EZY 2.99G landing at Luton

[angelorange]

AAIB report out and in this week's Flight:

Air Accidents Investigation: Airbus A319-111, G-EZFV (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/january_2013/airbus_a319_111__g_ezfv.cfm?goback=.gde_1080877_member_20741 1207)


Thankfully no serious injuries but U/C replaced.


"Below 30 ft, over the runway, both pilots sensed that
the aircraft was sinking rapidly and both initiated a
TOGA 102 go-around. The PF momentarily retarded
the thrust levers to idle before advancing them to the
TOGA (Takeoff and Go-around) position. At the same
time, he made a full forward sidestick input, within
one second, which was then rapidly reversed to full
aft sidestick. As the PF made the forward sidestick
input, the commander initiated an aft sidestick input
which reached the full aft position within one second.
He followed through the PF, pushing the thrust levers
fully forward and announced “I HAVE CONTROL”. The
aircraft made firm contact with the runway, on all three
landing gear legs simultaneously, before lifting off and
starting to climb. During this phase the PF relinquished
control and reverted to the PNF role."

[Avenger]

Interestingly the Captain under Training had more hours on type than the Captain doing the training... " Dual input" me thinks!

[Agaricus bisporus]

Hard to understand why such an uninteresting report makes R & N almost a year after the (non) event. Its not even a rumour and and it is ancient history in last years news.

zzzz

[TyroPicard]

I disagree.
There are two very important lessons to be taken on board by A320 Training Captains.....

[WanganuiLad]

Dual controls which can compete, while giving no physical or even visual feedback of that fact.
How is this not a design error ?

[frontlefthamster]

From one of their previous reports, Air Accidents Investigation: Airbus A320, G-DHJZ (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/december_2008/airbus_a320__g_dhjz.cfm) well-beloved of all those unfortunate enough to find themselves training on this aircraft:


During the landing phase of flight, an instructor pilot monitors the approach by assessing the aircraft’s performance, ie, by visually scanning both the flight instruments and the ‘picture’ through the flight deck windows. In addition, in a ‘traditional’ aircraft, where the flight controls are fully interlinked, the instructor might also be able to monitor the direction and magnitude of any, albeit relatively small, control inputs made by the student by sensing their movements in a tactile manner. By doing so, they may be able to prime themselves for the flare motion on the control column and, if the motion is late or absent, make an appropriate input in sufficient time to attempt to avert a heavy landing.

In a fly-by-wire aircraft fitted with sidesticks, the instructor also monitors the approach by assessing the aircraft’s performance, but does not have an option of sensing control inputs made by the trainee. By the time it is apparent that no flare, or an incorrect flare, has been made, it may be too late for the instructor to intervene and the aircraft to respond before a possible heavy touchdown occurs

[WanganuiLad]

Thankyou frontlefthamster.
That seems to cover it.

[737Jock]

How many posts before dozywannabe comes storming in telling that the AAIB and all pilots who posted so far on this thread are wrong?

That we are not supposed to be able to sense the other pilots inputs?

And that the FBW system was developed by genious pilots, so that it can't possibly be flawed?

On topic:

These guys recently would have come from the 737, which requires nose-down input during a go-around. So that could be a factor as well. Muscle memory in high stress situation.

[ReallyAnnoyed]

Perhaps the trainee was reverting to the instinctive reaction when in the RHS where the right hand pulls back and the left pushes forward instead of the new LHS where the right hand now pushes forward and the left hand pulls back. Just a guess though.

[Willie Nelson]

WanganuiLad

That is not quite correct, if both pilots provide input; which should not be done but often happens a "Dual Input!" will be annunciated through the loudspeakers (even if they're switched off)

If the correct technique is applied and the new PF selects the AP OFF/Takeover PB (while the AP is off) then a "Priority right/left" will be annunciated and a visual indication will appear on the glare-shield accordingly.

If what you were referring to was a proprioceptive feedback then that is correct and many would argue that would be more useful in any aircraft, however as always it comes down to understanding the system and not letting yourself get caught out by a last minute need to "follow through" otherwise as you say the inputs will be summed and disaster could ensue :eek:

[frontlefthamster]

The previous report makes mention, at least twice, of the highly instinctive nature of the sidestick, and the highly cognitive nature of the priority push-button. Add that the aural sense is often degraded in stress, and you can also understand that the warning is not a reliable safeguard.

Yes, pilots can be trained to exhibit 'correct technique' up to a point, but they cannot reliably be untrained from the deepest-founded results of their early training: if I move the stick, the aircraft responds. Airbus seem to think that human behaviour may be modified reliably to support: if I move the stick, the aircraft responds, unless I am under stress and my colleague may be making an input, in which case I have to press a button (which I hardly ever touch) as well, and then take account of whatever response the aircraft was exhibiting to my colleague's input, whatever that may have been, until I over-rode it. None of us need a PhD to see the holes in that proposition, and these regular accidents bear our thoughts out.

[lurkio]

The problem with that little red button is that in normal ops you only ever press it momentarily to disconnect the autopilot. In the take over case you have to press and hold it (for 30 secs to lock the other s/s out) to ensure you really do have control. If you forget then you are back in dual input territory.

[Clandestino]

Hard to understand why such an uninteresting report makes R & N almost a year after the (non) event. Its not even a rumour and and it is ancient history in last years news.

All other Airbus threads have lost momentum recently. Darned Li-ions!

How is this not a design error ?

Possibly because those officially tasked with recognition of design errors know a bit more than average PPRuner? Chances they don't or they are a part of worldwide conspiracy are pretty minuscule.

How many posts before dozywannabe comes storming in telling that the AAIB and all pilots who posted so far on this thread are wrong?Well, I suspected this thread was intended to elicit reactions but I never desired such an explicit confirmation.

How many posts about Airbus being faulty by design before someone puts such an argument into coherent, articulate, reasoned and fact-supported essay and sends it to aeronautical powers that be?

Perhaps the trainee was reverting to the instinctive reaction when in the RHS where the right hand pulls back and the left pushes forward instead of the new LHS where the right hand now pushes forward and the left hand pulls back. Just a guess though. Good guess, I'd say. It beats "He went temporarily insane when he cut the power and pushed forward as the aeroplane started sinking in flare" by wide margin.

the deepest-founded results of their early training: if I move the stick, the aircraft responds.Pilots subscribing to this line of thought are susceptible of joining the stall-spin statistics. Anyway, this Airbus reacted all right, even if it cost her every landing gear leg.

[PURPLE PITOT]

Surely airbus have upgraded to 4G by now?:)

[Gretchenfrage]

It has been proven so many times now:

Airbus design is for the every day, sop bound, non event, no disturbance flight for the barely trained and rated modern pilot.

It is not for any deviation from the above, not for training and certainly not for unforeseen and unexpected emergencies.

For all those astronauts who still insist that proper knowledge of the complicated system allows these super pilots to recognise any sub-sub mode and its deviations from the normal mode, instantly enables them to counteract the accompanying reversion of the protection which is due to the fact that the feeding probes and their computers were tricked by another submode that could not analyse properly what these pilots could see instantly by checking the PNFs PFC, knowing that if it deviated more than 5deg from the standby indicator, they had to disconnect one PRIM and the opposite SEC which would finally enable the PF to trust his sidestick again, provided the PNF did not intervene with a opposite input.

You guys should all have applied at Houston. :ok:

for me there is only one thing to say: Qoud erat demonstrandum

[Clandestino]

Then it must have been me wrongly assuming that repeated brash display of ignorance on PPRuNe does not constitute proof in any way.

[CONF iture]

The brief nose-down inputs made by the Capt U/T occurred at a time when a nose-up control input would normally be expected and probably took the commander by surprise. The sidesticks move independently. So he would have had no knowledge of the inputs being made by the Capt U/T until the flightpath of the aircraft changed.
At 30 feet it does not help to have to wait for the aircraft flightpath to change to understand a part of the story, when fully visible flight control commands or at least linked sidesticks would tell that full story earlier with a much better chance to spare 3 landing gears.
But nothing new here as similar events seem to accumulate.
Could be of interest to compare RYR and EZY statistics on that matter ... Which philosophy provides more pertinent information to a training Captain, 737 or 320 ?

[A33Zab]

In absence of a reaction by Dozy,

May I refresh your memory with some pictures of hard landing damage NON Airbus.

B737-300 ??G
http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/rr101/Zab999/Garuda733_zps57d70565.jpg


B767-300 1.8G
http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/rr101/Zab999/ANAB763atTokyoonJun20th2012_18G_zpsc4554457.jpg


DC-9
http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/rr101/Zab999/Airpostal_zpse883cd0e.jpg

767-300 1.8G
http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/rr101/Zab999/AirMaroc_zps34542956.jpg

B737-300 Excessive impact load ??G
http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/rr101/Zab999/ADAMAIR_zpsd94776b8.jpg

[CONF iture]

May I refresh your memory with some pictures of hard landing damage NON Airbus.
Impressive pictures, and without doubt MANY more available from NON Airbus.
You could also have linked a few video to emphasize your point like these ones :

ANA 767 Hard Landing Creases Fuselage - YouTube (http://youtu.be/Jw-aUVa3a0U)
DC 9 80 Hard Landing - YouTube (http://youtu.be/QIsbSz03WdU)

Now, do you think you can try answering the Q.
Which philosophy provides more pertinent information to a training Captain, 737 or 320 ?
Or is it you're simply missing the background to formulate an opinion ?

[A33Zab]

Which philosophy provides more pertinent information to a training Captain, 737 or 320 ?



Definitely I am missing the background, but still know the correct answer: to a training Captain a 737 gives more informtion.

And knowing that now, this justifies 'interconnecting' sidesticks?
interconnected columns didn't prevent hard landings

[taufupok]

Gretchenfrage
*
Join Date: May 2005
Location: middle of nowhere
Posts: 295
It has been proven so many times now:

Airbus design is for the every day, sop bound, non event, no disturbance flight for the barely trained and rated modern pilot.

It is not for any deviation from the above, not for training and certainly not for unforeseen and unexpected emergencies.

For all those astronauts who still insist that proper knowledge of the complicated system allows these super pilots to recognise any sub-sub mode and its deviations from the normal mode, instantly enables them to counteract the accompanying reversion of the protection which is due to the fact that the feeding probes and their computers were tricked by another submode that could not analyse properly what these pilots could see instantly by checking the PNFs PFC, knowing that if it deviated more than 5deg from the standby indicator, they had to disconnect one PRIM and the opposite SEC which would finally enable the PF to trust his sidestick again, provided the PNF did not intervene with a opposite input.

You guys should all have applied at Houston.

for me there is only one thing to say: Qoud erat demonstrandum

:D:D:D Bravo, well said!

I flew both Boeing and Airbus products...I heartily agree with this post.

I always had trouble with Airbus philosophy of the sidesticks' output being the summation of the the inputs from the left and the right. When I underwent training with Airbus instructors almost 2 decades ago, I opined that the greater or higher of the two sidestick inputs should rule but they couldn't give me a satisfactory answer. Likewise the autotrim cut out at 100 ft RA ( at least that was the case some 18 years ago on the A330 ) approaching flare to landing can lead to insufficient elevator pitch authority left to counter sink rate which force pilots to use the temporary " autothrust boost " thingy which can then cause long unstable landings.

[DozyWannabe]

Sorry to disappoint, but as A33Zab has clearly demonstrated (backed up by Clandestino) there's nothing I can say that's either worth saying or has not already been said.

Carry on.

[CONF iture]

Definitely I am missing the background, but still know the correct answer: to a training Captain a 737 gives more informtion.
Also in agreement with the AAIB then.

And knowing that now, this justifies 'interconnecting' sidesticks?
This hardly justifies independent sidesticks.
The minimum has to be a clear information note in the official documentation :
BE AWARE : Our concept may deprive the PM from valuable piece of data.

interconnected columns didn't prevent hard landings
How many hard landings or other tail strikes interconnected columns did prevent ... ?

[A33Zab]

And knowing that now, this justifies 'interconnecting' sidesticks?

This hardly justifies independent sidesticks.
The minimum has to be a clear information note in the official documentation :
BE AWARE : Our concept may deprive the PM from valuable piece of data.



The majority of hard landings/tailstrikes have other causes than 'non connected' SS or 'connected' yokes.
The justification of non linked SIDE! Sticks comes from the hours in which it is useless, distracting or even can be dangerous in certain situations.

A PF/PM needs to have knowledge of his equipment and should be prepared when appropriate.
If, in his opion, it is dangerous equipment to operate, he's either a hero to risk is own life or he's utterly stupid to risk the lives of his passengers on every flight.

Anyway he is obligated to report to the autorities and refuse to operate such a 'dangerous' concept.


interconnected columns didn't prevent hard landings
How many hard landings or other tail strikes interconnected columns did prevent ... ?



Don't know, I am the one without background, can you supply any figures?

[Mac the Knife]

Impossible to prove the negative case.

[Cool Guys]

Great! I love these yoke verses side stick debates. Some things I have noticed about these debates are:

There are many more people who are pro the interconected yokes than the side sticks.
The arguments for the yokes are generally from pilots who main interests are to do with making the plane safer or easier to fly.
The arguments for the S/S are generally to do with statistics or making the plane cheaper to build.

[Clandestino]

So, you will send your bullet points to EASA demanding radical Airbus redesign?

[CONF iture]

The majority of hard landings/tailstrikes have other causes than 'non connected' SS or 'connected' yokes.
Flight control commands, connected or not, are never the cause of hard landing/tailstrike events, but the connected one are an additional tool to help to prevent the occurrence for some of such undesirable events to fully materialize.

The justification of non linked SIDE! Sticks comes from the hours in which it is useless, distracting or even can be dangerous in certain situations.
Please explain ...

Anyway he is obligated to report to the autorities and refuse to operate such a 'dangerous' concept.
Dangerous ... who said dangerous exactly ?

Don't know, I am the one without background, can you supply any figures?
In my own personal experience alone, probably quite a few already, although none of them on an airliner I must concede (up to now at least ...), but I don't have that role of training guy.

[Fire and brimstone]

Clandestino

What would be the point in sending anything to EASA?

Do you think they care about safety?

Whilst the trainee was experienced, he was inexperienced on type. The general level of inexperience does not seem to concern the operator. And if this is what can happen with two experienced guys flying .............

Tell this to EASA ......... or the CAA .............

[DozyWannabe]

Some highly dubious statements there:

There are many more people who are pro the interconected yokes than the side sticks.

*Very* debatable - in my experience the numbers are about the same on here, but the pro-yoke/interconnection crowd do tend to go on about it a lot more.

The arguments for the yokes are generally from pilots who main interests are to do with making the plane safer or easier to fly.
The arguments for the S/S are generally to do with statistics or making the plane cheaper to build.


That's just rubbish. Again, the pro-yoke/interconnection posters would probably like you to think that's the case, but the truth is that there are a lot of differing viewpoints for a lot of different reasons.

Back to regular service...

[Cool Guys]

DW.

There is no statistical evidence to indicate that what you are saying is correct.

[SLFinAZ]

I don't think you need to look any farther then AF447 to understand the value of connected controls. I believe that had the PM had the added tactile feedback he would have been more assertive and possibly been prompted to take control...

[edmundronald]

I'll add a word of specialist vocabulary here:

The yoke is SELF DISCLOSING. The sidestick is not.
The same goes for self-moving throttles.

For myself, when younger and smarter I used to teach AI (Artificial Intelligence) and interviewed people eg. an Airbus pilot, a chess master re. their disciplines. The chess master said something relevant to the Airbus computer issues, namely that in chess energy is a factor players need to integrate, no player can always be at the top of his energy throughout the same game, while the computer is relentless. I think the Airbus design may not enable pilots to be better pilots, but it protects them most of the time from being stupidly bad due to a lapse of concentration. As we have been learning, the pilots have rusty skills due to their companies assuming they will always be protected.

[Clandestino]

What would be the point in sending anything to EASA?If it is really safety issue, what is the point of confining it to PPRuNe?

Do you think they care about safety?With the name "European Aviation Safety Agency"?

Whilst the trainee was experienced, he was inexperienced on type. The general level of inexperience does not seem to concern the operator. And if this is what can happen with two experienced guys flying .............

Tell this to EASA ......... or the CAA .............

I will tell EASA that I made my first 319 landing with total time 5 minutes, second 10, third 15 and by the time i got to seventh, my TT was about 3 hours and there were fare paying passengers on board. According to many a reasonable & unbiased PPRuNer I should not have survived such an ordeal due to my inexperience on type. I'll attach such opinions to my request to be officially certified as fliegende Uebermensch.

[CONF iture]

The yoke is SELF DISCLOSING.
I like this one.
What a nice concept for CRM purpose, especially when the crew includes a Captain seated on the middle seat ...

[Lyman]

Instantaneously available undisturbed fundamental data.

It must not be that important....what's a few airframes, hulls?

People?

[BOAC]

Captain (returns to cockpit, notices altimeter unwinding 'rapidement')

"Hey dude - why have you got that stick hard back in your guts?".........................

Who knows - might it have saved them?

[Lyman]

EASA have required Airbus to fix it, but which one, "interlinking" or "visibilty".

I think visibility?

[Prober]

What is the point of a PM if he cannot actually see what is happening. Might as well go home!:eek:

[Lyman]

By the logic of some present, it is not the PM place to peek at the PF sidestick.

It is somehow technologically rude...