ATSB launches new video on handling approach to land

[Checkboard]

Handling approach to land (http://www.atsb.gov.au/safetywatch/handling-approach-to-land.aspx)

The video example is of "an unexpected stall warning", which is then stabilised by the captain, and the aircraft continues to land.

The commentary expounds that at any time the approach has a problem, a go-around should be flown, but is that always the case? The advice seems a little trite to me.

Surely a crew should at all times assess the situation, and then continue with the best course of action, rather than applying a blanket rule? After stabilising the aircraft, continuing to land (in the case shown) would be the safest option. The aircraft is some way along the process of being configured to land and the pilots are well practised in that manoeuvre.

Assuming go-arounds are the safest option ignores the problems experienced during go-arounds (flap overspeeds, pitch problems, stalls) - all during a rarely practised manoeuvre.

[Flying Binghi]

Unexpected developments, or any confusion about roles or procedures can contribute to decisions and actions that increase the safety risk to the aircraft and its passengers.

10c

Chances are there were some sorta confusion to get a situation, so i guess a go-round is a single clear answer to any one of multiple different confusing situations. The head tends to clear with increasing altitude.

[004wercras]

There are to many variables to name. But hitting TOGA, climbing out and then receiving a holding pattern will buy you valuable time to sort the problem out, or at least determine what it may be, then you can formulate your next strategy. Then again time may be your enemy and you need to get the aircraft on the ground immediately, regardless of whether you are configured correctly or not. An onboard fire is one example.
One size shoe doesn't fit all I'm afraid. But in general terms an unstable approach isn't named that for no reason.

[Jabawocky]

You could take the recent B777 incident as an example of what not to do.

[haughtney1]

Good common sense stuff, but honestly? have we been dumbed down to such a great extent that binning it when its looking a bit wrong needs a video to remind us?

[Wally Mk2]

A good timely reminder I'd say. We drive these 'fangdangled' machines day in day out Ldg many times without incident so when a 'Stall' is pending in such a critical stage of flight then something is definitely wrong & the crew have fallen way behind the machine in the first place to get it to this stage so that is not the time to be 'deciding' how to go about recovering it to still effect a safe Ldg.
As we all know a G/A is a normal maneuver something that should not be feared so as has been said here already get the machine stable & going away from the ground.
Again as we know recovery in a modern day jet from a stall is Pitch, wings level & Power, (chk spd brake to) not a good time to be 'saving face' (& lets face it we are all under some sort of subconscious pressure to get the job done) when say turning final like after via 'Sheed' into ML R34 for Eg.
A clear head is needed with options after such an event.

I imagine the boffins would be trying to understand the thinking behind this particular Capt as to why he tried to save the situation & continue to land as that's where some of the answers lie with this type of event.
The two most recent events that no doubt has spurred on this discussion is the AF flight (A330 although not so recent) & the more recent B777 in the States, both lost the most basic of basic tasks of a pilot/s, situational awareness, a stall or a low energy state was the end result not so much the root cause I believe.

Wmk2

[Old Akro]

Who is the video aimed at? It refers to a heavy jet RPT environment, but surely airline pilots are going to follow the check & training procedures of their own airline and the aircraft manufacturer rather than the ATSB.

If the audience is GA, then presenting a multi crew, multi engine IFR environment is irrelevant.

The presenter specialises in human factors. She is president of the "Australian Aviation Psychologists Association". I can find 1 research papers that she has published on the correlation of flight hours and crew performance, plus 2 conference papers she has presented titled "Pilot performance and experience – are low hour pilots really ‘less safe’?" and Human Factors considerations in takeoff data entry errors."

With all due respect to Ms Todd - who may be a brilliant psychologist - But I want an experienced pilot who has done lots and lots of landings to give me tips on how to land - not a human factors researcher.

[peterc005]

@Checkboard - thanks for the video, it's new and I hadn't seen it before. That's my son in the right seat.

I think the video had a simple message and got it across fine. On about 2 minutes it discusses the decision making process around continuing or aborting an unstable approach. It's not necessary to read any more into it.

[framer]

Every airline pilot knows the rhetoric " If there is any doubt about the safety of the approach then go- around". So saying it again achieves very little. We already know that line.

The real question that the ATSB needs to provide an answer to, and then educate the pilot group about, is " why do experienced airline pilots find the decision difficult when they all know the standard rhetoric?"
If they answer that question honestly, discussing ego, continuation bias, overload, company pressure, company simulator training, and company requirements to immediately report a go-around through a reporting system, we might make some progress.
If they don't openly address those things ( the real issues)that drive the flawed decision making then I feel like saying " easy for you to say doctor, why don't you show us how it's done?" or " what are you doing about the fact that even though I fly domestically/regionally, my body clock is all up the whack and decision making slowed?" or " have you made a video explaining to my management that their policy of having me fill in a report for a standard go around could effect my decision making?"
NB: I do my best not to let any of those things influence my go around decision making.

[Old Akro]

The other issue which is not addressed is the point at which you can make this decision. In a Pitts you can decide to go around an inch above the ground at a speed below stall speed. In the jets featuring in the video it might be as high as 1,000 ft.

The go-around decision is dramatically different in different situations, one pilot vs two, one engine vs multi, piston vs turbine, weather, fuel status, runway conditions. All sorts of factors that are not acknowledged in the air conditioned theoretical academic world of the ATSB.

[Wally Mk2]

'Framer' yr touching on the very reason/s as to why pilots (some) try to land off a botched App & it's summed up all of what you said in two words that the Airlines like to use ....JUST CULTURE, the latest craze for that feel good environment that they 'think' we are in.
There's always gunna be an element of retribution in any organization if you don't perform like a circus monkey due one main reason, COMMERCIALISM, that underlying word that effects the outcome of most incidents, remove that nasty 'C' word & then watch the incident rate plummet rapidly.
Why do we fly an airliner in the first place? Not just to have fun but to make money, no other single reason really & it has zip to do with moving the masses, they can go via horse & buggy!

Wmk2

[framer]

I have thought of another video the ATSB could make. It could be aimed at CASA employees and explain that every few months airline pilots are checked in a simulator , the list of required manoeuvres issued by CASA becomes longer and longer as new technology is introduced to the industry yet an all engine go around is not on the list and with time at a premium, is rarely seen. The video could go on to explain to CASA folk how the lack of practice at the manouvre could be part of the reason they are so poorly flown and regularly result in minor incidents ( over speeds, altitude busts etc). In addition, Ms Todd could explain the psychological reasons as to how this could effect the pilots decision to go around in the first place.
Or we could not bother with these other issues, just ignore them, and continue along the " the pilots need a good stern talking to" road.

[Centaurus]

yet an all engine go around is not on the list

And even if it is, the pilot goes through the same old same old of press TOGA (and all that does is bring up the flight director anyway so the pilot blindly follows the dancing needles - not much skill in that...) If the autothrottles had been already disconnected then he has to manually open the power. if the autothrottles are already engaged for the final approach then pressing TOGA simply gives enough power for an initial graduated rate of climb.

Read the recent A380 Air France incident report where the first officer and captain botched a manual go around alarmingly overspeeding the flaps, busting altitudes - it was an astounding cock-up.

In the jets featuring in the video it might be as high as 1,000 ft.


It could also be as low as 50 feet with the wheels likely touching the runway during transition to climb away. A go-around from the landing flare with a low level altitude restriction is wonderful handling practice in the simulator. But we need to differentiate between an autopilot go-around and a non-automatics go-around from the flare. In real life in low visibility the go-around will probably be on full automatics. But if the discussion is about pilot proficiency in manual flying, then the operator must accept the fact that currency on manual flying is vital.

Because manual flying in jet transports (and some turbo-prop operators in Australia, too) is mostly confined to a few minutes after lift off to a minute before touch down, then simulator time has to be made available to allow practice at such things as a raw data manual go-around from 50 feet. This requires excellent skills which are honed with practice.

So this manoeuvre (manual raw data go around) is not an every day event on line of course. But the pilot needs to be thoroughly confident and competent if it happens. This is why simulator training on this low level manoeuvre is so important. Everything is packed into that low level go-around and things happen real quick. That is why it becomes an ideal way to ensure pilot instrument flying proficiency.

With the freeze and reposition facility on simulators, several go-arounds can be practiced within a short period of time (15 minutes?). Flown manually, without all the fancy automatic features including flight directors, it becomes an enjoyable worthwhile exercise designed solely to improve pilot basic instrument flying skills.

It is not meant to be just another a Ho Hum box ticking one/off exercise - at least it shouldn't be.

[Lookleft]

Read the recent A380 Air France incident report where the first officer and captain botched a manual go around alarmingly overspeeding the flaps, busting altitudes - it was an astounding cock-up.

What you are describing is actually not that unusual in an Airbus. I would go so far to say that it is the lack of practice on go-around maneuvers that creates a fear of cocking up a G/A that draws pilots to a conclusion that trying to land off a bad approach is a better option. A G/A on a Boeing and on an Airbus are very different in execution but with sufficient exposure should be as straightforward as a visual circuit.

I think framer has also nicely summarized the problem from a pilot's point of view.

[Mr.Buzzy]

Pilots may be reluctant to go-around because peripheral elements of our industry make such a big deal about going around.

Bbbzbzzbzbzbzbzbzbzzzzz

[Sarcs]

The importance of a stabilised approach being established prior to 1000' agl could be no better highlighted than the accident of Turkish Airlines into Amsterdam Schiphol Airport.:{ Report: Turkish Airlines B737-800 Schiphol accident report released (http://news.aviation-safety.net/2010/05/06/report-turkish-airlines-b737-800-schiphol-accident-report-released/)

The Dutch Safety Board has reached the following main conclusion:

During the accident flight, while executing the approach by means of the instrument landing system with the right autopilot engaged, the left radio altimeter system showed an incorrect height of -8 feet on the left primary flight display. This incorrect value of -8 feet resulted in activation (http://i.tracksrv.com/click?v=QVU6NTA3NTQ6NDphY3RpdmF0aW9uOmVlZGNjZGY4YTZjODUzNTMx Zjk3MTAyMDUxZTU5M2FmOnotMTM1Ni0xNzA2MjA6bmV3cy5hdmlhdGlvbi1z YWZldHkubmV0OjA6MDoxMzc4NTIwNjQwMTU2) of the ‘retard flare’ mode of the autothrottle, whereby the thrust of both engines was reduced to a minimal value (approach idle) in preparation for the last phase of the landing. Due to the approach heading and altitude provided to the crew by air traffic control, the localizer signal was intercepted at 5.5 NM from the runway threshold with the result that the glide slope had to be intercepted from above. This obscured the fact that the autothrottle had entered the retard flare mode. In addition, it increased the crew’s workload. When the aircraft passed 1000 feet height, the approach was not stabilised so the crew should have initiated a go around. The right autopilot (using data from the right radio altimeter) followed the glide slope signal. As the airspeed continued to drop, the aircraft’s pitch attitude kept increasing. The crew failed to recognise the airspeed decay and the pitch increase until the moment the stick shaker was activated. Subsequently the approach to stall recovery procedure was not executed properly, causing the aircraft to stall and crash. It was also featured as a absorbing episode on Air Crash Investigation. [YOUTUBE]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LilVxq4hcQ8

[Sarcs]

Reference the age 09/09/13:
Leading cause of flight deaths: pilots failing to abort landings (http://m.theage.com.au/travel/travel-incidents/leading-cause-of-flight-deaths-pilots-failing-to-abort-landings-20130909-2tf13.html)

A study has shown 97 per cent of pilots in the US have failed to perform 'go arounds' when circumstances indicated the landing (http://m.theage.com.au/travel/travel-incidents/leading-cause-of-flight-deaths-pilots-failing-to-abort-landings-20130909-2tf13.html#) should have been aborted.
An Asian airline's wide-body slams into a sea wall. A 737 with 150 people aboard hits the runway so hard its nose gear buckles. A cargo plane barely misses houses before plowing into a hillside short of the runway.
These recent accidents, marking the deadliest period for airlines in the US since 2009, have something in common: had the pilots aborted their landings at the first sign of trouble - a move known as a go-around - they might have avoided tragedy.
"They'd all be walking, talking and alive if they went around," Patrick Veillette, a pilot who teaches and writes about aviation safety, said in an interview.
The three US air crashes since July 6, which killed five people, spotlight the difficulty in getting pilots to abort touchdowns if they haven't made safe approaches to the runway. It's "the largest, lowest hanging piece of safety fruit" to make flying less hazardous, according to research sponsored by the US Flight Safety Foundation.
Crashes that occur during approach or touchdown are the world's leading category of aviation mishaps and deaths, according to data compiled by Chicago-based manufacturer Boeing.
The biggest risk factor for such accidents is failing to approach a runway at the proper speed, altitude and heading, known as an unstabilised approach.
If safety regulators can persuade pilots to conduct more go-arounds, lives may be saved and costs to airlines in damaged equipment (http://m.theage.com.au/travel/travel-incidents/leading-cause-of-flight-deaths-pilots-failing-to-abort-landings-20130909-2tf13.html#) and liability may be lowered.
Computerised flight-track records and a survey (http://m.theage.com.au/travel/travel-incidents/leading-cause-of-flight-deaths-pilots-failing-to-abort-landings-20130909-2tf13.html#) of 2340 pilots sponsored by the safety foundation found that crews have a long way to go to comply with airline requirements to abort landings if their approaches were unstable. Almost all pilots, or 97 per cent, continued to land in spite of the rules that they climb away from the runway and circle around to try again, according to the research.
"That's a risk factor that we really need to work on," Rudy Quevedo, director of global programs at the foundation, said in an interview.
The issue isn't simple or new, Quevedo and Veillette said.
"There isn't a commercial pilot who can say, 'Shame on you. You should have gone around,"' Veillette said. "We've all been in situations where in retrospect, we should have gone around and didn't."
In some cases, rules may be overly rigid, akin to imposing a highway speed limit that is so low drivers routinely exceed it, Quevedo said. Violating the rules has become so ingrained that airlines don't enforce them and pilots don't recognize when they are taking unnecessary risks, he said.
Setting up a proper approach to a landing is critical to safety, according to the US Federal Aviation Administration (http://m.theage.com.au/travel/travel-incidents/leading-cause-of-flight-deaths-pilots-failing-to-abort-landings-20130909-2tf13.html#), which regulates the aviation industry, and the United Nations' International Civil Aviation Organisation.
"It's really all physics," Quevedo said. "You want to be centered on the runway on the correct trajectory, the correct descent rate and the right speed."
If that happens, a plane will almost always cross the start (http://m.theage.com.au/travel/travel-incidents/leading-cause-of-flight-deaths-pilots-failing-to-abort-landings-20130909-2tf13.html#) of the runway at a height of about 15 metres, which is optimal for a safe landing, he said.
Airlines typically require that a plane be stabilized at 1000 feet (305 metres) above the runway in poor visibility and at 500 feet in clear weather. Pilots must also have performed required checklists, extended landing gear and configured the plane for landing, according to the foundation.
"If not - GO AROUND!" an FAA advisory to pilots and airlines says.
While the National Transportation Safety Board hasn't said what caused the three recent crashes, information (http://m.theage.com.au/travel/travel-incidents/leading-cause-of-flight-deaths-pilots-failing-to-abort-landings-20130909-2tf13.html#) it has released shows evidence of the aircraft being unstable at points within a mile or two from the runway or of pilots perceiving they were off course.
Pilots on an Asiana Airlines Boeing 777 that hit a seawall short of a San Francisco runway on July 6 (http://m.theage.com.au/world/third-asiana-jet-crash-victim-dies-20130713-2pweh.html) said they had indications once they reached 500 feet altitude that they weren't properly set up to land, according to NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman. The crash killed three passengers and injured dozens as the plane broke apart and slid to a stop.
One pilot told investigators the Asiana plane was below its optimal glide path at 500 feet, Hersman said July 9. Shortly after, the plane veered off the runway centerline, Hersman said.
The pilots told investigators they failed to notice other warning signs, including that their speed had slowed so much that the wings were in danger of losing lift. When they recognized what was happening, they attempted a go-around, adding power too late to avoid the accident, Hersman said.
A Southwest Airlines plane landed nose-first at New York's LaGuardia Airport on July 22, breaking the landing gear and skidding across the runway.
The NTSB hasn't said whether the Boeing 737-700 was on a stable approach. The captain took control of the plane from the first officer below 400 feet altitude, according to the NTSB. In previous NTSB cases, such shifts in control occurred after an emergency or because the captain thought the approach needed correcting.
Nine people suffered minor injuries, according to the NTSB.
The pilots of a United Parcel Service Inc. freighter that crashed in Birmingham, Ala., on Aug. 14 received a cockpit warning that they were descending too rapidly 7 seconds before they hit trees, NTSB member Robert Sumwalt said last month.
Whether the pilots also knew they were too low for their approach, which should have triggered a go-around, hasn't been released. The Airbus SAS A300-600F hit a dark hillside before dawn and broke apart, killing both pilots.
The NTSB has investigated at least 21 cases since 1999 in which pilots could have prevented accidents or incidents if they had aborted landings that ran afoul of airline rules, according to the agency's case files.
In an attempt to discover why such accidents continue to occur, the Flight Safety Foundation hired Martin Smith, a former pilot and psychologist who operates Presage Group Inc. in Mississauga, Canada. Smith oversaw the survey of pilots that found many weren't following airline rules.
The pilots who didn't go-around after an unstable approach tended to have a dulled sense of the risks and didn't communicate as much with fellow crew members, Smith said the survey showed. They also believed they wouldn't be reprimanded for attempting to land in those cases. A similar survey of airline managers is under way to determine why the rule is so widely overlooked, he said.
At the same time, some pilots said the criteria for a stabilised approach weren't realistic, Smith said in an interview.
Researchers are attempting to design new standards that require aborting landings only in dangerous situations, improving safety without unnecessarily boosting go-arounds, which can create their own dangers, Quevedo said.
"We should expect that if we have a policy, the people should follow the policy," he said. "But that being said, we need to make sure that the policy is good before we make people follow it. I don't think we're there yet." And a past (excellent & relevant) flight.org article :ok::

Gear up landings and pilot error (http://www.flight.org/blog/2012/04/22/gear-up-landings-and-pilot-error/)

:D:D