How did De Havilland financially survive the Comet 1 disasters ?

[WHBM]

Recent issues with the Boeing 787 sometimes leads to a discussion of the financial impact on the business.

Makes you wonder how De Havilland managed to survive financially the Comet issues. Were the purchasers compensated in any way or was it just too bad ? What about all the costs associated with the production of the part-built Comet 2 and 3s that you can see pictures of in the assembly plants, which were later scrapped. The loss of years of revenues for all the forthcoming orders. The costs of all the Farnborough tests which must have consumed huge amounts of De Havilland staff time. The low numbers of Comet 4 orders must mean it did little more than cover its own costs.

I've also sometimes wondered why they just carried on with the same name into the Comet 4 production. Given the huge bad publicity (for what was essentially an aircraft designer's fault), why they didn't go for a different name.

[Tableview]

I have no doubt someone with greater knowledge than I will supply better answers, but I would say that there are several reasons :

In those days there was more trust and confidence and less litigation.
Margins were not as tight as they are now.
There were fewer aircraft manufacturers so less choice.
I believe DH laso made military aircraft and munitions - perhpas that helped too.

[Nopax,thanx]

As an aside, I was at the Science Museum on Saturday and the failed section of Yoke Peter is on display in the Alan Turing exhibition (his computers have assisted with aircraft crash investigation) It's a very sobering thing to see....

[tornadoken]

AVM Sir Ralph Sorley became MD, DH Propellers, in 1952 and took the firm into IR AAMs. On 1/3/54 US fired a lightweight nuke around which MX could be designed (to be Atlas ICBM). RAE had persevered with ballistics, despite Ministers abandoning V2 interest by 1948. They extracted research funds for ROF Woolwich "sounding rocket" (to be) Skylark, 5/54, and initiated dribble funds for ballistic vehicle study at EE and DH Props.

Comet 1 was grounded 4/54. Precisely in parallel with Justice Cohen's investigation (Report, 2/55) Churchill was persuaded by Air Marshals to Approve, 1/3/55 (to be) Avro 730 supersonic bomber, Blue Streak IRBM, Blue Steel ASM and Yellow Sun H-Bomb. (To be) Firestreak had been confirmed for Javelins and (to be) Lightning F.1 and Lostock Factory re-tooled for it. On 30/7/54 US agreed to licence Intellectual Property (guidance and propulsion) and make a $-contribution to UK's IRBM, which was assigned to DH Props. by default, as EE chose not to be involved ("risk of Nationalisation").

So, the DH Enterprise must be sustained. 19 Comet 4s were ordered for BOAC, 17/3/55; £10Mn. Study was provided by MoS to scheme Comet 5/D.H.118 (which BOAC encouraged until they bought 15 707-400, 10/56, then discarded DH 2/57). Incomplete Comet 2 airframes were turned into RAF transports. None of that would have happened if DH Props had not moved into GW.
(Main source: R.Twigge,Early Devt. of GW in UK, Harwood, 1993. As TV says, the world was less litigious in 1955 and I know of no vast cash sums flowing to thwarted Comet 1 operators).

[VX275]

When did de Havilland become a company within the Hawker Siddley Group?
I know AVRO were a Hawker Siddley company from the time A V Roe sold out in the early 1930s but the title was only applied to AVRO designs in the mid 1960's.
Should the question be "How did Hawker Siddley financially survive the Comet 1" ?

[spekesoftly]

When did de Havilland become a company within the Hawker Siddley Group? DH was subsumed into the Hawker Siddeley Group (HSG) in January 1960, but the DH name prevailed as the HS DH Division until the company became fully absorbed into Hawker Siddeley Aviation (HSA) in June 1965.

How did De Havilland financially survive the Comet 1 disasters ?Healthy orders for other DH types?

As an example, between 1948 and 1959 the DH Broughton factory produced over 3,500 aircraft, including 1,236 Vampires, 889 Chipmunks, 834 Venoms, 209 Doves, 149 Hornets, 129 Herons and 65 Mosquitos.

[BSD]

I imagine that Boeing's defence work will protect it from any damage the 787 will have on its finances and therefore its future. However, the 787 which on paper looks like a great project may be just like the Comet; a leap too far for the aviation industry to fully exploit. Too much fancy technology for the modern "outsource everything" style of operation.

In time question might become "did the 787 debacle make the A350 a better aeroplane, like the Comet did the Boeing 707?" And in doing so signal the start of Boeing's retreat from developing commercial airliners.

[PAXboy]

Interesting question but it might be said that, whilst deH survived the initial crisis, within six years it was gone (in all but name) and that indicates that it did not survive. Had the Comet have suceeded, we might have expected deH to have taken HS under it's wing, not the other way around. Boeing gained immeasurably by Comet and Vickers were, I suggest, unfairly tainted by association.

However, I'll stick my neck out and say "Boeing is too big to be allowed to fail" Given that Boeing is the majority of the US aircraft industry - they will continue. By hook or by crook!

[WHBM]

I suspect that De Havilland selling out was due to two separate things. Firstly Geoffrey De Havilland himself was at retirement age (in fact beyond), it was his own and effectively a one-man business and there was no obvious heir (bearing in mind that his two sons were both killed in flying accidents).

Secondly it was government policy to merge up the myriad UK aviation manufacturers, hence we ended up with Hawker Siddeley's aircraft side and BAC. The government in those days use to have this approach in various industries, it was a classic civil service meddling to "organise the structure" without putting much money in; the French aircraft industry suffered exactly the same from their government as well. Quite why it was felt necessary when you look at the production volumes De H managed, that Spekesoftly refers to above, at their SECONDARY factory alone, let alone designing the world's first jetliner plus the pioneer jet engines to go with it, goodness knows.

[con-pilot]

However, I'll stick my neck out and say "Boeing is too big to be allowed to fail" Given that Boeing is the majority of the US aircraft industry - they will continue. By hook or by crook!

I suspect that you most likely are correct, however, I am one that believes that nothing is too big to fail, including countries.

If, and I readily admit it is a rather big IF, Boeing should go under, the end result would be liken to reinventing the wheel. Instead of one giant, meets all needs company, such as Boeing is today, we would see a spin off and creation of three or four new aviation/aircraft manufactures. Some perhaps under their old names, such as Douglas, etc.

Just as it was 20-30 years ago.

But I'm sure, if Boeing ran into extreme financial problems, the government would bail them out. However, the last time Boeing was is deep trouble, when the US SST program was canceled, Boeing almost went under and the government did nothing. I just wish I had bought a pot full of Boeing stock back then. Hell, I'd of owned that Falcon 900EX I used to fly.

[tornadoken]

Commercial Airplane Division is not the financial base of the Corporation. 787 will not bring the firm down. The issue will be fixed. We have been here before - JT9D/747, early days.

[WHBM]

We have been here before - JT9D/747, early days.
Yes, there were some airframes parked up, without engines. But it was for a couple of months, not multiple years. The 747 was never grounded, and, despite the JT9D issues, Boeing delivered a large number of 747s in 1970-71 (in fact way more than 787s have actually been handed over since deliveries started - 170 frames within the first two years), and got the cash for them. They had also managed to sell the early 747s into a sellers market at pretty much full list price, compared to the minimalist pricing of the early 787s.

[Fareastdriver]

I believe that when Boeing made the decision to go ahead with the 747 they effectively put the company on the table.

[PAXboy]

The differences in the world from 1970 to now are myriad - and fascinating. Essentially no comparison. For example, when the US SST was canx, Boeing was not the only game in the USA.

I am happy to accept Commercial Airplane Division is not the financial base of the Corporation. and I agree that no company should be too big to fail - but they are not going to let Boeing go down as they now have most of the eggs in one basket.

[barit1]

I believe that when Boeing made the decision to go ahead with the 747 they effectively put the company on the table.

Not just Boeing, but Douglas & Lockheed too. See: The Sporty Game: The High-Risk Competitive Business of Making and Selling Commercial Airliners (John Newhouse, 1982, Alfred A. Knopf)

[twochai]

See: The Sporty Game: The High-Risk Competitive Business of Making and Selling Commercial Airliners (John Newhouse, 1982, Alfred A. Knopf)


Its about time somebody does a sequel to 'The Sporty Game'. It was/is very good read!:D

[spekesoftly]

A Great British Air Disaster - Channel 4 Sunday 24th February 2013, 20:00 - 21:00 GMT


Not marked as a repeat, but CH4 did something similar a few years ago.

[Allan Lupton]

On 13 June 2002 Channel 4 broadcast a highly biased and inaccurate hatchet job on de Havilland and the Comet
A detailed complaint was made by a number of ex-de Havilland staff, some of whom had been interviewed, and their words were so edited as to completely change their meaning. Other unfounded allegations that knowledge of metal fatigue had been deliberately and culpably ignored by the company and its staff for commercial gain were also made.
The then extant Broadcasting Standards Commission found against Channel 4 and detailed apologies had to be broadcast and also printed in newspapers. A summary is on page 4 of this:
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/bsc/pdfs/bulletin/bulletin70.pdf
If this year's version repeats the same matter I for one will not be in the least surprised.

[spekesoftly]

Yes I'd forgotten just how long ago the previous CH4 programme was. I sincerely hope they do a much better and factual job this time.

[A30yoyo]

Is it correct to say that the fatigue cracks came from narrow radius corners on the ADF 'window' cut-outs in the skin? and that the failures from the 'square' passsenger windows were secondary (and that changing to circular or elliptical passenger windows was not essential but a belt and braces fix and a wise publicity move).

What is the correct story re replacement of Redux bonding of a component near the ADF cut-out with a rivet joint for production convenience?

Was it an appreciated factor that fatigue cracks from holes punched out (by press tools?) in pressure cabin sheet components were more likely than from drilled holes?

Whilst fatigue in pressure vessels was a recognized possible failure mode (hence Vickers selection of oval windows in the contemporary Viscount) was there any knowledge back around 1947-1949 of fail-safe crack tolerant structural designs or was that the main lesson and area of advancement after the Comet 1 disasters?

[Nopax,thanx]

The pieces on show at the Science Museum have the failure cracks, but they don't run from the corners of the apertures, as one might expect. IIRC the cracks were the result of a production change where the Reduxing had not worked, and rivets were put in to fix it.

If you're ever in the South Herts area the Mosquito Museum is a great place to visit - they have the fuselage of Comet 1 F-BGNX on display. It's hard to believe, when looking at the lightness of the skins and stringers, that it was a pressurised airframe. DH were at the forefront of contemporary design, but of course that in itself carries a risk...

[barit1]

Given that finite element analysis is a recent design tool...

I wonder if anyone has modeled the Comet 1 fuselage structure to determine the correlation between FEA after-the-fact results and the observed damage.

Sounds like an ideal thesis for a university study. :8

[barit1]

Designs from the earlier decade -

I have been just a bit puzzled by the window configurations of the DC-4 (~1940) vs the DC-6/DC-7 (1944). The earlier ship has oval windows, as though there was some awareness of fatigue stress (even though the DC-4 was unpressurized).

OTOH, the DC-6 was a pressurized ship, but with rectangular cabin windows with very small corner radii. Seems counter-intuitive to me. Perhaps if 411A were still with us, he might lend a clue because he knew some of the principals in the Douglas design team.

Whatever - one can hardly question the operational success of the DC-6/7 structure over the years. But was it true design insight, or mere luck?

[DH106]

If you take a close look at the DC-6/7 windows, they do actually have a reasonable radius at the corners - something like 3-4" by the looks of it.
Here's some good photos:

Photos: Douglas DC-6B Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/Adria-Airways/Douglas-DC-6B/2165834/L/&sid=2db1a9d6fcff73c900d7e6a1ebd44934http://)

Photos: Douglas DC-6B Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/Red-Bull-%28The/Douglas-DC-6B/2031377/L/&sid=2db1a9d6fcff73c900d7e6a1ebd44934)

I suspect that the Comet 1's window corners were much sharper ?

[WHBM]

The DC4/DC6 window issue has always struck me as counter-intuitive as well, the way that when Douglas pressurised the fuselage thet went from round to square windows, which seems the opposite of what fatigue knowledge shows.

Not only this, but the public got to know this as well, and some operators who still had DC4s then started painting black square rectangles around each round window to give the impression that this was the more modern type. Given that this was taking place at exactly the time the Comet details were becoming known, it seems most strange.

[VX275]

One benefit of working at Boscombe Down is that the Comet 1 investigation reports are accessible as pdf documents on the company intranet.
What amazed me when I saw it were the stopped drilled cracks in the rear ADF window cut out on G-ALYP (Fig 76 in Accident Note 260) which could only have been done during construction. The crack had also propogated through the drilled hole (By the way it was not the fatal crack).

[A30yoyo]

I think the issue of the shape of the passenger windows is a red herring....circular, oval, rounded triangular and rounded square windows have all been used on jet aircraft successfully when engineered correctly.
Where is there a simple account of what was wrong with the early Comets?

[bigal1941]

Try Ch 4 tonight 24th Feb at 2000hrs

[Flitefone]

There is a very good book - The Comet Riddle - written in the fifties by a former test pilot, Bill Waterton - which gives a good account of the Comet 1 disiasters and the recovery and investigations. Worth a read, although hard to find.

The failures were around the ADF antennae on the top of the fuselage, the square windows were also found faulty in the Farnborough fuselage pressure tests.

Geoffrey DeHavilland's autobiography - Sky Fever - another good read, gives an idea of how the company came through the disasters.

FF

[A30yoyo]

I was wrong about the window design being a red herring...on further reading it is not surprising De Havilland switched to circular windows on the Comet 4 because the water tank fatigue test fuselage failed from the 'rounded square' window and escape hatch corners....They would have needed a symbol of the thoroughness of the redesign
http://naca.central.cranfield.ac.uk/reports/arc/rm/3248.pdf

On a current news-worthy type (the 787) has the means of installing glazing caught up with the 'direct glazing' used in the automotive industry where glazing is bonded direct to the structure with polyurethane adhesive and has structural benefits?

[WHBM]

Try Ch 4 tonight 24th Feb at 2000hrs
Programme currently in progress. Mrs WHBM :) restraining me from throwing my coffee cup at the screen.

Who on earth is the blonde bimbo who has managed to get so much screen time with airhead comments ? Apparently a "social historian". What a load of rubbish she spouts - saying that the Comet 1 revolutionised travel to America.

Any programme which has to be padded out with deep notes on the Double Bass while there are lengthy shots of people standing round with similarly deep facial expressions can't be taken seriously.

[PAXboy]

Try Ch 4 tonight 24th Feb at 2000hrs
I did not see the repeat - had they edited the innacurracies and balanced things a bit?

[Allan Lupton]

Mercifully it was not a repeat of the 2002 hatchet job.
Several contributors, including John Farley (sometimes seen here!), told the story well with a bit of archive footage but it had to be padded out with "re-enactments" and that frenetic hand-waving "social historian" young woman mentioned above.

[thegypsy]

I wonder what happened to those aircraft we saw under construction with square windows cut out of the fuselage after the accidents?

[Planemike]

WHBM ...........

Who on earth is the blonde bimbo who has managed to get so much screen time with airhead comments ?

Which programme did you watch? No "blonde bimbo" in the programme I watched.

Planemike

[WHBM]

I wonder what happened to those aircraft we saw under construction with square windows cut out of the fuselage after the accidents?

It wasn't apparent when the film of the production line was taken, but I think that with square windows they would be the Comet 1, all of which were delivered by the withdrawl. These were all scrapped (often after many years of standing unused) except for the two Canadian Air Force ones, and one ex-Air France one which had been used in the tests and was sold on to the RAF, all of which which were extensively rebuilt with round windows to Comet 1XB standard.

The Comet 2s were in mid-production, there was a BOAC fleet being built at Hatfield and overseas orders being built at Chester. Three of these BOAC ones had flown by the withdrawl, but not been delivered. The Hatfield ones were rebuilt over quite some years and delivered (with round windows) to the RAF. The Chester production was all scrapped as it stood.

The Comet 3 production at Hatfield had hardly got started, and wasn't on final assembly.

[Planemike]

Red-haired not Blonde!

Oh yes, I spotted her............!!!!

Planemike

[bigal1941]

I think you will find that the RCAF, as it was then, had their planes rebuilt and used them to test the DEW Line that was installed around their shores, replicating incoming high level fast jet threats

Some of the rebuilt Comet 2's had a very long life as recconisance listening platforms, and I think were still around after DanAir's 4 had been retired

[mickq]

The Ch4 program never mentioned the real reason for the Comet disasters.
'Ultimate' pressure proof testing was initially performed on the fatigue test airframe. This resulted in strain hardening which masked and improved the ensuing fatigue life test results. Subsequently, after this was learned by the aircraft industry, two test air-frames, one for ultimate tests and another virgin one for fatigue testing became the norm. This was the price of pioneering.

[PPRuNe Pop]

In general I thought the prog was more imformative than the last one. Whilst we had very sensible deductions from the likes of 'our' John Farley, Roger Topp, Mike Birtles and other equally knowledgable gentlemen I am afraid Dr Kate Williams, 'social historian' (whatever that means) and author, failed to make a sensible contribution other than to push herself forward. Mildly gushy I thought.

The findings were a repeat of the original findings after the F'boro tank revelations, but did anyone say that the problem was with using 14g (I think I am correct) skin 'to save money!' The 'skin' started of at a higher guage but to save weight, and money, they went too far. Tissue like skin, on all of us, especially as we get older, will rupture under the mildest of stress and bleed. I suggest this was no different. Fortunately, as far as I know, good lessons were learned - as they often say.

[Allan Lupton]

Skin guage was stated in the programme as 22SWG but I thought I remembered 19. That was not to save money but weight - it is normal in aeroplane design to aim to be as light as possible.

All TV programmes these days seem to need a young woman waving her hands about and talking nineteen to the dozen about something irrelevant. I understand the one in question has written novels and biographies of royal persons.

Oh and it's Phil Birtles, not Mike, but we did have a short contribution from Mike Ramsden which could have been a lot longer as he has the knowledge and the ability to impart it.

[VX275]

The skin on the crown of the fuselage was 22 SWG whilst the side skins were 20 SWG (according to the Farnborough accident report)

[PPRuNe Pop]

Thanks for the correction AL. Actually I forgot to mention Mike Ramsden and you are right, Phillip Birtles.

The skin question was the major problem and it was someone at Hatfield on the design team, and where Phil Birtles 'resided' at some point, who made much of the fact that they needed to thin the skin. If 20g is what the accident report stated - that's it.

[A30yoyo]

If performing an 'ultimate pressure' test improves the cabin fatigue life why isn't it done to every production aircraft? or am I being thick?
Does anybody know what skin gauges were used on the successful Comet 4 series.
I watched the program from the Skybox then deleted it immediately... I thought the graphics of the structural break-up were particularly bad...the use of the term window for the ADF roof cut-outs is common though in texts about the Comet so it was one area where the program got something right in that 'YP' failed there whereas the tank specimen apparently failed from a passenger window