Lionair plane down in Bali.

[sevenstrokeroll]

in order to understand any of the modern gadgets, one must understand whence we came...the old ways.

I didn't fly DC3's, but I know I would be home in one.yet, in my day I was the first kid on my block to have full RNAV coverage for the USA...before civilian use of GPS!

any modern pilot not familiar with "fate is the hunter" has no business in the cockpit of a plane.

the same traps are out there...

[777boeings]

And meanwhile, back to the thread.......

[PickyPerkins]

The text below is by a RAF WW2 night-fighter pilot (F/O L. J. York, DFC) about his primary pilot training in the USA in 1942. How things have changed.

Primary School was at Tuscaloosa, Alabama (a University town). Here we flew Steerman PT17's (PT=Primary Trainer). They were (and still are) Radial Engine Biplanes about twice the weight of a Tiger Moth. The instructors were civilian ex bush pilots with at least 5,000 hours flying. The aircraft had no instruments whatsoever not even an air speed indicator.

We were taught to fly 'by the seat of your pants'. The whistle of the wind in the bracing wires was your air speed indicator, When it went quiet, you knew you were too slow and near the stall. It was a superb training to get you to have the real 'feel' of flying.

At the end of the two-month course, I had done a total of 67 hours flying. 50% of the course had been eliminated. For the Americans it meant that they would not be pilots. For the British it meant being shipped up to Canada, for re-assessment. We could not be as choosy as the Americans and some were trained as pilots in Canada.

[philipat]

That is simply NOT credible. Aircraft from the West for a landing on 09 NEVER approach from the East unless landing on 27. If landing on 27, the track would be well North of the field then over South Bali and the East coast and possibly out to sea (Depending on traffic) before lining up for the 27 approach. Either way, such a sighting from the Terminal would NOT be possible.

I strongly suggest that this "Eye Witness" can be discounted.

[philipat]

As in, First FTFA? Seems to be getting lost in the technology.

[Pucka]

The bottom line in this accident has to be how the crew handled the visual segment, at or before the MDA. Boeing wipers we know are crap. VASI/PAPI indications in heavy rain would have been visually limiting. Experience would have counted and reversion to basic skills for a successful in zone landing would then become primary functions..ie magenta dependency has to be dumped in favour for the cognitive flying skills that are the building blocks of what we do as professional aviators, irrespective of the types we fly.

[PJ2]

Dozy and others;

No, this thread is not the place to wander into those areas, and I apologize once again to contributors.

At the same time however, in the same manner that organizational factors may be examined for their contribution to the causal pathway in an accident, I think we can take one more step ack and acknowledge how automation and pixelation have changed our perception of what we do in the cockpit.

What got me thinking was someone on the thread who mentioned the possibility that this accident may be like the One-Two-Go MD80 go-around accident at Phuket and insofar as that connection can be made with the oft-mentioned in the thread, "children of the M. line" metaphor, I thought a bit of a wander was reasonable.

But nothing more on this here, as we need to reserve space for the recorder data, when & if that comes!

sevenstrokeroll;
the same traps are out there... Yessir, they are. That's the reason I decided to write what I did. What's more, I think we who have done this work for a few decades all sense the change in some way. I'm sure that most just coming into the profession and being hired by the likes of some outfits haven't a clue what they don't know and won't be told by their employer.

I think automation contributes enormously to flight safety, but not if one doesn't know how to fly and think.

QED.

PJ2

[BOAC]

The bottom line in this accident has to be how the crew handled the visual segment, at or before the MDA. - I assume you mean 'after' or 'below'?

[mm43]

@ Gobonastick

I've had a good look at the available ADS-B data from FlightRadar24, which terminates as the aircraft intercepts the extended runway 09 at 29NM from the threshold (abt. 28.5NM from ditching). At 0700Z the ADS-B reported - posn 8.7093S 114.6923E, alt 8350, gs 291KTS, V/S 1536FPM, hdg 128T. The impression I have is that the Lionair 738 was #1 in sequence to a Virgin Oz 738 approaching from the SE which was clearly able to join for 09 earlier but appears to have been given a speed restriction.

Without knowing LNI1904's ATC clearance, it looks as if it was cleared to join for 09, but at 0700 it was already low on the extended glide slope, and some other factors indicate that they kept their speed up until fairly late on the approach. Assuming they configured rather late for landing, there may have been more concern in bleeding speed off rather that watching their V/S, which resulted in the aircraft getting on the wrong side of the drag curve when they ran into a heavy squall. With AoA margin decreasing in the rain, any NU resulted in the reported "sinking feeling" at CLmax break. Luckily for everyone, there wasn't too much available airspace and the A/C belly flopped into the tide.

As for the Virgin Oz 738, it joined RH for 09 at about the same time as Lionair started paddling in the coral, and was immediately vectored to the ESE on a long RH circuit to rejoin and land 20mins later at 0730Z. Its position prior to the Lionair accident and shortly after may account for various reports attributed to "eye witnesses" by the media.

@ PJ2

Guessing that the A/C was probably 15 degrees or more NU at impact with the Bali Strait, the resulting dolphin dive probably caused the wipers to go vertical!

[Toruk Macto]

Very long time ago in a country not far from this place a local operator was just behind a foreign airline but other direction both approaching for a VOR app. Local controller told local operator in local dialect to keep the speed up and I will make you No 1 . Local intercepted dme arc , flew through inbound radial clean , continued descent at a high descent rate while trying to configure . The foreign aircraft reported sighting the aircraft in the water but no response from a now empty control tower .
I'm in no way saying this is what happened here .

[BOAC]

Just seemed an oddly specific remark from the witness, that's all. - I would suggest that since Bandung is west of Bali, this 'eye-witness' could usefully be ignored?

[jetjockey696]

Translated from Tempo.co (indonesian news network)


"Management stated Lion Air Boeing 737-800 NG aircraft pilot who crashed in Bali on Saturday to receive an award from the Boeing Company. "Mr. Ghozali, pilot, may award from Boeing," said Director of Airport Operations and Services Lion Air, Daniel Putut Kuncoro Adi, when contacted by Tempo, Thursday, April 18, 2013.

Putut not give a detailed explanation of the award. He said he would explain that after handing compensation to the victims this afternoon.

The news of awards to pilots who have won more than 10 thousand hours of flying was previously known from chirp Mahlup daughter, Sari Desita Dinda, on social networking site Twitter.

On April 16, 2013 at 16:35, Dinda typing tweet about his father received the award from Boeing. He also put pictures Mahlup, Mahlup wife, and a strange man who was standing in the office area. "Speech award dr parusahaan Boeing: '))," the chatter Dinda.

Previously, at 10.37 o'clock, Dinda also type a tweet that said her father received an award from the Chief of Bali Police. However, this time he did not put pictures, but only tag the tweet spot position is typed, ie, Lion Air Tower 6th floor. "Cieee Papap the chief of police dpt dr awards bali .. so i dont care about the news in the media ...," he said".

Tempo 18/04/2013

[ExSp33db1rd]

PJ2 - I agree that we should return to the subject of the accident, but I would just like to make a couple more comments.

I was once told, but can't verify, that when Eddie Rickenbacker was in charge of Eastern Airlines he refused to have aircraft fitted with the then fairly new Sperry autopilot of the era, on the grounds that those guys are paid to fly, so make them fly. Maybe some Eastern Old Fart can confirm ?

and ... I well remember the furore over the then BEA experiment of the two pilots flying a "monitored approach" whereby the non-handling pilot did nothing but look out of the window until he had the runway in sight and could positively take over and make a visual landing, meanwhile the handling pilot kept resolutely on instruments and made no attempt to transition from instrument flying to visual flying, and if at Minima the non-handling pilot had not taken over, then the instrument flying pilot started the go-around without further command. The concept was to avoid the difficulty of making the transition from instruments to visual, and maybe back to instruments again if nothing was in sight.

I was in Idlewild ( not Kennedy ) Customs one day when a grizzled old (!) PanAm Captain came over to us and asked if we were that Limey outfit carrying out the monitored approach nonsense ? ( we weren't, we were BOAC not BEA ) He went on to say that PanAm had been carrying out Monitored Approach procedures evers since the formation of the airline. Oh, really we said, Yes, he replied - I fly, he monitors.

Now ... about this accident ..............

[ATC Watcher]

I'm in no way saying this is what happened here .

No , but you are suggesting it, and based on evidence , or rumor you've heard ? I guess .Jeezz...
Please can't you wait a few more days, the CVR/FDR have been recovered .

[sevenstrokeroll]

but of course, the facts might not be the facts.

well, everyone got out alive...and I'm sure they didn't hit a flock of geese and that the plane wasn't at fault.

[philipat]

The NTSB is involved because of the "Boeing" angle. As far as I am aware, Indonesia has no capability of analysing Box data, so it will have to go to The US or The UK for analysis.

Whilst there might be some todying to Indonesian interests (Like in that disgusting Air Crash Investigation Episode where Bapak Franz is so useful), I find it unlikely that the recent Lion order of Boeing NG's would in any way compromise the truth in this investigation. Especially involving a 73.

Unless I am misunderstanding your intended meaning here?

More likely to hit Ducks in Bali but they are usually encountered crispy and not on the Kuta reef!!

[Toruk Macto]

My story concludes with the 2 controllers never making it to the trial. One committed suicide the other died in car accident on the way to inquest, both a bit mysterious.

I have heard nothing about what happen to this plane , I am very grateful everybody got out . My story happened a long time ago but it illustrates that waiting for the final report to come out may add nothing to air safety, what is being discussed here does. No offence to the Lion air crew .

[Capn Bloggs]

No , but you are suggesting it, and based on evidence , or rumor you've heard ? I guess .Jeezz...
Please can't you wait a few more days, the CVR/FDR have been recovered .
Settle Gretel. This is a rumour site. Don't like it? Don't come here. Besides, the multitude of posts here have thrown up some good learning points, especially for jet pilots. :hmm:

[Clear_Prop]

Sevenstrokeroll:

I certainly agree with you that we should wait for the facts... especially since I am not as sure as you that there was nothing wrong with the plane... it being a fresh delivery from a company recently blighted by quality control issues.

I'm not having a pop at Boeing I'm just saying that on balance I want to see raw data from the recorders before I decide for myself what the lessons are from this incident.

The speculation is getting very convincing from some posters on here but until we know what was being said and done at the time of the event, were just trying to fit a square peg into a round hole!

[PJ2]

ExSp33db1rd;

Yes, back on thread but thanks for your response. In re Rickenbacker, fascinating man and life. I suspect even men who seem larger-than-life like Rickenbacker could treat automation as the third, (or possibly even the second) pilot. I believe we see that thinking today in non-pilot airline executives, but with an ironic twist: Rickenbacker said that he paid his pilots to "fly" so no autopilot, while today airline execs pay millions for technology and expect it and not their pilots, to "fly". Both views badly misconstrue and therefore do not value the role of an airline pilot.

re pilot-monitored approaches, fully agree with your comments. I've done them, (DC9), they work well and you're right - they keep both pilots in the loop.

mm43;

Re the interesting notion regarding the wiper blades in the vertical position, yes I can see that happening; - the force of water momentarily washing over the nose as the airplane "dolphin-ed" forcing the blades to the vertical position.

The one thought that occurred when seeing them in that position in the original video (around page 3 or so) was, 'how odd that they would stop at that position (when electrical power was lost at impact)'.

But then, would even 15deg NU likely be sufficient to cause the nose to momentarily bury itself? Rather, would the airplane pancake, especially if the energy of the force upwards were expended in the breaking of the fuselage vice forcing the nose downward and into the water?

We'll know, (hopefully) soon enough whether the sound of the wipers is on the CVR.

PJ2

[tmny]

@philipat

The NTSC in Jakarta is be able to download the data from the recorders by itself.

Look at the final report 97004 of the Sukhoi accident 2012 at page X:

Both recorders were downloaded in the NTSC facility by the NTSC experts and were assisted by the Russian experts.

There is no reason to blame the Indonesia authorities, to them Lion Air is in the focus already and Lion Air is responsible who and how is flying there aircrafts in some way. Maybe more important than rain, clouds, ts, etc.

Maybe Lion Air needs help in education or finding well educated pilots for their huge growing. Maybe to be a pilot is more than to push the buttom or maybe speech recognition in the cockpit in future is a good idea to command as we have already in modern cars.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I did monitored approaches in the DC9 for CATII ops...worked fine.

When I lived in Boston, I went to the Public Library there and read every back issue of Aviation Week...in 1965 when the DC9 came out, there was a nice article on the monitored approach.

[fireflybob]

Last Company I flew for (a well known European loco) flies monitored approaches when weather below specified minima. Had never operated this way but rapidly came to the conclusion that it was a sound way of managing the approach.

I believe quite a large analysis of approach accidents discovered that 75% of them occurred on a non precision approach when the Captain was flying the aircraft. (No sleight intended against Captains but statistically just a fact of life).

[PJ2]

sevenstrokeroll;

Yes, it worked really well, didn't it? It required that the guy flying hand over a stable airplane, 'in-the-slot' so the guy looking out could just keep going.

Technology has outpaced such techniques I think and part of my point is that this is both a good thing and a problem, depending upon whether one knows what one is doing or not, and that in turn is a result of training, experience and one's individual keeness to work hard learning one's craft and profession. (I don't hear the word 'keen' too often anymore but then the profession has been altered vastly.)

If one believes in, and has confidence in technology to the exclusion of one's own belief and confidence in one's own skills, then it is a matter of time before circumstances overwhelm one's abilities if they're only honed "inside". I offered all the time and even taught but I couldn't get any F/Os to hand-fly and that was in 1992! What's it like today? I think we're seeing the outlines of an answer. So it will be very interesting to see what's on the recorders.

[framer]

There is no reason to blame the Indonesia authorities.
You may be right. We'll see shortly I hope. My bet is that you are wrong though.
Lion Air is responsible who and how is flying there aircrafts in some way.
The Indonesian Authorities are responsible to the citizens of Indonesia to ensure a safe development and operation of the Indonesian aviation industry. This includes ensuring that rules and regulations around minimum qualifications and ongoing training standards are enforced. It also decides what rules are there in the first place to serve the Indonesian people's interests. It also determines how quickly Lion Air can grow and expand and whether or not P2F pilots can be recruited and in what numbers. It approves the SOP's that seemingly allow the company to make rules such as f/o's not being PF below 5000ft.
The companies will gravitate towards the most " cost effective " methods of operating, it is the Indonesian Authority's role to draw a line in the sand and ( on behalf of the Indonesian public) prevent unsafe operating procedures from developing.
I would be surprised if one of the links in this chain wasn't produced within their halls.
Maybe Lion Air needs help in education or finding well educated pilots for their huge growing.
Maybe they could pay Rishworth or Parc Aviation to do this, it is certainly not the job of the Indonesian Authorities.

[Loose rivets]

Yep, MAPs in British Eagle c 64-65. Men from the ministry of planes sometimes came along to observe.

.

[ExSp33db1rd]

(No sleight intended against Captains but statistically just a fact of life).

Quote "There are lies, damned lies, and Statistics." ( Disraeli ? )

I would say that 'statistically' a Captain would do the flying when an approach was considered more demanding, i.e. a non-precision one, why stick your neck out and give it to a F/O whose skills one might not have had personal experience of, so if 'statistically' more Captains fly NPA's then 'statistically' most of the NPA accidents would happen when a Captain was flying.

QED

[Jet Jockey A4]

PJ2 and sevenstrokeroll;

Yes, it worked really well, didn't it? It required that the guy flying hand over a stable airplane, 'in-the-slot' so the guy looking out could just keep going.

I have to wonder with today's HUD and EVS equipped aircrafts if this is a thing of the past?

Because you are flying the HUD, there is no more transitioning to the outside at minimums so doesn't this make it safer?

[fireflybob]

I would say that 'statistically' a Captain would do the flying when an approach was considered more demanding, i.e. a non-precision one, why stick your neck out and give it to a F/O whose skills one might not have had personal experience of, so if 'statistically' more Captains fly NPA's then 'statistically' most of the NPA accidents would happen when a Captain was flying.

One assumes that both crew members have been adequately trained in their respective roles. Notwithstanding that on a monitored approach the FO is the pilot flying the autopilot would normally be utilised.
The monitored approach concept frees up the Captain from the task of flying the aircraft with, I would suggest, a reduction in the workload. Also if on reaching minima there is no visual reference the FO will stay on instruments and execute a Go Around.

I agree that there is more than one way of operating an a/c but speaking personally I have found it a very effective and I would suggest safer way of operating the a/c in conditions of lower cloudbase and/or viz. Of course I take your point that anything can be proved with statistics and am aware of the Disraeli quote.

[PJ2]

Jet Jockey A4;

Regretably I haven't flown using a HUD so can't compare the experience. However, your observation makes sense because one is already "looking through" the information at the environment ahead.

I think on a approach where weather, airfield conditions, terrain, fatigue or aircraft limitations may place unusual demands on a crew, the monitored approach may be one way to conduct the manoeuvre. But it has to be a company's SOPs and trained for; deciding to do it at the last minute because it seems like a good idea then making it up as the approach unfolds is obviously not as good as following one's company's familiar and trained SOPs. It does require practise.

It sure worked well in the maritimes . . . ;-)

PJ2

[framer]

I don't believe it to be a condemnation of Captains flying abilities at all and I think the premise is accurate.

Think of it this way, if the f/o is flying, and starts to get a fraction low or a fraction slow, how far will the Captain let it develop before he/ she verbalises the deviation?
If the Captain is the PF and starts to get a fraction low or a fraction slow how far will the f/o let it develop before he/ she verbalises it?

In an ideal world the answer to both questions would be the same but we don't live in an ideal world and the answer is not normally the same.
Some might be tempted to reply with " if the f/o did their job correctly then that wouldn't be a problem etc etc" but saying that doesn't change the reality that the answers are different, it doesn't change human nature, and therefore doesn't reduce the chances of dirt coming in the windows.
If you want to reduce the likelihood of CFIT then a step in the right direction is to have the f/o fly the approach while the Captain monitors it's progress and calls any deviations. The Captain will have more available mental processing power than he/she would have if they were PF and that fact combined with their presumably greater experience also helps to reduce the CFIT risk.

So.....how do you follow the Flight Safety Foundations recommendation to have the f/o as PF in this situation when your regulator allows the bean counters running the operation to employ pilots of such low experience and flying ability that an SOP is created to prevent them flying below 5000ft? The answer is that you can't and both the regulator and the airline management are negligent in their responsibilities to the travelling public.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I am reminded of the film (and book) "FAIL SAFE"...early on in the film, the head of the electronics firm, responsible for the gadgets in the war room, says: the machines are too fast , the human element is gone, but there is a new kind of problem, the machines can't be monitored by the men.


anyone who hasn't seen this film should really watch it (my words are a paraphrase, not a quote).

and the same thing with the advanced automation planes.

we have reached a turning point in the man / machine interface...and we are losing!

[onetrack]

One must not lose sight of the fact, that in this event being discussed, the end result would almost certainly have been vastly different, if there had been terra firma instead of water under the approach path.
The end result would have been another event virtually identical to the Afriqiyah Airbus A330 crash at Tripoli (flight 8U771). Different aircraft, yes - but a final result that would have been little different.
The fact that all pax and crew virtually walked away from this event should not mean that the crash should be treated with less importance than the Afriqiyah crash.
Both events appear to show serious deficiencies in CRM and piloting skills - that have survived training programmes, as well as extensive hour logging, by both the PIC and FO.

Pilot error caused 2010 Afriqiyah crash | Libya Herald (http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/02/28/pilot-error-caused-2010-afriqiyah-crash/)

[framer]

One track you have just reminded me of the Schiphol 737-800 that had the radio altimeter fail on the left side. If that occurred again( or was MEL'd u/s) and the thrust levers retarded because the aircraft thought it was approaching the flare, and the crew picked it up late, could we get the result we see here? I don't know enough about the Schiphol crash to make comment....anyone else here know more?

[radken]

Hard to stay current with all the writing going on so quickly in this thread... Maybe someone's already said this? But our -300's back in the 90's were all placarded with a nice big, red placard in front of both pilots, cautioning crew to "MAINTAIN AT LEAST 45% N1 WHEN OPERATING IN RAIN OR VISIBLE MOISTURE." This was done in deference to the CFM-56's tendency (small core dia) to lose its fire too easily during water ingestion. Keeping rpm up I suppose was the engineers solution to avoiding unpowered flight. Are those placards still on 737 dashboards? Can some of you pro's address this? What's it like to fly in those monsoon rains out in Bali? Could it be like ingesting birds, with similar loss of options and similar outcomes like Sully experienced?

[philipat]

Lion Air will pay maximum Rp 4m baggage compensation | The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/04/17/lion-air-will-pay-maximum-rp-4m-baggage-compensation.html)

(IDR 4m is about USD 400)

Lion will treat the incident as "Damaged or lost baggage" and will also cover medical expenses of those injured. Generous to a fault......

[Centaurus]

Both events appear to show serious deficiencies in CRM

Am I the only person to wonder if the term "CRM" is in danger of being a catch-all excuse for todays aircraft accidents in general? if the captain or his first officer flares too late and does a hard landing, the first thing that people talk about on Pprune is that he didn't use enough CRM -as if it is some type of new sunscreen or something.

From the current evidence on Pprune :ok: there is a good possibility that the cause of the Lion Air accident will be found to be the failure of the captain to conduct a safe go-around after losing all forward vision due heavy rain at or below the MDA. Where the actions of his first officer will come into the equation, has yet to be revealed.

But lack of CRM, or poor CRM or whatever other label can be applied to CRM, is steadily becoming a tired cliche applied to almost every accident report. In turn, this has fuelled an enthusiastic acceptance in the industry by professional and amateur pilots alike, that CRM must have been involved otherwise there probably would not have been an accident.

It should be remembered that CRM as a published concept first came to vogue after the PANAM/KLM double 747 crashes in the Canary islands that caused such great loss of life.

Suddenly the spectre of the God-like arrogant captain figure became alive and so CRM was designed to encourage subordinates to speak up and not cower before the Captain Queegs of the LH seat.

[lomapaseo]

Hard to stay current with all the writing going on so quickly in this thread... Maybe someone's already said this? But our -300's back in the 90's were all placarded with a nice big, red placard in front of both pilots, cautioning crew to "MAINTAIN AT LEAST 45% N1 WHEN OPERATING IN RAIN OR VISIBLE MOISTURE." This was done in deference to the CFM-56's tendency (small core dia) to lose its fire too easily during water ingestion. Keeping rpm up I suppose was the engineers solution to avoiding unpowered flight. Are those placards still on 737 dashboards? Can some of you pro's address this? What's it like to fly in those monsoon rains out in Bali? Could it be like ingesting birds, with similar loss of options and similar outcomes like Sully experienced?

best taken to the Tech section

[fireflybob]

Centaurus, well said!

[philipat]

Perhaps CRM failures have come to include a more basic concept that, First, someone should, FTFA?

[smiling monkey]

From the current evidence on PPRuNe there is a good possibility that the cause of the Lion Air accident will be found to be the failure of the captain to conduct a safe go-around after losing all forward vision due heavy rain at or below the MDA. Where the actions of his first officer will come into the equation, has yet to be revealed.

It has been suggested in this thread (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/512476-lionair-plane-down-bali-23.html#post7797407) from 'inside information' that the F/O retracted the flaps to 15 degrees without being commanded by the Captain, who we assume was now the PF. If that's not a failure in CRM, or Multi-Crew Coordination, then I don't know what is.

[Capn Bloggs]

It has been suggested in this thread from 'inside information' that the F/O retracted the flaps to 15 degrees without being commanded by the Captain, who we assume was now the PF. If that's not a failure in CRM, or Multi-Crew Coordination, then I don't know what is.
Precisely what Centaurus is saying. This is not CRM or "coordination", this is just a technical skill stuffup, plain and simple.

Would you really expect the crew to have a committee meeting (good CRM) to discuss what the FO had just done? Of course not. CRM is working together to solve a problem/FOs being empowered to speak up/Captains listening to their crew. However, one of the most basic requirements of good CRM is that each member involved is technically skilled in his/her job. If someone stuffs up in the hypothesised manner and the aircraft crashes immediately, it's not a CRM failure, it a technical skills failure.

Note: I am in no way implying that the Lion Air crew made any errors. My comments on CRM are general in nature using the example mentioned.

[lederhosen]

Not selecting go-around thrust would have to be high up on the list of possible causes.

Regarding the rumour that the FO may have selected F15 uncommanded, I am reminded of various suggestions made on a previous topic of what to do if your captain was determined on continuing with an unsafe approach. It may even have been the one about the Air India Express crash where an experienced Indian FO was paired with a highly experienced european and everyone was killed.

Forcing matters by calling go-around and starting the go-around actions was, if I remember correctly, one idea from certain quarters. Selecting flaps 15 is of course not the first action, but on the 737 it does come after setting go-around thrust and before 'positive climb gear up'. In the best traditions of pprune this is of course all rumour and speculation. But hopefully we will find out reasonably soon what really happened and can learn something useful.

[mary meagher]

Has anyone called attention to the similarities between the Polish President's flight and failure to go around with the Bali splashdown? The pressures to continue an approach despite unable to visually acquire the runway below decision height....if pilots worry about being called in for tea and biscuits every time they have to go around, part of the blame in both accidents must be squarely placed on the organisation.....

[radken]

Lomapaseo

I dunno.... Seems the point that maybe both eng's were drowned after joining the GS, due possibly the skippers failure to set up properly for hvy rain, could also be a distinct possibility, and as worthy of inclusion in this thread as other comments on p2f, etc.. FDR will prove or disprove this. It sure would explain what was reported concerning the uninterrupted descent to the water if in fact that is true.

[garpal gumnut]

This applies in so many disciplines which deal with critical incidents in real time as opposed to virtual reality minus experience. I have kept your post and will use it in my discipline.

[Speed of Sound]

As someone pointed out earlier, the surfer dude who went to the rescue seemed to be suggesting that the first he knew of the plane's presence was the splash as it hit the water.

If this is to believed then the engines were either out or at or just above idle. A high bypass engine spools up in less than 6 seconds so even a partially successful attempt at a go around would be making a hell of a racket before it hit the water. :-(

Am I right in thinking we haven't seen any pics of the post-crash engines yet?

SoS

[kimir]

Hello Radken,

The newer cfm-56-7B engines are fadec controlled and the eec provides for inflight flameout protection if there is an uncommanded reduction in N2 or N2 is below idle. The Fan is Wide chord but i'm not sure how much the core has changed? With regards to flight in heavy rain etc the manual says, avoid if possible but to place the start switches to "CONTinuous" probably as a backup to the auto relight function. No minimum N1 is specified, it does say to "Maintain an increased minimum thrust setting", An old training capt once told me min 40% on app for spool up reasons alone! Maybe the Lawyers got involved. Always easy when your not in the hot seat yourself. As you said it will all come out soon. Regards. Kimir.

[Capn Bloggs]

No minimum N1 is specified, it does say to "Maintain an increased minimum thrust setting"
Don't you just love clear, unambiguous manuals... :*

[Centaurus]

An old training capt once told me min 40% on app for spool up reasons alone! Maybe the Lawers got involved.

That sounds like yet another old furphy propogated by those who should know better. No warning in the FCOM about 40% N1 spool up unless you are talking about the initial spool before pressing TOGA at the start of the take off roll. And that is for a different reason altogether.

In another life there was a company procedure designed by our chief pilot that we must never come below a certain approach power setting on final below 1000 ft. It was an an F28 and to do with the chief pilot's personal opinion on spool up times in case of a go-around.

While under line training I needed to reduce thrust a smidgin to adjust speed on short final although the glide slope was spot on. The checkie screamed at me that I was breaking company SOP by bring the throttles back below the magic spool up number introduced by the chief pilot.

I said no problem - in that case I am now going around. Don't go around for fukc sake screamed the checkie- just don't do it again..:mad:

[kimir]

From personal experience Centaurus bringing the thrust back too idle on approach in gusty conditions can leave you in a low power, decreasing airspeed with slow engine acceleration (not as bad as earlier generation engines) situation. I still use 40% N1 as a ball park minimum on approach.... and yes this "technique" has worked for me for many years. ;) What sort of Higher than minimum N1 do you think Vol 1 FCOM is referring to? What do you use? Not a dig just a question? All the best. Kimir

[framer]

The chaps posting that CRM is about empowering the f/o to speak up or about having a democratic meeting about where the flaps should be set etc are either the victims of terrible CRM training or they are out of touch with what CRM is.
There is no doubt that moving the flap to 15 at that stage ( if it occurred) is a technical error, I agree with that, but what caused it? Was it a communication error? A decision making error? Lack of S.A? Poorly managed flight resulting in overload late in the approach? Lack of authority gradient?
Technical errors normally follow a series of non technical errors, CRM is the non technical elements that place pressure on the tech skills if not done well.
Would the same flight have ended differently if different decisions had been made earlier in the flight? Yip. Well those decisions are CRM.
To think that a flights successful outcome is totally dependent on tech skills and independent of non tech skills ( CRM ) is not realistic.
Non tech skills (CRM) are just that.......skills. They can be taught and improved. In fact that is what the old school guys did, they taught themselves CRM or were taught it by more experienced pilots , they just didn't call it CRM.
I am in my early forties, not a child of the magenta line and lucky enough to have been taught by some of the old school guys, but also able to accept the change and view of the modern thinking in our industry, a nice position to be in as I can see the value in both mind sets.
Rubbishing CRM is indicative of resistance to change in my opinion.

[PJ2]

For those interested in the CRM question, there is a good discussion on CRM on the Turkish B737 accident at Schiphol, with questions beginning about here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/363645-turkish-airliner-crashes-schiphol-143.html#post7686297).

CRM first, is just "good breeding", an old-fashioned term from the 50's which in western cultures generally means good manners, respect for others, courtesy without meek compliance or brash disregard, listening first then speaking, reserved judgment in the face of contrary information, clear expression of one's views while maintaining the dignity of the conversation and remembering what people say.

Believe it or not, that can be done in a cockpit and although it's just the beginning, common courtesies work.

It is when ego, narrowed-vision, sense of unquestioned authority, anger, distraction and frustration all interfere with common courtesy, that trouble can occur. In question such as these, settling the matter on the ground is the only course of action.

As I mentioned in that thread, the cockpit is NOT a democracy; legally, historically and practically there is only one decision-maker in the cockpit. CRM is a way of placing all information before the crew. Often a decision is mutual, but in cases of strong disagreement where agreement cannot be reached on a course of action with all knowledge 'on the floor', the captain alone is the decision-maker.

CRM is not politeness and, unless incapacitation or it is clear that the potential for an accident is extreme, it is does not authorize or legitimate taking over the aircraft. Exceptions are clear where there is risk of an accident: The Air Blue A321 accident at Islamabad and the Air India Express accident at Madras and the Garuda approach into Bali were clear circumstances in which it would have been appropriate for the F/O to have taken control.

The law is clear: the captain answers for the safety of life and property, period. Even if s/he wanted to, the captain cannot hand over command authority to anyone board unless incapacitated or absent. CRM is intended to elicit all views relevant to the circumstances at hand, (captain, should we be at this altitude this far out...?", etc.) offered by all crew members. Someone speaking up from the back seat about altitudes, speeds, rates-of-descent, distances, direction, fuel or times is heard first, then considered, then discussed, then acted upon, even if action is no-action.

Such a CRM "moment" can be a quick exchange lasting less than a few seconds, or 10 - 20 seconds long, or a protracted minute unless there's a serious and complicated emergency, (QF32...) in which case it's a very long and demanding exercise for all.

There is nothing "new age" or soft and "psychobabble-ish" about CRM. It requires toughness, training and discipline just like SOPs do.

PJ2

[framer]

"Good Breeding" is another way of saying that the family/ school environment that someone grew up in taught them CRM principals. I know I learnt a lot of mine working on the farm with my Grandad in my first 15 years.
Although I agree with a lot of what you just posted PJ, I still think that you are only describing a very limited portion of what CRM actually is. It feels like you limit it to how crew members interact and place particular emphasis on where command lies. Where command lies should never be in doubt.
Probably 90% of CrM principals apply to single crew operations as much as they do to multi crew operations.
Anyway, enough of a hijack, can anyone come up with a good reason that this was not a repeat of the Turkish accident in Schphol? Radio Altimeter fails, thrust levers come back, crew didn't notice because hands weren't on the thrust levers, or they didn't notice as they were hot and levers were at idle already.

[johannschmith]

How about:-

NPA - auto throttle not used. Go around attempted (for whatever reason) by pushing TOGA switch but no follow up on levers to ensure TOGA engages (forgetting that they were in Manual Thrust).

Pure speculation of course.

However it is true that Indonesian aviation is rotten to the core. Poorly trained pilots with little personal discipline or standards. I know, I've had to try to train some of them not so long ago, all with thousands of hours and unable to fly basic IF. Corrupt officials all the way to the top. EU foolishly allowed Garuda back into Europe saying that the Authority was now conducting proper supervision of all operators which we all know is laughable. This is the same Authority that allows Merpati to still hold an AOC even though they've had a fatal accident virtually every year for the past twenty or so years.

[repariit]

The FDR & CVR have been out of the bay for almost a week now. By now, shouldn't some journalist have asked the NTSB team, led by Senior Air Safety Investigator Dennis Jones, or the Indonesian authorities, where they were sent for examination, and reported on when the work would be done?

Any of you journalists care to comment?

[5 APUs captain]

2 kimir:

From my 5000 hrs experience with 737 - I am also using 40%N1 as a minimum setting on a glideslope; for me it works!

[johannschmith]

Yes you CAN level off at MDA legally and fly level to the MAP - dive and drive but this has been dropped by any self-respecting airline for years due to the number of accidents it produced.

A Constant Angle NPA - CANPA or CA APPROACH is flown like an ILS using (usually but not always) an increment of 50 ft added to the MDA so that one does not infringe the real MDA in a GA at MDA+50.

Much safer.

[PJ2]

framer;

Re, "I know I learnt a lot of mine working on the farm with my Grandad in my first 15 years."

Yep; that's what I meant. One learns it at another's knee, so to speak.

Re, "I still think that you are only describing a very limited portion of what CRM actually is."

Very likely - I'd welcome a discussion on that sometime as my experience is limited to airline ops.

Cheers!

PJ2

[philipat]

The Garuda approach into Bali??

[PJ2]

Going by memory, sorry. Yogyakarta, thanks.

The B734 overrun - non-stabilized approach.

[philipat]

I wasn't sure if you were referring to the Garuda approach into Jogjakarta (JOG) or the Lion approach into Bali (Which is a first here). I assumed the former because in the latter we simply do not yet know the circumstances. As you would be the first to point out.

[jetjockey696]

With all the crash and burns in Indonesia, I think the worst is still the Garuda Crash of flight 152 killed 238 people.

Flight 152.."The aircraft [PK-GAI], arriving from Jakarta, was cleared for an ILS approach to Medan runway 05 and was flying on a 316° heading on Airway 585/W12. Having descended to 3000ft the crew was instructed to turn left heading 240° for vectoring to intercept the runway 05 ILS. At 1:28pm local time, the flight was instructed to continue on a 215° heading and descend to 2000ft. At 1:30 ATC directed the flight to turn right heading 046 and report when established on the localizer. Confusion the part of the air traffic controller followed over whether GA152 was turning left or right. Just 10 seconds after confirming the right turn, the Airbus crashed in a wooded area, broke up and burst into flames. The wreckage covered a 150x75m area near the village of Pancur Batu, which is located at an elevation of 3000 feet above mean sea level. The accident happened 18 miles short of Medan Airport. The region was affected by smog from forest fires, and visibility was reported to be only 600-800m".

AirDisaster.com 1997

[jetjockey696]

For those who miss out on the Garuda Yogyakarta accident.. here is the full report..

http://www.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/Final%20report%20PK-GZC%20Release.pdf

[lomapaseo]

The FDR & CVR have been out of the bay for almost a week now. By now, shouldn't some journalist have asked the NTSB team, led by Senior Air Safety Investigator Dennis Jones, or the Indonesian authorities, where they were sent for examination, and reported on when the work would be done?


the NTSB is an assisting agancey not the agency in charge and as such should not comment on the course of the investigation without permission from the lead agency.

Typical early comments might be of the nature of the team makeup on the NTSB side and their approx travel schedule.

Keep in mind the release of any information is soley on FYI status basis and not necessarily for armchair internet investigators to fortify their theories.

It's like reading posts on PPrune, you have to read between the lines of all posters based on past experience

[framer]

PJ2,
Very likely - I'd welcome a discussion on that sometime as my experience is limited to airline ops.
I'm keen as mustard as I always learn something from discussions like that ( and this one for that matter) so I'll crank one up when this thread has run it's course.
Cheers :ok:

[philipat]

I think that cutting through the cultural biases remains one of the largest challenges. In the case of Indonesia, and this is off-topic so in no way am I suggesting that this is in any way related to Lion, the phenomenon is known as "Asal Bapak Senang". Literally, "Keep the Boss Happy". In other words, don't challenge your seniors and don't EVER bring bad news which might cause the Boss to "Lose Face" or have to feel embarrassed or compromised.

This also explains problems in the educational system in many countries, because it is not the done thing to "Challenge" the teacher by asking questions. Just shut up and listen. That does not make for enlightened students.

"Etiquette" is one aspect, but that is also culturally biased because Etiquette differs in different cultures. Finding CLEAR ways to cut through cultural biases and distinguish between "Responsibility" and "Disrespect" for the vast majority of the world's population is a major challenge for CRM. And other things.

These types of cultural biases, and also a culture of corruption within which anything "Bisa Diatur" (Can be arranged - for a price, of course), as alluded to in an earlier post, do not make good bed fellows with aviation safety.

[jetjockey696]

Philpat is correct... the culture in Asia is not too lose face.. from the employee to to employers. one want to LOSE damn face, or show weakness... perfect example the japanese, korean and china working environment... dont lose face.. obey your seniors, even they lead you to death... :}

There are rumours that the FO on that flight, was from the famous MSD agent..P2F agent..

here is the latest news from a ppruner (Jay71)... about secrets of MSD..nearly everything is true about MSD

"Those who are interested in joining the Lion Air program through MSD Aviation,

Well MSD aviation recruits pilots who holds a valid CPL multi-IR for a type-rating and a job placement in Lion Air , The executive director Mr. Siddharth Kasana and Director operations Mr Kush Bhasin operates the company operations in New Delhi and Jakarta, Indonesia . MSD aviation have placed around 90 pilots in lion air till now , both the directors are completely money minded they just want their monthly share in their hands for that they will issue forged Noc's which were never issued from the Indian DGCA & when you submit your documents for the renewal of IR rating they would tempered your license without letting you know about any sort of bull**** that they did on it ,they will make an entry on your logbook as a sim check & they would even make a fake sim check report and all that bull**** gets submitted in DGCA and by the time the applicant comes to DGCA to asked about his license , he gets all sort of bull**** in his file , the fake sim check reports , fake Noc's , fake logbook entry's , Since its a MSD'S policy in which they states that they will do all the documentation work related to DGCA the pilots working for the company gets their IR renewed with a fake sim check reports and MSD has paid a good amount of bribe in DGCA to get the things done without any verifications.

MSD aviation states that Lion Training Centre is a TRTO and of course everything can happen in a place like India where you just have to pay good amount of money to get the things done

Lion training centre isn't a TRTO so therefore even if a pilot does a sim check on those sims which ar placed in LTC even then also it won't count for IR renewal & the pilot who recently crashed an aircraft in Bali is an Indian , who flew for months on a fake NOC which was never issued by the DGCA and apparently the pilot doesn't even know from where did he did his last sim check for the purpose of IR renewal because he submitted his licenses to MSD aviation and Mr siddharth Kasana & Mr. Loveraj Singh made forged sim check reports under the knowledge of these pilots , few of them who were against all this forgery has already logged a complaint against MSD aviation soon there will be CBI knocking the DGCA doors again , they have also tempered a license of one of the pilots who was working for their company when the pilot came to India and visited the DGCA , he got to know his file has been lost , In the end he got to know that the training documents of B737 which were directly send to MSD aviation from the TRTO for the purpose of B737 endorsement were never submitted to DGCA in fact
Mr siddharth kasana tempered his license, the pilot has already logged a complain and ending this matter by filing a court case against (MSD Aviation Mr. Siddharth kasana, loveraj Singh , Kush bhasin)in Delhi Court

MSD aviation did this because they're earning 2000$/month from each pilots salary, somewhere about 90 pilots are currently placed by MSD aviation,
That comes out to be around 1,80,000$/month which further comes to be around 1crore INR/month and that's nothing because they are charging 50,000$ for type-rating of B737 which actually costs around 20-25k , so the rest 25k is charged for the conversion of CPL into Indonesian CPL and all those fake promises which ar still pending since 2011 , they have sent around 10 batches till now ,

So they is earning around minimum 3,00,000$/month ,

So if a pilots sits in Jakarta doesn't fly for lion air because of his expired IR then there is a problem for MSD since MSD have leased out these pilots to lion and lion can only complaint to MSD about it , MSD therefore created fake sim check reports followed by bribe to DGCA officers who approves a renewal of IR without doing any verifications and if lion wants to discontinue the contract with MSD aviation because of the pilots who weren't flying then who will lose 3,00,000$/month

I hope you all are smart enough

Well guys don't go through MSD aviation it doesn't matter in which ever airline he's placing you , don't go for it because at the end of the day it's not worth it

The criminal case proceeding will take place in few months , in which they will be prove guilty , apparently Mr Kush bhasin is so scared of the court case that he refused to be a part of MSD

But Mr sk thinks he is the smartest person living on the planet earth
In past few years he has already been involved in criminal activities
he's doesn't know how to get out of this one , from past 4 months he hasn't paid any salaries to pilots working under him. Is That what you pay for? "

[philipat]

I have NO axe to grind with Lion, any other carrier or any particular country. My post was purely philosophical in both nature and content. And was directed entirely at CRM issues, which were already a diversion from the Main Topic of this Thread.

[PJ2]

philipat;

Re, "I think that cutting through the cultural biases remains one of the largest challenges."

Yes, I think that is a realistic statement which is the reason I was careful to describe "breeding and manners" as a "1950's western culture" notion. That acknowledges that cultural biases exist, "the west" being no different.

You're right also about the context of this diversion (while we wait for anything new from the NTSC, etc) into CRM issues being philosophical and that is the way I understood it.

In fact it is not possible to connect "CRM issues" to Lion Air in this instance because we know absolutely nothing about what was said in the cockpit and what the flight data is.

PJ2

[SOPS]

So I read it, now i am really worried..260 knots at 10 miles..and the investigation does not say much about it...those Garuda Captains must really be net to God:mad:

[captjns]

Jetjockey696. What does your rant about MSD have to do with the crash in Bali?:ugh:

[repariit]

Anyway, enough of a hijack, can anyone come up with a good reason that this was not a repeat of the Turkish accident in Schphol? Radio Altimeter fails, thrust levers come back, crew didn't notice because hands weren't on the thrust levers, or they didn't notice as they were hot and levers were at idle already.

A post about midway through this thread reported "inside information" that the F/O (PNF) set flaps 15 when the Capt had not called for it.

[framer]

Yeah I read that but was more after technical information on why this crash was different from the Turkish one. Same aircraft type, ended up in the same place relative to the runway, both low energy etc.

[A37575]

Yeah I read that but was more after technical information on why this crash was different from the Turkish one. Same aircraft type, ended up in the same place relative to the runway, both low energy etc.

Let's cut to the chase in this accident. The aeroplane had a set of throttles that worked if you pushed them. It had a control wheel and two rudder/brake pedals. It had three artificial horizons, three altimeters and three ASI's. And it had two windscreen wipers that don't clear the windscreens in heavy rain. But presumably it had rain repellant.

Short final, runs into blinding rain (happens on busy freeways too) and loses sight of the runway. Happens every minute somewhere in the world. Splurges into the sea for some reason. Should have been a straight forward go-around. Isn't that what instrument ratings are all about?

A low altitude go-around isn't all that complicated when you have those basic controls and instruments if you know what you are doing. . It certainly shouldn't be; although TOGA buttons and other automatic goodies like flight directors can often makes things far more complicated than is really needed.

On the face of it, and at the risk of not knowing yet what really happened between the two pilots in the Lion Air accident, it seems to me that current simulator training syllabae needs to go back to the basics of learning to crawl before you can walk. Re-currency cyclic training in the simulator needs to be taken back to pure and simple basic instrument flying on raw data and no automatics until the pilot is certified competent in those skills. And that must include low altitude go-arounds as a surprise factor.

Only then should practice at use of the automatics and their application to sophisticated instrument approaches and their go-around procedures be made. It seems to me that ethnic cultural mores and and the demonstrated absence of pure instrument flying skills, make dangerous bedfellows.

[framer]

I would love to see that. My IF skills have deteriorated with the increased use of automatics. If our sim sessions involved 45 mins of bare bones IF flying ( no automatics or flight directors ) it would A) be great fun and B) remind everyone of which information is critical and which is " nice to have".
I would bet that many these days couldn't tell you what the required power and pitch is for a given situation. Our sim sessions are so full of box ticking exercises required by the regulator that to even get them done in the time available is a challenge.over the years they keep adding things ( TCAS RA's, RNP AR departures/ arrivals, EDTO scenarios, PRM breakouts etc) , but have the sim sessions got longer to accommodate this?
Nup.

[smiling monkey]

According to this news report on local Indonesian TV, the results of the investigation by the NTSC (KNKT) should be available in 4 months time. The reason for the delay is due to the fact that the investigators also have to report to Boeing their findings.

Hasil Investigasi Kecelakaan Lion Air di Bali 4 Bulan Lagi (http://www.metrotvnews.com/metronews/video/2013/04/17/6/175634/Hasil-Investigasi-Kecelakaan-Lion-Air-di-Bali-4-Bulan-Lagi)

That's one thing that I've found impressive about Indonesian crash investigations. They're usually done quickly especially high profile accidents such as this. I guess they have a lot of experience doing crash investigations, hence the quick findings and reporting. :E

[India Four Two]

I think news report would be better translated as " must be reported to the United States as the state of manufacture". Presumably this a reference to a request for comments from interested parties prior to final publication.

[BOAC]

Regarding this 'Flap15' rumour - maybe the co-pilot wanted a g/a and the Captain did not? Perhaps the co-pilot had been reading PPRune where I believe there had been suggestions in the past that the thing to do was either just raise the gear or select g/a flap?

In any case, if at Vref+5??, changing to Flap 15 would not cause an uncontrollable sink due to Boeing's manouevre speed schedule (power would help....). Far from ideal, mind you!

[Mikehotel152]

Stranger things have happened, BOAC, so it's possible. I've heard reports from the line of FOs doing stranger things after being empowered by modern CRM. But the Far East, where the cockpit gradients are reputed to be steeper than in the west, it would seem very unlikely. Personally, I suspect the final report will contain a few surprises - possibly something disappointing, like the PF called for flap 15 but forgot the related call for GA thrust, PF didn't notice and then the cows got bigger.

[BOAC]

like the PF called for flap 15 but forgot the related call for GA thrust, PF didn't notice.... - not the way any PF I have ever known in the west would do it? Just 'Call for GA thrust' with hands on levers? Is that the way in the Far East? Who handles the throttles, PF or PNF?

[philipat]

That rumour that the FO selected Flaps 15 was never attributed to any source, other than, as I recall "An insider" so probably has little credibility. Besides, how would anyone outside the cockpit know what actually happened?

[framer]

Yeah I've never heard of a PF "calling for go around thrust" either. If you're PF and you want thrust you make it happen one way or another.

[A37575]

Yeah I've never heard of a PF "calling for go around thrust" either. If you're PF and you want thrust you make it happen one way or another.

28th November 1979. A DC10 of Air New Zealand on a sighteeing flight over Antarctia struck the lower slopes of Mount Erebus, an active Antarctic volcano. The aircraft was at about 2000 feet flying at 230 knots. It was later thought they were in white-out weather conditions. The crew acted promptly to a GPWS pull-up warning but time and topography was against them and the impact instantly killed all 257 on board.
From the CVR read-out when the GPWS sounded, the flight engineer called 500 and 400 feet heights above ground level at the same time the captain called "Go around power, please"

[BOAC]

Not too relevant, A - the engineer sets power I believe? We are talking 737 here, not DC10.

[smiling monkey]

That rumour that the FO selected Flaps 15 was never attributed to any source, other than, as I recall "An insider" so probably has little credibility. Besides, how would anyone outside the cockpit know what actually happened?

Obviously close friends of the crew were told their version of events and this then spreads like a domino effect to outer circles. Rumour network in Indo airlines is large; from the trivial who slept with who the night before, to who failed their sim check ... all spreads like wild fire ...

[philipat]

So you are saying that the FO and PIC would openly discuss how they had just successfully flown a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the reef? I would find that difficult to believe, even if Lion's lawyers had not silenced them, at least outside the investigation itself.

I'm sure that we won't have to wait 4 months for more details of the CVR and DFDR data to become known.

[framer]

From the CVR read-out when the GPWS sounded, the flight engineer called 500 and 400 feet heights above ground level at the same time the captain called "Go around power, please"
Too true A37575, it's been a while since I read the copy of the royal commission that I have in my office but I'm sure you're right.
I have to agree with BOAC though that it's not particularly relevant now days.
The standard call in both the 737 operators I've flown for is "Going round flap 15" the PF pushes the TOGA button and advances the thrust levers ( no communication with the PM about that) while pitching up to about 15 degrees, the next call is " positive rate" by the PM and then " gear up" by the PF.
I doubt Lion had an SOP where the PF called for thrust, it would be unique in my experience.

[BOAC]

There are only two, very basic actions required in a 2-crew go-round. Raise the nose and apply g/a power, simultaneously. The a/c will then climb away. All the other bits, some button-pushing, some performance related, are 'extras' and totally irrelevant if the first two actions are not done.

[smiling monkey]

So you are saying that the FO and PIC would openly discuss how they had just successfully flown a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the reef?

In the last three years that I've been flying in this part of the world, there have been many incidents and a few accidents some involving friends, or friends of friends and yes, of course they talk about it to their close friends. To think otherwise suggest that you are far removed from the industry here.

[B737900er]

So lets say your flying the aircraft as Mr Boeing asks I.e manual thrust when the AP is off, You initiate a go-around calling go around flaps 15 simultaneously pressing TOGA and advancing the thrust levers.

You might not necessarily have go around thrust, you could be 5% short- especially if you didn't configure your seat correctly.

I was picked up in the sim from a TRE regarding this issue. So, when I brief regarding a go around, I mention the go around actions and to verify go around thrust is set, once a positive climb is established call for the gear to be raised.

It is the PM job to verify the actions have been carried out correctly and a common one is verifying go around thrust is set. We rely heavily on automation, so when we are finally flying the thing ourselves we forget its manual thrust and pressing TOGA will not give you the thrust required if you don't push forward! (If the speed is off then TOGA will push the levers forward).

[de facto]

You might not necessarily have go around thrust, you could be 5% short- especially if you didn't configure your seat correctly.

Or too short of an arm..:E

[B737900er]

Well this is Asia we are talking about :E

[de facto]

And if it were in the USA,we d be missing 5 degrees of pitch up attitude?:p

[B737900er]

With the belly of some of my colleagues then yes.

[philipat]

My essential point was that this rumour, at face value, has less credibility than many. It came out very early, at a time when I would have thought that the Captain and FO still had more pressing matters than gossiping with "Close friends" about mistakes they had made, resulting in an accident.

Should you have additional information in "The Jungle". please elucidate.

Fortunately, as luck would have it, in this case they were still alive to be able to exercise whatever judgement they saw fit.

[repariit]

My essential point was that this rumour, at face value, has less credibility than many.

Whether it is true or not will come out later. If true, that fact plus the reports from surfers that they did not hear the approaching aircraft with either engine making TOGA EPR noises, explains how it came to be in the bay.

[philipat]

That may very well be correct but unsourced rumours and other speculation don't really contribute much and, ultimately, are disrespectful to the crew in terms of both their airmanship AND the way that they MIGHT have conducted themselves after the event. At this stage, we simply don't know. Might it not be better just to wait for the data?

In such situations, Human nature suggests that it would be normal to find excuses, not admit errors, which is why I find the "Confession to close friends" explanation for an unsubstantiated rumour so unpersuasive. Which might be why the Captain was quoted as having said, to the effect, the rain was so heavy that it felt like the aircraft was just being pushed down beyond my control until I found myself on the reef.

[philipat]

And, incidentally, I don't know if you have ever done any surfing but:


It requires great focus and concentration on a wave. Especially with a Reef break.
The surf makes a HUGE noise.
Every surfer knows that if there are TS around, get out and hang in the Bar.
Many inconsistencies, as always. And also as always, the Swiss cheese slices alignment, as yet, is unexplained.

[philipat]

Actually, I do believe that the accident has already been very well explained herein, should you have read all 612 posts.

If not, either what are your ideas or goodnight.

[repariit]

So shall we all switch to the
Professional Pilots F i n a l R e p o r t N e t w o r k
now?

[philipat]

What if there really was Windshear and/or a FADEC problem and/or a structural or other problem? We simply don't know at this stage. I do believe that the earlier speculation on this thread has probably nailed it, but can't we still maintain some decorum and respect? Or in normal street terms, benefit of the doubt or the presumption of innocence?

As for: Professional Pilots F i n a l R e p o r t N e t w o r k

Is that PPFart.Net? I can't seem to get that URL to work?

[Mikehotel152]

the PF called for flap 15 but forgot the related call for GA thrust

Apologies for not being clearer. B737900er followed my train of thought. I was inferring that a tentative, low hour FO might not push the levers fully forward. Perhaps nobody checked?

if it were in the USA,we d be missing 5 degrees of pitch up attitude :ok:

[Fester Karbunkle]

Actually, I do believe that the accident has already been very well explained herein, should you have read all 612 posts.-And what background and experience are you basing that belief on?

[arba]

I doubt Lion had an SOP where the PF called for thrust, it would be unique in my experience


"GO-AROUND" , "FLAPS FIFTEEN" , "SET GO-AROUND THRUST", new Boeing Procedures. (FCTM Rev.11, last year)

[Centaurus]

You might not necessarily have go around thrust, you could be 5% short- especially if you didn't configure your seat correctly.


True. Depends how you define it. From the FCOM: At first push of TOGA in dual AP operation, thrust advances towards the reduced go-around N1 to produce 1000 to 2000fpm rate of climb. With the second push of TOGA switch after the AT reaches reduced GA thrust, the AT advances to the full GA limit.

In the case of Bali where presumably the thrust levers were being manually controlled, it may be that whoever pushed the throttles did not get them all the way to full GA limit. Not that mattered provided the throttles were set at least to the 1000 to 2000 fpm setting.

Note also in the FCTM under standard phraseology, the partial list of recommended words and phrases includes underthe sub-heading of Thrust:

"SET GO-AROUND THRUST"

(FCTM capitals) :ok:

[smiling monkey]

Actually, I do believe that the accident has already been very well explained herein, should you have read all 612 posts.

If not, either what are your ideas or goodnight.

Whoa, so no need to wait for the accident report then; philipat has worked it all out. PPRUNE arm chair experts does it again!! :rolleyes:

[Fair.Pilot]

"SET GO-AROUND THRUST"? Why need this phrase?
When u shout "GO AROUND" the follow-up action is to push the throttle to fire wall. Is the throttle in NG different from classic 737?

When the throttle is pushed to fire wall, MAX THRUST should be available.
If not, Boeing must redesign the THRUST/THROTTLE system.

1st time TOGA push button, 2nd time TOGA.... pure bullsh*t in EMERGENCY/Go Around

[framer]

I think we may be all correct but with different information in our respective FCTM's.
eg this is from my 2012 version
Standard Phraseology A partial list of recommended words and phrases follows: Thrust: • “TAKEOFF THRUST” • “GO-AROUND” • “MAXIMUM CONTINUOUS THRUST” • “CLIMB THRUST” • “CRUISE THRUST”
Also from my 2012 version;
push either TO/GA switch, call for flaps 15, ensure/set go-around thrust, and rotate smoothly toward 15° pitch attitude.
So it seems to me that although the call to " set go- around thrust " and the target initial pitch attitude are points of discussion, this may just be due to company specific amendments to the FCTM that each of us has been issued with.

Is it possible that some operators have such little faith in their pilots basic flying ability that they recommend delegating the setting of go-around thrust to the PM? It would be news to me but considering the rumour that the Lion Air Firts Officers are not allowed to be PF below 5000ft it wouldn't surprise me.
Thoughts?
Ps the idea of pushing the thrust levers to the fire- wall for a standard go-around seems ridiculous to me. I think it would result in messy level offs and even altitude busts if the MAP level off is at 2000ft as is the case at some airports.

[lederhosen]

There is the usual chest beating going on. The sad fact is that two engine go-arounds are one of the worst flown manouevres in 737 flying. There are several reasons. I will list some, but almost certainly not all, and in no particular order.

The two engined go-around is considered so simple it is rarely trained. On the line it happens very rarely and when it does it is quite unlike the sim where you are expecting it.

Firewalling the throttles is normally not necessary. The 737 is so overpowered that the main problem is not busting the level off as Framer has pointed out.

However not pressing TOGA, failing to set go-around thrust and not following the standard missed approach are all possible traps.

As our employers seek to downgrade the job of pilot to what is beginning to look like amusement park attendant in the left hand seat and hapless punter in the right I can only see this getting worse.

[BOAC]

amusement park attendant in the left hand seat and hapless punter in the right - I like that very much.

Perhaps a note of caution, however - are we all agreed that IF a g/a is called due to significant windshear (one 'theory' in Bali), a 'straight arm' throttle technique is advisable regardless of level-off altitude?

[lederhosen]

Definitely.

[Lookleft]

On the classic if you firewalled the thrust levers you would overboost the engines so it was only ever considered an emergency manouvre. Is this still the case or have Boeing finally put a FADEC in?

[fireflybob]

Lookleft - you can firewall the thrust levers with no issue - merely a tech log entry for the engineers.

Windshear escape manoeuvre calls for this

In a normal GA with my last Company on this type PF would call "GA Flap 15 Set Go Around Thrust" whilst simultaneously advancing thrust levers and rotating to 15 deg NU

The call "set GA thrust" was to remind/ prompt PNF to back up and set thrust as appropriate.

Obviously you call need to retract the gear

[FlyingStone]

On the classic if you firewalled the thrust levers you would overboost the engines so it was only ever considered an emergency manouvre. Is this still the case or have Boeing finally put a FADEC in?

Do you really think it's better to have FADEC-limited maximum (rated) thrust during EGPWS/windshear escape manuever or it would be better to have more than rated thrust ("overboost") available just in case?

Or let me rephrase the question - what is cheaper: 2 brand new engines or airframe with 200 pax on board?

[ExSp33db1rd]

Sounds like we're in danger of actually getting to the reality of that old joke ... The next generation of aircraft will be crewed by a Captain and a dog.
The Captain's there to feed the dog, and the dog's there to see that the Captain doesn't touch anything.

[philipat]

"Whoa, so no need to wait for the accident report then; philipat has worked it all out. PPRuNe arm chair experts does it again!!"

Isn't it wonderful how, in "The Jungle" things can be taken out of context and used to make a point ENTIRELY opposite to the main thrust of the total intent demonstrated by all my posts on this thread?

If you bother to review the record, at no time in this thread did I EVER make any speculation of my own as to the reasons for this accident, in fact quite the reverse, but I did suggest my agreement with the remarks of others that I respect on this Board. Whilst also agreeing that we need to wait for actual data before jumping to conclusions. I would be happy to send you a transcript of all my posts in this thread.


With respect. And this is my last comment to you.

[A37575]

On the classic if you firewalled the thrust levers you would overboost the engines so it was only ever considered an emergency manouvre

Happened in a 737-400 I knew about. Reached ILS minima. Captain literally over-reacted and shoved the throttles to the stops when not needed. F/O too startled to notice. Red EGT lights came on both engines indicating over-temp. Neither pilots noticed the red lights. Too busy making missed approach which required a early turn to track out on VOR. Firewalling is only needed if height is so ctitical that ground contact imminent such as GPWS pull up warning.

[B737900er]

Pressing the TOGA button will initially give you 1000-2000ft FPM that's if the AT is engaged, if not, the thrust levers will stay where they are that's why Boeing added the "ensure go around thrust is set or set go around thrust".


Lion follow the latest Boeing procedures.

I personally think its a good call to have, having to perform a go around in my last LPC using manual thrust, I pushed the levers forward but was 3% short of the initial N1 target, I asked the PNF to set go around thrust which he done.

The TRE had nothing to say regarding it as it was a well flown go around without automatics.

As someone else has already mentioned, a normal go around is not trained as it is a rare manoeuvre and classed as being simple. Take the automatics out, and well see if its simple then.

[smiling monkey]

I have a personal interest in the findings of the investigation as I operate in to WADD on a regular basis. Like with all accident investigations, we need to learn from it in order the minimize the risk of another accident or incident occurring given similar circumstances faced by this crew. But this will only start to happen once the final report has been completed and published. And only then, will the real discussion of what happened to JT 904 begin and be of benefit to those wishing to learn from this unfortunate event.

But please tell me, how have I taken your comment out of context when you say "Actually, I do believe that the accident has already been very well explained herein."

I am not having a go at you, by the way, as I would really like to know more about this accident which you seem to think is already well explained.

[SLFguy]

Smiling Monkey.. I think you may need to re-set your sarcasm detector..

[aa73]

On AA's 738s when you hit TOGA, the A/P disconnects (if it were previously engaged.) All GAs are hand-flown initially... but we can re-engage the A/P above 500'. Not sure if this is the case for all 738s... could this have been a factor in the Lion Air?

[B737900er]

I think you will find that is all 737's do that (stand to be corrected). I think quite a lot of people forget that the AP kicks out in a single channel go around, hence why it's a complete mess when it isn't practiced.

Word in the Lion crew room is that windshear is the cause.

[BOAC]

Thread diversion warning!! Second warning - of no relevance to the accident as far as I know.

OK - I have never flown IAN. Can you fly the 09 procedure as an IAN dual channel?.

[gaunty]

Old King Coal

Thank you for posting Children of the Magenta. Been away and catching up I was working my way through the thread thinking it was time to do so when turns page and there it is. A classic and should be compulsory watching for the "modern driver" :} :ok: fly the aircraft first.

Fascinating thread this with the multiplicity of comment some hilarious.

Maybe I'm way past it but what ever happened to the old low evel wind shear SURVIVAL technique, stick back into the shaker hold and max thrust. Provides the max performance available in what is a potentially life threatening situation.

Click click, click click. :cool:

[de facto]

Firewalling is only needed if height is so ctitical that ground contact imminent such as GPWS pull up warning.

Finally,someone with sense....:ok:

[aa73]

However, just for perspective, on a dual channel ILS or GLS, with TOGA to LNAV, the A/P will remain engaged for the missed. I would assume AA's 738's have this capability.

Actually, none of AA's 738s have the dual channel certification... single channel only for all operations. That is why a CAT 3 is hand flown using the HUD. So our A/Ps still kick off in TOGA even on a coupled CAT 1 ILS.

[OK465]

Actually, none of AA's 738s have the dual channel certification...

Did not know that.

From experience as a pax, you guys land so smoothly, I always thought it was autoland. :ok:

[aa73]

You obviously weren't on any of my flights when I flew it back in 2010! :}

AA chose to not go with dual-channel/autoland to save $$$ (shocker!) They figured, hey they already have a HUD for CAT 3, why pay to certify the dual-channel/autoland.

Rumors are that they may go with it eventually.

OK back to thread topic.

[framer]

I might be being a bit pedantic but just a reminder that on the -800 if you firewall it the EEC's don't give you any EGT protection.
Whoever is talking about fire walling the thrust levers for a normal go around on a classic must surely be a PC Simulator pilot.

[lomapaseo]

I might be being a bit pedantic but just a reminder that on the -800 if you firewall it the EEC's don't give you any EGT protection.
Whoever is talking about fire walling the thrust levers for a normal go around on a classic must surely be a PC Simulator pilot.

I wasn't aware that most engines don't even provide EGT protection even if you don't firewall it.

EGT is not a failure condition (if the engine is still running) unless you let it go long enough.

I'd be more worried about running into a surge/stall line and ending up with zero thrust. Thats a point failure rather than a wearout condition over minutes due to excessive EGT.

Not to worry on the new machines that limit what you can command and at least guarantee that your engines will stay with you until you land.

[Old King Coal]

aa73: On AA's 738s when you hit TOGA, the A/P disconnects (if it were previously engaged.) All GAs are hand-flown initially... but we can re-engage the A/P above 500'. Not sure if this is the case for all 738s.

Yes, that is the case on all B737's (Classic's & NG's) but there's a bit more to it than that… and there's a gotcha in what you suggest about re-engaging the autopilot.

Fwiw, here's how I teach and brief a two-engine go-around in a B737.

Nb. I'm a lot less interested in the lateral part of a go-around, than I am in the vertical part of the go-around, i.e. the main point of a go-around being to go back up into the air... much on the basis that nobody has ever collided with the air ! ;)

With a single autopilot engaged (i.e. 'single channel'), if you press the go-around button, the autopilot will disconnect. It is then up to you to push up the thrust levers and manage the pitch-up of the nose.

Nb. Some on here might be using the 'Speed Off' method during the approach phase which, I seem to recall, allows the auto throttle to remain engaged during the go-around, though you shouldn't rely on it to work, i.e. always advance the thrust levers yourself!

When the TOGA button is pressed, the MCP speed window will blank and it will remain blanked until you either press something (to do with power or pitch, or select an autopilot) on the MCP or that you get 'Altitude Acquire' (which ever happens first), at which point the MCP speed window will then open up at the speed that you are doing at that precise moment (which is not necessarily the speed that you were previously accelerating towards, i.e. prior to the speed window opening).

Here's a handy little reminder for managing the vital actions of a go-around: "Say. Do. See."

1) Say = "Go Around, Flap 15"
2) Do = Click TOGA button; Advance the thrust levers; Raise the nose!
3) See = TOGA on your FMA and also G/A on the thrust mode annunciation.

Nb. If you do not see 3) then you didn't press the TOGA button, doh!… and then the following will happen:

If you remembered to advance the thrust levers, the aircraft is probably now pitching-up / climbing.
The flight directors are still providing guidance for the last selected approach mode (i.e. probably commanding a descent).
The flap lever position based acceleration function will not work as advertised for a B737 doing a two-engine go-around.

Therein, "Say. Do. See." will at least get you going up, and in TOGA mode, and hopefully also get you into the mindset for the go-around.

@400 ft AGL - choose an appropriate roll mode (LNAV or HDG).

When at or above your airlines nominated Acceleration Altitude, AND so long as your aircraft is at or faster than Vref +15kts (i.e. at or above the white bug on your speed tape), ask for "Flap 5"… and then keep on raising the flaps in accordance with the increasing airspeed and note that, as you raise the flaps, the ASI bug will keep advancing to the speed for the next flap position.

If there's a long way to climb to your missed approach altitude then it's likely that you'll have flaps-up by the point when you get 'Altitude Acquire', whereupon the MCP speed window will open up at the speed that you are at, which (if you've been following your flight director) will be the flaps-up speed.

Alternatively, once the flaps are up (and prior to getting 'Altitude Acquire'), you can select any MCP power or pitch mode that you desire (e.g. LVL CHG, VNAV, V/S,... or an autopilot) without it screwing-up your TOGA mode thrust & acceleration.

If however, when you get 'Altitude Acquire', you are still at some intermediate flap setting, then the MCP speed window will open up (at the speed that you are at) and it's then up to you to drive MCP speed bug.

Also, if prior to getting your flaps fully up, you decide the press something on the MCP to do with either power or pitch (or select an autopilot), you will then cause the TOGA mode to cancel. The MCP speed window will open up (at the speed that you are at) and it's then up to you to drive MCP speed bug.

In my experience, the typical things that people select on the MCP during a go-around are any combination of autopilot & auto-throttle but, by doing so, they then take the aircraft out of TOGA mode and which, aside from screwing-up the flap lever position based acceleration (which Boeing have kindly provided), it also commands your thrust into another mode (of a thrust reduction; which might be ok, just so long as obstacles in the missed approach path are not an issue?!).

737-Classic's: the TOGA mode is available any time the aircraft registers that it is at or below 2,000 ft radio altitude.
737-NG's: the TOGA mode is available any time the flaps are not up (regardless of altitude) and / or (if flaps are up) any time the aircraft registers that it is at or below 2,000 ft radio altitude, or with the GlideSlope captured.

Simples! :}

[BOAC]

I know you know, OKC, but for the avoidance of doubt amongst those who may not (and it seems there may be some)

2) Do = Click TOGA button and advance the thrust levers and raise the *** nose

[Old King Coal]

lol... yeah (MP ;) ) I know... but I'd 'assume' (always a dangerous thing in aviation!) that with the power-pitch couple of the B737 underslung engines that the application of huge wadge of power in a two-engine GoAround would, in itself, cause the nose to pitch up... and therein take fairly heroic amount of forward pressure (or forward trim) to overcome it... but I do take your point, and so should others (hence edit now made above) !

[Lookleft]

Are those photos of the weather on the day of the accident?

[Capn Bloggs]

"Going Around, Flap XX, Check Go Around Thrust".

PM is told what you're doing, PM is told what to select, PM is told what to check (on FMA and whatever else you may have in your particular machine).

Simples...

[philipat]

Just to repeat my 2 cents as on the spot on the day of the accident (Now in Tokyo):


No, I don't believe those pictures were taken on the day of the accident. Poster please respond.
No, I still do NOT believe that Windshear/Microburst conditions existed at the time of the accident, BUT I recognise that I might be wrong. Hence my reluctance to jump to conclusions, even though pointing to potential issues. Let's wait and see.
If "Smiling monkey" is correct, in "The Jungle" all of this stuff is openly discussed and there is no confidentiality, so it should, presumably, be the case that the CVR and DVDR readings will be available here shortly?

[smiling monkey]

Just to repeat my 2 cents as on the spot on the day of the accident (Now in Tokyo):


No, I don't believe those pictures were taken on the day of the accident. Poster please respond.



Those photos are not taken at WADD, philipat. Looks definitely like Bandung. What relevance of those photos are to this accident, is anybody's guess.


If "Smiling monkey" is correct, in "The Jungle" all of this stuff is openly discussed and there is no confidentiality, so it should, presumably, be the case that the CVR and DVDR readings will be available here shortly?


How long is a piece of string? The full transcript of the Sukhoi SJ100 CFIT near Bogor has never been released, not even in the final report. The same goes for the other fatality that occurred in May 2011. I doubt the full CVR transcript for JT 904 will be published either. There may be excerpts here and there, but I doubt very much there will be a full official transcript. As for gossip of what's on the CVR and whether it will appear out in the open, well, that's anybody's guess.

[aa73]

OKC, great summary! Closely mirrors the way were taught back when I was on the fleet.

[India Four Two]

Lederhosen posted:
The two engined go-around is considered so simple it is rarely trained. On the line it happens very rarely and when it does it is quite unlike the sim where you are expecting it.

How rare is it?

I've experienced one sub-100' emergency go-around, due to wake-turbulence, in I suppose about 1000 flights as a passenger. Ironically, there was another more gentle one, at ATC request, on my very next sector.

[BusyB]

Doesn't anyone select the gear up in a GA?:confused:

[Jet Jockey A4]

@ BusyB...

No silly... We leave them down for the next landing attempt. :ooh:

[lederhosen]

For me I would say missed approaches occur about once every three to four hundred landings, roughly one a year. Most are because of aircraft not clearing the runway. Last one was because a CRJ cleared for takeoff did not like the weather on his departure route. Needless to say the tower was accomodating in allowing us to deviate from the standard missed approach.

[Jetstar2Pilot]

Lederhosen,

I agree 100% I can't remember the last time I executed a "real" missed approach when not in the simulator.

It's something we all ought to brief about prior to beginning the approach, especially when the Wx is at or near minimums.

[White Knight]

Quote:
Sounds like cr@p pilots at a cr@p airline

Based on what factual evidence White Knight?



Factual evidence? Are you serious HT? Look at the Lion Air record; and Indonesia overall. If I ever go to Bali I'll take the train:ugh::ugh::ugh::{:ugh::rolleyes:

[JPJP]

@400 ft AGL - choose an appropriate roll mode (LNAV or HDG)

OKC,

Good summary, however the above is not required if 'TOGA to LNAV' is available. :)

[Old King Coal]

JPJP: It's intentionally written that way because not all B737's have LNAV available as a (pre-)armed mode, i.e. prior to initiating a go-around, and therein require that the roll mode is 'selected', and accordingly it is hoped that those whom fly those types might still find this 'generic' advice useful too...of course in the NG it's pre-armed, though always assuming that the missed approach is indeed available (programmed) in the FMC via ones navigation performance engineering department and an example where it wouldn't be, being an airfield which has not been pre-programmed into your FMC in terms of approach & missed-approach tracks (& vertical profiles), i.e. just the 'blue circle' and nothing else and / or maybe not even the blue circle?!

[sevenstrokeroll]

the last time I did a missed approach it was in full, glorious day VMC. KLGA...traffic on the runway (31`) having just flown the long island expressway visual...

tower...go around, maintain 2500ft.

us...roger

tower...stop climb at 1500 feet...seaplane transiting at 2000'.

ME grabbing throttless and trying not to go negative g (we got the word at 1300'.

lesson...all go arounds involve pulling up, adding power, configuring and being ready for anything.

not punching buttons on an FMC.

Looking out the window helps alot too.


while making an autoland or low vis, i can see wanting electronics...but when navigating comes before aviating...something is wrong.

[White Knight]

lesson...all go arounds involve pulling up, adding power, configuring and being ready for anything

Well.............. How about selecting TOGA and then bringing back the power back ANYWAY as a 'good technique'. Works on the 'Bus:ok::ok::ok: But of course; if you're a Yank you wouldn't understand this:ugh:

DISCLAIMER: No idea about Seattle's technique for GA:cool:

[JPJP]

ME grabbing throttless and trying not to go negative g

Whilst yelling "we're going downtown, to pound down, some ground pound !" :}

[FlightPathOBN]

lesson...all go arounds involve pulling up, adding power, configuring and being ready for anything.

I would hazard a thought that most go-arounds are initiated before minima...so you would fly down to the MDA +momentary descent, and then follow the charts MA instructions?

[JPJP]

No - you would carry out the Go Around at the time of the ATC request. There is no requirement to continue to minima if you or ATC require the discontinuation of the approach.

'SevenStrokeRoll' does raise an excellent point though; At airports like LaGuardia (New York) or Midway (Chicago), where the level off altitudes for a missed approach are typically low, some thinking is required. In this case I prefer one "click" on the TOGA button. This provides a more manageable rate of climb. The obvious safety caveats being - VFR, Day, no obstacles and a non critical altitude at which the missed approach is commenced.

[Fester Karbunkle]

Actually, I do believe that the accident has already been very well explained herein-And what background and experience are you basing that belief on? I still do NOT believe that Windshear/Microburst conditions existed at the time of the accident.Perhaps you could explain what Windshear/Microburst conditions are?

[repariit]

Perhaps you could explain what Windshear/Microburst conditions are? This is from NOAA . . .

forecasting methodologies

There is at present an insufficient observational database from which to develop a comprehensive forecasting scheme for microbursts; however, there are enough data from the Joint Airport Weather Studies (JAWS) project on which to base and design an objective forecasting algorithm for dry microbursts. Data from the MIcroburst and Severe Thunderstorm (MIST) project plus case studies of the Gulf Coast and Florida area provide sounding based thresholds for wet microbursts. The development of a comprehensive forecast scheme for microbursts is for the moment on hold, until the required field project data are taken.

Microbursts in classic severe storm environments
The aircraft accident rate due to microbursts in association with classic severe local storms is practically nonexistent for commercial aviation, since the system is apparently well designed to protect passenger jets against well-organized, long-lived, and highly reflecting storms and therefore automatically protects aircraft from any microburst components of these storms. By simply avoiding classic severe storm types, such as squall lines and supercells, pilots are already avoiding any microburst components of these storms. However, aircraft are not well protected from wet and dry microbursts that are an unexpected component of isolated airmass-type thunderstorms, and rainshowers.

The predictability of microbursts in a dry environment
Krum (1954) first described the typical sounding associated with dry thunderstorms that produce strong downdrafts. Prediction of dry microbursts from local soundings was explored qualitatively first by Brown et al. (1982) then by Wakimoto (1985) based on JAWS (Joint Airport Windshear Studies) project data. A preliminary, quantitative prediction scheme also based on JAWS project data was proposed by Caracena et al. (1983a) and Caracena and Flueck (1986 and 1987a and b) (http://www-frd.fsl.noaa.gov/mab/microburst/dry_mb_pred.html), demonstrating that the virga-type microbursts in that form in dry sub-cloud environments can be forecast in terms of upper air data. What remained to be found were a means of forecasting microbursts in a wet enviroment in association with heavy rain. These were the type of conditions involved at New Orleans International Airport at 21 10 UTC 9 July 1982, when Pan American Airways Flight 759 crashed after attempting to take off through a wet microburst (Caracena et al., 1983b).

Predicting wet microbursts
Atkins and Wakimoto (1991) analyzing data from the 1986 MIST (MIcroburst and Severe Thunderstorm) project conducted in northern Alabama found that in all five days when wet microburst occurred, the equivalent potential temperature differences between the surface value and the minimum aloft were 20 deg K or greater. On the other three days with thunderstorms, but without microbursts, there were equivalent potential temperature differences of 13 deg K or less. Atkins and Wakimoto (1991) also examined data from other well documented wet microburst cases, such as happened near Chicago (Fujita 1985), near Edmund, Oklahoma (Eilts and Doviak 1987), and southern Florida (Caracena and Maier 1987). They found that in all these microburst cases, the equivalent potential differences were greater than 20 deg K.

[justanotherflyer]

Well.............. How about selecting TOGA and then bringing back the power back ANYWAY as a 'good technique'.

While avoiding the use of the word BACK!

[FlightPathOBN]

JP

No - you would carry out the Go Around at the time of the ATC request. There is no requirement to continue to minima if you or ATC require the discontinuation of the approach.

So, when you go missed, you dont follow the missed approach procedure?

[Capn Bloggs]

So, when you go missed, you dont follow the missed approach procedure?
Read, for example, the Australian AIP. The procedure to be used when ending an instrument approach prior to the MAPt is clearly stated. As a designer of IAPs, I would have thought you'd be on top of this? ;)

[FlightPathOBN]

This part?

"If ATC has not issued specific instructions prior to the approach and a missed approach is executed, the pilot must follow the (default) missed approach procedure published on the approach plate for that runway. "

[Capn Bloggs]

ENR 1.5, section 2.6.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Factual evidence? Are you serious HT? Look at the Lion Air record; and Indonesia overall. If I ever go to Bali I'll take the train:ugh::ugh::ugh::{:ugh::rolleyes:

Yup the truth hurts but it doesn't make it any less true.

[ExSp33db1rd]

ENR 1.5, section 2.6. Whose administration ?

I would expect to follow the horizontal plan of the missed approach procedure, i.e. "proceed to" at a specified final height, but not continue down to minima - wot's the point ? Why continue to get closer to the ground ?

Except .... at LAX there is a VFR corridor for uncontrolled light aeroplanes that fly directly over the centre of the airport at right angles to the 06/24 runway vectors, 3,500ft Southbound,4,500 Northbound, so if one were to break off the approach and immediately start climbing, then one might find oneself at the same height as a little guy flying at right angles to your path, which might ruin your - and his - day, course, they can only be there VFR so you would see them, wouldn't you ? For this situation aircraft carrying out a missed approach are advised to continue down to and maintain, 2,500 ft and not climb until clear of the VFR corridor.

[ManaAdaSystem]

This tread is getting weirder and weirder. I was flying a Cat III approach a few weeks ago. The GS transmitter failed when we passed 2000. How low do you guys want me to fly in this situation?
My SOP calls for a a go around anytime I get a failure below 1000 ft on a low vis approach. You want me to continue to 50 ft before I go around?
A go around can happen any time during the approach. No way I will continue as close as possible to the ground before I go around!
A missed approach is not an emergency!

[ExSp33db1rd]

Correct. I had a co-pilot ask me why I'd gone around on a Cat III just because the Terrain warning had sounded! He said we must be on the ILS because the needles were crossed - yeah! right ! He's probably a Child ( sorry, Captain ) of the Magenta Line now.

A terrain warning into Zurich, at night, in snow, is not something to be ignored, and yes, it did prove to be false. Tough.

[framer]

I've gone around in IMC with a false terrain warning as well. I'll do it again next time too. It didn't cost the company much in the scheme of things.

[FlightPathOBN]

ExSP, Bloggs, JP,

ExSP, that is correct. Quite a few airports have a crossing, since you can go missed at any point, in a procedure design, especially a coded one, that must be reflected. There is also the potential conflict with DEP to consider.

Edit: added AUS AIP section (Bloggs, I am not exactly sure what your point was...)

http://operationsbasednavigation.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ScreenHunter_45-Apr.-25-09.37.jpg

[FlightPathOBN]

A terrain warning into Zurich

Warnings are a different animal. Depending on your FMS manufacturer, and version, the settings are different. At the FAF, some default to 500' ROC, while others default to a 400'ROC. This tapers down to the 200' min, which btw, is at threshold (dont kill the messenger) Note the OCS surface intercept point.

http://operationsbasednavigation.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ScreenHunter_45-Apr.-25-10.38-e1366911676831.jpg

So, with that in mind...depending on the terrain in that area, you may get a warning on one ac, while not another. There is the precipitous terrain algorithm the FMS looks at as well, with the scan rate and differences between scans.
IF there is a turn to final, the OCS surface is artificially lowered as well, and you may get even more warnings...

http://operationsbasednavigation.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ScreenHunter_45-Apr.-25-10.37.jpg

[BOAC]

Diagrams and figures not-withstanding, I think most airlines say "IMC - Hard Terrain Warning - execute TW manoeuvre" so not much choice, really?

[FlightPathOBN]

BOAC,

Certainly cannot argue with that!

It helps to understand what the box is thinking sometimes, with the RNP procedures, and baro-vnav, there were frequently calls about the procedures, where just one particular aircraft would have warnings on approach.

Turns after the FAF on a short final were always a challenge...

One needs to keep this in mind when doing the flight val...

[framer]

4.17.4 If a missed approach climb is initiated prior to the specified missed approach point the pilot is required to track to the missed approach point and then follow the missed approach procedure. The missed approach point may be over flown above MDA.
The above is from the NZAIP. If there is time you request the missed approach, if not then inform ATC as soon as you can. I would be interested to hear from others if it different in different states.

[Capn Bloggs]

Edit: added AUS AIP section (Bloggs, I am not exactly sure what your point was...)

You asked
So, when you go missed, you dont follow the missed approach procedure?

So I gave you the reference for the answer (which you then posted).

[FlightPathOBN]

Bloggs, the response was rhetorical....

out of date, tell it to the Aussies, AIP General is not on the AIRAC cycle....

aside from that, perhaps the responses from pilots on what they do when going missed should be of much greater concern...:eek:

The missed approach point may be over flown above MDA.

I would certainly hope that any missed approach is flown above the MDA...

[ruzickaj]

GA without GA thrust? 15t hrs instructor with two FOs?

[Bullethead]

"I would certainly hope that any missed approach is flown above the MDA..."

Not all of it need be, I once commenced a missed approach in Perth from about 10 feet AGL, 310 feet below MDA for the approach I was flying, after flying into heavy rain in the flare which reduced the vis to zero. Next time around all was good.

[Bullethead]

G'day ventus45,

It was a night approach to R/W 03 in what were mostly visual conditions. There was a strong north westerly blowing with passing showers. I remember that at 1000 feet AGL there was 60 knots of crosswind with around 15 knots of cross advertised at the threshhold. An interesting night but not unusual for Perth.

The runway was clearly visible until I entered the flare and just before touchdown I flew into extremely heavy rain which reduced the vis to zero. A passing shower and me in the wrong place at the wrong time. I had no warning either visually or from the weather radar.

The missed approach went fine and the next approach was flown in identical conditions but with no rain in the flare. Touchdown and rollout were normal.

[training wheels]

This tread is getting weirder and weirder. I was flying a Cat III approach a few weeks ago. The GS transmitter failed when we passed 2000. How low do you guys want me to fly in this situation?
My SOP calls for a a go around anytime I get a failure below 1000 ft on a low vis approach. You want me to continue to 50 ft before I go around?

It's probably a rhetorical question you're asking, but of course you could only go down (legally) to the LOC (GS Out) MDA when such happens.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Not in my book. I'm not allowed to revert to an approach with higher minima once I've passed 1000 ft, but you are right, it was a rethorical question.
I've been on an IMC ILS approach when we were told there was a small aircraft stuck on the runway. We went around from about 1000 ft, and don't tell me (I don't mean you, t.w) ATC would expect me to continue to Cat 1 minima before I start the manouver.
Maybe Aussie rules flying tells you to, but I don't fly there at the moment, so I can't really be bothered to check, but I would be really surprised if it was the case.

[Capn Bloggs]

Maybe Aussie rules flying tells you to
They don't, and anybody who suggests otherwise is a nutter. :ok:

[de facto]

They don't, and anybody who suggests otherwise is a nutter.

Nutter would be a great understatement indeed.

[Schnowzer]

Update on Av Herald suggests no weather phenomenon involved:

Accident: Lionair B738 at Denpasar on Apr 13th 2013, landed short of runway and came to stop in sea (http://avherald.com/h?article=460aeabb&opt=0)

A witness on the ground observing the arrival of the aircraft from the terminal building of Denpasar Airport said, that he could see the aircraft descend towards the aerodrome at a normal rate of descent, but only realised something had gone wrong with the approach when the aircraft hit the waters instead of touching down on the runway. There was no rain or other obstruction of visibility around.

Looking more and more like bufoonery!

[nitpicker330]

Surely all will be revealed when the FDR CVR QAR data is read? It's a new machine so would have hundreds of data channels recording everything including the temperature of the Captains farts.......

Unless they never release the real data, surely Boeing would like it released?

[FlightPathOBN]

Bullethead,

Yes, Perth certainly does get its share of windshear and microburst activity...with more than its share of GA...

We are in fact, currently looking at a windshear system and DEP procedures for Perth. (it helped that a pretty high ranking ASA person happened to have a windshear encounter on final to Perth with a balked landing GA...)

[fireflybob]

Some good stuff here:-

Training and Standards (http://alpatv.alpa.org/DesktopModules/UltraVideoGallery/UltraVideoGallery.swf?vId=247&portalId=14)

[Mic Dundee]

And just why did the hull crack where it did

Flight Attendant opened the R4 door in the water (a no-no), thus weighing down the aft fuselage, immediately flooding the aft pressure bulkhead.

[repariit]

And just why did the hull crack where it did

When available, I expect the data will show that it broke where it did due to the nature of the impact with the water, or possibly a reef. While opening the aft doors is not recommended, in this case flooding would most likely have already occurred.

[nitpicker330]

Flight attendant opened the rear door flooding the Aircraft and that caused the break!!!!!!!!!!!!!! :D

Hardly, more likely the rear fuse impacting with the water at 140 odd knots did that!!:ok: 737's aren't designed to land tail first on land or water :sad:

Boy some of the crap I read in here makes me sick......:{

[Mic Dundee]

Flight attendant opened the rear door flooding the Aircraft and that caused the break!!!!!!!!!!!!!! :D

Hardly, more likely the rear fuse impacting with the water at 140 odd knots did that!!:ok: 737's aren't designed to land tail first on land or water :sad:

Boy some of the crap I read in here makes me sick......:{

I'm not suggesting opening the R4 door caused the crack in the hull. Obviously, the impact did that nitpicker. ;)

[Eastwest Loco]

All this talk of black boxes and their information.

A couple of billion Rupiah and the black boxes will have been stolen by persons unknown. Either that or irradiated to a point wher the data is ruined.

This is after all Indonesia with the finest officials money can buy.:ugh::{

If you have never bribed a Cop or official in Indo, you haven't been there nearly enough.

[repariit]

A couple of billion Rupiah and the black boxes will have been stolen by persons unknown.It appears that the FDR's and CVR's from previous Lion Air incidents have made it to qualified labs for analysis. Anybody know otherwise? I hope that is the case in this accident. I am surprised that no news coverage has yet reported where they were sent.

Aside from the insurance and liability needs for determining a cause, there is a 737-800 fleet safety need to know. If this airplane impacted the water similar to the US Air A320 on the Hudson, the fuselage should not have broken as it did. If it stalled (or hit by a microburst??) and dropped several hundred feet hitting tail first as the Turkish accident did at Schiphol airport, that may explain the condition of the fuselage and horizontal stabilizer.

The National 727-200 that landed in Pensacola Bay 35 years ago was largely intact. The aft fuselage belly skin was partially peeled away, but as pictured below, it was lifted out of the Bay in one piece.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0e/Nationalcrash.jpg/390px-Nationalcrash.jpg

[Chu Chu]

It seems to me that there's an obvious reason the fuselage broke -- the airplane crashed. Presumably in breaking, the fuselage absorbed some energy that otherwise would have gone somewhere else. It's conceivable that it will turn out the fuselage wasn't overstressed and shouldn't have broken, but it seems much more productive to assume it was overstressed, and ask what that tells us about the crash.

Of course, if the fuselage broke before the crash, it would be an entirely different story. But no one's suggesting that, presumably for good reason.

[repariit]

Assume it wasoverstressed, and ask what that tells us about the crashI think it tells us that one or more of the following was seriously out of the normal range for a landing approach: ROD, attitude, configuration, and/or airspeed. If those items were normal, landing in the (water absent a reef), or a gear up landing on a runway should not cause a fuselage break.

[Mr.Buzzy]

Having landed over the wreck several times in the past weeks, all I can observe (with respect to fuselage breakup) is that there is what appears to be a "swathe" cut through the reef just prior to what was the resting place of the jet.

I don't think it fair for some to suggest an inferior structural design when it seems this aeroplane wasn't obstructed by water alone.

[broadreach]

Since we're all guessing, try this.
Aircraft lands in water in a slight right bank. Starboard engine/wing take much of the impact, engine drops off, the sudden yank to starboard cracks the hull aft of the wing.
The aircraft groundloops (sealoops?) around the starboard wing, coming to rest very suddenly after doing a 270 to its original direction. Sudden stop serves to complete tail section fracture/separation.

[repariit]

The aircraft groundloops (sealoops?) around the starboard wing, coming to rest very suddenly after doing a 270 It appears from the photos like the fuselage fracture is along a pitch axis instead of a yaw axis. The wreckage was floating after impact, and was reported to have drifted closer to shore. The change in direction may have happened after it came to an initial stop.

The location of the engines is of interest. It is likely that they both separated near where it touched down. They should be found on the bottom in that area. Buzzy reports seeing a "swathe" cut through the reef just prior to what was the resting place of the jet. It sounds like the engines would be found in shallow water. Why is there no news coverage on the recovery of the wreckage?

[smiling monkey]

I flew in to DPS a couple of days ago and saw the wreckage, now placed along side the runway covered in tarpaulin. This is what's left of the 89.1 million dollar, 2 month old aircraft.

http://i43.tinypic.com/nfo9ro.jpg

[Jetstar2Pilot]

I'm really curious as to what was found on the FDR/CVR. Why hasn't this information been released by "someone" ?????

[yowieII]

The difference between the Hudson and this and many others...Sully was still FLYING the plane...

[PJ2]

Jetstar2pilot;

Re, "I'm really curious as to what was found on the FDR/CVR. Why hasn't this information been released by "someone" ????? "

ICAO Annex 13 (link within the ICAO article here (http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/others/ICAOchap13.html)), requires a preliminary report be published within 30 days of an accident. So we have about two weeks before anything must be published.

From Annex 13:

7.4 The Preliminary Report shall be sent by facsimile, e-mail, or airmail within thirty days of the date of the accident unless the Accident/Incident Data Report has been sent by that time. When matters directly affecting safety are involved, it shall be sent as soon as the information is available and by the most suitable and quickest means available.

[misd-agin]

The difference between the Hudson and this and many others...Sully was still FLYING the plane...

Sully or the AOA protection?

[yowieII]

Misd,

I don't pretend to know the levels of protection that the guys had left, or how relevant it is to this discussion... My point was that they understood the situation that they were in and maintained control, and controlled their end result, hence the frame remained intact..

[PJ2]

repariit;

From photos, the flaps appear to be in the 30 or poss. the 40deg position.

yowieII, from the looks of things this accident appears to be more like the THY B737 stall accident at AMS than the Hudson ditching.

[toffeez]

Sully's A320 remained in Normal Law throughout. Thus it had all the protections that were designed in, not just AOA.

He was telling the plane precisely where he wanted to go, and it took him there, wings level.

[ElitePilot]

All the protections? A 320 needs 2 engines spinning for Alpha Floor;)

[smiling monkey]

Sully's A320 remained in Normal Law throughout. Thus it had all the protections that were designed in, not just AOA.
.

And plus, Sully had a very experienced F/O in the right hand seat, not just a P2Fer.

Back on topic, the DGCA has asked the NTSC (KNKT) to expedite the investigation and to have it done within 40 days, according to this news report in Bahasa (http://news.okezone.com/read/2013/04/23/340/796407/knkt-didesak-percepat-penyelidikan-lion-air-yang-jatuh-di-bali).

Here it is in English:

Transportation Ministry asked the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) to expedite the investigation and uncover the cause of the crash around Lion Air Ngurah Rai Airport, Bali, some time ago.

Corresponding provisions laid down, NTSC has been given 40 days to uncover the cause of a plane crash of the airline with the lion logo.

"We expect the NTSC could expedite the investigation, considering all the data and evidence in the field have been obtained such as the black box and the VCR or cockpit conversations (VCR)," said Director General of Air Transportation, Herry Bakti, met in Kuta, Bali, Tuesday (23/4 / 2013).

The DGCA until now have not been able to take action against the Low Cost Carrier airline.

On a separate note, Transportation Minister EE Mangindaan stated that all parties should be duly grateful because all passengers and crew members survived.

"I can not believe that all passengers survived, no one died and this because of the intervention of the Lord. We should be grateful" Mangindaan said in Nusa Dua.

Currently, Mangindaan said, all passengers have received their entitlements in accordance with what's applicable ie, receive compensation and insurance. The Airline is to fulfill its obligations to take care of all the wounded undergoing treatment until they are completely healed.

"Now it is processed every passenger obtain insurance from Prog Rp55 million ($5,500 USD) in PP 77 of 1992," said the minister from the Democratic Party.

Likewise, the luggage of the passengers, will also be replaced in accordance with the Airline, in accordance with Law No. 33 and 34. Mangindaan sure, all of the Lion Air passengers' obligations will be implemented.

He said he ordered the airline and aviation authorities to begin evaluating the readiness of pilots to the airport tower, and to pay attention to safety and security so that future incidents like this one of Lion Air does not happen again.

[rottenray]

yowieII (http://www.pprune.org/members/289630-yowieii) writes:
The difference between the Hudson and this and many others...Sully was still FLYING the plane... Yup - Cactus 1549 was a *planned* ditch, while this most obviously wasn't.


misd-agin (http://www.pprune.org/members/128797-misd-agin) writes:
Sully or the AOA protection?Sully. He might have been relying on Normal Law for assistance, but he was also drawing from experience as a glider pilot. This shouldn't be hard to accept or acknowledge. It's a picture perfect example of knowing your airframe and how to use it to best advantage.


toffeez (http://www.pprune.org/members/399249-toffeez) writes:
He was telling the plane precisely where he wanted to go, and it took him there, wings level.:ok:


EE Mangindaan stated:
no one died and this because of the intervention of the Lord. We should be grateful...Really? Nobody died because of decent engineering in Seattle. If anything, the Lord saw fit to *test* that engineering.

[camel]

Looking more and more like a Laurel & Hardy situation...:confused:

[kwaiyai]

In the news recently,

Lion Management been reported as making crew exceed FDT's due to:
Cant get enough pilots to crew all the new Aircraft coming in.

[repariit]

Look for the NTSC to publish a preliminary report here (http://dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm) by May 13th.

[PJ2]

repariit;

Thank you for the link to the NTSC website. We will see if they actually publish anything.

There is nothing for the Lion Air MD83 overrun accident November 30, 2004; in fact the entire 2004 archive (NTSC and the internet, generally), is missing - the year isn't even listed in the list of accident reports by year on the NTSC website.

We'll see what shows up around May 13th. Maybe things have matured a bit.

[toffeez]

From the Airbus submission to the NTSB:

"Despite suffering bird(s) ingestion in both engines, the engines did not
suffer any uncontained failure but continued to deliver hydraulic and
electrical power (engine N°1 N2 was high enough, up to the re-start
attempt, for its IDG to remain on-line).

From the time Flight 1549 suffered birds ingestion into both engines until
it finally impacted the water, the Aircraft flight controls always remained
in Normal law with hydraulic power available.

The early APU start initiated by the Captain, allowed the Aircraft to
remain in Normal law during and after the engine N°1 re-start attempt."

[givemewings]

R4 door? That's a pretty big 738! :E

While it's not recommended to open aft doors (as another poster mentioned) it's not an absolute no.

A number of factors may have come into the F/A decision- given the proximity to land, the depth of the water and the presence of boats in the water immediately after, s/he may have felt it necessary and wiser to get the pax out asap.

From what I can recall, the boarding of rafts out of the OWE and L/R1 doors procedure is designed after a ditching where the aircraft must be kept floating for as long as possible (for example, the Hudson or other fairly open water) Since the time required to 'float' would clearly have been less in this situation, then that may have come into play. Its possible the crew were under the impression the plane was on the reef and pax could 'wade' from there?

Of course the SOP is there for a reason but the manual/manufacturer's textbook cannot cover every possible situation, That's why there's a human sat in that jumpseat and not a Coke machine in the back galley.

Not to mention depending on the crew it may or may not be possible to keep from being trampled by the back half of the plane trying to get out. Of course most pax would not have bothered to read the safety card which clearly shows the aft doors NOT used in a ditch. FA are also taught that at some point you will need to make the call to get out- if it was open or be trampled to death then it may have been the only option at the time.

Sorry for the drift, just wanted to address those points from the FA viewpoint... carry on!

[floatboy]

I spoke with four Lion Air pilots today who each said the Captain forget to apply go around power. And that they regularly fly in excess of 130 hours per month (110 hour maximum). I reminded them that the penalty is a two year license suspension and a USD50,000.00 fine to the pilot. No mention of any penalty to the company!

Two if them asked "how do we keep track of our flight and duty hours?" :confused:

These were ALL pay to fly expats, right seat with CPL's. :ugh:

[PJ2]

floatboy;

Re, "they regularly fly in excess of 130 hours per month (110 hour maximum)"

Hard (stick) time?! Wow - not good.

If so, fatigue would almost certainly be a factor, (which, of course, would have to be investigated just like all other possibilities and explanations).

Sounds more and more like the One-Two-Go MD80 accident at Phuket (http://www.webcitation.org/6EATBw8JP).

[vilas]

toffeez
Airbus protections had nothing to do with the ditching success. The only protection which would work in that situation is angle of attack protection. That would not let the aircraft stall but the pilot did not have to raise the AoA in any case because he was flying the aircraft down. Had he raised the A oF A to Alfa max the rate of descent would have increased and also the tail would have hit the water first then it could have ended in disaster. In this case alternate law would not have made difference to the outcome as it could have been flown the same way.

[smiling monkey]

If so, fatigue would almost certainly be a factor, (which, of course, would have to be investigated just like all other possibilities and explanations).

Fatigue may well have played a part. This appears to the chronology of events for the aircraft and crew that day from a reliable source.

The aircraft originated from Palu (PLW) in central Sulawesi with a scheduled departure time of 0605 so "sign on" time for the crew would have been 0505. The first sector was to Balikpapan (BPN) in Kalimantan, followed by Banjarmasin (BDJ), before heading to Bandung (BDO). In Bandung, the scheduled departure time for Denpasar was 1020, however, that day, Lion combined all three flights from Bandung to Denpasar in to one, that being JT 904 departing Bandung at 1200 with a scheduled arrival time at Denpasar of 1445.

The time that the aircraft impacted the water was reported to be 1510, which meant that the crew had been on duty for 10 hours when the accident occurred. Although this in itself is still well within the legal daily limits, you would still need to consider and analyze the flight and duty times of the crew prior to the accident to see if adequate rest had infact been given to the crew.

[PJ2]

smiling_monkey;

Re, "you would still need to consider and analyze the flight and duty times of the crew prior to the accident to see if adequate rest had infact been given to the crew. "

Yes, exactly. Flying 130hrs stick time in a month is certainly conducive to long-term fatigue, (as opposed to the occasional really long duty day). A ten-hour day is normally a non-issue even in demanding conditions but not in a regime where monthly stick time is regularly scheduled to the 100hr+ range.

[jetjockey696]

What I heard and know.. Lion will always be short of qualified pilots, Captains and First Officers.. most resign after a few years.. most are sick and tired of flying 110+hrs working 6 days on and 1 day off with a min rest period of 9hrs with 12 office days annual leave, NO ID travel, no social life and fighting chronic fatigue etc.

Except for some expats and the malaysian pilots have the golden salary package..:} 9000usd nett for 90+hrs 12weeks on, 2 weeks off with ID travel etc. :ok:

Pilots tell me...that the worst thing is that Lion are happy to let you work pass 110+hrs. Most pilots are happy to work pass 110+hrs because of the "so-called OT pay" i heard that over 110+hrs the increase in pay is 120% of flt pay, after 115hrs -130% , 120hrs -140%... if you get call to fly on your day off.. 100usd for captain and 77usd for FO the inconvenience.

What I learnt is that Batik Air pilots are from Lion.. they resign from Lion and join Batik..hopefully with better pay..

[jetjockey696]

The company behind low-cost carrier Lion Air plans to invest Rp 20 trillion ($2.1 billion) to build an express railway line to Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, improving transportation links between Jakarta and the Tanggerang aviation hub.

“If the government allows Lion Air Group in as investors, we would be very happy,” Rusdi Kirana, Lion Mentari Airlines’s president director, was quoted as saying by Investor Daily.

The national government had previously announced plans to build a 30 kilometer railway line linking the airport with Manggarai station in South Jakarta. The link has been extended by 15 kilometers to Halim Perdanakusuma Airport in East Jakarta. The government is also discussing plans to convert Halim airport into the main terminal for low-cost airlines.

“We are ready in terms of financing,” Rusdi said, adding that overseas banks would back Lion in the project. In 2011, the Export-Import Bank of the United States helped Lion purchase 230 Boeing 737s for a listing price of $21.7 billion.

The Transportation Ministry said it received an expression of interest from the airline two months ago, and is now looking for other investors to bid.

“Lion has an interest in servicing its customers … but this is also a huge project,” said Tundjung Inderawan, director general for rail transportation at the ministry.

Sarana Multi Infrastruktur, a government infrastructure financing arm, is conducting a feasibility study for the railway project. Should all plans go ahead, the express railway project will be ready for tender by early next year.

The express train project is one of two seeking to link Soekarno-Hatta with downtown Jakarta. Another proposed line will detour through Tangerang.

That project is backed by Railink, a joint venture of state-controlled airport operator Angkasa Pura II and train operator Kereta Api Indonesia. It is expected to be finished in 2015, behind its initial target of August 2014.

Established in 2000, Lion is now the largest privately held airline in Indonesia and is expanding its business from the airline industry to property.
Lion is set to open a 170-room hotel in Manado, North Sulawesi, this year.

On Thursday, Lion launched Batik Air, which will provide full service to passengers, including food and in-flight entertainment. Lion is seeking to fly Batik Air services to Australia.

Lion in March launched Malindo Airlines, which is in partnership with Malaysia’s National Aerospace and Defence Industries (NADI) to service Malaysia.

Lion signed a deal worth $24 billion — recorded as the most valuable commercial order in history — with France’s Airbus on March 18, ordering 234 jets to be delivered from 2014 to 2026.


Jakarta globe.. 29/04/13

[lomapaseo]

jetjockey696 post

If the new report is true then my concern would be that Lion Air may be getting too big to respond to punitve regulatory actions

[latetonite]

I do not know what was the reason for the accident.So i am not qualified to judge.
My personal opinion is, if i would have been their trainer, it would not have happened.
I am ready to receive flak.

[floatboy]

There's a reason why pilots exceeding the maximum 110 flight hours per month do not have their licenses revoked. Many "investors" and financiers of Lion Air are the same people who's job it is to uphold the law. As with most things in Indonesia, the important thing is to appear to be doing something, not actually doing it.

If Pilots are being paid "overtime rates" then there's a paper trail confirming their conscious breach of regs (and reward for doing so), and the operators coercion to do so.

I have flown with Indonesian pilots who have never stalled an aircraft, and therefore have never learned the signs of an approach to a stall, let alone recovery from one, including Instructors. Why? Because they were never taught it, their Instructors never taught it, and so on. If it's really quiet and all you can hear is wind, it's unlikely the thing's going to go up. Forgot something? Oh yeah... TOO late.:\

How is it that an airliner requiring two crew, can be "legally" operated by one qualified and experienced crew and one who is NOT. If the Captain is incapacitated, as happens, who's going to get the bird back on the ground? The new CPL who's still mesmerised by all the pretty lights and funny sounds?:eek:

Fatigue, training, ego, culture, under-qualified and under-experienced co-pilots (passengers). Throw it all up in the air and what lands is what we've got. Not a swiss cheese scenario, a FONDUE!

[de facto]

Because they were never taught it, their Instructors never taught it, and so on. If it's really quiet and all you can hear is wind, it's unlikely the thing's going to go up. Forgot something? Oh yeah... TOO late.

You have then absolutely no idea of what an actual stalled 737 feels or sounds like....

[ATC Watcher]

A witness on the ground observing the arrival of the aircraft from the terminal building of Denpasar Airport said, that he could see the aircraft descend towards the aerodrome at a normal rate of descent, but only realised something had gone wrong with the approach when the aircraft hit the waters instead of touching down on the runway. There was no rain or other obstruction of visibility around.

Looking more and more like bufoonery!

This is not what everyone else (reliable) here in Bali say. ATC did not see the aircraft on final and impacting the water due to a very localized rainshower . The crew of the Garuda at the holding position 09 (cleared to line up behind ) lost sight of it in the rain on APP and they did report the accident to ATC .

Talking to people around here in Bali. the picture #4 on the AvHerald site , mentioned earlier gives a good clue of what everyone here think happened.
The whole accident is also apparently caught on an airport surveillance video camera.

Lion air top management is treating the Capt as a Hero and are looking to get him an award from Boeing. Some others say the publication of the CVR might alter those plans slightly . We'll see.

[Hogger60]

Lion Management been reported as making crew exceed FDT's due to:
Cant get enough pilots to crew all the new Aircraft coming in. This has been the story with Lion for years. I know a guy who flew with them for two years on a PTF scheme, and he kept two different logbooks. One for the DCA and one for himself. He said this is quite common amongst the PTF guys.

There are lots of experienced FO's and Capt's out there, but you have to PAY them to come to Indonesia, and you would have to give up at least part of the PTF scheme, which is a huge money-maker for the airline. Nothing is going to change because of this crash. At least the CC's are getting really good at evac's at Lion and the other Indonesian carriers.

Anyone want to give me the over/under on how many incidents (rwy excurisons, etc.)/accidents we have there this year??

[framer]

Good point, I'd be down to Indo in a flash to fly their planes for 15k USD after tax if they wanted me. Good surf, closer to home. Would be great.But why would they do that if they can get guys/ gals to do it for peanuts and there is no consequence for stacking a jet?

[fireflybob]

Good point, I'd be down to Indo in a flash to fly their planes for 15k USD after tax if they wanted me. Good surf, closer to home. Would be great.But why would they do that if they can get guys/ gals to do it for peanuts and there is no consequence for stacking a jet?

Me too, framer -we wish!!

[D.Lamination]

It's not really Lion Air's fault, see puff piece here:

Invisible enemy: why flying in South-East Asia can be a pilot's nightmare (http://www.smh.com.au/travel/travel-incidents/invisible-enemy-why-flying-in-southeast-asia-can-be-a-pilots-nightmare-20130502-2iumv.html)

Some journos will swallow anything:yuk::yuk::yuk::yuk:

[ATC Watcher]

Some journos will swallow anything
But there were some very good clues given to the Journalist in there. How he translate them to the general public is of course debatable.
But what I have heard myself from reliable sources in DPS , fit that story.

Lion air of course pushes to highlight the microburst/wind shear aspect while trying to avoid discussing the actual procedures followed and actions by the Crew and the Airline. Standard post crisis Communications Technique.

[smiling monkey]

The Indonesian NTSC has asked the Australian ATSB for assistance in seeking weather reports from Australian flight crews flying in to Denpasar at the time of the accident. This is from the ATSB wesbite.

Investigation: AE-2013-076 - Assistance to Indonesian NTSC - Collision with terrain, PK-LKS, B737-800, Denpasar, 13 April 2013 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2013/aair/ae-2013-076.aspx)

If I recall correctly, there was a Virgin Australia 738 which performed a go-around during the time of the accident. I'm not sure whether the Virgin Aust aircraft was ahead or behind the Lion Air that ditched.

[nitpicker330]

I had lunch with a DJ mate after the crash. He said a DJ 737 was behind the Lion and landed after the crash. So the crew involved should be able to shed light on any weather they saw at the time?

[ATC Watcher]

I was told the aircraft that landed just prior Lion air landed normally and did not report any significant weather/problems to ATC during the approach..

[BPA]

According to the radar data from flightradar24, the Virgin Australia aircraft was about a minute behind the Lion Air aircraft.

[No RYR for me]

That must be the most bizarre clearance you can get.."cleared to land disregard the aircraft crashed ahead" ?? Normally the airport is closed as soon as there is a crash as ATC and the fire service have something else on their mind, let alone that the reason the first aircraft crashed might still exist... :rolleyes:

[Msunduzi]

According to the groundtrack on flightradar24, a 737 successfully landed halfway between Coventry and Birmingham airport a week or so ago.

Maybe something to do with the interface between flightradar24 and google maps, but it does indicate you can't always take things as they are seen.

I also thought that it was NOT radar data, but ADS-B transponder data.

I think it is more of a hobby interest site than something to be relied on in times of problems.

[BPA]

I think you find the Virgin aircraft (that did the go-around) landed of it's second approach and a Jetstar aircraft landed behind them, then they closed the airport.

[nitpicker330]

Yes that's the info I was given.
Plus other DJ flights en route diverted to Port Headland and then later continued to DPS after the airfield opened.

[jetjockey696]

A pilot was injured when a Cessna aircraft skidded off the runway at Nusawiru Cijulang Airport in the West Java district of Ciamis on Friday morning.

The incident took place at around 8 a.m., when pilot Rudi Herwin Cahyadi attempted to take off in the Cessna 172 SP from the small airport in the subdistrict of Cijulang during a training session.

The plane suddenly lost its balance and skidded off the runway and over a dike, before flipping over.

“There were no casualties in the incident, but the pilot sustained an injury on his head and has been referred to Banjar Hospital,” West Java Police spokesman Sr. Comr. Martinus Sitompul told the Jakarta Globe.

Martinus said the front and back parts of the single-engine, four-seater plane were damaged, and so were its wings.

It’s not clear yet as to what had caused the incident, nor if the plane carried other passengers.

The incident took place less than a month after a Lion Air plane carrying 101 passengers failed to land at Bali’s Ngurah Rai Airport and instead crashed into the sea.

Dozens of passengers were injured in the incident that took place on April 13

[Flying Clog]

Thanks JetJockey696,

That explains a lot. I can't believe no one else has made the connection between these two eerily similar incidents.

Case closed :D

[jetjockey696]

The Transportation Ministry is looking within its own ranks to source talent to overcome the shortage of pilots in the country’s fast-expanding aviation industry.

The effort to test whether the nation’s civil servants would be put to better use at 30,000 feet comes as the government grapples with the twin problems of a glut of bureaucrats — about 4.6 million — and an acute shortage of pilots and pilot instructors.

A large banner reading, “The Transportation Ministry offers civil servants in the ministry opportunities to be trained as pilots,” is on display in front of the ministry’s human resources department in Gambir, Central Jakarta.

Bambang S. Ervan, a spokesman for the ministry, confirmed the message was correct, saying that it was the first time the idea had been tried.

“[Those who enlist] will be trained at one of our flying schools and, on completion, will obtain the most basic pilot license,” Bambang said.

To obtain an entry-level license, called a private pilot license, trainees must complete 60 flying hours and more than 300 ground-training hours. After graduation, they can fly non-commercial aircraft.

The ministry has two flying schools, one in Curug, Banten, and a second in Banyuwangi, East Java, producing 150 pilot graduates a year between them, Bambang said.

The ministry’s program is scheduled to operate within 18 months.

Bambang said the program was made to fill the gap in Indonesia’s airline industry, which includes 16 scheduled commercial airline operators.

“The aim is to train flight instructors rather than to produce commercial pilots,” Bambang said.

The Transportation Ministry launched the program because it is not allowed to recruit more civil servants under the ongoing recruitment moratorium that has been imposed across most national government agencies as a cost-saving measure.

“There are not enough flight instructors in our schools right now, and we cannot recruit any more people. So the viable option is to train our staff,” Bambang said.

“It is possible for the graduates to become commercial pilots depending on their aptitude and the requirements from the respective airlines. But their first duty is to be instructors,” Bambang said.

Aviation analyst Dudi Sudibyo said the government’s program was commendable.

“Anyone can be a pilot, even civil servants, because it depends on whether they can pass all the related aptitude tests,” he added. “I think it is quite innovative for the government to take this approach in addressing [the issue of pilot shortages],” Dudi said.

The rapid expansion of Indonesia’s aviation sector has led to the pilot shortage. According to Dudi, Indonesia needs to produce at least 400 new pilots every year.

Bambang said the recruitment be strictly supervised. “Of course we will not recruit any random person. They will undergo the same rigorous training and procedures as any other pilot trainees,” he said.

Indonesia’s civil service is rife with ill-discipline, including reports of bureaucrats clocking off during working hours and failing drug tests. The country’s aviation industry, meanwhile, faces longstanding security concerns.

The crash of a Lion Air plane into the sea off Bali’s Ngurah Rai airport last month damaged already-weak public confidence in the sector. Investigations into the cause of the crash are ongoing.

Bambang said security was the Transportation Ministry’s chief concern. “With or without this program, security is our number one priority,” he said.

Dudi said a similar approach was taken by professional pilots. “Every pilot wants to perform their job safely. Security is their first, second and third priority,” he said.

But he added that Indonesia’s flying schools lag behind their regional counterparts in regard to facilities and the quality of the curriculum.

“For example, our schools still use planes with an analog controller, while most of the cockpits in commercial planes are now digital,” he said.

“It means that a graduate from an Indonesian school will need further training to fly a commercial plane.”

National airline Garuda Indonesia is among those carriers seeking to stave off staffing shortages.

“Garuda Indonesia had recruited 10 flight instructors to expedite our training program and as an anticipation of delays in our training timetable due to the lack of instructors,” the airline said in its annual report.

Garuda employs 842 pilots and copilots as of 2012, and has a further 239 candidates in its training program.

The archipelago’s 16 scheduled airline operators employ around 8,000 pilots and copilots, while approximately 600 foreign pilots have been drafted in, according to data from the Transportation Ministry.

Efforts by airlines to recruit foreign pilots have been hampered by objections among local pilots to differences in pay.

[jetjockey696]

Old news... just incase you missed it...




Thirty Indonesian Pilots Grounded for Flying Overtime 25/01/2013

Thirty Indonesian pilots have been temporarily banned from flying for exceeding the maximum working limit in the air.

“Exceeding flying hours causes fatigue and affects flight safety,” said Bambang Ervan, spokesman of the Transportation Ministry, as quoted by Tempo.com on Thursday.

He refused to give details of the airlines.

Each pilot’s grounding term would be adjusted according to the length of their overtime.

The ministry limited the flying hours of a pilot to only nine hours in a day, 30 hours in a week, 110 hours in a month and 1,050 hours in a year.

For cabin crew, their maximum limit — which includes flying hours — is 14 hours in a day, with at least nine hours rest before the next flight.

Bobby Mamahit, head of the human resources development at the Transportation Ministry, said the lack of pilots in Indonesia was one of the underlying reasons behind pilots working overtime.

Bobby told Tempo.com that Indonesian airlines needed 4,000 additional pilots, adding that the country needed on average between 700 and 800 pilots per year.

Alvin Lie, an aviation observer, recently told Tempo.com that it was airline management who forced pilots to work overtime.

“If they [pilots] refused overtime, the next month they would not be given flying hours , so their income would drop to only a basic salary,” he said.

But Bambang said that the [B]pilots should be able to reject the request of the airlines to work overtime, rather than face sanctions from the government as the airlines would not be sanctioned.

“Pilots are the ones who suffer the loss if they fly overtime,” Bambang said.

[framer]

Excellent! Problem solved. Rather than increase salaries and ticket prices ( by $1 per passenger per sector) to attract competent and professional aircrew and build the nations's aviation sector into something to be proud of, they are going to train civil servants to be instructors in C172's.
With these civil servants who have never had to make high pressure life or death safety decisions in their lives training the airline pilots what could possibly go wrong? I am now confident that the industry will go from strength to strength and reverse it's woeful safety record.
Good work Bangbang and co.

[PJ2]

The "solution" hardly merits time and comment. Any meaningful critique of such an idea would never be understood within the system that makes such a solution somehow sensible because such self-referential systems usually dismiss helpful and/or experienced input from the outside. The region's accident rate is no accident.

Some people just have to pee on the electric fence.

[fdr]

looking to get him an award from Boeing. ATC

:D


award for swimming skills?
award for...?


actually, the crew just recycled 89 million dollars of aircraft into sauce pans, probably a % finders fee of the replacement price would be in order. That would be worth awarding.

Early days, but planes missing planet earth by a couple of hundred feet usually have fairly distinct causes, most not desirable to have on your resume. In defence of the crew, the company has a very large responsibility in any outcome that is related to the crew decisions due to the pervasive FTL breaches by the company and what appears to be commercial pressures that would require that sort of cultural norm/normalisation of deviation, to exist.

Finding out what happened is straight forward, the why bit is going to have the usual regional issues and potential for obfuscation.

On putting the bureaucrats into training planes, I think it is a great idea, gets rid of the bureaucratic overhead, recycles the destroyed planes thus invigorating the manufacturers, and stops the bureaucrats causing greater damage to the industry. I like it. The proverbial Win-Win, not quite a Prisoners Dilemma or a Nash equilibrium, but good all round. Perhaps treating the aircrew as professionals instead of livestock may suffice?


MGW...
Mesoscale gravity waves are relatively large scale phenomena, not on the scale of the microburst. Nice try.

:)

[training wheels]

An interesting report about Lion Air pilots knowingly exceeding flight and duty time limitations.

sv-cyF9nqLU

[ATC Watcher]

ATC

award for swimming skills?
award for...?
actually, the crew just recycled 89 million dollars of aircraft into sauce pans, probably a % finders fee of the replacement price would be in order. That would be worth awarding.


According to what I have heard and understood the award request was for a ' skilled ditching" and saving lives. ( cartwheeling the aircraft to avoid the runway embankment) . Some say it might be a communication trick to divert attention to something else. Time will tell.
The CVR/FDR read out will be interesting .

[Jet Jockey A4]

LOLOLOLOL at doing a cartwheel while crashing!

As if they intentionally thought of doing this.

I could be wrong and without any of us knowing exactly what occurred and why it did, it would be pure speculation on my part but I'll bet you cartwheeling the aircraft was certainly not one manoeuvre they thought of when they were about to hit the water presumably with little forward vis available to them if they indeed they were in a severe downpour.:confused:

[pattern_is_full]

"Cartwheeling" is probably the wrong term - "Ground Loop" (or "Reef Loop" if you prefer) probably better fits what happened.

I have my doubts that it was an intentional manuever - but it did likely reduce the violence of the deceleration.

Wouldn't be the first pilot to get an award for "exceptional luck in the face of danger".... :D

[glob99]

Why hasn't there been any word on whether the FDR and CVR have been successfully read?

[repariit]

Why hasn't there been any word on whether the FDR and CVR have been successfully read? There has been no direct answer to that question. The NTSC has said that they would have a preliminary report posted here (http://dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm) by May 13th.

[RAT 5]

An interesting report about Lion Air pilots knowingly exceeding flight and duty time limitations.

The video contained a statement from the director of transportation/aviation. It smacked of shutting the stable door.............

Having been in many airlines in various States over many years i have found this attitude very common. The manuals submitted for approval have all the correct language, but the day to day reality is very different. I even had one Flt Ops manager say that if crews worked to rule, i.e. their contract, and if all XAA rules were observed to the letter the airline might as well close down. And that was in Europe. What chance the developing world? The pax had better watch out. They have more knowledge about their health & safety with what food they eat than how they trust their lives to third parties who try to defy gravity.

[nnc0]

Any updates on this?
CVR? FDR? NTSC press release?