Sukhoi Superjet off runway at KEF

[oceancrosser]

A Sukhoi Superjet 100 doing touch and go's at Keflavik Airport, Iceland apparently belly landed at around 0530Z this morning and slid off runway 11.
One engine reported broken off, one of 5 crew taken to hospital.

Pictures here

Flugslys á Keflavíkurflugvelli - mbl.is (http://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2013/07/21/flugslys_a_keflavikurflugvelli/)

[Hotel Tango]

Crew training? Flapless landing? No gear warning? Ooops? Pure speculation on my part of course, but it's been done before.

[StoneyBridge Radar]

"I said cheer up, not bloody gear up...":rolleyes:

This, along with media reports this week that the programme is teetering on the brink of financial default, can't bode well for the SSJ.

Russia's aviation flagship project the Sukhoi Superjet on the brink of default ? RT Business (http://rt.com/business/russia-aviation-sukhoi-default-940/)

[flaphandlemover]

What where they doing in KEF?
Crosswind training?
As it was the Sukhoi's own aircraft?

[Capetonian]

The same type of aircraft that flew into a mountain in Indonesia last year whilst doing demo flights. One can't but wonder if this is the bravado factor again.

[Clipper7]

The plane has been there for one month doing various tests according to the local media.

[maels]

There have been tests on landing in strong wind in Iceland

[twochai]

Iceland is a great place to do crosswind development testing. With strong westerlies blowing from 1,000 miles of open Atlantic ocean, crosswinds of 30-40 knots are very common and predictable, usually without much mechanical turbulence.

[Kulverstukas]

Today, July 21, 2013, at 05.25 local time at the airport in Keflavik (Reykjavik, Iceland), there was the incident with the aircraft Sukhoi Superjet 100 , reg RA-97005.

In the final stage of certification tests to improve the conditions of operation - automatic landing (certification program for ICAO Category CAT III A) in a crosswind at the landing with a simulated failure of one engine, there was a touch of the runway with landing gear retracted.

During the incident on board were five people, including three crew members and two certification center experts. No one on board was injured during landing. During the evacuation from the aircraft one of the experts received a leg injury.

In the flight test program CAT III A was involved Sukhoi Superjet 100 serial number 95005. The first flight of the aircraft took place on February 4, 2010.

At the time of the incident all systems were working normally. According to preliminary estimates of specialists of CJSC "Sukhoi Civil Aircraft", the aircraft will be restored and continued the flight test program.

TRANSLATED FROM (http://www.scac.ru/en/)

[Capn Bloggs]

Iceland is a great place to do crosswind development testing. With strong westerlies blowing from 1,000 miles of open Atlantic ocean, crosswinds of 30-40 knots are very common and predictable
Who was the mug who built the runway in the wrong direction then?! :p

[JW411]

It was buit by our American friends during WW2 and was originally known as Mekks Field. It had four runways - one every 45 degrees.

[BOAC]

one every 45 degrees Hrrrm........... make that 90?

[arem]

Not if you think reciprocals as well

[BOAC]

I do beg JW's pardon - he said had 4 runways.' You can still see the 'missing ones' from the air.

[JW411]

BOAC:

Right; let's start at the bottom and go clockwise. In approximate terms, the four runways were 02/20, 06/24, 11/29 and 15/33.

So, four pieces of tarmac and eight directions if we count the reciprocals.

[JW411]

Furthermore, the Americans also built a fighter airfield called Patterson Field which had three runways and was only a couple of miles east of Keflavik and can still be seen on Google earth.

[PEI_3721]

From the photos the nose gear appears to be down, similarly the left main, but sunk in the mud. If this is the final condition, then gear side-load at touchdown or drifting-off the runway edge could be candidate conditions. Add to these the possibility of a wet runway and/or effect of reverse on side-force in a crosswinds or the effect of gusts, then … … hazards of flight testing where the margins to the limit conditions may be unknown or decrease very suddenly.

[BOAC]

then gear side-load at touchdown or drifting-off the runway edge could be candidat - or. more simply, gear up? See post #13.

[westhawk]

Since the airplane appears to be resting on the engines and aft fuselage and located off the right side of the extended centerline of the runway, I'm wondering if the ground contact occurred during or shortly following gear retraction on the go-around. Pure conjecture of course. Yeah, that'll buff right out and be flying again in no time. :cool:

I'm sorry to see this happen to a minor competitor in the global airplane production game. I hope they recover to join Embraer and Bombardier to keep A and B from completely controlling the world market in all size classes.

[Machinbird]

Looks like they should have used the aft exits.
Then injury to crew would have been unlikely.
Sitting on its tail like that, the forward exits were awfully high.:uhoh:

Of course, hindsight is 20/20.

[Liffy 1M]

Clear photo here:
Photos: Sukhoi Superjet 100-95 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/Sukhoi/Sukhoi-Superjet-100-95/2288947/L/)

[oceancrosser]

It will be interesting to see what the investigation uncovers about the landing, the airplane is resting close to the end of runway 11, so it must have skidded between 2000-2500m assuming initial touchdown in the normal touchdown area. Isn't that rather a long skid for a light jet like this?

[olasek]

My first guess is that this was a case of pilots forgetting about the landing gear. There were no radio transmissions from them about issues with the landing gear and clearly from photos the nose gear is retracted. If this is confirmed than we have another case of a Russian test pilot crashing a perfectly good plane. :\

[Hotel Tango]

The crosswind tests may well have included a flapless landing. There would be no audible gear warning signal in such a configuration. If the landing checks are rushed or interrupted and no one spots the three reds then bingo.

[oceancrosser]

The crosswind tests may well have included a flapless landing. There would be no audible gear warning signal in such a configuration. If the landing checks are rushed or interrupted and no one spots the three reds then bingo.

Well they were doing CAT II/III autoland trials, not the basic crosswind tests.
The airplane is already certified and being delivered, but Low vis certification is ongoing. Somehow I doubt that a flapless landing is part of that, but partial flaps certainly probably as a part of a single engine (idling) approach.

[5 APUs captain]

As I've heard they completed 46 !!! approaches to certify for CAT III

[Flying Layman]

Already at his feet ;)

http://farm4.staticflickr.com/3673/9359573907_bd6cfb4b57_h.jpg

[Flying Layman]

http://farm4.staticflickr.com/3673/9359573907_a14b728d0f_c_d.jpg

(c) Flickr: KarlGeorg's Photostream (http://www.flickr.com/photos/karlgeorg/)

[maels]

del.....................

[Capn Bloggs]

"Down, 3 greens!". :ok:

[Agaricus bisporus]

It will be interesting to see what the investigation uncovers about the landing, the airplane is resting close to the end of runway 11, so it must have skidded between 2000-2500m assuming initial touchdown in the normal touchdown area. Isn't that rather a long skid for a light jet like this?


Doing touch and gos were they?

"Go Around! Flaps!"

"Oh b@gger, that was the gear handle"...puts them right about there?

[Karel_x]

Gear-up Superjet crew had requested touch-and-go (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/gear-up-superjet-crew-had-requested-touch-and-go-388686/)

...Pilots of a Sukhoi Superjet 100 test aircraft had requested to execute a touch-and-go manoeuvre shortly before a gear-up accident at Reykjavik's Keflavik airport...Both flight recorders have been retrieved and, although a final decision has yet to be taken, Gudmundsson says they will "most likely" be sent to Moscow's Interstate Aviation Committee for data download...

I have heard that gears were down and then they retracted them at the beginning of a climb. But maybe because of combination of a wind and lately increased power of the only engine, the plane dropped back to RWY and belly landed. They suppose human factor...

[oceancrosser]

Somehow that does not sound very plausible Karel_x. But we will find out in due course.

[Karel_x]

Somehow that does not sound very plausible Karel_x

Surely, but it is not my own speculation:

Игорь Виноградов, первый вице-президент ЗА "ГСС" по качеству и сертификации, об авиационном инциденте в Исландии:

"Самолёт заходил на посадку с выпущенными шасси, потом переломил траекторию и пошел на второй круг. Естественно, шасси стали убирать. В этот момент и произошел инцидент. Шасси и самолёт сработали абсолютно штатно".

My translation:

Igor Vinogradov, the first vice president of Sukhoi Civil Aircrafts, responsible for quality and certification, told about the Island incident:
"The aircraft had gears down on the final, then it changed its trajectory and went for go-around. Of cause it start to retract gears. In this very moment the incident happens. Both the gears and the aircraft work properly."


Source: Interview for Finam FM radio, time 18:30++
????? ???. ?????? 289 - ???????? ?????? ????????? ????? ??? ? ????? ????????? . ????? ????? ?? (http://finam.fm/archive-view/8507/)

[oceancrosser]

If so, that begs the question, what happened to:
"POSITIVE RATE - GEAR UP?

A TWR controller at KEF told me that it appeared that once the aircraft touched, they tried to get it airborne again (without the gears), hence the distance it travelled (about 2500m) before it came to rest about 20 m off the end of the runway.

But the report will tell.

[Karel_x]

The interview is ca 15 minutes long and Igor Vinogradov told a hint that now they are interesting about position of thrust lever. He told that engine followed thrust lever correctly, but now they investigate if pilots set it to correct position. After direct question of journalist he refused technical problems of undercartridges or engines and/or any other system of a/c and he speculated about a human factor. He also told about a wind change.

[stefstef]

This has been posted on the Transport Accident Investigation Board website:
"On Sunday morning July 21st at 05:23 AM, Sukhoi Superjet 100 of Russian experimental registry 97005 was performing a certification test flight under cross wind condition at RWY 11 on Keflavik Airport (BIKF), Iceland. The purpose, prior to the event, was to perform a low pass/missed approach with one engine shut down, close to the airplane‘s maximum weight limit, in cross wind condition. During the approach and the low pass, the landing gears were in down position. During the go-around procedure, and after the landing gears were retracted, the airplane decented with the result of landing at the RWY with the landing gears up. The aircraft skidded down the runway and stopped outside the end of the runway. There were 5 persons on board the flight. One person was injured during the accident. The accident is being investigated by the Icelandic Transportation Accident Investigation Board. The Russian Federation has appointed an Accredited Representative to the Investigation. The Air Accident Investigation Commission in Russia will also participate to the investigation."

Source: Sukhoi Superjet 100 Aircraft Accident on Keflavik Airport on July 21st 2013 | Fréttir | Rannsóknarnefnd samgönguslysa - Flugslys (http://www.rnf.is/frettir/nr/262)

[maels]

7GM5vFJELsY (http://youtu.be/7GM5vFJELsY)

[Karel_x]

A link to announcement from the Icelandic AAIU

Thanks for link. I think it is consistent with declaration of Vinogradov. The only little difference is that Vinogradov state that nobody was injured in incident itself, this man light injures during evacuation.

And there is missing one letter in the statement of AAIU :)
...the airplane deScented...

[maels]

after repair.

http://cs7002.vk.me/c320824/v320824816/6daa/zFSTEIE58I8.jpg

http://cs7002.vk.me/c320824/v320824816/6da1/pelAQTrQkXI.jpg

http://cs7002.vk.me/c320824/v320824816/6db3/9ybUWh20QYg.jpg

http://cs7002.vk.me/c320824/v320824816/6daa/zFSTEIE58I8.jpg

[DaveReidUK]

No paintshop facilities at KEF ?

[maels]

yes

http://www.vf.is/images/russar_flugvel_02.jpg

http://www.vf.is/images/russar_flugvel_01.jpg

http://cs7001.vk.me/c320824/v320824816/6d5f/RagFUsg0PvE.jpg

http://cs7002.vk.me/c320824/v320824816/6dc5/syyvERFF-c4.jpg

[glad rag]

Yes there are facilities.

they just didn't use them.

[oceancrosser]

Report is out: http://ww2.rnf.is/media/skyrslur-2013/M-01313---AIG-09-Russian-97005----Final-Report.pdf

Fatigue...

[Two's in]

Fatigue...

Not really. It was a always pi$$ poor plan, it was poorly executed, there was little or no element of supervision and then, and only then, when Mr Murphy decided to pay them all a visit, did the fatigue become a factor. When those superior flying skills were required to dig them out of a hole entirely of their own making, the PF had nothing left in reserve because of the fatigue. To blame it simply on fatigue overlooks the massive negligence involved in the planning and execution of the whole test flight regime.

[alph2z]

My 2 cents

1 - fatigue
2 - poor schedule

causing
3 - several TOGA cancellations due to intermittent WOW and computer logic.
4 - Wrong throttle moved.
5 - Landing gear ordered prematurely up.

contributing factors during test flight:
- one engine turned off intentionally
- low altitude flight of 10 ft AGL

The part that interested me most was #3, and #5.

page 33

The pilot flying pressed the TOGA button on the right TQL to initiate a go-around
and, according to the cockpit voice recorder, called out “go-around.”

Almost simultaneously, at 05:23:28:70, the main landing gear touched the RW
and as a result of left main LG shock strut compression a/c avionics complex
received WOW (weight on wheels) signal.

In response to WOW signal and in accordance with AFCS logic and SC AWO
316 requirements, the left A/T disengaged automatically. At the moment of left
A/T disengagement, the left engine TQL was at 16.59°.

The pilot flying noticed at the primary flight display that the go-around mode had
not engaged. He also noticed that the flight director was not available.

After the AP disconnected, the pilot flying attempted go-around by pressing the
TOGA button on the right throttle immediately prior to the landing gear touching
the runway at 05:23:28.7. The FTI 52 recorded a short “pulse” of GA mode
engagement, which confirms that the signal from the TOGA button reached the
auto flight system and its attempt to engage the GA mode on this computational
step.

At 05:23:29.5, the left LG WOW status appeared. Therefore, in accordance with
the auto flight system logics, the A/T system was disconnected. GA engagement
was inhibited by an asynchronous acquiring of WOW status by the two auto flight
system master channel computers. The GA was not displayed in PFD. So, at
05:23:29.5 the following events had simultaneously occurred:

Actual landing touchdown, A/T disconnect and GA mode engagement inhibit.

The main landing gear only touched the runway at 05:23:28:70 for a brief
moment (0.4 seconds) and then the airplane started to climb again at
05:23:29:10.

page 34

At 05:23:30 the right engine’s SOV 53 closed as it had previously been set to
failure mode by the ATTCS panel and shut down using the ENG MASTER
SWITCH.

At this point the AP, the FD, the left A/T and the right A/T were all selected OFF,
as was the right engine. The left engine was delivering thrust at TQL 16.59°,
slightly higher than idle. Manual input from the operational engine (left engine)
was therefore required to perform the go-around.

The pilot flying started to perform go around in manual mode, by setting the right
(inoperative) engine TQL to TO/GA.

The pilot flying pitched the airplane up and the airplane started climbing.
According to the CVR, no POSITIVE CLIMB callout was made.The pilot flying
ordered landing gear retraction at 05:23:34. The landing gear was selected to up
at 05:23:36 by the pilot monitoring.

The left TQL remained at 16.59 deg, until the pilot flying discovered his mistake
two seconds before the airplane hit the runway and put the left TQL to TO/GA.
By then, the throttle input on the left engine was too late.

[Capn Bloggs]

What a feeling, realising you'd pushed the wrong throttle up just before you dropped back onto the ground... :{

[alph2z]

Why does the WOW cancel a TO/GA ??

I would assume that the pilot would make better decisions than a computer when commanding a TO/GA event.

[Jhieminga]

Page 30 of the report:
In accordance with EASA AMC48 AWO 316, section “1.2 inadvertent go-around Selection”, an inadvertent selection of go-around mode after touchdown should have no adverse effect on the ability of the aircraft to safety rollout and stop. As a result of this EASA design requirement, the TOGA switches are automatically disengaged after touchdown to prevent inadvertent selection of go- around mode after landing.

[alph2z]

hmmmmm. I don't know who to believe anymore.

CS–AWO = Certification Specifications for All Weather Operations

CS–AWO 316 Go around
(See AMC AWO 316)

(a) The aircraft must be capable of safely
executing a go-around from any point on the
approach to touchdown in all configurations to
be certificated. The manoeuvre may not require
exceptional piloting skill, alertness or strength
and must ensure that the aeroplane remains
within the obstacle limitation surface for a
Category II or III precision approach runway as
specified in Annex 14 Chicago Convention.

(b) For decision heights below 15 m (50 ft) automatic go-around must be provided.

(c) When automatic go-around is provided, it must be available down to touchdown.

(d) When automatic go-around is engaged, subsequent ground contact should not cause its
disengagement .

[Jhieminga]

The CS talks about GA being selected prior to touchdown (which wasn't the case here). The report references the AMC and not the CS itself. I don't have the full AMC available here but the text is clearly about GA activation after touchdown.

In this case the GA mode was selected after touchdown, at which point the system prevented this because of WOW activation, and a manual GA should have been carried out. If the PF had pushed the button a bit sooner, before touchdown, this would probably not have happened.

[737er]

Depending on type, thrust lever position can effect the logic gate at touchdown. I have zero clue about the Superjet.

[alph2z]

Ahhhh ... much further down in the same EASA doc.

I'm very weary of section 1.2. Inadvertent Go-around Selection. Is this Inadvertent a big problem, does this happen often ? I'm very weary of the pilot not having the final word !!

AMC AWO 316

AMC = Acceptable Means of Compliance

Go-Around
1 Safety Considerations

1.1 Effects of Contact with the Runway: For aircraft in which a go-around from a very low altitude may result in inadvertent runway contact, the safety of the procedure should be established giving consideration to at least the following:

a. The guidance information and control provided by the go-around mode should be retained and be shown to have safe and acceptable characteristics throughout the manoeuvre,

b. Other systems (e.g. automatic throttle, brakes, spoilers, reverse thrust and alerting systems) should not operate in a way that would adversely affect the safety of the go-around manoeuvre.

1.2 Inadvertent Go-around Selection. Inadvertent selection of go-around mode after touchdown should have no adverse effect on the ability of the aircraft to safely roll out and stop.

[PashaF]

Well.. Gear-up landing test complete.

[Chris2303]

And airframe written off.

[Capn Bloggs]

And airframe written off.
Flying off to the scrap heap on the previous Prune page... :D

[Never Fretter]

Looks like trying to complete the final tests before weather set in set these guys up for failure.

Fatigued Flight Test Crew Crosswind Accident - Aerossurance (http://aerossurance.com/emergency-response/fatigued-flight-test-xwind/)

http://aerossurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/rrj-3.jpg


The RNSA concluded "that human factors played a significant role in this accident". In particular significant fatigue was evident.
The Russian Federal Aviation Regulation limits the duty period for test pilots (preflight preparation and test flight duration) to 8 hours. On the day, the commencement of flying has been slipped back several times. So whereas the first flight had been due at 14:00 it actually took off at 19:57, with the crew spending their time as follows.

8:30 -10:00 – preliminary preparations to flight in the hotel;
10:00 – 12:00 – rest in the hotel;
12:00 – 13:00 – lunch in the hotel;
13:00 – 18:00 – rest in the hotel;
18:00 – 18:30 – dinner in the hotel;
18:30 – 19:00 – transfer to the airport (start of shift according to Sukhoi);
19:00 – 19:35 – preflight training;
19:35 – 19:45 – transfer to the aircraft.
19:57 – 21:40 – first flight;
22:35 – 00:24 – second flight;
01:16 – 03:07 – third flight;
04:03 – c6:20 – fourth flight (ended at 05:23 with the accident).
The RNSA comment that each rescheduling had required some crew interaction during their rest period. They do nor detail the previous night's sleep though.
The accident occurred 10 hours and 53 minutes after the flight shift started and 20 hours and 53 minutes after the preliminary preparation started in the hotel at 08:30.
The ITSB [RNSA] concludes that although the flight crew was well rested prior to the originally planned flight duty time, it was not well rested at the time of the actual flight duty time due to significant and repeated delays.
This was done because the time for flight test campaign was about to finish and the weather forecast for the following 3 days did not have suitable weather conditions for the flight test program.
Additionally, the pilot flying has remained in Iceland during the test campaign (whereas other personnel had been rotated) and was on his 30th test flight in less than a month.
The RNSA note that:
Performance decrements associated with periods of prolonged wakefulness have been addressed in multiple research literature. Research has shown that performance on cognitive tasks, mental problem solving, vigilance and communication tasks shows a 30% decrement after 18 hours of wakefulness. After 42 hours, performance degrades by 60%. Performance degradation is therefore progressive, becoming worse as time awake increases.
Based on the above research and with respect to the preliminary flight preparation starting at 08.30 in the morning of July 20th, ITSB [RNSA] fatigue calculations estimated the task performance of the flight crew to have degraded approximately 46% at the time of the accident.
One of the more sensitive measures of performance degradation due to the fatigue associated with continuous wakefulness is reaction time. People who are fatigued, reliably react more slowly to situations and stimuli that require rapid cognitive or physical responses [as required for the accident flight test].
The accident occurred during night at 05:23, at the time of day when the performance and cognitive function of the pilot flying would have been at its low point...
An indicator of flight crew fatigue was that standard callouts were not made when initiating the go-around.
The pilot flying attempted the go-around with the use of the inoperative engine TQL and 15 seconds passed before he corrected this.


http://aerossurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/rrj-4.jpg