FAA Grounds 787s [Archive] - Page 3

cwatters

30th Jan 2013, 14:24

In five of the 10 replacements the main battery had showed an unexpectedly low charge

Would be nice to know what that line actually means because ..

Lithium Battery Failures (http://www.mpoweruk.com/lithium_failures.htm)

Under-voltage / Over-discharge

Rechargeable Lithium cells suffer from under-voltage as well as over-voltage. Allowing the cell voltage to fall below about 2 Volts by over-discharging or storage for extended periods results in progressive breakdown of the electrode materials.

Anodes
First the anode copper current collector is dissolved into the electrolyte. This increases the self discharge rate of the cell however, as the voltage is increased again above 2 volts, the copper ions which are dispersed throughout the electrolyte are precipitated as metallic copper wherever they happen to be, not necessarily back on the current collector foil. This is a dangerous situation which can ultimately cause a short circuit between the electrodes.

But that's an issue at very low voltages. The protection circuits should & did disconnect the batteries before they got that low.

Speed of Sound

30th Jan 2013, 15:36

But that's an issue at very low voltages. The protection circuits should & did disconnect the batteries before they got that low.

If these batteries were being replaced then they weren't just going 'service low', they were going critically low ie the point at which they can no longer be recharged and basically become very expensive scrap!

The estimated number of replacement batteries is 100-150. Even taking the lower of those figures that is, as someone has already pointed out, more than two batteries per aircraft in just over a year in service. If these batteries were replaced by Boeing under warranty, then they have known that they have a problem with the battery/charging/monitoring system for some time.

I would be very interested to know the timescale of these replacements. If they started in October 2011 and the number replaced is nearer the 150 mark then that is potentially as many as six or seven batteries replaced per aircraft!

I would also be interested to know how the number of replacements break down between main and aft as they are identical units but are both connected to differing parts of the electrical system. This information would be a big aid to diagnosing the problem.

What can be said for certain is the that the two battery events probably came as no surprise to Boeing and that they must have been working on a resolution to this problem for some time while throwing $130,000 worth of battery at each aircraft per year. :sad:

Lyman

30th Jan 2013, 15:50

Each Battery's replacement cost is 16k.

But at this point, money is WAY down the list regarding the install.

The logistics of a problem of this magnitude can only be imagined. Each install could be considered an unscheduled "event", and it is a virtual certainty that FAA were notified. "Incident" comes to mind, X150......

There is no "discretion" it is a no go item.....without paperwork.

Speed of Sound

30th Jan 2013, 16:19

Only in the US.

The ANA source says that battery replacement was not a matter for the regulator and only Boeing were informed.

TacomaSailor

30th Jan 2013, 16:21

As stated above "when the battery goes off with a bang it produces Oxygen."

I suggest that those claiming that thermal runaway in Li-ion batteries produce oxygen in the off gasses would document the source of that claim.

"Lithium-Ion Batteries Hazard and Use Assessment" was published in July 2011 and was written by four professional and/or PhD engineers at Exponent Failure Analysis Associates, Inc. The report clearly states:

"No significant amount of oxygen is found in cell vent gases…, but plays no measurable role in the flammability of vent gases."

Details from the report on page 49: “ Exponent and others have measured cell case temperatures during thermal runaway reactions. For fully charged cells, these temperatures can reach in excess of 600°C (1,110°F); case temperatures for lithium-iron phosphate cells are generally lower. The temperature rise is driven by reactions of the electrodes with electrolyte and release of stored energy. Some cathode materials will decompose and may change their crystalline structure.This fact has led to a misconception that lithium-ion cells burn vigorously because they “produce their own oxygen.” This idea is incorrect. No significant amount of oxygen is found in cell vent gases.91 Any internal production of oxygen will affect cell internal reactivity,11 cell internal temperature, and cell case temperature, but plays no measurable role in the flammability of vent gases.

A footnote on the same page states: “Analysis of cell headspace gases can reveal the presence of argon, nitrogen, and oxygen consistent with cell construction conditions. In one instance (testing of a prototype cell), trace quantities of oxygen and hydrogen were measured in cell vent gases, but spark ignition testing of those gases did not result in ignition.”

Page 52 of the report also states: “Depending upon the environment around the cell, the cell vent gases may ignite. The gases are not “self-igniting.”27, 93 There must be sufficient oxygen in the surrounding environment to sustain combustion of hydrocarbons and there must be a competent ignition source to ignite the vent gases.”

The report offers multiple tables and data points demonstrating off gas compositions concentrations , including no oxygen, and various options for inerting the the thermal runaway off gases.

The report also describes various tests with cooling the thermal runaway.

Lyman

30th Jan 2013, 16:27

SoS

True, but Boeing is under the jurisdiction of the FAA, and compelled to report applicable and pertinent data as a principal party, and holder of the certificate.

No reasonable interpretation of the laws around disclosure of material fact releases Boeing from the obligation to report......imo.

They would have to represent that the failures were not reportable.

Hmmm.......

cwatters

30th Jan 2013, 17:13

I suggest that those claiming that thermal runaway in Li-ion batteries produce oxygen in the off gasses would document the source of that claim.

It produces oxygen but not necessarily in the vent gases...

http://cdn.intechopen.com/pdfs/10407/InTech-Thermo_chemical_process_associated_with_lithium_cobalt_oxide _cathode_in_lithium_ion_batteries.pdf

Thermo-chemical process associated with lithium cobalt oxide cathode in lithium ion batteries

snip

Flow of current over and above the tolerable/standard charged state causes instability to the cathode which starts to release oxygen into the electrolyte. Thus released oxygen reacts exothermally with the lithium plated over the graphite anode and increases the temperature of the cell making the cathode to release oxygen further. The cell which was in the dormant state in the absence of oxygen and heat now becomes an explosive device in the event the cell is met with any abuse.

hetfield

30th Jan 2013, 17:20

Despite the incidents, McNerney said he didn't doubt the decision to use the new technology.
"Nothing we've learned has told us yet that we have made the wrong choice on the battery technology," he said. "We feel good about the battery technology and its fit for the airplane. Amen....
Boeing says it will find cause of 787 problems, defends batteries - latimes.com (http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-boeing-earns-787-dreamliner-20130130,0,6984636.story)

Speed of Sound

30th Jan 2013, 17:51

True, but Boeing is under the jurisdiction of the FAA, and compelled to report applicable and pertinent data as a principal party, and holder of the certificate.

In that case if the claim that over 100 787 batteries have needed to be replaced in a relatively small number of aircraft is true. then either Boeing has been hiding this from the regulator or the regulator has known and has failed to take action.

Is this a conversation that could have been taking place in private, between Boeing and the FAA?

Lyman

30th Jan 2013, 18:15

It is not necessarily as bad as it may seem. Boeing could have been reporting, and the FAA monitoring. It is a large discrepancy from the approved use, imo.

It is inconceivable that Boeing kept this to themselves, in hindsight.

Dispatch rate is a commercial consideration, but failure rate is regulatory, and seems to me to be not negotiable.

Does FAA have obligations to report? To whom? The Transportation Secretary, who just resigned? Ray LaHood? Both Boeing and Ray LaHood are from Chicago, Illinois. Boeing claims they are prevented from commenting, maybe the Transportation Secretary could comment? He had a statement after the grounding...

Nothing about safety could or should be construed as "proprietary". imo.

hetfield

30th Jan 2013, 18:23

BOEING should have ask themselves:

"What's wrong with the batteries?"

> 100, each 16.000 USD!!!!!

Lyman

30th Jan 2013, 18:27

1.6 Million USD plus labor, lost revenue, and angry clients.

But the CEO still has confidence in the batteries.

A new paradigm? Pain is good?

Taunusflyer

30th Jan 2013, 18:51

So B was aware about battery issues and didn´t communicate this status to FAA since grounding? This is a major topic in finding answers to the system failures. I can´t belive that this comes on top by an insider.

If 150 bat are deep discharged, then the power has gone somewhere. Internal short would destroy the bat and we´d had seen much more incidents and early grounding. So for me it is the surrounding system which is sucking at the bat.

Taunusflyer

30th Jan 2013, 18:57

from hetfield´s link in #523: "We feel good about the battery technology and its fit for the airplane"

:D after 150 dead bats...

hetfield

30th Jan 2013, 19:00

Völlige Ignoranz, sorry.

Speed of Sound

30th Jan 2013, 19:37

It is not necessarily as bad as it may seem. Boeing could have been reporting, and the FAA monitoring.

I suspect that to be the case.

If these batteries were being flagged up by the system as 'below minimum voltage/discharged' and simply being swapped out for new units under warranty, the regulator may have seen the problem largely as an economic one for Boeing.

I agree with you though, that such a failure rate should have set alarm bells ringing at both the FAA and Boeing.

BOEING should have ask themselves:

"What's wrong with the batteries?"

I'm sure they did and I'm sure there were some 'interesting' phone calls between Boeing and Yuasa where Yuasa were telling Boeing's engineers to look at their charging/monitoring systems and installation.

MkSi

31st Jan 2013, 01:05

Maybe not affecting the charging circuits but all that lithium, especially in a composite aircraft

HalloweenJack

31st Jan 2013, 06:34

how many flight cycles have these aircraft done (in peoples opinion) before battery swap? if it is , as mentioned above , 2 or 3 per year - that's really quite low to be swapping batteries!

cwatters

31st Jan 2013, 06:36

At 16K each it must be tempting to try and recycle the batteries that have reached the low voltage cut off?

They aren't talking about 787 batteries but..

How to Awaken Sleeping Li-ion - Battery University (http://batteryuniversity.com/learn/article/low_voltage_cut_off)

Some battery chargers and analyzers, including those made by Cadex, feature a wake-up feature or “boost” to reactivate and charge batteries that have fallen asleep."

snip

Do not boot lithium-based batteries back to life that have dwelled below 1.5V/cell for a week or longer. Copper shunts may have formed inside the cells that can lead to a partial or total electrical short. When recharging, such a cell might become unstable, causing excessive heat or showing other anomalies.

snip

A study done by Cadex to examine failed batteries reveals that three out of ten batteries are removed from service due to over-discharge. Furthermore, 90 percent of returned batteries have no fault or can easily be serviced. Lack of test devices at the customer service level is in part to blame for the high exchange rate. Refurbishing batteries saves money and protects the environment.

WindSheer

31st Jan 2013, 07:06

So to compare the 78 with the 77, why the need for these batteries in place of the equivalent as used on say the 77?
I am guessing it has an apu and a rat?

I am a little confused.

AtoBsafely

31st Jan 2013, 07:15

Pressurization for one. When you have electric supply of air, you don't want to run out at the first hiccup in power supply. The design/certification requires a lot of power, including in the backup system.

TURIN

31st Jan 2013, 08:04

The batteries do not supply power to the Cabin Air Compressors.
Emergency Brakes in the event of a complete electrical failure is the only extra heavy user that the battery is needed for compared to the 777.
I think....

AtoBsafely

31st Jan 2013, 08:11

OK. Thanks

Mark in CA

31st Jan 2013, 08:43

Elon Musk, founder of SpaceX and owner of electric car maker Tesla, who should know something about working with these types of batteries, has this to say about a fundamental flaw in Boeing's battery design:

Elon Musk: Boeing 787 battery fundamentally unsafe (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/elon-musk-boeing-787-battery-fundamentally-unsafe-381627/)

JohnMcGhie

31st Jan 2013, 08:55

Chuck Norris:

The Australian Civil Aviation Authority recently promulgated a rule banning all batteries, of ANY capacity and ANY chemistry, including Primary (non-rechargeable) batteries from hold baggage.

All batteries must be in carry-on luggage, either in their device or packed in an insulating container (paper envelope will do).

So in Australia, the answer is "Everyone's airline has banned them."

Cheers

JohnMcGhie

31st Jan 2013, 09:18

If a Lithium battery has never been charged, and is not connected to anything, it would be perfectly safe to transport it.

If it HAS been charged, then it becomes a problem. You can't empty it: a Lithium Cobalt battery will not recover from dead flat.

You could pack it in such a manner and such a place that you could ensure that it is disconnected and never gets hotter than 50 degrees Celsius, which would "lessen" the risk that it might spontaneously catch fire, but would not remove the possibility entirely.

I suspect the replacements will have to travel by sea (as deck cargo) or rail (but not through any tunnels...)

Cheers

WHBM

31st Jan 2013, 09:53

From BBC news
"....Boeing has backed the battery used in the Dreamliner after Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways said they changed a number of them in the past few months.........Boeing said while the replacement rate was "slightly higher" than usual, the changes were "routine maintenance" ......

On Wednesday, All Nippon Airways said it replaced batteries 10 times over the past few months, while Japan Airlines said it did so in a "few cases" over the past few months. Boeing said that it was carrying out an investigation to find out what caused the battery malfunctions.

.....said Mr McNerney, chief executive of Boeing.
"We feel good about the battery technology and it's fit for the aeroplane"..... "

BBC News - Dreamliner: Boeing defends 787 batteries (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21271614)

I wonder why "routine maintenance" has led to "an investigation". And if McNerney and the management team "feel good" about the battery arrangement, I wonder how the Boeing stockholders feel about the management team.

glenbrook

31st Jan 2013, 10:16

From BBC news Quote:
"....Boeing has backed the battery used in the Dreamliner after Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways said they changed a number of them in the past few months.........Boeing said while the replacement rate was "slightly higher" than usual, the changes were "routine maintenance" ......

On Wednesday, All Nippon Airways said it replaced batteries 10 times over the past few months, while Japan Airlines said it did so in a "few cases" over the past few months. Boeing said that it was carrying out an investigation to find out what caused the battery malfunctions.

.....said Mr McNerney, chief executive of Boeing.
"We feel good about the battery technology and it's fit for the aeroplane"..... "
BBC News - Dreamliner: Boeing defends 787 batteries (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21271614)

I wonder why "routine maintenance" has led to "an investigation". And if McNerney and the management team "feel good" about the battery arrangement, I wonder how the Boeing stockholders feel about the management team. The BBC headline is misleading. What McNerney has done is defend the choice of battery technology, not the batteries themselves. I think it is looking clear that Boeing needs a battery redesign and McNerney must know this already. In fact with dozens of battery replacements across the fleet, he should have known this for many months now. If Boeing management have done their job right, there should be a new battery already in the works. If...

DType

31st Jan 2013, 10:30

Just to illustrate the sort of thing that can go wrong (this is NOT a suggestion of what has actually gone wrong), just suppose that the temperature data was output fom the batteries in deg F, when it should have been output in deg C, and suppose that 10 deg C was the minimum operating temperature.

Then the temperature control would be happy to keep the battery above 10 deg F, equal to minus 12 deg C, and the data logged would "prove" that the temperature never went below the limit of 10 degrees.

Of course it will not turn out to be anything that simple, but it is an example of how the cause of a problem can sometimes hide the evidence.

Speed of Sound

31st Jan 2013, 12:02

When people are talking about 'defective' batteries and 'new technology', can we remember that the units installed on the 787 are made up of 8 x LVP65 cells which have been used successfully in various applications for nearly 10 years now.

What is 'new' is the installation and the charging/monitoring system that it is hooked up to as well as the loads it is expected to carry.

I'm sure that the solution to Boeing's problems will lie in the systems hooked up to the batteries, not the batteries themselves. :ok:

donpizmeov

31st Jan 2013, 12:13

SOS may well be onto something. If they just ditch the aeroplane bit of the setup the Batteries should work fine. Could save some money in production costs as well.:E

hetfield

31st Jan 2013, 12:19

@SoS

I fully agree...:ok:

Mark in CA

31st Jan 2013, 12:36

Another good discussion on battery design, Boeing vs. Tesla.

The battery in Tesla's Roadster used thousands of small cobalt cathode lithium cells - same chemistry used in the Boeing battery. Tesla delivered 2,418 Roadsters beginning in 2008, that contained 16,517,358 of these lithium cells. There are roughly 800 lithium cells total in all the 787s Boeing has delivered. No Tesla customer has ever had a burned up battery. Two customer 787 batteries have fried.

The Boeing battery contains eight GS Yuasa, LVP-65 lithium cells, each weighing 2.75kg (6 lbs). The much larger Tesla Roadster battery uses 6,831 cells similar to the Panasonic CGR18650HG [page 25], each weighing 42g (1.5oz).

The big cells in the Boeing battery are flat, allowing them to be packed tightly against each other. If one of these big cells experiences thermal runaway, a lot of heat is released, and because the cells are touching, adjacent cells will fry, too. Since the eight cells in the Boeing battery are connected in series, there is no practical way to disconnect a faulty cell and still have a working battery. If one cell goes, the whole battery goes - at least it's simple.

Because the cells of the Tesla battery are small, if one cell suffers thermal runaway, relatively little energy is released. And since these cells are round, they are not packed as closely together making it much harder for a failed cell to heat up other cells nearby. With many cells making up the Tesla battery, the battery control system is able to disconnect and isolate a faulty cell and the battery will continue working. Complicated, but it doesn't burn-up.

EV Investors Can Learn From Boeing's Battery - Seeking Alpha (http://seekingalpha.com/article/1145781-ev-investors-can-learn-from-boeing-s-battery)

John Farley

31st Jan 2013, 13:24

DType your post 543

Well done you. When it comes to explaining what has gone wrong with a complex system that sort of post is very constructive.

I seem to remember a NASA lander that was lost just due to a metric/imperial error. Boeing are particular vulnerable to that sort of problem since they are outsourcing from an essentially imperial world to an essentially metric one.

The longer all the very clever people investigating the problem around the world come up with nothing wrong in their part of the overall system the more likely it is in the end to be something too obious to have been considered.

FASRP

31st Jan 2013, 14:00

I believe Lockheed accepted blame for the Mars Climate Orbiter metric/imperial snafu.

They were contracted to produce the output in metric, and failed this task. It wasn't a case of the project specification being faulty and therefore no party to blame. The project specification was correct and stated metric units, but Lockheed appeared to not follow it.

Speed of Sound

31st Jan 2013, 14:27

they are outsourcing from an essentially imperial world to an essentially metric one.

Or the other way round! ;)

You are right though about the need to take a holistic look. Most industrial batteries are constantly under load and therefore to keep them in service they are constantly experiencing charging/discharging cycles.

The Li-ion units on the 787 are standby batteries in the true sense of the word ie. they stand doing nothing for pretty much all of their service life only occasionally being called into use.

If I was the engineer overseeing this process I would be looking at this and at things such as 'were the batteries that had to be replaced ever used in service'. Used as in had a real load applied such as starting an APU when this couldn't be done from from the on-board gennies or GPU, or did they just sit there in the bays in a constant state of 'charge' with the occasional test.

A key part of this is the data which shows how many replacement batteries were from the aft (APU) location or the fwd (main) location. It is the answers to questions such as these that may reveal the problem as much as looking at individual voltage/temp/float charge data.

Good luck to them :-)

Lyman

31st Jan 2013, 14:41

SoS

I think you touch on the most important question... The FAA requires a BACK UP electrical supply, for a very short period should all else fail.

The Batteries have no chance of pressurizing the Hull, and the requirement is for five minutes of service, roughly enough time to get the humans down to breathable air from flight levels, in an emergency.

It is looking more and more like the 787 engineering scheme is to incorporate a back up system into a sustainable part of the in flight regime of systemic electrical supply. If so, they violate the purpose of the regulations from my point of view.

At the very least, and I pointed this out long ago, the Yuasa batteries should be round, wound without rectilinear stress on the plate, such that heat can be dissipated, rather than concentrated in the case.

For that matter, the case should be cylindrical as well, if only to honor the principle that square batteries create problems, if the plate is rolled.

So from the outset, the design appears to challenge best practice, why? Because square "looks" better?

RR_NDB

31st Jan 2013, 15:01

Hi,

SoS, Duty cycle indeed is important to be considered in the analysis. And APU vs MAIN (batteries) failure comparison.
I commented on another possible 787 System "use" of the Thales battery in B/C thread.

Lyman, bleed scheme change in 787 created new dependability requirements to a degraded configuration. But as i imagine the POB are not relying on the Li Ion battery.
As i understand RAT and MAIN are for other less critical uses.

Or not?

poorjohn

31st Jan 2013, 16:52

The Australian Civil Aviation Authority recently promulgated a rule banning all batteries, of ANY capacity and ANY chemistry, including Primary (non-rechargeable) batteries from hold baggage.

All batteries must be in carry-on luggage, either in their device or packed in an insulating container (paper envelope will do). So no more than 3 oz of liquid in cabin bag, but an arbitrary amount of "batteries" allowed? The (wrong) possibilities are endless. Brilliant.

RR_NDB

1st Feb 2013, 00:11

Hi,

Poorjohn:

Bureaucrats are "brilliant".

Did you hear on 999% safe (or something similar) to 787 return to the skies?

Ex Cargo Clown

1st Feb 2013, 00:47

Sorry did do it today in a fumehood with some Li-Mn seems Ok to put out, Li-Co is deadly, you can always throw you mobile in a river if it catches fire.....

TURIN

1st Feb 2013, 08:45

I think you touch on the most important question... The FAA requires a BACK UP electrical supply, for a very short period should all else fail.

The Batteries have no chance of pressurizing the Hull, and the requirement is for five minutes of service, roughly enough time to get the humans down to breathable air from flight levels, in an emergency.

It is looking more and more like the 787 engineering scheme is to incorporate a back up system into a sustainable part of the in flight regime of systemic electrical supply. If so, they violate the purpose of the regulations from my point of view.

Its not really different to any other a/c.
The Main Battery is there to ensure continuity to certain systems in the event of total electrical failure (Engines out for example) until the backup systems kick in IE. RAT/APU.

In addition because the brakes are electric, there needs to be a store of power to bring the a/c to a stop after a succesful emergency landing. The RAT will be of no use as airspeed drops on roll out so the battery power is used.

To put it into comparison with the 777.

The APU has electrical and pneumatic starters, so even if electrics is lost, bleed air will start the APU, The Battery is still there to keep standby instruments going of course until the RAT drops and powers up.

As for the brakes, hydraulic back up is from an accumulator (compressed gas).

SandyYoung

1st Feb 2013, 13:02

Why is there such a fixation with Lithium? Does it really matter what battery technology is used provided it works reliably and does not burst into flames at random intervals?

Suspect that in something weighing over half a million pounds they could have used lead acid (ancient, reliable, tried, tested and not prone to catching fire) in which case Dreamliners might still be in service. Not that I'm suggesting this would be the best choice but it does illustrate the point.

If every Lithium battery is to be attended by a large tank of water the weight advantages will soon disappear.

hetfield

1st Feb 2013, 13:05

It doesn't have to be lead-acid

NiCd and NiMh do a good job.

Reliable, safe, cheap....

Speed of Sound

1st Feb 2013, 13:23

...but doesn't provide as much energy per kilo per cubic metre. :-)

Are the electrical specifications for the 787 in the public domain yet?

SoS

Taunusflyer

1st Feb 2013, 18:14

Also LiIon is doing a good an save job. How many mobile devices are out there powered with those? Mobile Phones, Laptops, Playstations, Shavers, Cameras, Watches, ... - a huge amount of LiIon-Systems works perfect. How many case came up with some issues? 20 out of 1.000.000.000?

hetfield

1st Feb 2013, 18:35

@Taunusflyer

It isn't that simple...

As long there is just one cell (3.7 Volts) it's not rocket science.

If the voltage demand is higher, e.g. 28 Volts, you need 8 cells.

And there is the challenge.

They have to be charged (on 787 serial) AND balanced AND monitored.

If this is not properly done, a thermal runaway may occure.

Ranger One

2nd Feb 2013, 00:00

It's time to get back to basics; what are Boeing going to DO? What are their options?

There are few things more serious than an in-flight fire, however supposedly contained or containable. The current batteries have demonstrated an unacceptable risk of such, and not by a small margin.

If Boeing want to continue using the existing technology, they're going to have an uphill battle proving it safe; this will not be quick, cheap, or easy.

If they decide to switch to a different technology... well that's a whole different ball game. Any other battery technology will not have the same energy density; they won't be able to fit alternative technology batteries with equivalent capacity in the same *space*. So not only would switching to a different battery technology entail a complete redesign of the charging and monitoring systems, it would require structural reengineering of the equipment bays to fit larger batteries.

Neither of these options are going to be quick. This aircraft isn't going anywhere any time soon. Not this year, maybe even not next.

(I'm no electrical engineer and neither are most of you - but engineers I know and trust have the same opinion)

FlightPathOBN

2nd Feb 2013, 00:59

Whew...
I am soo glad that the batteries are the only new technology we have to be concerned with....:eek:

Ex Cargo Clown

2nd Feb 2013, 02:09

If they'd gone with Li-Mn there would have none of this fiasco, going with Li-Co must purely down to cost, not weight or space.

ExSp33db1rd

2nd Feb 2013, 03:28

This aircraft isn't going anywhere any time soon. Not this year, maybe even not next.

From an aviation publication yesterday........

No Quick Fix In Sight For 787

Almost three weeks into its investigation,......hasn't found the root cause of the lithium-ion battery fires ......... Japan's Transport Ministry said investigators found no problems at GS Yuasa, ......... Meanwhile, a financial analysis by Jefferies & Co. found the grounding will likely cost Boeing more than $500 million, and in a worst-case scenario, up to $5 billion, according to Bloomberg.

............ On Wednesday, Boeing CEO Jim McNerney is expected to speak publicly about the airplane's problems for the first time, when he unveils the company's latest financial report.

RR_NDB

2nd Feb 2013, 10:24

Hi,

ExSp33db1rd,

A wrongly selected battery (from a single supplier) could do this damage?

"CRM" inside BA cockpit must have altn. options (technically speaking, on batt. issue) to shorten the grounding.

Or the FAA review is the real problem?

(Wrong battery selection yet represented an organizational and technical error. Now the delay in finding WHAT and WHY the batteries didn´t perform is going to damage a very important value: CONFIDENCE)

Is it possible?

bjm_bi

2nd Feb 2013, 15:19

Interesting information here, if it hasn't already been noted, including the fact that United also replaced batteries. The number of replacements seems astonishing, given the number of planes they have and how recently they were delivered.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/02/business/inquiry-into-787-batteries-expands-to-other-components.html

Chris Scott

2nd Feb 2013, 15:25

Hello RR_NDB,

For just a moment, I thought you had strayed off-topic: saying "CRM inside BA cockpit must have alternative options." Most people here in the UK use "BA" - in an aviation context - as an abreviation for British Airways. Boeing is Boeing, and CRM in a cockpit can be just as complex as the charging and monitoring system of a multi-cell Li-ion battery...

But if you suggest that Boeing must have had a Plan B (or more) somewhere up its sleeve, that makes absolute sense. Are you further speculating that Plan B might have been rejected by the FAA?

ATC Watcher

2nd Feb 2013, 16:10

This aircraft isn't going anywhere any time soon. Not this year, maybe even not next.

I hope not for Boeing's sake.

On the other hand a long grounding and loss of confidence @ la DC10 might have a financial impact but is not necessarily synomym to commercial failure.

A bit of historical backround for the young generation here :
The (extremely bad) publicity around the DC10 at the time did not prevent Douglas to sell 432 of them , while the technically superior L-1011 only sold 250 and pushed Lockheed out of the civil airliner market for good.

afly51

2nd Feb 2013, 16:31

If yu summarize what´s actually known about the 787 problems, I guess we will see them long time grounded. About TriStar you technically right, but not forget that it required sophisticated maintenance ...

Iron Duke

2nd Feb 2013, 17:18

Personally I am very saddened by the problems Boeing are experiencing. I have flown all the Boeings (except B777 unfortunately) and they are truly a fantastic product ... the expectation that I would see out my last 15 years on a Dreamliner seem premature, and whilst a lot has been made of the inconvenience and financial burden placed on the airlines and the manufacturer ... there are many hundreds of Boeing pilots whose future does not look as rosy as a consequence of Boeing's difficulties with this aeroplane.

What was correctly marketed as a game changing aeroplane has affected every corner of this industry, and there are no winners. This whole episode is sad and disappointing, and I cannot see any quick fixes as the battery/charger problems are fundamental to the architecture and operation of the A/C. This on top of enormous delays ... a tragedy.

Let's hope for some Divine intervention ....

edmundronald

2nd Feb 2013, 17:42

Sadly, the script for the continuation of this story is completely predictable.

First, the issues surrounding certification and lack of safety verification by the FAA of the existing design will give the politicians a way to get maximal compliance from the FAA, and there will be some personnel changes there.

Second an alternate battery system will be recertified in record time, whether it is tested or not, because the needed FAA compliance will have been ensured.

Third some administrative reason will be found to create equivalent financial losses for Airbus, to offset what Boeing has lost due to sloppiness.

I expect that by now the NTSB has provided USA Inc. with a very good description of the ways in which future battery issues can be mitigated, and we will soon see an "inquiry" into the certification process, personnel changes, and the new battery system will be installed in the cabin in lieu of some overhead luggage bins within three months.

By the way, if this is just an "emergency" battery, there is no reason to have a charger on the plane, or even to charge the battery when mounted inside the airframe. A recognition of this detail might accelerate the implementation of a safe solution, and its certification.

WHBM

2nd Feb 2013, 18:27

With a situation like this one would hope that CEO McNerney would be taking the helm, communicating confidently with the media that the issue is correctly gripped, that engineering resolutions are under way using the right engineers for the job (because no matter how it all plays out, those engineers will be the ones coming up with the right fix).

But instead we don't get this, we get silly statements meant to appease Wall Street "aviation analysts" who may write glibly about billions of dollars but don't know one end of an aircraft from the other. We get PR wiffle-waffle that treats the receiving audience as know-nothings. We get multiple signs of some sort of stand-off between Boeing and the FAA. We get inappropriate downplaying of serious issues that anyone in the industry can see through.

At the corporate level Boeing need to realise that their potential customers pay good money for sophisticated engineering products. They don't pay money for media statements that don't add up, or other trivia. And these customers know that a competent engineering company needs competent top management that, whatever the issues, can put the right people in place to fix them. Who, hopefully, they still employ, and didn't outsource to save a few dollars on the quarterly earnings a while ago..

TURIN

2nd Feb 2013, 18:53

By the way, if this is just an "emergency" battery, there is no reason to have a charger on the plane, or even to charge the battery when mounted inside the airframe. A recognition of this detail might accelerate the implementation of a safe solution, and its certification.

No offence, but I suggest you read the rest of this thread to understand why that statement is wrong.

WHBM.

Very well said. :ok:

deptrai

2nd Feb 2013, 18:58

to offset what Boeing has lost due to sloppiness

isn't it a bit harsh to accuse someone of "sloppiness"? at least it seems a bit premature, before we know what happened.

on occasion of their "demo flight", Aviation week wrote: "Boeing 787 engineers took on large-scale technology risks in designing this aircraft" - a statement which sadly seems to all too true (good read: Aviation Week Evaluates Boeing 787 (http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_12_10_2012_p46-522072.xml&p=1) ).

As for your predictions about USA inc, I'm not going to comment on that, but I predict once the issues have been understood and solved (which might take time), it will eventually fly :) and I believe most people will praise it, and quickly forget about all of this.

EEngr

2nd Feb 2013, 19:10

it will eventually fly

Yes.

and I believe most people will praise it,

Perhaps.

and quickly forget about all of this.

I hope not.

Whether pressured by the FAA, customers, or its own management, I hope there are some serious lessons learned from this fiasco as to engineering, certification and contract management. Unfortunately, I don't see that happening based on only the last option. Someone will have to hold Boeing's feet to the fire.

deptrai

2nd Feb 2013, 19:18

yes, agreed. with "most people", I meant "the public", and newspapers. Paying customers will no doubt "hold Boeing's feet to the fire".

Taunusflyer

2nd Feb 2013, 20:33

AI´s 787 are back in the sky:
VT-ANL - Air India - Flightradar24 (http://www.flightradar24.com/data/airplanes/vt-anl)
VT-ANI - Air India - Flightradar24 (http://www.flightradar24.com/data/airplanes/vt-ani)

Seems to be ferry flights, but strange they got release from India´s government.

AIC551 DEL 13:47 BOM 16:00 VT-ANK
AIC553 DEL 15:26 BOM 17:26 VT-ANI
AIC555 DEL 15:42 BOM 17:59 VT-ANL

Lyman

2nd Feb 2013, 23:16

I have in mind a rough corollary to Boeing's issues with the battery/system.

A defect in the Intermediate shaft of the TRENT972 was identified, and an AD issued. The desigh was marginal, and was wearing far too rapidly, Rolls was replacejng the shaft with an upgrade as fast as they could, logistically, and ate the cost, as I recall. After a time, the AD was relaxed, to allow for the engine to hang on the wing longer. Field change out was tried, and worked to a degree (The Rolls is modular, and maintenance, shaft swap was made easier due that engineering). Then QF32, due to a "duff stub pipe".

The point is, Rolls had a solution concurrent with the problem. I said ages ago, for Boeing to put this system into the field, and paint themselves into a corner should the device go t/u, is inconceivable. But they ate how many batteries?

It would be essentially the same as if they plugged the bleeds, cast their fate with electric pumps, and had no back up, "well simply open the bleeds".

What an incredible gamble if they have no fall back to a replacement for "five minutes of back up electrical power."

It is encouraging to see at least a few 787s back in the air at all, even if ferry.

Machaca

3rd Feb 2013, 01:36

Lyman: I have in mind a rough corollary to Boeing's issues with the battery/system.

Not even close. The battery system fault is yet to be divulged.

hetfield

3rd Feb 2013, 12:15

At the same time the government certified Boeing's 787 Dreamliners as safe, federal rules barred the type of batteries used to power the airliner's electrical systems from being carried as cargo on passenger planes because of the fire risk.
Now the situation is reversed.
Dreamliners worldwide were grounded nearly three weeks ago after lithium ion batteries that are part of the planes led to a fire in one plane and smoke in a second. But new rules exempt aircraft batteries from the ban on large lithium ion batteries as cargo on flights by passenger planes.
In effect, that means the Dreamliner's batteries are now allowed to fly only if they're not attached to a Dreamliner.
The regulations were published on Jan. 7, the same day as a battery fire in a Japan Airlines 787 parked at Boston's Logan International Airport that took firefighters nearly 40 minutes to put out. The timing of the two events appears coincidental.
Pilots and safety advocates say the situation doesn't make sense. If the 787's battery system is too risky to allow the planes to fly, then it's too risky to ship the same batteries as cargo on airliners, they said.
Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, a former US Airways pilot famed for his precision flying that enabled passengers and crew to survive an emergency landing on the Hudson River in New York, said in an interview that he wouldn't be comfortable flying an airliner that carried lithium ion aircraft batteries in its cargo hold.
AP Exclusive: 787 Grounded, but Batteries Can Fly - ABC News (http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/ap-exclusive-787-grounded-batteries-fly-18389906)

I fully agree with Sully.

Lyman

3rd Feb 2013, 12:18

Closer than you think. I believe the "problem" had been "solved" prior to grounding. That is why the feverish effort to replace batteries, Machaca.

What is left is to come up with a workable "explanation" that will redirect focus to the selected (sic) conclusion.

Boeing is not surprised. Will not be surprised. You may be, but that will be your option.

RR_NDB

3rd Feb 2013, 13:56

Hi,

We are observing a SURREAL situation.

The players, seems being represented by bureaucrats (with no enough active technical staff ) lost in a VERY BASIC issue: A DEPENDABLE AND SAFE DC SUPPLY, RECHARGEABLE "ON THE FLY".

The industry (at Boeing, FAA, NTSB and Suppliers) need Leadership (with Technical authority) to solve the virtual "stalemate". Where are good engineers (absolutely necessary NOW near the high rocks) to show the exits. Yes, there is not just one (exit).

We are dealing with one of the most basic "things": A DC supply.

The implications of this grounding are huge. Only comparable to the surreality we are observing.

742

3rd Feb 2013, 14:05

The players, seems being represented by bureaucrats (with no enough active
technical staff ) lost in a VERY BASIC issue: A DEPENDABLE AND SAFE DC SUPPLY,
RECHARGEABLE "ON THE FLY".

The industry (at Boeing, FAA, NTSB and
Suppliers) need Leadership (with Technical authority) to solve the virtual
"stalemate". Where are good engineers (absolutely necessary NOW near the high
rocks) to show the exits. Yes, there is not just one (exit).

RR NDB --

Boeing moved their headquarters to Chicago to "...get the engineers out of the Board Room." Are you suggesting that they let a few back in?

Lyman

3rd Feb 2013, 14:08

I started posting here just after Burkill put 038 in the mud.

Since that time, three mildly different iterations of the same failure mechanism have occurred, in one instance with great loss of life...

BA038, AF447, QF32, and now, thankfully prior to fatalities, the DREAM.

This is the same accident, with mildly different particulars.

Engineering, Production, Certification, and Regulation.

All four are sick, and the public is at risk.

If we keep focusing on minor bits, like a chicken staring at a line in the sand, more people will die.

ICE, ICE, STUB PIPE, BATTERY......bull****.

An elegant solution to the systemic problems comes to mind, one that will please everyone, save those responsible for, and profiting from, the root causes...

BTW That AP "Exclusive" was stolen from PPRuNe (ever the loyal bear)

polux

3rd Feb 2013, 14:38

they have to use LiFePO4 battery
lithium iron phosphate cells are much harder to ignite in the event of mishandling especially during charge,
It is commonly accepted that LiFePO4 battery does not decompose at high temperatures.
more with google...
Batteries LiFePO4 - Endless Sphere Wiki (http://www.endless-sphere.com/w/index.php/Batteries_LiFePO4)

Lyman

3rd Feb 2013, 14:43

Boeing, et al, are way ahead of everyone here. Their problem, et al, is concocting a digestible explanation for the sheep....I believe they have one in mind, if not completed, waiting for disclosure.

"It is inconceivable Boeing was unaware....."

I predict I will not believe it....(the published "conclusion"). Check that, there will be no lies, but the important bits will not be included....

areobat

3rd Feb 2013, 15:59

I saw this article in the Harvard Business Review that goes into some of the business / corporate reasons why Boeing and the 787 find themselves where they are. One can see how the design strategy used by Boeing on the 787 could result in parts the "didn't all fit together". One can also see how Boeing might have known about the issues with the battery but decided to take a mitigate now, fix later approach. I guess the only fly in that ointment is that they couldn't mitigate fast enough.

The 787's Problems Run Deeper Than Outsourcing - James Allworth - Harvard Business Review (http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/01/the_787s_problems_run_deeper_t.html)

Lyman

3rd Feb 2013, 16:23

There is no editing here. Good, and Bad....

That might mean you are deluged with too much Lyman and not enough
Machaca.

But I am increasingly agitated about the appearance of generic media here, as if some new thing will be known in its reading.

Baloney.

This article could have been a simple rewrite of any of several pages to be found here, on PPRuNe.

Example (from no less than Harvard :ugh: ) And NOT FOUND ON PPRuNe until now:

"Similarly, being integrated means you don't have to understand what all the interdependencies are going to be between the components in a product that you haven't created yet (which, obviously, is pretty hard to do). And, as a result of that, you don't need to ask suppliers to contract over interconnects that haven't been created yet, either".

UTTER and complete nonsense.....dangerous nonsense And part of the problem that has been discussed here at length.

It is exactly the opposite of good design.

Did someone pay Harvard to publish that propaganda? Because it is a perfect fit with other nonsense that prepares for a total misunderstanding of the problems by the public.

And exonerates Boeing, ultimately, from responsibility to what should be its core Mission: GOOD DESIGN....

bjm_bi

3rd Feb 2013, 17:14

Lyman,

Remember, it's Harvard Business Review, not Engineering Review. This probably makes perfect sense to the MBAs. I share your frustration that articles like these contribute to misunderstandings by the public (and perpetuate bad corporate practices).

RR_NDB

3rd Feb 2013, 17:26

Hi,

742 (http://www.pprune.org/members/131659-742):

Boeing moved their headquarters to Chicago to "...get the engineers out of the Board Room. (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/505455-faa-grounds-787s-30.html#post7673041)

The best feedback to the "high rocks" is the one received "in house". The cost of "feedback" after product is being mass produced is enormous. Specially considering the importance of this Dream craft to Boeing and to the industry in a difficult US an world Economy time.

poorjohn

3rd Feb 2013, 18:20

Those who've worked in aerospace manufacturing over the past few decades will realize the truths in the HBR article.

When management perceives their company to be operating in a high-cost arena (very much including all those expensive senior engineers) it's very comforting to imagine the problem can be solved by outsourcing the whole package to a world-class supplier in a lower-cost environment.

The HBR reference to module outsourcing doesn't go far enough. A corollary to the yet-evolving-interfaces problem is that an interface spec robust enough to be "thrown over the wall" to a supplier must be grindingly detailed - which are metaphorically full of devils, of course. Those specs are often written by mid-level engineers (or recent grads) willing to undertake that grind, and once issued, making corrections to them for whatever reason involves project and contracts people who'd rather you didn't.

Perhaps with that in mind many of the major players have formalized their engineering processes with a set of SOPs that when followed will produce a perfect result every time. They include a set of metrics that measure compliance with those SOPs. Thus when an external auditor agrees that the company's processes are being followed everyone can relax, assured that the airplane will come with a safe and happy electrical-system module.

Surprise.

John Farley

3rd Feb 2013, 18:22

Lyman

I don’t like making comments that risk being seen as getting at somebody, but in this case I feel you have completely misunderstood the Harvard article you quote. My reading of the article is that it suggests it is very dangerous to outsource the design, development and manufacture of elements of a complex system before the interactions between the various elements are completely understood. Indeed it queries whether you cannot even write a decent outsourcing contract until all the interactions are understood.

All of which are very sensible comments so far as I am concerned.

Lyman

3rd Feb 2013, 18:48

I note your opinion, John Farley, and am of course willing to look at my takeaway from the "Harvard Business Review".

If the conclusion is mistaken, and/or based on something out of contextual foundation, I will immediately retract it.

I believe the text of the writer is self explanatory, that modular design relieves one of the necessity to "integrate" each component with the whole.

If that was meant sarcastically, (which I doubt), then I am indeed in need of reassessing.

Fracturing the design and composition, let alone the integration (assembly) of a complex technology (airframe) to me has always been lunacy.

I may have let that prejudice color my opinion.

So I am in your debt. Also, you are free to be as harsh as you wish, the thickness of my skin should be apparent by now. Gratuitous insult is something I have never seen you employ.

Best wishes, Sir

WilyB

3rd Feb 2013, 18:50

it's very comforting to imagine the problem can be solved by outsourcing the whole package to a world-class supplier in a lower-cost environment.

Japan is not exactly "low cost" but the Japanese government subsidies to the tune of over $3B to the Japanese company involved in the 787 program was too good to pass.

Lyman

3rd Feb 2013, 19:10

Three issues thus far John Farley.

1. The statement I quoted is false, so I stand by my criticism. It can be considered an opinion, so call it a disagreement. The author appears to want to discuss Design/Build, but even if that is the case, his commentary is incorrect.

2. He discusses "Organizational boundaries" when I am virtually certain what he means are "Interdisciplinary Theories". Again, he is entitled to an opinion, as I am. I can even see the source of his emphasis, he is in Business, and organization would be his emphasis.

3. He dismisses Integrative efforts if a design is "In House", which is contradictory, by definition. His claim that postponing Integration creates freedom for designers, may well be true, I can see its logic, but design was done and over prior to modularization, so unless he believes in time travel, his article
lays Boeing wide open for criticism, if not criminal prosecution.

I am definitely coming at his writing from a lateral perspective, and may be utterly wrong myself; if so, I will be the first to admit it, and should be.....

regards, Sir

Turbine D

3rd Feb 2013, 19:34

Having read the HBR and the reference articles, it is a good presentation. As in any article there are things not covered that are important. One thing is the old adage, "The one thing about history is that you learn you don't learn". And that is what this article confirms in the case of Boeing.

There is a good book titled "The Sporty Game", authored by John Newhouse. It is about the high-risk competitive business of making and selling commercial airliners. The part that pertains to Boeing basically centers around the development of the 747 that Boeing bet the farm on and nearly went bankrupt resulting from unforeseen problems that cropped up along the way. It was an airplane never before imagined relative to its size, weight and demands of the propulsion systems. Malcolm Stamper was in charge of producing the 747 and building a new plant to house the assembly. It was a job at which he worked at "seven days a week, 365 days a year for 4 years," he says. The difference then was the plane was essentially built in-house, albeit more than one Boeing plant and minus the engines that were manufactured by P&W. The point of this history is what the article is in a way about. Translate this to the producing of the 787, adding in the never before done technology and world wide outsourcing.

Also, keep in mind the not so long ago Airbus development and assembly experiences on the A-380, i.e., different versions of the CAD-CAM being used and how things didn't work out so well for awhile.

Even if you have local control over manufacturing and assembly for something you have never done before, you are going to have problems along the way. If however, you chose to out-source to suppliers things you have never done before, look out!

As problems with new methods and modular systems arise, you are in a weak position to respond rapidly, video conferencing doesn't hack it. Then, once you are behind the customer power curve (postponed deliveries, monetary penalties accruing, cancelled orders), all hell breaks loose. In the instance of the 747, the design was good, history has proven that, it took longer to get to that point than what was anticipated. This will be true for the 787 as well.

Out sourcing components has to be done with a supportable reason or reasons in mind. Reduced cost is generally never a good reason as it is only temporary. But there are three good reasons to out-source:

1. The out-source can do it better and has more knowledge than you do, an engine manufacturer or Li-ion battery supplier.
2. The out-source is a share to gain venture to enhance market share, like CFM56 International.
3. The out-source is the only way to enter a particular market with your product, like offset agreements to build a facility to produce some component/components in a country for product entrance to sell your product.

In all instances, the outsourcer has to provide oversight at the out-source facilities no matter where they are located in the world. Often this fact is lost in attempts to reduce costs or downsize employment levels at the outsourcer.

Lyman

3rd Feb 2013, 19:49

Talk about jumping the gun.

I said I think outsourcing and modularization is lunacy, not that a firm like Boeing cannot make it work.

And they have.

My few issues have to do with the BATTERY. Collaterally with assembly, and with
possibly a problem with spec.

But MOSTLY with the possibility that BOEING may have acted unilaterally, without disclosure, and illegally, in the way they addressed a very serious problem.

No company can change the design and performance of an approved OEM safety required device without first disclosing the problem to FAA.

No one.

They appear to have replaced sufficient batteries to refit the entire fleet, PRIOR TO DISCLOSURE to the authority, whose job it would be then to assess the problem, accept or reject new solutions, and perhaps issue an AD.

Not to mention disclosing to the public the nature of the issue.

Something stinks, and it is not Interdisciplinary Disciplines. Well, actually......

kilomikedelta

3rd Feb 2013, 19:55

Perhaps some of my previous comments on this matter are appropriate: Boeing is a marketing company not an engineering company. Saving weight with lithium cobalt dioxide batteries packed cheek by jowl saves space for more marketable and fee generating cargo and slf amenities which contribute to shareholder value. The stock market forgets much more quickly than the families of a few dead passengers. I suspect the electrical system weights and redundancy decisions were made by MBA's, which like papal pronouncements in catholicism, are infallible in the corporate religion. No need to get your hands dirty (yecch!) with the actual physics and you can always wear a suit and look corporate.

PAXboy

3rd Feb 2013, 22:41

Some people think that - when you outsource - you can get away with less central control. But it is the other way around. The more you outsource, the more you need people at the centre who REALLY know what they are doing.

Boeing will survive this but their stock price could take a long time to recover and many heads have yet to roll.

RR_NDB

4th Feb 2013, 01:00

Hi,

PAXboy:

Some people think that - when you outsource - you can get away with less central control. But it is the other way around. The more you outsource, the more you need people at the centre who REALLY know what they are doing.

:ok:

(You cannot outsource intelligence)

:}

Turbine D

4th Feb 2013, 01:28

poorjohn,
Those who've worked in aerospace manufacturing over the past few decades will realize the truths in the HBR article.
You are absolutely correct!

John Farley,
My reading of the article is that it suggests it is very dangerous to outsource the design, development and manufacture of elements of a complex system before the interactions between the various elements are completely understood. Indeed it queries whether you cannot even write a decent outsourcing contract until all the interactions are understood.
So very true! Couple this together with language differences, although what may be presented to the outsourcer, written in English, the actual instructions for the workers are in the language of the out-source manufacturer, are they the same? Sometimes, they are not.

WilyB,
Japan is not exactly "low cost" but the Japanese government subsidies to the tune of over $3B to the Japanese company involved in the 787 program was too good to pass.
You bet! And both major Japanese airlines selected 787s not A-350s, not a coincidence I think.

Lyman,
2. He discusses "Organizational boundaries" when I am virtually certain what he means are "Interdisciplinary Theories".
You misunderstand. Organizational boundaries is exactly that. If you design and make section A, and I design and make section B we have to talk as they have to go together and work properly. And we both have to talk to those who design and make sections C, D, and E to be sure everything goes together and works. When you outsource all of the sections for design and build, it becomes crossing organization boundaries, think multiple corporation boundaries that adds complexity to something that is already complex. It is not "theory" at all.

PAXboy,
Some people think that - when you outsource - you can get away with less central control. But it is the other way around. The more you outsource, the more you need people at the centre who REALLY know what they are doing.
Absolutely correct!
It doesn't seem this worked well as a retired Boeing Exec. indicated.

Lyman,
But MOSTLY with the possibility that BOEING may have acted unilaterally, without disclosure, and illegally, in the way they addressed a very serious problem.
Can you substantiate this possibility, especially the illegal part?

Lyman,
They appear to have replaced sufficient batteries to refit the entire fleet, PRIOR TO DISCLOSURE to the authority, whose job it would be then to assess the problem, accept or reject new solutions, and perhaps issue an AD.
Not to mention disclosing to the public the nature of the issue.
Can you substantiate this as a fact? Can an airline change out all the engines on a 747, a 767, a 777 or a 787, not knowing what a problem might be, without notifying the FAA? What about the aircraft manufacturer?
During the testing process for the 747, 87 engines were used, 60 were destroyed during the testing process. Boeing had a dozen 747s sitting around with cement blocks suspended from the wings due to lack of engines. None of this prevented certification. The 747 was certified. Then, PanAm had six 747s sitting on the ground at JFK without engines when a new problem came up during revenue service. The FAA never grounded the airplane. Eventually the unknown causes of the problem were identified and all the PanAm planes began to fly again. As a Boeing Exec. said at the time "It is no fun producing gliders when your customer thinks you are producing a jet aircraft." I am sure that today's Boeing Executives are saying the same thing. I am also sure that everyone is working diligently and very hard to identify and correct the electric problem (note I say electric as it may not be the battery). Boeing just is not as swift to identify the problem as you seem to be or as you perceive Boeing should be to in getting to the goal line.

Lyman

4th Feb 2013, 02:04

TD

Boeing cannot withold disclosure whan safety critical systems are not performing
as expected. Service life bears directly on performance specs. They have an absolute duty to disclose this to the authority. If you insist, I will support that with additional information.

And FAA has a duty to monitor.

"Organizational boundaries" are subject to interpretation. My assumption is that the author's intent was to prove a fatal flaw in integrative process, merely because two entities are cooperating, per contract in different locations.

Integration is part of all contracts between corporations in aerospace.

Ask Morton Thiokol.....or Rolls Royce.

And if it is not a part of the bid in the first paragraph, the bid is not read....

RR_NDB

4th Feb 2013, 02:59

Hi,

Turbine D:

I am also sure that everyone is working diligently and very hard to identify and correct the electric problem (note I say electric as it may not be the battery). (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/505455-faa-grounds-787s.html)

The focus in the battery seems VERY CONSISTENT. As far we know:

1) 787 Thales Battery is: 8 LVP65 cells, 2 PCB*, connections, connectors and case.
2) Protections are inside the case.
3) Chargers presented minor faults as per NTSB briefing on BOS JAL
4) Over voltage was not recorded (the bus is not a factor for)
5) A battery of this type SHOULD be PROTECTED internally against outside faults (charger over voltage, diode module short circuit, ,excessive output current, cell voltages out of envelope, cell temperature and case temperature)
6) Two batteries failed

It´s very difficult to imagine the main factor other than the battery. It´s possible but IMO not probable.

There are chances to never understand clearly WHAT (sequence) and WHY in one or both cases.

:{

PS

"It is no fun producing gliders when your customer thinks you are producing a jet aircraft."

Analogy can be made (production continues) :)

saptzae:

No need, we can do that better by ourselves (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/505695-787-batteries-chargers-23.html#post7674102)
:ok::):D

(*) including temp sensor(s)

John Farley

4th Feb 2013, 08:38

Lyman

The statement I quoted is false, so I stand by my criticism

I see this statement as correct which is why I said you had misunderstood the HBR article. (as it happens I see several other posters since share my view).

The explanation of your misunderstanding is that when there is no outsourcing an aircraft company design office has many different specialist teams that are by definition already integrated in the one design office. If on the other hand specialist tasks are outsourced to one or more organistations you have to set up another home team to specifically integrate their efforts with those at home.

It is a pity you give no evidence of your education, training or experience which would help people respond to many of your seemingly incorrect notions around various PPRuNe threads. Of course you could also be a wind up merchant. We have no way of knowing.

mickjoebill

4th Feb 2013, 10:38

slight thread drift...
NiCd and NiMh do a good job.
In the early nineties (?) I wrote to CAA UK detailing the dangers of "re-celled" (reconditioned) Nicads that broadcast camera crews in the UK had begun to use.
Whilst the manufacturer of these popular camera batteries spot welded the metal strips that joined the cells the company offering the re-celling service used solder. The result one day was a solder joint broke, the metal strip slipped and created a short circuit. The battery was in transit in the back of a camera car and it caused a fire.

The crew had recently travelled on a commercial flight.

At the time there was a fuse on camera battery output, but individual cells had no protection and so a typical 13Ah 14 volt Ni-cad broadcast camera battery, if shorted internally could deliver a hundred amps.

Ni-cad is rarely used in camera batteries these days, the use of Lithium ion has enabled thermal protection for each cell and very sophisticated charging and monitoring. Of course lithium can hold its charge for many years so it is a good choice, in theory, for a standby battery.

I did not receive a response from the CAA and found it ironic that years later, following a series of lithium fores of the course of 5 years and the fire of a pallet of thousands of small lithium batteries at Gatwick Airport restrictions were put on the amount of lithium ion in a single battery enclosure (not more than 25 grams).

Yet nicads and Metal hydrides have no restrictions and are more likely to start a fire in my view, albeit a fire that is more easily extinguished than a lithium fire.

So it appeared to me that there is respect for the problems of extinguishing a lithium battery fire, but there was (is?) less respect for other battery types that are as or more likely to cause a fire.

Battery = kinetic energy = potential threat.
Over charging is a common cause of battery fires and since aircraft such as the A380 have 240/120volt in the seat back to power and charge laptops we haven't heard the last of on-board battery fires.

Ancient Observer

4th Feb 2013, 10:56

Paxboy has got it right. When you outsource anything, make sure that you have in-house the capability to specify and check what the outsourcer is up to.
One Engineering Co that I used to work for then added up the costs of the proper supervision of outsourcers that it did - and decided that for any Novel design, it would do all the detailed spec and design in house, thereby equipping it with the capability to specify and check what the outsourced producer was up to.......

fizz57

4th Feb 2013, 11:15

I'm a bit confused about the relevance of outsourcing to this specific issue (battery meltdowns).

Does Boeing make the batteries and/or chargers on any of their airplanes?

hetfield

4th Feb 2013, 11:25

@fizz57

It's not that simple, just NOT the battery. And this kind of battery isn't also simple at all.

To my knowledge, there are 4 companies involved for 787 batteries :

- GS YUASA (J), cells
- Kanto Aircraft Instrument (J), PCB for balancing/monitoring
- THALES (F), battery housing/assembling
- Securaplane (USA), charger

All have to work together to make it work....

netstruggler

4th Feb 2013, 11:26

Battery = kinetic energy = potential threat.

Only if you drop it.

I think you meant:

Battery = potential energy = potential threat.

Mk 1

4th Feb 2013, 12:03

No, potential energy is what the battery has before you drop it (becoming kinetic energy on the way down).

Chemical energy is my bid.

Mark in CA

4th Feb 2013, 13:19

JAL wants to discuss 787 grounding compensation with Boeing (http://news.yahoo.com/jal-wants-discuss-787-grounding-compensation-boeing-073539419--sector.html)

StainesFS

4th Feb 2013, 13:25

Strictly speaking, both are right. "Potential" energy describes a group of energy types where some action, e.g. striking a match or dropping an object, is required to "release" the energy. Thus, I would describe the type of energy as chemical potential energy. In fairness, this is usually abbreviated to just chemical energy.

Sorry for the thread drift. Back to Boeing's woes.....

Lyman

4th Feb 2013, 14:10

John Farley....

Quote...
My reading of the article is that it suggests it is very dangerous to outsource the design, development and manufacture of elements of a complex system before the interactions between the various elements are completely understood. Indeed it queries whether you (cannot) even write a decent outsourcing contract until all the interactions are understood.

my underline.

Is that your meaning? Did you mean "can write"?

Picky? Perhaps. My complaint is that the thrust of the article implies Boeing screwed it up, for reasons the author outlines.

They did not. Not so far as can be determined. It is not inherently "very dangerous" to outsource or modularize. The author goes to great pains to explain what is obvious; that there is risk in building complex systems.

Enough.....

Turbine D

4th Feb 2013, 16:24

My complaint is that the thrust of the article implies Boeing screwed it up, for reasons the author outlines.

They did not. Not so far as can be determined
Erm,
Jim Albaugh interview & lecture:
One bracing lesson that Albaugh was unusually candid about: the 787's global outsourcing strategy — specifically intended to slash Boeing's costs — backfired completely.

"We spent a lot more money in trying to recover than we ever would have spent if we'd tried to keep the key technologies closer to home," Albaugh told his large audience of students and faculty.

Boeing was forced to compensate, support or buy out the partners it brought in to share the cost of the new jet's development, and now bears the brunt of additional costs due to the delays.
Good enough for me...
It is not inherently "very dangerous" to outsource or modularize.
It is when you don't do it right as some posters have quite clearly pointed out.

As to the batteries and overall electrical system, as hetfield points out, it is complicated, made more complicated by a worldwide supply chain besides being cutting edge technology. Not only that, it was not among the first problems to surface, fuselage sections not mating properly, wrong fasteners used, lack of fasteners and some structural concerns all came first and were show stoppers at the time. Boeing had to focus on these problems as testing, certification and customer deliveries slipped away to some unknown time in the future... Were there any early signs (red flags) that there might be problems with batteries or the electrical system? Hmm...

Lyman

4th Feb 2013, 16:36

hetfield, and I, I believe, are discussing SAFETY, as are almost all the others here.

The author, John Farley and yourself are talking money. Business.

I believe there is a stark difference in the two topics.

Are they related? Definitely, but my takeaway is that HERE, safety is the issue.

Allow me to be the next one to claim the topic is OT.

And I apologize for bringing it up.

phil34160

4th Feb 2013, 16:45

Lyman !

There is a VERY strong link between money, business and safety !

Sincerly yours

Lyman

4th Feb 2013, 16:48

Are they related? Definitely, but my takeaway is that HERE, safety is the issue.

Peter643

4th Feb 2013, 17:00

Thought this article might be of interest, specifically how a Boeing engineer says that battery problems are just the surface of Boeing's problems with the electrical system. He says the main power panels are "Radio Shack" quality, made with cheap components and plastic parts that are prone to failure.

Boeing 787’s problems blamed on outsourcing, lack of oversight | Business & Technology | The Seattle Times (http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2020275838_boeingoutsourcingxml.html)

Turbine D

4th Feb 2013, 17:52

So Lyman,

Focusing on SAFETY,

For the 787 battery system, how do you ensure that safety will not be impinged upon when you outsource to four companies in three different countries in the world various components that make up the overall system?

Lyman

4th Feb 2013, 18:51

Risk Assessment. Risk/Benefit. Benefit assessment. Decision. Contract Language, development. Assurance, Performance. Warranty, Surety.

Request for Proposal, Request for Integrated Proposal.

Histories, Socio Cultural Analyses, Organizational parameters, Fluidity.

CRITICAL PATH. Organic Dispersal, Response Time, etc. Management authorities, scope, and perimeters, etc.

Funding Lock. Financials, Politicals, Risks.

Focal and geographical Leadership mechanism, ETC.
Response, Linkage, DATA,

Each division of the parent Company accompiishes all this subject to a synthesis prior to Contract by the Board, the Principals, and the Divisional leadership.

Boeing did all this, and much much more. This is SKELETAL.

No Company could do this but a gigantic Corporation like BOEING, the cost of the invisibles is prohibitive.

phil34160

4th Feb 2013, 19:06

James Surowiecki: The Trouble with Boeing’s 787 : The New Yorker (http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2013/02/04/130204ta_talk_surowiecki)

no comment !

donnlass

4th Feb 2013, 19:26

Are they still grounded?

TURIN

4th Feb 2013, 19:41

Grounded? Can't even get ground power on. :eek:

donnlass

4th Feb 2013, 21:08

:D;)

Class lol:)

Turbine D

4th Feb 2013, 22:26

Lyman,

Some good content in your Post # 623. Lets me try to put an overall plan together and organize the steps involved. Lets use the battery outsource as the prime example. Lets assume Boeing had never done business with them before and YUASA may be or not a good source for the LiIon battery. Since Boeing does not design or produce LiIon batteries, the first chore would be to develop an outline of what is required of the battery, all the attributes, must and must nots.

Steps: (Pretend you are Boeing)

1. Identify the basic battery requirements and performance expectations.

2. Identify believed to be capable supplier/suppliers (YUASA) and others (single source justification required if more sources exist)

3. Visit YUASA's battery plant, meet with management personnel, include a plant tour, generally discuss the program.

4. Establish that YUASA has an ISO 9001 Certificate (Quality Systems Management Requirements) of Approval. (If not, find another supplier)

5. Establish a Proprietary Agreement to protect sensitive data needed to be shared by both parties, submit to YUASA for agreement.

6. Establish Terms & Conditions for a Purchase Order, submit to YUASA for agreement.

7. Upon approval of the PA and T&Cs by YUASA, furnish to YUASA the Boeing general quality procedures and the general process required to gain approval for the LiIon battery, establish YUASA can and will be capable and willing to proceed knowing these items.

8. Send a request for quote to YUASA for the battery identifying quantity to be purchased and scheduling/delivery information.

9. Upon receipt of the quote from YUASA, Boeing sourcing, quality engineering, value engineering, and systems integration meet to finalize go/no go, further negotiations, etc.

10. If a go, Boeing Sourcing issues a purchase order to YUASA (This is the Contract).

This is Part 1 of a multiple step process, the balance will follow in another posting.

Lyman

4th Feb 2013, 23:41

Hi Turbine D

My first step upon being given an office, a budget, and a staff would be to develop an in house synthesis of a generic product similar in scope and timeline that I could use henceforth as a model, to create a standard; I would not waste my time on a one off. Once spent, the investment better payoff well beyond its limited near term value. It would have a label, an identity.

This is the 'organic'. Consider its corollary, 'stem cell'. The secrecy involved would be paramount.

You would not understand my choice of support staff and peers. You are an engineer.

Once created, sequestered, and given life, we have an organic model of an in house product, a 'Back up Battery', with a history, a code, and a workable method for a production line. But at this point, the Battery is an icon, not a battery.

My night time work would be to become more fluent in Japanese, and customs. The schedule would be superhuman. And I will have fallen in love with the project, literally. So too would my staff....

What I have created in 6-8 months will be completely applicable to other discrete products and systems, and if successful, will be the germ of further development, history, and growth....

The hardest work is the foundation. And the most rewarding. We can build a "battery" now, as well as can our affiliate, sole source, or successful bidder.

The key is leadership, and the leader serves. If it is not intuitive, it cannot be done. And nothing is impossible.

Next?

Turbine D

5th Feb 2013, 00:33

Lyman,

What I have given you so far is industrial real world, not hypothetical or academic theory, it is what is used and if used properly, will most often ensure a situation such as what Boeing is experiencing doesn't happen in a "blue moon". Much of what you suggest is a given, we know how to do business with the Japanese and their business customs, we don't have 6-8 months to fool around.

Do you want to go on, or are we wasting time here?

Turbine D

5th Feb 2013, 00:39

Peter643,

Thanks for the article, it gets at the essence of root cause of the problem, it's not rocket science, it's the systems, the procedures, the organizational arrangements that are in place that preclude things like this from happening...

Lyman

5th Feb 2013, 01:00

TurbineD

Again the scold. Are you assuming Boeing cannot have done the simple things you list? We see the problem in different ways. Boeing's crisis is not in reading specifications off a standard drill sheet.....

Boeing's crisis is in leadership, and in a lack of innovative ways to do new things in command, in design, in bold new approaches.

You cannot out Boeing, Boeing. Their failure was in confidence, fossilized corporate structure, and an obeisance to archaic methods and approach. They were not up to the work. Their imagination was held captive by a weak underlayment of identity....

As this is a technical forum, you prevail, my approach is less quantitative, and I was fearful you would not accept my way.

It took Boeing eight years to build what is a troubled and iconoclastic icon of how to fumble, and kick the ball whilst trying to recover it.

It took NASA the same eight years to go to the moon.

Boeing did it your way....Everything Boeing did stank of fear. it still does.

Leadership. Boeing have lots of good engineers.

Each time you build a Battery, you start over and build something else. Everyone's job in Aerospace needs be concurrent, not repetitious and formulaic the goal is an Aircraft, a unified and very nearly living thing.

Someone needs to see the gestalt, not the parts.

Be well :ok:

Ranger One

5th Feb 2013, 02:15

Lyman, there's an old joke (but also a truism) that used to say something along the lines of... the best airliner in the world would be designed by Lockheed, marketed by MD - and built by Boeing.

The last nail in the coffin of that old saw appears to be an aircraft that was designed by Boeing, marketed by Boeing, and built by no-one in particular...

Lyman

5th Feb 2013, 02:37

Hi Ranger1

I think that's pretty close, but Boeing's Dream was hobbled before the ink was dry.

Outsourcing is fundamentally a political process, which means it is unpredictable, hazardous, and inordinately expensive. There are unknowns that resist mitigation, (Lithium?) and other problems that are merely costly. Vought.

I mean it when i say that leadership is the grail. Those who trust process are doves in the gunsight. Process is the first casualty on a rudderless ship.

I had the good fortune to reupholster the two front seats in an EC121 back in the day. The Connie is incomparable. I got to poke around a 747 long ago, in the shop. What a glorious beast.

Marketing is for people I simply do not understand, and cannot relate to. Which is weird, because my last twenty years have been leadership roles. Leadership is non verbal salesmanship. It is an intuitive journey; it can be learned, but it cannot be taught.

Thanks :ok:

peter we

5th Feb 2013, 07:25

3. Visit YUASA's battery plant,

You do realise that Yuasa only makes the cells, the actually battery system is made by other companies and the Yuasa cells are the only part of that system, so far, shown to be functioning correctly with no known issues.

Securaplane assemble the cells into a battery and provide the technology that prevent it going into overload -

Designed for rapid operator payback, Securaplane's main ship battery chargers significantly reduce battery and charger maintenance while eliminating the guess work of identifying and solving battery/charger problems. Our battery chargers are capable of charging various battery chemistries including NiCad, lead-acid and lithium. Our new, innovative battery chargers use advanced DC to DC conversion technology, patented charging algorithms, comprehensive diagnostics and fault isolation. The latest application of Securaplane's battery charger is for charging and managing the Boeing 787 main ship lithium battery used for APU start and electrical system support.

Old technology chargers typically gauge the charge time based solely according to the cell voltage. This has led to either over-charging or under-charging the battery, with resulting water loss and increased maintenance. Securaplane has developed a method for accurately detecting the inflection point which has eluded battery experts for years and is critical in reducing an overcharge condition. This patented method of charging ensures that the battery receives the optimum amount of charge for all temperature conditions combined with various battery states of charge.

Innovative Inverter Technologies and Main Ship Battery Chargers for Power Conversion (http://www.securaplane.com/products/power-conversion)

Lets see, which is more likely to fail? 15 year old technology that is in use in billions of devices or brand new charger that makes it impossible, by design, for batteries to every explode?

golfyankeesierra

5th Feb 2013, 07:39

From Peter's quote
Securaplane has developed a method for .. .. which has eluded battery experts for years
and continues to elude, it seems..

WHBM

5th Feb 2013, 08:59

The last nail in the coffin of that old saw appears to be an aircraft that was designed by Boeing, marketed by Boeing, and built by no-one in particular...
Very good.

Actually the 787 is, at least conceptually, marketed by McDonnell Douglas. The rot set in when Boeing CEO Phil Condit (lifelong Boeing guy, worked up through engineering, programme management and sales; PPL since he was a teenager - an all-round aviation pro) got replaced by Harry S, with a Corporate America background, Sundstrand, McDonnell Douglas, etc. At Mac's he presided over their demise, including sales falling off a cliff, until what was left got sold to Boeing. Then he manages to get in charge at Boeing, and starts to change them to McDD ways. Apparently part of his reign was a clearout of what were seen as the Condit style supporters (ie those who understood what they were doing), the move to outsourcing, the downplaying of in-house engineering skills, etc. This was all at the time the 787 programme was getting going. Although he later moved on himself, the style of the team for the future, including the marketing-knows-all way, was set.

fdr

5th Feb 2013, 09:27

R1. So true. But Lockheed also built good toys that were fun to fly. Pretty much worked as advertised. The Long Beach cable company also had some darn good simple engineering that just worked, not fancy, just good stuff.

Lyman - "Gestalt"? Seriously? Boeings marketing division and the rest of the top down program that ensued coupled with the bean counter's influence on programs that then had inadequate project risk mitigation from overzealousness or hubris got this company right where it is now. A telling indicator of the impending issues was the repositioning of the corporate headquarters from Seattle to Chicago. Now, Boeing is diversified company, but that change was a clear point of departure from the core values that had been historical points of some corporate pride. There are good engineers in the company, grounded in both conservative design and rational evolutionary change. The program has been smoking something else for a while, but within their structure they have the competency to rectify these defects. Too much emphasis on Gestalt and a loss of the practical grounded engineering input into the design is more likely to be a root cause.

PS: NASA pretty much outsourced the space shuttle program... and more or less lost control of the QA of that due to the complexity and inadequacy of management systems related to risk management, attention getting with STS107. TBC has some prior examples of pitfalls from the course they have undertaken.

cockney steve

5th Feb 2013, 11:34

@turbine D......All this bullcrap !- the great Victorian engineering miracles were done on a handshake and trust!

The fact is, the complete battery sub-assembly is provided by THALES

As far as the customer (Boeing) is concerned, the box-contents are irrelevant, PROVIDED it "does what it says on the tin"...the onus is surely on Thales and the regulatory body ,to make sure this is the case?

Which leads to SECURAPLANE (ironic?)....their job was to supply a plug 'n play interface between the "screamliner's" electrical supplies/demands and Thales' "5-minute box of energy"

However you pass the parcel, waffle and apportion blame, the fact is, the interface between these 3 groups failed to work.

As the Securaplane device is INTERPOSED between the aircraft and the "energy-box" I suggest that it failed miserably in it's duty to protect, manage and monitor the use and availability of that resource.

The Lithium Cobalt cells are "fragile" technology..for safety, they should ONLY operate in the mid-area of their capacity-range...charging towards ultimate capacity can lead to instability, discharging to low level has the same effect.

THE VERY FACT THAT SO MANY OVER-DISCHARGED UNITS HAVE BEEN CHANGED WOULD SEEM TO CORROBORATE MY ASSERTION
SECURAPLANE'S UNIT IS NOT SUITABLE FOR THE APPLICATION.

Wether this is due to Boeings failure to accurately specify what it needed, or Securaplane's lack of understanding the battery technology it was supposed to be taking-care of is another issue.

To the poster who suggested that a main-battery discharge may well be unmonitored....NO!....It's inconcievable and absurd to suggest that an unlimited current -draw in total-faliure mode would be OK....so you're suggesting that it's better to avert the power-failure crash and substitute on-board fire instead? :uhoh:

cockney steve

5th Feb 2013, 11:57

FWIW- I think the fantastic fuel-efficiency and, hopefully, low maintenance of Composite construction, should make this aircraft an absolute winner.

The sheer cost ramifications of the fundamental design flaw in the electrical-system, COULD wipe all that out.

As an aside....there didn't look to be much spare room in the battery-rack for an alternative, lower energy-density technology!

Size/weight although an issue, must be seen in context...
it's effectively a very posh and expensive car battery,
there are only 2 on the entire aircraft.
the weight/bulk difference between proven, robust technology and the Li Co. is miniscule in proportion to the overall aircraft weight/size.

This is the only cutting-edge technology on board which has such disastrous failure mode.

Any competent engineer , left to his own concience, would have prepared a fallback position , in case this EXPERIMENT was a failure.

It was, they haven't , therefore conclusion....office of clueless,arrogant, airhead fxxxwits refused to countenance they could , just maybe, be wrong.

Culpable" management" wants the rough end of a pineapple shoved up their ass and shown the door...they've risked thousands of livelihoods and hundreds of lives.

Just my opinion , of course, so if i'm wide of the mark, I'm awfully sorry, mister caring, coroporate Boeing exec , unlike you I'm retired, on a state pension and worth bugger all so don't bother to sue :O

kilomikedelta

5th Feb 2013, 12:52

CockneySteve, Repeat after me the mantra of the business schools:Image over substance but your raison d'etre is to maximize your compensation.

toffeez

5th Feb 2013, 13:31

Many moons ago I knew people who worked for Airbus. And a few who worked for Boeing.

The Boeing guys, who worked under a strict hierarchy, were amazed that even junior Airbus people had the freedom to make suggestions and defend their ideas in front of top management.

Any connection?
.

Lyman

5th Feb 2013, 15:55

One conclusion. A successful firm values its people.....No strong company with clear leadership would allow its associates to twist in the wind....

Without COHESION, corporate assets get scattered to the four winds....

NTSB and Boeing have fit a 787 for flight test and peritioned the FAA for waiver to fly.....

The claim is: "We have identified 'Thermal Runaway' and wish to test the system, (BATTERY)"

Ah, finally some consciousness of PROTOCOL....

Hello ECAM... FOX NEWS reports NTSB reference to "Thermal runaway" being the purpose of the test.. That is my info....such as it is....:ok: please use caution...McNERNY has not "defended the BATTERY" as it implies in the BBC release. He has defended the "BATTERY TECHNOLOGY" this is the second alert from me, please be careful when reading these releases.

What is of primary importance, and " has not been referenced " is the mad rush to replace 150 batteries prior to any warnings that there was a problem, AT ALL

:ugh:

ECAM_Actions

5th Feb 2013, 16:41

BBC News - Dreamliner crisis: Boeing seeks test flight for 787 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21332256)

Battery charger? Curious there is no mention yet of what they're looking at.

MG23

5th Feb 2013, 17:10

It took NASA the same eight years to go to the moon.

To be fair, in that time they had an on-board fire that killed the entire crew, an on-board explosion which almost killed the entire crew (and, if an oxygen sensor hadn't failed and lead to shorter delays between stirring the tank, would likely have happened while they were on the Moon and left them stranded), and cancelled it early before anyone did get killed in space. So it's possible a few corners were cut along the way.

FlightPathOBN

5th Feb 2013, 18:43

From BoeingLand...

FAA faulted for outsourcing 787 safety checks to Boeing

"In a 2011 review, the inspector general of the Department of Transportation found the FAA in one case delegated some 90 percent of the determination for regulatory compliance for new aircraft design to outside representatives. The Inspector General’s Office would not identify the company, but the report focused on Boeing, Cessna Aircraft and Bombardier-Learjet."

FAA faulted for outsourcing 787 safety checks to Boeing | Boeing news | The Seattle Times (http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020288737_787faaxml.html)

Few people realize that years ago, most of the US Govt agencies went to self-certification...

The EPA allows chemical companies to self-certify their chemicals for hazardous properties and effects on humans and the environment.

Makes sense, right? :uhoh:...

DownIn3Green

5th Feb 2013, 22:35

Yep...Makes sense...just ask Captain Kubek of ValuJet 596...Sabre "self certified" those infamous O2 cylinders....Oops, sorry, can't ask her '
cause she died along with 109 others in the Everglades in May '96...:ugh:

EEngr

6th Feb 2013, 01:30

NTSB and Boeing have fit a 787 for flight test and peritioned the FAA for waiver to fly.....

The claim is: "We have identified 'Thermal Runaway' and wish to test the system, (BATTERY)"I'd like to see that flight test plan. IMO, a flight test isn't the right way to verify proper operation of the charger/battery/load system. One flight, or a couple of flights won't prove anything. The 787 flew how many hundreds (thousands?) of cycles without a failure. The same will happen here.

True tests, to the 'coffin corners' of the performance and environment envelopes aren't likely to be run on flight tests. There are too many test cases, so the economics doesn't make sense. At best, Boeing might hope to spot a common load or charging anomaly using actual aircraft loads and systems that prior cert. tests overlooked. If so, an actual re-certification will still be a ways off.

On the other hand, Boeing does have some planes to be delivered in need of checkout flights. And the flight line in Everett is getting crowded. So perhaps they just want to move the inventory around.

Lyman

6th Feb 2013, 02:19

The salient issue for me is one of safety, and the public right to duty of care from Boeing and the airline. Not to mention strict enforcement of the letter, and the spirit, of the regulations....

If the story is true that Boeing was changing out virtually all the batteries, for any reason, if the removal and replacement was on an accelerated schedule, that is a change of performance.

I am hopeful the true events become known.

It is especially critical if the Program of replacement was as a result of any particular and unexpected defect or failure. Any unexpected event presents the possibility of complete and critical failure, there is potentially a danger to the aircraft and passengers, on board and people on the ground.

I think most other considerations pale in comparison to the process involved in changing the batteries. I am sure the program was innocent, and proper.

mm43

6th Feb 2013, 02:46

@RetiredF4,

Not so sure the ANA earth-wire is really much different from the JAL one. Difference is that JAL one has been damaged by fire and the ANA one hasn't. Exactly how much damage was caused to either wire when disconnecting the cable plug is anyone's guess.

A close-up of the JAL front of case is here (http://oi45.tinypic.com/smugdw.jpg)

rottenray

6th Feb 2013, 03:56

CockneySteve, Repeat after me the mantra of the business schools:Image over substance but your raison d'etre is to maximize your compensation.

Wow.

Just wow.

Kilo, you have demonstrated, in one broken-English sentence, exactly what is wrong with Pprune and why these fora need to become a pilots-only environment.

WT?

rottenray

6th Feb 2013, 04:30

Time for a big-ass sanity check here, folks.

NiCd replacement - won't happen unless someone carves 2 extra cubic feet of available space in the EE bays.

Grounded until next year... Boeing fanboys didn't wish this sort of calamity on Airbus, even when the A380 SHED PARTS during her high speed test. Nor did GE engine fetishists wish doom and gloom on Rolls-Royce when an RR Trent blew into :mad: pieces on the wing of QF32.

I've read these fora diligently, trying to learn - and found that I have learned more from common media than I have here.

Mainly due to the simple fact that common media is predictable - the posters and posers here are not.

Seriously:

"Those wires are too small to balance a charge current!!" even though the balancing takes less than 5 amps the the "small" wires are 18 ga.

"The cells are actually 6 cells because NO CELL COULD EVER DELIVER 65 AH!" - Really? Look under the hood/bonnet of your freakin' car.

and on and on and on.

What a tribe!

Son, I am disappoint - this crowd has gone so far down hill since, I hate to say, AF447, that it's not even funny.

Boeing haters gonna hate. Dips with no knowledge whatsoever gonna spout. The few [smart] folks who work in the industry gonna try, for a while, to dispel ever-growing fallacy.

All the while, every idiot with a keyboard and an internet connection is going to keep cranking out his or her own version of how the 787 operates, how much electrical power it draws, how the batteries are used, and why the batteries failed. And how many batteries failed.

Along with wailing, gnashing of teeth, self-flagellation, and perhaps the odd suicide or two, based on how a well-executed safety action could potentially "ruin" an airframer which has helped write many of the safety certifications honored by ALL the other aviation authorities around the globe.

In the mean time, the media will keep fishing these waters and publish all the tripe that seems new - which only seems new because anyone held accountable for mouth or pen would NEVER dare to utter such BS.

Ignoring now, good luck with what I can only call one of the greatest examples of pure pilot / ramper / aficiando HUBRIS I have ever seen.

Nothing will ever top this, folks.

A few of you have been absolutely stellar in trying to de-mystify what's going on.

Most of you have been asses merely trying to prove how "smart" you are, while merely proving that you don't know soy from wheat.

And you wonder why people worry about WHO is flying the plane they bought a ticket on...

hetfield

6th Feb 2013, 07:23

"The cells are actually 6 cells because NO CELL COULD EVER DELIVER 65 AH!" - Really? Look under the hood/bonnet of your freakin' car.Yes, lead acid can do it, Li-Ion not.

In the 787 batteries each cell-array (8) has 6 cells in parallel.
So, one cell has litlle over 10Ah.

TopBunk

6th Feb 2013, 08:10

I have been told that the peak discharge when starting the APU is 1000 Amps!

TURIN

6th Feb 2013, 08:16

Rottenray,
Ok, I'll bite.
There are many of us who chose a professional career in aviation that does not involve flying aeroplanes.
Just as well, as you and all the other professional pilots would have nothing to fly, no one to maintain them, bugger all in payload and you would have to bring your own cheese tray!
Still, look on the bright side. Security would be a doddle.

Your arrogance does you no credit and is an embarrassment to the many professional pilots I work with everyday.

green granite

6th Feb 2013, 08:50

Well said Turin, after all pilots know how to fly aircraft, why should they also be an authority on electronics and batteries?

There appears to be some confusion over sub-cells, they are only there because of the prismatic construction of the cell, you cant bend the electrode through 180° with zero radius so you end up with sub cells, in a circular battery you can have continuous electrodes so it has no need of sub-cells, although there may well be multiple connections to that electrode.

rogerg

6th Feb 2013, 09:06

Really? Look under the hood/bonnet of your freakin' car.

A 12v car battery is 6 two volt cells in a case.

hetfield

6th Feb 2013, 09:12

after all pilots know how to fly aircraft, why should they also be an authority on electronics and batteries?

Yep, some pilots are also engineers with a university degree......;)

Cool Guys

6th Feb 2013, 10:55

If I was flying on a 787 or any plane with LiI batteries at any point in the future, any concerns I had about a battery failure, charger failure, charger SW issue and even thermal runaway would be secondary. All these things can and will fail at some point in the life of the 787. That is taken for granted. There seems to be enough redundancies for the probability of it causing any hazard to the aircraft are pretty low. My primary concern would be the fire containment. ie if there is thermal runaway in a cell any resulting fire would be contained within the battery casing and any fumes vented outside where they can cause no harm. If this was addressed I would be happy to fly on a 787 tomorrow even without the root cause of the battery failure being found. If the fires in the ANA and JI incidents were properly contained I doubt the planes would have been grounded.

mikkojuha

6th Feb 2013, 11:15

@ rogerg "A 12v car battery is 6 two volt cells in a case." And so what ??

@ hetfield "Yes, lead acid can do it, Li-Ion not. In the 787 batteries each cell-array (8) has 6 cells in parallel. So, one cell has litlle over 10Ah."

Are you saying, hat LiIon-cell can have only max 10Ah capacity? Why is that?

911slf

6th Feb 2013, 11:26

Capn Bloggs. rogerg said there were six cells each of two volts, which is indeed the case. I think you were a bit quick on the trigger there.

I worked for three years as a chemist in a factory making car batteries. I know this much.

As I don't know about Lithium batteries or aircraft I shall now withdraw.

cockney steve

6th Feb 2013, 13:02

For simplicity:-
The voltage of a cell is dependent on the technology(Chemistry) employed

the storage-capacity is a product of plate(electrode) surface -area within that cell.

The discharge-rate is a product of the technilogy and configuration of that cell.

Where Automotive LA batteries are concerned, there are standardised cases and terminals (shape and position)

Within the cases there is potential for a few thick plates, or a lot of thin ones. the more plates, the bigger the surface-area and the greater the peak-current potential. irrespective of how many plates there are, within a cell, all the pos. plates are bonded together like the fingers of a hand. the opposite polarity are linked likewise interleaved between them with porous spacers between,-this allows current to flow between ajacent Pos-Neg. plates, whilst stopping warping/shedding from mechanically shorting the plates together. that's why you get different prices, weights and energy-ratings in what looks like the "same" battery.-

The net result is 2 plates/electrodes. in a compact space.
-in the case of a cylindrical cell a "sandwich" of long strip plates and insulator-spacers is wound exactly like a Swiss-Roll (a capacitor is mechanically very similar!) compact, but doesn't use square spaces efficiently.

Back on topic... Lithium Technology has the potential to store a lot more energy in a smaller, lighter package , than Nickel Cadmium or Nickel Metal Hydride...in turn , these have superior weight and energy-density to Lead-Acid

The major disadvantage of Lithium technology ,is it's intolerance to deep discharge and maximum -capacity charge.

Keep within those boundaries and you can make massive short term current demands and have low self-discharge rates (virtually ALL batteries will go" flat" if left to their own devices).- which is why it seems eminently sensible that the "screamliner" constantly monitors and conditions it's batteries....or is that "Should constantly".... If it had done, there would have been no need to swap-out so many as if they were "use and throw" torch-batteries.

IMO , the Yuasa cells are beyond reproach... the charging/monitoring interface between cells and the aircraft's wiring-harness is the trouble-spot.

The state of the main/apu/rat power-deliveries is immaterial...a properly specified and built interface should ensure the battery is charged/discharged within it's safe working envelope.

Test-flights "may" uncover a shortcoming, but I'd bet a pound to a pinch of sh1t that the problem lies in the charger-unit.

I suspect also that the internal battery controllers are intentionaly configured to make the unit unusable by the end -user in"tailored" failure-mode thus ensuring a steady replacement and "reconditioning" market........

HOW MANY REPLACED, AGAIN ? Someone's taking the p155 and damaging the cost-savings potential.......biting the hand that feeds..../ killing the goose..... ??

RR_NDB

6th Feb 2013, 13:10

Hi,

When plane landed in TAK, very probably the battery was yet "out of circuit".

The rationale of this model was described in:

Post # 497 (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/505695-787-batteries-chargers-25.html#post7679260) and

Post # 498 (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/505695-787-batteries-chargers-25.html#post7679293)

Please refer to JTSB document (http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/flash/JA804A_130116-130205.pdf)

hetfield

6th Feb 2013, 13:17

Are you saying, hat LiIon-cell can have only max 10Ah capacity? Why is that?

@mikkojuha

At least, I don't know Li-Ion cells (one cell) which has 65Ah....

Lyman

6th Feb 2013, 13:25

Test-flights "may" uncover a shortcoming, but I'd bet a pound to a pinch of sh1t that the problem lies in the charger-unit.

cockney steve....then why replace only the BATTERIES as though the certificate depended on it?

question: As well as being 'self certifying', when did Boeing also become

"SELF INVESTIGATING"? Since BA038?? Before?

Objectivity is on life support......

I think a summary. A brief one.

Have not seen anything here that was not addressed by all concerned in the development and certification process.

Best efforts, best practice resulted in uacceptable failure trail, BY DEFINITION. The regulations were too minimal. If "Relaxed" to accomodate continued use, the Regulatory paradigm becomes a laughingstock, instead of just a wink wink....

At the very outset, the sham 'specials' were an obvious permission slip to utilize a technology that cannot be made safe for aircraft in commercial carriage. The recent hasty "Permission" to transport this "cannot be made safe" technology on aircraft only emphasizes the desperation of a failing attempt to salvage it.

I think Lithium Ion power on aircraft is done.

I think any "Test flights" are pretty much for show. Or to position a/c, as EEngr says.

peter we

6th Feb 2013, 20:12

I'd like to see that flight test plan. IMO, a flight test isn't the right way to verify proper operation of the charger/battery/load system. One flight, or a couple of flights won't prove anything. The 787 flew how many hundreds (thousands?) of cycles without a failure. The same will happen here.

I'd say the test flights will be to prove a theory or demonstrate a reproducible error/issue.

Simply replacing a part and flying it to prove the issue doesn't re-occur won't be very convincing unless they intend to test fly for 50k hours...

Piper_Driver

6th Feb 2013, 23:32

Speaking as an electrical engineer who has designed battery charging systems for exotic battery packs in the past I would suggest that Boeing may be trying to reproduce conditions that are difficult to do on the ground. If I was working on the problem I would want to insurument the holy ()*^ out of the entire system and then put it through simultaneous stresses- altitude, temperature, g loading, load dumps from the engines, etc. Maybe then I could get a clue as to what might be going on. The easiest way to do this might be a flight test.

syseng68k

6th Feb 2013, 23:49

Piper Driver:

Agreed - I've been thinking that the only way to reproduce the fault would be
to build a test rig with battery, charger and associated kit, then put it through
test cycles that simulate actual operation and beyond. Ideally, put it all in an
environmental test chamber to allow temperature cycling as part of the process.
This would perhaps be faster than flying the a/c

Perhaps they have this already, but the lack of info after nearly a month suggests
that the problem is far from obvious. It's starting to look increasingly likely that
some operation at the corners of the battery / charger spec may be triggering a
software bug, or battery management hardware running beyond design limits...

DozyWannabe

7th Feb 2013, 00:54

As well as being 'self certifying', when did Boeing also become

"SELF INVESTIGATING"? Since BA038?? Before?

You're playing fast and loose with the facts again - the root cause of the BA038 rollback problem was discovered and proved by the AAIB using a test harness.

The presence of manufacturer representatives on investigating teams is nothing new, and they're usually welcomed because they know the systems and airframe better than anyone else. As yet, no manufacturer has directly interfered with the investigatory process - because the risks of doing so considerably outweigh any potential benefit.

Lyman

7th Feb 2013, 01:13

You are too quick to judge.

I make no conclusion, only that Boeing plays the primary role in certifying, and a de facto lead in investigation. The two become inextricably interwined when one or the other merely exists....

You immediately jump to your patent obsessions with authority, control, and sensitivity to views other than your own....

Boeing played a huge role in 038, designing and building very expensive ground test formats. The conclusion was Ice in fuel, due improper design of FOHE, a fix was a trimback to eliminate the Fuel inlets extra length....

Although Boeings testing failed to reproduce what was believed to be the actual problem.

Otherwise, nice to see ya again...:ok:

FlightPathOBN

7th Feb 2013, 01:15

Pub User

7th Feb 2013, 07:55

Wouldnt they be able to test the APU system on the ground?

To me it would be prudent to test the hell out of that system on the ground, show its operational and safe, before even asking to go airbourne...

I can't imagine they haven't been doing that for the last three weeks. Also, it's not just the APU system, but the main aircraft battery. It can fly without an APU battery for 10 days, limited to 180 mins ETOPs.

cockney steve

7th Feb 2013, 09:24

Yesterday, I read a big section i'd missed on the Tech.forum thread/

THE CELLS ARE EACH COMPOSED OF SEVERAL (7?) SMALL CELLS IN PARALLELL

In essence, this works like your car-battery, several plates alternately stacked pos-neg-pos-neg to get the surface-area for the capacity and discharge-rate required.....all the plates of each polarity are linked together, so there's only 1 Pos and one Neg connection.

The problem with these Lithium Cells, is the charger ONLY MONITORS THE CELL_GROUP AS A WHOLE.
I don't pretend to know how sensitive the monitoring-system is, but now believe that the internal configuration and control-boards of the Thales "power storage box" needs a serious looking at......OOPS They're going to do that.

The charging-unit MUST be able to see yhe individual sub-cells in a stack which form one of the 8 cells in the battery.....once a small sub-cell runs -away, it would appear a domino-effect teces place and the thermal-runaway cascades through the entire battery.

Poor battery design, for the application and poor charger design which fails to adequately monitor and counter the inadequacies in the battery-pack it's supposed to control.......
all just my opinion ,of course.

EW73

7th Feb 2013, 09:49

OK...I'm very interested in that idea...would it be practical to design an 8-cell battery (with the same energy capability), that comprises 8 separate single cell batteries that are all charged/controlled by separate chargers.
That would seem to get around the problem of charge/discharge of each single cell, and limit the effects of a thermal runaway.

hetfield

7th Feb 2013, 10:06

THE CELLS ARE EACH COMPOSED OF SEVERAL (7?) SMALL CELLS IN PARALLELL

In essence, this works like your car-battery, several plates alternately stacked pos-neg-pos-neg to get the surface-area for the capacity and discharge-rate required.....all the plates of each polarity are linked together, so there's only 1 Pos and one Neg connection.

@cockney steve

Yes, the eight "cells" of the 787 battery contain each 6 sub-cells in parallel.
Paralleling increases capacity. So each sub-cell has about 11Ah makes roughly the nominated 65Ah. These eight cell packs in serial a 3,7 V give you 29.6 V/65Ah.

Concerning the comparison with a car-battery, the 6 cells in serial of 2V each (lead-acid) give you 12V, but serial arrangement doesn't increase the capacity, just voltage.

Otherwise I fully agree with your post:ok:

fizz57

7th Feb 2013, 11:52

This "cells in parallel" fixation is a red herring. There is no substantiative difference between having a two-metre long electrode folded up in one cell and two one-metre long electrodes in two cells connected in parallel: the electrical conditions on each square centimeter (or whatever) of electrode are identical.

There may be some slight differences due to the separate electrolyte, but the electrolyte in these batteries is largely immobilised in the porous separator anyway.

bsieker

7th Feb 2013, 12:05

Sorry, I can't seem to find it anywhere.

Is this "6 subcells per cell" claim substantiated anywhere?

I'd be grateful for a pointer to an authoritative source.

I remember seeing an exploded drawing (can't find that either) actually showing a "folded" cell, and even GS Yuasa makes no such claim in their "specifications".

hetfield

7th Feb 2013, 13:33

http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/flash/JA804A_130116-130205.pdf

Page 5?

green granite

7th Feb 2013, 13:50

have a read of:

Lithium Battery Manufacturing (http://www.mpoweruk.com/battery_manufacturing.htm)

and:

Materials and Processing for lithium-ion Batteries (http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/jom/0809/daniel-0809.html)

bsieker

7th Feb 2013, 13:51

hetfield,

thanks for the link. But it does not say anywhere that there are subcells. In fact, when I look at the lab table photos from the NTSB press releases, it appears there are 6 very long strips, indicating folded cells (now unfurled), and two shorter ones, which I take to be cells that were so severly damaged that there was no continuous strip any more.

So, this sub-cells hypothesis is not substantiated anywhere, but just a wild guess that somehow stuck in these forums.

Lyman

7th Feb 2013, 14:00

fizz57

Bingo. The "Case" contains eight batteries. Each battery has three "cells". Each "cell" is one electrode, ten metres long, 150 millimeters wide, wound (folded) to fit in the prismatic container. Each electrode has 35k square centimeters of surface area. Each time a pin sized aperture in the polypropylene separator melts or is occluded, efficiency drops, heat is created, and the battery loses efficiency.

The "cell" in its multiple "folds" presents as a brain, or kidney would, layer upon layer of organic material.

Hence the CT scan. Not that it would help an in service Cell.

Once again, I repeat. A circular, cylindrical wind is preferred, "folding" is problematic for the very thin separator.

http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/pdf/research/rflithiumionbatterieshazard.pdf

It's in there. I posted the pertinent part from the website in TechLog. #525

HeadingSouth

7th Feb 2013, 14:46

fizz57 et al:

When using Li-Ion (as well LiPo) cells it is important to have each cell voltage charged (or at least balanced) separately.
This means that when nominal cell voltage is 3.7V and you have e.g. 3 cells in SERIES to get a 11.1V potential, it won't do the job to charge them with a single 12.9V supply UNLESS each potential is balanced (i.e. 3 x 4.3V charge voltage applied to each single cell level).
If cells are in parallel, then it is of utmost importance that both cells have the same charge/discharge curve, otherwise current balancing is not possible between the cells, which may lead to under- or overvoltage discharge or overcurrent draw of single cells.
Thats at least how I learned it when designing large-ish power applications for Li-Ion batteries. And they still work fine, no issues, no interruptions, no anything.

EEngr

7th Feb 2013, 16:15

Not as big an issue as series batteries. Theoretically, you can view one cell as being 10, one meter long 'batteries' connected in parallel. Or 100, 10cm batteries, etc.

Discharge of paralleled batteries tends to be self balancing. As one battery provides more than its share of charge to the load, it's charge is reduced below that of is neighbors. And as its charge is reduced, its voltage drops and internal resistance rises, reducing its further contribution to the load until the others 'catch up'.

The problem arises when cell (or a section thereof) voltage rises with temperature faster than its discharge lowers it. That provides a positive feedback, causing that cell to discharge even faster, generating more heat. Now you have that thermal runaway.

Putting three paralleled cells in one can reduces the thermal gradient between them and reduces this effect. But the effect would still be present with only one cell per battery, given that the outer layer would lose heat to the container faster than those toward tthe center.

cwatters

7th Feb 2013, 16:18

The photographs and notes posted by others suggest the configuration is probably 6P8S.

In other words there are 48 cells. Six of these are wired together in parallel to make sub-batteries (increasing the capacity), then 8 sub-batteries are wired in series (increasing the voltage) to make the main battery.

The 8 sub batteries are balanced but the 6 cells in parallel in each don't appear to be. However that's not usually a problem because cells in parallel will tend to auto balance...

Cell Balancing and Battery Equalisation (http://www.mpoweruk.com/balancing.htm)

Self Balancing

Unbalanced ageing is less of a problem with parallel chains which tend to be self balancing since the parallel connection holds all the cells at the same voltage and at the same time allows charge to move beween cells whether or not an external voltage is applied.

llagonne66

7th Feb 2013, 17:22

http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2013/boeing_787/JAL_B-787_2-7-13.pdf

Quick solution does not appear to be just around the corner ...

syseng68k

7th Feb 2013, 18:00

llagonne:

Thanks for that. Some nice new pics, but no real substance otherwise ?...

Lyman

7th Feb 2013, 18:28

Correction to NTSB images.

The cells represented as "LEFT SIDE" and "RIGHT SIDE" are reversed.

Unless you are looking at the BATTERY from BEHIND.

"INSIDE THE BATTERY" page 8.....

llagonne66

7th Feb 2013, 19:49

The real substance is that they are still trying to understand what when wrong at every possible level (design, manufacturing, certification, etc.).

If you read between the lines, NTSB appears to take a tough stance and FAA looks on the defensive as they have certified the A/C while apparently overlooking something ...

HazelNuts39

7th Feb 2013, 20:12

Lyman,
Unless you are looking at the battery from behind
Or as it is shown on pages 7 and 9 ?

Lyman

7th Feb 2013, 20:27

No, as it is shown on page 8

Caveat. If you consider the reference for NTSB page seven and nine are "plan view" then by reference ONLY, page seven can be construed as accurate. Stand alone, page seven is reversed. "elevation"

:ok:

EastMids

7th Feb 2013, 20:32

787 battery approval should be reconsidered, top accident investigator says | Fox News (http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/02/07/787-battery-approval-should-be-reconsidered-top-accident-investigator-says/)

National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Deborah Hersman said the board's investigation of last month's battery fire in a Japan Airlines 787 "Dreamliner" while it was parked in Boston shows the fire started with multiple short-circuits in one of the battery's eight cells. That created an uncontrolled chemical reaction known as "thermal runaway" and spread to the rest of the cells, she said.

That's at odds with what Boeing told the Federal Aviation Administration when the agency was working to certify the innovative aircraft for flight, Hersman said. The manufacturer asserted its testing showed that any short circuiting could be contained within a single cell, preventing thermal runaway and fire, she said.

Boeing's testing also showed the batteries were likely to cause smoke in only 1 in 10 million flight hours, she said. But the Boston fire was followed nine days later by a smoking battery in an All Nippon Airways plane that made an emergency landing in Japan. The 787, Boeing's newest and most technologically advanced plane, has recorded less than 100,000 flight hours, Hersman noted.

syseng68k

7th Feb 2013, 22:46

llagonne66:

If you read between the lines, NTSB appears to take a tough stance and FAA looks on the defensive as they have certified the A/C while apparently overlooking something ...
Probably close to the truth. If outsourcing is so fashionable these days, perhaps the
FAA did that as well ?.

But, who watches the watchers ? :confused:

EEngr

7th Feb 2013, 23:53

Lyman:
Correction to NTSB images.Good catch. Page 7 (top view) shows cell 8 at the front of the battery. Page 8 (side view) shows cell 8 at the rear.
If we are going to follow the narrative with these visual aides, we age going to get lost. Which cell #6 ran away first? :confused:

I hope this is just a problem with the people doing the presentation artwork and not NTSB's evidence.

eastsidewillie

7th Feb 2013, 23:54

:( guys, just a post from left field.....i'm not that knowledgeable about aircraft design, but just from common sense and experience, why would you place any substance, gizmo, etc. that could possibly (and, according to Murphy's Law, will at some point) become toxic anywhere near the pilots of a commercial aircraft, who are the only ones on board with a chance of saving the situation. i don't know what the airbus folks are doing with the a350 in the works, but i'd love a look at it.

WanganuiLad

8th Feb 2013, 00:10

Test flights to go ahead
BBC News - Boeing gets permission for Dreamliner test flights (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21377954)

RR_NDB

8th Feb 2013, 00:59

Hi,

The main battery smoke left from the plane in two points:

The one underneath was what?

http://oi49.tinypic.com/vcqbd3.jpg

HeadingSouth

8th Feb 2013, 07:29

EEngr and cwatters:

"The 8 sub batteries are balanced but the 6 cells in parallel in each don't appear to be. However that's not usually a problem because cells in parallel will tend to auto balance..."

They tend to auto balance as long as charge/discharge currents are not too high. If for some reason a sudden current spike occurs, then the paralleled cells can start to misbehave due to inrush/outrush currents being momentarily too high for the auto balancing mode to work fine. For normal operations this may well be not an issue at all, but if an abnormal situation occurrs and current spikes are appearing I would prefer not to have to rely on auto balancing of Li-Ion (and LiPo for that matter) cells.

roulishollandais

8th Feb 2013, 10:36

edit : Preseance to WanganuiLad : I missed his post with BBC message...sorry

US clears Boeing to start 787 test flights - Transport - ArabianBusiness.com (http://m.arabianbusiness.com/us-clears-boeing-start-787-test-flights-488733.html)

"US clears Boeing to start 787 test flights By Reuters Friday, 8 February 2013 10:46 AM :

US agencies cleared Boeing Co to restart test flights of its grounded 787 Dreamliner in order to get more data on potentially faulty batteries, but they also demanded a closer look at how the batteries were approved, which may delay resuming delivery of Boeing's newest aircraft.

The 50 Dreamliners in service were grounded worldwide on January 16, after a series of battery incidents, including a fire on board a parked 787 in Boston and an in-flight problem on another plane in Japan. The groundings have cost airlines tens of millions of dollars, with no end in sight."

WHBM

8th Feb 2013, 11:36

BBC News - Boeing gets permission for Dreamliner test flights (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21377954)
I see that Boeing PR, who have been notably coy/inept on the subject to date, have suddenly leapt into action with news stories ensured in just about every publication imaginable that test flights are to start.

It really is rather a specialist subject, the operation of some test flights, but I suppose everyone at PR will now be working 24 hours a day hammering their media contacts to ensure an unending diet of "test flight takes off successfully", "test flight lands successfully", and such like.

DaveReidUK

8th Feb 2013, 11:46

which may delay resuming delivery of Boeing's newest aircraft

No kidding ?

green granite

8th Feb 2013, 12:25

I wonder how many test flights will need to take place before an incident of any sort happens, or, conversely, when do you stop if no events happen.

HazelNuts39

8th Feb 2013, 13:04

Test flights are generally conducted to obtain data, not to provoke 'incidents'.
All possible precautions are usually taken to minimize the risk of potentially uncontrollable situations.

Lyman

8th Feb 2013, 13:26

If I am Boeing, I am thrilled that this type is airborne once more, for any reason.
It is a beginning to a critical process of re acceptance, as well as re certified....
Prolonged perception of "cannot fly" by the public is having an effect on other than airworthiness.

To deny that is silly. And to frame the test flights as strictly single purpose is a bit narrow, imho. For three years past its due date, the company worked feverishly to get it airborne...

Call it cultural corporate memory...

jcjeant

8th Feb 2013, 13:37

Prolonged perception of "cannot fly" by the public is having an effect on other than airworthiness.Well .. not exactly the same .. but the DC-10 had some problems at it's "debut" and killed a lot of passengers (the most in the medias was the crash of Ermenonville TY DC-10 Capt Berkoz at commands)
Anyways .. passengers continued to happily boarding the DC-10

Lyman

8th Feb 2013, 13:56

Not me. The only time I saw a DC-10 launch I saw #2 compressor Stall at rotate, the flame was a hundred feet long, my girlfriend was on board.
Mexicana. I have never flown on a Douglas aircraft, save the -9.

Boeing was shrill, offensive, and played the corporate lunatic when FAA finally grounded the DREAM. They were replacing batteries, and they may have thought they had solved "the problem".

green granite

8th Feb 2013, 14:24

Test flights are generally conducted to obtain data, not to provoke 'incidents'.
All possible precautions are usually taken to minimize the risk of potentially uncontrollable situations.

Sorry HazelNuts39 I think we are at cross purposes here possibly due to my use of the word 'incident' to mean an individual occurrence or event out side of the normal operating parameters of the battery or charging system, I wasn't thinking of a catastrophic battery failure.

Without such an event they will have no more knowledge than they have now, hence my comment on how long do they keep looking for something.

What would be interesting to know is what instrumentation has been added to the battery pack and charging system to record the parameters.

Speed of Sound

8th Feb 2013, 14:43

my use of the word 'incident' to mean an individual occurrence or event out side of the normal operating parameters

I'm not even sure they will be looking for that.

That would be an open-ended project that could take months of 'incident-free' flying before seeing something out of the ordinary. As Hazel says, this may be no more than an exercise in real-time data collection. Remember Boeing should have 100-150 batteries worth of data from the 'swap-outs' to go by, so this operation must be looking for something over and above what they already have.

I'm not sure what extra gear would need to be hooked up to the system over and above what is already there to 'feed' the algorithm. And remember, any further monitoring of things like sub-cell temperatures, voltages and currents would be fairly invasive of the actual battery itself to the point where you would be effectively looking at a different system. :(

Lyman

8th Feb 2013, 15:07

A possibility might be that the Aft E/E bay has been made accessible in flight by removal of cabin floor decking, for real time minute observations to ascertain how better to make the system more compatible with the LithiumIon FARs.

It would be naive to think that Boeing is playing a boy scout role in trying to eliminate the issue. Or even solve the problem, beyond a minimal, and lobbied for, result that lifts the order to park.

'Best practice' is about getting back in the air. Not entirely, but when the self certifier and lead commercial interest in the investigation is not, cannot be, objective.....

The certifying criteria for this technology is cobbled together by the manufacturer, that is a known. The recent waiver of the FAR that prohibited LithIon batteries as cargo is case in point....How did BOEING ship replacement LIBs prior to January 7? RAILROAD? How did that FRP work, exactly?

Hersman is the one to listen to, FAA and Boeing? Not so much...

green granite

8th Feb 2013, 15:22

Without extra instrumentation I don't see what they are going to learn, unless of course there was no testing of that part of the system in the original flight test programme.
Actually it would be interesting to know how many batteries Boeing had to change during the flight testing up to certification

Lyman

8th Feb 2013, 15:31

Boeing built an immense indoor temperature controlled replica of the fuel system of the 777 post 038. Full size. The results that were published were inconclusive

Obviously, I am a known sceptic, gg, what they have aboard as to personnel and instrumentation will be doled out to the public through Boeing...Correction through NTSB from BOEING

And it will not be detrimental to Boeing...at worst, "inconclusive". Boeing knew the problem or it would not have developed an expensive, embarrassing, and FAR illegal FRP.

IMO

Lyman

8th Feb 2013, 15:40

no hazmat or autonomous breathers?

pax2908...by "previous flights" do you mean prior to the replacement program?

Or, since.

Good Heavens.... "what a surprise". not.

1. Lithium a known problem, that's why they were illegal.

2. Boeing wanted Lithium, designed a criteria to allow it

3. The criteria did not ignore the dangers, but allowed Lithium, if it could be shown "manageable".

4. It proved unmanageable.

5. All of a sudden there is a mystery?

6. It is performing in ways the FARs PREDICTED, eg, catches fire, spills electrolyte, damages collaterals....

7. The whole idea is to present the problem as mysterious...

8. A ""NEW" criterion (#10) will be added, and bob's your uncle.

9. Dusted, and done.

10 if BOEING wanted a nuclear pile on board, the FARS would accomodate.

11. Jeezuz

pax2908

8th Feb 2013, 15:40

There is a possibility that data logged during previous flights already shows (hints) of a problem, and the test flight is now focused on a well defined hypothesis.

poorjohn

8th Feb 2013, 16:44

Disappointing that engineering at the arguably-best transport-aircraft company on the planet led itself down this path - and got it so wrong. Given that, can we trust the objectivity of the 2007 report "Flammability Properties of Aircraft Carbon-Fiber Structural Composite"? (The report specifically examines the composite spec'ed by Boeing, but the work seems to have been done by University of Maryland for the FAA, so the answer may well be 'yes', but it's a pity to even have to think the question.)

EEngr

8th Feb 2013, 16:45

HeadingSouth:

They tend to auto balance as long as charge/discharge currents are not too high. If for some reason a sudden current spike occurs,Yes. But this brings up another failure mode/load incompatibility issue. Current balance and thermal runaway are more or less a steady state issue. They are a function of the thermal characteristics of the battery cells. I'm going to give Boeing and its subcontractors the benefit of the doubt and assume that many combinations of load or charge and ambient temperature were tested for the initial certification of this subsystem.

The 'current spike' brings up another issue which I have found to be often overlooked. That is: the electrical loads on these batteries are not steady state DC. Particularly in the case of the APU, the starter/generator is driven by a controller that draws very high levels of ripple currents from the source.

Batteries, in addition to being an electrochemical voltage source have an equivalent AC model that (overly simplified) can be represented as a series LCR circuit at higher frequencies (tens or hundreds of kHz). If one excites such a circuit near its resonance, it is possible to generate extremely high voltages across the various internal points of this equivalent circuit.

There is the possibility that the various combinations of load ripple and battery AC impedance was not properly characterized when the initial certification analysis was done*. I imagine that subsequent flight tests will be instrumented to capture exactly this kind of data.

*Back in my days at Boeing, I was involved with the 767 static inverter and its adaption to the 747-400. Initially, it had been certified to drive linear AC loads. This was because the smaller loads (typically driven by the standby AC bus) were exempt from limits on harmonic current draw. But, as it turns out, being exempt from a spec requirement doesn't meant that it shouldn't be considered. It turned out that an inverter rated at 1kVA was only capable of delivering about 400 VA to the connected loads before the voltage waveform became so flat-topped that it's output fell out of spec. This new 'all electric' airplane may turn out biting some old school engineers in the a:mad:.

Lyman

8th Feb 2013, 16:52

EEngr

pardon my ignorance. Is the tickle current at the SG modulated? is the generated current "controlled".....what pathway to the BATTERIES? I am wondering why the NTSB claimed the "charging current" never exceeded spec at the Battery?

poorjohn....I think the specs on CFRP are highly pertinent at this point.

CFRP + FIRE = gas.......What is the nature of the products of onboard fire, aloft, and at the GATE?

poorjohn

8th Feb 2013, 17:10

EEngr, fascinating point about the AC characteristics of the battery. Is it well-enough-known in the field so that "everyone" will realize they have to consider it in their design?

cldrvr

8th Feb 2013, 17:26

Europe's Airbus is considering whether to drop Lithium-Ion batteries and switch back to traditional ones on its new A350 as investigators probe Boeing 787 battery problems, several people familiar with the matter said.

Airbus studies dropping Li-Ion battery for A350: sources | Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/08/us-airbus-batteries-idUSBRE9170HL20130208)

Momoe

8th Feb 2013, 18:12

In reply to jcjeant,

I was sufficiently influenced by the DC-10 crashes that I made a point of not flying in the 10, I did fly 747 and Tristar but never the 10.

Granted people continued to fly in the 10 but I wonder how many voted with their feet?

EEngr

8th Feb 2013, 18:45

poorjohn:
Is it well-enough-known in the fieldIt should be at a theoretical level. But LiON batteries are relatively new beasts. So engineers used to dealing with SLA and NiCad and their relatively large plate spacings (and low shunt capacitance) might be dropping this phenomenon out of their analysis. Battery plate configurations look nothing like battery cells of yore.

Its back to first principles, where things like electrical resistance have to consider charge mobility and density rather than just Ohms.

syseng68k

8th Feb 2013, 19:02

EEngr:

Very good point.

Power density is much higher for LI and the thinner separator material might
be prone to high voltage transients. Separator breaks down enough to negate
self healing, cell shorts, thermal runaway and bang :eek:.

As for instrumentation, there are probably development versions of the charger
and BMS software that provide more debug data, which would normally be
removed for production...

EEngr

8th Feb 2013, 19:37

syseng68k (http://www.pprune.org/members/302789-syseng68k)

Charger and battery testing is one thing. But I'm thinking more of battery/load compatibility. That's not something I'd expect Thales or GSYuasa to be able to do easily. One needs a relatively accurate simulation of variable frequency drives, power supplies and other stuff on the battery busses. The best place to find that is on the airplane.

This brings up some interesting philosophical points in handling development and certification testing. The 777 was developed with an "iron bird". A mockup of all the aircraft systems where compatibility issues could be researched. But that was expensive. It may have cost Mullaly his shot at CEO, but he's doing fine at Ford. As far as I know, nothing to this extent was done for the 787. Flight testing is going to be more expensive than an iron bird test.

poorjohn

8th Feb 2013, 19:46

syseng68k

8th Feb 2013, 22:24

EEngr:

This brings up some interesting philosophical points in handling development
and certification testing. The 777 was developed with an "iron bird". A mockup
of all the aircraft systems where compatibility issues could be researched.
But that was expensive.
I would think that they at least had a fully instrumented test rig in house
for the battery subsystem, including expected worst case load profiles such
as apu starting and fast charging. If they didn't, I would see that as a
serious deficiency.

There's no reason why they shouldn't use a production a/c to do this,
much as a/c such as the Concorde prototypes had strain gauges everywhere and
instrumentation racks right down the isle. It probably costs orders
of magnitude more to do design in production, rather than during development,
but with subsystem parts coming from so many suppliers, how do project
management maintain full visibility ?. For software, it's easy to show that
a single module works as expected, but very difficult once hundreds
of modules are linked together for the application. It's the same for any
complex project. Managing complexity probably has dozens of books written
about it, but do management actually read them ?.

Attention to detail and due diligence are everything. Much harder to argue
for in this world of bean counters, cost centres and hr departments, who
are often more interested in whether you ever inhaled, rather than your
passion and ability to get the job done...

lomapaseo

9th Feb 2013, 05:48

Eengr - as I mentioned in a previous post, some large aerospace companies have replaced expertise with process, so the grey-beard who ran the department, was fanatical about every detail of "his" electrical systems, and had enough clout to insist to Project that they consider the AC aspects is long gone.

And (sadly imo) "his" has become "the team's". Back in the day, we emphasized individual responsibility, tossing "a camel is a horse designed by a committee" at those who needed a poke.

I have no idea if Boeing Commercial is particularly far along that path

I believe you will find that most aerospace companies have backed themselves up with "Fellows" whose job it is to lead the technical expertise at an industry wide level and at the same time ensure that internal processes supporting the design and manufacture are world class .

I espect that Boeing's technical Fellows are playing a significant part in reviewing what processes contributed to this. I also expect that any non-propietary weaknesses in this regard will be shared among all the appropriate industry wide technical fellows.

On a similar vein the FAA also has a much smaller cadre of identified technical expertise and leadership.

The crunch in all this is that in problems like the current one, this level of review doesn't get done until there is a fire to put out.

repariit

9th Feb 2013, 06:00

The 777 was developed with an "iron bird". A mockup of all the aircraft systems where compatibility issues could be researched. Maybe the "Iron Bird" term has been expanded. On the 707 program, and maybe through the 767 program, it referred to the structural test fixture that held an airframe primary structure in place, and used hydraulic actuators to flex wings and other key elements to simulate flight operation cycles with increasing severity to determine limits where structural failures resulted. Iron Bird was an appropriate description because the fixture was made of very heavy structural steel, but the airframe was a standard production configuration. Access to the facility was controlled because as limits were reached parts could, and did, fly off the airframe under test when they reached the braking point. Systems tests were run in separate facilities.

HazelNuts39

9th Feb 2013, 08:02

repariit,

You are describing a structural test rig. The 'iron bird' is a systems test rig that is used to test moving parts such as actuators, hinges, springs, valves, cables, trolleys, etc. Only these parts are as used in the airplane, the 'iron' structure is only representative of the airplane in terms of dimensions and mass properties.

areobat

9th Feb 2013, 13:45

One potential failure mode occurred to me this morning as I was enjoying the blizzard. Perhaps the battery failures are related to pressure cycling. Since the batteries are normally sealed, each flight cycle will put a pressure differential on the cases of the individual cells. This, combined with vibration and G-forces, could result in very small, but repeated changes in the cell plate spacing/position - especially with a rectangular plate design. This could then lead to internal shorting, especially when coupled with charging errors and/or high current discharge (e.g., starting the APU). I'm sure Boeing validated the battery system for pressure changes, but perhaps it's all about the number of pressure cycles.

Lyman

9th Feb 2013, 14:00

areobat

I think you are on the right page. The CT scan shows bulging battery cases, with intact interior folds. My sense is that the cases are bulging due to thermal expansion of the contents, perhaps including some trapped gaseous electrolyte.

The prismatic shape of the batteries does of course bear on the internal stresses. To the extent that the interior stresses of folding work against a dissipation of "wear", in my opinion, the separator material is subject to abrasive forces. The application of the paste to the poly film creates a stress simply by virtue of the relative physical properties of the two materials.

Any one who has opened a water bottle at cabin altitude after launch knows the pressure differential has an effect on the clear plastic bottle, the bottle will snap and crack, audibly.

Simplistic? Most problems start just that way.

The poly separator in the batteries is twenty five microns in thickness. The standard is a minimum of ten, to a maximum of forty (microns) dependent on application, (from the industry website I posted.

These batteries have a patent failure profile, consistent with the FAA considerations, the research data, and the evidence of failures since 2006.

Including the dramatic failures which caused the Japanese safety board and FAA to ground the fleet.

bill

I don't think the problem is mysterious. The actual temperature range for suitable performance of the poly may be much more narrow than that allowed.

I've had experience with plastics in normal temps. When it gets cold, it disintegrates, when it gets hot, it loses its resilience, and expands/contracts sufficiently to destroy its "shape". Since the perforations in this application are critical, my guess is that the poly deforms, the perforations change dimension, and allow short circuiting, which greatly accelerates the deterioration, and causes the need to "replace" the unit. Feverishly replaced, as Boeing has shown.

RR_NDB

9th Feb 2013, 14:12

Hi,

The WRONG designed battery was integrated into Boeing 787 ( for two mission critical functions) by the same group that supplied the FAULTY Air speed sensors used in AF 447?

In the group website we read "mission critical" products.

Boeing could be viewed as the main responsible if bought the batteries and installed it?

donnlass

9th Feb 2013, 14:20

The WRONG designed battery was integrated into Boeing 787 ( for two mission critical functions) by the same group that supplied the FAULTY Air speed sensors used in AF 447?

I thought the sensors were blocked by ice caused by super cooled water condensing into ice and blocking the pitot tubes rather than the sensor being faulty?

Lyman

9th Feb 2013, 14:22

Sorry, RR

Here I must defend Thales. The pitot probe was certificated, and speced to the A330 by other than Thales.

Any insufficiencies belong to the people who fastened the devices to the hull, imo. The AD should have been an EAD. Captain Chris Scott has the elegant answer to the problem: The airflow at Pitot position on the A330 is different than on the A320, and that is problematic.....

The DREAM,

Here, again, Thales did everything correctly. Boeing is responsible, even though they may not be culpable.

Boeing went to great pains to certify the Batteries, including developing the actual criteria, and certification parameters.

The fly in the ointment is the process, not the player.

The FAA is the problem. They have devolved to yes men and women, who play a role, instead of a part.

What the industry needs, imo, is an independent non-governmental body, one that has the power and the expertise to protect the public, not an "in-name only" husk, that works for industry, not the public.

Speed of Sound

9th Feb 2013, 14:25

The WRONG designed battery was integrated into Boeing 787

Given that Boeing and the NTSB have moved on from the battery to the monitoring, charging and other systems around it, I'm not sure you can describe the battery as 'WRONG'.

SoS

Lyman

9th Feb 2013, 14:36

"WRONG" is for the NTSB to suggest, and the FAA to action. imo.

PAXboy

9th Feb 2013, 14:43

Only two things change what makind does: Money and Death.

Fortunately, no one has died and it is Money that is going to change this. Companies that try to save money in the early stages (of anything) usually land up paying MORE money in the later stages.

Humans don't change much. When the report on the crash of Shuttle Columbia was published, they showed that NASA had not learned some of the lessons from Shuttle Challenger 17 years before.

RR_NDB

9th Feb 2013, 14:48

Hi,

The placement of adjacent cells inside a case easily capable to start a "positive feedback mechanism" called Thermal Runaway is:

One serious ERROR.

The battery has a label Thales in it.

And there are other errors in this WRONGLY DESIGNED BATTERY.

It´s clear my position?

RR_NDB

9th Feb 2013, 14:55

Hi,

PAXboy @ # 735

Richard Feyman worked very well in this subject.

Your comment is VERY OPPORTUNE.

Lyman

9th Feb 2013, 15:05

RR

Richard Feynman. Student of John Wheeler.

"Time exists to prevent everything from happening at once...."

"Space exists to prevent everything from happening to me......"

John Wheeler

grebllaw123d

9th Feb 2013, 15:22

It has been mentioned a couple of times on one of the threads discussing the present B787 problems, that the cell (LVP65) has been approved by NASA, ESA and other bodies.

I wonder what this particular type of cell has been used for - other than being a part of the B787 battery system?
If the B787 battery is not the first user of LVP65, there must be information available about the operational experiences with this cell.

What I mean is that if this cell has a perfect service record for many years in all other applications, it is not fair to call the cell wrongly designed IMO - the battery itself is a different story.

But if it is designed especially for the B787 - OK, then it is another story!

Lyman

9th Feb 2013, 15:27

Start here?

http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/pdf/research/rflithiumionbatterieshazard.pdf

etudiant

9th Feb 2013, 16:48

The evidence of the past several decades is that Boeing has lost the recipe for managing complex engineering projects.
The problem began during the Reagan era, when Boeing won much more business than they could cope with. They were slow on some and others were terminated for the convenience of the government, but no lessons were learned. A decade later, they won a huge NRO contract for Future Imagery Architechture, to follow on to Lockheed's existing spy satellites, which they failed utterly to produce. The only hardware from this multi billion dollar disaster are some telescopes that the NRO has recently gifted to NASA.
Since then, we have had badly delayed efforts such as the Australia Wedgetail radar surveillance project and the Japanese and Italian KC versions of the 767, also many years behind schedule and low on performance.
The 787 in other words shows performance in line with recent Boeing developments. It is not an exception and quite possibly the current battery/electrical system problems are only a symptom, rather than the real problem. Boeing used to respect engineering and flourished because of it, imho. Now it is increasingly outsourcing the engineering because it respects primarily financial returns. We will see how well that works over the coming years.

EEngr

9th Feb 2013, 17:51

lomapaseo (http://www.pprune.org/members/48942-lomapaseo):

I believe you will find that most aerospace companies have backed themselves up with "Fellows" whose job it is to lead the technical expertise at an industry wide level and at the same time ensure that internal processes supporting the design and manufacture are world class .And how's that working out for them? There's only so much one can do when you get too far away from 'the trenches'.

During my time, Boeing didn't build much of the electrical systems (panels and wire bundles was about it). We did do our own certification and acceptance testing, which helped give our staff some hands on systems experience. Now, this is all gone.

Taunusflyer

9th Feb 2013, 18:02

"If the Certification process was well conducted Boeing could even be a "victim" that simply bought bad batteries?"

Who says that the batterie caused the failure? Maybe the batterie ist the victim of a big surrounding electrical installation...

syseng68k

9th Feb 2013, 22:19

RR_NDB:

Actually i myself raised the "short high current spikes" possibility. That another
engineer (Chris) called a "red herring chase".

I do remember that :hmm:

Can you refer me back to that post, so I can comment on the context ?. My position
was and still is, that the problem is fundamentally that of battery management.. Ok,
sticking neck out, but i've been pretty consistent about that all along and that the
enclosure design is deficient, for various reasons...

Lyman

9th Feb 2013, 22:23

syseng68k

I cannot recall your concern with enclosure. can you refresh? Battery case? Battery group box?

many thanks

syseng68k

9th Feb 2013, 23:00

Lyman:

Here's one:

26th January, #161, tech log

All in all, not impressed. Boards and connectors of that type should
never be located anywhere near cells and their contents...

.#164, tech log

The assumption they possibly made was that the cells are sealed, but they
are not. With age, vibration and pressure changes from internal heating &
cooling, they will leak vapour which will accumulate within the enclosure.
Vapour meets electroncis = corrosion and it wouldn't need much deposited
on the pcb to cause measurement error in sensitive analog electronics.

I was going to make some comment about consumer electronics quality in a
billion $ a/c project, but I suppose i'd better not http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/worry.gif...

Probably find more with a search...

lomapaseo

9th Feb 2013, 23:37

EEengr

And how's that working out for them? There's only so much one can do when you get too far away from 'the trenches'.

During my time, Boeing didn't build much of the electrical systems (panels and wire bundles was about it). We did do our own certification and acceptance testing, which helped give our staff some hands on systems experience. Now, this is all gone.

Typically Technical Fellows report to a Sr Vp level. So I imagine that once they assess their short commings in all this they can effect some changes immediately in the process gaps. Nothing would stop them from auditing anything that they feel contributed including vendor performance. (financial contracts not included)

syseng68k

9th Feb 2013, 23:42

Lyman:

Sorry, have been posting to tech log and r&n and didn't make a note of which it
was posted in. Try tech log...

fdr

10th Feb 2013, 03:09

Allusions to black holes or Feynmans QED appears to be somewhat highbrow for the level of problem the B787 has at present. The hi tech battery/electronics have some problems... this is more a Homer Simpson "D'oh!" moment I would have thought, as far as program risk management goes. One assumes that given their time again, there would be some changes in how and what they decide to add as bleeding edge technology.

The assumption of responsibility of the FAA in the present condition is not consistent with their obligations; the regulator merely determines that the compliance basis of the manufacturer has been proved at the time of certification, to the agreed basis of certification. If the manufacturer has a problem thereafter but complied appropriately with the process, then it is a defect to be dealt with accordingly by manufacturer and regulatory process of continued airworthiness. The FAA ACO is obviously aware of the commercial sensitivity of the current situation, but it is not of their making, they didn't force the manufacturer to apply new technology. The special conditions that apply to the battery were reasonable and at the time of determination, the evidence would (or should) have pointed to the compliance with the intent of the regulations.

Lyman

10th Feb 2013, 03:24

fdr This is more germane

Air Safety Group Urged Tougher Battery Tests - WSJ.com (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323644904578268280356405680.html)

Boeing Proposes 787 Battery Redesign - WSJ.com (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323452204578288020674930066.html)

so far, a new "case", firmer mount, and separation cell to cell......

fdr

10th Feb 2013, 07:52

Lyman... the prior advice to TBC/FAA if corroborated, should have some people reflecting on the efficacy of their SMS programs. Without that advice, the situation is just poor project risk management, with the advice it looks more like expediency with a tinge of hubris.

Germaine?:)

Gill from Aircraft Spruce (http://www.aircraftspruce.com/menus/el/batteries_0gill.html)

:E

Lyman

10th Feb 2013, 13:24

The standard set by the FAA for this safety critical event is one occurrence in one Billion flight hours. IOW not even once in the life of the fleet.

Boeing negotiated a lower threshold, one in ten million flgiht hours. A reduction in standard of 100:1.

There have been two occurrences in less than one hundred thousand Flight Hours. A further reduction in threshold of 100:1.

Twice.

From Boeing:

Quote:
“We are working collaboratively to address questions about our testing and compliance with certification standards,” the statement said. “We will not hesitate to make changes that lead to improved testing processes and products.”

This translates to a continuation of Boeing making the rules. Boeing still wants to drive.

See, the regulator is FAA. FAA is the problem. In allowing the process to deteriorate, in the first place, and in staying mum while Boeing explains "the way it's going to be..." J

Self certification and writing the rules for the FAA to endorse? Maybe the FAA could be "redesigned" ?

And so far, it's just the back up batteries.

PJ2

10th Feb 2013, 15:51

the prior advice to TBC/FAA if corroborated, should have some people reflecting on the efficacy of their SMS programs.
Precisely.

Lyman

10th Feb 2013, 16:02

Quote:
Originally Posted by fdr
the prior advice to TBC/FAA if corroborated, should have some people reflecting on the efficacy of their SMS programs.

And a closer look at the RTCA criteria, I should think. With an eye toward incorporating them in toto.

RR_NDB

10th Feb 2013, 17:17

Hi,

Why NTSB, JTSB didn´t mention cell voltages?

The comments on "no overcharging" because 32 V limit was observed is almost irrelevant. Battery destruction could start due a cell failure. It´s voltage shows it.

Question:

Considering FDR are designed to allow investigators fully understand WHAT and WHY, should FDR access inside black boxes like batteries (looking to ea. cell)?

FDR, specially in teething phase of a new airliner would "benefit" to record some information coming from important sensors? (raw data from AoA vanes, Pitot´s etc.)

New technologies are constantly being introduced in airliners. Current FDR approach to look "outside" of boxes is enough for allow a conclusive investigation?

EEngr

10th Feb 2013, 17:39

RR_NDB:

FDR, specially in teething phase of a new airliner would "benefit" to record some information coming from important sensors? (raw data from AoA vanes, Pitot´s etc.)Two problems: First, think about the volume of raw data that could be collected from the internals of each subsystem. The FDR architecture would have to be revised significantly. And since that is a certified part of a production aircraft, backing down to the 'standard capability' FDR would require recertification.

Second: The internal charger/battery data is taken from the same sensors that drive the charge controllers. So if these are faulty, so too is the recorded data. Faulty data might tell investigators something. An anomalous zero cell voltage reading may indicate a broken sense lead for example. But at what point do we stop incorporating redundant sensors into systems just to satisfy these enhanced FDR requirements?

This is what certification test instrumentation is for. Redundant and separate from the systems under test. There just isn't much room left on an aircraft instrumented to this degree for SLF.

Lyman

10th Feb 2013, 17:42

RR

You don't get it. BOEING "demonstrated" that a single cell failure would not "propagate" to adjacent cells, and cause a fire.

The FAA was satisfied that that was the case.

Why should they bother to install a system to protect from something they showed could not happen?

Having failed to predict the problem, they should be relieved of the duty to rejig the tests and certs, and the RTCA requirements should obtain.

Once "burned", twice shy.....

OK?

RR_NDB

10th Feb 2013, 18:11

Hi,

EEngr (http://www.pprune.org/members/348127-eengr):

First, think about the volume of raw data that could be collected from the internals of each subsystem. The FDR architecture would have to be revised significantly. And since that is a certified part of a production aircraft, backing down to the 'standard capability' FDR would require recertification.
(http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/505455-faa-grounds-787s-39.html#post7687269)

Carefully selected TEST POINTS. E.g. Pitot´s, AoA vanes, cell voltages, etc. Limited data. Optimized by "caching" more data inside important boxes. Actually this is being done (QAR) (http://www.google.com.br/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=qar%20aircraft%20recorder&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CDYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FQuick_access_reco rder&ei=5-0XUc_COZLk8gS7oYH4Cw&usg=AFQjCNG87cLfGwsAisXtlanens4iy27JfQ&bvm=bv.42080656,d.eWU). (for other purposes)

Second: The internal charger/battery data is taken from the same sensors that drive the charge controllers. So if these are faulty, so too is the recorded data. Faulty data might tell investigators something. An anomalous zero cell voltage reading may indicate a broken sense lead for example. But at what point do we stop incorporating redundant sensors into systems just to satisfy these enhanced FDR requirements?It´s VERY EASY to have a NEAR PERFECTION probing for all cells inside a Li ion batt case. LOW COST!

If this info were recorded NTSB and JTSB VERY PROBABLY long ago reported WHY both batteries (JAL and ANA) failed.

How many bits/bytes for this? Easy to have ALL REQUIRED info on cell voltage in less than 1MB. Yes! ~ 8 M bits. I could reduce, if necessary further.

PS

Cache inside batt case operating like a CVR. If crash, stops recording and make available it to aircraft FDR. Redundantly stored in cache AND FDR.