787 review called for [Archive]

LiveryMan

11th Jan 2013, 14:35

I wonder if any of these issues could have something to do with the aircraft being in long term storage before delivery? Weren't the first 30 or so frames completed and stored in Seattle pending certification? Could such storage perhaps have had some adverse effects on the failing components?

EDIT:

Just saw this:

Press Release – FAA Will Review Boeing 787 Design and Production (http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=14213)

Press Release – FAA Will Review Boeing 787 Design and Production

WASHINGTON – In light of a series of recent events, the FAA will conduct a comprehensive review of the Boeing 787 critical systems, including the design, manufacture and assembly. The purpose of the review is to validate the work conducted during the certification process and further ensure that the aircraft meets the FAA’s high level of safety.

“The safety of the traveling public is our top priority,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “This review will help us look at the root causes and do everything we can to safeguard against similar events in the future.”

A team of FAA and Boeing engineers and inspectors will conduct this joint review, with an emphasis on the aircraft’s electrical power and distribution system. The review will also examine how the electrical and mechanical systems interact with each other.

“We are confident that the aircraft is safe. But we need to have a complete understanding of what is happening," said FAA Administrator Michael P. Huerta. "We are conducting the review to further ensure that the aircraft meets our high safety standards.”

The review will be structured to provide a broader view of design, manufacturing and assembly and will not focus exclusively on individual events. The review is expected to begin in Seattle, but may expand to other locations over the course of several months.

FAA technical experts logged 200,000 hours of work during the 787 type certification and flew on numerous test flights. The FAA reviews 787 in-service events as part of our continued operational safety process.

United Airlines is currently the only U.S. airline operating the 787, with six airplanes in service. The worldwide in-service fleet includes 50 aircraft.

FlightPathOBN

11th Jan 2013, 15:14

They were, and still are, racked up on virtually every space they had at the Boeing Everett Plant. Since the shells were not heated, it seemed there was a condensation issue...you could hear the dripping sound..
http://operationsbasednavigation.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/ScreenHunter_07-Jan.-11-07.57-e1357920973860.jpg

Looking at the cabling in the NTSB image, something appears odd. Not sure if the cabling in the upper left is data or power, but I believe power is supposed to be contained within 6 inches of a connection (like the cabling shown in the far background)

The exposed cabling that runs through the posts, just seems really odd...

I would think that the fire suppression system would always be armed, and it would be interesting to see if there were any recorded alarms from the incident.

Lyman

11th Jan 2013, 15:25

For anyone who would like a translation from doublespeak:

“We are confident that the aircraft is safe. But we need to have a complete understanding of what is happening," said FAA Administrator Michael P. Huerta. "We are conducting the review to further ensure that the aircraft meets our high safety standards.”

"We are convinced the aircraft is safe, we'd like to know why"

Chris Scott

11th Jan 2013, 15:27

Quote from the FAA:
"The purpose of the review is to validate the work conducted during the certification process and further ensure that the aircraft meets the FAA’s high level of safety."

Extraordinary. A statement more worthy of a political spin doctor than an aviation safety regulator, responsible for certification.

"FAA technical experts logged 200,000 hours of work during the 787 type certification and flew on numerous test flights."

So, will heads roll? Or have they already...

(Perhaps I should add that I know little more of the 787 than that it has two wings and a tail, but have always believed that the Americans make airplanes second to none.)

Lyman

11th Jan 2013, 15:36

Perhaps the single most troubling artifact of politics' invasion of engineering.

Without evidence, (of a mitigating fix), keep your traps shut.....I don't know whether to be relieved or further troubled that both Boeing and the FAA are working together...

Who wrote the public interface book these spokespeople are referring to?

Nixon? Clinton?

EEngr

11th Jan 2013, 16:00

Its interesting that the authorities are going back to the certification process to look for faults. Some of these problems sound like QA issues (fuel lines not properly installed, etc.). On the other hand, if these are issues with design, the "787 type certification", that could be serious.

There are design issues that do crop up in the manufacturing process. The design looks good in analysis and in testing, but it just can't be replicated in manufacturing reliably. That would call into question the whole "design team" philosophy Boeing advertised, where members of manufacturing sat in on preliminary design meetings to identify those that were unproducable. It may turn out that these were exercises in getting manufacturing to keep quiet about bad engineering once it hit the shop floor. And they (mfg) didn't buy in. I saw quite a few instances of that when I did my time at Boeing.

The other "type certification" issue is that Boeing doesn't own much of the design process anymore. Some of these problems might be chased back to Boeing's partners. And if the system requirements and contract language were not written without loopholes, the required changes will cost Boeing a bundle of money. That will get some push back from Boeing as not "encouraging aerospace trave", one of the FAA's roles.

Lyman

11th Jan 2013, 16:30

If the FAA is to "encourage aerospace travel" and provide for the highest level of safety, we have the problem to hand, and it is not pretty....

The salesman also oversees safety? Hello?

Part of the globalisation of aero construction (design?), other than fracturing single site assembly, is to dilute and diminish ultimate responsibility, and not just the financials.

The definition of good design is to simplify to the point nothing is left that is not crucial. Scattering critical task at the altar of "sharing" is risky, if not downright dangerous......the incest of discrete disciplines is the problem.

This applies to the blending of newish technology with "marketing"....to include manufacture, oversight, and reliability (safety).

falconer1

11th Jan 2013, 17:36

THAT safety review will be all politics...

however the new FAA top indian, the DOT boss and last but not least the Boeing CEO are taking some risk...

if only one 787 should experience some "china syndrome" event in flight with one of those Li Ion batts, they will all be toast...

dont know whether that causes them to lose any sleep...

it better should...

dont get me wrong, I like the concept of the 787...it will ultimately become a great airplane...however, to "spice" that baby up with Li Ions as main batts was a big mistake from Boeing's side..

and OK, the CJ 4 ( C525C) is "only" a part 23 airplane, but also had "special conditions" by the FAA for that Li Ion Main Batt...but when Cessna's own demo bird went up in flames in their hangar in ICT the bird was effectively grounded by Cessna and the FAA until having been retrofitted with conventional batts..

sure that may not be so easy on the 787 as the performance of those Li Ion batts seems to have been incorporated into the design already at a very early stage..

but at the end of the day, makes no difference...Li Ions are neither ready nor mature yet for air transport from a safety point of view...it's as simple as that at the end of the day

fotoguzzi

11th Jan 2013, 19:39

[Not a pilot--ignore or delete as necessary] My question is what did Boeing have to do to get this approved for production? It's not as if they built the plane and smuggled an illicit battery aboard. If the battery was not defective or installed incorrectly, is it likely that a major failure scenario would have been missed by the engineers/designers under intense scrutiny by aviation authorities? [Later: Sincere thanks to aterpster and EEng. Sounds like, "We'll back you all the way--until you screw up!"]

BOAC

11th Jan 2013, 19:58

Can someone help me here please! I seem to recall that L-ION batteries were limited to ??400gm?? for carriage by air under IATA DG regs. What has changed to make these safe?

EEngr

11th Jan 2013, 20:42

fotoguzzi (http://www.pprune.org/members/287624-fotoguzzi); Often, a company such as Boeing will have some key engineering personnel known as DERs (Designated Engineering Representatives) who approve or recommend for approval designs to the FAA. (see: Designees & Delegations - Designated Engineering Representative (DER) (http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/designees_delegations/designee_types/der/)).

There is some controversy regarding the over reliance that the FAA has on the work product of these DERs. Boeing clearly didn't 'sneak' a LiON battery onto the 787. They requested an exemption to current rules restricting the use of this battery technology onboard aircraft. So now the questions are: Did Boeing (or more accurately Boeing's subcontractor) consider all of the environmental factors and conditions of use placed on the battery when doing its testing and analysis? And did the FAA miss anythging when reviewing the DER's work product?

Often times, Boeing, or some systems subcontractor will define the conditions under which a component will operate and request that the component be designed and tested to those conditions. But due to a lack of understanding of systems integration considerations, those conditions may be poorly defined. The component will pass tests under the specified conditions. But some aspects of its use may push it beyond its design limitations.

Given that there are several layers between the component suppliers, systems contractors and Boeing, the finger pointing may soon commence.

FlightPathOBN

11th Jan 2013, 22:15

Here in Boeing land, its getting kindof ugly...

The FAA is said to review the design, manufacture, and certification of the 787 Firebird.

That is not a vote of confidence for either group, Boeing nor the FAA.

My opinion, just as the aircraft cert parameters have little correlation to real ops...perhaps the battery specs are as well...
remember, meeting certification is the bare minimum between legal and illegal.

Look at the size of that battery compartment and the battery itself...very high load demand for that size..with little apparent cooling.

Li batteries rely on shielding of each cell, and a perfect balance between each cell..to avoid runaway...

note that cars with Li cells are immersed in a cooling agent that is circulated

Put some temperature monitors on the other 787's in operation...

aterpster

12th Jan 2013, 01:07

[Not a pilot--ignore or delete as necessary] My question is what did Boeing have to do to get this approved for production? It's not as if they built the plane and smuggled an illicit battery aboard. If the battery was not defective or installed incorrectly, is it likely that a major failure scenario would have been missed by the engineers/designers under intense scrutiny by aviation authorities?

The FAA simply does not have the technical competence nor staff to certify a complex Part 25 bird. In the case of Boeing birds, Boeing self-certifies under the cloak of government certification.

Same thing happens in France. (and elsewhere.)

FlightPathOBN

12th Jan 2013, 01:30

terpster...

Concur with your assessment...

The FAA has gone down the path of facilitating self certification..

In reality...the regulators are 'validating' the validity of the submission to them..

It is NOT the mission of any regulatory agency to approve, therefore assume liability for the aircraft....

It is only the regulators duty to approve what was submitted to meet the minimum requirements, and it is NOT the regulators scope to design by regulations, how the system meets the criteria...

A significant disconnect in my view..

Lyman

12th Jan 2013, 01:44

Neither is it the purview of the regulator to bless any design as "safe"....

That is a subjective, and purely political, "favor"

EEngr

12th Jan 2013, 03:12

Put some temperature monitors on the other 787's in operation...Yeah. But what that will tell you is the behavior of a battery under normal conditions. A proper certification test would consider starting an APU under worst conditions: Bearings near end of life, igniters gummed up, worst possible atmospheric conditions for starting, etc.

That's the way we used to do this kind of stuff when I got to burn parts up in the lab. :E

glad rag

12th Jan 2013, 06:11

Have there been any changes to the FAA [broadly speaking] since the original certification process for the 787 was completed?

Sunnyjohn

12th Jan 2013, 11:11

This is a state of the art aircraft with a huge number of innovations, including the use of composite materials, so there are bound to be teething troubles. Boeing and the US government had a big vested interest in getting this aircraft out and there must come a time when they have to say 'Just get it out there and we'll sort out the clitches as they arise'. The point where the manufacturer has to jump is a fine one and in any case is governed by commercial and politicalpressures. Watch this space . . .

aterpster

12th Jan 2013, 13:00

glad rag:

Have there been any changes to the FAA [broadly speaking] since the original certification process for the 787 was completed?

Randy Babbitt was replaced as the Administrator. His assistant became acting administrator and was recently confirmed by Congress as the permanent Administrator. He probably had to pass muster with the power brokers at Boeing to obtain is confirmation by Congress.

PAXboy

13th Jan 2013, 01:30

EEngrThat would call into question the whole "design team" philosophy Boeing advertised, where members of manufacturing sat in on preliminary design meetings to identify those that were unproducable.Forgive my innocence but - surely ANY company designing a complex device has manufacturing involved from Day 1?

Since Boeing have been doing this for a few years now, they know the way to get departments pulling together. Unless, of course, they have got carried away by some new fangled mgmt speak guru and trend in ways to save money - on paper.

It's just that, being an old bloke who has been around the block before, I have seen a few reinventions of the wheel that were found not to be quite as good as was originally stated.

barit1

13th Jan 2013, 02:01

PAXboy:... I have seen a few reinventions of the wheel that were found not to be quite as good as was originally stated.

Sometimes the corporate memory forgets aspects of what made the old design a success, and omits a vital detail in a new design. I've seen this happen in a 1980s prop design that overlooked vital details from a 1930s prop.

OTOH, sometimes a good idea gets poorly implemented, and the chosen corrective action is to revert to an old but proven design, and the Brand X "corporate memory" is to never make that mistake & try that new idea again. Until:

1) The boss retires or is replaced, and new decision-makers derive a newer successful design - or

2) the Brand Y competitor beats them to a successful implementation, possibly putting Brand X out of business.

Squawk-7600

13th Jan 2013, 02:18

Quite right, look at the number of "Rocket Science 101" mistakes NASA has made over the years! :ugh: You'd think they couldn't possibly make such a basic mistake, let alone have it get through to a mission state; then yet another mission goes crashing into a planet ... or doesn't fit ... or can't see ... or ....

The bottom line is, don't believe that just because projects have been successful in the past, that fact will necessarily make another project successful in the future.

woodja51

13th Jan 2013, 03:41

“The safety of the traveling public is our top priority,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “This review will help us look at the root causes and do everything we can to safeguard against similar events in the future.”

Sooooo....if this is the FAA s priority, why have they not fixed/ mandated locking of the access to the E/E bay from the pax compartment in all Boeings of 767 or larger size including 787? Now is a chance to do so...private video below to demonstrate...

Go to

Youtube

See if you think LiIon batteries are as much of a risk as what is depicted in the video and email me your thoughts so I can push regulation to fix it ... Or 9/11 is repeatable ...IMHO.

Lyman

13th Jan 2013, 04:13

“The safety of the traveling public is our top priority,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “This review will help us look at the root causes and do everything we can to safeguard against similar events in the future.”

Says in wiki that Mr. Lahood is a Republican politician from Illinois.
Majored in education and sociology.

So we are extremely humbled and comforted that a politician appointee places safety ahead of whatever is in second place.....

Better to keep quiet and be thought a fool..... I await the day a politician actually Defers to those with expertise. Like Mike Sinnett, or any engineer from Boeing....

There are many things that need to be changed in the new connected world, perhaps a new effort at discretion in public discourse.

Temp Spike

13th Jan 2013, 06:59

A little faith in man and machine might serve you better Lyman.

Rail Engineer

13th Jan 2013, 08:21

Sometimes the corporate memory forgets aspects of what made the old design a
success, and omits a vital detail in a new design. I've seen this happen in a
1980s prop design that overlooked vital details from a 1930s prop.

OTOH,
sometimes a good idea gets poorly implemented, and the chosen corrective action
is to revert to an old but proven design, and the Brand X "corporate memory" is
to never make that mistake & try that new idea again. Until:

1) The
boss retires or is replaced, and new decision-makers derive a newer successful
design - or

2) the Brand Y competitor beats them to a successful
implementation, possibly putting Brand X out of business.

They say Industry generally has a corporate memory of about 15 years before it has to start the process of relearning the hard way again.

I can thoroughly recommend Trevor Kleitz's book "Lessons from Disasters" which looks at this in the Chemical and process industries.

Lessons from Disaster: How Organisations Have No Memory And Accidents Recur - Trevor A. Kletz - Google Books (http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=bnvLyTcwDE0C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false)

RR_NDB

15th Jan 2013, 03:18

EEngr

That would call into question the whole "design team" philosophy Boeing advertised, where members of manufacturing sat in on preliminary design meetings to identify those that were unproducable. It may turn out that these were exercises in getting manufacturing to keep quiet about bad engineering once it hit the shop floor. And they (mfg) didn't buy in. (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/504995-787-review-called.html#post7624704)

32 years ago i learned at HP in Palo Alto on the Troika:

Representatives of R&D, manufacturing and marketing with project managers each 10 ~15 days in meetings for every product. (a true feedback system)

I consider a risk a product to be developed 'open loop". A good one must be developed in this "safe" environment.

RR_NDB

15th Jan 2013, 03:45

EEngr

A proper certification test would consider starting an APU under worst conditions: Bearings near end of life, igniters gummed up, worst possible atmospheric conditions for starting, etc. (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/504995-787-review-called.html#post7625671)

Certification of an A/C is not the way to verify items like a battery of this type.

Just a curiosity:

I disassembled several laptop and cell phone lithium battery packs. They have a quite complex protection scheme with some temperature and ea. cell voltage monitoring. It seems mandatory a much more complex system when using lithium batteries in aviation. The recharger/load limiter should be designed "integrated" (in design) with the pack. This is critical to the battery reliability.

I remember my surprise when first found "complex circuitry with microprocessors, etc." inside a video camera we was using in skydiving. This was in 1998.

And i remember when in University read a russian book on batteries. They seemed far more complex than what i was studying like Theory of Circuits in Millman Taub books like. Batteries of today are fantastic but she are dangerous and complex. And can present surprises. (Like the women. :})

Some points i covered in an earlier post. (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/504572-another-787-electrical-smoke-incident-ground-10.html#post7631063)

RR_NDB

15th Jan 2013, 03:54

Bear,

“This review will help us look at the root causes and do everything we can to safeguard against similar events in the future.”

(http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/504995-787-review-called-2.html#post7627424)

We may never learn what caused this incident.

perhaps a new effort at discretion in public discourse.

:}

RR_NDB

15th Jan 2013, 03:59

barit1:

1) The boss retires or is replaced, and new decision-makers derive a newer successful design - or

2) the Brand Y competitor beats them to a successful implementation, possibly putting Brand X out of business.

I.e. the "feedback system" works in the long term correcting what could be avoided since the beginning.

:} :sad:

criss

15th Jan 2013, 09:49