books in a batch, including the L'Estrange highly slanted one. GV's book is full of insights that no other person involved in the enquiry could have come up with. The sad thing about GV today is the terrible things that a stroke can do to your senses. Remember your aspirin prooners one and all.

rjtjrt
26th Apr 2014, 02:17
Good to know Gordon Vette is still with us, although saddened to hear of his illness.
Respect.
John

Brian Abraham
26th Apr 2014, 09:18
Not only did he break the rules written to safeguard his passengers, he showed poor airmanshipBut he had received (1) sufficient training for overflight and (2) explicit instructions about descent below MSA, which he disobeyed without sufficient knowledge, cause or care.Give it a rest Ornis. There was plenty of "blame" to be laid at many a door, the long running past thread holds all the arguments without another impugning an individual who is no longer here to defend himself. And he had not received all the CAA mandated training.

Paragraph377
26th Apr 2014, 09:27
Fantome, that was a great score, well done. A fine piece of history you have collected, and to think it was dumped in a second hand store.

Gordon Vette was a brilliant mind, intelligent man who could certainly define sh#t from clay. He has been ill for some years now, and it is an absolute crying shame that his mind be cut short by one of the ravages of this world we live in.

Ornis
26th Apr 2014, 12:55
Erebus Disaster|Mt Erebus Plane Crash OFFICAL Facts Website|1979 Air NZ|NZALPA (http://www.erebus.co.nz/) This website is hosted and maintained by the New Zealand Air Line Pilots' Association © 2009 NZALPA.

Erebus disaster - the story and the facts. About the Mt Erebus plane crash (http://www.erebus.co.nz/Background/TheStory.aspx) It is the multi-faceted nature of the causes of the disaster that make the Erebus story eternally relevant and compelling. NZALPA trusts that the resources gathered on this website will both inform and evoke reflection and discussion, thus keeping the story alive.

Jim Collins Memorial Award (http://www.erebus.co.nz/MemorialandAwards/JimCollinsMemorialAward.aspx) NZALPA President ... announced the memorial trophy [which became] THE JIM COLLINS MEMORIAL AWARD FOR EXCEPTIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO AVIATION SAFETY

The Flight Path Controversy (http://www.erebus.co.nz/Background/TheFlightPathControversy.aspx) Through little fault of their own, this crew lost situational awareness before the aircraft had left the ground,

Give it a rest, NZALPA.

prospector
27th Apr 2014, 00:05
Give it a rest, NZALPA

Exactly, there will always be two trains of thought as to the cause of this "accident", and many of these people who hold contrary views to the findings of Justice Mahon are far from "armchair opinions".

Paragraph377
27th Apr 2014, 11:04
NZALPA did what it should and stuck behind the deceased crew. Dead men can't talk, they can't defend themselves, they can't speak about the facts so somebody had to keep the dead crews dignity alive.
Judging from some of the posts on here it would seem that some of the old CAA, Muldoon supporters and ANZ hierarchy are still blinded by arrogance, egos and pride.

I now await Ornis to reignite his Perpignan obsession, to try and tie that accident in with Erebus and then demand answers from me as to why I 'didn't resign over Perpignan'?

prospector
27th Apr 2014, 21:41
still blinded by arrogance, egos and pride.

That statement may well be correct, but you have attributed it to the wrong people.

Fantome
27th Apr 2014, 21:53
oim tinkin' the only man missing from the fool circularity
of dis here blather is de Rev'rend Ian Paisley.

what Para said . . . .. accord the deceased some respect
some modicum of dignity

prospector
28th Apr 2014, 00:14
accord the deceased some respect

Got the utmost respect for Ron Chippindale and his report.

Ornis
30th Apr 2014, 00:14
There was an old PPRuNer called Paragraph
Who blamed Air New Zealand office staff
As much as he bleated
His propaganda was greeted
With two fingers, harsh words and a laugh.

Brian Abraham
30th Apr 2014, 01:02
A typical infantile, and not completely unexpected reply, from one who wishes to denigrate Captain Collins, and those who have the temerity to stand in his corner.

Mods, I think it's time to get the key out, no good can come from the likes of the previous post.

prospector
30th Apr 2014, 01:29
from one who wishes to denigrate Captain Collins, and those who have the temerity to stand in his corner.

The following from "New Zealand Tragedies Aviation" compiled by John King.

"Because the findings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the cause of the disaster were limited in scope, being legally an opinion and not a statement of fact, they could not be appealed in legal terms, unlike the Office of Air Accidents Investigation report, which remains the sole official account-- and has never been officially challenged."


And that to me sums up the situation precisely.

No doubt it has been noted that the official accident report states the" probable cause", no one will ever know with any certainty what actually happened, not even Justice Mahon. The theory of sector whiteout that was put forward , which had never been experienced by any other aviator, or at least reported on, after many years of operations in the area by a number of Air Force aircraft.
If one looks at the ALPA web site one can see the size of Mt Erebus, how it is possible to hit that mountain, and be in legal flight conditions is difficult to perceive.

Ornis
30th Apr 2014, 06:34
The was an old PPRuNer called Abraham
Whose opinion of me's not worth a damn
T'was not Collins I scorned
Nor people who mourned
But Paragraph ramming his ALPA scam.

Brian Abraham
30th Apr 2014, 08:58
The theory of sector whiteout that was put forward , which had never been experienced by any other aviator, or at least reported on, after many years of operations in the area by a number of Air Force aircraft.
If one looks at the ALPA web site one can see the size of Mt Erebus, how it is possible to hit that mountain, and be in legal flight conditions is difficult to perceive. Prospector, I'm afraid your post demonstrates your lack of understanding of whiteout. Any aviator with arctic experience can give you chapter and verse. Search the old threads for posts by compressor stall, he is one who flies fixed wing in Antarctica. I've had the opportunity myself to experience white out in Antarctica and can attest to its existence and effect. Given the discussion in previous threads on this subject I'm confused as to why you are expressing such ignorance on the subject.

From FAA "General Aviation Pilot’s Guide to Preflight Weather Planning, Weather Self-Briefings, and Weather Decision Making"Similarly, scientists who study human vision have determined that weather transitions are sometimes too subtle for the limits of the visual system. Like other sensory organs, the eye responds best to changes. It adapts to circumstances that do not change, or those that change in a gradual or subtle way, by reducing its response. Just as the skin becomes so acclimated to the “feel” of clothing that it is generally not even noticed, the eye can become so accustomed to progressive small changes in light, color, and motion that it no longer “sees” an accurate picture. In deteriorating weather conditions, the reduction in visibility and contrast occurs quite gradually, and it may be quite some time before the pilot senses that the weather conditions have deteriorated significantly. In essence, you have to learn how to look past the visual illusion and see what is really there.

Certain weather conditions also make it particularly difficult to accurately perceive with the eye. For instance, a phenomenon called “flat light” can create very hazardous operating circumstances. Flat light is a condition in which all available light is highly diffused, and information normally available from directional light sources is lost. The result is that there are no shadows, which means that the eye can no longer judge distance, depth features, or textures on the surface with any precision. Flat light is especially dangerous because it can occur with high reported visibility. It is common in areas below an overcast, and on reflective surfaces such as snow or water. It can also occur when blowing snow or sand create flat light conditions accompanied by “white-out,” which is reduced visibility in all directions due to small particles of snow, ice or sand that diffuse the light.

Awareness is important in overcoming these challenges, but you can also develop your visual interpretation skills. Appendix 8 provides tips and techniques you can use to estimate in-flight visibility and cloud clearance, thus enhancing your ability to evaluate in-flight weather conditions accurately.

prospector
30th Apr 2014, 09:44
Prospector, I'm afraid your post demonstrates your lack of understanding of whiteout.

Brian, please read what was written, of course many people are aware of whiteout, the point I made was that nobody had defined any such thing as sector whiteout, once again I quote from John King's publication.

Gordon Vette gave evidence in Washington expanding on his sector whiteout theory, but his suggestion that McMurdo should have realised the DC10 was in peril from whiteout was not taken seriously. Judge Greene wrote

Since Gordon Vette was apparently the first person to have presented to experts in perceptual psychology and to the world at large the theory of SECTOR WHITEOUT with respect to an aircraft in level flight, the phenomenon was entirely unknown prior to the crash of Flight 901 and therefor by definition unfamiliar to the controllers at McMurdo on November 28, 1979. The Air Traffic controllers cannot be faulted for failing to predict that the flight crew would be unable to see the mountain on account of that phenomenon, particularly when neither its existence nor the possibility of its presence were ever mentioned to them.

How many trips did Gordon Vette do to McMurdo?, and yet he discovered a phenomenon that people with many years experience in that environment had never encountered?

This ground has been covered before in these threads but is still very relevant. The statements by Captain Derek Ellis in a letter to NZALPA.

Having read Gordon Vette's book, I can only conclude that something went very badly wrong at the Mahon hearing. I fully respect your duty to act as advocate for your members but I question, in this particular instance, was it all carried to far, with the result that the real causes were obscured and consequently, the wrong people blamed.

You will no doubt be aware of the qualifications and experience held by Captain Derek Ellis

Paragraph377
30th Apr 2014, 10:54
Ornis and Prospector are acting out a play I think. In the play Prospector is Chippendale and Ornis is Muldoon I would say, judging by the way they are carrying on all emotional and angry like.

Brian Abraham
30th Apr 2014, 13:48
the point I made was that nobody had defined any such thing as sector whiteoutFrom the FAAIt is certain that such weather phenomena like flat light and white out have existed since the beginning of time. However, to date, no real in-depth studies into these weather conditions have been examined extensively as they relate to the aviation community. The Federal Aviation Administration continues to explore this unusual visual condition and in the interest of safety is committed to reporting any new findings.How many trips did Gordon Vette do to McMurdo?, and yet he discovered a phenomenon that people with many years experience in that environment had never encountered?All experienced arctic aviators have experienced the phenomena at one time or another, but it would seem a particular name had not been given to it. The term "sector whiteout" is now well entrenched in the lexicon of both the USA and Canadian regulatory authorities.You will no doubt be aware of the qualifications and experience held by Captain Derek EllisI am well aware of his background, but through lack of experience of arctic flying he is no better equipped to expound on its hazards than a student at my aero club. And I doubt he would be the man to go to for advice on crop dusting techniques. All the experts said stomach ulcers were caused by stress or spicy foods. It took a dumb doctor to prove them all wrong.

I'm very much surprised, given your interest in Erebus, that you have not made an effort to educate yourself in the sector whiteout phenomena Prospector. The web is replete with information. I can only assume from your lack of interest in educating yourself you may have a closed mind, or an axe to grind.

Back to Basics - Flying in Flat Light & White Out Conditions - YouTube

Ornis
30th Apr 2014, 18:04
There was an old PPRuNer called Ornis
Who Para tried to paint into a cornice
But to Prospector's delight
He stayed right in the fight
And ascribed Para's views to jaundice.

prospector
30th Apr 2014, 21:02
The facts have been put forward many times on this and other threads on this subject.

What it boils down to is there are those who think it is acceptable to completely disregard Company standing orders, CAA directions, and blat around at 1,500 ft in excess of 250kts, in a DC10 loaded with passengers, in conditions that are known can be hostile on your very first trip to the area, and make statements like "We may have to pop down here to 1,500ft here, I think, and the first officer replies "Probably see further in anyway."

Those that think whiteout obscured Mt Erebus at all times during the descent from 16,000ft, as it was never sighted at any time. Those that think going past Beaufort Island on the wrong side and not noticing is acceptable, then no amount of discussion, and fact, is going to change there beliefs, obviously.

Paragraph377
1st May 2014, 01:53
Then there are also those foolish enough to believe;
a) The Investigator actually had the skills to conduct such an investigation (which he didn't) and;
b) The Investigator was not a government footstool who was always going to ensure his investigation report blamed the crew otherwise his employer (the government) would be held liable and accountable and have to cough up a settlement amount to the deceased relatives, which at the time would have sent NZ broke.

And you post this classic;
Those that think whiteout obscured Mt Erebus at all times during the descent from 16,000ft, as it was never sighted at any time. Those that think going past Beaufort Island on the wrong side and not noticing is acceptable, then no amount of discussion, and fact, is going to change there beliefs, obviously. If you actually believe what you have written then there is absolutely no doubt that you sir are Mr Chippendale reincarnated.

It took the intelligent non flying Mahon to understand, grasp, and expose 'whiteout' in this accident. No wonder there were/are pilots and aviation experts down to this day who still hold a grudge against Mahon. A number of 'experts' from the day were truly shown up to be exactly what they are - incompetent deceptive amateurs serving as the governments whore.

prospector
1st May 2014, 04:02
Ornis and Prospector are acting out a play I think. In the play Prospector is Chippendale and Ornis is Muldoon I would say, judging by the way they are carrying on all emotional and angry like.

With such a pathetic diatribe as is shown in your last post who is the angry and emotional person?

Everything in my post is documented fact. Perhaps you have read Paul Holmes emotional claptrap and are using that tome as your source of in formation?

Brian Abraham
1st May 2014, 05:27
The facts have been put forward many times on this and other threads on this subject.Some facts have, but so has many non facts, such asBut he had received sufficient training for overflightandhow it is possible to hit that mountain, and be in legal flight conditions is difficult to perceiveRefer to the discussion by compressor stall as to what constitutes visibility when referring to VFR limits. And an education regarding what whiteout is will greatly benefit.

prospector
1st May 2014, 05:56
And an education regarding what whiteout is will greatly benefit.

As there was no intention of landing, and as the minimum VFR altitude specified by both the company and CAA was 6,000ft, then whiteout should not have been a problem.

But following your argument along, you do not disagree that your stance approves the decision to take a DC10 down to 1,500ft in weather conditions that were below, and reported by McMurdo to be below that needed for the cloud break procedure, at speeds that had to be above 260kts in an area that you had never before flown to, your tour guide just a few minutes before hand advised the Pax that when he knew where they were he would tell them, not appear to be unduly worried that they had not been identified by radar, had no VHF comms with the controllers, all mandatory requirements for this descent, and you would believe that this descent was not a foolish decision? If this is so, and by the content of all your posts thus far it would appear to be the case, then it is certainly pointless carrying on this discussion.

No doubt you will come up with the argument that previous flights had descended below 6,000ft. They had weather conditions suitable for such flight, and were all invited down by McMurdo radar after they had been positively identified. Mt Erebus was never sighted at any time by this flight, are you trying to tell me that was because of whiteout? from 16.000ft?

Paragraph377
1st May 2014, 09:39
how it is possible to hit that mountain, and be in legal flight conditions is difficult to perceive
That's because I doubt you have ever flown in this condition. Your understanding (or I should say a lack of understanding) is very very evident.
Regardless of your Pprune status, it is likely you are a young pilot experienced in flying Caravans or hot air balloons whose only experience with whiteout is what you have read on the internet? Surely you are not an experienced, competent, reasonable and experienced widebody Captain?

Ornis
1st May 2014, 10:27
There was an old bore at PPRuNe
Whose head's wrapped in a cocoon
Calling Chippindale a whore
To even an old score
Tsk! The sound of barking at the moon.

Brian Abraham
1st May 2014, 11:13
As there was no intention of landing, and as the minimum VFR altitude specified by both the company and CAA was 6,000ft, then whiteout should not have been a problem.Whiteout can be a problem no matter the altitude. In the case I experienced we were at 18,000.Calling Chipindale a whoreYou're really sinking to new lows Ornis. Please inform us who ever called Chippendale a whore, besides your good self.

SawThe Light
1st May 2014, 11:49
Ron Chippendale's report simply stated the facts. The aircraft was flown into the side of a mountain.


None of the Airline Board of Directors or the General Manager was aboard the aircraft. The safe operation of the aircraft during the flight was delegated to, and was the responsibility of the Captain.


This was a CFIT event. The Captain, as we know was a consummate professional, was in full control of the aircraft, and flew it into the side on a mountain.


Where was the official Accident Report wrong?

prospector
1st May 2014, 19:40
This from para 377

incompetent deceptive amateurs serving as the governments whore.

Brian, you obviously are not reading what anyone else is posting when you post such garbage

You're really sinking to new lows Ornis. Please inform us who ever called Chippendale a whore, besides your good self.

Whiteout can be a problem no matter the altitude. In the case I experienced we were at 18,000.

The point I was making, is that no matter what track they thought they were on, the mountain should have been visible from many miles away, unless it was covered in cloud, which it was. The final moments may well have been sector whiteout, but it was to avoid such a scenario that the descent requirements were as they were. Bear in mind it was NZALPA that insisted that all their captains "had a turn" on these flights, not like the other operators who had to have been down to the ice a number of times before they went down in command.

Paragraph377
1st May 2014, 20:45
Brian, ignore them as you were correct, this is what I actually said;
A number of 'experts' from the day were truly shown up to be exactly what they are - incompetent deceptive amateurs serving as the governments whore.
Of course the tag team of Ornis/Prospector have covertly picked out just some of my words, massaged them slightly and then come to a conclusion I was talking about Chippendale. I never actually mentioned Chippendale in that context and I also mentioned that were a number of 'experts' from that day who fit the bill of government whores.

What is interesting Ornis/Prospector is the method and style in which you choose to take just a handful of words from a statement and then you spin them into a completely untrue fabrication of what was actually said. This reeks of 'government training 101'. Who knows, perhaps you both worked for the CAA or the government back in those days?

Ornis
1st May 2014, 21:33
Then there are also those foolish enough to believe;
a) The Investigator actually had the skills to conduct such an investigation (which he didn't) and;
b) The Investigator was not a government footstool who was always going to ensure his investigation report blamed the crew The inference is that the government expert
(1) didn't have the skills, that is, was incompetent or amateurish
(2) was going to sacrifice his honour for money.
Chippindale was the government expert.

A number of 'experts' from the day were truly shown up to be exactly what they are - incompetent deceptive amateurs serving as the governments whore. Here you refer sarcastically to "experts" and call them incompetent amateurs serving as whores.

You wriggle like a worm, Paragraph 377. Of course you meant to include Chippindale in your diatribe.

Paragraph377
2nd May 2014, 11:12
Paragraph 377 of the Mahon Report sums up this accident succinctly;

Near the end of the document under the section title "The Stance Adopted by the Airline Before the Commission of Inquiry": "The palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not have been the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were very clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so& I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies." (Paragraph 377)

Ornis
2nd May 2014, 13:20
Paragraph 377 of the Mahon Report sums up this accident succinctly;

"The palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not have been the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were very clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so& I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies." (Paragraph 377)

No, it doesn't sum up the accident. It sums up Mahon's view of his inquiry.

The facts of the crash are clear and not in dispute.

Let me ask you, Paragraph 377. Had Collins not been so low for so long, heeded the flight engineer and pulled up sooner, and missed the mountain by say 100 ft. Would he have been thanked by Air NZ and congratulated by the CAA? Feted by NZALPA, a safety award introduced in his name? Members of the public flocking to fly with him?

From what you write in your public profile, I surmise you were a B747/B777 captain, with Air NZ. Is that correct? You must have been in your mid-twenties when Collins flew into Erebus. So, did you spend virtually your whole career under the shadow of Erebus, where you are today, or are you just revisiting?

JammedStab
2nd May 2014, 14:34
Brian, please read what was written, of course many people are aware of whiteout, the point I made was that nobody had defined any such thing as sector whiteout, once again I quote from John King's publication.

How many trips did Gordon Vette do to McMurdo?, and yet he discovered a phenomenon that people with many years experience in that environment had never encountered?

This ground has been covered before in these threads but is still very relevant. The statements by Captain Derek Ellis in a letter to NZALPA.

You will no doubt be aware of the qualifications and experience held by Captain Derek Ellis

If you are going to fly in an unfamiliar environment, it would be unwise to go down to a low level below MSA unless is very nice clear weather. I have flown a lot in the arctic and am quite familiar with whiteout conditions. I hope that I might have recognized the conditions encountered.

On the other hand, if flying flying in desert areas of a similar topography as the My. Erebus area, I think I would stay above my MSA unless it was very obvious that the weather was nice. I have no real experience in desert areas.

There are all kinds of light aircraft that have crashed under similar circumstances. The accidents reports invariably put the blame on the PIC. This just happened to be a bigger aircraft.

Of course there are other issues to be considered, but having incorrect coordinates just shows how you cant trust anyone. If you are going to break some rules, you better make 1000% sure that you can get away with it. Flying into milky white or conditions without it being one of those nice clear days over the mountains increases risk if below a safe altitude.

Paragraph377
2nd May 2014, 21:06
From what you write in your public profile, I surmise you were a B747/B777 captain, with Air NZ. Is that correct? You must have been in your mid-twenties when Collins flew into Erebus. So, did you spend virtually your whole career under the shadow of Erebus, where you are today, or are you just revisiting?One shouldn't surmise, and it's interesting to see how you are trying to covertly work out my age, rank and serial number by your line of questions. Nice try! But seeing that we are playing the game of 'surmise' I would surmise from your profile that you were/are a long term career bureaucrat, possibly a FOI, maybe an accident investigator. You may not reside in NZ, possibly you are a Brit as you and Prospector are fans of Derek Ellis, however your insistence, almost obsession that Chippindale was a great investigator tends to indicate that you are from his fold, you were possibly taught by him which would explain your arrogance and the way you lack accurate detail in your analysis of matters. Then again you could be one of his relatives, or a grandchild of Muldoon? Really, who cares, I don't. My original thread posting stands, nothing will change my mind, especially the tautological arguments that you and your tag team partner propose.
Kia Ora

prospector
2nd May 2014, 21:42
You really are pathetic, you post



One shouldn't surmise, and it's interesting to see how you are trying to covertly work out my age, rank and serial number

After posting

Regardless of your Pprune status, it is likely you are a young pilot experienced in flying Caravans or hot air balloons whose only experience with whiteout is what you have read on the internet? Surely you are not an experienced, competent, reasonable and experienced widebody Captain?

It would certainly be nice to be a young Caravan pilot again, but as I was, and had been flying for some years prior to the Erebus event it is not possible. If you are an example of

Surely you are not an experienced, competent, reasonable and experienced widebody Captain? [/QUOTE] then I am quite happy to not be one.

Paragraph377
2nd May 2014, 22:05
It would certainly be nice to be a young Caravan pilot again, but as I was, and had been flying for some years prior to the Erebus event it is not possible.Seems you were born in the wrong era old chap! DC 3's were a great aircraf (your era ?), and Caravans still are, but certainly a far cry from 4 holers and flying in whiteout on a regular basis. You should probably stick to the GA/parachute operator type threads Prospector, because your lack of modern aviation, technologies and methodology is alarmingly evident.

Cheers old chap

prospector
2nd May 2014, 22:14
but certainly a far cry from 4 holers and flying in whiteout on a regular basis.

And that statement alone would show how easy it is to put up a false resume in the pprune forums.

Ornis
2nd May 2014, 22:37
Paragraph377: One shouldn't surmise, and it's interesting to see how you are trying to covertly work out my age, rank and serial number by your line of questions.
About Paragraph377
Licence Type (eg CPL. Pilots only): ATPL
Current a/c Type (eg B737. Pilots only): 747, 777
Biography: Professional Pilot. Location: New Zealand. Interests: Aviation. Occupation: Retired
Date of Birth: November 8, 1952 (61)
Join Date: 4th Oct 2013. Total Posts: 222

I was simply trying to clarify your profile while giving you the benefit of the doubt. Is what you have written true or not?

Ornis
2nd May 2014, 23:08
Paragraph377. When can I expect an answer to my earlier question? Had Collins not been so low for so long, heeded the flight engineer and pulled up sooner, and missed the mountain by say 100 ft. Would he have been thanked by Air NZ and congratulated by the CAA? Feted by NZALPA, a safety award introduced in his name? Members of the public flocking to fly with him?

Paragraph377
3rd May 2014, 02:19
Paragraph377. When can I expect an answer to my earlier question?You will be waiting a long time. You think you can pose questions to me and that I am somehow obliged to respond to you with an answer? I really don't know who the hell you think you are but I choose who I wish to discuss matters or answer questions too, not the other way around.

Hempy
3rd May 2014, 02:45
Would have thought it would be pretty hard to maintain currency on two widebody a/c types after retirement.

Ornis
3rd May 2014, 03:15
Paragraph377. You will be waiting a long time. You think you can pose questions to me and that I am somehow obliged to respond to you with an answer? I really don't know who the hell you think you are but I choose who I wish to discuss matters or answer questions too, not the other way around. Exactly what I was expecting. You were quite happy to throw Mahon's layman's views at us but now you've been caught out by pilots you have a wee tantrum. The truth is: You can't face the questions I asked.
Cognitive dissonance - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_dissonance)
Confirmation bias - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias)
Motivated reasoning - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motivated_reasoning)

I remind you that you started this thread on TE901. You can't complain if your assertions and arguments are challenged. Either you answer or you concede.

tolakuma manki
3rd May 2014, 03:15
Two types in retirement, no problems for 377/004

Brian Abraham
3rd May 2014, 04:29
Would have thought it would be pretty hard to maintain currency on two widebody a/c types after retirement.Don't get too carried away Hempy. Like me, he has obviously listed what he once did, unlike yourself which is totally void of info, other than you are in Oz.

Paragraph377
3rd May 2014, 07:26
Don't get too carried away Hempy. Like me, he has obviously listed what he once did, unlike yourself which is totally void of info, other than you are in Oz.
Brian, well done son. You worked it out in one, and quickly. Maybe you could teach those other dopes a thing or two :ok:

prospector
3rd May 2014, 10:12
para 377,

When you make statements such as

a) The Investigator actually had the skills to conduct such an investigation (which he didn't) and;
b) The Investigator was not a government footstool who was always going to ensure his investigation report blamed the crew otherwise his employer (the government) would be held liable and accountable and have to cough up a settlement amount to the deceased relatives, which at the time would have sent NZ broke.

The question of Ron Chippindales qualifications and experience obviously have to printed once again to counter such scurrilous utterings.

From John King's New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation.

The commissioner's assessment of his first witness ignored Chippindales considerable experience as a flight instructor and transport pilot in the RNZAF. He had been formally involved in military flight safety and accident investigation for several years before being seconded to similar duties in civil aviation, and his standing in the world community is such that as someone scrupulously fair and independent, he has been asked to help investigate some accidents of a particularly delicate political nature. (Recently, for instance, he was appointed to the five strong United Nations team to investigate the loss of the Korean Airlines Boeing 747 airliner, FlighKAL007, shot down by a soviet fighter near the Island of Sakhalin in 1983)

Hempy
3rd May 2014, 10:48
Don't get too carried away Hempy. Like me, he has obviously listed what he once did, unlike yourself which is totally void of info, other than you are in Oz.
Brian, well done son. You worked it out in one, and quickly. Maybe you could teach those other dopes a thing or two :ok:


Interested in buying a bridge??

framer
3rd May 2014, 11:12
Air New Zealand cocked it up.
Collins cocked it up.
Then a lot of people began behaving poorly.
That's it boys and girls........they both cocked it up. Neither party comes out of it looking good and it's that simple.
For anyone to argue that Collins didn't cock it up is ludicrous . Even supposing the minimum heights weren't 16,000ft for IMC and 6000ft VMC..........when was it ever a good idea to be at 1500ft doing 260kts clean in a transport jet full of pax ? Anyone ?.......Para377?...... If they were over a flat brown desert with a perfectly defined horizon to a bright blue sky it still would be a bad decision to do 260kts , 1500ft, clean and full of pax.....but they weren't, it was worse than that.
One of the lowest blows in this saga IMO was Holmes's denigration of Chipendales character 12 months after he died. It was just so gutless.
Anyway, back to it chaps.

Brian Abraham
4th May 2014, 00:59
Interested in buying a bridge??Sure am, but only if it's in Sydney.Air New Zealand cocked it up.
Collins cocked it up.
Then a lot of people began behaving poorly.You got it in one framer, though even 6,000 VMC was a fools paradise, once below MSA all bets are off, with the insidiousness of whiteout always there to catch the unwary out.

prospector
4th May 2014, 01:38
You still have not got it.

though even 6,000 VMC was a fools paradise

To even descend that far they had to have been identified by radar, had VHF contact, and have a DME lockon, they had none of these things. And who was it that made the decision to descend?

They also had company memorandum that covered requirements for descent OAA:14/13/28 dated 8th November 1979.

Delete all references in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let down procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows:

1. Vis 20km plus
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 grid through 360 grid to 270 grid from McMurdo field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH29.
4.Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.

Given all those facts I would have thought anybody or perhaps I should say any reasonable person, would accept the Company and CAA had done their bit to ensure a safe operation.

Brian Abraham
4th May 2014, 04:02
I'm afraid you still don't get it prospector, the traps that lay with whiteout.Given all those facts I would have thought anybody or perhaps I should say any reasonable person, would accept the Company and CAA had done their bit to ensure a safe operation. They had nothing of the sort.

Vmo248
4th May 2014, 04:21
Mr M R Davis retires as chief executive of Air New Zealand.

#Just realised been a month or twelve since I actually posted anything here!#

prospector
4th May 2014, 04:41
They had nothing of the sort.

If they were in the area that was approved for the sightseeing, and not below 6,000ft, and had been identified on radar, what would whiteout have to do with anything? there is no high ground in that area, and if they had of been identified on the radar do you not think the radar operator would advised them if they were approaching any high ground?

As has been stated before, if you want to break the rules you have to be 100% certain you are right.

Hempy
4th May 2014, 04:53
I'm afraid you still don't get it prospector, the traps that lay with whiteout.Given all those facts I would have thought anybody or perhaps I should say any reasonable person, would accept the Company and CAA had done their bit to ensure a safe operation. They had nothing of the sort.

I'm struggling to understand this 'sector whiteout' argument in regards to this accident. Undoubtedly the phenomenon was not widely known about amongst civilian pilots at the time of the accident. It's probable that no one on the tech crew knew of it's nature. They thought they were in VMC but the conditions meant that the rising ground in front of their mis-identified position was impossible to spot visually against the cloud/horizon..

So what?

If they had stayed IFR above the MSA (F160) until they were radar identified (as per every other flight, and company procedure), not only would have they discovered the gross navigation error (as they appeared on the scope overhead Erebus), but the 'sector whiteout' would have been irrelevant.

They were flying into a potentially inhospitable environment, with much more to worry about than sector whiteout. In conditions other than perfect blue to MSL, and with a 12 thousand foot mountain close to their elected flight path.

VHF radio is line-of-sight. So is primary and secondary radar. Clear comms dropping out on descent, and lack of radar identification well within the expected coverage of both was the first little whiff that something wasn't quite right.

Yet the crew decided to descend. Anything after this was always going to be in the lap of the God's...all of the preset safety measures were redundant as soon as they dropped below 16,000".

Are you suggesting that had 'sector whiteout' been a commonly known phenomena that ANZ would have amended the SOPs for descent below MSA? or that ANZ should have known about this phenomena and push more stridently in their SOP's for radar identification and VHF with McMurdo prior to descending below MSA? Or are you suggesting simply that Collins would not have descended until he was identified had he known about 'sector whiteout'?

What's the relevance? They plowed into a mountain at 260 kts and 1500". The argument seems to be that they didn't see the mountain and had no way of knowing it was there. Well fk me, of course they didn't see it. That's the whole point..

Ornis
4th May 2014, 06:36
There's nothing mysterious about whiteout. It is simply the eye having nothing to focus on, a special case of empty field myopia. If there's poor light under full cloud over ice and snow, you would still see a large-enough dark object. If you can't, it's not VMC (day) - by definition.

Collins didn't see Erebus for exactly the same reason pilots in VMC don't see the nearer snowy ridge when there is another higher snowy ridge behind: No contrast.

Whether or not Collins was in VMC as defined by the company, and thus required legally under CARs, is an other matter.

I have already broached one aspect of VFR with the CAA. It is that whatever the rules are about visibility and cloud, there is an implicit requirement that you fly with reference to the ground. In my opinion this should be explicit in the rules. In general terms it means you recognise the ground for what it is, preferably identify it. If you are above cloud then you must be in clear air such that higher ground or its cloud cover is obvious.

The fact is Captain Collins, flying VFR, descended without identifying his position with reference to the ground. He couldn't see a very large mountain he knew was close by, either above the cloud or below it. That is not a good position to be in. A prudent pilot might have retraced his path out over the sea and climbed. So confident was he of his instruments he continued. Under VFRs he was not permitted to do so.

I know Brian Abraham is, quite rightly, more concerned with the lessons to be learned than apportioning blame, but the sad fact is a large number of people out for a joyride were killed quite unnecessarily and I don't think the lessons were learned. That is why I brought up Perpignan.

If airline pilots are not going to accept the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the flight, why have them at all? Why not just program the aircraft and send it on its way? After all, it's probably at the point you really only need a pilot when something goes wrong.

ampan
6th May 2014, 18:32
Hempy #123:
“Undoubtedly the phenomenon was not widely known about amongst civilian pilots at the time of the accident. It's probable that no one on the tech crew knew of it's nature. They thought they were in VMC but the conditions meant that the rising ground in front of their mis-identified position was impossible to spot visually against the cloud/horizon.”
The captain knew about the difficulty distinguishing the cloud from the ice. On hearing of the low cloud layer over McMurdo Station, he considered baling out and going elsewhere.

Paragraph377
6th May 2014, 20:40
The captain knew about the difficulty distinguishing the cloud from the ice. On hearing of the low cloud layer over McMurdo Station, he considered baling out and going elsewhere.The condition known as whiteout, it's insidious nature and its rapid onset were virtually completely unknown in commercial aviation, particularly at ANZ in 1979. Of course Capt Collins understood the difficulty of distinguishing between snow and ice, as would the other crew who flew those sightseeing sectors, but that in itself is completely different to the condition of whiteout phenomena.

Ornis
6th May 2014, 21:41
Paragraph377: The condition known as whiteout, it's insidious nature and its rapid onset... Sounds more like syphilis.

NZALPA: THE EREBUS STORY. What was the official finding of the Mahon Report? FAQs (http://www.erebus.co.nz/FAQs.aspx)

“In my opinion, neither Captain Collins nor First Officer Cassin nor the flight engineers made any error which contributed to the disaster, and were not responsible for its occurrence.”

Whiteout, whitewash, hogwash, I don't care, I just don't want to fly with these pilots.

ampan
6th May 2014, 21:41
“Cases of aircraft flying directly into snow-covered terrain in clear air, but with an unbroken low overcast, have been so numerous in aviation history as to be a matter of common knowledge among pilots who fly at low altitudes in polar regions and in northern Europe and Canada in the winter months.” (Mahon’s 1981 report, page 71)

Paragraph377
7th May 2014, 00:48
Ampan;
“Cases of aircraft flying directly into snow-covered terrain in clear air, but with an unbroken low overcast, have been so numerous in aviation history as to be a matter of common knowledge among pilots who fly at low altitudes in polar regions and in northern Europe and Canada in the winter months.” (Mahon’s 1981 report, page 71)
ANZ was not experienced in flying under these conditions. ANZ still isn't a Europe/Canada style operation. Best ask the ANZ flight ops department of the day how much training they gave fleet Captains and crews of the day in relation to whiteout.

Ornis;
Sounds more like syphilis.
Typical response. At least we now know about your area of expertise!
And;
Whiteout whitewash, hogwash, I don't care, I just don't want to fly with these pilots. Another stupid comment. Go back to flying your little Caravans mate.

ampan
7th May 2014, 01:25
The issue is whether the captain was entitled to descend below the cloud layer on the basis that he was visual. In fact, he wasn't - but did he know that at the time? If he did, then it was a very bad case of pilot error, which bordered on outright recklessness.


If the relevant issue is the captain's knowledge, the lack of training provided by Air NZ has no relevance. If he already knew about the visual problem below the cloud, then what damage was done by Air NZ's not telling him? None.


Captain Collins clearly had a basic understanding of the problem. Note that we have snow in New Zealand, and mountains. For example, there is a Mount Hutt on the edge of the Canterbury Plains which, coincidently, is where the RNZAF Wigram base used to be and which is where the captain spent four years. When the cloud layer is lower than the mountain's summit, the mountain is not visible, which is an important piece of information for a trainee RNZAF pilot flying a Harvard over the Canterbury Plains.

prospector
7th May 2014, 01:32
The condition known as whiteout, it's insidious nature and its rapid onset were virtually completely unknown in commercial aviation,


Why do you persist with such rubbish? They should never have been in a position that whiteout was going to be a problem.

Are we talking about an aero club pilot doing his first solo? No, we are talking about an ex RNZAF pilot, who had worked his way up to command of a DC10, had been given his standing orders for this flight, and the requirements for descent had been very clearly laid out. He took it upon himself to completely disregard company orders and CAA requirements with the end result that many people lost their lives in exactly the circumstances that these descent requirements were meant to avoid.

Oakape
7th May 2014, 02:37
He took it upon himself to completely disregard company orders and CAA requirements

If these were so watertight as you seem to be suggesting, why was the company busy destroying records immediately after the accident, instead of wheeling them out & pointing the finger of blame squarely at the crew?

The various systemic & operation failures that led to this accident are far more complex than some here seem to comprehend.

ampan
7th May 2014, 02:59
I do not agree. Various NZALPA 'believers' trot out pompous pieces of nonsense about Swiss cheese etc., but the cause of this accident was obvious from the CVR transcript (whatever version is chosen). So how does a believer deal with that? By trying to turn something simple into something complicated.

prospector
7th May 2014, 04:07
If these were so watertight as you seem to be suggesting,

They were watertight, as has been posted numerous times in this thread


They also had company memorandum that covered requirements for descent OAA:14/13/28 dated 8th November 1979.

There was a copy recovered from the cockpit so the crew were aware

will post it again, though it seems quite straightforward to me.

Delete all references in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let down procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows:

1. Vis 20km plus
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 grid through 360 grid to 270 grid from McMurdo field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH29.
4.Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.

Oakape
7th May 2014, 04:43
It would appear that there are 'believers' on both sides of the argument.

I really don't know that much about this accident. However, I do know what it is like to operate in the real world, where expectations from management seldom match exactly what the manuals, etc state. I know that the regulator often does not adequately address this situation for one reason or the other.

I also know that when it goes pear-shaped, that management & the regulator often run for cover behind the manuals & rules despite what has been allowed & sometimes actively 'encouraged' on the line.

In the real world, things are not as simple, or cut & dried as some would like to believe. Throwing some documents around & using them to 'prove' that the sole reason for the accident was the pilot's fault doesn't really help anyone, apart from giving some the satisfaction of 'knowing' what the cause was.

Aside from a few obvious exceptions, pilot's don't go to work to get themselves & their passengers killed. The cause of an accident is always a product of many factors & if all of these factors are not explored, understood & addressed, the risk of a repeat accident is high.

Oakape
7th May 2014, 04:46
prospector,

assuming your position is correct, why would the company be destroying documents like they did? Surely all the documents the company had to hand would have only supported your position that they were squeaky clean.

prospector
7th May 2014, 05:21
Surely all the documents the company had to hand would have only supported your position that they were squeaky clean.

I do not think anybody in this thread has stated the Company was "squeaky clean", that has been accepted, there were faults there granted. But they did not cause the accident, one thing caused the accident, the decision to descend against all the requirements laid down by the Company and CAA.

All these mandatory requirements have been quoted many times in this and other threads appertaining to this accident.

apart from giving some the satisfaction of 'knowing' what the cause was.

Exactly, the "probable cause" was given in the only official document relating to this accident, that was the report compiled by the Aircraft Accident Investigator, Ron Chippendale. Mahon report was but a legal opinion. That ground has been covered to, many times.

This subject keeps getting dragged up in this forum, and when some people try to tell us to respect the "deceased", and then carry on to pile abuse onto the late Ron Chippendale, then those of us who believe he was correct are going to say so.

framer
7th May 2014, 07:43
It would appear that there are 'believers' on both sides of the argument.
There is a faction that believes that Collins is completely without responsibility and they box that corner hard. In fact, Holmes's sorry book had an open letter to politicians asking for an acknowledgment that the crew were without blame.
The cause of an accident is always a product of many factors & if all of these factors are not explored, understood & addressed, the risk of a repeat accident is high.
Very true. And to say that the crew bore no responsibility for the outcome of the flight is to miss the opportunity to prevent history repeating.
Have we learned though?
The Erebus flight was below the legal altitude for the operation the were performing.
The Perpignan flight was below the legal altitude for the manoeuvres they were conducting.
The ANZAC day Iroquois was below the legal altitude for the operations the were conducting.
Imagine if all three Captains had refused to break the law.
By saying that I am not knocking the individuals because as you rightly pointed out there are many influences within the company etc that play their part....but there is reason for the all encompassing authority given to the pilot in command.
Good reason.

Oakape
8th May 2014, 00:56
I seem to be misunderstood here. I am not saying the crew are without blame. What I am saying is that there is more to it than simply that. When looking at accidents I am more interested in the why, rather that the who. That is where accident prevention really begins.

ampan
8th May 2014, 01:10
My sincerest apologies - You are badly misunderstood, Oakape (being the name, as I recall, of a large stupid-looking African goat). The whole reason for the continuing argument is the suggestion that the crew were blameless, being the view propounded by NZALPA, the thankfully-late Paul Holmes, and the rest of that rag-tag bunch of dimwits.

framer
8th May 2014, 02:30
I got your drift Oakape.
I was trying to explain the point that is argued and didn't mean for it to come across like I was directing it at you. I share your view point. The disappointment comes when people only want to acknowledge the mistakes made by one party or another and refuse to acknowledge that most parties involved made mistakes.
Cheers.

ampan
8th May 2014, 02:41
In order to bring an end to the pathetic hand-wringing can I, on behalf of those who think that Peter Mahon was an old fool with a brain tumour, acknowledged that numerous Air New Zealand employees were negligent, including the captain - but the captain's negligence was by far the worst. To name a flight-safety award after that gentleman is a disgrace.

grummanavenger
9th May 2014, 00:28
An aspect that has always puzzled me is that with the reported viz at McMurdo when Captain Collins and crew were at low level why at least one didn't ponder why Erebus was invisible.
Am also aware there was at least one crew who had the spare F/O with a Topo continually plotting their position with ref to the Lat/Long display on the overhead panel.

ampan
9th May 2014, 02:20
This is not a forensic issue: Any intelligent person who who can be bothered spending a few hours examining the evidence will, if venturing an honest opinioin, ascibe a degree of fault to the crew and, in particular, to the captain.
This is nothing more than applied politics. NZALPA know that they got very very lucky with Mahon, so they continue to try to keep his conclusions embedded in stone – and it has worked, for 34 years.
The fact is that most NZers, if asked about the Eerebus disaster, would trot out a version of Mahon’s report. So congratulations, NZALPA. Well done.

Brian Abraham
9th May 2014, 09:56
An opinion written by Macarthur Job, a former Senior Inspector with the Air Safety Branch of the then Department of Civil Aviation. An ex flying doctor, charter and aerial work pilot, who has been pre-eminent in his work as an aviation safety promoter and educator.Notwithstanding the airline’s lamentable role in the many factors that contributed to the accident, and the enormous integrity with which the Royal Commissioner went about his searching Inquiry, did his findings go too far?

Did they overlook fundamental principles of air navigation? The basic terrain-clearance philosophy of IFR flight; and the concept, inherited from generations of seafaring experience, of command responsibility? Will they pose problems of precedent that could one day have far- reaching implications?

For example, how valid can be an opinion, no matter how eminent, whose entire basis and background is essentially legal, on operational judgements made in a highly technical environment? What are we to make of a situation where a professionally qualified government authority, with statutory powers for the safe ordering of air navigation, can have its rulings overturned by legal but technically "lay" arbiters who do not carry that statutory responsibility?

Minimum Safe Altitudes are prescribed for air routes throughout the world to ensure aircraft are not put at risk by descent into areas of high terrain. Both Air New Zealand and the NZ Civil Aviation Division agreed that the MSA for the last 33nm of the route to McMurdo was 16,000 feet.

With terminal conditions at McMurdo poor, the sound navigational procedure would have been to remain at this height until within range of the McMurdo radar, checking over the last portion of the flight that the distance to run on the AINS was of the same order as the DME distance from the McMurdo TACAN.

But, the captain, having spotted a break in the cloud, decided to descend from FL180 when still some 43nm out and not yet identified on McMurdo radar. At this stage the aircraft was only some seven minutes’ flying time from the destination waypoint, when the McMurdo aids could have been relied upon for a safe letdown.

The crew thus contravened the MSA requirement by undertaking a descent without corroboration of position from ground based aids. The fact that no VHF transmissions of any sort were being received from McMurdo also did not assume the relevance it might have.

Airline flight crews are constrained by regulatory requirements. If a crew member transgresses those regulations, he can expect to be disciplined. It was thus surprising that the Royal Commissioner condoned the breaking of MSA requirements on the basis of the conduct of previous Antarctic flights, and the perceived need to provide sightseeing passengers with "their money’s worth".

Even so, it was the Royal Commissioner who succeeded in uncovering the unpalatable facts about the airline’s internal deficiencies and conduct, evidently missed by the technical investigation, which progressively and inexorably painted this unfortunate crew into a corner.

A major, technically complex investigation of this sort, where much hangs on the exact establishment of cause (and, inevitably, the apportioning of blame) is demanding in the extreme. Because of all that is at stake, it can also be subject to subtle but real commercial influences from various "interested parties". Political motives and media pressures for "instant answers" are also brought to bear.

For all these reasons it is plain that such an investigation requires both unfettered technical expertise and highly ethical "outside" objectivity — of the standard provided by Mr Justice Mahon’s Inquiry — if it is to arrive at the unbiased truth.

But could the Royal Commissioner’s findings in this particular case mean that the airline industry might eventually come to the point where the whole basis of command responsibility, as it has been traditionally understood, becomes outmoded? If so, who will then hold the ultimate responsibility for the safe conduct of an airline flight?

In an age when increasingly computerised operational technology is being imposed on the world airline industry — not without serious reservations in some cases — these questions still await answers.
It's interesting that the NAT tracks have been suffering a series of gross navigational errors as a result of errors in the nav data bases in recent times. Air New Zealand nav department come to mind?

Ornis
9th May 2014, 11:31
[Macarthur Job quoted by Brian Abraham.] What are we to make of a situation where a professionally qualified government authority, with statutory powers for the safe ordering of air navigation, can have its rulings overturned by legal but technically "lay" arbiters who do not carry that statutory responsibility?

FAQs (http://www.erebus.co.nz/FAQs.aspx) The Mahon Report was originally shelved (unaccepted by Parliament) upon the report’s release in 1981. In 1999, Maurice Williamson tabled the Mahon Report in the NZ Parliament, which finally recognised the report as an official government report.

Mahon's report is an official document because it was eventually tabled, but Chippindale's is the official accident report, it was not "overturned". Williamson announced on television that the aircraft was doomed when it left New Zealand, and is most famous for his Rainbow-over-Pakuranga speech when Parliament redefined marriage for votes.

In science, something approaching the truth may be found in a statistical analysis of the data. Given exactly the same circumstances as Collins, how many pilots would do what he did?

Obviously we can only guess. What do you reckon, Brian?

Ollie Onion
9th May 2014, 20:41
The way I see it is, no matter how many systematic errors are made by the Company prior to the flight they could have ALL been rendered null and void by a crew that didn't descend below MSA. This suggests to me some level of responsibilty on part of the crew and particulary the Captain. The argument that others have broken the rules so it is OK for me to brake the rules is not valid now anymore than it was then. Sure the investigation / Company and Government actions were acdisgrace. But we must all acknowledge that ANY well run researced report would have also placed blame, atleast partially, at the feet of the crew. Saying the plane was doomed when it took off may be valid with something like TWA or Pan Am but is an insult to other crews who wouldn't have flown a passenger jet in such a wreckless manner.

prospector
9th May 2014, 21:11
It was thus surprising that the Royal Commissioner condoned the breaking of MSA requirements on the basis of the conduct of previous Antarctic flights, and the perceived need to provide sightseeing passengers with "their money’s worth".


He had to say "surprising", would not have been PC to say "stupid"

Brian Abraham
10th May 2014, 00:11
Given exactly the same circumstances as Collins, how many pilots would do what he did?

Obviously we can only guess. What do you reckon, Brian? Obviously a question we can but ponder Ornis. SOPs are SOPs, and nearly all flights operated without regard to SOPs for the descent. The argument that it was "gin clear" does not hold water, for then, how less than "gin clear" do you then adopt SOPs.

It would seem ANZ was imbued with a "get the job done" ethos, and remember that NZers have been at the forefront in their history for innovation. A rightly proud nation with credits in many fields. But when "getting the job done" is a feature of corporate culture it can be a slippery slope. Read up on Prof. Diane Vaughan and her "normalisation of deviance". The failure of previous flights to comply with SOPs was very much a "normalisation of deviance". And everyone new of the deviance, for it was made a feature in the airlines advertising.

My own experience, is that where "normalisation of deviance" is a corporate feature, new comers wonder what in the world is going on at first, but readily adopt the culture. A Pprune poster, Sunfish, knows full well the company of which I speak, and is one of the few who saw the light and said it was not for him.

ampan
10th May 2014, 02:53
Blah, blah, blah.






What point, "Brian", are you attempting to make?


To get straight to the point, were the crew of TE901 in any way to blame?
If "no", you're deranged.
If "yes", what's the point of your continued contributions and lengthy irrelevant quotations?

Brian Abraham
10th May 2014, 03:03
ampan, you're nothing but a bitter old man. I'm sorry for you. What's the point of your continued contributions.

Hempy
10th May 2014, 04:30
I'm still waiting to learn the relevance of 'sector whiteout'. Anyone?

Ornis
10th May 2014, 04:35
Brian, thanks. We can all understand how and why Collins crashed, and we can forgive. What we can't say is he was without fault.

The shambles at AirNZ was systemic and less forgivable. Nevertheless, most pilots at AirNZ at the time felt Collins must take some blame, according to my contacts.

This constant picking at a sore hoping it can be made to heal without a scar is absurd. It's not going to happen.

Brian Abraham
10th May 2014, 07:24
Hempy, if you read Chippendales report he gives a good insight into the phenomena.most pilots at AirNZ at the time felt Collins must take some blameOf course he does Ornis, but the need is to understand why he did what he did.This constant picking at a sore hoping it can be made to heal without a scar is absurd. It's not going to happen.Read my previous that threads on this subject never end well.

Ornis
10th May 2014, 08:22
Had Collins not broken the rules, he would have been safe. Surely that is incontestable?

Had Collins been down before he might have been more aware of the dangers - whiteout - he might have behaved differently; not broken the rules. Can we agree on that?

The divergence seems to be: Factors most people accept contributed and help explain what happened, some people feel excuse Collin's decisions - a few even to the point he was blameless. Is that a fair assessment?

I think Collins left NZ determined to see Erebus. As circumstances changed he didn't, for whatever reasons: mindset. He made shocking error. That's what humans do, sometimes.

I don't understand the NZALPA mania - keeping the matter alive. It's pathetic.

framer
10th May 2014, 08:24
Brian, thanks. We can all understand how and why Collins crashed, and we can forgive. What we can't say is he was without fault.
That's it in a nutshell folks. The only arguments come when someone says otherwise, ie, the crew was not responsible in any way. The people who say the crew bore no responsibility are not fit to be in command of an airliner ( IMO ) but luckily most who do tow that line have never held ultimate responsibility for people's lives. They are normally folk who like the lime light, like politicians.ALPA's stance is hard to fathom.

Hempy
10th May 2014, 09:20
Hempy, if you read Chippendales report he gives a good insight into the phenomena.

Yeah I've read it. I know they didn't see Erebus until they hit it. I've seen the photos they took in the helicopter down there as well showing the phenomena in action. I still don't know how it's relevant to this accident...it's like saying a speeding drunk driver hit a tree because it was raining.

Ornis
10th May 2014, 12:10
Hempy: it's like saying a speeding drunk driver hit a tree because it was raining.

I'd say it's more like spending the night with a woman who says she's on the pill, doing what you want to do, then finding you've got an accident on your hands.

Hempy
10th May 2014, 14:15
Hempy: it's like saying a speeding drunk driver hit a tree because it was raining.

I'd say it's more like spending the night with a woman who says she's on the pill, doing what you want to do, then finding you've got an accident on your hands.

I'll concede that, adding that the fact was known that the woman was a slut and a liar before going to bed with her.

framer
10th May 2014, 19:30
'd say it's more like spending the night with a woman who says she's on the pill, doing what you want to do, then finding you've got an accident on your hands.
Only if you're a highly paid gigalo who's been told that no matter what, you're responsible for any pregnancies and it's illegal for you to sleep with a woman without protection in case she mistakenly took a panadol instead of her pill.

Ornis
10th May 2014, 20:04
Hempy, let's develop the analogy: "I've never been to bed with an ugly woman but I've woken up with a few."

I wrote earlier Collins made a shocking error. The "shocking" is said with hindsight. I think this reflects Brian's stance. (Next morning things look different...)

Collins made a decision to descend. He didn't see any significant risk because he believed he was clear of Erebus. He broke the rules, as others had done. Had he been where he thought he was, he would have got away with it, in all probability.

But he wasn't, and that's what changes the decision from "poor airmanship" to "shocking error".

ampan
10th May 2014, 22:23
Even if he was where he thought he was, he would still have flown within 3 nautical miles of Ross Island, whose summit is about 13000 feet, at a height of 10000 feet, at a speed of 260 knots. And if he was so certain of his position, with the high ground of Ross Island to his left, why didn’t he turn right when attempting to climb out? His first officer had just told him that it was clear to the right, yet the captain turned left, towards where he is supposed have thought the high ground was. The answer, I think, is that the penny finally dropped and he recalled what had been said to him at the briefing, which was that the final waypoint was at the NDB at McMurdo Station. If so, the nav track would go right over the summit of Erebus, which meant that Mount Bird would be to the right, so the only way out was left.

Ornis
10th May 2014, 23:40
Ampan, agreed. I am not trying to justify Collins' flying, I am trying to find some way of looking at it that allows for some diversity of opinion and gives us some basis for agreement.

I have to say the most intransigent seem to be entrenched in Mahon's camp. I think most who accept Chippindale's report would concede some deficiencies at AirNZ and the CAA.

prospector
11th May 2014, 08:43
He broke the rules, as others had done.

One can see where you are coming from, but to knowingly break the rules when you had absolutely nothing on your side to justify breaking said rules, I mean they never ever sighted Mt Erebus, just beggars belief.
It was stated in an earlier post that Jim Collins was a good pilot and a decent man, and I would agree with that. But his decision to descend when he did, with the info he had regarding weather conditions as they were must surely be regarded as a massive brain fart, and if he could come back and join this discussion I am sure he would agree with that opinion.

Ornis
11th May 2014, 10:31
Prospector, agreed. You don't get off a ticket for running a red light because people do it all the time without getting caught. You don't get away with murder just because some people do. Collins made a mistake, he broke the rules and exhibited poor airmanship, but he didn't set out to kill anyone. This is why I tried to reduce the behaviour, the error, to statistics: How many pilots would have done what Collins did?

I suggest very few. It is an approach I used to try to get Paragraph377 to rethink his position. If he was an airline pilot, and I have doubts he is a pilot, he has been brainwashed. That is the danger of NZALPA: groupthink.

Anyway, getting back to statistics, we know one pilot did what Collins did: Collins.

I am also trying to explain that it was the outcome that changed the decision from poor airmanship to shocking error.

The mind is a funny thing. We all make poor decisions. Clever people do stupid things, without thinking. That's the reason we need rules. Pilots should obey the rules, but pilots are humans, and humans tend to observe rules that make sense, that seem important.

Collins should not have descended, regardless of the outcome, which we are aware of but he was not - it being in the future. He shouldn't have descended because it broke the rules in place to ensure a safe flight, and because he was flying VFR on instruments, which is forbidden. Why? He had reasons and he had justifications but he was wrong on all counts.

There is a point where we all must take responsibility for what we do. A surgeon can't defend an action because he was trained a certain way. An engineer can't blame a collapsed bridge on his school. Collins cannot defend his decision to descend because he wasn't trained to fly in whiteout. We can say it would have made a difference had he been, but he went outside his task and his training. He took a bet on his skill and he lost. Along with a lot of other people.

If my exposition seems clumsy or waffly, presumptuous even, sorry.

prospector
12th May 2014, 00:41
If my exposition seems clumsy or waffly, presumptuous even, sorry.

None of the above, in fact very good.

Brian Abraham
12th May 2014, 08:10
A question. If a flight was to fly the descent in accordance with,the only letdown procedure available is VMC below FL160 to 6000’ as follows:
1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid MT EREBUS area by operating in an arc from 120° Grid through 360G to 270G from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.”and became visual at 6,000. How then was the flight permitted to proceed?

eg: Confine operations to the designated arc as above at 6,000, then climb within the designated arc to the MSA and return home?

Hempy
12th May 2014, 09:35
It's a let down procedure. At 6000" you navigate visually, presumably wherever you like as long as you follow the Visual Flight Rules (and the company restriction of nb A060). The procedure was designed to keep them away from high terrain in poor visibility, hence the restrictions on it. They broke the restrictions and then they hit the high terrain...

framer
12th May 2014, 10:48
and became visual at 6,000.
You couldn't go below FL160 unless you were visual so the above doesn't apply.
You could only leave FL 160 if you we visual, and then you could descend to 6000ft while maintaining visual.
That's it.
The argument that "everyone else did it" has it's place, but not not in absolving the Captain of responsibility. It's place belongs in the discussion of 'company culture'. If Collins was heavily influenced by the actions/words of his superiors and colleagues then he is completely normal, so we have to look at how seriously we take the development and maintenance of these cultures, because 99% of us are susceptible to the influence they wield. The CEO's and department heads in our organisations need to be aware that they are responsible for the 'safety culture' and that they need to control the direction it is moving, this will be uncomfortable for them as it may make it difficult for them to achieve some commercial targets, but that is the cold hard truth. I would go so far as to say that the 'safety culture' needs to be monitored.
Either way, Collins, who I assume was a good man, dropped the ball. The fact that he was let down by others around him does not absolve him of his responsibilities. That's life, now we need to look at why we haven't learnt from it.

Kharon
12th May 2014, 20:33
framer –"That's life, now we need to look at why we haven't learnt from it."

Brava: – Bravo that man.. Well said Sirrah; have a choccy frog or two even....

prospector
13th May 2014, 01:52
the only letdown procedure available is VMC below FL160 to 6000’ as follows:

I have posted the descent requirements a number of times, in this and other threads on the same subject. I would not have thought that the following had to be spelt out.

You couldn't go below FL160 unless you were visual so the above doesn't apply.
You could only leave FL 160 if you we visual, and then you could descend to 6000ft while maintaining visual.
That's it.

But it certainly removes all doubt to have it spelt out so well.



.

Brian Abraham
13th May 2014, 06:20
I confess my slip up, I meant under the original arrangement prior to the VMC from FL160, that is with the 7,000 overcast..

Hempy
15th May 2014, 08:14
On 10 August 1977 Air New Zealand letter HO:B:22 requested authority to conduct five flights overflying Antarctica in the McMurdo area undertaking to operate these flights to the specification earlier submitted with the following exceptions:

“a. A proposal to permit descent to 6000 feet QNH in VMC or by the approved NDB procedure in IMC provided that:
1. Cloud base to be 7000 feet or better.
2. Visibility reported to be 20 kms or better.
3. ASR is available and used to monitor flight below flight level 160.
4. No snow showers in the area.

Flight in the McMurdo area below flight level 160 will be restricted to an arc corresponding to a bearing of 120° Grid through 360° G to 270G from the NDB within 20 nm in order to keep well clear of the Mr Erebus region."

The change was the requirement for ASR monitoring was altered to 'coordinated with local radar control' and the descent in VMC from F160 to A060.

To be honest, a descent in IMC to A070 following the original procedure was safer than the later amendment requiring visual terrain clearance - but then again only if it was actually followed too I guess.

prospector
15th May 2014, 09:51
From John King's publication. New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation

Before the 28 November flight the McMurdo NDB was officially withdrawn.
Although still operating, it was no longer being maintained and so its accuracy could not be guaranteed. The nearby TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation System with its Distance measuring equipment , or DME) was used instead.

grummanavenger
12th Jul 2014, 22:47
Note - tonite ( Sunday) on TV 1, NZ time @ 2030, "Erebus, Operation Overdue."

"Tells the emotional and compelling true story of four police officers who went to Antarctica to recover the bodies of the victims of the 1979 Air New Zealand crash that killed all 257 passengers."

(Appears as tho the vexed question of the diary missing pages emerges again.)

Should be available within days on TV 1 Ondemand.

tpad
13th Jul 2014, 09:09
ALPA ....Schmalpa. An organization so erudite they named their safety award after the guy who hit the hill. 'Nuff said.

Tpad

MitrePeak
13th Jul 2014, 23:12
If you had asked Jim Collin's colleagues a week before the accident, " What sort of a Pilot is he ?" The comments would have reflected a methodic,professional, cautious, exemplary Aviator. By all accounts, he was well respected. A week later he flies a servicable aircraft into the side of a mountain killing all. As so many have rightly asked, " How on Earth could that happen to Jim of all people"? The photos showed sunlight pouring through the windows, apparently good visibility in most directions etc, etc.
It makes no sense. So why, how, ?? I make no attempt to conclude who was to blame for this accident, i'll leave that to others. But i would like to offer some food for thought as to why such an experienced crew ended up dying that day. I believe it can be summed up in two words;
'Commercial Pressure'
Jim Collins had flown year in year out doing what all IFR Pilots do. Get airborne, follow the SID, climb to cruise altitude, hours later descend, follow the STAR, fly the ILS, Land...then get to the hotel in time to make the 'Happy Hour' ! Totally procedural. The requirement for these routine flights was to get the passengers from A to B.....nothing more. After years of doing that successfully, they are asked to fly down to Antartica and provide the passengers with a 'Scenic Flight'. Considering the terrain, the extreme weather that can suddenly appear/change, the fact that they'd never been there before(most of them), the fact that they would have read and seen the articles about previous flights flying low level in glorius weather up McMurdo Sound, giving the passenger magnificent views of the ice, plus the fact they themselves would have been keen to see it themselves, would in my opinion, have put a 'not so subtle' pressure on the crew to deliver. I have spent the last 15 years plus doing an awful lot of 'ad hoc' flying globally. I went into many places for the 1st time. One example that comes to mind is Iraq. It is quite mountainous towards the North and East. If i had been asked to perform a scenic flight around there, having never gone there, i would surely have been a little apprehensive. It's one thing to 'fly all the numbers' and have a runway pop out in front of you, it's another to try to get down and show the passengers what their expecting. A different ball game completely !
If you're lucky enough and it's a gin clear day, well great, it makes it a lot easier. If it's not, then the 'Commercial Pressure' now sits heavier on your shoulders...and it's possible our decisions become influenced by that ?
That i think explains why TE901 didn't return that day. As to who is ultimately to blame ?, i'll leave that one alone...

prospector
13th Jul 2014, 23:32
After years of doing that successfully, they are asked to fly down to Antartica

Would agree with the intent of your post with the exception of the above.

Was it not ALPA that demanded that their senior pilots all have a "Turn" at these Antarctic flights? They must have known of the requirements of other operators, the USAF, USN, RNZAF etc that required a Captain not go down in command of a flight to the ice unless they had prior experience as an observer or first officer. The wisdom of that policy is surely demonstrated with the demise of flt 901.

trashie
14th Jul 2014, 01:30
When the RAAF were operating there, not only did the pilots need a check ride they had to complete a survival course at Scott Base. Unfortunately mine was abbreviated due to the instructors having to recover the bodies from Erebus. My crew were on the C141 30 minutes behind ANZ

Old Fella
14th Jul 2014, 03:04
Trashie, not only the pilots had to do the survival course, the whole crew did. Additionally, as you may recall we maintained HF contact with McMudo getting regular updates on wx trends as to probability of "white-out" for our ETA. If the trend was indicative of "white-out" we would, and did on one sortie at least, return to Christchurch before PNR. I went down to McMurdo in Dec '78, our initial involvement in Deep Freeze. Ironically, the one big fear the people at Scott and McMurdo expressed to us was that one of the scenic flights might have an accident in which there were survivors whom would likely perish before being rescued due the limited resources on the ice.

Brian Abraham
14th Jul 2014, 03:58
Was it not ALPA that demanded that their senior pilots all have a "Turn" at these Antarctic flights? They must have known of the requirements of other operatorsA familiarisation flight was a requirement initially. The airline asked the CAD to remove the requirement in light of the briefing given. Can't lay that at ALPAs door, unless you're saying ALPA runs the airline and CAD.

From Chippendales report.
2. Area Qualification Requirements
Area qualification shall consist of the following:
a. A comprehensive pre-flight briefing which covers at least the following items:
(i) En-route and terminal routing
(ii) Terrain and minimum safe altitudes
(iii) The seasonal meteorological condition and statistics
(iv) Meteorological communication and ATC facilities,
services and procedures
(v) Navigation facilities
(vi) Prohibited and restricted areas
(vii) Search and Rescue facilities and procedures
AND within 30 days
b. A flight in the area under the supervision of a person authorised by the Flight Operations Director.

1.17.19 None of the pilots on this flight had previous Antarctic experience but on 24 October 1979 a signal message from Air New Zealand Limited to CAD asked:

“OPS 880 Flight Operations. Reference our telecon regarding the operation of company flights to Antarctica and return non-stop it is our understanding that because of the briefing programme carried out in our route training unit and the simulator detail covering exercises in grid navigation and the NDB could break at McMurdo that there is no requirement for flight under supervision. The briefing and simulator detail are completed within the week prior to operating the flight8. Would you please confirm that our understanding is correct”.

In a reply dated 24 October 1979 CAD stated:
“OPS 523 98/4/14. Your OPS 880 is confirmed correct and Ops Specs will be amended to reflect such detail”.

prospector
14th Jul 2014, 09:09
unless you're saying ALPA runs the airline and CAD.

One could say with some justification that there is a grain of truth in that statement.
I will quote from Bob Thomson "History of New Zealand Antarctic Research Programme 1965-88.

"Air New Zealand and NZALPA went to some lengths to ensure that their senior pilots and members were seen as professionals who knew it all and did not therefore need to seek advice from elsewhere, such as the RNZAF,USAF, USN or the Division.

Nor did Air New Zealand take advantage of the experience gained by members of their aircrews who flew on earlier flights. Apparently the NZALPA saw the Antarctic flights as a "special perk" for their members and had an agreement with Air New Zealand that flight crews should be spread widely amongst its members."

As I can see no other reason for the Company to change the crews for every flight, more expense for training etc, than this agreement with NZALPA then it is more than likely that this was why so many different crews were used on these flights.

Whilst Bob Thomson was not a qualified pilot, he had made75 trips to the ice, 50 being on the flight deck of aircraft approaching from the North. He was in fact scheduled to fly as the commentator on Flt 901. When asked if he ever felt uneasy that but for a twist of fate he may have died that day?
his reply was "Not at all. I always insisted on a complete circuit of Ross Island before letting down below 17,000ft. That way I could get an idea of the complete situation and what the weather was like, where any clouds were."

Oakape
14th Jul 2014, 09:55
Area qualification shall consist of the following:
a. A comprehensive pre-flight briefing which covers at least the following items:
(i) En-route and terminal routing

Interesting that a 'comprehensive pre-flight briefing' covering 'En-route ...... routing' was required.

Wasn't the official position that moving the final waypoint & therefore the track to fly directly over Erebus was not relevant to the outcome of the flight?

If they could move the route all over the map without telling anyone & still hold the belief that that was safe, why would a comprehensive pre-flight briefing on en-route routing be required by the regulator?

reubee
21st Jul 2014, 10:46
Note - tonite ( Sunday) on TV 1, NZ time @ 2030, "Erebus, Operation Overdue."

"Tells the emotional and compelling true story of four police officers who went to Antarctica to recover the bodies of the victims of the 1979 Air New Zealand crash that killed all 257 passengers."

(Appears as tho the vexed question of the diary missing pages emerges again.)

Should be available within days on TV 1 Ondemand.

... got round to watching the documentary (thanks MySky).

The documentary had a link to a website, primarily about the documentary. What I found interesting was this link ... The Making of | Erebus Operation Overdue (http://operationoverdue.co.nz/the-making-of)

... and the comment about Gemmells knowledge of what happend to the ringbinder contents ...
...He admitted to knowing that Air New Zealand staff had removed pages of a ringbinder...

... I didn't think much of the excuse given.

Hempy
21st Jul 2014, 13:15
and what about the sim run??

OXCART
22nd Jul 2014, 20:47
My cousin was a FA on that flight.

Golden Rivit
23rd Jul 2014, 02:11
In response to Framers post # 169,Why we have not learned .
I have the answer to your question,You said it yourself.
"as it may make it difficult for them to achieve some commercial targets"

framer
23rd Jul 2014, 07:50
That's half of the problem, but not the whole problem ( IMHO of course) .

Ornis
27th Jul 2014, 18:47
Humans fall into traps all the time. How do we avoid them? Words that spring to mind: knowledge, experience, being aware and careful, rules, routine.

What is a common trap for pilots? Not changing the plan as circumstances change: plan continuation bias. How do you recognise it? That is the problem.

Paragraph377
2nd Nov 2014, 02:25
Only a few short weeks to go; ANZ Erebus crash 28 November 1979 - 35 years later. On November 28 1979 Air New Zealand Flight TE901crashed into Mt Erebus killing 237 passengers and 20 crew. 35 years have passed but not forgotten.
R.I.P to all those souls.

Paragraph377
27th Nov 2014, 19:42
The last thread, as usual, was slyly made to disappear yesterday. That's a shame because 257 lives were lost 35 years ago today. Some people are willing to remember;

https://tvnz.co.nz/national-news/special-commemoration-35th-anniversary-erebus-6177838

R.I.P friends.

Pali
26th Dec 2014, 11:55
I've stumbled upon this thread when I searched data about Gordon Vette and found this interesting document:

xyWvOI_MD-Q

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xyWvOI_MD-Q
I am rather surprised it has less than 5.000 views. I am not a pilot whatsoever but a management consultant and lecturer and I can only say that many executives can learn from aviation field thus I like to use such examples in my lessons.

It is interesting to observe the struggle to find out what and why happened.

Just one question - didn't DC-10 have some MFRD type of radar back in 1979?

ampan
13th Jan 2015, 21:52
http://www.erebus.co.nz/Portals/4/Documents/Reports/Mahon/Suggested%20Pilot%20error.pdf


The radar issue is dealt with at pages 120 to 127.


Whatever Mahon might have to say on the subject, and he says quite a lot, the radar had no relevance, because the captain descended into the danger zone on the basis that he was flying visually. The word "visually" does not refer to what one can see on the radar screen inside the cockpit. Instead, it refers to what one can see out the window, outside the cockpit.


As a matter of fact, the conditions were not suitable for a visual descent, because white cloud above would merge with the white ice below, making one indistinguishable from the other. Did the captain know that before he descended? Most definitely: He expressly said so 10 minutes before he did it.