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lmgaylard
17th Sep 2013, 12:13
I think the problem has been that most of the last few Heads of the navy have been ex 'Ship-drivers', so have no real knowledge or experience of aircraft.

Hopefully now Admiral Zambellas is in charge (ex FAA) things might be different......

The Helpful Stacker
17th Sep 2013, 14:21
.... and when (fiscal) push comes to (financial) shove - they always will.....:ugh:

Of course the one thing the senior service is never short of is someone to blame for circumstances of their own making.

I'm sure "the RAF done it" is scrawled somewhere in the pages of BRd2.

orca
17th Sep 2013, 20:31
I thought that over the same period the RN haemorrhaged DD/FF numbers to keep the carriers alive. So the 'RN cared more for ships' argument is at best simplistic.

(More than aware that a carrier is a ship, before the kindergarten level argument resumes.)

seadrills
18th Sep 2013, 05:17
I think the problem has been that most of the last few Heads of the navy have been ex 'Ship-drivers', so have no real knowledge or experience of aircraft.

Hopefully now Admiral Zambellas is in charge (ex FAA) things might be different......

Ex FAA? No such thing. You never leave the Fleet Air Arm - life membership applies at all times.

WE Branch Fanatic
23rd Sep 2013, 06:02
engineer(retard)

Not sure that was the case with the SDSR. The First Sea Lord at the time was an ex CVS Captain, who knew more about running fixed wing flying at sea than those who ignored his advice.

Head of Navy made last minute plea to save Harriers from scrap-heap (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8131298/Head-of-Navy-made-last-minute-plea-to-save-Harriers-from-scrap-heap.html)

The highly-controversial cut to the Harrier force – condemned last week by several former heads of the service as "perverse" and risking "national humiliation" – was decided only three days before the final announcement of the defence review, sources said.
......

In a tense meeting, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, the First Sea Lord, told Mr Cameron that he "could not endorse as his military advice" the decision to axe the Harriers and considered it a "political, not military decision."

Later (in May 2011): Loss of Carrier Strike Capability Top Concern of Royal Navy Chief (http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110511/DEFSECT03/105110307/Loss-of-Carrier-Strike-Capability-Top-Concern-of-Royal-Navy-Chief)

[QUOTE]LONDON - The head of the Royal Navy says retaining Britain's carrier strike capability would have been top of his "wish list" if the recent strategic defense and security review were to be rewritten.

First Sea Lord Adm. Sir Mark Stanhope told the parliamentary defense committee that if Britain still had a carrier available, it would be deployed off the coast of Libya helping to enforce U.N. Resolution 1973.

Giving evidence alongside the heads of the Army and Air Force on the impact of last year's defense review, Stanhope said that retaining HMS Ark Royal and its fleet of Harrier strike aircraft would have been his top priority if the government's strategic defense review and associated four-year defense spending plan could be revisited.

The raison d'être of an aircraft carrier is to carry aircraft. The raison d'être of carrier aircraft is to operate from a carrier. Deleting one to save the other makes little sense.

teeteringhead

I wonder if different arrangements could have been found had things not been decided at the last minute?

lmgaylard

The previous First Sea Lord was an ex CVS Captain, as was the one before him. They do not need to be pilots to get the ship/aircraft integration issue, and to understand the skills needed, and the whole ship nature of things.

Sun Who
23rd Sep 2013, 07:34
WE Branch Fanatic said:The raison d'être of an aircraft carrier is to carry aircraft. The raison d'être of carrier aircraft is to operate from a carrier. Deleting one to save the other makes little sense.

You have to be careful with that sort of teleological argument chap, it's the sort of naive statement that can get the rug pulled out from under you when talking with the adults. They tend to respond with something along the lines of "Fine, carriers no use without aircraft - we don't have any aircraft - get rid of the carriers"
As a general rule of thumb, never link two things you want together as dependencies - you'll lose them both in a funding debate.:=

Sun.

engineer(retard)
23rd Sep 2013, 09:57
The raison d'être of an aircraft carrier is to carry aircraft. The raison d'être of carrier aircraft is to operate from a carrier. Deleting one to save the other makes little sense.

Understood completely but what was the 1st Sea Lord prepared to sacrifice to save the Harriers?

I thought that over the same period the RN haemorrhaged DD/FF numbers to keep the carriers alive. So the 'RN cared more for ships' argument is at best simplistic.

As is putting all the blame for the loss of the Harriers into the great RAF conspiracy bucket. Capability was being shed at a hideous rate by all the Services to meet budget constraints.

althenick
23rd Sep 2013, 10:53
Sorry Guys there has been a lot talk about where the blame lies for the dropping of harrier in the Last SDSR. I have been wanting share my thoughts on this for a long time so here goes…

From an RAF perspective – The Choice was a No-brainer. Getting rid of Tornado instead of harrier would have reduced operational availability of CAS by a factor of what - 2½? – Probably more as at least 1 squadron of Harriers would have been shipboard. Then there is the Manning issue. The post of WSO is rapidly going the way of the Dodo this would have meant that a lot of Officers most of whom would still have career aspirations would have either been made redundant or given ground appointments. Same with ground crew the redundancy situation would have been even worse. So all-in-all I believe this was the right thing to do.

HOWEVER

The RN should have been given time to find the budget for retaining the harrier even as a pure FAA Aircraft. With a little determination and imagination The RN could have made this work. They have always been good at Heath-Robinson in the past. It seems to me however that the RAF announced this pretty much at the last so draw your own conclusions.

Mine Are…

The RAF did the right thing by its own people and the country by have a greater availability of CAS resources
The RAF tried to get the RN out of Fixed wing Flying by timing the announcement. However the RN should have anticipated this as they have been stiffened by the RAF on a couple of occasions previously.

Cheers
Al

engineer(retard)
23rd Sep 2013, 11:22
The RAF tried to get the RN out of Fixed wing Flying by timing the announcement. However the RN should have anticipated this as they have been stiffened by the RAF on a couple of occasions previously.

Do you really believe that the RAF played this joker at the last minute without the RN even being aware of it :confused:

Perhaps a more balanced view of the decision processes at work would be in order:

http://thinpinstripedline.********.co.uk/2012/09/loosing-harrier-part-two-sdsr-debate.html

althenick
23rd Sep 2013, 12:16
Eng
Cant get the link to work sorry

Timing was everything. It was pretty much announced last minute, you cant honestly tell me that the RAF wern't going to do this all along. However equally the RN should have had a contingency plan for this.
It didn't help that the whole SDR thing was rushed through though. The Bottom line is that all 3 services will do what they can to protect their assets. The RAF did a sterling job here, and as I said it was the right thing to do. My Criticism is more at their lordships than the Airships! :)

glojo
23rd Sep 2013, 12:30
I thought that over the same period the RN haemorrhaged DD/FF numbers to keep the carriers alive. So the 'RN cared more for ships' argument is at best simplistic.

(More than aware that a carrier is a ship, before the kindergarten level argument resumes.) Were their lordships out thought as opposed to out fought?

SpazSinbad
23rd Sep 2013, 12:51
For 'althenick' the graphic for the URL:

http://i98.photobucket.com/albums/l261/SpazSinbad/NewerAlbum/ThinPinstripedLineURLforum.gif~original (http://s98.photobucket.com/user/SpazSinbad/media/NewerAlbum/ThinPinstripedLineURLforum.gif.html)

engineer(retard)
23rd Sep 2013, 12:52
I'm not sure why it doesn't work, try googling "Pin striped line withdrawing harrier". It might give you a feel for why their battleships could not justify their opposition.

The blog is written by someone with a nautical persuasion

Melchett01
24th Sep 2013, 12:01
Bump - just for Sun Who

just another jocky
24th Sep 2013, 15:02
Sun Who who? :}

althenick
24th Sep 2013, 21:37
Spaz & Eng - Thanks, I got it in the end.
All of it makes sense but I still think the timing was engineered.
This was interesting....

Could the RN have funded the Harrier alone though? Its often suggested that the RN should regain control of its fighter squadrons and use the money to fund its force directly. A great argument in theory, which ignores a salient fact. The RN over the last 14 years could have made sacrifices to find the funding – under older arrangements it could have put forward plans to sacrifice other capabilities directly to fund the Harrier. It chose not to do so, preferring instead to try to find savings through joint work.

Couldn't agree more

Glojo
Its Easy to out-think Career Seaman Officers. :E I worked at Faslane as a Scumbag Civil Servant and had to deal with them. Always found the Non-Seaman Branches pretty good (Stand fast the Reg Officer :) ) But Seaman Officers - Well it amazes me that these guys get jobs outside the RN.

engineer(retard)
26th Sep 2013, 15:13
You are inferring that the RAF put together a plan of Machiavellian proportions that completely out witted the RN (again). My recollection of those years is that nobody had a clue about next budget round, let alone a 5 year plan to eliminate an aircraft type to remove FAA control of their airframes. The Pin Stripe account is for me the most balanced view I've heard from anyone with a dark blue leaning

Courtney Mil
26th Sep 2013, 19:51
You are inferring that the RAF put together a plan of Machiavellian proportions that completely out witted the RN

You are right, it is one of today's best conspiracy theories, but at least it's funny.

Of course, if the conspiracy IS true, the RN were jolly easy to outwit. If it wasn't true then they were jolly stupid to give it all up. Either way, the sad, ranting old bearded one appears to have slammed the Royal Navy's reputation. How could he do that?

AutoBit
27th Sep 2013, 16:16
So Courtney what you're telling us is that the RAF have never had any plans to get rid of the FAA and take control of all UK military flying?

I think this chap here disagrees with you.

RAF chief predicts controversial takeover of Royal Naval air power - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/5461255/RAF-chief-predicts-controversial-takeover-of-Royal-Naval-air-power.html)

lmgaylard
27th Sep 2013, 16:36
Interesting read!

A friend of mine recently asked me; ''If Great Britain sees its future as fighting more overseas, pre emptive strike etc, this is obviously best from an aircraft carrier as it has less restrictions. So why does the RAF need to have F35?'' :hmm::hmm:

Good question....

The Helpful Stacker
27th Sep 2013, 16:57
If Great Britain sees its future as fighting more overseas, pre emptive strike etc, this is obviously best from an aircraft carrier as it has less restrictions.

And I'm sure, being the level-headed, non-partisan person you are you pointed out the flaws in such logic to your 'friend'?

Less restrictions? Yeah none of the 'dodgy' nations of the world have SSKs and anti-ship missiles. Filling holes in runways is slightly easier than raising previously floating runways off the sea bed.

Simplistic? Indeed, but no less so than blanket statements of aircraft carriers having less restrictions.

orca
27th Sep 2013, 18:00
Bearing in mind that the Naval Strike Wing only returned from theatre in December 2008 - and there were RN personnel serving with 1(F) at that time I found that particular piece from the Telegraph abhorrent.

On top of that the desert flying coverall and the carefully posed photograph that just crops the Harriers to the left were just finishing touches.

Obviously he redeemed himself somewhat with the pure slapstick genius of multi role Typhoon and scared cows. What a cheese.

I remember watching this particular idiot on a programme about the Nimrod crash in theatre when he came across as some bloke who had been walking past in No 1s by pure chance when he bumped into a camera crew.

Sorry about the emotive language team - but someone so evidently far from Joint winds me up. We never witnessed anything of the sort by a CO/OC JHC when his boys and girls of any cloth were at war.

glad rag
27th Sep 2013, 18:42
:ouch:
I am but a bit player to all this "commissioned" stuff, but I never had much liking for the FAA [who I worked for/with in my time in service] for various reasons none of which really matter now, but, when I listened to the audio on YT of Ward describing his actions to a Argentinian family member, well, I felt a great deal of admiration for his moral courage.

Maybe it's time to let this thread sink into obscurity.

Courtney Mil
27th Sep 2013, 22:03
Some hope, GR.

Courtney Mil
27th Sep 2013, 22:11
Orca,

Sorry, Mate. You can describe Glenn Torpy as many things, but he is not an idiot. I can see the point he was making there and the reasons behind it. We may not like it and many would certainly disagree. But he is most certainly NOT an idiot.

SL Hardly-Worthitt
28th Sep 2013, 03:56
Courtney,

Sorry, mate. You can defend TCT as not being an idiot, however many of us would still vehemently disagree!!

As ever,

H-W

Justanopinion
28th Sep 2013, 06:39
There is no other aircraft better than the Typhoon except for a US F22 Raptor and an F22 is significantly more expensive. Typhoon is truly multi-role, it is a world class aeroplane.

Puts him firmly in the "idiot" category

Courtney Mil
28th Sep 2013, 08:01
Except, of course, a VSO stating in public that our new jet is worse than anyone elses would have been truly idiotic. I wouldn't argue that Typhoon isn't bloody good - tricky double neg for you there - b ut I know stating a world ranking of modern ac will always be contentious. Not sure whether your statement is prompted by your view of Typhoon or the man.

Anyway, I sadly won't be online to get the responses to that for a while, so you'll have to play nicely until I'm back.

:ok:

WE Branch Fanatic
28th Sep 2013, 16:30
engineer(retard)/SpazSinbad

I am sure that you are aware of the problem of Groupthink (http://www.psysr.org/about/pubs_resources/groupthink%20overview.htm).

Janis has documented eight symptoms of groupthink:

1. Illusion of invulnerability –Creates excessive optimism that encourages taking extreme risks.
2. Collective rationalization – Members discount warnings and do not reconsider their assumptions.
3. Belief in inherent morality – Members believe in the rightness of their cause and therefore ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.
4. Stereotyped views of out-groups – Negative views of “enemy” make effective responses to conflict seem unnecessary.
5. Direct pressure on dissenters – Members are under pressure not to express arguments against any of the group’s views.
6. Self-censorship – Doubts and deviations from the perceived group consensus are not expressed.
7. Illusion of unanimity – The majority view and judgments are assumed to be unanimous.
7. Self-appointed ‘mindguards’ – Members protect the group and the leader from information that is problematic or contradictory to the group’s cohesiveness, view, and/or decisions.

When the above symptoms exist in a group that is trying to make a decision, there is a reasonable chance that groupthink will happen, although it is not necessarily so. Groupthink occurs when groups are highly cohesive and when they are under considerable pressure to make a quality decision. When pressures for unanimity seem overwhelming, members are less motivated to realistically appraise the alternative courses of action available to them. These group pressures lead to carelessness and irrational thinking since groups experiencing groupthink fail to consider all alternatives and seek to maintain unanimity. Decisions shaped by groupthink have low probability of achieving successful outcomes.

SpazSinbad
28th Sep 2013, 20:08
'WEBF' your comment including me strikes me of being Unthinking. But youse knew that. Right? I'm a Taswegian Uncaring about the shenanigans in UKland about RNers V. Crabs. OK?

glad rag
28th Sep 2013, 21:13
But you must admit it's a stonking line!

I am sure that you are aware of the problem of Groupthink (http://www.psysr.org/about/pubs_resources/groupthink%20overview.htm).

Janis has documented eight symptoms of groupthink:

1. Illusion of invulnerability –Creates excessive optimism that encourages taking extreme risks.
2. Collective rationalization – Members discount warnings and do not reconsider their assumptions.
3. Belief in inherent morality – Members believe in the rightness of their cause and therefore ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.
4. Stereotyped views of out-groups – Negative views of “enemy” make effective responses to conflict seem unnecessary.
5. Direct pressure on dissenters – Members are under pressure not to express arguments against any of the group’s views.
6. Self-censorship – Doubts and deviations from the perceived group consensus are not expressed.
7. Illusion of unanimity – The majority view and judgments are assumed to be unanimous.
7. Self-appointed ‘mindguards’ – Members protect the group and the leader from information that is problematic or contradictory to the group’s cohesiveness, view, and/or decisions.

:ok:

SpazSinbad
28th Sep 2013, 22:03
Are you talkin' to me?

engineer(retard)
29th Sep 2013, 09:53
WEBF have you heard of Occams Razor?

"The razor states that one should proceed to simpler theories until simplicity can be traded for greater explanatory power. The simplest available theory need not be most accurate."

WE Branch Fanatic
30th Sep 2013, 06:09
WEBF have you heard of Occams Razor?

"The razor states that one should proceed to simpler theories until simplicity can be traded for greater explanatory power. The simplest available theory need not be most accurate."

Yes, but is entirely different. Groupthink is the problem of poor decision making in organisations, largely as a result of a need to people to conform, hence poor decisions are rationalised after the event, not all alternatives are considered. and leaders exert influence on decision making. For example, why did SDSR have to include a straight choice between Tornado and Harrier, instead of reductions to both? Why was Nimrod MRA4 axed without giving any thought to an alternative MPA - leased P-3s perhaps?

Occam's razor favours the explanations supported by the least assumptions, however this should not be taken as favouring explanations that are contradicted by evidence. Too often it us used as an excuse to ignore evidence - for example basing conclusions on circumstantial evidence. Imagine a young woman called Lucy who goes to the off licence every day. You see her one evening when less than sober. Is it fair to put these two things together and assume that she has a drinking problem? What if she works at the Off Licence, and had been out with friends? Has poor Lucy now been labelled as an alcoholic despite the lack of real evidence?

Several years later, Lucy is applying for a job where you work. You mention her going to the off licence every day, ad the time you saw her drunk, but manage not to mention her job there. The HR/management types decide that she will be unreliable due to her problem and she does not get the job. Fair?

If you think this sort of thing does not happen you must be living on a different planet.

Occam's razor has value as a rule of thumb, but is no substitute for the scientific method, systems thinking, or legal due processes. Life is complex.

Back to SDSR and the axing of Harrier:

1. Back in late 2009, the plan was to prepare for CVF by embarking Harriers at sea as often as possible, for longer periods. This was what the briefings in the service at that time said, and it was also backed by this discussion (http://www.arrse.co.uk/aviation/99743-ark-royal-landings-8.html#post2664235) and the articles quoted at the time.

2. Following the 2010 General Election, the new Government wanted the SDSR to be completed as soon as possible, despite warning that it would need a year to complete.

3. For some reason, someone decided that there should be a straight choice between Tornado and Harrier. apart from putting both RN and RAF on the defensive, it meant that options like retaining a reduced Harrier force were not seriously studied. JFH had been cut from four to three squadrons in late 2009, so the feasibility of this option was not explored. A desire on the part of some in the RAF hierarchy to stitch up the RN perhaps? Post SDSR, there seem to be no RN pilots flying Tornado or Typhoon. Evidence of unhealthy attitudes?

4. Just before the SDSR announcement, the Prime Minister decided that we should procure the F-35C instead of F-35B, without investigating things such as the added training burden, the costs of installing extra equipment aboard Queen Elizabeth and Prince Of Wales, or the need for extra manpower.

5. Just before the SDSR, the Prime Minister panics as he fears cutting the Army's number when the Afghan commitment continues will lead to bad PR. So he demands the cuts hit the RN and RAF instead. The Army gets cut anyway, several years later.....

6. Because of the commitment of Tornado to Afghanistan, coupled with the reduction in Harrier numbers in late 2009, and the RAF's desire to keep Tornado, lead the Prime Minister to go along with their plan. The alternative of smaller numbers of both jets.

7. The First Sea Lord is told this the weekend before SDSR is announced. Presenting the option of additional naval cuts in exchange for funding the entire Harrier force is not a realistic option for the RN. If there had been say a month to investigate an option to retain say a single squadron, then my personal view is that things would have been different.

8. Post SDSR, Groupthink seems to have kicked in and some have forgotten that JFH was planning not only to act as seedcorn but to return to being a ready carrier force, which would have been useful during the Libyan conflict.

9. The switch to F-35C allows the axing of Harrier to be justified on the basis that it only existed of prepare for a STOVL future, and ignoring the fact that most of the issues relating to the deck handling and whole ship aspects of carrier aviation are similar regardless of CTOL or STOVL.

10. Opposing voices are shouted down - "he's an Admiral so he would say that", "well, an ex CVS Captain is going to say that," and so on.

11. 8 to 10 can be clearly seen throughout the Harrier thread (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/431997-decision-axe-harrier-bonkers.htm), right from the first page.

They can also be seen on every other thread on PPRuNe/ARRSE/etc that talks about these issues.

Courtney Mil
30th Sep 2013, 08:16
A desire on the part of some in the RAF hierarchy to stitch up the RN perhaps?

So it's true then? :D

engineer(retard)
30th Sep 2013, 09:05
So in every procurement decision, the poor, honest but simple jolly jack tar is outwitted by the clever, evil scheming crabfat? To be honest, if I had to select an organisation to defend my country, I would pick the clever one with a track record of winning.

Yes, but is entirely different. Groupthink is the problem of poor decision making in organisations, largely as a result of a need to people to conform, hence poor decisions are rationalised after the event, not all alternatives are considered. and leaders exert influence on decision making. For example, why did SDSR have to include a straight choice between Tornado and Harrier, instead of reductions to both? Why was Nimrod MRA4 axed without giving any thought to an alternative MPA - leased P-3s perhaps?

Because there was not enough money. The Groupthinkers have to deal with real world events and real world costs.

11. 8 to 10 can be clearly seen throughout the Harrier thread, right from the first page.

The picture you paint can only be seen on the Harrier thread because you keep repeating it. Yes a carrier would have been useful during Libya but it was not essential, nor was it an essential for Afghanistan and Iraq both of which required robust sustainable fleets of fast jet. As you have been told ad nauseum, sustainable fleets are a numbers game and NRCs for support of an aircraft fleet are big numbers. NRCs for 2 aircraft fleets are 2 really big numbers which would have required cutting todays wargoing numbers to achieve your target of maintaining a seedcorn capability for the future.

I am sure that you are aware of the problem of Groupthink.

Janis has documented eight symptoms of groupthink:

1. Illusion of invulnerability –Creates excessive optimism that encourages taking extreme risks.
2. Collective rationalization – Members discount warnings and do not reconsider their assumptions.
3. Belief in inherent morality – Members believe in the rightness of their cause and therefore ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.
4. Stereotyped views of out-groups – Negative views of “enemy” make effective responses to conflict seem unnecessary.
5. Direct pressure on dissenters – Members are under pressure not to express arguments against any of the group’s views.
6. Self-censorship – Doubts and deviations from the perceived group consensus are not expressed.
7. Illusion of unanimity – The majority view and judgments are assumed to be unanimous.
7. Self-appointed ‘mindguards’ – Members protect the group and the leader from information that is problematic or contradictory to the group’s cohesiveness, view, and/or decisions.

Read your points and take a good look at yourself

WE Branch Fanatic
1st Oct 2013, 19:08
As you have been told ad nauseum, sustainable fleets are a numbers game and NRCs for support of an aircraft fleet are big numbers. NRCs for 2 aircraft fleets are 2 really big numbers which would have required cutting todays wargoing numbers to achieve your target of maintaining a seedcorn capability for the future.

How do Italy and Spain run their smaller Harrier fleets? I know that have a support MOU with the US, but there must be more to it? To resolve the issue would have required real out of the box thinking, and looking at lessons from our allies?

The fact that you keep using the word "seedcorn" illustrates the point about rationalising. It was intended that the GR9 would provide a fully deployable force (CVS or land based) post Herrick.

Justanopinion (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/431997-decision-axe-harrier-bonkers-56.html#post6647432)

Apart from the sterling job on HERRICK , can't agree. During HERRICK the FEAR was 18 with 8 required in Afghanistan. The force continued to maintain carrier ops as well as dets to Red Flag / Green Flag. It is a complete myth that Carrier ops were so seriously affected during Afghanistan for the Harriers, I must have imagined my time at sea during that time. Post Afghanistan I remember being briefed many times that the force was going to concentrate on all round regeneration, not a Carrier seed corn capability.

Not long before the SDSR, Ark Royal deployed with Harriers for a number of months, practising using Harriers for a variety of roles, including ground attack and air defence *beyond the range of shipborne missile systems. A Google search found the following on the RAF website:

No 1(F) Squadron on Exercise Auriga (http://www.raf.mod.uk/newsweather/index.cfm?storyid=FED0ECDC-5056-A318-A87C92FBBA42D87B)

After a long period of distinguished service on operations in Afghanistan, Joint Force Harrier has, for the last twelve months, been working hard to regenerate all the important skills which necessarily took a back seat to the primary task of Op Herrick. One such skill, much practiced by 800 Naval Air Squadron(NAS), is the demanding realm of embarked operations. The summer of 2010 sees 1(F) Squadron take their turn by embarking in HMS Ark Royal for Exercise Auriga: two months of carrier flying and simulated fighting off the eastern seaboard of the United States.
----
After the initial qualification period, the squadron was involved in the dropping of freefall bombs and live 1000lb bombs mixed with air-to-air fighting with Canadian Hornet fighters. For many aircrew this was the first drop of a live bomb, and as such it is a great testament to the ship’s weapon suppliers, the squadron armourers and the deck crew that all the bombs were dropped successfully.

But how is it on board ship? For the vast majority of 1(F) this is the first experience of life at sea. The biggest challenge has been changing the normal daily routine to fit in with the ship’s equally busy activities including live firing of the ship’s defences, practice man-overboard drills and damage control exercises. Equally though, it is very satisfying for the members of the Squadron who would ordinarily not see flying directly to be involved with deck operations. They work in close proximity to aircraft launching and recovering, an area fraught with danger demanding high standards of professionalism. This professionalism is reflected in the rest of the ship’s company who are very keen to make sure that everyone from the air group feels a true part of the ship. SAC Howe was heard to say, “The whole CVS environment has turned out to be much better than I had anticipated. Once you get used to the way the Navy do things you can just get along with enjoying such a novel experience.”

As Ark Royal prepares for the month of July, 1(F) look forward to further exercises alongside the Americans, and will include the dropping of 1000lb laser guided and freefall bombs, training in urban close air support of troops, and the additional possibility of being involved in beach head assaults with 3 Commando brigade. This will be a chance to exercise one of the Harrier’s key skill sets: to be involved in amphibious landings from the sea in direct support of troops on the ground.

Seedcorn?

The picture you paint can only be seen on the Harrier thread because you keep repeating it.

What about the comments of Bismark, Not_a_boffin, and many others?

Read your points and take a good look at yourself

Can an outsider be prone to Groupthink?

Courtney Mil
1st Oct 2013, 19:32
The Auriga write-up is a good read, as are most squadron deployments and training exercises. Point is, I'm not sure anyone here is saying that 1Squadron weren't as good as any other UK fast jet unit, or indeed, any UK squadron. But I'm not sure what the issue is here. No matter how it happened, the Harriers have gone and they won't be coming back.

I'm probably missing something deep and meaningful here, but I can't see it.

As for Italy and Spain, I don't think they took the same decision that the MoD took to ensure future capability - which, funding permitting, we should be able to do. Again. Maybe time to face reality, accept that decissions have been taken and acted upon. Now start working out how, REALISTICLY, we're going to get the new kit into service and train up the personnel. That would be constructive. Trying in vain to lay blame at various doors and prove how wrong the decissions were - all to late and pointless.

I'm sure you'll tell me if you think I'm wrong. :cool:

hanoijane
2nd Oct 2013, 07:21
I think your problem is not that you made a stunningly poor decision to dispense with Harrier too early, but that a significant number of you refuse to acknowledge this fact.

Everyone makes mistakes. Most of us manage to learn from them.

engineer(retard)
3rd Oct 2013, 10:03
How do Italy and Spain run their smaller Harrier fleets? I know that have a support MOU with the US, but there must be more to it? To resolve the issue would have required real out of the box thinking, and looking at lessons from our allies?

Perhaps it is worth taking a look at Italian and Spanish operational commitments and comparing them to the UK. As to the rest, I cannot fill on your question marks without making lots of assumptions and invoking the razor.

What about the comments of Bismark, Not_a_boffin, and many others?

Not a Boffin provides balanced comments on the Thin Pin Stripe blog and is well worth a read. As for the "many others" I have no idea of who they are or their credentials. However, it does appear to be a Group with a dark blue slant on life, while the planners had to provide an round defence capability.

There were 3 problems to be faced when the decision was taken, money, money and money and the aim was to maintain defence commitments within budget. As far as I can see they have been met. Would they have been met if wargoing numbers had been cut to maintain harrier at sea? Any answer would have to be speculative but the Thin Pin Strip blog remains the best critique that I have seen.

Can an outsider be prone to Groupthink?


You are inside a forum with Bismark, Not_a_boffin, and many others, why not?

SpazSinbad
3rd Oct 2013, 20:27
An example how RAN is preparing for LHD Av Ops. I hope they do not get infected with group think. Probably not - they look like a bolshy lot. :}

NUSHIP Canberra aviation team prepares to be first of class 30 Sep 2013 by LEUT Emily Kennedy (author), CMDR Paul Moggach (photographer)
"The Air Department in the Royal Australian Navy’s first Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ship, NUSHIP Canberra, has taken another step towards achieving operational capability following a period with the Royal Navy (RN) developing multi-spot helicopter operating procedures.

NUSHIP Canberra’s Commander Air, Commander Paul Moggach, Lieutenant Commander Flying, LCDR Paul Hannigan, Deputy Lieutenant Commander Flying, Lieutenant Matt Schroder and the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer, Squadron Leader Mark Rowe conducted a two phase visit to the RN which took Canberra another step closer to being ready for next year’s first of class flight trials.

The first phase involved a week at Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton where the teams examined the theory and courseware used to qualify Flying Control (FLYCO) personnel in safely and effectively controlling multiple aircraft to multi-spot ships. Royal Australian Navy’s Training Authority – Aviation’s training developer Lieutenant Commander Lucito Irlandez accompanied the group during this phase to help develop the RAN’s first LHD FLYCO training program which will be used to train the FLYCO team in the RAN’s second LHD, NUSHIP Adelaide.

The Canberra team then embarked in the RN helicopter carrier HMS Illustrious for ten days as part of the United Kingdom’s Response Force Task Group’s Cougar 13 deployment to the Mediterranean Sea. The timing of the trip coincided with amphibious operations during Exercise ALBANIAN LION - a two week major exercise conducted around Albania’s Vlorë Bay. The exercise involved seven ships, 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, Royal Artillery and aircraft from the Navy, Army Air Corps and Royal Air Force. The exercise commenced with an amphibious raid and culminated in a non-combatant evacuation operation.

Commander Moggach said that this was a highly valuable experience.

“The embarkation of both Army and Navy helicopters gave us a great view of the challenges of conducting amphibious aviation, particularly when overlaid against the movement of landing craft in a dynamic operating environment,” said Commander Moggach.

“A key element of the visit to Illustrious was to provide a level of education in FLYCO operations to enable our team to be authorised to commence at sea aviation operations during the First of Class Flight Trials in 2014.

“As the Canberra class’ air operations and procedures will be adapted for the RAN based on the RN framework, the opportunity to witness a variety of aircraft operations including launch, recovery, deck movements and emergency procedures greatly aided the development of Canberra’s own procedures,” he said.

Canberra’s Lieutenant Commander Flying, LCDR Paul Hannigan said that the work being undertaken now is the baseline for the next 30 years.

“Our Air Department faces the complex task of developing and testing the operating procedures that will be the standard for aviation operations for the life of the RAN’s two Canberra class LHDs,” said Lieutenant Commander Hannigan.

“Canberra is now well placed to meet all airworthiness and operational training requirements that will lead to aviation operations commencing in 2014,” he said...."
NUSHIP Canberra aviation team prepares to be first of class | Navy Daily (http://news.navy.gov.au/en/Sep2013/Fleet/466/NUSHIP-Canberra-aviation-team-prepares-to-be-first-of-class.htm)

Imagery is available on the Royal Australian Navy Media Library at: Navy Imagery - FotoWeb 7.0 (http://images.navy.gov.au/S20131550)

WE Branch Fanatic
7th Oct 2013, 06:19
engineer(retard)

Groupthink is when a group tries to prevent information being considered. All of the those you mention are the opposite, attempting to flag up very real issues that potentially grave implications. Groupthink is saying "we can safely ignore that.....[whole ship aspects]". and launching ad hominem attacks against anyone expressing doubts - such as former CVS Captains or retired Admirals.

Perhaps if the SDSR had no been changed so much in the last minute, better decisions could have been made?

Courtney

Agree! The past is the past, and we need to focus on preparing for the future. I just hope attention is paid to the expert views expressed on various pages of various threads, such as this from Bismark here (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/431997-decision-axe-harrier-bonkers.html#post6022717) and here (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/431997-decision-axe-harrier-bonkers-2.html#post6024550), Not_a _boffin (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/431997-decision-axe-harrier-bonkers-4.html#post6029196), WhiteOvies (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/517553-sharky-watch-live-6.html#post7909736), and orca (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/517553-sharky-watch-live-6.html#post7910075).

As is always the case, we have made it a lot harder for ourselves than it need be. The quote from the 1(F) squadron write up proves that they got it, and appreciated the whole ship aspects. Not everyone on PPRuNe, and not all of those involved in last minute SDSR, understood the importance of these issues.

Moving forward must include learning from the past, taking a systems type approach to ship/aircraft integration and the skills that different personnel will needed, and considering new and imaginative ideas that reduce uncertainities and risks.

Those who forget history are doomed to repeat it.

engineer(retard)
10th Oct 2013, 08:59
Groupthink is when a group tries to prevent information being considered. All of the those you mention are the opposite, attempting to flag up very real issues that potentially grave implications. Groupthink is saying "we can safely ignore that.....[whole ship aspects]". and launching ad hominem attacks against anyone expressing doubts - such as former CVS Captains or retired Admirals.

Or Groupthink could be blaming the RAF for all of your woes for the last 50 years? Perhaps the risk impacts associated whole ship integration were measured against those of not being able to cope with ongoing operations and so were accepted?

Perhaps if the SDSR had no been changed so much in the last minute, better decisions could have been made?

Perhaps worse decisions or no decisions would have been made?