" FAA concerned about increase in manual handling errors"

[Armchairflyer]

News: FAA concerned about increase in manual handling errors (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=45bee59c&opt=0)

Good approach IMHO, no fancy "heroic" stuff, just practising manual flying in everyday operations when it's safe to do so.

[Croozin]

Good approach IMHO, no fancy "heroic" stuff, just practising manual flying in everyday operations when it's safe to do so. Strictly forbidden by my last employer.

[Capn Bloggs]

I'm not practising, I'm "exercising my manual flying skills". I like it. :ok:

[DozyWannabe]

Strictly forbidden by my last employer.

Therein lies the rub, folks. Unless regulators are willing to compel airlines to do this, then it's all just fancy words.

[grounded27]

Good approach IMHO, no fancy "heroic" stuff, just practicing manual flying in everyday operations when it's safe to do so.

Really??? when it's safe to do so. At any moment sir you should have competent control of your aircraft under manual operation.

What disgusts me is that it is so clear that aircraft manufacturers have been allowed to cater to liability free operation through the sale of automation. They also sell aircraft that require less maintenance to maintain automation at what I feel is a lesser standard leaving the operator with more responsibility and less help.

From the pilots aspect the above is clear. From the mechanical as an aircraft ages it degrades and support for troubleshooting degrades with it as they wan the aircraft to become less reliable forcing a new aircraft purchase to bring the numbers up.

Damn, I am ranting again. Suppose I miss the classics.

[Capn Bloggs]

Grounded27, please exhibit a bit of balance. We do not shut down engines at V1 on revenue flights so that I can maximise my manual flying skills. For the same reason it is unwise to handfly when safety is significantly degraded eg high-traffic, bad weather scenarios.

That said, there are many, many situations where valuable and meaningful manual flying can be conducted quite safely. That was the point Armchairflyer was making.

[Gretchenfrage]

The FAA identified “an increase in manual handling errors”.

Well congratulations! Hasn’t this been endlessly reported by older pilots for years now? It’s just that if the regulator allowed the operators to subdue such internal reports and itself didn’t want to listen to these voices for ages. It would have meant a) work and b) hurt some buddies in management of the airlines.

The FAA suggests “maintaining and improving the knowledge and skills for manual flight”.

Well congratulations again! At the same time the regulators approve such a stupid syllabus as the MCC. A blatant contradiction exposing this new article as hollow speech. You cannot maintain what has not been learnt! At the same time you cannot improve where there was no basic ground work, and installing the basics should definitely not be done on line.

The FAA “recommends to all operators to take an integrated approach by incorporating emphasis on manual flight operations into both line and flight training”.

That’s a start. However, a regulator should not only “recommend”, knowing quite well that the holy beancounters in operations just laugh at recommendations. They should “oblige” airlines to write such emphasis into their OMA, otherwise it simply stays hollow speech.
But the regulator shoud definitely make a higher basic skill mandatory for any commercial licence. Minimal flight hours with well defined training, like i.e. a minimum of aerobatics, and then finally scrap hoax syllabi like the MCC for heaven’s sake!

I would wish that the FOs joining airlines had a much higher proficiency. I am sometimes in complete disarray when I see a set of almost panicking eyes to my right, when I propose a visual into a beautiful island airport with severe cavok threatening for the next few days. They only come back to normal life when you take controls for a few moments to allow them to set up the FMS for a 5 mile parallel downwind leading into a 10 mile final and the ILS underlying as back-up.

Please FAA, either do it right or don’t elaborate on the subject at all.
The actual approach is simply a fig leaf to pretend doing something.:ugh:

[DA50driver]

The FAA has never subscribed to the MCC load of crap. That was a European thing. The FAA increased the minimum to be a co-pilot to 1500 hours. I would rather have a 1500 hour banner tower than a 250 hour MCC pilot next to me.

[Armchairflyer]

My humble point was indeed that simply focusing on everyday practice in the daily work environment instead of more fancy settings seems like a useful and realistic approach to me. Of course one can ask for top-gun line pilots who (after grueling selection and hypertough training) could safely pick up handkerchiefs with their wingtip (inverted in case of good weather), hand-fly a CAT III approach in a snowstorm on one engine and standby instrumens, and ace the most challenging sim exercises blindfolded, one-handed, and with ping-pong balls thrown at them while the check pilot belts out "You’ve lost that lovin’ feelin’". But somehow I feel that concentrating on just being at ease with normal manual flying in day-to-day operations whenever the situation permits without nibbling away at any safety margins is the more promising approach.

Of course, a bit more impetus in this direction (as Gretchenfrage put it: "oblige" instead of "recommend") might indeed be necessary to realize any potential benefits, otherwise it will partly remain "strictly forbidden" in favor of bottom line and bonuses for the company's next quarterly report.

[Gretchenfrage]

The FAA has never subscribed to the MCC load of crap. That was a European thing. The FAA increased the minimum to be a co-pilot to 1500 hours. I would rather have a 1500 hour banner tower than a 250 hour MCC pilot next to me.

My mistake, sorry FAA.

How about banning MCC pilots from flying into the USA?
There are blacklisted airlines, so the same could apply to inadequately trained pilots.

[DozyWannabe]

What disgusts me is that it is so clear that aircraft manufacturers have been allowed to cater to liability free operation through the sale of automation. They also sell aircraft that require less maintenance to maintain automation at what I feel is a lesser standard leaving the operator with more responsibility and less help.

Playing devil's advocate, the manufacturers are only giving the operators what they asked for. Each phase of automation from the early gyro units to the modern FMS autopilots has statistically improved safety and reliability, so the operators asked for more with each generation. That the operators didn't take into account the need for pilot training to increase as more time was spent in George's hands is largely on them. This process was exacerbated by a shift in management experience - as the old guard, who were usually in aviation all their careers, retired and were replaced by people who were straight out of the MBA school.

[fireflybob]

The FAA requiring 1500 hours to be FO is a sledgehammer to crack a nut!

In a well regulated environment 250 hour cadets can and often are just as competent as anyone else.

Extra hours in the logbook is useful but it's not the only parameter that counts.

[RAT 5]

250 cadets in a B738 after a thorough training are fine. What scares me are 3000hr captains who have also been through the same robotic trained monkey training scheme and nothing else. The basic course for cadets is procedures, procedures and more procedures. Flying and thinking and making decisions outside SIP's is not included. I'm not sure how much of that is included in the command course either. It's the future of cockpit experience that concerns me more than the present. Unfortunately the future is always built on the present.

[I Just Drive]

Rat 5 is right, a 3000 hr Captain can get there having never gone around, never landed in a dark and stormy night onto a short slippery runway, never had an autopilot kick out because it can't cope, never had an FO put the wrong rudder in at 20 feet. You can only hope that they gain that experience slowly before they are tested on it quickly.

[alf5071h]

The FAA safety message is somewhat illogical. The need to address manual handling errors is based on an analysis of normal operations, incidents, and accidents. Yet errors are to be expected; it is the severity of the outcome and underlying cause which demands action. No such reasoning is stated in the SAFO.

Incidents and accidents receive most attention as generally the outcome of ‘error’ in these was more severe (consequential) than in normal operations. Yet a cursory review of ‘handling’ incidents / accidents shows a range of situations; many involved system failures or abnormal operations, and many with adequately trained and experience crews. There were some self-inflicted incidents/accidents, but these and the ‘failures’ all have a common theme relating to understanding the situation (including weather and workload); either in failing to avoid hazardous conditions, failure to appreciate the situation or previous error, or failure to choose or act on a safe course of action.

Requiring pilots to have more manual flight time may help maintain professional standards, but will it address the needs relating to the ‘manual handling errors’. Are we expecting plots to make errors so to practice recovery from the error?
Manual flight is unlikely to be conducted in adverse weather or involving high workload, or with systems failures; and obscure situational factors resulting in accidents are unlikely to be encountered. There is little evidence that crews could not have avoided or recovered from adverse situations (with existing manual flying skills) if the situation had been understood or there was a timely choice of action.

If the dominant issue is in understanding the situation, then perhaps there should be specific training targeting this issue. Manual instrument flight could help, as would wider experience of non-normal operations, e.g. go around. But even non-normal operations require good situational understanding and an apt decision to choose the manoeuvre; the skill to accomplish safe flight is secondary to awareness and choice of action; no evidence of absence of skill is provided.

The FAA has made a case for manual flight without presenting a justified basis. The interpretations in implementing the recommendations may be as wide as the range of views in this thread – but which will address the safety issue; there is a safety issue, but at which end of the elephant is it?

[Croozin]

I would wish that the FOs joining airlines had a much higher proficiency. I am sometimes in complete disarray when I see a set of almost panicking eyes to my right, when I propose a visual into a beautiful island airport with severe cavok threatening for the next few days. They only come back to normal life when you take controls for a few moments to allow them to set up the FMS for a 5 mile parallel downwind leading into a 10 mile final and the ILS underlying as back-up. Amen to that. Times were that a visual approach was a relaxation of stress levels and a bit of a buzz, even fun, for all concerned. In my latter years on the line, I saw - with some surprise at first, but then with increasing alarm - that for most FOs, far from being fun, (even with the Old Fart as PF), a visual approach was an expediential INCREASE in stress levels.

I made so bold as to fly an ILS manually (before such 'high risk behaviour' was banned by my company) with a reported cloud base of 700'. (Before someone screams 'you shouldn't have done that in such conditions' - Colombo, no other traffic, good and trustworthy ATC and Met reporting.) My (Brit) FO was damn near squirming out of his seat before - I'm sure, to his utter surprise - the bloody runway appeared, right where it was expected, in the windscreen at 699'.

I have friends of my own (old) age who will argue that maximum use of automation at all times is the only way to go, but I think they're missing the point. If it's CAVOK and the traffic is light, manual flying should not just be permitted, it should be encouraged.

When it was allowed, I used to make myself do at least one raw data, no auto throttle approach a month. In my experience, those who did this didn't need to, while the opposite applied, almost without exception, to those who didn't.

It might happen just once in a forty year career - but it only takes once - when the automatics let you down. Every pilot owes it to himself to have developed - and maintained - the skills that will allow him to cope with that highly unusual situation.

[Phantom Driver]

Sofaman;

My humble point was indeed that simply focusing on everyday practice in the
daily work environment instead of more fancy settings seems like a useful and
realistic approach to me. Of course one can ask for top-gun line pilots who
(after grueling selection and hypertough training) could safely pick up
handkerchiefs with their wingtip (inverted in case of good weather), hand-fly a
CAT III approach in a snowstorm on one engine and standby instrumens, and ace
the most challenging sim exercises blindfolded, one-handed, and with ping-pong
balls thrown at them while the check pilot belts out "You’ve lost that lovin’
feelin’". But somehow I feel that concentrating on just being at ease with
normal manual flying in day-to-day operations whenever the situation permits
without nibbling away at any safety margins is the more promising approach

Nicely put. Just that "whenever the situation permits" is less and less an option these days. We're not flying DC 3's anymore. This is the era of RNP/RVSM/ Crowded ATC/Low cost carriers filling the skies. Manual flying, as we used to know it, is no longer feasible, especially for long haul operators; Just invites you to the office for tea and biccys for some violation or other, be it company ops or ATC.

Like it or not, we are in the autopilot era, and so be it. However, I do wholeheartedly agree that manual flying skills need to be reinforced. I have preached ad nauseam on this forum that this should be done in the sim and not on day to day line ops. However, sim training these days seems to focus on LOFT exercises.

Jeez, on one LPC. we spent 1 hour doing low vis taxi around AMS followed by full de-ice procedures before getting airborne! What a waste of sim time. This sort of stuff should be reserved for the MFTD. Full flight sim time should involve more raw data manual flying business; that's where you find out if guy's still have the "Right Stuff", but then, in many companys that may not be politically correct or accepatable (too many failures?)

So automation continues to rule, 24/7. That is modern day Aviation Life.

[sevenstrokeroll]

oh come on...if you are in a wx condition (other than low visibility autoland or similiar), you better damn well be able to hand fly...even an autoland may require you to manually go around or take HAND action of some sort.

I've hand flown to minimums on approaches...I've hand flown in turbulence, I've hand flown at max authorized altitude (remember when that was called ''service ceiling"?) and I wouldn't be worthy of the name PILOT unless I could do it.

what the freaking thing is wrong now a days.

[bubbers44]

Autopilots were a luxury for my first three thousand so rarely available for minimums approaches. We didn't need them because we all could hand fly well. I don't think we should now say we only need programmers, not real pilots to fly airliners. A 15 year old kid can push buttons better than most of us.

AF 447 is one example of losing or never having hand flying skills. I hope with the new FAA rules the US will not go down this slide. Sometimes automation fails, now you need a real pilot.

[Prober]

How right Croozin is (#16). In many cases it never happens and the nearer retirement looms, the more one hopes it never does. I had the misfortune to experience an engine failure followed by an APU glitch causing total screen loss and thus a single engine NPA on stand-by instruments – and a G/A just for good measure. My previous 8k or so hours had been on a steam driven (albeit high performance) aircraft which involved a great deal of hand flying, so it was no big deal. I was able to take a glance at the right hand seat and was rather disturbed to see a certain degree of – “disengagement?” and fear that this is the future. If hand flying is actively discouraged (and I agree with “obliged” rather than “encouraged”), then we might as well all go home and leave it to the automatics – but I do not think that there will be many passengers to pay for the bean counters’ bonus. For heaven’s sake, are you a PILOT?:ugh::{

[777boeings]

I absolutely agree that we should all practice manual flight wherever possible. However, it needs to be said that in the modern environment we should be circumspect where we do this. In the early days, if we had a low level altitude capture for example, it didn't matter too much if we overshot by a small margin. Today we can't get away with such errors. I would suggest that if we are in a metric environment such as China and Russia, we absolutely have to engage the autopilot at minimum height. This allows the PM to monitor better and reduces the threat of setting an incorrect value.
If a SID has a low level restriction, perhaps anything less than 3000ft, we should be engaging the autopilot to better manage the level off. Complex RNAV arrivals should also be flown using all automation available.
As one post rightly stated, if you are approaching an island in CAVOK or any airport for that matter, where the weather and traffic is acceptable then we should use the opportunity to practice our hand flying skill.
My point is that I agree with all the posts so far but lets not get carried away by using poor judgement to manually fly at times when prudence dictates using the automation provided.

[bubbers44]

DME arcs are so easy. We did them every night at Kingston. The 727 would stay in a 5 degree bank on autopilot but would roll wings level if less so it was fun to do the 15 DME arc and stay within .2 miles of the arc in a constant bank at 250 knots.

[main_dog]

My point is that I agree with all the posts so far but lets not get carried away by using poor judgement to manually fly at times when prudence dictates using the automation provided.

This scenario happens so rarely that it is barely worth worrying about. The more concerning issue is those myriad CAVOK days where you can see the field 30 miles out, you're on vectors for an ILS, and it would frankly be a shame to let the A/P do the flying instead of taking the opportunity to shake off a little of the rust that inevitably accumulates. And yet I rarely see anyone click off the autopilot and handfly, let alone switch off the F/Ds and practice their scan. When I do, I inevitably get that suspicious "I've never seen anyone do that before, are we even allowed to do that?" look from the F/O.

I'm not talking superhero one engine out partial-panel stormy-night heroics, I'm talking about quietly keeping your skills honed when opportunity allows; you owe it to yourself and your passengers. The numerous imaginative reasons guys come up with for NOT doing this always smack of nervousness and insecurity to me, these are often guys afraid of making mistakes: but of course that's a vicious circle, the less you practice the more rusty you become, the more rusty you are the less you want to hand-fly, and it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The A/P is your assistant, not the other way around!

[Centaurus]

Therein lies the rub, folks. Unless regulators are willing to compel airlines to do this, then it's all just fancy words.








Never a truer word. Some time ago I underwent a simulator check by a flight ops inspector as part of my annual instructor check. I hand flew the ILS and a couple of circuits. At the de-brief he wanted to know why I hand flew and I told him because I enjoy it and that was necessary to avoid being automation dependant. He was quite polite but also firm that in his opinion the automatics should be utilised fully on all sequences.

His background? Turns out he was a former 737 captain for a major domestic airline and his whole career had been an airline pilot from being a cadet. That airline pushed automatics right from the first type rating.

This introduced a breed of pilots totally addicted to button pushing because of company policy. . Of course, individual flight ops inspectors have their own opinions based upon their previous flying experience but few have the desire to buck the system and recommend that hand flying be practiced on line. Nothing will change.

[A37575]

The 727 would stay in a 5 degree bank on autopilot but would roll wings level if less so it was fun to do the 15 DME arc and stay within .2 miles of the arc in a constant bank at 250 knots.

The only thing to be wary of when flying at a continuous gentle angle of bank to maintain the DME arc, was the well known propensity for the artificial horizon to erect to a false horizon as the pilot levelled out.

In one such 727 incident in night IMC, the pilot conducted a continuous gentle (less than six degrees) angle of bank when turning through 45 degrees as he circum-navigated a storm over the Western Pacific near Guam.
On straightening to a specific compass heading, his AH indicated 15 degrees bank angle error which then progressively got worse to 45 degrees. The only way to rectify the situation was to pull the circuit breaker for the VG and then reset it few minutes later.

This gyro error is discussed in the Collins Radar WXR 700 Pilot Guide that says, among other things, dynamic error is caused by the gyro aligning with false gravity due to aircraft accelerations...this is an inherent limitation of gyro technology...VG errors may be caused by shallow turns, and autopilot interaction...in effect the VG aligns itself with bank angles of less than six degrees but lags due to the slowness of the erection circuit.

In other words it is better to keep the angle of bank to more than six degrees in a prolonged shallow turn (such as a DME arc, otherwise there is the potential for pilot disorientation in IMC when a false bank angle occurs on the ADI. We are talking about old aircraft with `steam driven` ADI's.

[Tee Emm]

The more concerning issue is those myriad CAVOK days where you can see the field 30 miles out, you're on vectors for an ILS, and it would frankly be a shame to let the A/P do the flying instead of taking the opportunity to shake off a little of the rust that inevitably accumulates. And yet I rarely see anyone click off the autopilot and handfly, let alone switch off the F/Ds and practice their scan. When I do, I inevitably get that suspicious "I've never seen anyone do that before, are we even allowed to do that?" look from the F/O.


You must have read my mind! Friend of mine was flying a 737 into Sydney (Australia) on a CAVOK day and approaching the localiser on a visual approach. The AP was engaged. The F/O was PF and asked the captain if he minded if he (the F/O) switched off the AP to practice hand flying as he had a simulator test coming up. The captain said no problem - be my guest. But the F/O did not switch off the AP and they were getting near the ILS centre-line at 10 miles out. The captain asked when the F/O was going to switch off the AP. The F/O replied not yet because I need it to intercept the ILS localiser first. Eventually the F/O was persuaded to turn off the AP but he then left the FD on.

The captain said why not turn off the FD seeing as you have an instrument rating test coming up where you will be required to demonstrate a raw data ILS? The F/O said I may need the FD for a GA? The captain replied you don't need the aid of the FD for a GA under these conditions. Reluctantly the F/O switched off the FD and a perfectly normal ILS was hand flown without the aid of the FD.

Later the captain asked where the F/O had undergone his 737 type rating as he was obviously a bit twitchy about flying CAVOK on a visual hand flown approach. Turns out the third party simulator provider taught full automatics from the very first simulator session.

[Burnie5204]

This is why, when I'm at work I like hearing those 3 magic words from pilots - "Request visual approach"

BMI Baby crews used to do it quite often in the evenings as soon as they became number 1 in sequence. I hear a few Atlantic Airlines pilots do it but not many others at all (bar the flying school of course) which is a shame as the RYR cadets spend a week here just flying visual circuits all day in a B738 but I havent once heard a scheduled RYR flight go visual, only ever remaining on the RADAR vectors.

[aterpster]

This is why, when I'm at work I like hearing those 3 magic words from pilots - "Request visual approach"

BMI Baby crews used to do it quite often in the evenings as soon as they became number 1 in sequence. I hear a few Atlantic Airlines pilots do it but not many others at all (bar the flying school of course) which is a shame as the RYR cadets spend a week here just flying visual circuits all day in a B738 but I havent once heard a scheduled RYR flight go visual, only ever remaining on the RADAR vectors.

Do you work at a airport with terrain significantly higher than the airport within the terminal area, say within 30 miles? If so, some companies don't want their crews doing visuals at night at such airports.

[Burnie5204]

Of course airlines arent going to like their pilots doing that when automation is available

But why shouldn't they? The Pilots are supposed to be capable of doing it otherwise what would they expect to do if the FD/AP drops out?

In my mind there's only one way to stay proficient at that sort of flying and that is to physically do it in a real aircraft. Sims may be getting more and more realistic but there's no substitute for being strapped into a real aircraft.

[bubbers44]

My major US airline had no restrictions on manual flying unless it was lower than Cat 1 approach minimums. We used AP and AT and FD only as a convenience or to reduce work load, our choice. We could dispatch with all three inop and climb to any altitude we wanted to when I was flying. I know now RSVM requires it but I retired just before it began in the US in 2003. Not letting pilots hand fly because of SOP's is asking for trouble.

[Desert185]

Simply put, the best way to minimize manual handling errors is...to practice manual handling...within one's own envelope of limitations. That envelope will almost certainly expand as one becomes familiar with the concept. If the person in the seat is too lazy or inept to do that, then he/she should seek another occupation where whining excuses are held to a higher value. :ugh:

[scud]

F/O: 'mind if I turn the AP off?'

Capt: 'sure; go ahead'

F/O: 'mind if I turn the flight directors off?'

Capt: 'well, I suppose so'

F/O: 'mind if I turn the autothrottles off?'

Capt: 'why do you want to do that for!?'

Mid 90's when I used to fly the 320. I realised that I hadn't hand flown the 320 for the previous couple of years, except take-off (first 400 feet) and landing (last 1000 feet). I discovered that my instrument scan had become terrible at that point.

There was a reluctance to hand fly it, partly because of company policy. Partly also because we seemed to have been brainwashed into thinking that the 320 was not meant to be hand flown. Actually, it is a very nice handling airplane.

[Check Airman]

If a SID has a low level restriction, perhaps anything less than 3000ft, we should be engaging the autopilot to better manage the level off.I agree with a lot of what you said, but strongly disagree with this. Perhaps it's because my humble RJ doesn't climb as fast as your 777 (presumed from your username), but I think that a level off (even below 3000ft) hardly constitutes a high workload environment.

If I find myself screaming up at 4000fpm on a low altitude level off, adjusting the power setting does the trick most of the time.:ok:

[aterpster]

Burnie:

Of course airlines arent going to like their pilots doing that when automation is available

But why shouldn't they? The Pilots are supposed to be capable of doing it otherwise what would they expect to do if the FD/AP drops out?

In my mind there's only one way to stay proficient at that sort of flying and that is to physically do it in a real aircraft. Sims may be getting more and more realistic but there's no substitute for being strapped into a real aircraft.

True enough. But, this has nothing to do with terrain in the terminal airspace and night visual approaches. (My Post #29 to you.)

[Speedwinner]

FAA concerns about manual handling errors. Sure. So i was pretty suprised to hear, that long range pilots only fly 2-3 sectors a month. Wow. And when they do so, they aren´t that much proficient as other pilots flying a beech, cessna and whatever without autopilot.

What are the discussions about flying raw data ils approaches without autopilot. Folks, do you really think that is above standard skill? Or flying without autopilot out of flight level 150. Sorry guys, people who aren´t able to do this aren't real pilots and were never screened of a professional.

I often think of the situation that my 320 looses two hydraulic systems with a engine failure and a light stall on the other engine. In fact the flight director quits the service as well as the flight path angle. For sure, we have 30 knots xwind and not much fuel. These are the situations the boys train their skills with flying a raw data sector or a visual? Come on. They should cancel their 7896 insurances which should protect us and actually never help us in out life till we die.:ugh:

Our operation asks for more airmanship: Don´t discuss terrain warnings when they come. Learn the performance of your aircraft especially on contaminated runways instead of a smooth touchdown. Be legal every time or at least try to be. Know how much fuel you need. Be a leader instead of satisfying your ego with hand flown approaches.

I wanna say: Use automatics when you need them. Fly raw data when you have fun. Because we´re pilots. But never ever say you´re more proficient than other pilots only because you fly here and there a raw data or visual with a visibility from pole to pole. :ugh:


PS: All the guys telling you, that they flew so much raw data in the early years and all pilots with glass cockpit couldn´t fly, tell them to use street maps to navigate next time instead of their little fancy gps iphone.

[Phantom Driver]

777B

I absolutely agree that we should all practice manual flight wherever possible.
However, it needs to be said that in the modern environment we should be
circumspect where we do this. In the early days, if we had a low level altitude
capture for example, it didn't matter too much if we overshot by a small margin.
Today we can't get away with such errors. I would suggest that if we are in a
metric environment such as China and Russia, we absolutely have to engage the
autopilot at minimum height. This allows the PM to monitor better and reduces
the threat of setting an incorrect value.
If a SID has a low level
restriction, perhaps anything less than 3000ft, we should be engaging the
autopilot to better manage the level off. Complex RNAV arrivals should also be
flown using all automation available.
As one post rightly stated, if you are
approaching an island in CAVOK or any airport for that matter, where the weather
and traffic is acceptable then we should use the opportunity to practice our
hand flying skill.
My point is that I agree with all the posts so far but
lets not get carried away by using poor judgement to manually fly at times when
prudence dictates using the automation provided.

The problem with this forum is that a lot of people post without really reading or digesting what has been previously stated. Your points just about sum up the whole issue about manual flying, i.e Yes, very necessary, but there is a time and place for everything.

Years ago, my F/O wanted to fly the whole (short) sector from one Gulf airport to another; this in the A330. Autopilot off, autothrottle off,(yes, not a disaster in the scarebus!). Nice day, no traffic, NO PROBLEM:ok:

(There IS a time and place for everything. As professional aviators, our job is to make the right choices. That's the least we can do for the fare paying punters riding down the back. The problem-as others have pointed out-is that these options are becoming fewer and fewer these days. The commercial skies are simply getting too crowded. Monitoring by all is now the order of the day, or else trouble looms. RVSM, RNP,RNAV was not an issue in the good old days; it is now, which is why most sensible operators demand full use of automation to meet the rigid standards).

Now, the requirement to keep the right side up in emergency situations is another matter entirely, and this comes down to selection and training issues. Hand flying skills per se are not the only solution. Just take a look at the accident rates of the byegone era. The Atlantic Barons were pretty well schooled in manual flying, (handicapped by high rates of mechanical failures), but control loss and CFIT were still alarmingly high.

In the military, manual instrument flying skills were mandatory for a successful career; night low level intercepts/attacks over the sea- (500 ft, 500 knots, 60 degrees angle of bank)- was not the time and place to be doubting your manual flying skills. But, well practiced as we were, we still lost good guys, for reasons unknown. Human error will always be with us, no matter what. Automation simply loads the dice in our favour.

Want to have fun and keep your hand in? Go fly a Pitts Special. (always did wonder why aeros training was not mandatory for commercial pilots:))

[safetypee]

Most posts in this thread focus on the need for more manual flight, but few if any actually state what this will achieve in respect to the ‘manual handling errors’ analysed by the FAA.
As @ post #15, there is no data on the nature of problems which result in error; many people are guessing or linking the increased use of automation (reduced manual flight) with error, but without data and reasoned explanation, this is only supposition.

Considering that the vast majority of normal operations are flown safely, and that most of these operations involve automation, perhaps the industry should investigate what current crews do that enables them to avoid ‘manual handling errors’. Daily operations will provide far more evidence of what goes right (including recovery from error) as opposed to what goes wrong.

The industry should focus on the positive aspects of safety; how did crews avoid or recover from upset situations, manage ADC/ASI and autopilot failure, conduct check-flight stalling in high technology aircraft, and routinely fly missed approach go-around manoeuvres.

In order to understand the reasons behind what goes wrong – resulting in ‘error’, it is necessary to know what goes right and why, then compare the two cases.

[Gretchenfrage]

According to your logic, we should investigate what people do to manage to live a happy marriage and out of that we should then better understand why some end up in violence .....

Sounds intelligent, but not very practicable. Just about as your theory.
Do not complicate things, especially when a regulator finally steps in and points to a pandemic in modern aviation.

-> The training has been diluted to the point of having airline professionals who have less total manual hours on equipment than some Cessna hobby pilot.
-> The recency in manual skills has been reduced to the last 500 feet with completely established parameters and maybe one handling sim-session with a well briefed 30 minutes of coordinated turns and a one-engine ILS approach without FD.

Please do not dress up whatever could serve as a lame excuse for such a situation by putting an intelligent sounding statistical and bureaucratic veil over the topic .... in orden not having to act.

Face it:
Today's pilots lack training and skill when the holy automatics go West.

Do something about it.:ugh:

[woodja51]

Very good post.... In fact the taught technique of 10-15 ahead /behind the needle is for that exact reason of cutout alignment thresholds and false horizon on rollout.

However- the A330 fmgs when flying arcs depending on the range, flies them as low AOB and the stby AI will have residual bank on rollout.. It might be digital etc but has the same albeit minor issue. so not just a steam driven problem.

Similarly autothrust in holding ..... Older aircraft without autothrottle/thrust you would hold in a race track at about min drag plus ten kts... That way thrust remained constant, and speed dropped due to the turns , but stayed above min drag = lessfuel burn.

New aircraft fly min clean , or green dot in the hold and thus " throttle bash " to hold the selected speed = burn more fuel...

So some of the old technques are still valid but the history has or is getting lost ...

[Onceapilot]

It is strange but, the IR has become something of a surrogate handling test. Commercial restrictions are not going to allow extra sim time or base flying that is not mandated by law and there is some extra risk in self taught training coupled with the fact that todays flightdeck automation is designed to allow safe operation in demanding airspace. If poor handling skills are an issue, the regulatory bodies should establish a mandatory handling skill test to augment the IR test.

[sheppey]

If poor handling skills are an issue, the regulatory bodies should establish a mandatory handling skill test to augment the IR test.


In Australia, for the airlines, 90 percent of the instrument rating test is on automatic pilot which makes the test easy. The Australian CAA require one instrument approach to be flown without the autopilot. Presumably that proves the candidate can hand fly and the regulator is happy. The airline is happy and it didn't cost anything as it is all part of the IR package. Yet Blind Freddy knows that one hand flown approach a year does not a competent pilot, make...

[greeners]

Interesting to see that the FAA felt it necessary to issue a SAFO recently encouraging operators to 'promote manual flight operations when appropriate'.

http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2013/SAFO13002.pdf

It will be fascinating to see what real world impact this 'encouragement' has.

[Chris Scott]

Thanks, greeners,

The FAA SAFO (Safety Alert) is dated January 4th.

Will the UK CAA follow suit? So far, apparently not.

[JW411]

Well it's high time that they did.

[safetypee]

Gretchenfrage, your comments @#39 (on #38 & #15 ?), seek to simplify the problem and thereby increase the practicability of a solution.
This appears to be what the FAA have done (a pandemic in modern aviation); but it’s easy to find error as it is a normal aspect of human behaviour. However, without evidence that these ‘errors’ directly contribute to reduced safety (and what are these errors), more of ‘this or that’ simple solution will not guarantee any improvement. You may only improve the skill in ‘flying one-engine ILS approach without FD’.

The FAA’s investigation has used pilot error as a stopping point; the human is at fault, thus train the human – more currency. This simplistic approach may miss underlying problems, and until these and the contributing factors are understood then any meaningful intervention cannot be formulated.

Training standards and currency in manual flying skills may well have deteriorated, but are these changes in proportion to the tasks and situations typical of modern operations, or really at the root of handling related safety concerns. What about the organisation, economic, and social changes; has the baseline human behaviour been affected by these.
Modern views of human factors by-pass human error with the concept of variability; this is a performance characteristic necessary to manage daily activities. No situation is perfect / clear cut, work activity is a compromise. So one aspect to consider is if pilots are sufficiently trained / skilled in the process of compromise – the judgement that originates from situation assessment and choice of action (aspects of airmanship), and which also involves risk management, and the skills of thought when stressed.

I agree that action is required to maintain / improve safety, but this does not imply a simple ‘blame and train’ solution. The industry needs to understand how pilots manage variability, how they compromise activities in the many different situations encountered every day; how do pilots judge situations and choose the correct course of action. Then with evidence of this and any disparity with the task demand, a solution might be proposed.
A solution might not be simple to identify, but it could be shaped to be practical and then at least it would be meaningful.

The third age of human factors. (http://hal-ensmp.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/73/81/26/PDF/Hollnagel_RailHumanFactor.pdf)

[Armchairflyer]

Do you really see a "blame and train" element here? I rather feel that this FAA approach is quite explicitly directed at the blunt rather than the sharp end (which would IMHO make it all the more important to oblige instead of merely recommend, BTW). And I conjecture that when "looking for what goes right" in everyday flying, some major contributions come from having good situational awareness, being "in the loop", being able to make sound decisions concerning the appropriate level of automation, or not having to fiddle around with the FMC or autopilot to quickly and precisely execute maneuvers not included in the preplanned flight path (which was one central point in the "children of the magenta line" video, IIRC). It may be just me, but I'd see all these skills benefit significantly from increased discretion and encouragement concerning handflying (apart from increased motivation among those bored by button-pushing). All that directly on-the-job, during revenue-generating activities (from a bean-counter perspective).

[Mikehotel152]

The tongue-in-cheek solution is simple. Fail your RA. This will lead to autopilot disengagement and loss of flight directors on the failed side upon G/S and LOC capture (the switch to approach mode).

Works very well on the 738 regardless of the wx and the surprise on the PF's face is rather amusing as raw data hand flying is thereby compulsory.

Or we could petition the FAA/CAA to legislate for a minimum AP disengagement height of 1580 instead of 158 feet. :)

Tongue back in cheek.

[Gretchenfrage]

@ safetypee

Gretchenfrage, your comments @#39 (on #38 & #15 ?), seek to simplify the problem and thereby increase the practicability of a solution.

You are damn right! For three reasons: First, in todays scope-bound world you need to simplify in a loud way to raise attention, and that’s what I want. Second, the KISS principle applies here as well, simple solutions are more often the most effective ones because they, third, increase the practicability, as you state yourself.

It’s easy to find error as it is a normal aspect of human behaviour. However, without evidence that these ‘errors’ directly contribute to reduced safety (and what are these errors), more of ‘this or that’ simple solution will not guarantee any improvement.

I refuse to go down the “Dozy way” in asking for evidence or proof for everything that would implement change from the established system. This is an easy way out, because there is almost no real possibility to produce such evidence. It all runs down to statistics, and we know that this is a twisted approach. I.E: In the most recent cases it evolves around Airbus accidents, and the same protagonists that crie for “evidence” before having to engage, deny the blunt fact that such evidence (statistically) prove the competition’s system with 0 victims (as opposed to AB, see the “is AB safe” thread), and then such evidence is immediately rejected.
Therefore asking for “evidence” is almost futile.


The FAA’s investigation has used pilot error as a stopping point; the human is at fault, thus train the human – more currency.

Wrong approach. This thread talks about manual handling errors. But it's not about "faults". It’s more about lack of being able to fulfill the role the human still has his place in the cockpit:
To take over when the electrons go the wrong way.


Training standards and currency in manual flying skills may well have deteriorated, but are these changes in proportion to the tasks and situations typical of modern operations, or really at the root of handling related safety concerns.

Again, you sound great intellectually and such questions might be worth investigating, but I guess our customers don’t really give a hoot about any changes in proportion to tasks and situations when the s..t hits the fan. They expect us to be able to take over, fly the airplane out of any danger irrespective to any of the above (and even you are a customer every now and then).
Even on newer cars equipped with cruise-controls and distance monitoring/interveneing you still need to be able to brake yourself!


Safetypee, I know what you mean, but still insist that the underlying problem here, is that the basics are not taught well enough and the aquired is not maintained enough. This might be simple, but then it's just as simple to remedy it!!
You can still engage in all other aspects you mention, but do not use any of that to try to delay the earlier.

[RAT 5]

"Do you agree, about several examples of incidents/accidents at well known carriers besides THY, like AF/LH/TAM and others, where the crew lost track due to "complexity" of their ship?"

I disagree, slightly. I am giving a Type qualification course at the moment. As with many airlines it is self-funded by the student and thus is kept to a minimum number of sessions. As with other airlines the type rating is combined with an OPC. A few decades ago, in my early life entering the airlines, we were taught to fly the a/c in the TQ course, with SOP's attached. The line operation and SOP's were refined during line training. The initial emphasis was knowing how the a/c worked, how the systems worked and how to fly it. The line training refined these skills and expanded how to operate it within the airways system and a multitude of busy airports and small visual airfields. Understanding the complexities of the systems came with our 'apprenticeship', which had started in the sim.
Nowadays the TQ course seems to shift the emphasis more towards SOP's during the manoeuvres, some of which are with normal & non-normal scenarios. Some of the non-normals scenarios are box-ticking on the LST form, very few are in depth training of the gotchas and pitfalls. The handling emphasis is aimed at the LST items.
Thus IMHO it was not the 'complexity of their ship' which sucked them into trouble, it was the lack of training = understanding of those systems. This ignorance created a complex system when in fact with proper training it would have been quite simple.
One wonders if the policy of many airlines to use relatively (2 years experience) inexperienced F/O's as SFI's is correct. They have followed the self same course of knowing what to do, but not the how & the why. They then pass on this diluted knowledge to the next generation of cadets who will become the next generation of SFI's and so the downward spiral of knowledge continues. SOP's are so intense that the first thought of a pilot in a less than ideal situation is to ask, "what does the book say?" Second, if at all, comes "what is the most sensible airmanship thing to do?" By the time you arrive at the 2nd option it might be too ate as the a/c was still travelling very fast during the first phase of questioning confusion. It is noticeable that I've been told by newish F/O's that flying with the old farts is usually more relaxing than with the newbie captains. The oldies do what is best instinctively, and within the book boundaries, but are not afraid to bend the SOP's; the newbies are terrified to even blow at the boundaries and thus delay making some decisions and then have to race to catch up. All old farts were newbies once, but mostly with a longer and deeper apprenticeship than today.
IMHO, if the industry is gong to continue making captains with relatively low hours then the training of manual skills, and especially systems knowledge and understanding of all their possibilities, needs to be more in depth to compensate for the shorter apprenticeship. Too many commands can be given to those whose prof checks are above average and SOP knowledge is perfect. SOP's can not cover all eventualities. Most incidents and accidents started quite subtly and the human intervention, or lack of it, caused a can of worms to develop, when it was preventable. And that's a whole other discussion about a good crew being preventative rather than reactive. Slavishly following SOP's is not always preventative, but that was touched upon in an earlier thread.

Knowledge is power: ignorance can be painful in the extreme.

[bubbers44]

I guess lack of training never applied to us old guys. We kind of trained ourselves. We couldn't afford a lot of formal training. Our first few thousand hours had no automation so we just took our hands and did what was needed to fly.

When automation became readily available we used it to reduce workload when we felt like it. We didn't really trust it but we used it knowing we could easily disconnect it when it didn't do what we wanted.

Now some airliners want everything done on autopilot because it can fly better than any pilot. Airlines hire young pilots with little experience and they are shown how you don't need to hand fly any more because of automation. Labor is cheap.

Then AF447 shows the world how wrong that was. All that flight needed was one pilot in the cockpit who knew how to handfly but they didn't so everybody died for no reason. And the beat goes on.

[hikoushi]

You know, for those USA based pilots on here (like myself), if you ever really want to hear your recurrent ground instructor / fleet manager / head check airman / chief pilot / training scheduler / POI / etc laugh you out of the room, just wait until the next time you are in recurrent ground school / a check airman meeting / etc and the subject of logging a minimum number of autolands for CAT 2/3 currency (or the equivalent) comes up in conversation. Then, raise your hand and suggest to them that "we also mandate a certain number of manually flown, raw-data approaches and landings be logged to maintain hand flying currency, similarly to how we log autoland currency" as a response to this SAFO.

I'm going to try it at my next recurrent. I expect the response will be entertaining!:ok:

[aterpster]

hikoushi:

You know, for those USA based pilots on here (like myself), if you ever really want to hear your recurrent ground instructor / fleet manager / head check airman / chief pilot / training scheduler / POI / etc laugh you out of the room, just wait until the next time you are in recurrent ground school / a check airman meeting / etc and the subject of logging a minimum number of autolands for CAT 2/3 currency (or the equivalent) comes up in conversation. Then, raise your hand and suggest to them that "we also mandate a certain number of manually flown, raw-data approaches and landings be logged to maintain hand flying currency, similarly to how we log autoland currency" as a response to this SAFO.

I'm going to try it at my next recurrent. I expect the response will be entertaining!

Make sure you print a few copies of the FAA bulletin to hand out at that training/meeting session:


http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2013/SAFO13002.pdf (http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2013/SAFO13002.pdf)

[safetypee]

Armchairflyer (#46), Gretchenfrage (#49);
‘Blame and Train’ might be a bit strong, but the theme underlies the SAFO.
The focus is on the operators, management and crew; the sharp end from the FAA’s perspective. Furthermore, this view may avoid the need to explain whether regulatory and checking processes should have detected the issue earlier.

‘Evidence’ perhaps is not the right word; the safety initiative requires justification and supporting information to help operators better direct their interventions.

The reasoning in the SAFO is illogical and weak; how does “continuous use of autoflight systems … lead to degradation of the pilot’s ability to quickly recover the aircraft from an undesired state.”
What are the errors which presumably lead to “an undesired state”?
The crux of the recommendation is that operators “should ensure that all pilots have the appropriate opportunities to exercise the aforementioned knowledge and skills [for manual flight] in flight operations”; but what is this ‘knowledge’ and what specific skills shortfall are there?

Error (fault) can be interpreted in several ways; using ‘variable human performance’ could minimise any confusion.
The FAA has identified that manual handling performance deviated from that required (error); but what was the context, in what situations.
Was the deviation because human performance was less than that expected, or did the situation demand greater performance than was available. A mismatch could also originate from assumptions about training standards, knowledge and skill retention (in an automated world), or the nature of the situations to be encountered (in an automated world).
Also consider that the handling problems do not necessarily relate to individual pilots; aircraft are operated by a crew. Was the handling performance deviation detected and countered, if not, then why not? Were there weaknesses in monitoring - detection or intervention, or with some other aspect of operational situations which contributed to inadequate performance.

The SAFO provides no background on these aspects whatsoever, and indeed most of the assumptions would be under FAA control.

“The underlying problem here is that the basics are not taught well enough and the acquired is not maintained enough.” (#49) This is supposition.
Alternatively, consider the reasons for the success of everyday operations.
The current high safety standard suggests that the vast majority of pilots are sufficiently well trained and that they retain the requisite knowledge and skills, apparently without overly practicing manual flight.

Without ‘evidence’ (further explanation and information), operators may choose to fly manually ‘as and when’ it suits them, and just ‘tick the SAFO safety box’ without further thought.

Delay safety; no.
Just pause for thought about effective safety.

Whatever Happened To “Human Error”? (erik.hollnagel.googlepages.com/HESSDKeynote.pdf)

Perspectives on Human Error: Hindsight Biases and Local Rationality. (http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/woods/error/app_cog_hand_chap.pdf)

[Gretchenfrage]

@safetypee

This drifts into semantics, we can continue all night long.
The only real meat in your statement is:

Was the deviation because human performance was less than that expected, or did the situation demand greater performance than was available?

My answer is yes and yes. Therefore remedial action is required.

Take AF447.
1. Human perform was less than expected, because they could not fly an Airbus straight and level and save it from deep stall crash.
2. The situation, provoked by malfunctions first then inadequate design later, demanded greater performance that was either never taught or not trained well enough.

If such (may I call that) evidence is not enough for rapid remedy, then I am slightly lost about the genuine intent of the responsible participants.
We need aircraft with less of all the little nintendo-snags and crews that can adequately fly an aircraft stripped from such gags. Basta, khalas, point à la ligne, schlusspunkt, indeed or whatever!

It is so simple and almost jumping us in the face. That's why I criticise approaches like yours, albeit very intelligent and certainly honest. But they give the responsible parties all the time and excuses to act in an investigative way. Look at all the courtrooms who do just that to make sure there is no loophole a slimy lawyer can exploit, and the result are processes that take several years only to be diluted beyond reconnaissance. That will happen to our topic if we continue to "pause for thought".

[fdr]

The tongue-in-cheek solution is simple. Fail your RA. This will lead to autopilot disengagement and loss of flight directors on the failed side upon G/S and LOC capture (the switch to approach mode).

Works very well on the 738 regardless of the wx and the surprise on the PF's face is rather amusing as raw data hand flying is thereby compulsory.

Or we could petition the FAA/CAA to legislate for a minimum AP disengagement height of 1580 instead of 158 feet.
MH152

Interesting concept, to practice (not simulate...) the underlying failure event that resulted in parking the THY B738 in the tulip field... tongue in cheek notwithstanding.

As commented on by safTP in part, there is variability in human performance...
beyond that, there is constant variability in the operation performance from almost all factors exhibiting random and coupled variations, which can result in a total performance deviation outside of acceptable conditions. The linear system behaviour that Reason elaborated on, and which current CRM principles as well as SMS analysis is predicated on is a simplification of system dynamics.

For a bad outcome to occur doesn't take a bad pilot, bad training, bad plane design or bad weather, normal performance variation can result in exceeding normal performance due to the resonance of the system components; the normal accident. The problem can be one of loss of awareness of the system performance, effectively a failure of SA1, 2 or 3 by those entrusted with achieving the operating outcomes. In the current discussion, that would also include the FAA, as a stakeholder in the health of the state aviation program. It is a good outcome that they have recognised an issue, and are proposing a simply implemented fix, that has some change of achieving an improvement in outcomes. If getting pilots to fly manually in some conditions does result in reducing the inertia against intervention, and improve monitoring skills and recognition of anomalous operation, then that would be a great outcome. On my own observations while evaluating crew performance, there is room to get the crew back into the command loop in order to ensure that they are more comfortable with a reversion when they recognise that there is an issue. The history of catastrophic losses is replete with serviceable aircraft or those with minor failures being lost, more prevalent than heroic multiple system failures occurring. Reinforcement of recognition and lowering the barriers to intervention are potentially good things to be developing. Increasing the manual flying in appropriate circumstances has a potential to achieve these aims. All changes have potential for additional risk to be assumed, and increasing manual flying can be a change to the crew coordination routines that have resulted from the emphasis on automation use.

IFLOC is inexcusable from an industry perspective; if the pilots cannot fly planes we have a big problem. The industry changes that have lead towards the atrophy of flying skills is a result of commercial pressures and the pragmatism of the CAA's in accepting the standards of the airlines. Apparently this is the free market at play, with consequences.



[Why inexcusable? a student pilot losing control of a C150 is unacceptable, having flight crew that are unable to either recognise a loss of control state or handle the aircraft thereafter to a safe flight condition is not what the passenger is expecting when they pay for their ticket (albeit the cheapest fare that is offered under the open sky/deregulation enabled arbitrage that exists in the global market)].

[Gretchenfrage]

IFLOC is inexcusable from an industry perspective; if the pilots cannot fly planes we have a big problem. The industry changes that have lead towards the atrophy of flying skills is a result of commercial pressures and the pragmatism of the CAA's in accepting the standards of the airlines. Apparently this is the free market at play, with consequences.

Great post, agree 100%! Thanks.

Free market is a good thing, but it needs oversight with some ruling guidelines. Otherwise we end up with "consequences" like the banking system. That's basically why modern societies implemented regulators. Such regulators must however have the power and the balls to impose and not only recommend. Or we end up with something like the banking system again, where the overseeing bodies trusted too much in "self regulating forces" and only intervened with "recommendations".

If something is "inexcusable", as you rightfully say, then there must be rapid and stringend intervention.

[safetypee]

Gretchenfrage, +/- semantics, we have similar ideals.
Putting AF447 aside (it’s too muddled by hindsight and emotive bias), consider a hypothetical LOC accident following instrument failure, where there had been several previous incidents in which crews maintained control or recovered from abnormal manoeuvres.

Superficial comparison of events might identify differences in piloting performance, yet even some of the successes showed apparent weaknesses in flight technique or, as with the accident, the initial input could have been intentional. The difference in avoiding LOC was the appreciation of the revised situation. Thus deeper analysis would add initial and subsequent situation awareness to the list of possible contributors to the accident.

Further investigation might look at the standard of training, not only the basic skills, but the specifics of flight control after instrument failure. In this there are at least two scenarios; the critical dynamic situation after takeoff, and the more benign level flight. If, in supposition, the specific training had overly focused on the dynamic situation (which required memory action) then when encountering the more benign, the human may be predisposed towards the memory drills and (for the benign situation) incorrect flight manoeuvres.
The difference was again in recognition that the initial behaviour did not match the situation, but also the influence of the training method (situational / contextual emphasis) on the pilot’s choice of action.

The point of this example is to highlight that the apparent superficial conclusion in the SAFO - that lack of manual flight currency was the only contributor to the operational incidents, may not contribute very much to safety, and also adversely bias operational wiliness to invest time and money in this or subsequent initiatives.

By all means fly manually more often, but don’t expect the ‘promised’ improvements*. Yes the industry requires rapid and stringent intervention, but it has to be an appropriate intervention.

* ‘promised’ improvements - semantics - expected or as assumed from simple ‘effect = cause’ reasoning.

What you find is not always what you fix. (liu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:346268/FULLTEXT01)

[Desert185]

I'm just going to handfly...like I've been doing all these years...while some of you "safety guys" analize the "problems" and get it all sorted out. It's going be a long day. Coffee, black, please. :ugh:

FE, looks like we'll need LRC or we might have a fuel issue at destination.

Tongue in cheek...sort of. :rolleyes:

[Armchairflyer]

Despite being an academic myself, I feel that the objections to "paralysis by analysis" are rather justified in this case, and while mandating more garden-variety handflying might be no panacea, IMVHO it is one of the most effective and at the same time easily implemented, cost-neutral, and time-saving (hence hopefully realistic) measures to ensure that pilots don't feel like "strangers" in their daily work environment when for whatever reason George is not the option of choice or not available.

On a side note concerning the "emotions" surrounding AF 447: I am somewhat puzzled that a very similar accident some four years earlier (West Caribbean Airways Flight 708 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Caribbean_Airways_Flight_708)) is hardly ever used to illustrate the woes of automation and de-skilled "children of the magenta line" (maybe because the aircraft involved has a distinct "pilot's plane" reputation, and the person to assess the situation correctly was a very young F/O with probably little handflying experience on type?).

(BTW, I also see AF 447 much more as a call against Fast Finger Freddy and for procedural discipline than for better handling skills. AFAIK, if the pilots had simply followed the pertinent checklist and left the plane alone beyond that, the ASI loss would probably have had no far-reaching consequences. Purely personal opinion, all hindsight and armchair pilot disclaimers apply.)

[bubbers44]

All my old pilot buddies would have held cruise attitude, about 2.5 degrees nose up and gotten out the checklist for unreliable airspeed. It would have then been a non event. They chose because of their automation reliance and being told the Airbus can't stall to pull back on the side stick and do a full stall for over 3 minutes with no clue how to recover. We have a new generation of computer pilots, not real pilots.

The US has made it harder to get into the right seat by requiring 1500 hrs. That is good because they may learn how to hand fly, maybe not, depending how they build that time. I did flight instruction, crop dusting, charter and corporate to get my first airline job with 5500 hrs and felt lucky to do so. 250 hrs into the airlines is nuts.

[aterpster]

bubbers44:

All my old pilot buddies would have held cruise attitude, about 2.5 degrees nose up and gotten out the checklist for unreliable airspeed. It would have then been a non event. They chose because of their automation reliance and being told the Airbus can't stall to pull back on the side stick and do a full stall for over 3 minutes with no clue how to recover. We have a new generation of computer pilots, not real pilots.

The US has made it harder to get into the right seat by requiring 1500 hrs. That is good because they may learn how to hand fly, maybe not, depending how they build that time. I did flight instruction, crop dusting, charter and corporate to get my first airline job with 5500 hrs and felt lucky to do so. 250 hrs into the airlines is nuts.

This old buddy would have dropped the nose about 3 degrees below the horizon and reduced to cruise descent power while sorting things out.

[bubbers44]

We woulldn't pull up into a stall and hold full back stick, would we?

[DozyWannabe]

That would depend how freaked out you became by the sudden rush of adrenalin when things started going wrong at O-dark-hundred in the middle of some significantly unfriendly weather.

Don't get me wrong, it's likely that pilots with more high-altitude manual handling experience on the line probably would have done better (in fact over thirty times when the same tech issue cropped up, the crews managed just fine).

But the truth is that none of us - pilot or no - can really say how we'd have reacted in that position unless we've been put in a position of similar difficulty and come out the other side. Thankfully few of us have.

[RansS9]

Amongst other suggestions made I like the idea of mandating that routine sim sessions include at least one scenario in which the correct response is to turn off the automation and hand fly; preferably with a subsequent recovery from unusual attitude, instrument failure, or difficult raw data procedure thrown in just for laughs.

This has the benefit of imprinting this as a possible and acceptable behaviour. It also means candidates will have to maintain their instrument skills at least at the level they achieved when passing their instrument ratings.

In order to facilitate the latter mandate all Airlines to require their pilots log a particular number of manual flying hours per year.

For those who have been there and done that. What would your recommendations for minimum hand flying be ? Obviously balancing the requirement to maintain these skills in the particular aircraft flown with commercial pressures and passenger safety. What areas of flying would you feel were most important to cover (approaches, low level manoeuvring, high altitude manoeuvring)?

[alf5071h]

- mandating more garden-variety handflying might be no panacea, IMVHO it is one of the most effective and at the same time easily implemented, cost-neutral – @ #60.
This is like prescribing treatment without diagnosis, based on the premise that pilots are like "strangers" in an automated flightdeck.
Previous analysis of crew errors identified a combination of contributing factors and cross-cutting factors which contribute to crew errors (refs), it would be interesting to see how many of these were also associated with the FAA’s list of manual handling errors, and if some of the solutions also apply. Particularly time pressure or the crew’s perception of time, together with surprise. - Fast Finger Freddy –

- For those who have been there and done that. - :ok:
See the slides on hindsight bias and myths about human error; and for those who wish to perpetuate the debate on AF447, switch to ‘America 903’ instead (in the second reference); why did they survive:– then return to hindsight bias and human error, ad infinitum.

Ref 1. The Misunderstood Role of Pilot Error in Airline Accidents. (http://humansystems.arc.nasa.gov/flightcognition/Publications/KD_ICAO3_05.ppt)

Ref 2. Limitations and Vulnerabilities on the Flight Deck. (http://humansystems.arc.nasa.gov/flightcognition/Publications/LOE_slides_SAT_030607.ppt)

[Armchairflyer]

This is like prescribing treatment without diagnosis, ...IMHO not so much specific treatment as a generic preventive measure. No pills, just sometimes taking the stairs instead of the elevator.
... based on the premise that pilots are like "strangers" in an automated flightdeck.Granted, "out of the loop" (like, e.g., in the second link posted, thx BTW) would probably have been a more appropriate expression.

[alf5071h]

- taking the stairs instead of the elevator, "out of the loop" - :ok:

So how does this help understand the underlying issues raised by the FAA recommendation; how is more ‘exercise’ going to prevent some pilots tripping or going up opposed to down (skill and cognitive errors) when taking the stairs (flying manually).
Do those pilots who always fly manually because they have no automation (those without elevators, always having to use stairs) make similar manual handling errors?

[RansS9]

How does it help? .... I presume considerably.
The ability to manually fly an aircraft (VFR / IFR) is a skill prone like any other to degradation through disuse.
If you take the view that ONE of the common factors involved in recent accidents has been poor manual flying skills then take action to rectify it.
This doesn't need to wait on the identification of other factors. Or I you suggesting that it does?

[alf5071h]

Rans, a point of debate is the presumption that the lack of manual flying alone (overuse of automation) is the source of manual flying errors.

This is not to suggest that we dismiss the potential influence of more manual flying, but to be aware that the SAFO assumes that a single (predominant?) factor is the reason for the errors. With absence of data and interpretation, this assumption is questioned. There may be many contributing factors to ‘manual flying errors’ some with equal or higher relevance than manual flight.
A simple evaluation might conclude that the effectiveness of a safety intervention will be in proportion to its ranking in an occurrence, whereas in modern complex operations it is more likely that a combination of factors and their interaction is more important.

A good example comes from recent analysis of overrun accidents, which previously identified TCH, landing speed, touchdown position, runway condition, and tailwind, as individual factors, where one or another dominated in a specific accident. However, when projecting this data to help avoid further events, it is a combination of several factors which is more important than the particular, thus all of the factors should be considered including a previously unspecified pre-landing distance assessment.

Based on recent highly salient LOC accidents, a combination of factors such as situation assessment/awareness, surprise, automation failure, and knowledge might be a grouping, however without data for lesser incidents and events in normal operations, operators cannot be sure which aspects of ‘more manual flight’ will minimize operating risks. Thus judgment / risk assessment to reduce manual handling error cannot be concluded effectively.

[Smilin_Ed]

Dozy:But the truth is that none of us - pilot or no - can really say how we'd have reacted in that position unless we've been put in a position of similar difficulty and come out the other side. Thankfully few of us have.A

Any person who could not have reacted appropriately in that situation is simply not a qualified pilot and should not be allowed in the cockpit let alone on the roster to fly a commercial aircraft. You can blame it on training or any other thing you want, the three pilots of AF447 should not have been there.

[CEJM]

Any person who could not have reacted appropriately in that situation is simply not a qualified pilot and should not be allowed in the cockpit let alone on the roster to fly a commercial aircraft. You can blame it on training or any other thing you want, the three pilots of AF447 should not have been there.

The same can be said about Colgan Air 3407!

[Smilin_Ed]

The same can be said about Colgan Air 3407!

AMEN! (I have to have more words or the system won't let me post, so here they are.

[RansS9]

"a point of debate is the presumption that the lack of manual flying alone"

---simple don't presume I don't think many people are arguing that it is the ONLY factor.

"SAFO assumes that a single (predominant?) factor is the reason for the errors."

---apologies I don't know who SAFO is. I'll let him answer for himself and only reiterate that nobody else thinks the majority of accidents are single factor.

"There may be many contributing factors to ‘manual flying errors’ some with equal or higher relevance than manual flight. "

---Again agree although I am struggling to think of a higher relevance factor than "the inability to manually fly". Equal possible, higher I am struggling.

"when projecting this data to help avoid further events, it is a combination of several factors which is more important than the particular, thus all of the factors should be considered"

---so address all the factors if they have been identified and are amenable.

Based on the evidence of recent air incidents, changes in training and changes in the use of automation ; do you feel that mandated improvements in training / currency for manual flying skills should be brought in now? Or should we await further data or interpretation?

[safetypee]

SAFO - Safety Alert for Operators, FAA.
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2013/SAFO13002.pdf Manual Flight Operations

[bubbers44]

If you can't hand fly stay out of the cockpit. We need pilots up there that can make everybody not die if automation fails.

[alf5071h]

Rans hopefully the debate is a little clearer with SAFO 13002 as background.

Re "the inability to manually fly".
This view blocks any deeper thoughts. If inability is seen the cause of a relatively few accidents – as in posts above – the human is at fault - , it overlooks all the other non-accident flight operations, which are the overwhelming majority, and in which manual flight ability is not a factor. Furthermore the ‘errant’ pilots up to the point of their accident apparently exhibited the requisite ability; so did they just have a bad day or are there other factors to be considered.
Similarly consider American 903, the crew apparently lacked ability at 16000ft, but at 13000ft they regained the necessary ability – the difference could have been in the situation or the way in which they interpreted the situation, or the initial (in)action vs later actions.
A soon as we put ‘the human is at fault’ to one side then there are many other possible contributions to the situation and human behaviour.

We might assume that the FAA has the data; then why not publish it. If their single view of cause persists, representing an old view of human factors, then what might this say about the FAA’s views on HF or even their safety culture?

A favourite ref. http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/seattle_hessd/judithlynne-p.pdf

[RetiredF4]

If we go back to our basic flying training and look at the development of our flying skills, than it comes down to gaining expierience by training. First just to fly the aircraft straight and level or do gentle turns ocupied our whole thinking process despite hours of theoretical training. Would we have been able to manually fly a raw data ILS without FD in the first hours? No, we would have been all over the place. But after we honed the manual flying skills within a few hours, we had room for further tasks like flying on instruments under the hood including doing approaches and go arounds. Later on we (from the military) could do it in close formation and while performing other military tasks like implementing sensors and weaponary, even in single pilot operated aircraft. With continuing hours we got better from year to year, although not perfect and not without some shortcomings, as nobody gets ever perfect.

But nowadays I have the impression that the peak of manual flying performance is reached prior the work on the line starts, and then decays from this minimal level to a background noise. When the situation arises that manual flying is mandatory due to some sudden technical deficiency, the brain is overloaded with the simple task to maintain aircraft control by handling the controls without the daily helpers, which then leaves less room for dealing with the cause of the situation on hand and the necessary steps to perform. It´s like in a bad dream when you want to run away, but you are not able to move your limbs.

I´m probably exagerating and i hope that most pilots are still able to use the knowledge once learned in basic training otherwise i wouldn´t fly anymore, but i think it´s high noon to do something against a further decrease of those once learnt skills.

[bubbers44]

R4. I agree. I don't think anybody should be sitting in the front seat if they can't hand fly as we all started out doing.

[Armchairflyer]

This is not to suggest that we dismiss the potential influence of more manual flying, but to be aware that the SAFO assumes that a single (predominant?) factor is the reason for the errors. With absence of data and interpretation, this assumption is questioned.Maybe I misread the SAFO, but I fail to find any allusion to "more handflying and all will be fine". It arguably is just one "piece of the safety puzzle", but IMHO relatively easy to implement and with an excellent cost-to-benefit ratio. Neither do I see a finger of blame pointed at the sharp end here.

[RAT 5]

One problem is commercial. I know of one airline who used to allow visual approaches in the hope of saving time & fuel. They did this in their 'old' a/c. Now with shiny new wizz-bang a/c and all that great SA information you'd expect it to be even easier. Rapid expansion has led to a vast spectrum of abilities and experience. Philosophy now dissuades from short cut visuals. One of the reasons was the large increase in G.A's as soon as CAVOK hit the airfields. Guys thinking they could thread the needle again after months of IFR stuff. The 'lack of fuel & time saving' by such antics caused a shift in attitude and rather than address the root cause = lack of training & practice, the solution was to restrict it. To counter this attitude by the CAA's there will be a great bun-fight and my guess is the airlines would win it.

[Centaurus]

In order to facilitate the latter mandate all Airlines to require their pilots log a particular number of manual flying hours per year.

As there is no way you can have an audit trail for manual flying during line flying then it opens the way for wide spread cheating. That is a common thing in fake logging of instrument flight time on line - no audit trail. As far as simulator logging of hand flying is concerned that means the sim instructor must keep the log which gets messy. And don't forget it is a good bet that many sim instructors are themselves addicted to automation.

[Uplinker]

A start might be to turn the whole thing round and require crews to do manual, raw data ILS's on CAVOK, low wind days, unless a good reason prevented it?

The trouble is; once fleet managers start to insist on use of automation to keep the incidence of pilot c*ck-ups and ASR's low, then the pilots start to get rusty, with the result that there will be more c*ck-ups and ASR's when circumstances such as technical problems force them to fly manually.

However, if we all were required to practise raw data flying albeit within the confines of an ILS on good weather days only, then we might keep our skills honed a little better?

[safetypee]

This is a repost from the thread http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-emergency-response-planning/505691-flight-annual-safety-review-amazing.html#post7649826, which may be relevant to this discussion:-

“Therefore a closer examination of the character of handling factors is required …”

As a starting point there are some interesting views in the presentation ‘Responding to Emergencies and Abnormal Situations’. (http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/flightcognition/download/EAS_Symposium_Presentations/Responding.pdf):-
The first section reviews several themes contributing to events (albeit checklist related) and identifies the importance of linking knowledge through concepts to action (flying skills - expertise).
Slide 26 onwards presents a very interesting view of the domain of core operating skills – flying, operating, and managing; and that it is amongst these where problems of the higher level operational skills are seen.
The implication is that the perception of poor operational flying skills is actually a symptom of weak strategic management (Prioritisation, Anticipation, Planning, Recognition), and mental activity (Mental Flight Path Control, Rules of Thumb, Gates and Triggers, Event Flow Patterns, Generic Response Patterns, Situational Concepts, Time Management) slide 33.
And because this is where the “action takes place” – the mental activities, then “this is where problems are avoided”, slide 35
The remainder of the presentation involves cogent argument as to what the specific issue are, and perhaps how they might be addressed with training.

[Machinbird]

As there is no way you can have an audit trail for manual flying during line flying then it opens the way for wide spread cheating. That is a common thing in fake logging of instrument flight time on line - no audit trail. As far as simulator logging of hand flying is concerned that means the sim instructor must keep the log which gets messy. And don't forget it is a good bet that many sim instructors are themselves addicted to automation.
I'm not sure that is valid. With a little bit of software, most modern aircraft could keep track of whether or not the aircraft is being flown manually and by which side. Should be an easy job to uplink that data along with aircraft maintenance data for analysis at the end of each flight / series of flights (if out of communication at an intermediate destination.)

If it is important, it can be done.

[TTex600]

How does one " manually fly" a non-manual (FBW, "protected", Airbus) airplane?

If McBoeing guys are having problems hand flying, they need more practice. If Airbus guys are having problems hand flying, it's because the bus has turned on them.

[flown-it]

Easily!

You click off the A/P, pull the throttles out of the detent, look out of the window, stir the stick with your left hand and move those throttle thingies back and forward with your right to keep the bus going where YOU want it to go.

I did it when my copilot activated a secondary flight plan just as we captured the loc. Complete non event hand flying to a visual approach and landing

[BlogName1a]

So when does the FAA go from recommending to actually doing something about the erosion or never having had hired pilots with hand flying skills?

[misd-agin]

How does one " manually fly" a non-manual (FBW, "protected", Airbus) airplane?

If McBoeing guys are having problems hand flying, they need more practice. If Airbus guys are having problems hand flying, it's because the bus has turned on them.

Do Airbus' fly any different than hand flying a 777 or 787 that are FBW and "protected"?

[Uplinker]

How does one " manually fly" a non-manual (FBW, "protected", Airbus) airplane?

TTex, I think some have missed the subtlety of your point. In normal law on an Airbus, there are always two of you flying - one pilot and the aircraft: The pilot tells the aircraft where s/he wants to go, but the aircraft still has some control in the background - giving flight path stability and also protections; limiting bank angle and 'g' etc. The closest you can get to real manual would be to fly in direct law.

However, once you get your head round this, it is no problem to fly manually - just don't stir the stick too much because then you will be fighting the flight control computers. Just nudge it where you want it to go.

[fdr]

As there is no way you can have an audit trail for manual flying during line flying then it opens the way for wide spread cheating. That is a common thing in fake logging of instrument flight time on line - no audit trail. As far as simulator logging of hand flying is concerned that means the sim instructor must keep the log which gets messy. And don't forget it is a good bet that many sim instructors are themselves addicted to automation. CentR Us

You can audit this if you are prepared to use the data available properly, or add cockpit cams. The data on any aircraft designed in the last 40 years will identify if the AP is connected.

IMC vs VMC, cam is the only solution, which would also lift the value of the stabilised approach data when the program has implemented different IMC to VMC criteria.

The addiction to automation is a result of the direction that the manufacturer, regulator, human factors and compliance programs have pushed the operation. It is true that deviations from the automation are much easier for the instructor to identify, or anomalous use of automation modes, but the industry was pushing towards "the promised land" of reduced human error through automation without heeding the warning on the packet (under MSG %...) that distancing the human from the control process loop increases the likelihood of SA failure as we have seen on repetitive occasions over the last 20 years. The loss of basic flying skills, having pilots in a RPT aircraft that would be lost in a C150 let alone a Pitts S1 is so depressing I think I will go and have a quiet sob in the corner over the demise of professionalism in this industry, the final insult of the bean counters, bureaucrats and the shortsighted.

The history of IFLOC in the last 20 years has been an abject disgrace. We originally fell to earth as aircraft filed through inadequate materials and knowledge, then we ploughed fields on the sides of mountains or short of runways, and now we float down vertically in stalls such as AF447/TK1351 to arrive inelegantly in the bottom of a splash or a shallow grave, or more akin to a lawn dart (splashdown) such as Silkair, Flash or Adam air. The disneyland rides given are an embarrassment to the industry, and a direct result of the same industry's direction.

[Linktrained]

A number of posters earlier had suggested a red button to turn off some or all the Automatics.

As a York F/O in 1953, a new switch was fitted to my control column so that I, as F/O, could disconnect the A/P. The other A/P controls were by the Captain's left hand. The Training Captain with whom I was flying said that there had been a " hard over" by this kind of A/P, ( possibly on a Tudor (?), which was also built by Avro ) and this would allow me to regain normal control, hand flying.

( Some of the radio controls were not accessible from the F/O's seat. But I controlled the fuel, u/c, flaps and sychronised the props !)

[Linktrained]

" Some of the radio controls were not accessible from the F/O's seat..."

The VHF selectors were behind my left ear. The ADF was manually tuneable from below and behind my bottom.
As a very newly promoted F/O ( now paid an extra £100 pa.) we took some of the British Olympic Team to the 1952 Helsinki Olympics. Our route was via two NDBs, "Oboe Jig Jig" and " Oboe Jig Yoke" which should prevent us violating a Prohibited Area. The two NDBs had frequencies 5 Kcs apart.
I cannot recall which of the other three Flight deck crew tuned the ADF. ( Captain, 2nd. Officer or Radio Officer, we had one of each then !).
Those who remember Morse Code will have noted that the last letter of each of the identifiers, "Jig" and "Yoke", differ by having a Dot and a Dash transposed.
( YES, I should have checked, too.)
We violated. We had an investigation, delaying our departure.
Some months later I got a letter from the Ministry telling me "not to do it again."
I have not been to Helsinki again.
Was that what they meant ?
The two NDBs retained their identities and frequencies for at least ten more years - I used to check their listings from time to time, but never went there... That was what the Ministry said.

Idlewild used to give a " HAMPTON 4 DEPARTURE "which was sometimes read back as " HAMPTON FOR DEPARTURE"

Elsewhere " CLEARED TO FIVE ZERO" ... Or was that " TWO FIVE ZERO"