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angels
29th Jan 2013, 07:37
Reuters are reporting a plane with 21 pax/crew has crashed near Almaty in Kazakhstan. No more details yet.

cldrvr
29th Jan 2013, 07:54
BBG quoting as Scat Airlines.

6 crew, 15 pax

Kulverstukas
29th Jan 2013, 07:57
Bombardie CRJ-200
DV 760

angels
29th Jan 2013, 08:20
Plane was en route to Almaty from Kokshetau and came down near Kyzl Tu according to Reuters. Have no idea how close this is is to Almaty.

WX is very foggy it seems.

ARNSpoty
29th Jan 2013, 08:44
Kyzyltu is apparently just 12 clicks north-east of the terminal of Almaty Int. So just before arrival i guess :sad:

Klosterman
29th Jan 2013, 08:44
Metar: Uaaa 290930z 04002mps 0100 r23r/0150n r23l/0150n fzfg vv001 m01/m01 q1017 882/0150 nosig rmk qbb040
taf: Uaaa 290500z 2906/3006 05005mps 0800 fzfg fu vv003 tx00/2908z tnm04/3001z tempo 2906/2914 0200 vv001 tempo 2914/3006 0200 -sn fzfg vv002

WinchGorilla
29th Jan 2013, 09:14
Country or territory: Kazakhstan
Affected area(s): Almaty
Incident: Commercial airline incident


Incident description
A commercial passenger plane carrying 15 passengers and six crew members has crashed near Kazakhstan's largest city, Almaty; all those on board have reportedly been killed. The plane, operated by the Kazakhstan-based SCAT airline, is believed to have been en route to Almaty from the northern city of Kokshetau when it crashed near the village of Kyzyl Tu.


Analysis
The cause of the crash is currently unclear; however, reports have suggested that the aircraft was approaching Almaty in low visibility due to fog. Salvage and rescue operations are ongoing at the crash site.

Aksai Oiler
29th Jan 2013, 09:16
Not a good day for Aviation in KZ. Whilst I understand the reports have not been confirmed I hope they can find survivors...

I used to fly SCAT frequently in the past when I lived in Atyrau, albeit on the company's Antonov's. This has made Mrs Oiler nervous about visiting her parents, in the summer; particularly following last nights 6.3 earthquake in Almaty Oblast.

angels
29th Jan 2013, 09:21
Sadly, there are people at the scene and it appears there are no survivors. There is a guy quoted as saying the plane just flew into the ground (no explosion, signs of engine failure) and he is blaming the weather, which was indeed foggy.

SE210
29th Jan 2013, 09:51
It appears to be MSN 7413 - flew with Cimber until last year as OY-RJA.

Kulverstukas
29th Jan 2013, 10:41
http://static.zakon.kz/img/040575/040575626.JPG

DV 760 KOV-ALA
CRJ 200LR (UP-CJ006) 2000 year, #7413
25707 hours, 22975 landings
Last serv 26/06/2011
Sertified till 20.09.2013

The Ancient Geek
29th Jan 2013, 12:29
Yet another CFIT on approach by an Eastern Block airline.
There seems to be a culture of busting minimums and get-there-itis.

Commercial pressure, training issues or both ?.

Aksai Oiler
29th Jan 2013, 12:32
Mrs Oiler wonders if there was any official from Kokshetau Oblast onboard demanding for the pilots to land ? For now we will not know, they should have diverted to Astana

Kulverstukas
29th Jan 2013, 12:36
Mrs Oiler wonders if there was any official from Kokshetau Oblast onboard demanding for the pilots to land ?

Kaczyński Light?

happybiker
29th Jan 2013, 13:50
More info here:
SCAT's Bombardier business jet crashed near Almaty killing 21, including 1 foreigner. Emergencies. Tengrinews.kz (http://en.tengrinews.kz/emergencies/SCATs-Bombardier-business-jet-crashed-near-Almaty-killing-21-including-1-16449/)

Swiss Cheese
29th Jan 2013, 14:07
I note that SCAT appears on the EU Commission Blacklist of airlines, current as at 4.12.2012.

It seems that only Air Astana passes muster in terms of acceptable EU levels of air safety within Kazakhstan. This may well be more to the lack of western levels of regulatory oversight (in the US sense of the phrase)

What prospects are there for an unbiased and clear safety led accident investigation as per Annex 13?

Big Pistons Forever
29th Jan 2013, 14:26
Sigh....... yet another crash. I wonder how many smoking holes full of dead bodies will be required before the root causes of these accidents are ever addressed.

Turbavykas
29th Jan 2013, 14:26
Why do they have 3 pilots on a such small jet? What is 3'rd pilot doing during the flight?

His dudeness
29th Jan 2013, 14:43
Maybe a supervisor or line trainer....

Is the CRJ usually CAT II or III ?

8314
29th Jan 2013, 15:16
Ours were HGS equipped CatIIIa

udachi moya
29th Jan 2013, 15:42
Some pea-soup fog in ALA today, so many shooting approaches followed by G/A and holding. Spookily watch FR24 today as colleague coming out of ALA on another airline was delayed by the fog, I watched EY A319 do about 20 or more turns, two approaches before buggering off sensibly to TSE. Several other g/a aircraft too, except for KC who seemed to go straight in (100m posted vis with RVR150m declared on METAR)

The posted accident site, is somewhere around 7km from the airport, but, if i retrace the g/a traffic from RW05 that I was watching on FR24, they all passed over this village as they executed a right turn... guessing this aircraft followed the same track, and rumour has it this was his third approach. News reports no smell of kerosene or aircraft fuel.. just a thought.

hetfield
29th Jan 2013, 18:07
Why do they have 3 pilots on a such small jet? What is 3'rd pilot doing during the flight?Training?
Check?
Supervision?

Karel_x
29th Jan 2013, 21:10
Airport CAT IIIB, pilots CAT II (minima 350m, actualy 250m). Fuel enough for GA or divert. Speculation about icing.
CAP 18000 h, 1000 h on type, FO 3500/132 hrs
Source and photos:
Борт-200 - Общественно политическая газета "Время" (http://www.time.kz/index.php?module=news&newsid=31563)

Sqwak7700
30th Jan 2013, 07:16
Whatever you do, do not google "Scat".

Makes you wonder if the yahoots that picked the name of the airline ever heard of the internet. Probably not. :yuk:

Willie Everlearn
30th Jan 2013, 08:27
The aeroplane may have been Cat IIIa capable but only if it was equipped with HGS. Besides, it is highly unlikely this operator was 'approved' by the Authorities to conduct Cat IIIa approaches even if they had the equipment.
Certainly, if it were so equipped, the crew trained, the company approved and on a Cat II runway, they should NOT have missed the first approach in the first place.

Something out of place with this one I'd say.

Swiss Cheese
30th Jan 2013, 08:52
If the crew were Cat II licensed, and the RVR was below that, i.e Cat III, then I am missing something, or should they never had made that last approach (query any earlier ones too)?

This reminds me of the Manx 2 crash at Cork, Ireland in February 2011. See that thread for similar details.

wunwingpaul
30th Jan 2013, 08:53
Having flown regularly in the region, Ala-maty is one of the better airports, but that really isnt saying much.

I remeber a KLM flight declaring a mayday and the controllers english was so bad that the KLM crew really couldnt understand.

The standard of english by the air traffic controllers is to be quite frank very poor.

They also had a tendency to change the approaches from the published ones which caused no end of confusion.

hetfield
30th Jan 2013, 13:38
Interesting note/warning on chart....

http://avherald.com/img/uaaa_ils23r_y.jpg

geneman
30th Jan 2013, 14:14
SCAT captain says they were out of fuel?

"She called her father [a SCAT captain] right after the accident and he named a possible reason of the plane crash. My father says that the pilot asked for an emergency landing (in Almaty airports), but they we told to make the second round. They did not allow the landing (at the first approach). The planes are normally diverted to Karaganda airport in case of bad weather conditions in Almaty. But apparently they didnt have enough fuel (to make it to Karaganda airport).

http://en.tengrinews.kz/emergencies/2nd-pilot-who-had-to-be-on-the-crashed-plane-comments-on-possible-causes-16498/

Kulverstukas
30th Jan 2013, 15:13
Sqwak:

SCAT Airlines (http://www.scat.kz/)

Karel_x
30th Jan 2013, 20:58
SCAT - Special Cargo Air Transport - they start enterprising with cargo service some 15 years ago.

I believe it is the biggest Kazakhstan private company. The absolutely biggest company is state owned Air Astana. One year ago I traveld by another SCAT CRJ-200 t/n UP-CJ005. Common unexceptional flight.

DavidWoodward
30th Jan 2013, 21:06
Whatever you do, do not google "Scat".

Makes you wonder if the yahoots that picked the name of the airline ever heard of the internet. Probably not. :yuk:

Of course, I completely ignored your advice and did it. I wish I hadn't.

Ganzic
31st Jan 2013, 14:22
We were scheduled to fly at that time, but postponed for 3 hours, couldnt even get 200M visibility, when we did take off, as did the Transair flight in front of us, we picked up a lot of ice, and couldnt clear Servere Icing until FL120, then Moderate Icing until FL220. The worst bit was Grnd to 1000 ft.

No warning from ATC until after we took off.

DownIn3Green
1st Feb 2013, 01:50
7700...that's funny...I thought the same....

AncientGreek...A little below the belt, wouldn't you say? All country's airlines CFIT...Not specific to the country or pilot's heritage...I've worked with former Aeroflot pilots and they have excellent standards ala Western pilots...

Then there's the other factor...Flying in the enviornment they do, of course their accident rate is higher...But I've never known them to have "get home itis"

Actually I find the opposite true...Now they can do things they couldn't do during Communist times...namely lay over at the first opportunity...

ALATOWER
1st Feb 2013, 04:50
Perhaps you have been flying in ALA in the last century.

All emergency cases investigated, the materials are sent to the airliners and in the last 5 years, there was not a single complaint by ATC phraseology.
Nonstandard phraseology often used drivers from USA and EU.

Every airport publishes a bunch of approach charts, but when ATC uses vectoring, adequate pilots have no question.

noneya
1st Feb 2013, 11:43
I agree 100% with ALATOWER! And yes I am one of those US drivers that sometimes uses nonstandard phraseology.

I have been flying in and out of UAAA for the last 5-6 years on a weekly bases and have never had a problem with communications from the tower or approach.

The airport is not the problem! Unfortunately weather, especially in the winter, is!

My two cents

fade to grey
1st Feb 2013, 12:04
Sorry to see this crash.
I was a regular operator to ALA and then Bishkek with the bmi 757. Nothing wrong with ALA RT at all, just remember what 'metres' you are climbing to if you go around...

As we all know the 'tempo 200m FG' is given from Nov until April in the forecast, it would help if they weren't quite so conservative with the forecast and a bit more accurate.We know the reasons though.

Kulverstukas
1st Feb 2013, 14:17
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BB2iJ48CQAAstls.jpg:large

hetfield
1st Feb 2013, 14:30
I was a regular operator to ALA and then Bishkek with the bmi 757. Nothing wrong with ALA RT at all, just remember what 'metres' you are climbing to if you go around...Have been there many times. Not bad, ATC IMHO is one of the best of former UdSSR. ILS CATIIIB, approach procedures not too demanding, very long runway >4.000m.

Karel_x
8th Feb 2013, 14:45
Vice minister of transport and head of investigation commision told:
Это загадка: пилот уходит на второй круг и машина не уходит, машина входит в землю.

(Translation of this pun is something like this: It is a mistery: the pilot did go around and the plane did not, it goes to the ground.)

There was a fuel enough on the board of CRJ (for 2.5 hrs), the plane hit a ground nose down 19 at speed 240 kph.


My comment: Icing??


Source:
???????? ???????? ? ?????? - ??????? (http://www.z001.kz/article/view?id=168)

Mariner
8th Feb 2013, 15:33
FWIW; we got two Sigmets about severe icing and one about severe turbulence from ATC while inbound Almaty later that evening.
Didn't get a trace of ice on the way in though, and it was perfectly smooth all the way.

And about ALA-ATC; I fly in there regularly and find them competent and professional. Their english is among the best in the region.

The weather; lots of low visibilities, especially in the wintermonths. Fog can be moving in and out, forecasted or not.
A month ago, we could not see the ground from the flight deck when parked. That's 8 meters....

PJ2
8th Feb 2013, 15:44
We were scheduled to fly at that time, but postponed for 3 hours, couldnt even get 200M visibility, when we did take off, as did the Transair flight in front of us, we picked up a lot of ice, and couldnt clear Servere Icing until FL120, then Moderate Icing until FL220. The worst bit was Grnd to 1000 ft.
Are you describing the weather/icing conditions for the departure out of ALA at approximately the time of the accident?

The CRJ-100 & 200s are "hard-wing" aircraft - no LE devices.

Regarding icing, go-arounds and the CRJ-100 & 200, the following may be of interest:

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1997/a97h0011/a97h0011.pdf, and more generally, Bombardier CRJ200 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardier_CRJ200#CRJ100)

Karel_x
8th Feb 2013, 19:46
Data from CVR and FDR was already read and now are analysed by Kazakhstan commission, MAK and was sent to Canada. Still there is NO hypothesis i.e. from CVR and FDR is not clear what was happened. It is still little "mystery".

Today a new incident of SCAT reported - AN-24 veered RWY at ALA, landing on flight from Taraz, 20 pax aboard. Nobody hurts.

In Kazakhstan new rules are prepared for civil aviation. It is supposed that some little aircompanies end its operation. Every air pax company must have at least 3 planes, IOSA etc. Safety revolution or earthquake in 2015 :-).

PJ2
8th Feb 2013, 21:12
Karel_x;

Thank you very much for this information.

The key notions in the Canadian TSB Report on the Fredericton accident are:

a) icing conditions encountered during approach;
b) normal entry into the low-energy regime for landing;
b) decision to go-around followed by power application & stall of the right wing.

Karel_x
9th Feb 2013, 21:16
Group of three experts from Bombandier, leaded by very experienced investigator of Transport Safety Board of Canada, Denis Deroy, are travelling to Kazakhstan to take a part in investigation. Reportedly they supposed that the bat weather conditions are one of most probable cause of the disaster.

It is interesting that except of Moscow, Almati airport was the only one where Russian supersonic Tu-144 performed scheduled flights. The last one was in 1978.

Willie Everlearn
11th Feb 2013, 04:07
The more likely cause is pilot error.
The Fredericton accident was due to stall in the flare during icing conditions AND retraction of flaps prematurely in a low energy state, thereby increasing the stall speed.
Pilot error.

But we'll have to wait. I'm only speculating.

Mad (Flt) Scientist
13th Feb 2013, 11:11
From memory, the flap retraction at Fredericton wasn't a significant cause - the aircraft stalled before the flaps had moved significantly (if at all) from the landing position.

I can't find the full TSBC report online, will look for it later.

PJ2
13th Feb 2013, 16:27
The Fredericton accident was due to stall in the flare during icing conditions AND retraction of flaps prematurely in a low energy state, thereby increasing the stall speed.
Pilot error.From the TSB Report, to which I provided the link above: 2.4.4.4 Flap Movement
The flaps had just started to move when the aircraft stalled and, although there was probably some effect on lift and drag, the overall effect on the aircraft stalling was concluded to have been minimal.

Willie Everlearn
13th Feb 2013, 18:54
The CRJ 200 on takeoff (at rotation) if the rotation rate is too aggressive will result in a stick shaker activation.
A CRJ 200 in a low energy go-around such as one in the flare at 10 feet and in ground effect if too aggressively pitched up toward the flight director will also initiate a stick shaker. If you retract the flaps whilst below Vref, in a low energy state while engines spool up (from flight idle to Max on the order of 5-8 seconds) you will very likely stall a wing tip which results in a roll toward the stalled wing which could result in a tip strike during that low energy state and surface friction will contribute to....
etc., etc., etc.
which was part of the YFC low energy go-around.

I believe the accident report also mentions a wing tip strike. This is my take away from what I read in the report but, I'm still only speculating which doesn't necessarily make me correct.

If an airport is reporting Cat IIIb RVRs, how does a professional airline crew not certified for Cat II or III even begin to fly an approach on a Cat I ILS?
Pilot intent or pilot error?
How does that same crew hit the ground 2 miles short of the intended landing runway?
By descending to a pseudo DH? By running out of fuel?
again, pilot intent or pilot error?

Ganzic
19th Aug 2013, 09:16
The problem is the safety culture in ex Soviet countries. If you want the jobs you go and do it, sometimes it makes pilots believe that a diversion not an option or they can cheat the devil.
That day the WX was really bad, RVR 125-250 all day, Severe Icing reported from ground to FL250, we flew in turbo prop and couldn't clear the cloud at FL220, icing was evident on all unprotected areas of the a/c, and the worst was during taxi... I doubt icing was a problem for CRJ, there must be more contributing factors, fuel starvation is not a problem either. Only a suicide maniac will fly to Almaty on empty. Due to the airport location in the dip and proximity to Mountains, airport is below cat1, specially in winter when nearby villages use coal for heating - the smog makes vis drop dramatically, 20km north and its CAVOK.
Looking at AN-72 crash same winter near Chymkent, one old procedure come to mind, they don't change 1013 to QNH or QFE even if they are cleared to altitude below Transition, until they reach the transition altitude often forgetting to reset altimeters... that was a primary cause of AN-72 crash.

Was it the case here, I don't remember what was the QNH on the day, possibly very low, in which case they may have passed their DH and not paid attention to Radalt.

Apologies if I am repeating myself.

Karel_x
12th Feb 2014, 12:27
Not final report yet. Unofficial 31 min CVR audio file (partly in Russian) at:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EleIXGQGiUg

Most interested after 30:18 (ONE THOUSAND)

Karel_x
13th Feb 2014, 10:12
My attempt for transcript of CVR (I am not Russian native). From Time 28:37, after checklist. Be aware of metric units (except for one thousand). Thanks for completion or corrections.

2:25 TWR: SCAT 760, distance 13, continue approach 23R
2:21 PNF: Continue approach 23R, SCAT 760
2:08 TWR: Visibility at RWY- beginning 225, middle 250, end 250, freezing fog, vertical 40
1:49 PNF: SCAT 760 roger
1:45 PIF: Flaps 45
1:44 PNF: Flaps 45.set
1:37 PNF: Flaps 45 indicated
1:22 PNF: Check speed
1:16 TWR: SCAT 760, Visibility at RWY 200
1:13 PNF: (Roger)
0:54 BEEP
0:51 PIF: Wing on
0:50 PNF: Wing on
0:46 ONE THOUSAND
0:44 PNF: One thousand (at the least)
0:39 PIF: (To 500 and then GA)
0:27 PIF: Ask visibility
0:26 PNF: SCAT 760, tell visibility, (report ?)
0:23 TWR: SCAT 760, visibility 200, 0.5, RWY ready
0:18 PNF: 760
0:16 PIF: Go around
0:15 PNF: Go around
0:14 BEEP 3 times
0:13 PIF: Flaps 8
0:12 PNF: Flaps 8
0:09 PNF: Flaps 8 indicated
0:08 FIVE (HUNDRED?)
0:07 PNF: 760, going around
0:06 SINK RATE!
0:06 TWR: SCAT 760 (turn to heading 128)
0:05 PULL UP! PULL UP!
0:02 PNF: 128
0:01 TERRAIN!
0:00 End of CVR file [Time 31:04]

New changes in blue

According to investigatrs, icing was not cause in this accident and they suppose human factor. In some moments, voice of PNF sounds to me a little tired. Bud I am not so good in Russian to be sure.

CRJ200 crash probe focused on go-around actions - 1/30/2014 - Flight Global (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/crj200-crash-probe-focused-on-go-around-actions-395406/)

ulugbek-pilot
13th Feb 2014, 11:22
I don't know what was the need to further descend knowing visibility is below your minima, is it granted to descend even down to DH in Kazakhstan, would anyone share their rules?

Chronus
13th Feb 2014, 18:57
KAREL X `s cvr transcript is useful. Unless altimeter was incorrectly set, the 1000ft call at 0:46 would suggest at a 750ft.p.m. rate of descent there should have been sufficient time to execute a succesful go around at 0:16. It would be useful to know what the so called BEEP was, could this be a rad alt CHIME and whether this somehow became the cue for the PNF to announce Levers Set and make a second call of correct indication. But I would appreciate any commentary as to what is meant by LEVER SET. I would presume the word Lever means power. In which case I would assume it was the PNF who set the go around power. Is this SOP or is it another situation similar to the Cork accident.

olasek
13th Feb 2014, 19:08
is it granted to descend even down to DH Not sure what is supposed to be "granted" here?. Once you start the approach (obviously after the clearance from ATC) you can certainly descend all the way to DH, however in the typical airline flying in the West, per regulations, a crew can't even start the approach if the weather is reported to be below the minimum.

A4
13th Feb 2014, 19:32
We're permitted to commence an approach regardless of the RVR. However, if any of the required RVR are below minima that approach must be discontinued no later than 1000' above threshold. If it's ok at 1000' you can continue and even if it subsequently goes below you may continue to DH.

Listening to the CVR it sounds like a request for flap 0 moments before impact... could be wrong but sobering nonetheless.

porterhouse
13th Feb 2014, 20:15
Is this SOP or is it another situation similar to the Cork accident.Don't know about the Cork accident but this one could very well be similar to Air Canada's Canadair CL-600 accident in 1997 to which user PJ2 (#42) provided a link above. Similarity of aircraft type makes it an even better comparison. Yes, setting the go-around power is the correct procedure but as it happened in the Air Canada case the aircraft must be in the correct energy state and with engines at N1 setting which guarantees quick spool-up or otherwise go-around may not work very well. These are so called Low-Energy go-arounds that could be deadly.

ulugbek-pilot
14th Feb 2014, 01:39
We are not cleared to descend below trans lvl if some element is below minima. Considering altimeter setting this QNH approaches in meters on aircraft having its primary altimeter readings in feet totally confusing

Emel.OW
14th Feb 2014, 05:25
We are not cleared to descend below trans lvl

Sorry, but which regulations are you talking about? In general, you can't descend below the FAF altitude if the weather is below minima, but if the RVR falls down when you're already on the glide, you may continue down to DA(DH).
If there are any local differences, they must be at least described in the approach ban chapter of your jeppesen or equivalent manual (like those 1000' in UK).
Just haven't found any similar restrictions among CIS countries.

Karel_x
14th Feb 2014, 07:57
to Chronus:
Yes, those worlds "Lever set" could be key ones, because in few seconds after we can hear SINK RATE warning. I could not decide if it is "Power set" or "Flaps set" (surely it is not "Gears up") so I write "neutral" the Lever. If it was Flaps retracting and it was done too early or too much, the wing could lost the lift. The same if the PIF action lead to high AoA. I suppose that gears were down at that moment.

If this tripple CHIME is RA (and not disengaging A/P), it may be 100m alarm. In the approach check list, after an artificial voice "RADIO ALTIMETER", we can hear PNF reporting "one zero and zero" (if not one zero one zero).

Another interesting thing is that the voice of PIF is much more quiet that the one of PNF.

I did some editions in transcript in blue. I believe that deicing was acivated (Wing on) and maybe PIF told in Russian that he is going to fly to 500 (feet) and then GA. I am not sure, the sound is very quiet.

ulugbek-pilot
14th Feb 2014, 14:48
What regulations? My state regulations, and I think they're very adequate comparing with another ones which approves to descend down to DH even being informed by ATC at higher levels that RVR below minima. And if RVR is decreased while on final,this part is rather same-not arguing, you may go down to DH.Still,why would one need to descend down to DH knowing that you won't get landing clearance,why to take risk getting closer to ground. Even if they made a mistake with altimeter setting(I suppose that was the case) they'd have enough alt margin staying higher,maybe in holding.

olasek
14th Feb 2014, 16:09
knowing that you won't get landing clearance,
This part is very confusing.
What's your base country, former USSR?
Do you fly for military?
In "normal" civilian aviation world ATC tower doesn't give you clearance (or deny) clearance based on current weather or RVR.

ulugbek-pilot
14th Feb 2014, 16:42
You're actually right with former USSR:),and yes,if RVR or ceiling...is below my minima, my states ATC would not grant me landing, I didn't get your point, please describe stupid me,the right sequence-rvr below minima, you continue approach,atc gives you rvr which is BELOW MINIMA God damn it, why wouldn't you discontinue approach at earlier stage (God forgive me).

porterhouse
14th Feb 2014, 17:03
my states ATC would not grant me landingAnd this part is non-typical, I mean in typical civilian flying in the world. We know that you fly in former USSR where things might be different but practically anywhere else "ATC would not grant me landing" can't happen solely based on RVR. If you read posts by Emel.OW or A4 above they give you an idea how it is done in the rest of the world (Emel.OW is from Russia and I suspect typical civilian Russian controllers operate now by standard rules).

Emel.OW
14th Feb 2014, 17:15
To ulugbek-pilot

Well, there are some situations, when it's not a bad idea to continue down to DA. As an example, RVR is fluctuating, and why make a go-around too early, if you're already stabilized on ILS, and mid- & stopend values are not below your t/o minima? Just wait for DA and make your decision.
Of course, this case was different, because Alma-Aty is often covered by thick fog & fumes during winter, and there's almost no chance for any changes until sunrise :)
Anyway, just wondering which state requires to stay at TL, because I can't really find any in our manuals.

ulugbek-pilot
14th Feb 2014, 17:17
So you're saying when tower gives RVR below minima, you continue to da/dh and you somehow see the RW,you may declare "RW insight-landing" and land ?

porterhouse
14th Feb 2014, 17:25
The tower gives you RVR and it is up to you what you do with it. Again, posts by A4 and Emel.OW explain more - read them. Yes, you arrive at DH and you decide what you can see and you land or go missed. There are separate regulations that tell you when you can descend below DH, what things you must see, etc.

ulugbek-pilot
14th Feb 2014, 17:51
I've seen those posts. Our regulations are very restrictive at this point :(. Before approach we are asked about our minima and endurance, and if some element is below minima, take a guess:) That's why some foreign crews arriving here had some problems with our CAA after landing below minima (investigations and all that crap)

olasek
14th Feb 2014, 18:13
The part of the world you fly in has one of the worst accident records in the world (only Africa is worse) so those 'restrictive' regulations clearly do not help.

ulugbek-pilot
14th Feb 2014, 18:45
You are obviously mistaken, accident record is very low in here, just a couple of with those old Russian planes we used to operate(that had nothing to do with the regulations), the safest airliner we're considered in CIS. Don't you believe that all of your pilots being possessed by the landing wouldn't descend below minima hoping to see the precious RW, what's the difference East or West, we're all same-humans

Chronus
14th Feb 2014, 18:46
Am prompted by Karel x to add further observations, as follows.

Flaps are commanded by PF, set and confirmed by PNF.
PF commands WING ON, PNF confirms. Am curious to know what this means, could it be GLD system, improper early deployment of spoilers. What is the min height and speed regime for spoilers and flaps for the CRJ200.

The Barcelona Air Nostrum CRJ200 accident of July 2011 is a case in point. See link below.

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2590.pdf

The curious point in this instance the PNF`s calls for Levers set and Levers set indication. It is suggested that PNF carried out both actions of setting and checking.

Karel_x
14th Feb 2014, 19:08
Now I play with audio using audio editor for a while and I found that there is a PF command "Flaps set" (rather then Lever set) a half of second erlier. I correct transcript already.

I guess that "Wing on" means deicing (heating) of the wing.

ulugbek-pilot
14th Feb 2014, 19:29
Is that flaps set or flaps eight during GA ?

Karel_x
14th Feb 2014, 20:08
Thank you for correction.
CRJ MISSED APPROACH PROFILE

1. TOGA power (take off go around power) , Spoilers in!
2. Positive rate (gear up, Flaps to 8* (first notch)
3. Sync speed mode, and activate Speed Mode (Set v2+15). Activate Hdg Mode (this should have already been set). AUTO PILOT ON! Change the NAV on the PFD to FMS and activate NAV Mode. It should intercept the missed approach coarse automatically. If not, use your heading bug to intercept the missed approach coarse then then activate NAV Mode.(sometimes the missed approach will have an initial turn before you can get on coarse.)
4. Flaps up before 180 kts, climb to the proper altitude and let the Autopilot fly the missed approach coarse. (after takeoff check)


CRJ LOW ENERGY MISSED APPROACH PROFILE

Same as the standard missed approach, Low energy means that you are to close to the runway and have retarded the thrust levers to begin the flare. During a low energy missed the landing gear may actually touch down on the runway surface because of the lag in spool up time with the engines. Once thrust is achieved and airspeed begins to accelerate then you continue the standard missed approach procedure.

olasek
14th Feb 2014, 21:37
you are obviously mistaken, accident record is very low in here,No, I am not mistaken, I am using the official IATA statistics, you an easily find them yourself, and looking at the available 2006-2013 data Russia & CIS had cumulatively about 7 times worse accident rate for that period than Europe or North America. Your particular airline can be 'safe' but others 'less safe' clearly generate the data.

ulugbek-pilot
15th Feb 2014, 02:01
We're not Russia and yes it's shame to have such a bad common record being one of the CIS countries cos of some loser airlines who doesn't give a :mad: of rules or even worse-passengers lives but profit. I know that you still think that after USSR disintegration we stayed as we were, NO,and this time you're misjudging

Karel_x
15th Feb 2014, 09:13
I travelled with SCAT once, with sisters CRJ-200 T/N 005, from Kazakh capital - Astana. SCAT had nice office at the airport with two girls, and although there was the only flight scheduled that day, they were here all day long. I paid for overweight, very cheep, maybe $4 for 5kg and I have forgotten some papers in the office. One of girls found mi in transit area, while I was waiting for gate opening, and gave me back my file. I sure can not say that they looks like thinking only for profit. On the other hand, my flight was several hours delayed and I looked forward Yak, that was initially scheduled.

Of course Kazakhstan is not Russia, but the same as in Russia you can see progress at every step. I believe that in several years the bad safety records will be history. But a economy collapse after disintegration was very deep, they say deeper than after WW2. My friend from Kazakhstan told me his story that after his car accident, while he waited for money from insurance, an inflation was so terrible that for the money he got he can buy a quite new car - radio controlled toy.

Green Guard
15th Feb 2014, 16:22
Ulugbek
Don't you believe that all of your pilots being possessed by the landing wouldn't descend below minima hoping to see the precious RW, what's the difference East or West, we're all same-humans

All those (pilots possessed for landing) are one way or another NOT flying any more.
In your job you can hope for many things, BUT DO NOT HOPE for better view bellow MINIMA.
Why do we call it "MINIMA" by the way? Do not stay above, GO bellow ONLY if you see ground or Rwy lights , otherwise GO AROUND, change Rwy or APT,
only then you can state that we are all-same-humans.
Tamam ?

porterhouse
15th Feb 2014, 16:53
I believe that in several years the bad safety records will be history
I believe that it will be a long way before their safety record "normalizes". They still don't have a strong aviation institutions like FAA that can actually enforce proper standards, have enough corrupt-free inspectors in the field, etc.

Emel.OW
15th Feb 2014, 17:24
The main thing is not just institution, it's so-called "Russian" or "soviet" mentality. It's still normal for some pilots to rely not on the actual rules or regulations, but on their previous experience or "vision". CRM is often just a word, and some older pilots say "don't *** my brains with this western ***, we used to fly OK in the USSR without any CRM". We are all trying to get rid of this situation, but it's still a long way ahead. As some people say, "if you want a western pilot not to do smth, you just state that it's NOT RECOMMENDED in your FCOM. As for Russians, you have to say "HIGLY ABSOLUTELY ULTIMATELY PROHIBITED,", add some formulas from aerodynamics & math, and it's better if you add some photos of fatal accidents as well. And even then someone "very clever" will try to violate."
The situation is better in large companies, and it's getting better as new generation of pilots starts flying. And personally I really hope that some western instructors will be finally allowed to work for our airlines, to introduce the western culture to our people.

Karel_x
15th Feb 2014, 19:05
There are new discussions in Kazakhstan press:

1. Document of MAK leaks to media. Medical specialist of MAK claims that there was a undiscovered heart disease of captain. In the moment of impact, he reportedly didn't hold controls - was he conscious?
2. There exist calculations that it is not sure that plane carried enough fuel to Shimkent divert. May be, but there are nearer airports, for example in Taraz in half a way to Shimkent.
3. CRJ are not ideal planes for local conditions. Too sensitive for icing (-40C is common temperature in winter), pollutions and imperfections of leading edge in conditions of low energy GA. In CIS countries the CRJs are wide used by both regional and big companies now.

http://ratel.su/papka/papka2/1391759099%D0%AD%D0%9A%D0%A1%D0%9F%D0%95%D0%A0%D0%A2%D0%98%D 0%97%D0%90.jpg
Ratel.su - ????????????? ????????-?????? (http://ratel.su/news.php?news=178)
Ratel.su - ????????????? ????????-?????? (http://ratel.su/news.php?news=101)

porterhouse
15th Feb 2014, 21:25
-40C is common temperature in winter
Perfect, with such low temperatures there is no chance for icing.

Chronus
16th Feb 2014, 18:27
Link below shows rescue vehicles parked close to displaced VOR/DME array and some soot marks on the foreground of the photo. Aircraft crashed 1.4k from threshold. I wonder whether they were established on the ILS.

Crash: Scat CRJ2 at Almaty on Jan 29th 2013, impacted ground near airport (http://avherald.com/h?article=45ce98f4)

Karel_x
17th Feb 2014, 12:05
I wonder whether they were established on the ILS.

I believe they were. Impact point was ca 1.1 nm (2 km) before touch down zone TDZ. Angle of GS at ALA is 3.00. We can hear ONE THOUSAND (300 m) at the CVR 46s before impact and 30s before GA decision. This point (intersection GS with 1000ft height) is in distance 3.1nm (5.8km) from TDZ.

When we suppose GS of CRJ slightly smaller 150knots, we can calculate that in the moment of initiating GA they were at altitude 600feet (180m) and in distance 1.9nm (3.5km) from TDZ. It is in good accordance with PF's statement (I am going to fly to 500 a then GA). It seems to indicate, that their attempt to land was rather pro forma, vertical visibility was 40m and there was zero chance to see RWY lights. Until this point, everything was OK.

In fatal last 15 seconds, after TOGA, they:


waited for motor spinning up for maybe 2s - is it enough? Hard to say, it depends on action with controls
omitted gears up (spoilers?)
set flaps to 8

Immediately after it we can hear FIVE (FIVE HUNDREDS? - Incomprehensible two voices simultaneously) followed SINK RATE because plane start to descent very steeply (stall or PF's loss of spacial orientation?). PULL UP! PULL UP! TERRAIN! Impact.

From the initiating GA to the impact, the average angle of descent was 7 and GS increased to average 210knots (390km/h).

It looks like full real, possible scenario and this is the reason why I believe, that they were probably well established on ILS. This scenario can give answer for questions what and when, but not for why.

Karel_x
22nd Feb 2014, 20:25
We often discuss about lack of legal actions for increasing an air safety in CIS. In Kazakhstan 2013:

suspended COA for 112 aircrafts (now total 471 registrated)
suspended or cancelled AOC for companies: Jet One, Asia Continental Avialines, MEGA, D.E.L.T.A., Samal Air, Asia Continental, Irtysh-Air, Almaty Aviation, Luk Aero
limitation of AOC for Semeyavia, Jet Airlines
cancelled licence for air transport for: Euroasia Air Intl, Kaz Air West, Delta-C

I think that we can see an effort to do things better and I hope that it will bear fruits in next years.

?????? ??????? / ??????? ? ? ??????? (http://www.caravan.kz/article/77231)

JammedStab
17th Apr 2017, 19:12
From Avherald....

Crash: Scat CRJ2 at Almaty on Jan 29th 2013, impacted ground near airport (http://avherald.com/h?article=45ce98f4)

On Mar 2nd 2015 the Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) released their final report in Russian concluding the probable causes of the crash were:

The crash of the CRJ-200 occurred after the crew initiated a missed approach in instrument meteorologic conditions, that became necessary due to lack of visual references visible on the ground (vertical visibility in fog did not exceed 40 meters), the missed approach became necessary due to actual weather conditions being below minima required for the approach. During the missed approach the elevator was deflected to lower the nose instead of rising the nose resulting in a steep dive and impact with ground. The investigation was unable to determine the cause of the elevator movement to pitch down. The investigation did not find evidence of any system malfunction or evidence of external influences like icing, windshear or wake turbulence while the aircraft attempted the go-around.

The most likely scenario to cause the reversed pitch commands was:

- a partial incapacitation of the pilot flying (captain)
- insufficient cockpit resource management resulting in the first officer diverting attention to radio communication instead of following the principle aviate, navigate, communicate, which resulted in the lack of monitoring of flight parameters
- lack of response to EGPWS alerts
- somatogravic illusion causing perceiption of a pitch up
- increased emotional stress by crew associated with the failed expectation of improving weather conditions at the time of approach
- failure to comply with requirements to medically assess flight crew, which led to the captain being assigned to the flight without needed rehabilitation and assessment following a surgery

The MAK reported the captain (56, ATPL, 18,194 hours total, 1,010 hours on type as commander) was pilot flying, the first officer (44,CPL, 3,507 hours total, 132 hours on type) was pilot monitoring, a pilot (700 hours on AN-24, theoretical examination on CRJ-200 passed) occupied the observer's seat.

The MAK reported that the captain had accumulated hours first on an Antonov 2, AN-24, IL-76 and YAK-42. In 2010 the captain converted to a Boeing 737-500 and became CAT II approved. After 1227 hours on the 737 the captain converted to the CRJ-200 in October/November 2011 and was checked out as commander with CAT I approval. In 2012 the captain also added the type rating for the CRJ-700 and was assigned flight instructor for the CRJ-200, in 2013 the captain was appointed flight examiner on the CRJ-200.

The captain had been in hospital from Nov 28th 2012 to Dec 4th 2012, where he underwent surgery for varicose veins. He was to undergo a rehabilitation period of three months following discharge from hospital.

The MAK annotated that the captain's records of the last quarterly medical examination were missing from his documentation as were the records of the examination after the sick leave that lasted for more than 30 days.

The first officer had started his flying career on Antonov 2 and AN-24s, then converted to the Yak-42 before converting to the CRJ-200 in 2012 being checked out as first officer with CAT I approval.

The MAK reported that the aircraft contacted ground first about 1600 meters short of the threshold runway 23R with a pitch attitude of 20 degrees nose down, wings level. At that time the flaps were between 15 and 10 degrees and the stabilizer trim was at -3.5 degrees. Debris of the aircraft spread until 1408 meters before the runway threshold over an area of 192 meters along the extended runway center line.

The MAK summarized medical forensic examination reporting that the captain was in his seat and in an active working position, feet on the pedals, hands on the yoke, at the time of the crash, however, there was no active participation in the aircraft control. His right hand showed injuries inconsistent with activity on the control yoke indicative that the right hand perhaps was involved in activity not associated with the control of the aircraft (the MAK suggests the seat position may have been adjusted around that time). The captain showed extensive injuries to his chest consistent with impact with the control column suggesting that his shoulder harness was not tight.

The autopsy also revealed that the captain had suffered from chronic coronary heart disease, which could result in sudden cardiac death, angina, myocardial infarct, heart rythm disturbance or heart failure. The MAK therefore analysed that a sudden partial incapacitation of the captain appears possible as result of the heart disease.

The MAK reported, that the first officer was also found in working position with his hands on the control yoke and his feet on the rudder pedals.

The MAK analysed that the flight was uneventful until the aircraft reached decision height of 185 meters, at which point the commander called "go-around" due to lack of visual reference, there was no violation of flight rules. The first officer confirmed "go", the captain instructed the flaps to be retracted to position 8. The autopilot gets disconnected, the engines accelerate for go-around, the flaps start retracting, the stabilizer trim remained in its position at -3.5 degrees, the elevator remained in its position initially but about 4 seconds after the autopilot was disconnected began to deflect commanding the nose down. At that time the first officer radioed ATC about the go-around, there was no action to arrest the descent. The EGPWS sounded "Sink Rate" and "TERRAIN", however, despite the alarms the first officer continued the radio transmissions.

The aircraft impacted ground 15 seconds after the autopilot was disconnected.

The MAK analysed that the last audio received from the captain was when he commanded the flaps to 8 degrees while initiating the go-around.

atakacs
19th Apr 2017, 05:09
During the missed approach the elevator was deflected to lower the nose instead of rising the nose resulting in a steep dive and impact with ground. The investigation was unable to determine the cause of the elevator movement to pitch down. The investigation did not find evidence of any system malfunction or evidence of external influences like icing, windshear or wake turbulence while the aircraft attempted the go-around.

As other have pointed out before being apparently censored this sounds very strange.

Although not a CRJ200 specialist I am pretty sure the both pilots yoke inputs are recorded by the FDR. As such it should be pretty clear to know who did what (or not, from the sentence it is not 100% clear that the deflection was pilot induced). Given that the elevator movement was the core cause of the crash I am really surprised by this.

Mad (Flt) Scientist
19th Apr 2017, 14:00
Not for all CRJ200, I believe. Earlier aircraft had only the control surface positions recorded, then intermediate age aircraft recorded control wheel/column positions, and the final standard recorded both crew positions and forces. The recent report into the accident in Sweden, to serial 7010 (one of the oldest aircraft) makes no reference to anything other than control surface positions, for example.

This aircraft was 7413, which means it might or might not be "early" or "intermediate" in terms of FDR capability, i don't know.

atakacs
20th Apr 2017, 11:29
Not for all CRJ200, I believe. Earlier aircraft had only the control surface positions recorded.

Most informative, thanks. Had no idea. I would have thought that such basic information would be part of the mandatory requirements.

Mad (Flt) Scientist
20th Apr 2017, 13:35
It is NOW but the FDR requirements have evolved (grown) over the years as a combination of both a perceived need for more data 9from the investigators mainly) and the increased capability of newer systems.

We used to get 8 parameters in a strip of foil ... now if you pull a QAR from something like an A380 you get thousands of parameters over many many hours. (I know a QAR isn't a FDR, but even FDRs record hundreds of parameters these days)