NS Safety improvements?

[charlieDontSurf]

Instead of posting in the "ditched 332"-thread, I'm starting a new thread concentrated on suggestions and views regarding safety of Offshore OPS in the North Sea.

I think that could be useful to us who fly in the NS everyday.

First, I fly from Norway, and have only been in the British sector a few times.

But me and my colleagues often talk about the massive use of radio-calls, and repetition of flight-plan info to many different stations when flying in the British sector.
Compared to the Norwegian sector it seems somewhat overwhelming and one might think it can contribute to a lack of situational awareness when there's too much going on on the radio. I guess one get used to it, as with everyting else, but it seems a bit unneccesary.

Another issue is the practice of hot turn-arounds. We don't do that on-shore in Norway, and we get a little break between the flights.

My thought is that I think I would be a lot more tired after 6-7 hours flying in the UK sector than I am here in Norway.
Fatigue can make people miss a thing or two, that's only human.

Of course, one gets used to everything, but wouldn't it be nice with less chatter on the radio, and a little break between the flights?

That's my first thoughts, and maybe I've got it wrong, but how do you who fly in UK see it?
And do you come up with any other safety-issues?
We are somewhat anonymous here, and it's always good to discuss SOP, and improvements.:8

[charlieDontSurf]

No feedback from UK guys?

[Adroight]

Having operated offshore in both Norway and UK and in many other parts of Europe and the world I can assure you that Norway has by far the best attitude to safety and work practices that I have witnessed.

You probably have not had much response to your post because UK North Sea pilots, and in particular those who work in Aberdeen, have an unshakeable belief that their way is the only way to do things. They also seem to spend their entire working lives in that environment and so have not been exposed to anything else.

[Ray Joe Czech]

BBC News - Offshore helicopter firms announce safety review (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-24259936)

After some time this will no doubt come up with several minor alterations in practice that (a) cost little and (b) cause no lost flights for the clients, while ignoring several elephants in the room.

[Barney238]

Considering fatigue, you touch a valid point there Charly. CHC had a similar incident some years ago in the Netherlands, where an S61 ended up in the same situation but was able to perform an over-torque climb-out after touching the sea.
If I do remember correctly, fatigue was in issue according to the findings. Also management attitude, deviation from SOP's and crew attitude for that matter.
There are indeed many (hidden) area's we still need to look into and find improvements...

[cyclic]

You probably have not had much response to your post because UK North Sea pilots, and in particular those who work in Aberdeen, have an unshakeable belief that their way is the only way to do things. They also seem to spend their entire working lives in that environment and so have not been exposed to anything else.

So untrue! Most of us recognise there needs to be change but unlike the Norwegians, the pilots on the NS don't have much of a voice. When the state virtually owns the oil industry and you have a very powerful union, it is a lot easier to make change - we have three companies plus multiple customers all fighting amongst themselves. The CAA are starting a review, the operators are reviewing safety, where is the announcement from the oil majors?

A lot of us have done plenty of other things in aviation as well.

[SASless]

Most of us recognise there needs to be change but unlike the Norwegians, the pilots on the NS don't have much of a voice.

It would seem to me that you have an opportunity to change that situation if you care/dare to try.

The Spotlight is on....it is looking for something to shine on.

The CAA and MP's are going to be reviewing the situation, the Media has taken interest, the Workers Union is beating their Drum, and Rotorheads has two threads going now where you can make your concerns known.

In time....some News Reporter or Journalist is going to read what is posted here.

So....I would say you have every chance of being heard if you will just speak up.

I do wonder if the silence is due to arrogance or fear.

But.....right now Silence is the wrong course for sure.

Post your concerns here, write you local newspaper, mail a letter to the CAA, send BBC a Tip, call your MP, roust your Union Management, send and e-mail to your own company management, but speak up folks.

[Bravo73]

But me and my colleagues often talk about the massive use of radio-calls, and repetition of flight-plan info to many different stations when flying in the British sector.
Compared to the Norwegian sector it seems somewhat overwhelming and one might think it can contribute to a lack of situational awareness when there's too much going on on the radio. I guess one get used to it, as with everyting else, but it seems a bit unneccesary.


re the radio calls - it helps (a lot) that you have radar coverage right down to deck height in the Norweigan sector.

There would be a marked improvement in flight safety (and a dramatic reduction in the number of radio calls) if there was a similar service in the British sector. But I imagine that it comes down to the good ol' chestnut - at what cost?

[26500lbs]

Maybe part of the silence is not arrogance or fear but “where the hell do we begin and how have we got here?”

The operators are conducting their own reviews. Hmmm…Who exactly in the company will be responsible for this? What if they say the top man is the problem or suggest such a major overhaul that the cost is deemed unacceptable by the duty accountant? Isn’t this really just the greatest arse covering exercise to date?
Whoever does a review needs to be totally independent and unbiased without loyalty to a company, the CAA or the customer. This is just becoming the greatest self licking lolly otherwise.
SASless is bang on with the suggestion that maybe the greatest change will come from within. For years pilots have been ignored on safety issues, now they have a voice and they must use it in whatever way they can.

[212man]

There would be a marked improvement in flight safety (and a dramatic reduction in the number of radio calls) if there was a similar service in the British sector

Doesn't multilateration address this? Innocent question as never operated with it.

[Bravo73]

Doesn't multilateration address this? Innocent question as never operated with it.

WAM only works above 1500ft, so not down to deck height. And it's not the most reliable of systems either. If/when it drops out, the 'outer sector' (ie from 80nm from the ADN to the Median line) reverts to Aberdeen Information with a Basic Service.

Even with WAM, you still don't get any effective radar or traffic service below 1500ft.

[Bravo73]

BBC News - Offshore helicopter firms announce safety review (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-24259936)

After some time this will no doubt come up with several minor alterations in practice that (a) cost little and (b) cause no lost flights for the clients, while ignoring several elephants in the room.

Well, if they are serious about it (and although it's got no connection to this accident), this review will hopefully see the end of night bow deck landings.

[M609]

Norway is going to establish controlled airspace (D) from 1500 to FL85 in what is Balder and Ekofisk ADS areas now. Airspace will be the first in Europe based solely on ADS-B

re the radio calls - it helps (a lot) that you have radar coverage right down to deck height in the Norweigan sector.

This is not true, the only offshore radars are at Gullfaks and Norne.

[Hummingfrog]

Is there a permanent Met Observer at Sumburgh? With the amount of helicopter traffic going through the Shetlands and the need for accurate weather forecasts I would presume there is. I know the observer was removed at one point to save money:ugh:

HF

[cyclic]

and maybe a sensible cloud base limitation for all night approaches. How about no unstable decks at night? Just a start.

[HeliComparator]

So its interesting that the things pilots find a little scary at times (or, for the benefit of our passengers "hard work") are getting listed, even though they have never resulted in an accident. Sorry but this shows a lack of understanding of flight safety issues. Its very easy, as demonstrated, to fix on things that superficially seem dangerous, but proper analysis must be done to determine whether something is actually dangerous, as opposed to looking and perhaps feeling dangerous. Otherwise effort is completely misdirected.

Yes we can find night bow decks etc a little challenging but no-one has ever come to grief. If you look at the "failure modes" of this activity, they are few and unlikely. In part this is because everyone in the cockpit is giving their full attention and the activity is easily aborted by flying up and away. Accidents are much more likely to happen during something more routine when complacency can be a factor. Hopefully those taking part in the review wil understand these things!

[TiPwEiGhT]

The down to deck coverage in Norway is provided by M-ADS. ADS-B operations are planned to be ready for last quarter 2014, I believe.

TiP

[cyclic]

HC

These issues may not have directly resulted in an accident, but how many unreported close calls have there been? I think it is important to let everyone have a voice rather than just putting the opinions of others in the trash can. You could say that the unreported incidents show the wrong culture and this is true as well. By bringing all matters that anyone thinks are of concern to the fore, perhaps we will genuinely get a much more transparent culture on the NS. How many night bow decks have you done in the past few years?

Just because one issue has never caused an accident in the past doesn't mean it doesn't have potential to in the future. This is a truer understanding of flight safety - proactive, not reactive.

[heli1]

Cyclic...I so agree with you. Those at the sharp end need to say what worries them and the broad industry needs to listen and evaluate ,not instantly dismiss.
Sure some safety criticism will be on minor matters,but even that might point to training gaps or collectively something bigger.
So come on guys,as this thread originator alluded ,now is the time to list your safety worries on offshore ops.

[Nf stable]

Yes we can find night bow decks etc a little challenging but no-one has ever
come to grief. If you look at the "failure modes" of this activity, they are few
and unlikely.

HC, has anyone ever come to grief on a localiser/DME approach whilst operating in the North Sea before? I don't my history well enough to give a definitive answer on this, but not that I can recall.
So does this mean prior to a couple of months ago, we would not be able to list this either???

Personally I also support Cyclics' suggestion on night bow decks and night unstable decks. There have been very close calls during these operations (rumoured, of course) by at least two of the companies in the near past that have gone "un-reported", but just because they didn't go splash, are you saying that we can't consider them dangerous?

HC, perhaps it's your "lack of understanding" on this thread that may need to change.

[HeliComparator]

Cyclic my point was not to trash other opinions, but to point out the difference between something that looks dangerous, vs something that doesn't look dangerous but in fact results in an accident, and to point out that its not just the thing itself that is relevant, but also the way its perceived that effects the overall safety. So the very fact that something looks dangerous acts in its favour, because folk will be paying attention.

Yes it's true that just because something has yet to cause an accident in the 35 yrs or so of the N Sea, doesn't mean it won't in the future. However there is also an argument that perhaps its things that have repeatedly shown themselves to be accident causes, that should be addressed as the priority.

However, exposure as well as severity should be considered and the very fact that an operation (night bow decks for example) is fairly uncommon is again in its favour because the frequency of exposure is low, and the risk of complacency therefore also low.

Lets not have any concept of "safe" or "unsafe" please - there is no such thing, only a sliding scale of grey in between.

[HeliComparator]

HC, has anyone ever come to grief on a localiser/DME approach whilst operating in the North Sea before? I don't my history well enough to give a definitive answer on this, but not that I can recall.
So does this mean prior to a couple of months ago, we would not be able to list this either???

Personally I also support Cyclics' suggestion on night bow decks and night unstable decks. There have been very close calls during these operations (rumoured, of course) by at least two of the companies in the near past that have gone "un-reported", but just because they didn't go splash, are you saying that we can't consider them dangerous?

HC, perhaps it's your "lack of understanding" on this thread that may need to change.

I am not aware of any "close calls" in our company. People feeling uncomfortable, yes. But that can be healthy as I have suggested.

Your point about the Loc approach really makes my point - something as seemingly benign as that would not have been on this thread's radar last year (if there had been such a thread). But looking at the fixed wing data, it seems that maybe its something we could have been taking more seriously had we scientifically, rather than emotionally, evaluated the risks.

If this thread is to just become a pilot whinge-fest, an opportunity will be lost. Could I suggest that before posting that "we don't like bow decks" etc, some thought is put into exactly why, what the real risks are, rather than just that they make us feel uncomfortable.

So no, I don't think I have a lack of understanding on safety matters. Its an area where I have done a considerable amount of work and research.

[Nf stable]

If this thread is to just become a pilot whinge-fest, an opportunity will be
lost. Could I suggest that before posting that "we don't like bow decks" etc,
some thought is put into exactly why, what the real risks are, rather than just
that they make us feel uncomfortable.

So, just because a pilot doesn't want to compile half a page of explanation as to why they feel something is dangerous, and instead they just state the particular item, this turns it into a "whinge-fest". Considering we are on a pilots forum, speaking on a thread that will be predominantly be read by Nth Sea pilots, ALL of whom understand and appreciate the flight manoeuvre mentioned, and ALL of whom appreciate the un-necessary risks involved (considering that the deck could have been programmed for a day landing), you feel that it needs to be dissected in order to make it a legitimate concern..... :ugh:

Well, why don't we start then shall we, anyone one else feel free to chime in please:

Shall we start by the fact that night approaches are to be conducted from a stable approach gate, standardised by a visual sight picture. As we no longer have a heave limit, as long as the heave rate is acceptable, the deck could be moving by say 10m (not unheard of), so where do we get our standard sight picture on a deck that is moving 30ft. Disorientation and black hole effect are serious risks here.

Did I really need to break that down? I suspect not.

HC, stop belittling fellow pilots suggestions, if this needs to become a "whinge-fest" in order to get the points out in the open, then that at least it might get us talking, as long as we have your response to any suggestions, it will only encourage pilots to stay silent. Why do you think it's taking so long for this thread to gain momentum?

[Ray Joe Czech]

Specific concerns about night bow decks:
Heave rate rather than heave amplitude means, as suggested above, the deck can be moving a _lot_. I haven't had a 10m heave but I've had 8m. Although this was day time, the vessel, being a category 1 was within night limits with an IIRC, 0.7m/s heave rate. If you do not have the opportunity to position out of wind you may be doing a lateral landing with possibly no horizon to a boat that is moving 20-30 feet up and down with, I would suggest, a good chance of losing your visual cues if the vessel dips down as you move over the deck.
The landing I mention above was by the other LHS pilot, so we may have been slightly out of wind. However, from my seat, at one point I could see the tip of the boat, the next I could see nothing. Not a good position to be in when you have signed for the aircraft. And there are a large numbers of new pilots on the NS this winter. I know they do a lot more training nowadays but I wouldn't be surprised if they get through all that with a minimal number of unstable decks and even fewer bow ones.
The final issue I would raise is power margin. How many times are there large loads onto or off of boats? Most times I can recall being on and off a bow deck you have been at or above safety pitch.
As to the observation about us bleating about things that make us feel uncomfortable, I am sure we can differentiate those times when we feel out of our comfort zone because we are working hard and those where we feel that we are exposed to potentially hazardous events, disorientation, power failure, striking the stinger on the deck, etc.

[HeliComparator]

HC, stop belittling fellow pilots suggestions, if this needs to become a "whinge-fest" in order to get the points out in the open, then that at least it might get us talking, as long as we have your response to any suggestions, it will only encourage pilots to stay silent. Why do you think it's taking so long for this thread to gain momentum?

If it becomes a whinge fest it loses credibility and means that any valid points are lost in a sea of whinging. Not productive for safety.

Perhaps its taking so long to get going because for the most part our ops are safe and not scary. And yet we still crash. More intelligent thought required...

[Nf stable]

And yet we still crash.

which is perhaps direct contradiction to

for the most part our ops are safe and not scary.

I respect your views on Nth Sea operations, and often support your opinions, but on this, I feel you're way out of order. There's already been valid support for an opinion that you dismissed as whinging, so please just let people express their valid concerns. By all means feel free to offset their concerns with a logical argument in support of the current system if you disagree, therein lies the path to a constructive thread.....

[Ray Joe Czech]

I think the reason that it is taking so long to get going is that everyone knows nothing will change. Or, at the risk of having a second push of the wheelbarrow, nothing that costs or is disruptive.

[HeliComparator]

Nf, for some reason you don't seem to be getting my point. Perhaps I am explaining it badly but after 3 goes I'm not going to do it again.

[Ray Joe Czech]

When did the Norwegians stop doing night bow decks or is it something they have never done?

[charlieDontSurf]

I got a PM with a very good point.

Information regarding incidents/close calls should come out to the whole industry quickly following the incident, so that everyone can learn from it.

After an accident the AIBN typically spends several years processing the incident before the report comes out. That's too long.

In my previous company we had a great system that we felt worked without anyone getting "blamed". It was a small company, but we signed by full name. Nobody ever talked behind others backs after an incident.
-We described what had happened in detail, and concequences.
-We had to come with a corrective suggestion.
-The Ops-dept then wrote their comment/corrective action.

The report was filed for everyone to see the same day it had happened.

Maybe we could have an across-company, non-public reporting site, for everyone in the industry to see/learn? Then some sort of board to come up with suggested corrective actions? That could rotate between the companies.
And the reports should be able to see the minute they are submitted.

In our old company, the suggested corrective action was often "operational risk"
Offshore I think it would often say "follow SOP"....:eek:

One don't have to break a leg to know it hurts!:\

[cyclic]

HC, as per usual, if it isn't your way, it is the highway. You come out with some great stuff but it is always qualified with "not at my perfect company". This comes across as distinctly arrogant, which I know isn't the message you are trying to convey. I don't wish this to be a company v company issue which is why we have all three companies working together - I don't have shares in any of them! Perhaps we can really learn from each other this time or perhaps some don't think there is anything they can be taught about NS ops.

You didn't answer with the amount of bow decks you have flown at night recently. I would wager, that most of the night bow decks flown on the NS at the moment are done by one company - just the way the cookie crumbled. That gives some of us a little more recent background to what really is happening out on the street.

[industry insider]

Many of the vessels used during my company's hook up phase are bow decks. All of our decks are unstable as our facilities are semi submersible in very deep water.

I am glad our operations are not in the NS otherwise the pilots would shut us down. We try not to fly at night but sometimes its unavoidable.

HC tells us the 225 has auto hover capability? What technology do you need to make a night bow deck landing safe, because just to ban them at night completely is not acceptable for the industry that contracts your services. How about some scientific analysis which has some credibility.

[HeliComparator]

HC, as per usual, if it isn't your way, it is the highway. You come out with some great stuff but it is always qualified with "not at my perfect company". This comes across as distinctly arrogant, which I know isn't the message you are trying to convey. I don't wish this to be a company v company issue which is why we have all three companies working together - I don't have shares in any of them! Perhaps we can really learn from each other this time or perhaps some don't think there is anything they can be taught about NS ops.

You didn't answer with the amount of bow decks you have flown at night recently. I would wager, that most of the night bow decks flown on the NS at the moment are done by one company - just the way the cookie crumbled. That gives some of us a little more recent background to what really is happening out on the street.

Well firstly I don't know where you are getting any company vs company or Bristow elitism from. Can you show me where on this thread I have done that, or withdraw your comment?

Secondly, I retired 1st August so I don't work for any company (mea culpa for habitually saying "we" recently when I should have said "they".

Thirdly I am a bad example because as a chief trainer I have done little line flying in the past 5 yrs or so. Year before last I think I did 80 hrs! However I have done enough night bow decks in the past to know that they are challenging.

Yes, typically one of the pilots can be unsighted and trust has to be put in the other. However it is also "normal" for one pilot to be unsighted to any deck during part of the approach, although some structure usually remains in sight to give a clue.

So this is reasonable hazard to consider, however it could be controlled for example by requiring an elevated minimum experience for p2.

Then there is the issue of heave rate and power margin. I think that heave rate is a better measure than absolute heave since it directly relates to power margin. But we fail to "do it properly" by considering what the helicopter's actual power margin is for the current conditions and mass. There is a one size fits all figure for allowable heave rate which I suspect was derived without too much science. Really we should be checking the mass and performance to ensure we can match the heave rate with a good deal of safety margin, say 100% extra. By not doing so we are just being lazy and complacent.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

I have not done a night bow deck for about 3 years but I agree with the comments posted. It is an activity where very little margin is left for error and if they are not really necessary why should they be on the menu.

HC - I think everyone's voice should be heard. We all think slight differently and we all have different experiences. I do not hear any "whinging" on this thread. Just concerns from honest pilots.

DB

[Ray Joe Czech]

Many of the vessels used during my company's hook up phase are bow decks. All of our decks are unstable as our facilities are semi submersible in very deep water.

The bow decks on your ships are likely to be less than Cat 1 so already suffer from reduced limits. The Semi Subs are likely to have different (greater iirc) limits.

I am glad our operations are not in the NS otherwise the pilots would shut us down. We try not to fly at night but sometimes its unavoidable.

See if you think that when someone puts the tail rotor through the bridge when they lose references. Why do you try not to fly at night? I hope it is because of the science based reasons you quote in your next paragraph.

HC tells us the 225 has auto hover capability? What technology do you need to make a night bow deck landing safe, because just to ban them at night completely is not acceptable for the industry that contracts your services. How about some scientific analysis which has some credibility.

It's not the hover that is the problem it is the bit from the hover to the deck. You sit there watching the deck heave around below you and getting the PM to tell you if there are any big waves coming. Good game, I recommend it.
As to your comment about 'completely unacceptable, blah, blah' well you are wrong. It is acceptable in Norway as they don't do them. What you _mean_ is that you don't want the cost/disruption implications (sorry, third push at the wheelbarrow).
As to how to make it safer, HC beat me to it. Short of not doing it, crew composition and power margin and maybe tighter heave limits. I'm not a fan of any bow deck being Cat 1.
Finally as to the scientific analysis bit the safety reviews ongoing have a simple choice: do they want to have a look at the tip of the iceberg, i.e. the crashes that have occurred and address those specific problems or do they want to have a look at the whole iceberg. The bit below the waterline is stuff that hasn't happened yet but might. Some of the things that may be part of the submerged iceberg might be issues that are raised here: bow decks, etc. You can take these pilot concerns on board or not, it is entirely up to you. If, however, you want scientific analysis to support these concerns you will probably have to wait for a future AAIB report with bodies attached.

[HeliComparator]

RJC

Post Mortem scientific analysis is one way, but not the only way. Scientific proactive analysis is also a way. I hate to use the term "risk analysis" because these are usually done with a view to an outcome, but done properly they can be good. Its just that at the moment, they are rarely done properly.

[Lingo Dan]

Having spent over 25 years of my life in Shetland, I'm fairly confident in saying that Sumburgh has more foggy days than any other airport in UK. Yet there is not a full ILS on runway 09.

Had this capability been available on the day of the recent Puma accident, it would have filled one of the holes in the much-mentioned "Swiss Cheese" of the accident chain.

[TiPwEiGhT]

In Norway we still do night landings to unstable decks, most ships here are bow mounted. During winter it is regular to do one or two a week depending which company/contract you work on.

Petrojarl Varg (80ft deck) is a good example with regular early morning and evening shuttles.

TiP

[industry insider]

RJC

All of our Bow Decks are CAT 1 and we are using a Cat A helicopter under HCA definitions.

HC makes a good point re power margins to compensate for heave, but I am asking you again, what technology, procedures or equipment do you need, based on a scientific approach to allow you to conduct Bow Deck landings at night?

I find it strange that we would direct attention towards something which has not caused accidents rather than to something which has, ie. CFIT, should we have dual EGPWS and a double AVAD instead?

[terminus mos]

Finally as to the scientific analysis bit the safety reviews ongoing have a simple choice: do they want to have a look at the tip of the iceberg, i.e. the crashes that have occurred and address those specific problems or do they want to have a look at the whole iceberg. The bit below the waterline is stuff that hasn't happened yet but might. Some of the things that may be part of the submerged iceberg might be issues that are raised here: bow decks, etc. You can take these pilot concerns on board or not, it is entirely up to you. If, however, you want scientific analysis to support these concerns you will probably have to wait for a future AAIB report with bodies attached.

A bit harsh RJC, there have been plenty of scientific studies conducted which have not been prompted by an accident (helideck lighting?)

There seems to be a hatred of the customer by NS pilots, these discussions always seem to generate into "customers need to pay more" or the transport budget is only x% etc (which is a very over simplistic argument).

It's your helicopter companies you should be talking to. If there are genuine safety issues which need to be addressed, then ask your companies to address them with improved technology or procedures. Industry will pay, passengers will demand it.

So instead of blaming the oil companies, look inward, you might be surprised at what you see. If you want runways, go and fly a plane because you are in the wrong business.

[Ray Joe Czech]

HC makes a good point re power margins to compensate for heave, but I am asking you again, what technology, procedures or equipment do you need, based on a scientific approach to allow you to conduct Bow Deck landings at night?

Asked and answered.

I find it strange that we would direct attention towards something which has not caused accidents rather than to something which has, ie. CFIT, should we have dual EGPWS and a double AVAD instead?

HC will hopefully chip in here as it is a while since I flew EGPWS. However, onshore I cannot remember getting any warnings while flying instrument procedures. I suspect if they did get one on the localiser it would have been too late to do anything.
As to the AVAD, unless they had suspended it before becoming visual (unlikely) or it was u/s they would have probably got a shout at 200 and 100 feet and yet they still hit the ground/sea.
As to offshore approaches, you occasionally get 'Caution Obstacle' or 'Warning Obstacle' shouts as you approach a rig. If you are visual you can disregard these and continue the approach, which would have been the situation in the ETAP incident.

As to your comment about directing attention to things that have caused accidents, one would hope that any safety review worth the paper it is written on would address itself to not only factors that have caused accidents (the normal reactive approach) but factors which they think may cause accidents (proactive approach).

[Ray Joe Czech]

A bit harsh RJC, there have been plenty of scientific studies conducted which have not been prompted by an accident (helideck lighting?)


True, and other stuff like triggered lightning. But it is a very patchy picture and any big money items like PC2e just get punted into the future (unless you are in Eire that is).


There seems to be a hatred of the customer by NS pilots, these discussions always seem to generate into "customers need to pay more" or the transport budget is only x% etc (which is a very over simplistic argument).

Well, I cannot speak for other pilots but I don't. Some of the oil companies strike me as very well organised smart outfits, others not so much, but I don't have that kind of response because I am not a 13-year-old.
As to the question of the transport budget being x%, of course it is. They will have a budget set just like every other department, they aren't just told to spend what they want.

It's your helicopter companies you should be talking to. If there are genuine safety issues which need to be addressed, then ask your companies to address them with improved technology or procedures. Industry will pay, passengers will demand it.


None of the helicopter companies will do anything radically different from the others as they don't want to put themselves at a competitive disadvantage, which is why any change probably needs to be driven by the client.


So instead of blaming the oil companies, look inward, you might be surprised at what you see. If you want runways, go and fly a plane because you are in the wrong business.

Look, you can agree with me or disagree with me, it is entirely up to you. But suggesting that I either put my big boy pants on or pi$$ off isn't the most helpful response to someone who is trying to point out things that could perhaps be done more safely.

[Special 25]

It seems we are all speculating on what causes accidents in the North Sea, but not actually looking at a factual list. Below is a list drawn from the AAIB investigations, but not a definitive list. Apologies, but I am not computer literate enough to turn this into a neat table or formatted correctly, but I think it is readable!




Year - Reg - Type - Location - Cause - Fatalities - Day / Night - Details

1981 BIJF 212 Dunlin Human Yes Day Disorientation in poor weather
1981 ASWI Wessex Bacton Mechanical Yes Day Power Loss and failed Autorotation. Cause unknown
1981 BGXY S76 Peterhead Mechanical Yes Day Blade Spindle Failure
1982 BDIL 212 Murchison Area Unknown Yes Night No Firm Conclusion. Likely CFIT(W)
1983 TIGD 332 Aberdeen Mechanical No Day Tail Rotor Failure due to Drive Shaft Cover Failure
1984 BJJR 212 Humberside Unknown Yes Night Aircraft Crashed on approach at night. No conclusion provan
1986 BKFN 214 Aberdeen Mechanical No Day Failure of Collective Hub Nut -
1986 BWFC BV234 Sumburgh Mechanical Yes Day Gearbox Failure - Blades connected during fight (Chinook)
1988 BDES S61 Aberdeen Area Mechanical No Day Transmission Failure
1988 BEID S61 Sumburgh Area Mechanical No Day Gearbox Fire
1987 BHYB S76 Fulmar Human No Night CFIT(W) - Co-Pilot took control and established a climb but aircraft briefly hit water
1987 BKZH 332 Unst Mechanical No Day Tail Rotor Control Falure
1990 BEWL S61 Brent Spar Human Yes Day Collision with structure during landing
1992 TIGH 332 Cormorant Alpha Human Yes Night CFIT(W) - Aircraft crashed at night while shuttling between platforms
1993 BTCT 332 Gryphon Alpha Platform Mechanical No Day Double Engine Failure due to ingestion of snow
1994 BKJD 214 Petrojarl 1 Weather / Human No Night Vortex Ring State on Go-Around from Approach - Very Low Recovery - Possible Microburst
1995 TIGK 332 Brae Field Weather No Day Tail Rotor Failure due to Lightning Strike
1996 TIGT 332 Aberdeen Human No Night Rollover During Taxi
1997 BWZX 332 Soverign Explorer Weather No Day Lightning Strike
1998 BWMG 332 Sumburgh Area Mechanical No Day Rear Stabiliser Detatched from Aircraft during Flight
1998 ATBJ S61 Aberdeen Mechanical No Day Tail Rotor Control Failure on Landing
1999 BTEU 365 Loggs Platform Mechanical No Day Control Difficulty caused by Detatched Door Strut
2001 BKZE 332 West Navion External No Day Aircraft Rolled on Deck due to Excessive Vessel movement
2001 BMAL S76 North Denes Human No Day Inadvertant pulling of Collective instead of Parking Brake - Aircraft lifted then landed hard on tail
2001 TIGB 332 ESB Weather No Day Aircraft flew into waterspout. Tail rotor blades made contact with Tail Boom
2002 BJVX S76 Clipper Field Mechanical Yes Day Blade Failure - Main Rotor Blade Detatched from Head
2002 BMAL S76 Leman Field Human No Dusk Aircraft Struck Deck Edge on Approach to Platform
2002 SSSE S76 Trent Platform Human No Night Near Vortex Ring on Night Departure from Offshore - Co-Pilot Recovered Aircraft to climb from low altitude
2006 BLUN 365 Morcambe Bay Human Yes Night CFIT(W) - Aircraft crashed at night while shuttling between platforms
2007 CHCK S92 Aberdeen Mechanical No Day Vibration - Tail Rotor Blade Pivot Detached
2008 BKXD 365 Leman Field Human No Day Tail Boom Struck Crane During Approach
2009 REDU EC225 ETAP Platform Human No Night CFIT(W) - Aircraft crashed at night while approaching to land
2009 REDL 225 Peterhead Mechanical Yes Day Gearbox Failure
2010 IACC S92 Scatsta Human No Day Inadvertant pulling of Collective instead of Parking Brake - Aircraft lifted then landed hard
2012 REDW EC225 Aberdeen Area Mechanical No Day MGB Bevel Gear Failure
2012 CHCN EC225 Orkney Isles Mechanical No Day MGB Bevel Gear Failure
2013 WNSB 332L2 Sumburgh Yes Day Under Investigation

[terminus mos]

As to the question of the transport budget being x%, of course it is. They will have a budget set just like every other department, they aren't just told to spend what they want.

Of course, Ray Joe but transport is a lot more to a smaller oil company with low production than it is to a major, it depends on lifting cost, and location.

I am not suggesting you put your big boy pants on but I am suggesting that you concentrate on the issues that your industry on the NS is having not the ones they are not having but could have one day. If you want absolute safety, stay in bed.

There are lots of areas which have lots of helicopter operations in challenging conditions which are not having accidents. So, maybe its cultural and confined to the UK North Sea? That's why I think you should look inwards and stop suggesting its the fault of the customers who generally say OK when you don't want to fly.

None of the helicopter companies will do anything radically different from the others as they don't want to put themselves at a competitive disadvantage, which is why any change probably needs to be driven by the client.


That is between you and your employer. You are the operators who charge the customers, work as one unit not as pilots versus management another cultural issue?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Terminus Mo - yet again you prove yourself part of the problem!!

What Utter management rubbish you write.

You clearly have no vested interest in safety so why bother posting at all!!

DB

[terminus mos]

What Utter management rubbish you write.
You clearly have no vested interest in safety so why bother posting at all!!

And that, DB is the problem on the UK side of the North Sea, no one else has a legitimate view. Its obviously not about doing a job and transporting passengers who have to get to work to get paid.

Please call me Management again, I like the sound of it, if only it were true!

So, let's have a thorough safety review, but just don't suggest anything that might mention the word pilot, or CAA (they are the problem right?) because BALPA couldn't possibly allow anyone to actually take a look in case they find part of the problem.

Well, carry on, because all of the accidents with heavy twin engine helicopters are happening in the UK NS, not Angola, not Vietnam, not China and not even the GOM which the NS looks down on.

Look inwards, because before you can improve safety, you have to find the problem and it might just be closer than you think, there are a lot of "human" lines in Special's post above.

[Colibri49]

Accident list drawn from the AAIB investigations

This helps me to put some perspective on the risks for our passengers. Of the 3 dozen or so accidents listed for 33 years, about 12 involved fatalities. So there is an accident with fatalities in UK offshore operations about once every 3 years (every 2.75 years if you prefer), on average.

My "back of a cigarette pack" arithmetic comes up with maybe 50 return flights from Aberdeen and Scatsta each day for all three operators combined, five days a week. For 50 weeks a year, I get 12500 return flights a year for the Northern North Sea, or 25000 single flights.

Each passenger who is doing a 3 week on, 3 week off cycle, goes on about 17 single flights a year, or 46 flights every 2.75 years.

Now my shaky grasp of statistics is revealed, because using the above info, I reckon that each passenger has roughly a 1:1500 chance of being on a flight involving some fatalities in each 2.75 year cycle.

Yet chance doesn't always work so simply and I agree that we must strive to improve on what is already a very low risk.

But unless we can fly in daytime, VFR only, benign sea states, carrying a maximum passenger load of 50%, with survival-trained cabin crew, in aircraft with EC225 quality autopilots to unobstructed helidecks, I don't see how we can much improve the accident rate.

[HeliComparator]

Surely 50 return flights for all operators including Scatsta is a significant underestimate? Plus the accidents cover SNS and Morecambe.

[diginagain]

From the perspective of the passenger, may I suggest that the industry looks into an anthropometric study of passengers, particularly with a view to the practicality of escape while wearing the full PPE, the possibility of implementing a seat-allocation system to improve not only passenger comfort but the ease of egress in an emergency, and fundamentally, the methods of cabin-door jettison on the EC225, as it would seem that, from information posted on the recent thread that we have a situation where the liferafts can be deployed to the cabin door by any one of three methods, yet we have only one means of jettisoning the door, and even this mechanism is sub-optimal in it's accessibility to the passengers?

[Hummingfrog]

In my time flying in the NS there were perhaps only a couple of evolutions that I felt could be on the limit of safe operations.

These were:-

1. Night decks to a small deck which was at the limit of pitch roll and heave. It was always interesting that when deck parameters were broadcast they were often just below our published limits! (which of course the ship operators knew).

A night deck was the only time that I did an emergency pull away as I felt it was going wrong. It was important to make sure you had a good excess power margin as in this case I pulled full power as I rotated into forward flight.

2. Approaches onto rigs whose decks were in the "turbulent sector". I spent many years on the 40s whose decks where notorious for turbulence and wind reversal over the deck when the wind was from the SW. We were allowed an extra 10 kts on the limiting wind speed as we were experienced on making approaches in these conditions. The approaches were challenging and it wasn't unusual to get a large nose up attitude as the tail was "hit" by the wind reversal and you had to hold the a nose down attitude as you knew that ground effect would come into play as you levelled for the landing. It was always interesting to see the "eyes on stalks" of first time passengers as they disembarked!!

3. Poor allocation of crew experience by the ops cell. When I first joined the NS after 20yrs in the RAF I was surprised that there was no thought of matching crew experience/personality. In the RAF a lot of effort was placed in making sure that crew experience/personality was correct. In the NS it was just filling the capt and co-pilot positions from the pool available that day. Several accidents have had crew gradient as a contributory factor.

NS operations can be challenging and it is practice as well as good training which will keep it a safe operation. I was very confident as a night flyer as I did at least 28 night approaches (and sometimes 100+) each month during the winter. I wasn't as confident doing night approaches to moving decks as I did so few. It is interesting that DB hasn't done a night deck for 3 years!

The old adage train hard fight easy applies to the NS and the companies have to have solid SOPs which will allow pilots to have experience as well as practice on the less common evolutions in the NS.

HF

[Colibri49]

Okay HC, I was being very conservative and "ball park".

Make it about 2 dozen accidents in the NNS in 33 years, of which 8 involved fatalities and 75 return flights, or 150 singles each day, 5 days/week, 50 weeks/year.

Using these revised figures, there has been on average 1 accident involving fatalities in the NNS every 4.125 years.

This would mean that your typical offshore worker doing 3 weeks on, 3 weeks off, would go on 72 flights in 4.125 years and would have an approx 1:2150 chance of being involved in an accident with fatalities.

Unfortunately I couldn't find stats for Aberdeen and Scatsta annual helicopter departures and arrivals, so erred conservatively.

[Hummingfrog]

Colibri49

What do you define as a flight - one takeoff and one rig landing - ie a sector. If that is your definition then in the 40s in the 1990s we had 2 a/c each doing 42 sectors a day/night 365 days year or 30660 sectors a year plus one of those a/c doing an extra 10 sectors a day 365 days a year or 3650 sectors. This was a total of 34310 sectors. There were other shuttle contracts in the NNS at that time, on the Ninian and Claymore, though the 40s was the busiest. These figures slightly skew your simplistic view of accident rates!

HF

[Colibri49]

HF

I'm not going to get drawn into pointless debates about what counts as a flight and this will be my last word on the matter. Having been a NS pilot for decades, I'm as aware as you are of the complexities and all that I was trying to demonstrate is the historically low risk our passengers are exposed to of being in an accident where there are fatalities.

I hope that most pilot colleagues will understand the clear inference of my estimate of departures from and arrivals into Aberdeen and Scatsta. Simply that our passengers go offshore to work and return usually 3 weeks later.

How many en route stops the helicopter might make for fuel etc and how many shuttles the passengers might be involved in while working offshore is of no significance in my "back of a cigarette pack" calculations. Except that if you insist on adding in all those extra sectors, then the 1:2150 chance looks even more conservative.

Things have changed since the 1990s and in my experience there are now fewer in-field shuttles than used to happen. Generally we take them to work and bring them home 3 weeks later. What happens in between is of little interest to me, apart from that I hope it all gets done safely.

If you now wish to rearrange my efforts and build your own hypothesis, please feel free to do so. Personally I prefer to keep things simple.

[terminus mos]

Colibri

I am not debating or disagreeing with your statistical analysis, but if the Lottery had those odds, everyone would flock to buy a ticket and would say "we have a 1 in 2150 chance of winning, what a great chance".

If there was an activity which involved a 1 in 2150 chance of death, I would not take it. My life insurance would have a huge premium with those numbers.

I certainly will not be riding in the back of a helicopter in the North Sea with such a high chance of being involved in a fatal accident.

[Hummingfrog]

Colibri49

I was under the impression that you were trying to say the NS was a very dangerous place to go to work in as like terminus mos.

if there was an activity which involved a 1 in 2150 chance of death, I would not take it.

I would also not take it. My point is that there are far more flights/sectors than you quote. My example alone doubles the number of sectors.

Personally I prefer to keep things simple.

There is no point keeping things simple if that gives a totally inaccurate answer:ugh:

HF

[Special 25]

Lets not get bogged down in lottery statistics.

What did stand out for me is that of the 12 fatal accidents, half were in the early 80's, on types that we no longer operate - Bell 212, Wessex, Chinook.

Then suddenly things changed. Super Puma arrived, HUMS, Procedural changes and following the 1986 Chinook disaster, the accident rate improved dramatically.

There is a lot of negative opinion on this forum that things cannot change and there will be no progress if it will impact our commercial operation. I disagree. We have seen before a very significant 'Step Change' in our industry safety and that all cost money. There is a genuine focus on achieving these goals and am entirely confident that in the current climate, that could be accomplished again.

What I don't want to see is change for change sake. Too much poor information amongst our customers, and a desire to push out an aircraft that the pilot workforce consider to be the safest aircraft available.

[HeliComparator]

Its interesting that Colibri thinks 1 in 2150 in 4 years is a good rate. Some offshore guys work their whole careers, say 30 years offshore, that puts their lifetime rate to 1 in 286. Even though this is the chance of being involved in an accident with fatalities, not actually dying, this seems a horrendous statistic to me and I just hope its wildly inaccurate.

[SASless]

If you are going to argue Stats....let's get back to the one that got a lot of this discussion going.....the difference between Norway's Safety Record and the UK Sector's safety record.

The salient "Numbers" to me are simply the number of Accidents/Ditchings, and Injuries or Fatalities that occur and the determination of the causes of the them.

In a perfect World....the number would be a simple "0" but we do not live in a perfect World.

We have to determine the causes for the events, analyze them and determine how to prevent them from happening again by doing an honest evaluation of the system, procedures, and standards extant.

Rather than arguing over the extent of the problem you define by the creation of your "numbers"....why not just agree something needs to be done to reduce those "numbers" to as close to "Zero" as possible and offer some ideas that would work to do that.

Like it or not.....the North Sea UK Sector has a problem. You can deny it, spin it, but in the end....you are putting aircraft into the water and killing people.

[OffshoreSLF]

Its interesting that Colibri thinks 1 in 2150 in 4 years is a good rate. Some offshore guys work their whole careers, say 30 years offshore, that puts their lifetime rate to 1 in 286. Even though this is the chance of being involved in an accident with fatalities, not actually dying, this seems a horrendous statistic to me and I just hope its wildly inaccurate.


I'm one such statistic! I started offshore in 1975, before we had survival suits, rebreathers Etc., and our lifejackets were in a little pouch that we tied round our waist. There were S58's still in service at that time, and I wouldn't even like to count the number of trips I made to/from Forties, plus infield shuttle flights in that time. I also worked on the Australian NW shelf project for a while, flying from Karratha to the Goodwyn.

In all that time, I know of none of my colleagues who were killed in flying accidents, though I do know of a couple who were killed in car accidents coming/going to the heliport. What does that tell us? Probably not a lot.

Let's not get hung up too much by statistics, and just concentrate on why we are having all these incidents in the UK sector in the past few years, and what we can do to make it more safe.

[HeliComparator]

SAS, the trouble is that when you look at the recent fatal accidents, its hard to find any repetition from the same apparent cause. The holes that caused those accidents have already in the main been plugged. So you have to look deeper at the underlying culture if you want to reduce the likelihood of the next "accident from a hitherto unthought-of cause".

[industry insider]

Like it or not.....the North Sea UK Sector has a problem. You can deny it, spin it, but in the end....you are putting aircraft into the water and killing people.

SAS, you and I don't always agree but in this case we agree 100%. What seems strange to me is that there is a general agreement that there needs to be a review but some "pilots" on here want it to exclude the CAA and any pilot issues, something I don't understand.

While the whole operation needs to be looked at, we should concentrate on those areas which appear to be causing problems.

[26500lbs]

The stats as we see them are not the whole picture and we need to be aware of that when discussing who is doing what best. We have no idea of the near misses in Norway and the unreported incidents. Don’t believe that things are vastly different in Norway, there just has not been as many accidents, but there has certainly been a few near accidents that I know of in the last few years that could very easily have equalled the statistics or even made put Norway on the unsafe side of the NS.

[thelearner]

We have no idea of the near misses in Norway and the unreported incidents Agreed, but the same is true for the UK - we cannot add these in to the UK statistics either - or the UK could be even worse?

There is some really great information on both threads which needs to be looked at and acted on, unfortunately it is far from clear who will do this, and most disappointingly no apparent willingness for the 3 UK companies (the experts with the experience)to get together and review this. Is it not true that one of the companies has statistics to match the Norwegian sector?

What is clear is that somebody has to do it - the longer this goes on the more inclined I am to believe that a totally independent review like the one carried out by Lord Cullen after Piper is the way forward - I'm not sure any of the others will capture everything?

[SASless]

you have to look deeper at the underlying culture if you want to reduce the likelihood of the next "accident from a hitherto unthought-of cause".

I will bet there are lots of "thought of causes" that are not spoken of by anyone except perhaps over that Pint or two in quiet smoky Pubs someplace.

If you step back and think about in as an objective manner as you can.....there are so many vested interests at play in the mix that only a completely independent investigator could begin to poke Lances into all the Sacred Cows that exist.

If One points out a shortcoming....immediately there shall be a defensive response from the folks holding jurisdiction over it. Some will yell about costs, technical problems, jurisdiction, research results, manning, training, and dozens of other excuses.

Just work your way through the 225 situation beginning clear back to when the Design Engineer first put pencil to paper.....and work your way forward till today. Connect all the Dots and mark all the links that lead to issues that affected how we got to where we are today.

This is just one example of how complex and convoluted the path can be and remains yet.

I am not singling out the 225.....just using a recent topic as an example.

What we don't want to get into is a Finger Pointing exercise where it looks like a circular firing squad. What we want is every player to be frank and honest about how to improve what they do and improve the way they interact with all the other players.

The CAA and other Authorities darn sure need to improve things at their end....as we have seen some glaring examples of Design Testing and Certification failures. Manufacturers also need to improve the way they do business.

Operators need to look at their Training and Operations policies, procedures, and techniques.

The Oil Companies need to improve the amount of money they are willing to spend to improve infrastructure and safety.

Above all....each Individual needs to do some Soul searching and find the courage to start speaking up when something needs to be improved.

The CAA and other authorities shall not clean their own houses....just as the Manufacturers will not...or will the Operators or Oil Companies until they are convinced of the absolute need to do so....be it by popular acclamation or pure embarrassment after being called out in public by the independent investigation.

[Colibri49]

Press and Journal: Mon 30 Sep 2013

Who else saw the letter from a reader pertaining to the chances of survival in a ditching, suggesting that any large passenger who can't fit through cabin escape windows shouldn't be allowed to be carried offshore?

The letter asserted that such large passengers very often occupy a seat next to a window to give themselves a little more comfort and consequently they also block that window for anyone else who might be trying to escape.

The writer of that letter suggested that there should be a frame created through which anyone wishing to work offshore must demonstrate that they can clamber, before being allowed to be carried offshore. Presumably such a physical requirement would need to be demonstrated by each passenger at every refresher in the BOSIET program.

My wife read the article to me and she's not around at the moment to tell me where she hid the newspaper, so I can't give you the exact words.

Goodness knows, but I've seen a few passengers who wouldn't fit through the largest windows, as installed in the EC225, never mind the somewhat smaller windows which can be found in the S92 !

I think the writer of the letter is making a very valid point. Has this been raised before elsewhere? I haven't seen it.

[Wizzard]

I will bet there are lots of "thought of causes" that are not spoken of by anyone except perhaps over that Pint or two in quiet smoky Pubs someplace.

Nostalgia's not what it used to be SASSY, pubs are almost an endangered species but smoky ones are a thing of the past...

[FrustratedFormerFlie]

New SOP. Instead of getting IN through the big door and OUT (in emergency) through the small window, we do things the other way round.

Passengers will be embarked through the small window (if you dont fit, you dont fly) but, having embarked, will be permitted to exit offshore via the comfortable 'lardy boys' doorway.

Simples!:ok:

[Colibri49]

Fitting through windows

Or do like the airlines do for cabin baggage; have a frame near the check-in area through which each passenger must pass before being allowed to check in. That should cause a drastic reduction in the consumption of pints and pies; also fewer visits to the ice cream dispensers offshore. The idea's a winner from every angle.

[902Jon]

have a frame near the check-in area through which each passenger must pass before being allowed to check in.

Only problem with that is, after check-in is when the passenger is wearing their immersion suit, lifejacket & rebreather. Even bulkier than before.
I was shot-down by SASless on a previous thread, when I said that I had been expected to fly 9 guys with an average weight of 306lbs in a S76.
For those that don't know the layout of a S76, the front row passengers have to board behind the crew seats (that have to be lowered to let people in) and the rear seat passengers have to board behind the middle row.
I'm not saying this is unsafe, but that it could be safer if there wasn't huge guys that would block the emergency exits in the event of a ditching. This is an issue for the Oil/Gas companies to address.

[26500lbs]

Or……..how about make a tool that fits the job not a job that fits the tool.
What about some really innovative thinking from our industry. If fixed flying is so much safer, simpler, better, then why not go tilt-rotor and get the best of both worlds. Cruise at FL250, pressurized, above the majority of the weather and icing, saving fuel, traveling further, faster more effectively, better glide performance, no tail rotor, better alternate performance planning options, fewer bases required. Fit it with the latest greatest avionics and AP suites. Reduced payload, but more reduced risk in many areas. AW609 could be interesting in the North Sea. Everything could be flown from Aberdeen and Bergen or whichever airports are best equipped/suited. The oil companies save money and time on logistics and can better address safety. The operators can use fewer bases to serve larger areas. The crews have a more comfortable working environment. The pax have a more comfortable environment. That way nobody can do what we used to do in the old days ‘cos it was better in those days, as there were no old days! Just a crazy idea, thats all.

[Bravo73]

Or……..how about make a tool that fits the job not a job that fits the tool.
What about some really innovative thinking from our industry. If fixed flying is so much safer, simpler, better, then why not go tilt-rotor and get the best of both worlds. Cruise at FL250, pressurized, above the majority of the weather and icing, saving fuel, traveling further, faster more effectively, better glide performance, no tail rotor, better alternate performance planning options, fewer bases required. Fit it with the latest greatest avionics and AP suites. Reduced payload, but more reduced risk in many areas. AW609 could be interesting in the North Sea. Everything could be flown from Aberdeen and Bergen or whichever airports are best equipped/suited. The oil companies save money and time on logistics and can better address safety. The operators can use fewer bases to serve larger areas. The crews have a more comfortable working environment. The pax have a more comfortable environment. That way nobody can do what we used to do in the old days ‘cos it was better in those days, as there were no old days! Just a crazy idea, thats all.

It isn't really the cruise that is the high risk portion of the flight. It is the bit at the end, especially with any performance 'exposure'. A tilt rotor isn't going to fix those problems.

Also, what about areas such as the SNS, where sectors are often no longer than 40-50 miles? There wouldn't be much point going up to FL250 (or cruising at 350kts) for that.

[OffshoreSLF]

Press and Journal: Mon 30 Sep 2013

Who else saw the letter from a reader pertaining to the chances of survival in a ditching, suggesting that any large passenger who can't fit through cabin escape windows shouldn't be allowed to be carried offshore?

The letter asserted that such large passengers very often occupy a seat next to a window to give themselves a little more comfort and consequently they also block that window for anyone else who might be trying to escape.

The writer of that letter suggested that there should be a frame created through which anyone wishing to work offshore must demonstrate that they can clamber, before being allowed to be carried offshore. Presumably such a physical requirement would need to be demonstrated by each passenger at every refresher in the BOSIET program.

My wife read the article to me and she's not around at the moment to tell me where she hid the newspaper, so I can't give you the exact words.

Goodness knows, but I've seen a few passengers who wouldn't fit through the largest windows, as installed in the EC225, never mind the somewhat smaller windows which can be found in the S92 !

I think the writer of the letter is making a very valid point. Has this been raised before elsewhere? I haven't seen it.

Believe me, sitting next to one of these "XXL" guys isn't much fun either, and "I hope we don't have to get out in a hurry" did cross my mind.

If you have a "hoop" that the passengers have to jump through, it MUST be done in full kit. Anything else is a complete waste of time and effort.

[Colibri49]

Helicopter Evacuations Press and Journal 30.9.13 (transcript of actual letter)

SIR, - As an independent consultant to the oil and gas industry, I often make offshore visits. I have noticed many helicopter passengers whose girth would be too great to enable them to exit via the helicopter windows in the event of an evacuation.
They would not only be unable to escape themselves, but might also prevent others from doing so and undoubtedly cause loss of life. It is also noticeable that larger passengers tend to prefer a window seat on a helicopter, since sitting on the aisle is far less comfortable for them.
Prior to issuing an offshore survival certificate, at an offshore medical, and at all heliports, use should be made of a window template to gauge whether or not a passenger could exit via the window in the event of an evacuation.
During offshore survival training, I have noticed that the windows of the simulators used are often larger than those of many helicopters, so the template would need to be a realistic representation of the actual size of the windows of the helicopter in question. If the passenger is too large, they should not be allowed to fly.
Checks are in place already for alcohol/drug use ahead of flying, with passengers denied boarding if they are found to be under the influence of either, and checks should also be in place to ensure passengers are able to exit safely.
Dr Paul Williams, Riverside Drive, Aberdeen.

[FrustratedFormerFlie]

OK, so,
Check in
Draw Immersion Suit etc
Don Immersion Suit etc
Oops, they've shut the door of the PFB room - and only opened a flap the size of the smallest emergency exit on the type I am to fly.
If I get through the cat flap, happy days. If I don't, head back to the (onshore) gym
Might sound harsh, but its a whole lot less harsh than finding out the hard way (ie in a ditching) that you dont fit - or worse, finding that your exit route is blocked by said lardy boy

Of course if introduced overnight, a significant percentage of next day's pax would be 'beached', so stand by for pleas for 'sympathetic/progressive introduction' of system from employers and emplotyees alike!

[SASless]

If one cannot fit through the Cat Door....would it mean you are too large or the Cat Door is too small?

If One immediately responds it is the person that would show a reluctance to consider the Escape Exits might be too small as the design criteria might have been improperly researched or that the original design criteria did not envision the addition of Survival suits and all the other gear folks have to wear for North Sea flights.

If one questions the size of the exits....then that opens up a really really huge Bucket of Worms!

The Manufacturers, Operators, Authorities,and Oil Companies are confronted with a huge project to arrive at larger, safer, more effective Escape Exits, revamped seating, and all sorts of obstacles to ensuring the Passengers and Crew can escape during a water landing.

So.....is there any guess where the efforts to remedy this situation shall be directed?

[FrustratedFormerFlie]

Probably a bit of both.
And probably action required on both fronts

[diginagain]

Has this been raised before elsewhere? I haven't seen it. See post #49.

[26500lbs]

It isn't really the cruise that is the high risk portion of the flight. It is the bit at the end, especially with any performance 'exposure'. A tilt rotor isn't going to fix those problems.

Also, what about areas such as the SNS, where sectors are often no longer than 40-50 miles? There wouldn't be much point going up to FL250 (or cruising at 350kts) for that.


Tongue was firmly in cheek by the way.:ok:
But - maybe the problem is not just the last bit, it is the just the last bit that it finally manifests itself. There are a whole host of other factors that have gone on before that last bit. I for one suspect that some form of fatigue will feature in the final AAIB and any review. It is important that there are many things that contribute to this fatigue. The constant changes from operations, the weather planning and re-planning, performance issues, meal stops, turnaround times, real quality of rest the day before, cockpit environment, commercial pressure to get the job done, the attitude and culture. The list could go on and on. All very real and very underestimated in my view, but also all very fixable without too much effort or cost. 8 hours in a A340 is very different to 8 hours in a EC(Airbus!!!)332L1 or S92. Lucky boy in the 340 has a nice quiet comfy environment, a smiling hostess to bring him coffee and a sandwich. He can wear shortsleeves and can hear Fred next to him without a headset. Fatigued in the 332 yet?
Secondly the sectors in the SNS are small but only if you are flying from the current bases. What if all ops in the UK were able to fly from one or two bases? Most likely a very unworkable idea of course, but don’t dismiss the blue sky thinking either - it might lead to something workable. The flight time would be similar, but cruising at 275kts from one or two hubs instead. A hell of a lot more efficient for all involved in logistics and planning.

[Colibri49]

SASless, my dear sir.

At the risk of seeming to "raise my shield" and exhibiting a partisan preference for the EC225, which I don't deny, I would suggest that anyone who's interested in survivability following an offshore ditching should go and sit inside both the EC225 and the S92.

It would become immediately obvious that only the most seriously obese passengers couldn't get through the windows of an EC225, while many of the more averagely large-sized passengers of today wouldn't stand a chance of escaping through some of the S92 windows.

Considering that the EC225 gearbox problem has now been resolved by the best experts which money can buy, employing double protection techniques and inspection regimes, there is no doubt for me that the EC225 is what I'd rather have for my wife and children to be transported over water.

[SASless]

49,

This is not an argument about the relative merits of two aircraft Types..... but is a discussion about how large an emergency exit itself should be.

I don't give a stuff about which aircraft has what currently....just is the installed Emergency Exits, Doors, Windows, Panels....are properly designed, operate in all situations, and properly affords the safe evacuation of people from within the Cabin and Cockpit.

I apply that concern to every aircraft manufacturer, Make, Model, and Type.

If an aircraft has adequate numbers of adequately designed and functional exits is all that matters.

If you consider the 92 deficient.....fine.

If you think the 225 is not deficient....fine.

But the argument is not about the 225 compared to the 92 it is about EXITS.

[Ray Joe Czech]

Can I just add my tuppence worth about obese passengers? I try to eat as many stickies as I can on every sector I fly so our passengers don't have to, so I am stunned by the ingratitude they show by expanding to the size they are :)

[Colibri49]

Yes SAS. I agree completely that improvements in design must be sought, but that takes years.

Our passengers have the immediate consideration of how to be transported in greatest safety in the flying equipment currently available. If I cause annoyance and upset, my apologies to those I'm offending.

My responsibilty as a pilot is to help our passengers in any way I can and point them towards the safest choices available.

And a relatively spacious cabin isn't necessarily the safest cabin. We badly need a helicopter which combines the best aspects of the S92 and the EC225.

In the meantime, I would also recommend to our respected passengers that they should press for a reduction in the number of passengers to be carried in all offshore helicopter types. That way lies an immediate gain in safety.

[Hummingfrog]

SASless

I agree that the argument is about exits, but it is also about training and ease of use of those exits. The 225 exits are large but training often fails as can be seen by the fact that the main cabin door, in real ditchings, doesn't seem to have been jettisoned but opened thus blocking 2 front windows.

The 225 has been involved in ditchings which have shown how the "real passenger" reacts rather than an ideal passenger.

The 92 has been fortunate and not has a real ditching in the NS so it is difficult to work out how "real passengers" will react.

In the fix wing world the manufacturer has to demonstrate an a/c evacuation using real pax - I believe they give a monetary reward to the first off the a/c to simulate the rush/panic to get off.

Do the helicopter manufacturers have to demonstrate a live evacuation using fully kitted passenger?

What size are the 92's windows - they do seem to be very small!

http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/kk68/squadron72/92_zps0d51e262.jpg (http://s277.photobucket.com/user/squadron72/media/92_zps0d51e262.jpg.html)

Compared to a EC225

http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/kk68/squadron72/Super_puma_ec225_zps0685ec83.jpg (http://s277.photobucket.com/user/squadron72/media/Super_puma_ec225_zps0685ec83.jpg.html)

I agree that offshore workers have got bigger, I certainly did while living offshore;), but I had a big door to escape through!

HF

[SASless]

Perhaps some real life testing is warranted.

Pick some passenger lists at random to ensure a purely random selection of subjects and do some tests.

[Uneasy Rider]

Size of the matter ? offshore ergonomics prepares for an overhaul - Offshore Technology (http://www.offshore-technology.com/features/featuresize-of-the-matter-offshore-workers-ergonomics-overhaul)

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

ISTR the S92 windows are just about the same size as the small windows on an L2. I may be mixing my types though so happy to be corrected.

[thelearner]

While the exits are important, let it not distract everyone from the primary objective of stopping the helicopter ending up in the water in the first place.
The position of the door jettison handles on the pumas, well 225 anyway, needs to be addressed.

I always thought with a controlled ditching on a calm day, everyone would get out into the liferafts OK. Survival chances good.

Controlled ditching on a winters day when the helicopter turns over, chances not so good of getting out, but improved with rebreather if you have time to deploy it. Then in the water, if you find the liferaft and manage to get in, chances improved but rescue needs to get to you quickly and get you out of the water. The less fit and older you are your chances get less. I always thought if I ended up in this scenario 50-50 chances of survival.
If we can find something easier than rebreather we should take it.

If there had been size and weight restriction it would have motivated me to stay nearer the size I was 20 years ago.

HSSG FAQ's issued yesterday. (http://www.stepchangeinsafety.net/newsevents/news/news.cfm/newsid/123)Last question is about investigation and reviews. I hope if this goes well it will work.

[charlieDontSurf]

I agree with TheLearner.

If we didn't ditch, we wouldn't need emergency exits eighter...

On a Boeing 737 I think there are 6-8 exits, and they carry up to 240-250 pax.

I agree that the design might be wrong, and the exits that are incorporated should be bigger.

But the real focus should be what we could improve to avoid incidents, and accidents.
Our business is actually very fool-proof on paper.
We fly scheduled flights on familiar routes to familiar destinations, with enough(?) time to plan, we fly multi-crew, we have autopilots, and we have SOP's that cover most of the situations we could end up in.
The only bit of hands-on-flying is during take-off and landing. It should be very safe.

We haven't had any accidents in a few years in Norway, but we sure have had incidents that could have ended bad.
Is it lack of crew coordination? Do we have too many tasks on the Pilot Monitoring during T/O and LDG?
Should we finish all checklist-items at a higher altitude, so both pilots are fully focused during critical stages? Do we follow SOP, or do we take shortcuts?:confused:

[charlieDontSurf]

....or of course bad cockpit design/layout....

Take the collective AP beep-trim on the S-92, that can contol what height Rad-Alt one is flying. It's next to the china-hat that controls the searchlight!
That's not exactly ideeal when approaching a rig at night, ecpecially as SOP says we are supposed to be coupled to Rad-Alt below 1000' (wich I think is smart at night).

[darkbarly]

...27 accidents involving helicopters in the North Sea during the period 1990 to 2009, 6 accidents were fatal.

The average number of fatalities per
fatal accident is 10.3. The average accident rate in the North Sea for the period 1990–2009 was 0.91 accidents per million person flight hours.

The rate varies between 0.38 for Norway and 1.33 for the United Kingdom.

The average number of fatalities per accident was 2.3...

From EASA NPA 2013-10

http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/docs/npa/2013/NPA%202013-10.pdf

[902Jon]

Let's keep this thread alive with different NS safety thoughts.

Q. As all of the N.S operators now have "stabilised" night visual approaches, with gates one must aim for, why, coming off the end of an ARA (rig radar as we used to call it), is it acceptable to be landing off 300' minima?

For instance, on a CAVOK night with 20 kts, I have to be established on finals at a mile out and not descending below 400' until I have good visual reference to the deck lights. On an ARA, after getting the platform visual at 3/4nm & 300', (poor vis & probably little wind to help), and already offset by 15°, I have a lot less time & reference to make a safe final approach & landing.

Does this seem to be inconsistent or am I missing something?

Comments please.

[HeliComparator]

Not you're not missing anything. Yes its an inconsistency, although IIRC its deck height + 200, min 300' for Bristow. Still, there is a big difference between deck height + 200' and deck ht + 50'.

On the other hand, onshore landing off an instrument approach is in general different from landing off a visual approach (eg instrument, arrive at 200' and maybe 110 kts, visual, turn finals at 500' and maybe 80 kts. So the concept of differences for visual and instrument are widely accepted and necessary. If you propose to raise the ARA minima to deck ht + 200 you are getting close to removing any point in an ARA for some of the higher decks.

But, with the different rules at night for en route descending, needing to do an ARA at night is fairly common even when the wx is not that bad. A good ops manual would point out that descent should only be made below deck ht +200 if so required to get below cloud. It would be stupid to arrive at deck ht + 50 when deck ht +200 would get you in comfortably, but I've seen plenty of people doing it.

Pretty sure BHL ops man doesn't make this point, and I doubt others do (but stand to be corrected).

[SASless]

A good ops manual would point out that descent should only be made below deck ht +200 if so required to get below cloud.

What WX Minimums are you using for these approaches if you can go below Deck Height plus 200 feet to "get under cloud"?

Are we mixing VMC/IMC flying here?

[HeliComparator]

SAS Eh? Don't get the question. MDH for an ARA is 300' at night, or deck ht +50 if its higher. Admittedly there are not many decks that are >250' but there are some, and plenty >200'. These are IFR approaches!

VFR the gate is company-dependant I think, but recommended deck ht +200', min 300' for BHL.

My point that you quote relates to an ARA - IFR approach.

[902Jon]

[QUOTE]although IIRC its deck height + 200, min 300' for Bristow./QUOTE

No, its Deck height +50', minimum 300'. MDA is deck ht + 200' if RADALT u/s

My point was, if the training departments' think that the only way to be safe on a night visual approach is to be hitting all the "gates", why do these visual gates not matter in the final stages of landing from a night ARA? I'm aware of the differences between landing onshore visually or from an Instrument approach. However, there will be at least 500m vis at the bottom of an ILS not just the deck lights of a small platform with inky blackness all around it.

Deck height +200' seems reasonable for a non-precision approach when that is what you have to work with from an onshore precision approach. It gives you the space/time to make a safe transition to the visual part of landing.

[HeliComparator]

[QUOTE]although IIRC its deck height + 200, min 300' for Bristow./QUOTE

No, its Deck height +50', minimum 300'. MDA is deck ht + 200' if RADALT u/s

My point was, if the training departments' think that the only way to be safe on a night visual approach is to be hitting all the "gates", why do these visual gates not matter in the final stages of landing from a night ARA? I'm aware of the differences between landing onshore visually or from an Instrument approach. However, there will be at least 500m vis at the bottom of an ILS not just the deck lights of a small platform with inky blackness all around it.

Deck height +200' seems reasonable for a non-precision approach when that is what you have to work with from an onshore precision approach. It gives you the space/time to make a safe transition to the visual part of landing.

Its deck height + 200 (recommended) min 300 for a visual approach in BHL. Its deck height plus 50 min 300 for an ARA.

So in practice not a difference in min ht for a low deck, the difference is that for a high deck you retain a good site picture from visual, whereas from an ARA to minima the site picture is non-existant until the very last bit, just before nominal commital point.

However, ARAs to minima at night are fairly rare and as I mentioned before, this can be in their favour to some extent due to the "paying attention" factor.

I know I may be coming across as poo pooing various suggestions for perceived dangerous things, but as I have said before I don't think its these that will be the cause of the next accident. It will be something else that catches the crew in a low state of arousal because they didn't perceive it as being dangerous.

One of the most dangerous things about N Sea operations is the boring repetitiveness and predictability of it, and its the complacency this engenders that I think will be the cause of the next accident.

Bit like the Air France accident where they were bimbling along in yet another sleepy long haul cruise in the dead of night far above the ocean - consequently it took them a long time to grasp that they were in deep do-do.