Old Akro
8th Jul 2013, 00:27
The recent report on the Warrior that landed on a road near Hamilton caught my eye. Report AO-2013-071. It is a small report on a minor incident, yet embodies most of the failings of ATSB reports. The report is not good enough from which to yield any learning, which begs the question; why do the investigation at all?
My comments on this report are not intended to reflect on the pilot. He found himself in a weather condition that he didn't like, executed a precautionary landing, walked away - and it looks like the aircraft can be used again. The very definition of a perfect landing.
The issue is that the report has no intellectual rigor, presents data inconsistently and does not table primary data - only ATSB edited data. It fails to be a transparent, objective technical report. These reports should present primary data and allow the reader to track through the logic that leads to the conclusion. This report, like many ATSB reports, does not allow this.
My first issue is the presentation of times. UTC or local is not specified. The times associated with the forecast only make sense if they are local times, which mean the ATSB has converted them - which is not acknowledged. A small issue maybe, but is shows sloppiness.
My second issue is that the ATSB state the forecast trough was passing through Hamilton at the time of the incident, but the data that is tabled says it was due to pass through at 1500 hours. A warrior with a 30 kt headwind would have a flight time from Coldstream of 119 minutes. So it should have been in the area at 1230 to 1300 - 2 hours ahead of the trough. This is not considered by the report. The calculation is not done by the report. One wonders if the author knows how to do it.
The third issue is that the tabled forecast and BOM "one - minute data" and SPECI data would indicate that Hamilton was VFR. The report does not consider this.
Based on the forecasts & actual weather presented by the ATSB in the report, this flight should have been possible under VFR to its destination. A report with intellectual rigor does not leave this sort of un-addressed inconsistencies.
In order to be a document that might provide lessons for air safety, I would have liked the safety message to have discussed:
1. Whether the student pilot had sufficient training / skills for marginal VFR flight
2. The pilot flew over a number of private airfields. Possibly as many as 7 (2 shown on the WAC reproduced in the report). Under stress we tend to focus on what is in the windscreen. I would have liked to have seen a discussion about the other alternatives that could have been chosen.
3. There was no discussion about fuel state. If the aircraft had significant fuel reserves, was circling while a shower passed an option? Or had the pilot run out of options?
The thing I like least about the report is the schools response to raise the weather minima for training flights. This is an understandable and politically required response in the face of questioning from the ATSB and / CASA. But doesn't it create a self-fulfilling prophesy? Isn't this incident an illustration that we should undertake more training in marginal conditions to better equip pilots? Isn't this report and its required response from the school just contributing to create a generation of fair weather flyers?
I have been in the reception area of schools and watched while a whole days lessons have been cancelled because of passing / intermittent poor weather. The risk management procedures make it the easy, safe choice. But in the good old days, I went to the flying school for every lesson. Sometimes we did one circuit and came down. Sometimes we started navs not knowing if we could complete them. To me, this is how we learn. But abstract, theoretical, reports like this one together with pressure on organisations to introduce remedial procedures to prevent a recurrence are robbing us of a full & thorough learning experience.
Some guys on this forum don't always read everything, so I'll say it again. The pilot did a good job.The pilot got in a situation he didn't like, landed without obvious damage to the aircraft and walked away. But, I would have hoped the ATSB would do what I hope the pilot has done. Conduct a post-mortem of the event to consider the other options in the pursuit of being a better, safer pilot.
And by the way, note the creeping influence of EASA in the thinking of the ATSB / CASA. Why? I would have thought that the FAA was regarded as the best practice organisation and that the terrain & weather over a significant part of the US was more similar to Australia than Europe. And the sort of private flying and long navex's that we do are more similar to the US than Europe.
My comments on this report are not intended to reflect on the pilot. He found himself in a weather condition that he didn't like, executed a precautionary landing, walked away - and it looks like the aircraft can be used again. The very definition of a perfect landing.
The issue is that the report has no intellectual rigor, presents data inconsistently and does not table primary data - only ATSB edited data. It fails to be a transparent, objective technical report. These reports should present primary data and allow the reader to track through the logic that leads to the conclusion. This report, like many ATSB reports, does not allow this.
My first issue is the presentation of times. UTC or local is not specified. The times associated with the forecast only make sense if they are local times, which mean the ATSB has converted them - which is not acknowledged. A small issue maybe, but is shows sloppiness.
My second issue is that the ATSB state the forecast trough was passing through Hamilton at the time of the incident, but the data that is tabled says it was due to pass through at 1500 hours. A warrior with a 30 kt headwind would have a flight time from Coldstream of 119 minutes. So it should have been in the area at 1230 to 1300 - 2 hours ahead of the trough. This is not considered by the report. The calculation is not done by the report. One wonders if the author knows how to do it.
The third issue is that the tabled forecast and BOM "one - minute data" and SPECI data would indicate that Hamilton was VFR. The report does not consider this.
Based on the forecasts & actual weather presented by the ATSB in the report, this flight should have been possible under VFR to its destination. A report with intellectual rigor does not leave this sort of un-addressed inconsistencies.
In order to be a document that might provide lessons for air safety, I would have liked the safety message to have discussed:
1. Whether the student pilot had sufficient training / skills for marginal VFR flight
2. The pilot flew over a number of private airfields. Possibly as many as 7 (2 shown on the WAC reproduced in the report). Under stress we tend to focus on what is in the windscreen. I would have liked to have seen a discussion about the other alternatives that could have been chosen.
3. There was no discussion about fuel state. If the aircraft had significant fuel reserves, was circling while a shower passed an option? Or had the pilot run out of options?
The thing I like least about the report is the schools response to raise the weather minima for training flights. This is an understandable and politically required response in the face of questioning from the ATSB and / CASA. But doesn't it create a self-fulfilling prophesy? Isn't this incident an illustration that we should undertake more training in marginal conditions to better equip pilots? Isn't this report and its required response from the school just contributing to create a generation of fair weather flyers?
I have been in the reception area of schools and watched while a whole days lessons have been cancelled because of passing / intermittent poor weather. The risk management procedures make it the easy, safe choice. But in the good old days, I went to the flying school for every lesson. Sometimes we did one circuit and came down. Sometimes we started navs not knowing if we could complete them. To me, this is how we learn. But abstract, theoretical, reports like this one together with pressure on organisations to introduce remedial procedures to prevent a recurrence are robbing us of a full & thorough learning experience.
Some guys on this forum don't always read everything, so I'll say it again. The pilot did a good job.The pilot got in a situation he didn't like, landed without obvious damage to the aircraft and walked away. But, I would have hoped the ATSB would do what I hope the pilot has done. Conduct a post-mortem of the event to consider the other options in the pursuit of being a better, safer pilot.
And by the way, note the creeping influence of EASA in the thinking of the ATSB / CASA. Why? I would have thought that the FAA was regarded as the best practice organisation and that the terrain & weather over a significant part of the US was more similar to Australia than Europe. And the sort of private flying and long navex's that we do are more similar to the US than Europe.