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View Full Version : ATSB report just published on A320 throttle asymmetry incident


A37575
22nd Jan 2013, 06:49
The report:

Investigation: AO-2012-022 - Inadvertent thrust lever asymmetry during the take-off roll involving an Airbus A320, VH-JQX (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2012/aair/ao-2012-022.aspx)

It is well written and well worth close study. It took a year to publish which is surprising for such a relatively simple incident. Seems during the takeoff roll a small asymmetry between the two thrust levers was noted. The left seat pilot was under training for a command while the right seat occupant was his instructor. Without going into details here (see the ATSB full report), the captain under training heard what he thought was the word "Rotate" from the instructor (PNF) and commenced rotation before realising the airspeed was still 20 knots below the correct VR. The aircraft became airborne but the pilot was able to pick up speed by reducing the climb attitude.

Rotating on the call from the PNF of "Rotate" is something often seen in simulator training even though the airspeed indicator of the PF shows well below the correct VR. It goes to show that the word "Rotate" in a firm voice can very much sound like a command, rather than just a support or advisory call by the PNF. Of course, in real life and no significant airspeed difference between the two main ASI's, "Rotate" is invariably ties in with what the PF expects to see on his ASI.

In the old days, the calls were simply "V1.....VR". Boeing changed "VR" to the new term of "ROTATE" and while that has been in use for decades I wonder how many unreported incidents have ocurred where "Rotate" called in a firm voice has caused momentary confusion if an ASI defect is present and the tendency is to respond to a firm voice (in this case "ROTATE") rather than on a correct bugged airspeed.

But there is a powerful tendency to start rotating at the word "Rotate" depending how forcefully the word is annunciated and despite the fact the airspeed on the side of the PF has not yet reached the correct VR. In other words, because things happen so fast approaching VR, it is a human factor problem where it is all too easy to act on the PNF's support call rather than rotate on the bugged VR on the PF's ASI.

In the simulator, this is most likely to occur when the instructor introduces an airspeed error between the two main ASI's with the PNF calling "rotate" on his own ASI despite the airspeed of the PF being nowhere near VR. Invariably we observe the PF then start pulling back on the control column in momentary confusion even though his ASI may be nowhere near his bugged airspeed. This is where it is good airmanship to be aware of the expected ground speed at VR as a double check.

ATSB missed a good opportunity to emphasise the need for the PF to plan on rotating on his own ASI bugged VR and treat the PNF support call of "Rotate" as purely advisory. if the PF reaches his own bugged VR speed but fails to get a support call from the PNF for whatever reason, he simply rotates (a quick glance at the ground speed indication is wise at that point). There should be no confusion and the problem sorted out at a safe altitude.

The Green Goblin
22nd Jan 2013, 08:06
Every so often you com across some gold on pprune.

This is just such an occasion.

It certainly makes me think.

Shot Nancy
22nd Jan 2013, 08:12
Pay peanuts........:yuk:

Icarus2001
22nd Jan 2013, 08:58
This is where it is good airmanship to be aware of the expected ground speed at VR as a double check. How would you propose to observe that groundspeed?

For me, I scan the ASI along with temps and centreline until I am crosseyed by which time it must be time to haul back. Non standard calls during the roll are extremely difficult for just this reason.

By the way, tell me about these throttles? What sort of jet engine uses carburettors?;)

a_pilot
22nd Jan 2013, 09:12
Pay peanuts........http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/pukey.gif

Get monkeys ? Is that what you are trying to say ?

So you think the incident occurred to some inexperienced pilot not good enough to get a real airline job with a real airline ? (as you imply)

As a matter of fact, if you care the read the ATSB report, the pilot happened to be a highly experienced Qantas pilot (on leave without pay under the MOU) with over 14,000 hours including about 7000 hours on the B767 :eek:

Please don't try and tell me that he is a monkey otherwise we all are :p

sheppey
22nd Jan 2013, 12:01
[QUOTEHow would you propose to observe that groundspeed?
QUOTE]

If you don't know where to find the ground speed you need refresher in the sim:ok:

If you have not heard of autothrottles ditto above :=

FlexibleResponse
22nd Jan 2013, 12:50
A37575

ATSB missed a good opportunity to emphasise the need for the PF to plan on rotating on his own ASI bugged VR and treat the PNF support call of "Rotate" as purely advisory. if the PF reaches his own bugged VR speed but fails to get a support call from the PNF for whatever reason, he simply rotates (a quick glance at the ground speed indication is wise at that point). There should be no confusion and the problem sorted out at a safe altitude.

Right on the button. Three cheers to that man!

Icarus2001
22nd Jan 2013, 13:47
If you don't know where to find the ground speed you need refresher in the sim
If you have not heard of autothrottles ditto above

Thanks for illustrating my point. If the PF has time available to look at the GS on the panel then he or she could just as easily look at the much more relevant airspeed on their side. Scanning groundspeed for rotate point is about as useful as scanning groundspeed at 100' agl on final.

Yes there is an autothrottle system sometimes also referred to as autothrust but the levers in the cockpit/flightdeck/bridge/control room/reading room/pointy end are most definately called thrust levers or power levers by the jet manufacturers I am familiar with.

Anachronism anyone?

FYSTI
22nd Jan 2013, 20:08
But there is a powerful tendency to start rotating at the word "Rotate" depending how forcefully the word is annunciated and despite the fact the airspeed on the side of the PF has not yet reached the correct VR. In other words, because things happen so fast approaching VR, it is a human factor problem where it is all too easy to act on the PNF's support call rather than rotate on the bugged VR on the PF's ASI.

In the simulator, this is most likely to occur when the instructor introduces an airspeed error between the two main ASI's with the PNF calling "rotate" on his own ASI despite the airspeed of the PF being nowhere near VR. Invariably we observe the PF then start pulling back on the control column in momentary confusion even though his ASI may be nowhere near his bugged airspeed. This is where it is good airmanship to be aware of the expected ground speed at VR as a double check. A37575 - I think you need to consider the psychology of the process. In essence, the word "rotate" could be changed to "Vr" or "banana's" - it wouldn't matter. Any call has the potential to become a classically conditioned (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classical_conditioning)response. What you are arguing (correctly) is for the PF to ensure he does not fall for this conditioning process, and actually cross-check against some independent system. Changing the words isn't enough. If you look at the Boeing Takeoff manoeuvre in the QRH it simply has V1 ...VR Rotate, and offers no guidance or hint of a crosscheck. The FCTM goes into elaborate details of tail clearances - again anything but the need to crosscheck ASI's.

This is a huge advantage that the HUD offers, your own ASI is right there in your field of vision, together with the tail strike warning, is worth its weight in gold.

Kharon
22nd Jan 2013, 20:10
A37575 – Pprune at it's very best. There is no icon for 'Hats off' but consider mine doffed.

It's an old debate now, but years ago a couple of overseas companies I had the pleasure of working with used a "80 knots" callout, the idea was that it provided, well before any critical speed an ASI, engine power check and a warning of the approaching V1 speed range. I liked it and found it helpful. The GS check is also very useful, particularly when the speed tape and GS readout are on screen, but the early cross check built 'time' into equation. I still do it – in my head – just a quick look to make sure the power is balanced, the GS about what I'd expect and a glance at the standby, takes longer to write it out than it takes to do. Not advocating - just my slightly battered two bob's worth.

This report is interesting as it describes one of those 'sneaky' little holes in the cheese which can distract and create havoc; experience, training and discipline greatly benefit on those occasions, particularly at the pay attention end of a take off roll. All's well that ends well.

4Greens
22nd Jan 2013, 20:57
We used 80 knots as a check. I thought it was in general use.

Geragau
22nd Jan 2013, 21:29
For the love of God, this was in Australia you guys are talking about. The pilots here are supposedly God's gifts. It just cannot be!

Rotating at 20 kts below Vr? Unless it is a contaminated runway with the correct take off speed computation, there is a very small V1/Vr spread. As such, it was likely that rotation was accomplished before the V1 call. I do not recall take off V speed callouts on the A320 reverting to previous practice by certain operators of F-27 whereby the only callout was " rotate " when V1=Vr!

Kelly Slater
22nd Jan 2013, 23:14
Just as a matter of interest, what inputs are used to calculate ground speed and will it still read correctly if the ASI is in error?

woodja51
23rd Jan 2013, 01:56
I guess after a minor 'lever assymetry' issue on take off ( and by the way as the detentes wear out it gets even easier to not quite have them both/ all four in the slot, thus generating the assym ecam and requiring a minor amount of fiddling on the odd occassion ). The next thing we might see in an ATSB report is the use of FLEX/MCT when a flex temp is missed out, generating the THRUST NOT SET ecam as well....ending in an RTO or similar perhaps?

Both of these very minor issues IMHO should 'not result in anything more than either pushing up the levers to TOGA ( actions for the latter ECAM actually tell you what to do) or a bit of adjustment . Bearing in mind the actual thrust set will be TLA determined ,normally checked at 80 kts ( yet with no acknowledgement of the 'THRUST SET ' PNF call by the PF - which seems strange to me , but is AB standard now.) .. Then '100 kts ' as the hi / low speed RTO divider and x check etc ( or 80 kts on a Boeing if I remember)

As far as rotating 20 kts early, yes, perhaps a pavlov dog reaction , but hopefully just an ease off of the pitch rate would have prevented any tail strike as with both engines operating the jet would pretty quickly be there anyway.

To be honest , if they did not bend the jet or generate a QAR event which they had to answer to the safety department for, it is hardly worth even being a reportable incident in my view... Simply a debrief item to learn from ...well done for the crew coming forward if they did so voluntarily as it has generated some good discussion.

But this is Australia And we do like to get wrapped around the axles for trivial issues...Go work overseas for a while and see how bad things have to get to hit the papers!!!

Lookleft
23rd Jan 2013, 02:08
This is not that different to other incidents where the gear up was called for and the flaps were raised instead. It all boils down to the age old communication problem of what was said being different to what was percieved. Mandating use of the interphone I think would help mitigate that problem. A jet cockpit is still a noisy work environment and as both pilots are looking out the front, the other cues that help a person decipher what is being said by the other person are not present. At least using the interphone what is being said is heard in the headset and not a distorted bunch of words coming from the other side of the cockpit.

I would imagine that the Training Captain got a nasty shock when the nose started coming up in response to his "Go..TOGA" command.

Buckshot
24th Jan 2013, 03:47
I think you need to consider the psychology of the process. Any call has the potential to become a classically conditioned response.

Especially if that call comes from a Training Captain in the RHS!

Icarus2001
24th Jan 2013, 04:02
Mandating use of the interphone I think would help mitigate that problemInteresting. Are there any jet operators in Australia that do not use headsets & intercom as standard below transition? Maybe not mandated but always used?

A jet cockpit is still a noisy work environment and as both pilots are looking out the front, Both looking forward? Not sure I agree. As PF I am trying to keep the beast on the centreline, scan speed and temps, when the FO is the handling pilot the same as well as being ready to take-off for an RTO.

The Green Goblin
24th Jan 2013, 04:29
Headsets always on below cruise altitude.

Interphone is optional.

Most guys don't use it, however overseas operations can require both speakers on ears and interphone on.

potteroomore
24th Jan 2013, 08:13
Geragau, I agree with you completely. If one does not receive the V1 call but only the call to " rotate ", something is definitely not right...cause for pause, query and a quick crosschecking. For these two highly experienced pilots to be caught in this incident is highly troubling.

Lookleft
24th Jan 2013, 17:18
Both looking forward? Not sure I agree. As PF I am trying to keep the beast
on the centreline, scan speed and temps, when the FO is the handling pilot the same as well as being ready to take-off for an RTO.


Agreed but where is most of your focus?


the other cues that help a person decipher what is being said by the other
person are not present


The rest of the statement puts the first part in context.

Interphone is optional.

A headset without using the interphone actually hinders intercockpit communication. One ear is covered and the other is not so its not surprising that in this instance the PF misinterpreted what was said by the PNF.

For these two highly experienced pilots to be caught in this incident is highly troubling

Doesn't matter how experienced you are as an F/O, when you are doing Command training on a new type you are on a steep learning curve and mistakes will occur. The Training Captain can't anticipate every unexpected response if he hasn't experienced it previously.

Anti Skid On
25th Jan 2013, 00:47
As a mere PPL two things come into my head; would they not have calculated the proposed take off roll, and would this not be able to be gauged by the amount of runway used up, and, would it not be unheard of to glance at the ASI before committing to becoming airborne?

Capn Bloggs
25th Jan 2013, 02:58
Read the report 10 times. I'm not looking forward to my A319 endo! http://www.smilies.our-local.co.uk/index_files/scratchhd.gif

I think more plain language from training captain was in order, and/or just push up the throttles to TOGA himself. "Thrust asymmetry, selecting TOGA" or similar.

"Go"? one syllable, easy to mishear?

Good learning experience nevertheless, even for us non-computer types. Good on the crew for reporting it. :D

Rudder
25th Jan 2013, 03:04
Why airlines dick around with manufacturers recommended procedures and SOP's is beyond me.

The ATSB show again that they cant do any sort of analysis or have any expertise. This is just a regurgitation of an internal Jetstar report it would seem.

scrubba
25th Jan 2013, 05:08
Hey Rudder,

What are the "manufacturers recommended procedures and SOP's" that apply in this situation? :hmm: :hmm: :hmm:

jandakotcruiser
25th Jan 2013, 06:50
Doesn't matter how experienced you are as an F/O, when you are doing Command training on a new type you are on a steep learning curve and mistakes will occur. The Training Captain can't anticipate every unexpected response if he hasn't experienced it previously

Then this trainee captain IS DEFINITELY NOT READY for command! As has been pointed out, rotating without crosschecking is a no no, especially if there was no prior V1 call.

Jack Ranga
25th Jan 2013, 07:12
Ah, ah, ahhhhhh bullish!t he's not :cool:

How did this make it to report stage? Bro in the right seat shoves the throttles full stick, tells bro in the left seat, lower the nose a bit bro, climb, climb, climb. Don't do that again bro! Sorry bro....

d_concord
25th Jan 2013, 08:07
Scrubba,

I don't know what Rudder has in mind but being an Airbus trained TRE/TRI my view is that the SOP's call for a thrust set call by 80 its. If it isn't then a slow speed rejected takeoff would have been more appropriate and required by the SOP's otherwise why have the call in the first place.

From what I read, the Pilot under training was not with the aircraft even at this early stage and the training captain sitting there and hoping this would resolve itself by directions probably is a bit passive. While clearly the Training Captain knew that the thrust was at least forward of the detent and had at least the minimum power expected for this particular takeoff, the guy with his hands on the thrust levers had no idea.

While I clearly think that this takeoff should have been rejected. Another course of action given that the training captain was situationally aware of the power, was as Capt Bloggs indicates and that was to push the lever forward himself to TOGA ASAP and take over.

I have no idea how anyone can get Rotate out of GO TOGA but it does indicate that probably the guy under training was still trying to in fact figure out what was going on and was well behind the aircraft and this is the guy pulling the aircraft into the air!!

Bloggs you will love this aircraft. You just have to give up on Boeing and come across to the dark side!! (Sniggering aside they are really great)

Jack Ranga
25th Jan 2013, 08:11
Never trust an A320 NEVER :ugh:

*Lancer*
25th Jan 2013, 08:27
Anti skid on, take off distance is not calculated. Speeds are calculated to fit in with all the factors. Estimating distances is pure guesswork based on familiarity with the runway and conditions. But yes, checking the ASI should very much be part of the scan.

"Go toga" and "Rotate" probably sound similar in the fog of war.

compressor stall
25th Jan 2013, 10:32
"Go toga" and "Rotate" probably sound similar in the fog of war.


Maybe so, and impossible to argue against that.

However, why didn't the cognisant lack of a V1 call raise a hair on the back of the PF's neck? Shouldn't the PF have a chronological feel for when the call should be coming from the inertia of the aircraft? 130-150 kts is a fair split and if you "thought you'd missed the call" wouldn't you also be thinking it's a bit early and double check your speed tape?

I assume the speed tape scan was part of the PF's scan? The report doesn't mention the 100kt call though either....

PS. I'm giving the ATSB the benefit of the doubt for the lack of detail in this report due to the fact that the CVR would have been overwritten...

Centaurus
25th Jan 2013, 12:13
With the 737 there is a 80 knot call and with Airbus there is a 100 knot call. The principle as far as I know is a check that both ASI's are within a bull's roar of each other. In other words guarding against a gross error. A wise man will know the wind velocity before the start of the take off run and by association the expected ground speed read-out at the 80 or 100 knot call for the aircraft type.

As a general observation it is probable that an experienced simulator instructor will see more events or incidents in one week while training various ranks of pilots than most line pilots would see in 20 years. So the opinions following are the result of watching years of "events" with erroneous airspeed during type rating and general simulator training.

It takes less than one second to glance at the ground speed indicator during the take off roll at the support call of 80/100 knots. That is of course if you know exactly where the ground speed indicator is located on the instrument panel.

You can never know if a hidden defect is present giving erroneous airspeed. It could be on the take off roll which is critical - or some other time. Indeed, a reminder of this fact may be found in the B737 FCTM where there is a statement "ground speed information is available from the FMC and on the instrument displays (as installed). These indications can be used as a cross-check."

A year or so ago ATSB published an incident report to an A330 on take off at Brisbane with the F/O as PF. I don't recall the exact details but I think there was an insect stuck in the captain's ASI which had the effect of causing his ASI to under-read by a significant amount. Passing 100 knots the F/O expected a support call of 100 from the captain but didn't get one. He said nothing assuming the captain had been distracted and forgot to make the call. Approaching VR on the copilots side and as the copilot was preparing to rotate, the captain called "100 knots". There was immediate confusion as you can imagine. After a very brief moment the captain took control and made high speed abort. Back at the gate the fusible plugs let go as the brakes were hot.

In the Boeing FCTM there is a statement under the general heading of "Callouts" and says "The PM makes callouts based upon instrument indications or observations for the appropriate condition. The PF should verify the condition/location from the flight instruments and acknowledge. If the PM does not make the required callout, the PF should make it."

That is why it is good airmanship for the PF to call something like "95 knots my side" if he didn't get the call of "80 Knots" from the PM. The high speed of the abort by the Brisbane A320 might have been avoided if the PM (the F/O in this case) had called "110 my side" during the take off run instead of saying nothing. While 100 knots was the SOP call here by the time the PF has reacted to no support call by the PM the aircraft would likely have been 10 knots faster - hence the theoretical "110 my side" call by the PF. That would have alerted the captain to a potential problem and he would have to decide to take over and abort or tell the PF to keep going especially as an erroneous airspeed defect is not normally a reason to make a high speed abort.

This then leads us to the value of the ground speed glance where in this case the PF could have quickly noted his ground speed as he passed 100 knots. Having already had in his mind what the ground speed should read approximately as he saw his own IAS going through 100 knots he would be in a good position to know his own ASI was good in event of an erroneous airspeed rare event. In fact there was an erroneous airspeed event on the captain's side - so these things can happen albeit at an unexpected time and very rarely. But that is what good airmanship is all about.

In the simulator an instructor may select a 25 knot airspeed over-read or under-read on one of the two pilots ASI's. Example follows: Captain as PF has the over-reading error but doesn't know about it of course as he starts the take off run. His ASI comes off the stops early and soon rockets past 80 knots. The PM will not know of course. The captain doesn't receive the expected support call from the PM of "80 knots" (Boeing). He quickly calls
"90 my side". The astonished PM mentally thinks "Bullshit" as his ASI is around 55-60 knots. He says something out aloud about airspeed disagreement and by this time the aircraft is rapidly accelerating through 100 knots real airspeed.

The captain realises there is an erroneous airspeed problem but there is no time to glance at the standby ASI and evaluate the umpire. Now he could have picked up the problem earlier if he was in the habit of glancing at his ground speed as he passed 80 knots IAS. With his over-reading airspeed he would have been a bit shocked to see his ground speed was something like 50 knots. Providing as a good captain he knew what the W/V was before the start of the roll, he knew the airspeed of 80+ and the GS of 50+ didn't compute and it would then be up to him to continue or stop. He could rotate at the scheduled VR speed on his ground speed reading (allowing for wind component) and at a safe altitude sort out the problem in the air.

This technique taught in the simulator is invaluable and once the crew get into the habit of ground speed awareness because of simulator practice then it becomes second nature for all future take offs. Honestly it is no big deal. But it is a real big deal if a premature action is taken to make a high speed stop simply because of a perceived airspeed difference between the two main ASI's in the middle of the takeof run.

One Pprune contributor in this thread scorned use of the ground speed indication on very short final as useless. In fact those pilots who have flown into some of the atoll runways like Nauru, Tarawa, Truk, Pohnpei and the like will remember the unreliability of local anemometers and at night the windsocks may be unlit. In fact years ago, we had the situation at one island airport the flight service operator announced the wind as calm by simply looking at the forecast wind. His anemometer was u/s and some vandals had shot out the windsock lights. We were on final approach at night at 5 miles and kept a wary eye on the ground speed which showed a 15 knot tailwind from 10,000 ft down. "Wind calm - runway clear" said the local in the flight service tower. That didn't tie in with on course on the VASIS rate of descent. At 500 ft the ground speed was now 10 knots tailwind. The runway was just 5600 ft long and no way were we going to land with any TW so we went around and landed from the opposite direction. It was good to see a 10 knot HW component on that runway.

Morale of that story? Be fully aware of the ground speed indications that may alert you to unforecast or actual tailwinds. Nothing wrong with a quick glance at the ground speed at 200 ft on short final. Especially with varying winds. Similarly on the take off run be aware of the expected ground speed indication as the PM makes his IAS support call for the aircraft type. This could prevent an unwarranted high speed abort because of perceived airspeed reading difference.
Please note: The above comments are personal opinion only. Arguments against should preferably be based on technical disagreements - not playing the man!

jaded boiler
25th Jan 2013, 13:18
Great stuff Centaurus.

Kelly Slater
25th Jan 2013, 22:00
Just as a matter of interest, what inputs are used to calculate ground speed and will it still read correctly if the ASI is in error?

scrubba
26th Jan 2013, 02:07
Thanks d_concord,

I thought the TLA mismatch was surprisingly small to cause this problem and even more surprised that the ATSB made no comment about the apparent sensitivity. For the non-Airbus people, I was also disappointed that there was no discussion of what the available solutions were - I'm guessing that repositioning the TLs is not an option, but I'm also surprised that it is not an option up to a certain point in the TO sequence.

I'm unclear why you seem to think it warranted an RTO. Presumably there is some cross-check of engine parameters to confirm that at least flex thrust is being generated - so if it is available, why not continue? Can normal autothrust be reinstated airborne at a safe altitude? Is manual thrust setting difficult or are automatic features disabled with the A/T?

FWIW, I am particularly glad that it was reported, investigated and published. I thought that a lot more could have been drawn from the event and the lead up to it, as well as the company SOPs, preparation of training captains, etc and what reviews took place post-event.

For those who have never suffered a loss of SA by a distraction at a critical time while under the duress of training, don't be so quick to judge - I've seen some very good pilots do some very unexpected things in similar circumstances and everybody was much better for understanding the experience.

Icarus2001
26th Jan 2013, 02:23
Some very good points Centaurus. I cannot disagree. However you said...
One PPRuNe contributor in this thread scorned use of the ground speed indication on very short final as useless.That would be me, for the record what I said was...
Scanning groundspeed for rotate point is about as useful as scanning groundspeed at 100' agl on final.

My bolding this time around. Your point about "trusting' ground reports of wind is one I take to work everyday. Looking for GS for me is not the solution or really required, simply glancing at the wind vector arrow does the trick :ok: GS is only part of the story ie is it a quartering tailwind vs headwind etc.

I still feel that scanning GS on the TO roll is problematic, partly due to update rates on the particular box, small as that may be in the scheme of things but mainly due to the small window between "power set" and "V1" to scan all the other useful stuff. Anyway, each to their own.

*Lancer*
26th Jan 2013, 03:19
For those unfamiliar with airbus, the GS comes from the GPS through the inertial reference system. It's displayed at the top of the Nav display.

d_concord
26th Jan 2013, 04:41
Hi Scrubba,

The thrust TLA can be just a millimetre out of the detent to give this indication on the FMA. It will give this whether one thrust lever is forward of the detent or behind as well. The Levers are just a slide switch so position is everything.

What happened here is not unusual. I have seen other do it and have done it myself. And as you say, in all the cases I have seen or done myself you just put the lever instantly back into to the detent and presto now you have the power you programmed. I have never heard of anyone to just sit there with the problem until now.

This is from the Airbus QRH for the PNF

BELOW 80 kt:
N1 (EPR)CHECK
THRUST SET ANNOUNCE
PFD/ENG PARAMETERS SCAN

You will note it says below 80Kts not a specific speed.

This all takes place almost instantly after the levers have been put into the correct position and the FMA will indicate what has been commanded. This is followed by the PNF confirming that the thrust is set from the engine parameters. This will all happen well before 80 Kts. That is what is unusual here. The reality is the thrust set call normally takes place well before 80 kts. The airbus call is "thrust set" not "80kts Thrust set" or "80 kts thrust not set"

The PNF called "80 Kts. Thrust Not Set" (maybe another issue is why wait till then!)

Its very clear that this was now a non normal take off .

A slow speed RTO is a non event in this case. (That's not the case with a slow speed RTO with an engine out but that is another issue )

To be honest, I just don't think the PF understands the FBW characteristics of the aircraft. If he did he would have instantly known the cause and the remedy.

It is interesting that the findings did not see the need to look at or make any comment on any deficiency in understanding or the need to improve the initial conversion training onto the aircraft. Seems as though they did not even look at the ground course or training syllabus of the organisation that did the training. Given the PF had only 120 hours on type this incident started there.

As Rudder indicated you really have to wonder about the ATSB and the level of experience, skill and analysis.










compressor stall
26th Jan 2013, 08:17
A very interesting event that has two distinct aspects. First is the actions of the PNF in the 80-120kt region, second the actions of the PF in rotating @130kts. I think the actions of the PF were dealt with above.

But IMHO the action that started this incident was the non standard call "Thrust Not Set" when it appears that it was. That lead to the PF's confusion.

To follow on from d_concord's comments:

Immediately after the Thrust Levers are moved into their takeoff detent, MAN FLX 62 (or TOGA etc) appears on the screen. But the engine isn't at the Thrust Set stage yet. It also takes longer for the IAEs to get to power than the CFMs.

The required N1 (CFM) or EPR (IAE) is displayed on the screen just to the right of the engine N1 or EPR. Only when these two are matched can you call "Thrust Set". This is to be done before (not always at) 80 knots.


Now back to this incident: From the little information available, it would appear that the thrust was indeed matched between that commanded by the TLA and that required (it should have exceeded it, but we aren't told this :rolleyes:) . As such the correct call would have been "Thrust Set" even if there was a MAN THR displayed on the FMA. in this case, the FMA has nothing to do with the Thrust required, which is the purpose of the thrust set call.

The correct call (in addition and either before or after the Thrust Set call as noticed) should have been reading the FMA - "Manual Thrust".

Then if was all still going to custard which is the subject of another debate, Go - TOGA was the correct action (as the thrust was indeed set).


Hopefully this thread can remain a healthy discussion here with appropriate respect to the pilots involved about an event from which we all can learn.

Kharon
26th Jan 2013, 22:37
Rudder # 23 –"The ATSB show again that they cant do any sort of analysis or have any expertise. This is just a regurgitation of an internal Jetstar report it would seem". A valid point, well worth some time and consideration. The slippery feel of 2012 report offers little 'meat' compared to the 'food for thought' of 2006 report and very neatly demonstrates the differences we are consistently seeing in ATSB reports.

Airbus 2006.
(http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1360789/aair200601453_001.pdf)
Airbus 2012. (http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4066707/ao-2012-022_final.pdf)

There is in the GA section a report on an engine failure, at night of a single engine training exercise. The report has a smug, almost patronising feel to it and provides little of value. It arrives at the end of a long string of similar offerings. If you can bear it, have a look at the Air Rescue, Air North, Pel Air and Canley Vale efforts, they are enlightening.

Oh, almost forgot, overheard at the after cricket BBQ – and this is strictly "off the wind"; but it seems some bright spark at CASA has outlawed the "80 knot" cross check call for "light" jets and similar. Remove all traces from SOP or evil will be visited on your house. Only BBQ fuelled hot air at this stage – but I do intend to get to the bottom of this rumour; if true then someone better tell Boeing and a couple other not very well informed manufacturers.

d_concord
26th Jan 2013, 23:29
C/S

I agree with you overall. While it is clear from the report that thrust was probably set. The fact is that neither pilot indicated they knew what thrust was set. The PF had no idea what was going on and the PNF (and training captain) called it as not being set. Smart move would be to pull it up from low speed. I don't agree with your go call at all "in this case".

There is lots not to like about this incident, most of which has been covered above. Another thing to look at is the role of the training captain. A simple advice to bring the lever back to the detent would have fixed this from the second the FMA came up . Thats what training people would normally do.........! There were passengers on this aircraft. The concept of lets see if he works it out is probably not a great one.

compressor stall
27th Jan 2013, 01:29
Let me expand on the intent of my penultimate paragraph which i admit isn't clear, probably due to watching tv at the same time...

IF the thrust had been determined to be at least what was commanded then there is nothing inherently wrong with the GO command, particularly if the MAN THR was noticed over 100kts.

I still feel had the Airbus SOP calls been followed it is likely that this would never have happened.


Further criticisms of the nuances and actions (as to whether he should have left it or not) in the role of the Training Captain I'll leave to those of you more qualified than I.

Sarcs
27th Jan 2013, 02:48
Been monitoring this thread with particular interest, it is good to see posters with very real experience in High Capacity Jet ops getting involved in the debate. This thread highlights the importance of the ATSB in publishing good factual reports that disseminates vital safety issues that we all can learn from. :ok:

However as several posters are now starting to realise the ATSB report is somewhat short in detail in the technical and operational aspects.:=

Kharon’s 2006 comparison is a particularly good one as it displays what appears to be a totally different methodology of investigation by the ATSB (that was then this is now!) and the nuances are obvious in the final report.




Examples:

In the ‘Additional information’ section of the 2006 report the ATSB highlights research into ‘Previous events’, this is described as finding a ‘causal chain’ (Reason model). The 2012 report is totally devoid of any such information suggesting that this was a isolated (one in a million incident) but judging by some of the posts that is probably not entirely true.


d_concord said: What happened here is not unusual. I have seen other do it and have done it myself. And as you say, in all the cases I have seen or done myself you just put the lever instantly back into to the detent and presto now you have the power you programmed. I have never heard of anyone to just sit there with the problem until now.

It has also been pointed out that the 2012 report seems to be lacking in the organisational and management information:

scrubba said: FWIW, I am particularly glad that it was reported, investigated and published.I thought that a lot more could have been drawn from the event and the lead up to it, as well as the company SOPs, preparation of training captains, etc and what reviews took place post-event.

d_concord said: It is interesting that the findings did not see the need to look at or make any comment on any deficiency in understanding or the need to improve the initial conversion training onto the aircraft. Seems as though they did not even look at the ground course or training syllabus of the organisation that did the training. Given the PF had only 120 hours on type this incident started there.


Whereas the 2006 report has a whole section devoted to “Organisational and management information” which includes quoting from the Operations Manual the relevant section dealing with; “The A330 operating techniques, instructions, standard operating procedures (SOP) and limitations in the operations manual that affected the conduct of an RTO” (pg 6 of the report).





The ‘Safety Actions’ sections of both reports are also like chalk and cheese..
2012 Safety Actions (operator):
Jetstar

Simulator training

The operator advised that, in response to this occurrence, they have incorporated a ‘thrust mishandling/abnormal event prior to V1’ into their ‘Captain Simulator’ qualification. They have also incorporated a module into their simulator cyclic training regarding incorrect thrust setting on takeoff.

Communications

The operator advised that, in response to this occurrence, they have issued a communication to flight crew regarding ‘Command of Flight’ requirements for the pilot in command in circumstances where an operational event occurs during a flight.

2006 Safety Actions (operator):
Aircraft operator

On 5 February 2006, prior to this incident, following a third airspeed–related occurrence involving an A330 where wasp activity was suspected, the operator’s engineering department initiated the following actions:

• A property fault report was raised requesting urgent action be taken to remove mud wasp infestations on the operator’s ground support equipment (GSE) that was located at the Brisbane Airport international apron. In response to that fault report, a contractor was employed to inspect and spray the operator’s portable equipment. During the process, a wasp nest was found and removed from one set of portable stairs.

• An arrangement was put in place for the quarterly inspection and spraying of all ground equipment.

• An email was distributed to all line maintenance staff at Brisbane that included an overview of the wasp-related problems, and an instruction to fit pitot probe covers as soon as possible after an aircraft’s arrival, with their subsequent removal as close as possible to the aircraft’s departure.

• As a precautionary measure, the operator inspected all pitot lines throughout its A330 fleet. No foreign matter was found in those aircraft’s lines.14

In May 2006, the operator assumed responsibility for the ongoing wasp inspection/eradication program in their GSE area. The following schedule was established:

• weekly inspections/eradication took place until the end of June 2006

• monthly inspections/eradications were invoked from July to September 2006 (the period of least expected wasp activity)

• a weekly program was to be reinstated from 1 October 2006 (the perceived time of greatest wasp activity).

In addition, the operator promulgated information to flight crews in order to alert them of the potential hazards of wasp activity at Brisbane Airport.

In October 2006, the operator implemented a formal Local Area Procedure at Brisbane, which provided more detailed guidance than the maintenance instruction manual for the fitment of pitot probe covers to A330 aircraft as follows:

• when aircraft ground time exceeded 2 hours, pitot covers were to be fitted and a Technical Log item raised to reflect their fitment

• when the aircraft were on the ground for less than 2 hours, and at the discretion of the certifying Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (LAME), pitot probe covers were to be fitted and a Technical Log item raised as necessary to reflect their fitment

• if wasp activity increased during the summer months, the less than 2 hour option should be adopted.

Finally, the operator also planned to introduce low-to-intermediate speed range rejected takeoffs (RTOs) to the company’s recurrent simulator training program.

I also find the following comments interesting… “The ATSB show again that they can’t do any sort of analysis or have any expertise. This is just a regurgitation of an internal Jetstar report it would seem.”… “As Rudder indicated you really have to wonder about the ATSB and the level of experience, skill and analysis”.

Not that we are expecting the bureau to necessarily have a type rated expert in the investigation team, however it is perhaps poignant to make a comparison to the NTSB system of investigation and how they get around the ‘expertise’ issue.

Within the NTSB investigative process they have what they call a ‘Party System’, see here:
The Party System


The Board investigates about 2,000 aviation accidents and incidents a year, and about 500 accidents in the other modes of transportation - rail, highway, marine and pipeline. With about 400 employees, the Board accomplishes this task by leveraging its resources. One way the Board does this is by designating other organizations or companies as parties to its investigations.
The NTSB designates other organizations or corporations as parties to the investigation. Other than the FAA, which by law is automatically designated a party, the NTSB has complete discretion over which organizations it designates as parties to the investigation. Only those organizations or corporations that can provide expertise to the investigation are granted party status and only those persons who can provide the Board with needed technical or specialized expertise are permitted to serve on the investigation; persons in legal or litigation positions are not allowed to be assigned to the investigation. All party members report to the NTSB.
Eventually, each investigative group chairman prepares a factual report and each of the parties in the group is asked to verify the accuracy of the report. The factual reports are placed in the public docket.

This system makes a lot of sense as it means that various parties with a particular interest and expertise can provide a ‘team’ effort to proactively analyse, research and contribute to getting the best possible safety outcome from the NTSB Final Report.:D

With the 2006 report there does appear to be more of a ‘team effort’ and level of cooperation between the ATSB and the operator, however the 2012 report hints at a distinct lack of cooperation and there is almost a level of ‘political correctness’ displayed i.e. ‘we don’t want to upset them best let them address the safety issues.’ :bored:

Anyway back to the thread and keep up the good work filling in the gaps that the ATSB is apparently happy to leave out these days!:E

my oleo is extended
29th Jan 2013, 11:37
Excellent post sarcs, excellent.

If my memory is correct, the ATSBeaker indeed did on occasion call on the assistance of third party's to assist with investigations. One such example was QF71 into Learmonth, in 2008 I am fairly sure. They seconded a CASA FOI who had A330 experience to assist. The ATSBeaker didn't have the internal specialist so they went external, a good call. Smart, mature and genuine approach to a thorough investigation.
However that was in the days before Beaker came onboard and applied his 27 years of Government bureaucratic crap to the well respected investigative bureau and turned it onto the embarrassing mess it is now. Now he won't even sign off on recovering the key known pieces of evidence required so that an accident investigation can be fully concluded (Norfolk).

No, the only external party's Beaker involves in anything are the ones that provide high tea served on fine porcelain along with silver cutlery, at events where he and his cohorts can hypothesise,philosophise and muse over universal complexities and mysteries.

And Kharon, if what you say is true, and I have heard the same rumour, then this industry really has gone loco, raving
mad, insane when a pilot is threatened for following an S.O.P written in the aircraft manual by the manufacturer? Are we to believe the pilot is expected to violate S.O.P's? Is that part of a just culture? Would that not constitute a 'workaround'? Sounds like somebody's SMS isn't working??

No wonder the Senators are all over this mess, at least somebody in higher power is concerned.

Sunfish
29th Jan 2013, 19:09
So to summarise from the comments here in laymans langauge, and please correct me if I am wrong:

1. A Jetstar pilot mishandled the throttles of the aircraft which could have resulted in not enough thrust being available for a successful takeoff.

2. The training pilot and pilot flying miscoordinated the takeoff rotation action and the pilot flying did not check the airspeed - which could also have resulted in takeoff failure.

3. The ATSB decided their was a single cause for the incident and did not subscribe to the James Reason / chain of circumstance model of incident eventuation and did not examine the causes of the incident in more detail as they relate to management and training. They employed the far cheaper and quicker "one off" incident model.

3, The safety action taken by Jetstar was to tell the pilots not to do it again.

4. The ATSB was entirely satisified with this outcome.

So am I right if I draw the conclusion from this that the ATSB/Jetstar safety action does not, in the opinion of airline pilots, comprehensively preclude a similar incident happening again?

.........Especially since Airbus side sticks don't provide any direct haptic feedback to the non flying pilot about what the pilot flying is trying to get the aircraft to do. (translation: the other pilot can't feel what the other guy is trying to do because the side sticks aren't mechanically connected)

to put that yet another way, is there a tail dragging incident or worse in Jetstars future?

halfmanhalfbiscuit
29th Jan 2013, 19:41
Definitely appear to be non believers in Jame Reason's theories. This guy has been involved in some pretty serious accident investigations, Piper Apha and Kings Cross London Underground fire as a starter.

As Sunfish points out this report on Jetstar is pretty average at best. However, when you look at Pel Air. Pilot error! Then compare with what contributing factors the senate inquiry has been presented with. Now, if the ATSB had looked at these and then concluded pilot error that would be a different matter. But they were not even considered and to leave the CVR and FDR on the ocean floor too! I think it was around 44m from previous info?

CASA even had a SMS presentation with a DVD containing a James Reason and Patrick Hudson lecture on it that they were distributing a few years back.

Kharon
29th Jan 2013, 20:47
Sunny – there are several issues which, I imagine will be hammered out at Check &Training meetings. As has been pointed out the incident of it's self was essentially a something nothing at face value. The guys here are pointing out and highlighting very well some of the subtle, deeper issues relating to modern operations.

For example - Flight engineers were replaced by automation – so when an 'old' school' skipper called for power there was a pair of practised hands to make sure all the donkeys were pulling in harness and not behaving badly. The flight crew probably had at least one eye on the engine clocks, 'tuther on the ASI and various other things. Now the 'automatic' flight engineer is still monitoring but, with the new gear, there is a risk that a casual glance, rather than 'intense' monitoring of the engine clocks and reliance on a 'warning' can become a normalised deficiency, where small aberrations, such as we have here can pass undetected. This crew spotted the deliberate error; the 'procedure for correcting' seems to have got tangled up. Good on the crew for reporting it.

ATSB have identified this as a single issue "in house", but as many others have pointed out, that is not the end of the story. There are training issues, CRM issues and some deeply entrenched, subjective issues which deserve consideration and discussion. I dare say some C&T brainstorming will develop into revised protocol and practice. This will be limited to what the manufacturer SOP allows, but in the sim, perhaps now there will be additional notice taken of what the engines are doing early in the piece, that correction is made a long time before the business end of a take off and that communication is absolutely clear.

This is one those sneaky, non events which can and do create havoc even on the best run flight deck. The Airbus and Boeing crews have the best of both worlds, the manufacturer pays a lot of attention to incidents, company C&T and SMS similar and usually; if there is a serious issue, it gets sorted, in house.

Simply telling the crew not to do it again or changing a rule or three will not solve the problem, particularly if the problem is deeply entrenched, or not recognised. It will be industry, probably an in house C&T team which identifies and fixes many of the issues not raised; not the ATSB and certainly not the 'expert' opinion of CASA.

There are 'other' elements of the report which bother me, but they will keep for another day. Tricky business this C&T stuff.

Jack Ranga
29th Jan 2013, 23:52
Sarcs post says it all :ok:

I used to think the ATSB was a good counterbalance to CASA, political correctness from sheltered public servants is now a real threat to flight safety. It's obvious they have thrown out their text books that have any of James Reason's work in it. If they hadn't they would have to name themselves as a huge threat, as one of the biggest holes in the piece of cheese :ugh:

my oleo is extended
30th Jan 2013, 04:50
Jack, you are correct. They WERE a good non political outfit. They would act and report independently, and they sure as hell had the respect of those of us on the industry.
But under Albanese we have seen Beaker appointed as Comissioner at ATSB, the Skull at CASA (along with the rise of Aleck), and Russell at ASA (and now Staib). If you want Swiss cheese then look no further. These 3 aviation bodies have imploded and melted like Danish butter ever since bureaucracy got in the way of safety. The appointment of these type of individuals into executive roles has seen a rapid deterioration in the safety and core functions of these individual silo's.
Not a week goes by when we at the coalface don't see a further erosion of safety and standards at the hands of a disconnected spreadsheet monitoring, budget focused, spin doctoring group of magicians.

Well the act is up, the mystery, the mystique, the masquarades, the pony tricks, the disappearing act, the sock puppets and smoke and mirrors has been exposed for all to see. It's up to the Senators whether the magic game will continue or whether a giant carving knife will be taken to the top layers of the rotten cake and the rancid rot will be thrown away.

Kharon
30th Jan 2013, 05:52
Sometimes, I just sits and thinks – sometimes I just sit.


ATSB - Ben Sandilands – Plane Talking. (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2013/01/30/atsb-shamelessly-rails-against-safety-under-reporting/)

my oleo is extended
30th Jan 2013, 11:29
Kharon, thanks for the link.

Mr Sandilands, once again a brief but succinct article.
Indeed, more hypocrisy, more empty words, more glossy statements and more scarily - MORE STUPIDITY!

The ridiculous babble, contradictions, backflips and bureaucratic baloney is nauseating. And Ben is right, how stupid do these Executives think we all are? The fact that they continue to spin all this folly out to all and sundry expecting that we will all swallow it proves how arrogant, ignorant, conceted and disconnected from reality they are.

Apart from a small smattering of loyal followers including mid tier management, everybody else knows they are full of crap. I just hope for aviations sake this dross gets what it deserves, which in itself is long overdue.

There is a saying that 'a team is only as strong as its leader', and if the outputs and direction of CASA, ATSBeaker and ASA is anything to measure success against then I rest my case.

Senators, it is time to go for the jugular. Hold these buffoons to account. Ask the hard questions and demand logical answers. Do not stand for any delayed responses, limp wristed explanations or answers spun with brown matter. With all due respect please do what your constituents have voted for and trusted in you to do, and that is act on our behalf and fix out declining aviation problems. The last 14 months has clearly exposed to you what the real issues are. The evidence is there, now you have to act upon it. You must force change, introduce real accountability. We can no longer tolerate nor accept the squandering of taxpayer money over grudges and payback. We can no longer accept inept investigations such as Norfolk. We can no longer accept the lack of frontline resources in air traffic controllers, we can no longer accept bullying and intimidation such as with Quadrio as being the 'norm' and 'accepted practise'.

What do we actually want? Simply and truthfully and without the irony, 'safe skies for all'.

toolish
31st Jan 2013, 05:20
In regards to checking the ground speed, a little off topic, but as the aircraft is accelerating it is a little difficult to check and compare ever changing gs and tas on the nd.
Important to check at some stage but at vr it is a bit pointless, as someone else mentioned.

My fix is, when 100 kts is called check the nd, this is the point where the number are joined on the nd by a wind direction arrow, if it indicates a hw life is good but if a tw it is time to make some decisions.

I have never heard this being taught it is just something I picked up by chance in this self help airline.

The other one that amazes me is when I ask the FO to monitor the tw on approach nearly everyone just looks at the wind arrow, my advice and this is nothing new for those with some experience, is to compare the gs and tas numbers (they should be fairly steady because the aircraft should be stabilised at Vapp) and if the gs is tas + 10kts please let me know.

The problem with Jetstar is that if you have had a command for 2 weeks you will be accepted into C&T. How are pilots meant to learn if their training captains are inexperienced?

Lookleft
31st Jan 2013, 06:42
The problem with Jetstar is that if you have had a command for 2 weeks you
will be accepted into C&T. How are pilots meant to learn if their training
captains are inexperienced?

Bollocks! Before you get to be a training captain you have to go through a process of applying, interview, ground school, sim then line observation flights and a check before getting near a student. Your sim and route checks scores also have to demonstrate a high standard. All takes a bit more than 2 weeks in the command seat. MOU guys have been getting TC spots but they are hardly inexperienced and most of them have at least 12 months LHS time.

VH-Cheer Up
31st Jan 2013, 11:20
Must admit I thought PF's job was centreline alignment and PNF's job was to scan for temps, surges and to call out bugged speeds.

Centaurus
1st Feb 2013, 10:45
PNF's job was to scan for temps, surges and to call out bugged speeds

Hopefully he will also be watching the centre-line tracking like a hawk. Never ever trust captains to be perfect...although some like to think they are:ok:

Lookleft
2nd Feb 2013, 02:03
I am amazed at how few F/O's do check the EGT and N1's during the takeoff especially in the simulator. I am often well into an RTO while the PNF is still trying to work out whats going on. During the early stages of command training I always ask the question after takeoff "Which engine had the higher EGT?" and they soon realise that they should be scanning a lot more than just the speed tape. As for centreline tracking that should be easy to monitor just with the peripheral vision.

VH-Cheer Up
2nd Feb 2013, 02:47
... So, just to clear things up for me - on a jet, where should the PF's visual focus be - mainly down the runway, or mainly scanning the panel?

Shouldn't PNF be mainly focused on the temps and pressures checking for potential RTO criteria and calling it before V1?

Lookleft
2nd Feb 2013, 05:15
On a jet the only person calling an RTO is the PIC. If the PIC is also PF then the primary focus is on everything! Realistically as you get closer to V1 then you should be go minded so your emphasis shifts to outside. Most F/O's tend to focus outside when they are P/F as they know they are not responsible for an RTO.

Capn Bloggs
2nd Feb 2013, 05:52
Most F/O's tend to focus outside when they are P/F as they know they are not responsible for an RTO.
They are also steering the thing, so focussing outside helps a lot...and they are responsible for bringing to the captain's attention (if he's the PNF) anything they might run into, on the ground or in the air.

Shouldn't PNF be mainly focused on the temps and pressures checking for potential RTO criteria and calling it before V1?
Correct.

Lookleft
2nd Feb 2013, 07:31
and they are responsible for bringing to the captain's attention (if he's the PNF) anything they might run into, on the ground or in the air.

If they are going to run into anything I think the captain will be aware of it. The captain won't have his/her eyes buried in the "temps and pressures" (are we talking piston or jets here ). If the captain is PNF he/she does not rely on the F/O PF to alert them to the possibility of an RTO.

kellykelpie
2nd Feb 2013, 07:41
No need for an FO then, right Lookleft? In fact perfect user name for you....

Lookleft
2nd Feb 2013, 08:12
No need for an FO then, right Lookleft?


Bit sensitive KK? I did say most F/O's, the good ones won't just be focused on the dashed white line. Have a look at the report. The bloke under training rotated 20kts early. Do you think he was more situationally aware than the PIC even though he was training to be one? I have trained people to be in the LHS and initially they are purely focused on the path ahead and are not scanning the EGT and N1. Thats because they never have looked at them before and it is a habit they have to develop.

Capn Bloggs
2nd Feb 2013, 09:17
I have trained people to be in the LHS and initially they are purely focused on the path ahead and are not scanning the EGT and N1. Thats because they never have looked at them before and it is a habit they have to develop.
Sounds like a fundamental failing of your C and T, LL. Are you serious your FOs under training for command "never have looked at them before"?

Lookleft
2nd Feb 2013, 09:25
Are you suggesting that all F/O's at every other airline do? They're not ulitmately responsible for initating an RTO so they don't include it in their scan. Its why I have stated before that it is most obvious in the sim when an RTO does occur they are still going WTF when we are already at max braking and full reverse. Its why I ask them what engine had the highest EGT, it makes it obvious that they have to include the engine indications in their scan.

Capn Bloggs
2nd Feb 2013, 10:10
Geez, I would have thought the first thing a FO Bloggs gets taught, when PNF, is to look at the engine instruments! That's what he's there for?? :ooh:

kellykelpie
2nd Feb 2013, 10:11
Are you suggesting that all F/O's at every other airline do?

That's the procedure, so I would hope so.

Lookleft
2nd Feb 2013, 10:28
Then how do you explain a rotation 20kts before V1if he is in the habit of scanning his PFD and engine instruments? How do you explain the startle factor in the sim when an RTO occurs and they should be scanning those very same instruments that procedure dictates should be scanned? According to your Utopian world of airline SOPs an F/O should be equally as familiar with OM1, FAM whatever as the Captain but because they are not ultimately responsible for the operation of the aircraft there is usually a knowledge gap. I'm not sure what seat you blokes occupy but if it is the LHS next time you are P/F have a glance at where your F/O is looking. Any Captain who is relying completely on the F/O to notify a failing engine is not doing the job properly. Any Captain who doesn't take over and conduct an RTO before the F/O notices any problems is not doing the job properly.

Derfred
2nd Feb 2013, 11:09
Wow, you must be a pleasure to fly with.

Capn Bloggs
2nd Feb 2013, 11:42
how do you explain a rotation 20kts before V1if he is in the habit of scanning his PFD and engine instruments?
Err, a stuffup (assisted in large part by a non-standard and misunderstood call from the RHS)?

because they are not ultimately responsible for the operation of the aircraft there is usually a knowledge gap.
Actually, it's the other way round.

Any Captain who is relying completely on the F/O to notify a failing engine is not doing the job properly.
Obviously.

Any Captain who doesn't take over and conduct an RTO before the F/O notices any problems is not doing the job properly.
Obviously. By definition, if the captain is taking over, he was the PNF, and he would have spotted the engine failure first...

Centaurus
2nd Feb 2013, 12:37
and he would have spotted the engine failure first...








But only if he just happened by coincidence to be staring at both N1 needles exactly at the very second one engine failed, and in between monitoring the F/O trundle down the centreline of the runway at high speed. It is probable the F/O would have detected the engine failure first as he would instinctively correct for the yaw from the centreline.

Lookleft
4th Feb 2013, 09:41
That's not been my experience in the sim which is the only time I have experienced an RTO thankfully. That's why I refer to the startle factor, it's usually the stop command that alerts the F/O to the fact something is wrong.

Glad to see that you agree with me Bloggsy on most points although you I'm not sure why your definitive statement about the knowledge gap is any more definitive than my statement. An important part of having knowledge is knowing how to apply it, a lot of F/Os and most cadets do not have that knowledge,hence the knowledge gap. You are suggesting it's the captains who don't have that ability to apply the knowledge. If it is truly the case that your F/Os know more than you then I suggest it's time you get back into the books.

As for the incident in question just being a simple "stuff up" it wasn't the non standard call it was the poor situational awareness that led to the early rotation.

amos2
6th Feb 2013, 08:05
Ah Yes!...supreme knowledge, a wonderful thing that all super hero captains like Left Right have.
Pity the poor senior first officers that don't have this Left Right supreme knowledge, but an inferior knowledge that has to be monitored at all times!
Thank goodness we have super hero sim instructors like Left Right to maintain the standard in Oz! :rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes:

Jimothy
6th Feb 2013, 08:32
Just wondering Lookleft - How long have you been in Airline Training?

amos2
7th Feb 2013, 09:20
Hmm!... Look Right seems to have vacated Prune.
Must be locked up inside the sim doing his super hero sim instructor stuff to save the Oz public from the lesser cretins of Oz aviation! :rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes:

my oleo is extended
7th Feb 2013, 12:22
With the attitude Looklame exhibits I am thinking he may in fact be an old crusty CASA FOI!!

Kharon
7th Feb 2013, 18:16
Back to the drawing board for me; another opportunity for the industry to shine, educate the children (CASA and ATSB included) and to discuss some of the more subtle, cunning and devious methods aircraft can use to spoil your day; lost in mists of ego, rhetoric and twaddle.

Aye well – next time. :ugh:

amos2
8th Feb 2013, 08:27
Perhaps time to enter the real world for you Kh! :bored:

Lookleft
11th Feb 2013, 00:05
Hmm!... Look Right seems to have vacated Prune.
Must be locked up inside the sim doing his super hero sim instructor stuff to save the Oz public from the lesser cretins of Oz aviation!


So you think that your rapier like wit and powerfull insight into all things aviation is enough to frighten people away from the keyboard amos? Unlike you I don't stick my head out from under the bridge when the billy goats gruff cross.

Interesting that other than CB and Centaurus the only comment is from those making personal attacks and nothing of substance.

K laments the opportunity missed and I agree with him. My posts refer to my actual experience and a possible explanation of why an experienced F/O undergoing command training interpreted something his training captain said as a command to rotate without checking his own speed tape. I'm not going to rehash it, read what I actually wrote and not get all hot under the collar because you think F/O's are some sort of sacred cow.

BTW Never been a sim instructor and I have plenty of airline training experience, thanks for asking. Whats your experience?