Towards the next Defence and Security Review

[Bannock]

Since they are talking about it in Parliament, why dont we.

House of Commons - Defence Committee - Written Evidence (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/1090/contents.htm)

Some interesting statements WRT where we were, where we are and where we Should be.

I will copy some comments to kick off

ROYAL AIR FORCE
13. The Royal Air Force (RAF) post SDSR 2015 is a conundrum. In fast jet (FJ) terms only a single fleet of circa 100 FGR Typhoon will be available for land operations – and a former Chief of the Air Staff has concluded that this FJ fleet, supported from a total RAF manpower base of 33,000 - more than 50% fewer than at the time of Gulf War I - will restrict forward deployment to a maximum of 3 squadrons (between 30 and 36 aircraft) of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target-acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capable aircraft. ISTAR, Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS), Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) and Air Transport (AT) will be vested in 8 C17, 22 A400m, 14 A330-200, 3 Rivet Joint, and 7 E3D. The future of Sentinel (ASTOR) is still undecided and the effectiveness of the RAF fleet of E3D is steadily being eroded whilst MoD refuses to implement NATO block 40/45 Project Eagle upgrades to the computerised data-link communications suit. Despite a continuing DPA requirement, not least to support the UK independent nuclear deterrent, there are no published plans to back-fill the long range maritime patrol aircraft (LRMPA) gap.

and how about.



In the current financial climate realism must also play its part. Therefore, the defence budget as set must be used in the most cost effective way to achieve best 'bang for buck' which will require far more attention to professional programme and project management. For example: why pay in excess of £6bn for the failing F35B when perfectly suitable operational alternatives – French Rafael or US F/A-18E/F Super Hornet – are available now at a third of the cost? Why must MoD persist with its OR restrictive two Fast Jet fleet policy? Why do MoD continue to believe that the Army Reserves, despite all the commercial difficulties for employers, should be used outside their traditional general mobilisation role?
CEC for the fleet and Project Eagle for the E3D must be funded to compensate for the lack of numbers and to keep our weapons systems up to date, relevant and able to integrate with allies.
b. In the case of the RAF medium range Tornado GR4 replacement OR - the F35 of any variant not meeting the specification - the time may be right to consider full development of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV) rather than conventional technology.
c. LRMPA capability must be restored.

A lot of common sense in this document, however in some of the others in the link, Complete hoop.

Bannock Sends:ok:

[Bastardeux]

Is there any mention of ditching the £25 billion trident replacement in favour of a cheaper nuclear deterrent...like astute launched tomahawks or something?

[Bannock]

The documents does mention ditching Trident but I believe the policy of using Astute against rebelious nations is confined to Ramming them!

Hat, Coat, Taxi.....:E

[Bastardeux]

I believe the policy of using Astute against rebelious nations is confined to Ramming them!

My sources in the MoD have told me even that is now off the cards after the unmentionable f**k up a few years ago...it's okay though because the maritime warfare centre are apparently developing a top-secret computer that sends very angry letters to said rebellious nations, telling them how angry we are.

[Wyler]

Going to need a whole lot more Senior Officers to staff all of that....................:E

[orca]

'Give SH to the army' caught the eye, along with the prodding of Rafael [sic] or F/A-18E/F purchase. Perhaps the authors ought to check what the aeroplanes are actually called, and perhaps briefly address the glaring absence of any wires and catapults on the decks.

At the end of the day, just opinions being expressed by people no better versed than pprune contributors - just with more access to loftier places.

[Biggus]

Your quote is from written evidence presented by DefenceSynergia, a defence think tank whose founders and members all previously belonged to UKNDA.

Unfortunately, before anyone gets their hopes up, it doesn't represent government policy - it's practical value is therefore minimal.... :(

[Evalu8ter]

'Give SH to the army' - oh dear. Whilst probably a viable thought in the FJ heavy (it seems now....) 70s/80s it would probably signal the end of the '100 year experiment' today. The SH force is now a large proportion of RAF manpower (not to mention, by far, the most decorated...), to lose it would inevitably drive claims for the AT/AAR assets by the RLC and the vestigial FJ by the RN. Not a good idea....

[Jimlad1]

Why would we want to purchase Rafale, which would solely benefit the French aerospace industry, and which we would not have any control over the design or modifications to the airframe?

I love the idea that we can just pitch up, purchase a French jet that doesnt currently meet our requirements and magically walk away with a new cheaper fighter fleet and still have a UK aerospace industry too...

[Wrathmonk]

Give SH to the army

Unlikely given the background of the next CAS. But then again if he wants to be CDS....

[Kitbag]

Why would we want to purchase Rafale, which would solely benefit the French aerospace industry, and which we would not have any control over the design or modifications to the airframe?


Cos its available now, it works, it can fly from a floating airfield.

How much control/input do you honestly think there will be over F35 design and modifications?

[Jimlad1]

"Cos its available now, it works, it can fly from a floating airfield."

If by available now you mean 'French industry can produce 12-14 airframes per year' then I'd read that as 'by the time the contract was placed and airframes delivered, we could have got F35 which we've got far more value in, got far more jobs out of, and will be able to do far more with'.

If we'd ordered Rafale a decade ago then it may have been useful now - today with the timeframe from order to delivery to proper use, it would be better to stick to what we've got planned.

[Roland Pulfrew]

Kitbag

Cos its available now, it works, it can fly from a floating airfield

Available - Sort of, but see above; works - but does not meet our requirement, fly from - not from our floating airfields it can't. :=

[vascodegama]

Bit of a thread creep but am I wrong in thinking that the QE Class carriers were supposed to be fitted for but not with EMALS . Of course when we wanted to exercise that option it was t diff! If the option was avail then Rafale and/or FA18 would be possible choices.

[Not_a_boffin]

It remains perfectly possible to fit EMALS (and EAR) to both QE and PoW. They are designed with sufficient space and margins to receive those systems. What the contract does not (and never did) include was the actual detailed design to system level (ie the actual structural seatings, cutting plans, weld procedures, cabling and power management system software) and subsequent supply of the hardware.

For a variety of reasons (some credible, some less so) the "cost of modification" (which may or may not include other elements) for one ship was "estimated" thiis time last year at £1.9Bn which exceeded what MoD was prepared to pay.

Hence the "reversion" to STOVL.

[Heathrow Harry]

full discussion of EMALS etc in the carrier and F35 threads

Intersting that the "Times" had a story on the budget process this week and the current Chancellor (Osbourne) asked a previous Chancellor (Lawson) if his biggest problem would be Tory Ministers asking for cuts - he was told the biggest problem is that Tory Ministers asking for more money for their departments

I suspect the next DSR will be bloody - there isn't any cash left over and the Treasury will want at least another 10% out of the military budget....... something will have to give - Trident Successor or the F-35 is my guess

[5 Forward 6 Back]

I read an excellent Telegraph article pointing out some of the issues with us continuing to slash defence budgets.

Link here (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10013197/America-our-great-protector-is-looking-the-other-way.html) (bear in mind it's a progressive paywall thing, so will count as one of your "20 a month" or whatever)

Basically, it says that US spending as a proportion of NATO defence spending has increased over the past few decades from 63% to 75%. The US spends 4.8% of GDP on defence; we spend 2%, the rest of Europe's NATO members around 1%.

It accuses us of slashing defence to pay for large welfare systems, and assuming the US will always pick up the slack. In the meantime, with Asian defence spending rising, and China rapidly emerging as a new defence superpower, the US focus is shifting to the Pacific. Gates stated that he doesn't think future Generals will see the US participation in NATO as worth the cost once the Cold War becomes a memory.

Apparently important US defence people have expressed surprise that we're happy to carry a carrier strike and MPA capability gap, with the assumption being they'll just pick up the NATO slack. What if they decide not to?

End of the article:

How might this be avoided? Britain has a crucial role to play. The defence and security review of 2010 was designed to keep us above the vital but undefined threshold that makes Britain a worthwhile ally for America, while still making inevitable cuts. The more realistic goal turned out to be ensuring that when we did fall below that line, we would eventually be able to clamber back up again.

In this way, Britain tried to avoid relegation to the free-riders. So we lost our ability to launch strike aircraft from carriers, but we will regain this when the first Queen Elizabeth Class vessel enters service in 2018.

However, the current defence equipment programme assumes that its budget will rise by 1 per cent above inflation after 2015. That may not be a safe bet. True, the Trident issue is something of a red herring: we can maintain the capacity and have a proper military if we really want to spend the money. But there is still a Potemkin village quality about some of our aspirations. The Royal Navy will get two giant carriers, each capable of carrying 36 Lightning II fighters, but only one vessel will be available at any given time – and this will probably have only 12 planes. In theory, Britain will have two platforms capable of embarking 72 fighters; in reality, one will be available with only a sixth of that number of planes.

Put bluntly, Britain is perilously close to joining Europe’s free-riders. If that happens, and a future American president then turns decisively towards Asia, the government responsible will have made a great strategic blunder.

... perhaps cutting defence isn't such a smart move beyond 2015 after all?

[Biggus]

Who ever said that the people who ultimately make the decisions (i.e. politicians) are smart....? :=:=

[vascodegama]

Not a Boffin

Thanks for the explanation, so it seems that the PofW (the second ever carrier due to have emals) fitted would end up costing more than the first ever carrier to have it (the Gerald Ford). Yet again we would end up with a more expensive and less capable system.

[Kitbag]

RP I appreciate it is not operable from our current carrier class, then again nothing else worthwhile is either; I suspect F35 is unlikely to be ready for the big boats commissioning by quite a margin and the final costs will be more eyewatering than the catapult conversion quote

VDG, I may have misunderstood you, are you saying that a carrier without a catapult system installed is more capable than one with?

[vascodegama]

Kitbag

Yes you have misunderstood the point I am trying to make. If the figures are correct and we had continued with the the emals option on the PofW , the resulting ship would end up costing more than the Ford. I would suggest that the Ford would have been a more capable ship as well as cheaper.

[Easy Street]

'Give SH to the army' - oh dear. Whilst probably a viable thought in the FJ heavy (it seems now....) 70s/80s it would probably signal the end of the '100 year experiment' today. The SH force is now a large proportion of RAF manpower (not to mention, by far, the most decorated...), to lose it would inevitably drive claims for the AT/AAR assets by the RLC and the vestigial FJ by the RN. Not a good idea....

You worry that the departure of SH would leave the RAF too small to survive. I would point out that on 1 April 1918 the RAF was proportionally far smaller compared to its leviathan parents than a SH-less RAF would be next to the other services today. Why, if it was it a good idea to go independent then, would it not be a good idea to for a SH-less RAF to stay independent now? There are plenty of far, far smaller air forces in the world. The residual assets (ISTAR, AT, air defence, attack) would all have pan-environment utility and would attract competing demands from both Army and Navy - exactly the rationale for the creation of the helicopter-less RAF in the first place.

In any case, breaking up the RAF and redistributing it to the other services would not realise a great deal in the way of savings, which ultimately would be the only political justification for closing down the Service. Fewer blue uniforms, yes (although great swathes of the RAF seem to dress in combats on a daily basis, anyway). Fewer parallel training streams, yes (although that aspect is already being radically streamlined). Fewer bloated RAF HQs, yes. But all of these are a drop in the ocean compared to the vast expense associated with the equipment and its largely-civilian support organisation (of which the scope for trimming is unrelated to who actually flies the things).

I am a definite advocate of the independent air force. However I struggle to see how we have ended up in a position where the Navy has an organic SH fleet (being upgraded with ex-RAF assets), yet we can still argue that the RAF must dispense all of the Army's SH requirements. It doesn't make sense to me; one of these arrangements must be 'wrong' and it surely is illogical for them to co-exist. Both the FAA and the Army have operated RW from ships and from land, in high-threat and low-threat areas, and would presumably give at least as much priority to specialist roles (SF / JPR) as the RAF does, i.e. lots / nil respectively. I would be grateful if somebody more on-message than I could explain exactly why SH must stay as-is... it's a definite chink in my light blue armour.

[high spirits]

Easy,
I would go the other way. It's JHC for a reason, and in times of conflict it has worked very well. I know of few places where the 3 services as operators get on so well as JHF(A). I think if you applied that model to the home sqns and split the individual fleets between them you would see fighting capability increased with mixed Sqns of AH and SH. It would also stop the pathetic bickering....

[Easy Street]

If the services really can agree to share their toys nicely, the need for an independent air force is removed surely? And the reason why the Navy has the CHF, while the Army has no big RW is?

[Roland Pulfrew]

CHF there specifically to support 3 Cdo Bde? Big RW there to support everything else?

[Finningley Boy]

Easy Street,

If you'll allow a shameful plug, you should buy my book Fading Eagle it is an eye opener just how the other two services have fought the existence of the junior service from day one!

Trenchard deserves credit for making the impossible happen. If he hadn't been successful, no matter what, without a dedicated independent air force by 1939, the Battle of Britain would have been a completely different story.

FB

[Heathrow Harry]

yes we might have had an airforce equipped for battlefield interdiction like the Luftwaffe and have stopped the Germans short of Dunkirk................

[Finningley Boy]

I doubt it Harry,

As matters were we didn't have a sufficiently well equipped Army despite no end of re-armament schemes. To imagine that the Army or the Navy would have pursued the development of aircraft to the standard of the JU87 and 88 along with 20 mm cannon armed Fighters... well I somehow doubt. The important lesson from all this is that splitting the R.A.F. into the air components of the other two services would be pursued, as Easy Street pointed out, solely for financial gain and certainly not for any realistic military reasons. Therefore, the air elements in such circumstances would be short of one thing, investment, no four-star officer to make their case, no direct channel to the Defence Secretary, or as was the case, no Air Ministry. The Aeroplane in the hands of the Army, if not the Navy as well, would have been regarded, through to the defeat of British Arms on British Soil by the Wehrmacht, as nothing more than that new-fangled thing.:ok:

FB:)

[Justanopinion]

Therefore, the air elements in such circumstances would be short of one thing, investment, no four-star officer to make their case, no direct channel to the Defence Secretary, or as was the case, no Air Ministry

And how did maritime air power fare in the lead up to the Second World War when "air elements" were under the control of an Air Force? How has maritime air power fared since 2006 and back under the control of an Air Force?

I am not one bit in favour of removing the RAF but I would suggest your argument is flawed

[orca]

FB,

I completely agree in most cases, but in the specific case of SH why would the best model be the status quo? i.e. a helicopter operating customer (Land) has the lion's share of it's light and medium RW lift provided by someone else, (Air) - whilst the provider doesn't appear to provide for anyone else?

I am sure JHC has performed - but is it really the best way, and if so, why?

Hoping for enlightenment but fearing the usual...

[HAS59]

Okay...

why do the RAF have the UAV/RPV/RPAS assets and not the Army?
They are about direct support to soldiers (mostly) are they not?
After all they're not real aeroplanes flown by real pilots are they?

H

[Easy Street]

I would go the other way. It's JHC for a reason, and in times of conflict it has worked very well. I know of few places where the 3 services as operators get on so well as JHF(A). I think if you applied that model to the home sqns and split the individual fleets between them you would see fighting capability increased with mixed Sqns of AH and SH. It would also stop the pathetic bickering....

I don't find the success of JHC and JHF(A) a persuasive argument for the involvement of the RAF in the SH business. If the army and navy consistently demonstrate that they can share their toys nicely, and make strides in the development of capability, there is no need for independent air force involvement, shurely?

why do the RAF have the UAV/RPV/RPAS assets and not the Army?
They are about direct support to soldiers (mostly) are they not? Since they were acquired, yes, they have been employed exclusively in support of land activity. However, Reaper could easily be employed in support of naval objectives (in the Straits of Hormuz, for example) and thus there is a strong case for it to be maintained as an air force asset, rather than being organic to either service.

The same argument could easily be applied to helicopters. All medium- and heavy-lift helicopters, operated by the air force, to be apportioned according to operational priorities between the navy and army. Exactly aligned with the Trenchard model. Except that it seems to have become accepted that the navy should operate its own SH fleet, which has left the RAF operating in practically 100% support of the army.

CHF there specifically to support 3 Cdo Bde? Big RW there to support everything else?
Why? Both the RAF and the Army have operated RW from ships and into the littoral. Allowing 3 Cdo its own organic SH whilst denying the same to the Army is incoherent and blows a hole in the Trenchard model, making defence of RAF ownership of big RW somewhat awkward.

Until the rationale for all this contradiction is explained to me, I cannot put together a decent argument why the RAF either should or should not keep SH, which leaves me in a somewhat individious position as an officer in an air force now led by a SH pilot... perhaps I should ask him?!

How has maritime air power fared since 2006 and back under the control of an Air Force?
The RN chose to discard the Sea Harrier in a political miscalculation. The GR9 vs Tornado debate has been done to death elsewhere. Suffice to say that the decision was taken based on short-term operational requirements, with the long-term future of maritime fast air already secure (ruthless prioritisation, yes, but is that not the point of an independent air arm? The decision was vindicated only months later). The Nimrod saga would have played out exactly the same under the FAA since the failings were in the Centre and the support organisations, and emphatically not in Air Command, the groups or the squadrons. What would the navy have given up to fund an alternative?

To imagine that the Army or the Navy would have pursued the development of aircraft to the standard of the JU87 and 88 along with 20 mm cannon armed Fighters... well I somehow doubt.
Agree. I'm 100% sold on the need for an independent air force, most particularly in the fields of air defence and attack, but also AT and ISTAR. The notion that an air force consisting only of these elements might be broken up is plainly wrong.

[Justanopinion]

The RN chose to discard the Sea Harrier in a political miscalculation. The GR9 vs Tornado debate has been done to death elsewhere; suffice to say that the decision was taken based on short-term operational requirements (vindicated only months later)

We will never know what the RN would have given up to pay for requirements and I'm not interested in getting into an RAF vs RN slanging match (steering clear of GR9 vs Tornado although interesting that Libya is seen as vindicating the decision). The RN did not "choose" to discard the Sea Harrier, rather their hand was forced (and I have to say in favour of the correct platform). The fact is (as demonstrated through history) with an airforce in charge of maritime platforms, maritime activity is seem as of secondary importance. The example of JSF is already demonstrating this with an aircraft specifically ordered based on a Maritime Strike capability being seen as something that is based ashore and happens to go to sea rather than the other way round, not to mention F35 A being discussed as an option.

[Justanopinion]

14. With the introduction of the QE class of aircraft carrier the subject of UK fixed wing air power is no longer a matter just for the RAF. Indeed, the MoD decision to buy 48 of the F35B Lightning II short take-off and rolling landing (STORAL) version must be factored into the overall picture and UK air power doctrine (the two Fast Jet policy) revisited. The RAF operational requirement (OR) is for a medium range (1500 – 1800 nm) Tornado GR4 replacement which frankly none of the F35 variants (not least the F35B) can meet. Further, the NSS calls for 12 F35B to be routinely embarked upon a carrier with the ability to surge to 36 in an emergency. With a fleet of only 48 F35B and the necessary establishment of an operational conversion and trials unit (OCTU) it is unlikely that more than 40 aircraft will ever be available for operations, of which, some 25% will be unavailable for maintenance reasons, making the DPA requirement to surge to 36 a 'pipe dream'. Whether the RAF has a role in flying the F35B alongside the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) is academic. To meet the NSS commitment and to achieve combat ready (CR) status whilst maintaining flying currency the majority of F35B, crews and maintainers will have to be dedicated to FAA carrier operations. This leaves the RAF with a single FJ (Typhoon) and no medium range Tornado GR4 replacement.

This quote from the original document also makes interesting reading

[Backwards PLT]

Kind of interesting in a "author clearly displaying he is clueless" sort of way. Really, it probably isn't his fault but if you know very little on a subject it is probably best to refrain from commenting on it. Of course that would kill PPRuNe contributions by 90%+ but written statements to parliament?

[high spirits]

Easy,
I don't mean to be patronising, but the JHC could be so much more potent if Sqns were mixed fleet (with whatever Sqn number). Carry on letting the politicians divide and conquer if you want, but the fact remains that all the independent services offer something to the overall party. If you cut the RAF out of the helicopter picture, you will have very few assets below FL100, after which you will lose further arguments on why the RAF exists. Presently, there is a lot of jealousy internally about the successes of the RAF SH force. Have a look at the names, dates and DFCs on the 18, 27 and 28 Sqn honours boards and the appointment of latest CAS to back this up. The RN are in a similar position with a top bod with aviation experience at the helm(as opposed to an escort ship driver). It shows how far both services have come.....

Stop giving the pollies another excuse to cut the Armed Forces.

[Finningley Boy]

Backwards PLT,

Does the author not make a coherent and quite obvious point that 48 F35Bs would be woefully insufficient to provide the minimum requirement as stated? Unless of course things like OCU, OEU and aircraft for qinetiq are not to be drawn from the figure of 48. But even then, with maintenance and other operational commitments beyond having 12 constantly, or for the most part, at Sea it doesn't seem likely. It does appear that an awful lot of reliance is being placed on such projects as the yet to fly technology demonstrator the Taranis new fangled thing. Further, it would appear that as a result, another capability gap from 2019 forward is certain.

There seems to be an over certain mood that the future can and should be relied upon with the most technologically advanced equipment that can be found i.e. F35 or nothing. The newer, the more unorthodox, the better. Even if we will rely upon a precious tiny number of assets. The thinking seems to be that HM Forces certainly will not be used to confront any but the most primitive insurgent force and that supporting the Army is all that we need be concerned about far round the corner into the future.

If we should find ourselves actually on a war footing with an industrialized state ever again, I think there will be a reluctance to employ a carrier with F35s anywhere in harms way, far too much will have been invested by the treasury.:ok:

FB:)

[alfred_the_great]

HS - Adm Z has nearly as much time Commanding Warships as he does flying Lynx.

[high spirits]

Alfred,
Ok, just trying to point out his aviation experience, as opposed to purely ship experience.....

[Backwards PLT]

FB, yes some of his conclusions I actually agree with but many of his arguments are flawed. My main issue is that he is clearly ill informed and inexperienced.

[Easy Street]

the JHC could be so much more potent if Sqns were mixed fleet
Not sure how the composition of squadrons relates to my point, but anyway: I presume the perceived advantage of a mixed-fleet squadron would be that you could deploy 'Example Sqn' and it would be able to provide a well-rehearsed combination of its own armed escort, ISTAR and lift under one numberplate? I would respectfully observe that what you describe could be judged as best practice for a specific mission within a specific operation. But attack helicopters, ISTAR and lift all have diverse roles away from each other. In a full war (e.g. DESERT STORM or TELIC Phase 1) the attack helicopters would be operating together en masse; if their day job had been as part of a mixed-fleet squadron, might one infer that they wouldn't have been as practiced in their anti-tank role? There are weaknesses in all models of squadron structure, but the single-type squadron has become by far the dominant model in worldwide military aviation. Interoperability, common doctrine and adherence to SOPs are what glues air power together, not sticking a particular type of mini-COMAO together under one squadron badge.

Carry on letting the politicians divide and conquer if you want, but the fact remains that all the independent services offer something to the overall party. If you cut the RAF out of the helicopter picture, you will have very few assets below FL100, after which you will lose further arguments on why the RAF exists.
I think the existence of the CHF means that the RAF has already lost one argument below FL100. And I don't care about the existence of the RAF for its' own sake. If the only reason for keeping something was to preserve a badge and some history, then I couldn't support that. I believe in the RAF because it ensures that focus remains on areas of air power that (for good reasons) are not immediate priorities for either the Navy or the Army. SH is an immediate priority for both of those services.

By your FL100 logic, the USAF would be under existential threat; it isn't. As I set out earlier, why should an air force consisting of air defence, attack, AT and ISTAR not continue to exist as an independent entity? All of those areas have applicability over maritime and land environments and sit very well in a separate service.

Presently, there is a lot of jealousy internally about the successes of the RAF SH force. Have a look at the names, dates and DFCs on the 18, 27 and 28 Sqn honours boards and the appointment of latest CAS to back this up.

I haven't detected any jealousy towards the SH force from my corner of the RAF. Their DFCs were very well-earned in tough environments. It's a simple fact that in recent years the AT and FJ fleets have not needed to expose themselves to ground threats to the same extent (stand fast XV179 - RIP) and none of us can possibly begrudge any recognition of the courage of the SH force. However the luxury of operating above the the reach of the Afghan / Iraqi / Libyan ground threats does not diminish the contribution or experiences of others in any way; indeed I would observe wryly that none of the SH DFCs would have been won were it not for the truckies bringing the helicopters and crews into theatre. But if thinking that we are jealous makes you feel better about your achievements, then please do so, it's free and I don't mind! http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

As regards the new CAS, my concern would be that should he seek to defend the position of RAF in SH (which, I'm sure you can tell, I don't believe is the most defensible of our assets), there is a risk that he might trade away items that are more firmly within the 'core' of an independent air force's business. Still waiting for someone to convince me!

[high spirits]

Easy,
CHF provide a very valuable, but niche capability. They are not big enough to do all SH. So are you suggesting expanding them? If that's the case, you will save on a handful of crab blue uniforms and some HQ posts. The assets, infrastructure, pay, pensions, accommodation etc of a 60 ac chinook base and a Sqn of Puma are still needed. I can't really understand the point. The need to maintain relevance, credibility and parity with the Army and RN on the battlefield is everything. If all they see of the RAF is Brize and the odd FJ the 'hundred year experiment' will become just that.

As for the Sqn model. There are not many enemies that we would need to fight against requiring mass tank busting helicopter regiments. Sqns by their very nature can be too insular. The JHF model has worked very well, I think we should capitalise on it that's all.