Another 787 electrical/smoke incident (on ground)

[pattern_is_full]

Fire Breaks Out In Parked Japan Airlines 787 Dreamliner At Logan Airport « CBS Boston (http://boston.cbslocal.com/2013/01/07/smoke-reported-in-cockpit-of-japan-airlines-flight-at-logan-airport/)

[Lyman]

Massport crews were venting smoke from a door at the bottom of the plane

The aft EE Bay Hatch?

[JW411]

The cleaner's hoover caught fire?

[SMT Member]

The aft EE Bay Hatch? No, just unclear language. I've seen pictures where both fwd and aft cargo hold doors are open, which one would expect them to be during a turnaround, and in one shot white smoke seems to be venting from the aft hold. Could be the hoover, as suggested above, might also be the aft EE compartment (again), or something else entirely. With Boeing's current luck in the art of electrickery in mind, however, my money's on an abnormal event in the EE compartment.

[poorjohn]

The cleaner's hoover caught fire?Those fastidious Japanese know how much the pax appreciate a well-groomed/hoovered plane - "According to Tweets from the Boston Fire Department, the fire was in “a compartment with batteries and other electrical components.”

[TURIN]

If you look at the video, there appears to be smoke coming from under the fuselage fwd of the aft cargo door. That is the aft EE bay hatch location.

Hmmm. Worrying? :suspect:

[areobat]

Boeing 787 Dreamliner reported on fire at Logan International Airport - Boston.com (http://www.boston.com/metrodesk/2013/01/07/boeing-dreamliner-reported-fire-logan-international-airport/1HCFhQuwAn8ELwuDg5oDgI/story.html)

Massport Fire Rescue Chief Robert J. Donahue said firefighters encountered heavy smoke in the entire cabin of the plane and used thermal imaging devices to determine the source of the fire. “We found a fire condition about ‘midships in the avionics compartment underneath,” he said. He said the fire began in a battery that was part of an auxiliary power unit that is only used when the plane is on the ground and its engines are turned off.

[AirlineCritic]

It is indeed interesting that there are reports of fire having started in the battery compartment or the avionics bay. I found these quotes from Boston Herald interesting:

“We don’t want to speculate, but it could have happened after it arrived,” said Freni, adding that all luggage was off the plane at the time the fire was reported.

Massport Fire Chief Robert Donahue said firefighters saw “heavy smoke conditions” in the entire cabin when they arrived and determined the source of the smoke was the plane’s avionics section where the batteries are located.

(From Boston Herald (http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_coverage/2013/01/fire_reported_dreamliner_logan))

[SaturnV]

Freni [Massport Aviation Director] said he believed that this particular plane had gone into service only recently, in the past few weeks.

He said he had seen the plane land from his office. “I saw it taxiing. There was no indication of smoke at that point,” he said.

Flight 8 was expected to turn around and fly back this afternoon, but it has now been grounded.
Boeing 787 Dreamliner reported on fire at Logan International Airport - Boston.com (http://www.boston.com/metrodesk/2013/01/07/boeing-dreamliner-reported-fire-logan-international-airport/1HCFhQuwAn8ELwuDg5oDgI/story.html)

[repariit]

Here's more info . . .
Boeing 787 Dreamliner Fire Probed, Blaze Adds to Setbacks - Businessweek (http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-01-07/boeing-787-damaged-in-fire-while-on-ground-in-boston)

[Turbine D]

According to the Associated Press, the Port Authority fire chief said the fire began in a small battery pack for the plane's APU. The firemen used infrared equipment to find the source of the smoke and fire and had it out within 20 minutes. It did flare up again when one of the batteries exploded. The plane landed normally without problems with 173 passengers and a crew of 11. Everyone had left the plane, but there was a mechanic on board that noticed light smoke in the cockpit after being onboard for 15 minutes and reported it to authorities. The cause of the batteries overheating is not yet known.

[Lonewolf_50]

Everyone had left the plane, but there was a mechanic on board that noticed light smoke in the cockpit after being onboard for 15 minutes and reported it to authorities. The cause of the batteries overheating is not yet known.
A tip of the cap to the mechanic for getting it right, :D and getting the fire team out there. Perhaps he prevented something much worse :eek: from coming to pass.

[tubby linton]

B787 batteries are Lithium -ion , a first application in a civil aircraft.
Boeing 787 Thales (http://www.thalesgroup.com/News_and_events/Countries/Spain/Thales_technologies_onboard_the_B787/)

[doobs115]

Have you guys ever seen a thermal runaway? Just have a quick search on YouTube. I've seen batteries go before and it is not something I'd like to be near to again!

Regards

[pipersam]

A picture clearly showing the amount of smoke coming from the cargo hold:

Twitpic - Share photos and videos on Twitter (http://twitpic.com/btav08)

[Squawk-7600]

Have you guys ever seen a thermal runaway? Just have a quick search on YouTube. I've seen batteries go before and it is not something I'd like to be near to again!

Agree, I've seen a number of videos of Lithium-ion batteries in consumer appliances going up and it's quite scary. I don't know anything about the type used in the 787 but I'd hate to be around if one of them that size went off like the consumer ones!

[E_S_P]

+1, and from personal experience any battery going up definatley isn't fun, especially in a confined space...

Rather them than me going into the unknown.... Just thinking of that China Airlines 737 that went up at Okinawa and how quickly that went up. Brave lads :D

[DaveReidUK]

NTSB has now opened an investigation into this latest incident.

[Lyman]

Batteries combustion. Resin?

[harpf]

Li-ION cover a broad range of Li Chemistries - Any one know what is acutaly in 787 Li-ION battery?:confused:

[harpf]

Some Cessna citations had A123 LFP starter (main) batteries,until one caught fire. It seems they failed to consider what happens if youconnect a 2000 amp Hobart to a fully discharged 40AH LFP battery! There gonenow do to the AD.:ugh:

[Skokholm]

It appears to be Yuasa who make the Lithium-Cobalt-Oxide cells:

Aviation | GSYuasa Lithium Power (http://www.gsyuasa-lp.com/aviation-lithium-ion-markets)
http://www.s399157097.onlinehome.us/PDFS/BoeingPR_06_12_2005.pdf
http://www.s399157097.onlinehome.us/SpecSheets/LVP10-65.pdf

[donnlass]

Arent those the batteries that brought the 747 down in Dubai?

[Dubaian]

Yes Lithium batteries were the probable cause of that crash but they were in the cargo. (Not sure if the final accident report was issued?)
This incident however appears to be with batteries fitted as aircraft equipment.

[green granite]

With the Lithium battery's well documented ability to catch fire, one would hope that certification authorities would require them to be contained in a fire proof compartment.

[cockney steve]

These batteries will be the same "family" as Lithium-polymer.
Lithium Polymer has revolutionised the model helicopter world, a huge energy-density,massive discharge rates and rapid charging rates are some of their advantages...oh, they can be shaped to fit almost anywhere,

The down-side -charging control is absolutely critical , as is balancing of cells and a need to discontinue discharging below a critical voltage.

Failure to keep on top of things or the normal level of in-service failure of anything man-made, has caused house-fires, car -fires and other serious losses.

It is customary to recharge these model-aircraft packs in a brick/concrete bunker or a steel ex-gov't ammo-box lined with sandbags!

IMHO the technology is still too unstable for such a mission-critical application as a commercial aircraft.,,,In that situation, reliability and safety MUSt take precedence over space and weight-saving and the Lipo's heavy discharge potential.

The failure-rate IS very low, but once spontaneous combustion starts, there's NO practical way of stopping it. the offending cell/pack has to be removed to a safe area to burn itself out (like THERMITE, it doesn't need outside oxygen)

Anyone remember the spate of mobile-phone batteries getting"hot" not so long ago?....same technology. :ooh:

[Seloco]

3 UA 787s on the ground in IAH last night and a rumour doing the rounds of the gate that the UA fleet has now been grounded. I was unable to corroborate before leaving but can anyone else confirm this?

[harpf]

On the Yusau site I could not find a link to the data sheetwith Co3O4 as the actual chemistry.

As an aside. I'm working with Headway LFP batteries forturbine starting. A size that fits in the 40AH RG-380 series mount. I have a proposaldrafted to use ceramic materials, for some applications as well.

Fireproof case does not solve the problems, If the casereaches 1000C it going to melt thru whatever it's sitting on. So if 50KW ofground power gets dumped into a battery it going to china syndrome no matterwhat[

[harpf]

Several aircraft were lost with NiCad Runaway, most any battery including SLA can do it. The key is the charging and protection system, Gulfstream 680 has some LiFePo4 on it.

One solution is to have a low power charger for each cell and diode isolate the pack from the power buss. It is a brute force way to prevent thermal runaway of a whole pack. I think this is the Gulfstream implementation. A drawback is don’t get the real fast recharge rate the Li-Ion can provide.

[harpf]

It seems that they 787 may have RC copter / Cell Phone 'LiPo'. That is a brave engeering team to put LiPo in an aircraft. I guess they think if they can do Level A SW for FBW so they can Level A software to protect from battery chemistry. How about door to drop the battiers out the bottom of the plane when they get to hot!

From Wiki -

Chemistry, performance, cost, and safety characteristics vary across LIB types. Handheld electronics mostly use LIBs based on lithium cobalt oxide (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_cobalt_oxide) (LCO), which offers high energy density, but have well-known safety concerns, especially when damaged. Lithium iron phosphate (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_iron_phosphate) (LFP), lithium manganese oxide (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Lithium_manganese_oxide&action=edit&redlink=1) (LMO) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Lithium_nickel_manganese_cobalt_oxide&action=edit&redlink=1) (NMC) offer lower energy density, but longer lives and inherent safety. These chemistries are being widely used for electric tools, medical equipment and other roles. NMC in particular is a leading contender for automotive applications

[Lyman]

Fox are reporting the fire as identical to "the one that caused an emergency landing in flight testing".....Laredo.

I believe the entire fleet at UA is three aircraft.

I did not know Lipo was ready for a/c, or that its character lent itself to such. The major plus is its flexibility, its ability to be shaped into panels, and structures. Not so much an energy sink.... Live and learn.....the Poly is the electrolyte, right?

[harpf]

Lithium salts are always the electrolyte in a Li-Ion battery. It is what the plates (anode, cathode) are madeof that differs between types.

[G&T ice n slice]

Has the 787 ETOPS ? if so, how does all this affect?

Just curious, retired ground person, not ever a pilot, no aptitude...
(so you vcan ignore me ...)

[Lyman]

The 737 has ETOPS.

GT brings the elephant into the parlor.

harpf... Yes the plates, I remember the Poly represents the capability, in its flex, to incorporate a battery into a fender, a frame, or any molded structure.

[Fargoo]

The APU and main batteries are quoted as a Lithium Manganese in my 787 gen fam course notes.

I believe the FAA voice many concerns over use of Lithium Ion batteries a few years ago when they were put forward for use on the 787.

Don't know much about them as I'm more familiar with Ni-Cad types.

[harpf]

They should be much better from a safty POV than Cobalt

[G&T ice n slice]

GT brings the elephant into the parlor.

ahhh... yes.. sorry

Silly me... :oh:

[RobertS975]

Not to be an alarmist, but isn't this all getting a little scary?

BTW, today's (Jan 08) JAL 787 BOS-NRT flight was sent back to the gate because of an apparent fuel leak! Not a good week for the JAL Dreamliners!

Japan Airlines Dreamliner Leaks Fuel At Logan Airport « CBS Boston (http://boston.cbslocal.com/2013/01/08/japan-airlines-jet-leaks-fuel-at-logan-airport/)

[areobat]

Fuel leaks from Dreamliner flight to Tokyo - Boston.com (http://www.boston.com/metrodesk/2013/01/08/fuel-leaks-from-dreamliner-flight-tokyo/bL83P1vSeCRjSeOfsWXlXM/story.html)

Fuel leaks from Dreamliner flight to Tokyo; plane returning to terminal

Perhaps inadequate remediation on fuel line coupling issue(s)? The '87 sure seems to be having a lot of teething pains.

[keel beam]

The B787 main battery has a battery diode module to prevent being charged by any source apart from the main battery charger.

The APU does not have a battery module diode.

There is then a possibility that the APU battery is being over charged and any safeguards are overridden. (The APU battery is in the aft electronics bay)

So I would not be surprised if a mod came out to install a battery diode module for the APU battery.

[Lyman]

GT.. Only in Fairyland would anyone miss the implications for ETOPS...

You are the first one who had the b---s to bring it up.... :ok:

keel beam.... There is a monumental possibility the implications will be missed if a solution is really that simple. For now, explanations are being tested that have to do with wishing and hoping, both that there is a simple fix, and/or, the problem is at least seen that way....or that the 'creation' of a separate headache will diminish the import of the real deal.

Fire has nought to do with teething... If it was simple, it would not have happened the first time. It is either too expensive, too complicated, or too time consuming to remedy with an "Ah-HAH".

My first impression, with Laredo, was a systemic, or design issue.... Space weight and cost are the goblins of a/c design; throw in safety and reliability, and the designers are simply incarnations of Merlin, the alchemist. Their degree is in magic, as much as anything else.

It is forgivable, that new aircraft will have issues. But that does not make the problems acceptable. Especially fire. I am not telling tales, and I hope with all my heart the aircraft is soon as dependable and profitable as the Fat One.

Cheers, they're on it....

[keel beam]

Lyman

Yes a simple solution, but I do agree that a thorough investigation is required, leaving no stone unturned.

I think more disturbing is that though Boeing appeared to have a similar incident with one of their test aircraft a year or two back, the problem arises again. Clearly not as simple a solution as I may have implicated!

[RobertS975]

The WSJ reported a short while ago online that UA has discovered "wiring issues" with one of its 787s after inspecting them following the gate fire on the JAL 787 in BOS yesterday.

Earlier, it reported that the same bay was involved in the November 2010 test aircraft fire and the recent UA emergency landing in MSY. It speculated that the ETOPs certification was at risk.

[RobertS975]

SeenItAll, the fuel leak incident at BOS today has already been reported in reply #38 and minutes later in #39.

[crHedBngr]

Here's an update from Reuters: UPDATE 3-Boeing 787 with fuel leak returns to gate in Boston | Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/08/boeing-japan-airlines-idUSL1E9C88NH20130108)

Boeing stock is down . . . big surprise!

[RobertS975]

Today's aircraft, the one involved in the fuel leak, did eventually depart BOS Logan after a three hour delay.

There should be some tower communication with the aircraft on this link:

Second Japan Airlines plane stopped before takeoff at Logan | Metro News - WCVB Home (http://www.wcvb.com/news/local/metro/Second-Japan-Airlines-plane-stopped-before-takeoff-at-Logan/-/11971628/18051988/-/m5drtwz/-/index.html)

[skol]

Fire on board, just what you need central Pacific.

I won't be paxing on these things anytime soon.

[Lyman]

A320 doesn't catch fire and we know it can land on water.

[Sydy]

Not the 330...

[Lyman]

The A330 deserves little slack. It is too old to still be coming up with gotchas.
I cannot wait to greet the 350. We need progress desperately.

[Temp Spike]

I'm still Boeing all the way vs Airbust. Always a kink or two in a radical new design. Boeing always comes out on top though. Thing is with Airbus, at best they are junk IMO. Pilots like them sometimes though and that is because they have no idea what is actually going on within an Airbus.

[tubby linton]

The NTSB have a link to a photograph of the affected area on their twitter feed

[charlie83]

Apologies for feeding the troll.

Temp Spike

"Thing is with Airbus, at best they are junk IMO" and other random crap.

In your opinion perhaps....

Have a word with yourself sunshine, you're embarrassing.

[Lyman]

For my part, I absolutely reject such drivel....

[ion_berkley]

They say a picture is worth a thousand words:


https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BAHpuT_CIAAgjPn.jpg:large

[Ct.Yankee]

Is that pic. the 787 test aircraft incident in Texas a few years ago, or yesterday's incident at Logan?

[tubby linton]

The NTSB are saying that it isthe JAL aircraft.

[SaturnV]

The National Transportation Safety Board is looking into the fire. In an investigative update issued today, it said that the fire severely damaged the auxiliary power unit battery and caused “thermal damage to the surrounding structure and components.” One firefighter was injured, the agency said.

The Wall Street Journal, citing an unidentified source, reported today that United Airlines found an improperly installed bundle of wires in one of its 787s during an inspection following the Logan fire. The wires connected to the battery used to start the auxiliary power unit.

A United spokeswoman confirmed that the airline inspected all six of its 787s overnight after the Logan incident, but she would not comment on the results. None of the planes are out of service.

Fuel leaks from Dreamliner flight to Tokyo - Boston.com (http://www.boston.com/metrodesk/2013/01/08/fuel-leaks-from-dreamliner-flight-tokyo/bL83P1vSeCRjSeOfsWXlXM/story.html)

[FlightPathOBN]

CT Yankee...the Seattle news is reporting that the image shown in that post is NTSB investigator Robert Swaim evaluating the damage to the 787 Dreamliner in Boston on Jan. 8, 2013. (Photo: National Transportation Safety Board)

MINNEAPOLIS (AP) - Boeing is confirming that a fire on one of its new 787s appears to have started in a battery, as scrutiny of the problem increases.

Also Tuesday, the National Transportation Safety Board said it will send two more investigators to Boston to examine the Japan Airlines plane. The NTSB says the battery had "severe fire damage."

The fire happened on the ground Monday, with no passengers on board. But in-flight fires can be catastrophic, so the matter is getting close scrutiny by aviation authorities.

United Airlines says it checked its own 787s overnight. It would not say what the inspections found, but the Wall Street Journal reported the airline found improperly installed wiring on one of its 787s.

Boeing says the problem appears to be unrelated to previous electrical problems on the 787. Boeing Co. shares have fallen nearly 5 percent since the fire was reported.

It was the first of two issues this week involving a Japan Airlines 787 in Boston.

Massachusetts Port Authority spokesman Richard Walsh said the Boeing 787 was towed back to the gate for evaluation early Tuesday afternoon after about 40 gallons of fuel spilled. He said the plane had 178 passengers and 11 crew members on board.

A JAL spokeswoman said the crew reported a "mechanical issue" before returning to the gate.

http://static5.businessinsider.com/image/50eaf9dc6bb3f71e5200001c-4547-400-299/boeing-787-dreamliner-united-8.jpg

[aerotransport.org]

http://nsa29.casimages.com/img/2013/01/08/130108070441829982.jpg

[sevenstrokeroll]

boys and girls...unless there is a seperate thread for the 787 fuel leak at beantown airport, I think this theory should be talked about.

as most of you guys know, big planes have big fuel tanks in the wings...among other places

but there are usually installed very small ''overflow'' tanks or ''vent tanks". the TV images seemed to show fuel coming out of the PORT (left) wing near the tip. IF the fuel tanks were filled prior to a freaking long flight to tokyo and over filled or heat expansion and a rapid turn while taxiing, the fuel may have spilled out of the vent/overflow tank.

I've seen it happen on other planes...perhaps someone has a nice view of the fuel system on the new wonder jet.

and yes the airbus is crap...the last good boeings were made by douglas

[grounded27]

The cause of the batteries overheating is not yet known.

Hell I have seen a battery run away on a classic 737.

[repariit]

"...the last good boeings were made by douglas"
Would that be the MD-11's?

[Phalanger]

Statement from Randy here: Update on 787 event in Boston (http://boeingblogs.com/randy/archives/2013/01/787_update_1.html)

The smoke was later traced to the battery used to start the auxiliary power unit.

We can’t talk about any specific details while the investigation is ongoing. But I can tell you that nothing we’ve seen in this case indicates a relationship to any previous 787 power system events, which involved power panel faults elsewhere in the aft electrical equipment bay.

Considering the type of battery the lack of damage to the surroundings is reassuring (not that I'd like a mouthful of that smoke).

[Airbubba]

"...the last good boeings were made by douglas"
Would that be the MD-11's?

'Shirley' your not comparing the MD-11 'Turtle' to the B-787 'Firebird'.

Apologies for the authentic pilot forum spelling and grammer. ;)

[bille1319]

Was there any hull damage such the plastic melting? I wonder did Thales stock fall any after the battery incident as they provide most of the electrical gadgetry : integrated cockpit displays, inflight entertainment, etc. All this ever increasing workload must require quite a hefty power source from transformers and rectifiers to maintain the power to the load. If most of it is DC at lower voltage this would mean higher currents which should mean heavier cabling and bigger AH standby batteries.

[wings1011]

Now after the completion of the 787 training and going thru the synopticts it's clear that the earlier mentioned aft ( Apu) battery does not ave a diod. Simply because it does not need one - the fwd ( main) battery has it due to its connected to the main 28v f/o and capt instrument bus - basically everything in cockpit primary or secondary are 28 v dc and are normally fed thru generators via rectifiers . So the potential backloading to the battery is eminent ,so therefore it's fitted a diod to prevent that , then the only source to charge the battery will be thru the charger. However the aft battery ( Apu) is just about only used for the Apu start and will never ever feed into the normal 28 v system ( not connected to that) and the only source into the battery is via the charger so for that specific battery it's not needed a diod . The aft battery is used for Apu start and for some external lighting if aircraft is towed with no power and tow switch selected on.
Just some small info - I could post synopticts but I don't know how to . So whatever happened must have been something else than back power anyway .

[SmsPro]

Hey, that is a lot of fuel to go up if it caught fire. What are the procedures for dealing with a fuel leak of this magnitude? Is there foam?

[heavenbound]

Any issues with Air India's 787s? I hear they have four now?

[DaveReidUK]

Latest NTSB press release:

Initial investigative findings include:

• The NTSB investigator on scene found that the auxiliary power unit battery had severe fire damage. Thermal damage to the surrounding structure and components is confined to the area immediately near the APU battery rack (within about 20 inches) in the aft electronics bay.

• Preliminary reports from Japan Airlines representatives indicate that airplane maintenance and cleaning personnel were on the airplane with the APU in operation just prior to the detection of smoke in the cabin and that Boston Logan Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting were contacted.

• Rescue and fire personnel and equipment responded to the airplane and detected a fire in the electronics and equipment bay near the APU battery box. Initial reports indicate that the fire was extinguished about 40 minutes after arrival of the first rescue and fire personnel. One firefighter received minor injuries.

Further investigative updates will be issued as events warrant. To be alerted to any updates or developments, please follow the NTSB on T.witter at t.witter.com/ntsb.

[Tu.114]

The Austrian news site ORF.at reports (http://www.orf.at/stories/2160245/) (in German) another ANA 787 flight from Yamaguchi to Tokyo cancelled, this time due to brake problems.

Now, this is obviously unrelated to the two BOS incidents, and certainly the 787 (one already cringes at the word "dreamliner") is under some media scrutiny at the moment, possibly blowing minor things out of proportion. But still, there appear to be some teething problems on this type that need solving.

[airsound]

New York Times has more (reporter in Hong Kong)
...the Japanese carrier All Nippon Airways cancelled a domestic flight after a computer on board erroneously showed problems with the aircraft’s brakes. A spokeswoman for the airline, Megumi Tezuka, said the computer glitch was similar to one that appeared when the carrier first started flying the Dreamliners in 2011. The flight NH698 had been due to depart from Yamaguchi Ube airport in southern Japan for Tokyo’s Haneda airport at 4:50 p.m. local time. The flight’s 98 passengers were transferred to a later flight.
Full report at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/10/business/global/safety-of-boeing-787-dreamliner-called-into-question.html?_r=0

However you look at it, it's not a very happy new year for Boeing.

[FlexibleResponse]

Fires in flight are acknowledged to be amongst the (if not the very) worst possible emergencies in an airliner (ignoring major structural failure).

In this case it has been reported that the fire was on the ground after disembarkation of passengers and occurred some time after starting the APU.

Suppressing and finally extinguishing the resulting fire presented a significant challenge to presumably well-equipped ground-based rescue and fire personnel.

Initial reports indicate that the fire was extinguished about 40 minutes after arrival of the first rescue and fire personnel.

A time of 40 minutes for ground personnel to contain and extinguish the fire does not give anyone a "warm fuzzy" feeling.

The APU battery is not accessible to the crew in-flight and so if it caught fire in-flight after the APU was started, only the aircraft fire indications, aircraft fire suppression/extinguishing systems could be used. This immediately brings into sharp focus exactly what is the capability of the inbuilt aircraft fire fighting systems in the case of a APU Battery fire?

Therefore the JAL APU Battery fire incident/accident would seem to qualify as a critical flight safety issue for the Boeing B787.

The "easy" workaround would seem to be to disable the APU battery and associated systems inflight, until an acceptable fix can be implemented.

But, nothing in aviation ever seems to be easy...and the Boeing/FAA political decisions based on sound engineering data and recommendations that need to be taken in this case will have to get it exactly correct.

[glad rag]

Having just snatched a quick look at the lo res available here, I'm shocked at wiring installation standard. Surely that can't be the JAL aircraft?

[areobat]

As an engineer (and SLF) it has been my experience that true "spontaneous combustion" events with batteries, of any topology, are very rare. Incendiary battery events almost always occur under high current conditions, regardless of the root cause of failure (mechanical damage, manufacturing defect, overload, etc.). Since the APU was running rather than being started when the battery fire occurred, I would suspect an issue with the battery charging circuitry as opposed to a problem with the battery itself. I'm not sure if in-flight APU operation is possible on a 787, but if so, I agree with Flexible that it should be prohibited until a complete investigation/inspection is conducted. Just my 2¢ worth.

[Alwaysairbus]

The red self annealing tape on the connector backshells looks colourful. Is this standard installation or has this aircraft had a rough time vibrating and chafing like a 10year old motor?

[falconer1]

details about charging circuits etc...

the "underlying fundamental" is that it was complete bull**** by some design engineers to spec Li Ions for the 787..

the 787 will become a very good airplane, I am sure, but to overcomplicate the new electrical architecture of that bird by specing Li Ions ( I know, I know, weight & power etc etc) when at that time all the big names in aircraft batteries for safety reasons wanted to stay away from that...

and the FAA did not feel comfortable at all, for all understandable reasons..

gimme a break, Cessna hat to retrofit the CJ 4 after their own demo burned down in their hangar in ICT when the bird was connected to a ground power which brought the Li Ion installed to flames...

I am positively sure that Boeing will have to temporarily fix that by retrofitting conventional batts to the bird and the FAA will in all certainty issue a corresponding AD....

every stupid seat cushion has to be fire blocked nowadays and then they are installing main ship batts into that bird, which at today's state of technology for Li Ions are just time bombs...and that on a bird which ultimately should qualify for 330 min ETOPS...

Darwin Awards, or what????

[FlightPathOBN]

Having just snatched a quick look at the lo res available here, I'm shocked at wiring installation standard. Surely that can't be the JAL aircraft?

Whats wrong with knob and tube wiring? :{

[grebllaw123d]

areobat,

Look at this link:
http://www.hamiltonsundstrand.com/StaticFiles/HS/Communications/General/Documents/Auxiliary%20Power_Slip%20sheet%202011.pdf

Acc. this the APU may be started and operated up to 43100 feet.

You suggest that the use of APU should be prohibited until the case has been investigated - sounds reasonable.

I flew the BOEING 767 for many years and on this type a serviceable APU was required for flying ETOPS - I do not know the requirements for the BOEING 787, but I assume that the rules are similar. If so, a ban on APU operation airborne would severely restrict the operational capabilities of the BOEING 787.

CharlieDeltaUK,
Check Wikipedia regard ETOPS - they have a good explanation!
Or instead you can check this FAA paper for a VERY comprehensive explanation:
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/2e0f31985abd83ef8625746b0057fd06/$FILE/AC%20120-42B.pdf

brgds

[Rail Engineer]

CharlieDeltaUK

I am sure an expert will come along shortly and expand but put very simply, ETOPS stands for either Extended-range Twin-engine Operational Performance Standards or Extended Operations, depending who you speak to.

It is a set of rules that enable twin engined jets to fly over places that were only accessible to 4 engined jets. The ETOPS rules are there to satisfy the FAA requirement that you can reach an alternate airport in the case of an emergency diversion.

This effectively enabled twins to cross the Atlantic.( Because the 60 minute away airport could be at Greenland, then at Great Britain etc)

There are different levels of ETOPS certification, each allowing aircraft to fly on routes that are a certain amount of flying time away from the nearest airport. For example, if an aircraft is certified for 180 minutes, it is permitted to fly any route, as long as it is always within 180 minutes flying time to the nearest airport. ETOPS operation has no direct correlation to water or distance over water. It refers to single-engine flight times between diversion airfields, regardless as to whether such fields are separated by water or land.

Advances in technology ( 777 and hi bypass turbofans) meant that a twin can now safely cross the pacific. Thus there is ETOPS 120. This means that instead of 60 minutes airports can now be 120 minutes away.

ETOPS 180 and ETOPS 207 are also available. ETOPS 207 is only available to the 777.

Now ETOPS certified aircraft have to have some extra redundancy. Such as be able to light the APU mid flight, have more capable fire suppression systems etc. They are also higher maintained.

I would prefer an expert to comment on the elephant in the room.

[Lyman]

glad rag

You beat me to it. The casual fit of the cabling, insuls, and loosely insulated coaxials is not confidence inspiring. I have seen residential knob and tube more squared away...

After two foot long flames, forty minutes of fire, and copious smoke, the EE bay is that clean? It looks sanitized, post fire. The inspector is inspecting the area in front of the battery, not the battery station. The battery's install site is around to the left, and empty. I am surprised the photo was released, if it was thought to be calming, or to minimize the look of damage, I would have to disagree.

[glad rag]

Well lets wait and see.....but it's the little things, like the screen bond/earth to the left going to the frame, crimp pointing horizontally-no drip loop, this stuff is BASIC basic wiring installation, standards are standards.
Seen it before in my old career, it can point to unskilled/minimally trained labor constructing the barrels, poor [or under pressure QA] signing it off....

And there's more, even in that lo res.

Hope they get all this sorted. Competition improves the breed.

[safetypee]

It would be interesting to know what the adjacent systems ‘boxes’ control – elect distribution / power management, etc, and thus what potential there is for collateral damage from a battery fire ?
Does the elect bay have fire suppression or just containment for ETOPS ?
Even with containment, the assumption that other services will remain available for long periods may be challenged with the evidence from this and previous incidents.

[Lyman]

The ground which caught glad rags eye caught mine. It appears to be a graft, or, occupies the insulated portion of the conductors. It attaches at the aluminum frame rail. Following the rail to its terminus at the bulkhead, we see evidence of fire or arcing. If the ground becomes hot (+/-) then the possibilty for dead short or polarity x suggests a source of lost power, or arcing/heat/ignition? Wherever that rail travels elsewhere? Shouldn't that suggest the need for isolation?

Some day some knucklehead is going to use those red taped connectors for a step.

[Ivanbogus]

An A330 was completely destroyed by fire in her early days. It has nothing to do with the aircraft type. The 787 has outperformed the A380 so far, regarding technical issues.....

[bubbers44]

Boeing makes fine airplanes and this one will be fine too. The fire was associated with the APU battery. They will fix the problem. I have had electrical smoke in flight in a 757 so know how it instantly gets your attention.

The Swissair crash near Halifax happened about a year before my situation. I shut down non essential busses for galley, etc immediately before the checklist. Two weeks later our airline changed the checklist to do what I did.

I always considered if necessary shut all generators off if the smoke is uncontrollable because if you can see out the window in VMC conditions you don't need anything. You just want to survive so SOP's can be discussed later at your hearing.

[rottenray]

Some day some knucklehead is going to use those red taped connectors for a step. That may have already happened, as the battery assembly normally sits right underneath those connectors - the big open area near the NTSB dude's knee.

http://nsa29.casimages.com/img/2013/01/08/130108070441829982.jpg

[bubbers44]

It ended up the Galley oven wiring had caused the insulation to burn so what I shut off with no checklist stopped the smoke. Now it is an immediate action.

[DozyWannabe]

...the last good boeings were made by douglas

Do you mean the one where they (Douglas) didn't bother calculating what an explosive decompression would do to the floor (and the control lines running under it) with the volume of air inside a widebody?

There's a forest just outside Paris where you can kick over the topsoil and uncover small bits of DC-10 and even tinier fragments of the people who were on that DC-10 because Douglas didn't do their homework. And even then, having been called on not doing their homework, were given a mulligan by the FAA, promised they'd fix the problem and didn't.

Say what you will about Airbus and Boeing, but any mistakes they've made in the last four decades pale in comparison with that.

[sevenstrokeroll]

dozzy wannabe...glad you have to go back so far to find problems with douglas.

B737...flips upside down and kills everyone due to rudder problems

AB320...settles into trees with top notch test pilots at controls

AB330 lost while pilots can't recover from stall

B767 thrust reverser extends in flight...all lost

B747 improper repair, vertical fin blows off killing over 500 people

Sure there are problems with douglas...but the inherent strength in the single digit (douglas) is wonderful...esp when compared with other planes.

I seem to recall Gen Eisenhower giving credit to the Douglas C47/DC3 or Dakota as helping to win WW2...and that the Dakota was the first plane in the Queen's Jubilee flyover...An American plane.


hmmmmmmmmmmmm

[bubbers44]

My Boeings were very trusted by me. They never let me down once. I did not want to fly anthing else.

[DozyWannabe]

dozzy wannabe...glad you have to go back so far to find problems with douglas.

OK - I'll respond once and once only, because this is off-topic.

Firstly, I note you go back further to find something particularly good made by Douglas... ;)

B737...flips upside down and kills everyone due to rudder problems

True, but the problem could be mitigated by maintaining a higher Vapp - no such luck with the DC-10 if the floor collapsed.

AB320...settles into trees with top notch test pilots at controls

Untrue - the crew consisted of an AF training captain and two line pilots. The accident itself was largely down to poor preparation by AF.

AB330 lost while pilots can't recover from stall

True, but this was preceded by a very similar crash - West Caribbean 708, which was an MD-82.

B767 thrust reverser extends in flight...all lost

Also possible (manually) on the DC-8, with tragic results.

B747 improper repair, vertical fin blows off killing over 500 people

True - a bad repair, but there was no fundamental problem with the design in the same way there was with the DC-10.

Sure there are problems with douglas...but the inherent strength in the single digit (douglas) is wonderful...esp when compared with other planes.

The BAC 1-11's skin was machined from ally billets, way tougher than any Douglas before or since, and in the right conditions Mother Nature could still rip her tail off.

I seem to recall Gen Eisenhower giving credit to the Douglas C47/DC3 or Dakota as helping to win WW2

And the Gooney Bird was a lovely aircraft, no doubt. But Douglas rested on their laurels and expected their reputation would carry the day, even if they cut a few corners here and there. They were wrong.

[FERetd]

Oh dear, Dozy's here and this thread is now guaranteed to go on for another five pages.

Dozy will give you all the answers, in his opinion, - yours don't matter.

Time to move on ?

[FlexibleResponse]

From Reuters:

(Reuters) - Boeing Co rolled out the Dreamliner's chief engineer to try to quell concerns about the new jet following three mishaps in as many days, including an electrical fire that caused severe damage to a plane.

At a news conference on Wednesday, the engineer, Mike Sinnett, defended the 787, the world's first plastic plane, and said its problem rates are at about the same level as Boeing's successful 777 jet.

Relatively few technical problems prevent 787s from leaving a gate within 15 minutes of scheduled departure time, he said. "We're in the high 90 percents," he said. "We're right where the 777 program was" at this stage.

The prevalence of more significant issues, such as a battery fire, is in the same order of magnitude as previous programs, he added. "There's no metrics that are screaming at me that we've got a problem."

Sinnett explained in detail how the lithium ion battery system that burned on Monday was designed by his team to be safe and prevent smoke getting into the cabin in the event of a fire during a flight. "I am 100 percent convinced that the airplane is safe to fly," he said.

Asked why smoke entered the cabin on Monday, Sinnett said the plane lacked cabin pressure to expel smoke because it was on the ground. In that scenario, "We expect that there would be sufficient time to evacuate the plane safely," Sinnett said.

This Sinnett chappie (reportedly the B787 Chief Engineer) doesn't exactly inspire confidence with his comment that fails to acknowledge that a lithium ion Battery fire is a metric that should be screaming at him and that Boeing does indeed have a critical safety of flight issue with the B787.

Sinnett sounds to me more like a political spin doctor than an engineer.

Hopefully, the real Boeing engineers working for him will provide the corrective action to return the B787 to a safe air transport vehicle and bolster Boeing's reputation for safety before corporate profit.

[toffeez]

Apparently Mr Sinnett is 787 Chief Project Engineer. So maybe he thinks about whether it's projected to be perfectly safe, rather than it is perfectly safe.

[DaveReidUK]

Sinnett explained in detail how the lithium ion battery system that burned on Monday was designed by his team to be safe and prevent smoke getting into the cabin in the event of a fire during a flight.No kidding.

As opposed, presumably, to those battery systems that are designed to be unsafe and allow smoke to get into the cabin in the event of a fire during a flight ?

Asked why smoke entered the cabin on Monday, Sinnett said the plane lacked cabin pressure to expel smoke because it was on the ground.Ah, so when a battery fire occurs when airborne, the differential pressure puts it out ? That's all good, then, no cause for alarm.

Apparently Mr Sinnett is 787 Chief Project Engineer.Heaven help us.

[toffeez]

"In case of fire, you will find lithium ion batteries located beneath your seat"

[G&T ice n slice]

The prevalence of more significant issues, such as a battery fire, is in the same order of magnitude as previous programs, he added. "There's no metrics that are screaming at me that we've got a problem."

I have read & re-read this many times and I have NO IDEA what he is trying to say.

"Prevalence" =
commonness, frequency, regularity, currency, universality, ubiquity, common occurrence, pervasiveness, extensiveness, widespread presence, rampancy, rifeness, profusion, predominance, hold, rule, sway, mastery, primacy, ascendancy, preponderance, popularity

Now, forgetting for the moment engine-related issues, because those are not in the control of an airframer, I cannot remember any previous Boeing programme that has had such serious "issues" as this one.

Right at this moment I would walk rather than risk being on board a 787 in flight.

And STILL no-one can indicate to me exactly how this aircraft can qualify under ETOPS...


Disclaimer, not a pilot, no aptitude.

[RobertS975]

Fate is the Hunter remains one of my favorite aviation books almost 50 years after I first read it as a kid. And fate has thrown the aviation world a big bone here.... this battery fire occurred on the ground and not at FL410 over the Aleutian Islands or off Kamchatka. And even with this fire on the ground, it was quickly discovered and dealt with before the entire aircraft could be destroyed, greatly hampering the process of discovering the cause.

If the aviation world and Boeing ignore the gift that fate has presented to it because of the massive financial implications and repercussions, that will be folly to the highest degree.

If I heard today that the 787 fleet was grounded until a solution was found, I would understand perfectly. But at a minimum, these airplanes should be routed so that immediate landings can be made in the event of another fire. As SR111 showed and the AC DC-9 at CVG, even that may not be enough when your ship is burning in flight!

There are only a couple of dozen 787s flying today, and at least two of them have had a fire in the aft electronics bay. Fate has been kind... the test ship was able to land in Texas back in 2010 (crew evacuated with slides) and the JAL ship was between flights and on the ground.

We cannot count on fate being so kind the next time!

[airsound]

I do agree, RobertS. I think.

Just one small correction:There are only a couple of dozen 787s flying today, There are actually 49 in service, in 8 airlines. It's estimated they're doing 439 flights a week.

And of course Boeing is planning to deliver a lot more, as we speak.

A very interesting situation developing.

airsound

[RobertS975]

Thanks, airsound. I should have looked up the deliveries, but the larger point is unchanged. There are not many of them out there, and these are not just random issues or "teething" problems.

[Phalanger]

It's over half of the number of A380s out there now. Not such a bad ramp up recently.

[sevenstrokeroll]

dozzy

by the way, the rudder on the 737 was not mitigated by a higher vapp. crossover speeds were raised demanding the ineficient use of flaps.

yes the DC8 could extend inboard thrust reversers inflight, but not with devastating results.

and I said single digit douglas ( not including the later MD)

The method of construction on the douglas was very strong...can't think of any pop tops like aloha 737.

but, back to the thread...haven't seen much response to the fuel portion I brought up.

[kbrockman]

yes the DC8 could extend inboard thrust reversers inflight, but not with devastating results.

That's not completely true as proven by what happened in '66 with a DC8 from Air New Zealand.
Vliegtuigongeval op 04 JUL 1966 met Douglas DC-8-52 ZK-NZB - Auckland International Airport (AKL) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19660704-0&lang=nl)

[lomapaseo]

And STILL no-one can indicate to me exactly how this aircraft can qualify under ETOPS...



ETOPs is not a relative argument in this discussion so you will have to ask questions somewhere else

[Lyman]

Strictly speaking, neither is rudder hardover or inflight thrust reverse. Or the success ratio of engineers trying to pitch market acceptance and relative entry performance. Slagging the T7 to make the 787 look like one of the crowd, does this guy know Dozy?

Two of these aircraft had inflight emergencies due to fire, and landed well ahead of some ETOPS minimums. Why did these flights not press on, and gain some impressive buzz re: airworthiness? Missed opportunity?

Since we heard marketing and OT performance from the project engineer, maybe this time a PR person to interpret the technology?

In my opinion, things were at a manageable level until some dimbulb decided to task an engineer with sales, and lecturing out of his field....

It could have been a ploy...Make corporate look so dumb, the actual issues disappear from the discussion...

By the way, the engineer said Boeing relies on cabin pressure to keep smoke out of the cabin. That's a neat trick with doors open, and a couple hundred people inside, waiting to leave.

The fact that there is atmospheric communication between the cabin/cockpit, and the battery bays at all, is troubling. Both emergency landings involved smoke in the cabin, at altitude, no? 35,000 feet?

[EEngr]

... probably saved this airplane. All of the fire/smoke detection and suppression systems that flight crews depend on in flight didn't appear to do a bit of good in this recent case. With nobody on the flight deck to notice alarms (if any were even operational in this mode), all that was left was some observant cleaning crew.

While this isn't as serious (from a loss of life point of view) as a fire in flight, I'm certain that airlines are not going to be happy about having their latest capital investments spontaneously combust while parked at the gate.

[Lyman]

From an early release, there were mechanics present when the fire was noticed, as well as Cabin Cleaners.

It was not established who these mechanics represented. My assumption was JAL, or contract.

When this situation becomes only about loss of Capital investment, I stop flying.

[poorjohn]

FWIW in Corporate America a Project Engineer "engineers" the project. His job is to squeeze the best possible compromise out of the real engineers to meet his budget and schedule.

At best he's a super-engineer who perfectly understands what all the disciplines are telling him and what all that babble means in terms of building an excellent airplane, and leaps tall buildings with a single bound.

At worst, it's all babble to him, but he makes the decisions anyway because that's his job.

In any case the Senior of him sits with upper management, with all that means in terms of making platitudinous noises when The Press is present.

[Lyman]

poorjohn. Yes, thanks. There is a BS in Interdisciplinary Studies in the family.

Apropos?

My point is that damage control can cause its own damage. It is too early to polish this turd.

[sevenstrokeroll]

kbrockman...

FWIW I wrote INBOARD...the accident report indicated number 4 engine was reversed...that is not an inboard engine.

and it is a training accident...training is different than normal passenger operations.

[PJ2]

OT but FWIW the DC8-40 series (RR Conway powered) was certified for in-flight reverse on all four with thrust at MCT.

[EEngr]

angryrat (http://www.pprune.org/members/358411-angryrat) , I'd like to be a fly on the wall for that 'review'. I was at Boeing after a 757 crash when the FAA handed Boeing its head on a platter over QA issues. Back then, our manufacturing certificate was at risk. But we (I was a part of the engineering group tasked with straightening things out) pulled that one out of the fire.

It sounds like things went downhill after I left. I should have told them, "Don't make me come back there!" on my way out.;)

The problem is: The last time, it was corrective action plus a civil penalty because management said, "We didn't know it was in violation of regulations". You can't use that excuse twice. People may have changed, but institutional memory is supposed to bridge the generational gap.

[repariit]

The method of construction on the douglas was very strong...can't think of any pop tops like aloha 737. About 1980 a DC9-80 test flight landed at Edwards AFB dropping its tail on the runway, and leaving the fuselage in pieces. That Douglas airplane was new. The the Aloha was very high time, had far more cycles than any other 737 fleet with similar hours, and also had corrosion issues.

[edmundronald]

Pulling the plug would give Boeing an out, mandating them to do the battery replacement which would cost each airline a seat or two in weight.

The FAA should do this in the interests of protecting not only the passengers but also the manufacturer.

Last not least, casualties created by the current battery system would discredit the agency itself.

A design mistake can creep into a piece of equipment, it is no big problem to admit it and yank it out.

[sevenstrokeroll]

reparit

the DC980 incident/accident at edwards is interesting...an FAA pilot flying the plane exceeded design limits on touchdown.

the aloha was within limits but failed.

and you don't see the same failure mode in the douglas ...take a close look at the fuselage of the douglas and see the ''finger laps'' used...no such construction on the 737

[Capn Bloggs]

the DC8-40 series (RR Conway powered) was certified for in-flight reverse on all four with thrust at MCT.
Maverick could have used that instead of pulling 10 G to get the baddies to "fly right by".:ok:

Why on earth would anybody want that certification point? Runway change=high on slope? :}

[fotoguzzi]

[Not a pilot--discard or ignore if necessary] At this stage are there not about four scenarios? 1) The plane was designed with the idea that batteries sometimes smoke and everything worked as it should have. 2) The battery failed because 2a) it or 2b) the installation was defective. 3) The battery failed because of improper procedures. 4) The battery failed because the design concept was flawed.

While, 3) should presumably not be allowed to happen, it might be forgiven if someone invented a novel mistake. I presume that 4) is unlikely or the aviation authorities never would have allowed it to the production stage.

Can any of these be ruled out yet?

[toffeez]

"The FAA shares the commenter's (ALPA) concern over a fire
erupting in flight. The regulations and the rigid requirements defined
in these special conditions are intended to prevent lithium battery
fires on board the aircraft. We have made no change as a result of this
comment."

Seems likely the FAA screwed up this time. To many free lunches?

.

[pontifex]

The DC9-80 incident occured duringperformance trials when they were trying to get the shortest landing figures. Technique was to come in at Vat and chop the power at 50ft. It fell out of the sky and, effectively, crashed and the newly lengthened fuselage broke in two. Bit late on the round out Hoskins! Lessons were learned.

[HalloweenJack]

BBC are saying , 2 more incidents since? for a total of 5 this week?


apparently 2 ANA 787`s have more issues - a windscreen has cracked with a `spider web` cracking in front of the pilot in flight and oil was seen leaking on a taxi`ing aircraft after landing?

I don't recall the 777 having so many potentially serious issues in 1 week!


@Ivanbogus

according to

Aviation Safety Network > ASN Aviation Safety Database > Type index > ASN Aviation Safety Database results (http://www.aviation-safety.net/database/dblist.php?Type=023)

no A330 has been destroyed by fire? and in fact other than the AF incident , only 2 other loss of life - 1 of which was when it was being test flown , the other was a controlled decent into the ground

[BRE]

EEngr - which 757 crash was caused by QC problems at Boeing? Other then the two blocked pitots (which are not QC related), I do not recall and could not find any 757 crashes due to techinical problems win the ASN database.

[Romulus]

Boeing bungles fuel Qantas engineer claims (http://www.smh.com.au/business/boeing-bungles-fuel-qantas-engineer-claims-20130111-2ck23.html)

[DouglasFlyer]

In my opinion it wasn't a A-330 that has been destroyed by fire.

I was flying from Geneva to CDG with a nice forecast: sky clear and good visibility. Half way to Paris we received a wx-message indicating the visibility deteriorating. It was the 20 January 1994 when an A340-211 F-GNIA was lost to fire during servicing at Charles de Gaulle Airport and creating a sudden fog condition with it's smoking fire...

[Mr @ Spotty M]

The nightmare liner, reminds me of a old song.
It is currently a ugly duckling and one day it will develop into a beautiful Swan.
This aircraft is having technical issues with every airline operating it and if each one was reported by the BBC or here on Prune it would be never ending.
The high number of components being replaced and the issues being found which result in Boeing QA having to take action is a alarming.
My guess is, all operators have been asked to remove both the main and APU batteries, inspect them and reinstall as per the AMM. This also makes sure they have been installed correctly.
A number of us that have knowledge of the day to day operation of this aircraft, are very happy that our own Airline cancelled its order.
I am confident that Boeing and its partners (Vendors) will end up with a great product, but l fear it is going to takes years and not months to achieve.

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

BBC are saying , 2 more incidents since? for a total of 5 this week?


apparently 2 ANA 787`s have more issues - a windscreen has cracked with a `spider web` cracking in front of the pilot in flight and oil was seen leaking on a taxi`ing aircraft after landing?

I don't think it's "since".
No mention of the oil spill after landing. Isn't it a confusion with the fuel spill before take-off? If so, already accounted for in the "3 in a week".
About the windscreen, see => here (http://avherald.com/h?article=45b190bb&opt=0). 24th Dec. Not in the week. Unless another occurence, but I don't think so, it would have been reported elsewhere, given the current attention of the press to the 787.

[edit] and I was wrong thinking that... :rolleyes: My bad.
- the oil spill was in fact a leak inside an engine generator (see BBC news quoted in the post below), so no confusion with the fuel spill @ Boston.
- according to NYT linked below : "Earlier on Friday, A.N.A. reported cracks in the cockpit window of a 787 (...), the third time that cracks had appeared in the windshield of one of the 17 787s operated by A.N.A.". So, not the same incident as on Dec. 24, but another occurence of the same type.
I stand corrected. Thanks Twitcher & Romulus for bringing more sources. :ok:

[Twitcher]

BBC News - Dreamliner plane review ordered by US regulators (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20988117)

Dreamliner plane review ordered by US regulators

US regulators have ordered a review of the 787 Dreamliner plane after a series of incidents put a question mark over the safety of Boeing's flagship plane.

The review by the Federal Aviation Administration will look at the design and manufacture of the planes.

It is not clear whether the planes in the air at the moment will be grounded.

An electrical fire, a brake problem, a fuel spill and cracks in the cockpit's windshield have affected Dreamliner flights in the past week.

The Boeing 787 Dreamliner is one of the most advanced aeroplanes ever created. Much of it is made from very strong, light carbon-fibre composite material.

However, a spate of technical issues has hurt its image. On Friday, two new problems were found, adding to Boeing's woes.

On Friday, All Nippon Airways reported a crack in the window on the pilot's side of the cockpit. It caused no problems for the 237 passengers and nine crew on a flight from Tokyo's Haneda airport to Matsuyama, but the return flight was cancelled
The same airline said another Dreamliner flight, shuttling between Haneda and the southern Miyazaki prefecture, experienced a delay due to an oil leak from a generator inside an engine
On Wednesday, ANA cancelled a 787 flight from Yamaguchi to Tokyo because of a brake problem
On Tuesday, Japan Airlines cancelled a Boston to Tokyo flight after about 40 gallons (151 litres) of fuel spilled
An electrical fire broke out on board a Japan Airlines Dreamliner on Monday shortly after it landed in Boston, following a flight from Tokyo
Last year, a United Airlines flight was forced to make an emergency landing because of an electrical problem
In December, Qatar Airways grounded one of its 787 Dreamliners after several manufacturing faults caused electrical problems similar to those that affected the United plane.
Last month, the head of Qatar Airways criticised Boeing in an interview with the BBC over several manufacturing faults that have resulted in the grounding of one of its three 787 Dreamliner aircraft.

[FlexibleResponse]

Poster toffeez is right on the docket:

re FAA Special Conditions for 787 certification (2007)
"The FAA shares the commenter's (ALPA) concern over a fire
erupting in flight. The regulations and the rigid requirements defined
in these special conditions are intended to prevent lithium battery
fires on board the aircraft. We have made no change as a result of this
comment."

Seems likely the FAA screwed up this time. To many free lunches?

Pages 57842 - 57844 of the Special Conditions pertaining to the FAA Certification of the Boeing 787 are very informative. Even a layman would find it hard to not realize that many requirements of these Special Conditions have been well and truly breached with the JAL battery smoke, explosion/fire and the associated conditions and damage.

It will be very informative about the Political will and the teeth of the FAA in watching its reaction to enforcing its own Regulations in trying to protect the traveling public and at the same time not causing commercial damage to the US's National aircraft manufacturing treasure...namely, Boeing.

For those with the inclination and the interest may read more at:

Federal Register/Vol 72, No. 196/Thursday, October 11, 2007 Rules and Regulation
Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. NM375 Special Conditions No. 25–359–SC]
Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787– 8 Airplane; Lithium Ion Battery Installation

Google is your friend.

[Romulus]

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/business/faa-to-begin-a-review-of-boeing-787s.html?hp&_r=0

[SaturnV]

Excerpted from the NY Times article supra,
All Nippon Airlines of Japan reported cracks in the cockpit window of a 787 Dreamliner heading from Tokyo to Matsuyama, the third time that cracks had appeared in the windshield of one of the 17 787s operated by the airline.

The cracks were on the outermost of five layers that compose the cockpit windshield and did not endanger the aircraft, said Megumi Tezuka, a company spokeswoman.

Moreover, she said, cracks of this kind are not unique to the 787 Dreamliner; cracks have appeared in other aircraft types operated by All Nippon from time to time.

In a separate matter, Japan Airlines said that an incident on Tuesday involving a fuel leak on a 787 was because one of four fuel valves connecting two tanks had been left open. This caused fuel to flow into a surge tank near the wing tip and out a vent. The plane was towed back to its gate but eventually left Boston for Tokyo after a delay of nearly four hours.

[nathanroberts2K8]

BBC News - Dreamliner plane review ordered by US regulators (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20988117)

[A4]

So does anyone have any statistics regarding windscreen cracks? A fleet of 17 aircraft in service for 13 months having three occurrences does seem high. Same airframe? Have any of the other operators experienced problems? Is this a screen manufacturing/design fault or a "mounting" issue?

In terms of stresses, with the 787 being a predominantly long haul bird the number of pressurisation cycles will be lower than a shorthaul equivalent? Additionally the 787 is pressurised to a lower deltaP than "conventional" airliners.

Something fundamental going on here - or just unlucky?

[glad rag]

I believe it was a 340 that was written off after the aft cargo door actuator hyd pump was left running for a "very long" time......

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

Additionally the 787 is pressurised to a lower deltaP than "conventional" airliners.
Wasn't it to a lower cabin alt? Hence a higher ΔP ?

[Lyman]

Windscreen? Overfill slosh? Oil in Generator? Teething?

Distractions...


Fire. Not so much. Three fires.

[DaveReidUK]

Wasn't it to a lower cabin alt? Hence a higher ΔP ?

Yes.

http://www.boeing.com/farnborough2012/pdf/Bkgd_787_interior.pdf:

the 787 will be pressurized (increased pressure to create the lower altitude) to a maximum cabin altitude of 6,000 feet.

[Lyman]

With compressors that are powered with electric motors?

[DaveReidUK]

With compressors that are powered with electric motors? Is that what's meant by stating the bleeding obvious ? :O

[A4]

:O:O of course.....increased deltaP.

[repariit]

the DC980 incident/accident at edwards is interesting...an FAA pilot flying the plane exceeded design limits on touchdown.

the aloha was within limits but failed.

and you don't see the same failure mode in the douglas ...take a close look at the fuselage of the douglas and see the ''finger laps'' used...no such construction on the 737 The pertinent issue is not whether Boeing or Douglas products are stronger. What is pertinent to this thread is that both of these incidents were big news makers in their time that resulted in improvements, and are now forgotten by the traveling public. That will be the result of the current 787 hoopla.

The DC9-80 test flight touched down with a sink rate of 12 FPS. While this was a bit faster than intended, the resulting breakup was far worse than anticipated. Being unacceptable later production incorporated improvements.

The Aloha 737 flight had an in-flight failure of the upper lobe of the monocoque from the aft edge of the entry door to the leading edge of the wing. Newspapers published shocking pictures taken on approach showing the passengers sitting in seats while totally exposed from the floor and above. The crew managed a normal landing with only the fuselage structure below the cabin floor remaining to keep the cockpit, and forward seated passengers in place. This was not a structural design problem. It was an aging aircraft maintenance issue that became a new industry wide program that changed how such aircraft are maintained.

[Lyman]

Too early for conclusions re: 787 issues.

Not too early to float the idea that far from a design or manufacture issue, this problem could be down to poor judgment with knowledge of pre existing performance issues.

Maybe not.

[Avionista]

If the outcome of the FAA review deems Lithium-Ion batteries to be too hazardous for transport aircraft applications, then AB may also have a problem. L-Ion batteries are used to power emergency lighting on the A380 and AB also plans to use them on the A350.

[Squawk-7600]

Agree. This aircraft was the product of the marketing department/spin doctors and not the engineering department. I would not have liked to have been an engineer on this project. The novelty of project meetings beginning with "You promised WHAT???!!" would have worn off very quickly!

[grebllaw123d]

I found a comprenhensive and interesting report made by the American Fire Protection Research Foundation regarding "Lithium-Ion Batteries Hazard and Use Assessment" - info about failures/fires starts on page 47.

http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/pdf/research/rflithiumionbatterieshazard.pdf

[Cool Guys]

Whats wrong with an LI battery getting on fire? Just ditch in the ocean. Sully can help with the SOP. The thing is supposed to be very strong so it will hold together. Its made of plastic so it will float. The Aft E & E access door is bound to leak a little and put the fire out. If they can keep the aux going the pax can keep warm and watch their entertainment while they wait for rescue.

[Chris Scott]

grebllaw123d

Thanks for that link. Would be interesting to know whether this battery fire/explosion occurred under load, or under recharge. The details of when it took place, and the circumstances, are sketchy.

To this non-engineer, various questions arise. Was the APU running; and – if so – for how long, and had it started at the first attempt? Had there been any previous problems with the APU? Did the cleaners have to call for the mechanics, or were they already on board? Were the mechanics present to advise the firemen?

As for the system itself, does anyone know for certain if the APU battery is recharged from the aircraft’s main electrical system (effectively), or is there some kind of autonomous charging circuit? Is there enough space on that rack for a different kind of battery (e.g., NiCad) that would be man enough to replace this Li-ion one? And would the recharging system have to be changed?

[TWT]

Aviation | GSYuasa Lithium Power (http://www.gsyuasa-lp.com/aviation-lithium-ion-markets)

[Chris Scott]

Thanks TWT,

Sounds perfect. Obviously no cause for concern then... This seems to back up much of what EEngr (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/504995-787-review-called.html#post7624704) has been saying on the other thread.

[toffeez]

“Thales is determined to create the safest, most advanced, efficient and reliable power system possible for the Boeing 787 Dreamliner.
We are partnering with GS Yuasa because we are delighted with their battery technology. Since it is maintenance-free and has longer
service life comparing to current nickel-cadmium batteries, it makes for lower operating costs and increased safety for airline companies”

A no-brainer

[Cool Guys]

According to the Yuasa Data Sheet they say

"Inappropiate handling or application of the cells can result in reduced cell life and peformance, electrolyte leakage, high cell tempertures, and even the posibility of smoke generation and fire."

By the way they say "and even the posibility of smoke generation and fire." it seems like they mean fire is very unlikely so I concur, there is nothing much to worry about.

http://www.s399157097.onlinehome.us/SpecSheets/LVP10-65.pdf

[Speed of Sound]

Thanks for that link. Would be interesting to know whether this battery fire/explosion occurred under load, or under recharge.

This is key to understanding it.

From my reading of the report that greblaw posted, apart from mechanical or thermal damage the most likely risks of thermal runaway are due to either overcharging or attempting to charge a 'dead flat' battery. My understanding of Li-ion battery caused fires, is that they have started under the latter circumstances where aircraft with discharged batteries have been standing idle for some time with the batteries off-line and a GPU has then been applied to the 'flat' battery.

I can't see an 'almost new' 787 having any of its batteries in a discharged state even if it has been stood in a hanger for a few days. This has to be something else.

Guess we'll need to wait and see.

[Chris Scott]

I wonder if this is the battery type in question. If so, it’s presumably based on the larger cell, the LVP65. (They might have used the smaller LVP10 elsewhere?) The data sheet shows that each cell is rated at 65Ah, with a nominal voltage of 3.7V. Can someone confirm that the low-power DC electrics are the standard 28V DC, implying a 24V battery? If so, would they need a battery pack consisting of 6, 7 or 8 of these cells, connected in series? Each cell is 2” thick, and weighs just over 6lb.

Interesting that they went for Li-ion cells that use “Lithium Cobalt Oxide cathode material”, providing “the best combination of high reliability [sic], high energy storage, and long life”. Knowing nothing about this, I wonder if anyone might comment on this extract from a website (http://batteryuniversity.com/learn/article/lithium_ion_safety_concerns) giving consumer advice on batteries, dating from 2011:

“There are two basic types of lithium-ion chemistries: cobalt and manganese (spinel). To achieve maximum runtime, cell phones, digital cameras and laptops use cobalt-based lithium-ion. Manganese is the newer of the two chemistries and offers superior thermal stability. It can sustain temperatures of up to 250°C (482°F) before becoming unstable. In addition, manganese has avery low internal resistance and can deliver high current on demand. Increasingly, these batteries are used for power tools and medical devices. Hybrid and electric vehicles will be next.

“The drawback of spinel is lower energy density. Typically, a cell made of a pure manganese cathode provides only about half the capacity of cobalt.”

[787PIC]

The horrific onboard fire and the subsequent tragic crash of the UPS 744F flight in DXB was suspected to have been caused by a shipment of inactive container of Li-Ion batteries.
Most flight crews have watched in shock and awe the video of a burning laptop and its multiple re-ignitions onboard a training device during yearly emergency training syllabus.
No one has yet discovered an easy way to pull off the road and jump off a burning aircraft over the Pacific Ocean, cruising at FL410!
Although sophisticated battery technology and extreme electronics are not my area of expertise, I too was concerned when I learned the use of such dangerous power supplies or ideas such as liquid cooling of hi voltage cables in the Dreamliner or any other "330 ETOPS" aircraft with composite structure.
Most of us who grew old with Boeings and other jetliner manufacturers have experienced and understand "growing pains." But so far, 787 adolescent has been more of a nightmare than pleasant dreams!
Perhaps I should ask those gentlemen at the board room in Chicago; how is that outsourcing thing working out for you now?

[Spooky 2]

Come on Rusty a little to much drama and somewhat light on all the facts. BTW, do you really have a 787 type?

[sevenstrokeroll]

wow...

I"m not a fan of the 787...but it is being beaten up way to much for what has actually happened.


the following could happen to any plane (transport ;jet)



battery fire (yes in my lifetime I've heard about nicad fires and YES I THINK LITHIUM ION is a bit too new for airplanes)...and this could have been due to someone shoving a golf club through the battery area by accident or something else.

FUEL LEAK...well, it really wasn't a fuel leak, it was a fuel spill out the surge tank vent...

Windshield crack...outer pane of a 5 pane windshield...I've seen it happen on 2 different jets that I've flown.

Brake problems...oh come on

oil leak from engine...yes it happens.

and there were delays, probably due to massive subcontracting all over the world.

yes, teething problems...yes it will get better...but come on.


oh, and to the guy who mentioned the 12FPS impact of the DC980...well, planes can handle a dead drop from 6 feet, and 600 FPM (hey boys and girls that is less than 12 FPS) is about a max landing without damage

sure, we learn things...improvements are made...and real pilots know not to fly the "A" model of anything.

[Chris Scott]

Thanks, sevenstrokeroll,

So all pilots who fly early MSNs are unreal? ;)

[JW411]

Well, I was taught right at the beginning of my flying career (more than 50 years ago):

"Don't ever fly the 'A' Model".

[repariit]

oh, and to the guy who mentioned the 12FPS impact of the DC980...well, planes can handle a dead drop from 6 feet, and 600 FPM (hey boys and girls that is less than 12 FPS) is about a max landing without damage
Damage to be expected: certainly. Their prototype's epitaph "May it rest in pieces," was a big surprise for the designers.

See it here: www.youtube.com/watch?v=COsT6DqkTDc

[Lyman]

On the face of it, outsourcing is not the issue. If a vendor is offshore and delivers his ready to install unit to final assembly, (batteries), it takes a leap to finger system interface as the issue. Place, position, and secure, then it gets wired......

This is an ops issue, imo. Boeing can't be present for line service, and thats on the Mx, or contractor. If its procedural, again, Boeing can't bird dog best practice on the line.

Windshield? Install issue. Almost certainly. Sloshing fuel dumped on the tarmac?
The tank was overfilled....Brakes? That died a quick death, no fallout.

I have no idea what FAA is up to. "Review" can mean anything from flipping through the logs to swarming the engineering with a microscope.

This entire thing could be overblown. The first fire was a tramp tool left in the EE bay, the second a fried generator, and now perhaps poor procedures on the ground.....

The arrow spins, was it Boeing for pushing too hard for Lithium, or the FAA for signing it off whilst blindfolded? They wrote it, should they eat it?

One thing is certain, somebody got chewed out for releasing the picture.

[bubbers44]

I picked up the guy standing on that desert landing at Palmdale in the DC9 80 in a citation jet. He left the shoe for his broken foot in the airplane so delivered it to him the next day. The FAA guy was doing the landing and exceeded the required sink rate at touchdown. The Aloha 737 that blew it's top off came from our airline and I had hundreds of hours In it. You can see our paint job by the ripped off skin. The 787 will be fine once they work out a few problems. Most new models go through a growing process.

[repariit]

bubbers44,
This aviation business is indeed a small world.

[aterpster]

bubbers44:

The 787 will be fine once they work out a few problems. Most new models go through a growing process.

Probably so. But in the meantime I would take a pass on an ETOPS trip on the bird.

[Squawk-7600]

What was the final ROD? It didn't look THAT bad ... not bad enough for the whole freaking tail section to drop on the ground anyway :eek:

As for the 787 I'm not as confident as some. Watch this space I'd suggest.

[henra]

If the outcome of the FAA review deems Lithium-Ion batteries to be too hazardous for transport aircraft applications, then AB may also have a problem. L-Ion batteries are used to power emergency lighting on the A380 and AB also plans to use them on the A350.

Which doesn't make it a good idea.
Although one has to say that size matters.
I'm not sure the Airbus battery for emergency lighting is a whopping 70lbs self ignition capable exlposive device.
To be functioning these things have to be fully charged. Unfortunately that is exactly the regime where these things are really dangerous.
And the usual way to blow them up is:
charging.
And guess what. That is what has to happen to them regularly per design and use case.
And all that in a 'plastics' airframe....

I will not knowingly board an airliner with a 70 lbs Lithium Ion or polymer battery.

why don't they use safe LiFe (-polymer or phosphate) batteries???
They are not that much less weight efficient yet much safer.

[Tu.114]

It appears the next fuel leak has been found on a 787. As reported by the Austrian ORF (http://www.orf.at/stories/2161026/), the JAL aircraft that had shown one fuel leak at KBOS last tuesday has come up with another leak at RJAA today.

It will be a while until I confidently board one of those aircraft.

[1stspotter]

Indeed the 787 had another leak discover in Japan

The fuel leak came from a fuel nozzle on the left wing that is used to remove fuel, a JAL spokeswoman says.

Open valve again caused fuel leak during checks on 787 that leaked fuel on BOS last week, but a different valve, says JAL. Cause unknown.

[repariit]

What was the final ROD? It didn't look THAT bad ... not bad enough for the whole freaking tail section to drop on the ground anyway http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/eek.gif
If the video showed the end of the landing, you would see that the fuselage forward of the wing was also broken open.

The final sink rate of the DC9-80 discussed above was 12 FPS.

It is worth noting that the MD-80 hard landings encountered over the 33 years following this test flight did not have such structural failures. Although the flight test plan did not call for such sink rate, the result was improvements that probably prevented loss of aircraft and saved lives during the service history of this type.

[peter we]

If the outcome of the FAA review deems Lithium-Ion batteries to be too hazardous for transport aircraft applications, then AB may also have a problem. L-Ion batteries are used to power emergency lighting on the A380 and AB also plans to use them on the A350.

Li-Ion battery's are the problem, its the mishandling by the 787's electrical system that caused the fire. This incident is a real concern because in indicates something relatively easy to prevent wasn't, so what else is fundamentally wrong? Overloading batteries, or anything else, is a serious issue with the much higher power levels in a 787 and it should have been impossible by design. Hence the review.

[MD11Engineer]

Having worked on aircraft built by Boeing, Airbus and Douglas for many years, IMO the problem with Boeing is not the design, which is generally solid, but shoddy workmanship and possibly a lack of quality control with details. E.g. crossthreaded Cannon plugs under the wing-to-body fairing on a brandnew 737NG, in a location which hasn´t been touched since the plane left the factory and which gave us a lot of trouble with the engine controls. Or pins, which seemed to have been crimped on using waterpump pliers. Or badly routed wires, rubbing against structure.
I know that boeing is notorious with it´s hire-and-fire policies, especially where low skilled (trained just for one job) assembly line workers are concerned, so they might not get the best motivated and skilled workers.
On the other hand we once had a brand new A300-600, which gave us lots of problems with the fuel quantity system. We finally opned the wings and took about a bucket full of swarf (shavings and drilled off rivet heads from manufacturing of the wing structure) out of the wing. They obviously didn´t clean the inside of the wing in Filton.

[areobat]

It seems to me that rather than deny the possibility of failure, more effort should have gone into establishing a better failure mode. Venting the contents of an Li-ion battery pack into the electronics bay just doesn't seem like the best solution. Perhaps encasing the battery and equipping that case with a pressure/temperature device that vents to the outside of the aircraft? Or perhaps liquid immersion like the packs used in automobiles (better cell-to-cell thermal distribution would allow for earlier detection of a fault and shutdown before a runaway condition develops)? I still think the root cause is (was) an issue with the charging system, but regardless of what it is ultimately found to be, the failure mode for the system as a whole leaves me a bit concerned.

[Spooky 2]

From another website but so appropriate at this hour:

http://forums.propilotworld.com/images/buttons/viewpost-right.png (http://forums.propilotworld.com/showthread.php?p=936216#post936216)
BREAKING NEWS (Chicago IL): Dreamliner passenger reading light fails at Seat 22B during routine flight. FAA certification team enroute. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood says aircraft "safest reading environment in airline service today". Boeing to provide loaner Kindle Fire (the one with the backlighting) to affected passenger; replacement lightbulb to be flown in on 747-8 Intercontinental. Boeing stock down 1/8 in continuing turbulence.

[Squawk-7600]

If the video showed the end of the landing, you would see that the fuselage forward of the wing was also broken open.

The final sink rate of the DC9-80 discussed above was 12 FPS.

It is worth noting that the MD-80 hard landings encountered over the 33 years following this test flight did not have such structural failures. Although the flight test plan did not call for such sink rate, the result was improvements that probably prevented loss of aircraft and saved lives during the service history of this type.

Sorry for the OT comments, but isn't 12 fps is around the certified design envelope? In other words an aircraft should (theoretically) be able to fly a normal approach profile and the pilot pretty much not flare at all, and at maximum landing weight the aircraft should not suffer permanent structural damage, never mind breaking up into several pieces!!! Not something I'd like to put to the test, but I thought that was the basic logic behind the figures.

[olasek]

No, typical airliner's undercarriage is rated to withstand about 600 fpm descent rate (or about 10 fps). but this doesn't guarantee that after such landing the aircraft will be able to return to service right away, often expensive repairs may be required. And 600 fpm is less than a typical descent rate during final approach, so if you don't flare you pretty much are guaranteeing loss of the hull.

[fdr]

I will not knowingly board an airliner with a 70 lbs Lithium Ion or polymer battery. HENRA

So, how about a short range big selling jet that is supposed to have ring frames fabricated by CNC which were being produced by using hammers and mark one eyeball? Recall that the OEM's QA officers that reported this to the OEM were constructively dismissed, and about 20% of this fleet operate under the auspices of the leading FAA oops sorry, er, "NAA..." :} as being fit for service? After you have removed all the aircraft types that have had issues in introduction... gong to be doing a lot of walking.

Now, OTOH, your concern on LI batteries has some merit. Personally, not too keen on them, blew the nose off a MIL jet I was flying once with a BTR, lots of metalwork and a new engine needed, so cannot say that I am a fan of these. ll systems have risks, time will tell.

[Squawk-7600]

No, typical airliner's undercarriage is rated to withstand about 600 fpm descent rate (or about 10 fps). but this doesn't guarantee that after such landing the aircraft will be able to return to service right away, often expensive repairs may be required. And 600 fpm is less than a typical descent rate during final approach, so if you don't flare you pretty much are guaranteeing loss of the hull.

Yes, that's why I said "around" the certified design envelope and "pretty much" not flare. While there may be some damage, there shouldn't be permanent damage. I guess I should have been more specific with what I meant and instead said permanent irreparable damage. Anyway all quite OT, I was just surprised to read that an aircraft said to have touched down within 100 fpm of it's maximum certified limits would completely disintegrate. It's ROD in the final 50 ft or so looked more than that, but not so much that for the spectacular result.

[henra]

Now, OTOH, your concern on LI batteries has some merit. Personally, not too keen on them, blew the nose off a MIL jet I was flying once with a BTR, lots of metalwork and a new engine needed, so cannot say that I am a fan of these.


First of all my rant is not against the airframe itself. But the choice of battery of this size and technology makes me a bit nervous.
Even though my comment was maybe a bit over the top, I have personally seen 1lbs proper brand LiPo cells go off which were charged with a proper brand charger. It is quite the fireworks. And there wasn't any reason to expect it. Went suddenly boom during charging. Took 4 litres of water to put it out. Water works fine against urban myths btw. I wouldn't try it in a closed room though, it creates a bit of poisonous acid.
From all what I've seen Li Ion is pretty much identical in behaviour.

70 times the size of this fire I do not want to imagine. And especially not inaccessibly in a carbon fiber tube at 35kft. These cells have self ignition capability once charged beyond a certain level. Be it due to a failure in the charger or an uncaught manufaturing defect in a cell or a pre- existing damage due to handling or temperature exposure. (There is just a very thin plastic foil separating the layers - you damage the foil at any place - you light up your place big time).
You get the point. Too many variables which are hard to control and in case of failure there's not much of a mitigation plan.
Just good ol' luck might save your day.
And all that while there is an alternative with only limited drawbacks.
Just one word: Why?

[Tu.114]

A question to those in the know: Is the avionics bay, or even the pressurized part of the fuselage the only place eligible for installation of the battery type used in the 787? On my aircraft (DH8), the 3 batteries (Nickel-Cadmium type) are in the non-pressurized part of the nose cone and there are vent openings overboard to prevent the buildup of any untoward gasses. And they seem rather unbothered by the often changing ambient conditions. So I do wonder why Boeing engineers did not elect to put the batteries somewhere they cannot cause as much havoc as they can right in the avionics bay (which is among the last places I would want an unruly battery in, personally); typically, there should be ample space in the tail cone and the wiring between the APU and the battery would also be shorter and lighter.

I trust that there is something I did not consider though?

[Lyman]

henra: "Just one word: Why?"

Just two words: poor judgment

In the face of well known performance issues, a spec that ignored concerns without mitigating the risks known in the field.....

Unfair?

As to the two prior airborne emergencies....

1. The tool that was left caused the fire. Was there any involvement of the Battery? Any danger presented by the heat in the EE bay due tool fire?

2. The Generator. It was involved, ok, in what way? Was there a charging issue that overloaded the charger/system? Was there risk due to excess heat re: Lithium Ion battery presence?

And,

3. (Boston) At what point did the APU Battery ignite, and for what reason? Was it on discharge, or charge?

Is this down to Battery spec, distribution, or systemic load controlling?

[poorjohn]

Poor judgement?

Some aerospace corporations are keen to bring hordes of young recent graduates into the engineering ranks. Economical, anxious to please. To make way for them, senior folks are given incentives and opportunities to leave the company. All their experience has supposedly been captured in what passes for SOPs in the engineering world, so no worries.

Has Boeing been following that path in recent years?

[Lyman]

poorjohn

No one in the industry would admit to that. It really does not matter, in this case, unless there is reasonable action taken. The industry is so into ass covering and deflection, it is difficult to get a straight answer anyway.

We do have a politician (transportation Secretary) reminding us that his job is public safety. I wonder if he had to look it up?

[grebllaw123d]

Tu.114,

Unfortunately, moving the battery to an unpressurized position is not possible - I had the same thoughts until I read the spec. for the cells: min. operating temp. is minus 18 degrees C.
See this link:
http://www.s399157097.onlinehome.us/SpecSheets/LVP10-65.pdf

I fully agree with you that the avionics compartment is not the most "pleasant" battery location in case of fire, explosions or other problems.

[Tu.114]

Grebllaw123d, thank You for the explanation. In this case, it makes sense indeed to place the battery somewhere warm and pressurized.

[henra]

Tu.114,

Unfortunately, moving the battery to an unpressurized position is not possible - I had the same thoughts until I read the spec. for the cells: min. operating temp. is minus 18 degrees C.


The minus 18°C is the ultimate lower limit. However Lithium Cells (off all kinds that I'm aware off) increase their internal resistance drastically at low temperatures. Drawing high currents at low temperatures can damage them.
Typically they are starting to feel well (meaning low internal resistance, high C rate capability) at room temperature.
They deliver best performance at around 50 - 60°C. Unfortunately that is close to the point where self -destruction starts (Usually between 75 and 95°C). They are not well suited to cold operation at all. That is a big disadvantage in power tools as well.

[Desert185]

The Classic 747 battery is under the FE's table. On the DC-8 its in the right wheelwell. :ok:

I like Boeing, Douglas and taildraggers in general, but thinking of the diverse and innovative 787 being a real electric jet, with circuit boards assembled in Mexico and lithium batteries...what could go wrong? :rolleyes:

The Douglasaurus Direct Cable-8 is looking darn good right now.

[radken]

Twins and their certifications ....

It is fortuitous when aircraft we build sometimes warn us, through the medium of non-fatal demonstration, of our various engineering, production, or operational oversights. The penalty for ignoring or white-washing these shortcomings is often a quite fatal “Can you see the problem now?” event later on. I often think on the “almost fatal” DC 10 aft cargo door incident” near Windsor back in ’72. The machine essentially told us we’d better step up, pay the price, and make an immediate fix, or pay an even greater price later, which, of course, was the way it turned out in France for Turkish Airlines. Oh, yeah, the industry had plenty of money to get the job done right the second time around. Exposed, however, was the soft underbelly of the cozy FAA/industry sleeping arrangements vis a vis grounding AD’s and non-grounding service bulletins demanded by the bean counters.
No different today as the high stakes players continue with a much more advanced game of “‘kidding yourself” called ETOPS. Nobody back in ’72 flew twins much over lonely waters, but a new industry driving paradigm came to pass in the 80‘s, that “By God, we’re going to fly over those damn oceans with no more than two motors and two pilots come hell or high water!” Thus we took our first steps off the rock on to the sandy shore and murky world of our engineered to the max big and small twins.
I won’t belabor the issue of what one or two more engines brings to the safety of flight equation insofar as the flying public masses are concerned. Ignorance of these issues on their part is certainly pure bliss as they sit suspended in space three hours southwest of Honolulu in their two motored, complex retractables.
Was that flaming LI battery pack in the 787 last week related to the on-ground APU start? Are they starter batteries? Was that a portent of something very dangerous that could happen in flight, a fortuitous message? What if they’d had to start it 3 hr’s SW of Honolulu say at FL 300? I don’t know if batt’s are even used for 78‘s APU start when either of the engines are operating. But what if they were already operating SE out there at their drift down altitude, and had to start APU. Would this battery fire have occurred? Could the plastic hull integrity have been easily compromised, pressure lost, and further descent made mandatory, with fuel consumption increasing to an even more ridiculous level? Would a good landfall have then been within reach? QF 32 (380) with two more motors comes to mind. The latter probably would not have made it. And what about an empennage fire starting in flight from that battery rack. Took the fire dept. 20 min. to kill it? What kind of fire suppression is on board to help out in this instance? Real questions needing real answers from certification folks.

[Busbert]

In 1997, shortly after EIS of the RR powered A330, Cathay Pacific and Dragonair took the decision to park their RR T700 powered fleets after the 4th in flight engine failure in a matter of a few weeks. At the time the OEMs were presenting Weibull analysis :ugh: justifying continued operation, but ultimately the airline showed its own commitment to safety. The row of parked aircraft focused a few minds in Derby and Toulouse.

[RobertS975]

radken, go back and read what I wrote in post #99 on this thread. Fate has so far been very kind by giving the aviation world the chance to acknowledge these apparent flaws without loss of life or even serious airframe damage. And I do feel that it would be serious folly to ignore these warnings becase of the great economic stakes involved.

I am not sure whether the analogy is apt or not, but recall the warnings given by the Morton Thiokol engineer about the solid rocket booster O-rings on the Space Shuttle. They were ignored until calamity occurred.

[goldfish85]

I do think we ought to give an "attaboy" to the main landing gear design team on the MD-80.

[RR_NDB]

Hi,

There are two possibilities (discarding other less probable factors):


A cell failure triggering failures to other cells.

A failure of electronic circuitry. Charger(s), current limiters or sensor(s)


I hope the pack is protected by independent cell sensors (temperature and voltage) such as used in serious Lithium battery pack designs.

But there is a threat: May they learn what caused the incident?

It seems very difficult to identify the trigger. In this scenario certainly we have a problem. And a threat that will require a change.

What kind of change? IMO the proper action should be a redundant change:


Repositioning of the pack(s)

Better sensors in the pack(s)

Higher reliability electronic circuitry

Data monitoring (a data recorder)


As a designer (*) with a passion for Reliability i consider this a serious issue and it seems FAA (review) started very well. We hope the bureaucrats to have no way to suppress the Technical people voice.

This is common and the example mentioned by RobertS975 on the Challenger disaster is typical.


* (Started to design with vacuum tubes after working maintaining aircraft radios like Collins ART-13, ARC-2, BC348, ARR15 and ground station equipt. (HF, VHF and Teletype gear) like 4WTFA, ERCO CFR etc.)

[RR_NDB]

Chris Scott

To this non-engineer, various questions arise. Was the APU running; and – if so – for how long, and had it started at the first attempt? Had there been any previous problems with the APU? Did the cleaners have to call for the mechanics, or were they already on board? Were the mechanics present to advise the firemen?

As for the system itself, does anyone know for certain if the APU battery is recharged from the aircraft’s main electrical system (effectively), or is there some kind of autonomous charging circuit? Is there enough space on that rack for a different kind of battery (e.g., NiCad) that would be man enough to replace this Li-ion one? And would the recharging system have to be changed? (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/504572-another-787-electrical-smoke-incident-ground-8.html#post7625936)

A good environmental control of the cells (temperature and voltage monitoring) would guarantee the pack operates properly. Minimizing risks of "runways".

Certainly the recharger receives power from the APU or from the System. Probably the same recharger.

The size very probably will not be enough for a NiCd of similar capacity.

The recharging system certainly is completely different.

Would be interesting to know whether this battery fire/explosion occurred under load, or under recharge.


Probably the pack was still being recharged or completed it.


I started to comment on this serious issue in previous post. (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/505010-incidents-when-new-airliners-enter-service.html#post7631073)

[FlightPathOBN]

http://operationsbasednavigation.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/2020133448.jpg

The battery underwent an X-ray CT scan at an independent test facility this weekend “to document the internal condition of the battery prior to disassembling it,” the agency said in an update on its inquiry into the fire.

Investigators also removed burned wire bundles, the battery charger and several electronic-control memory modules.

The two combined flight-data and cockpit voice recorders from the jet were taken to NTSB headquarters as well. The flight data is being analyzed by the investigative team.

[RR_NDB]

FlightPathOBN:

The two combined flight-data and cockpit voice recorders from the jet were taken to NTSB headquarters as well. The flight data is being analyzed by the investigative team. (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/504572-another-787-electrical-smoke-incident-ground-10.html#post7631137)

Some FDR channels will need to be used to monitor cells (temp and voltage), charger electronics, load limiters, etc. :mad:

Batteries are becoming too complex to be used without integrated recorders. :}

Very difficult task to learn root cause. Perhaps impossible.

The best scenario would be trace it to a defective charger (hard failure like a defective component).

Highly improbable to learn something from the remains of the battery. :sad:

[Ancient Mariner]

Would be interesting to know whether this battery fire/explosion occurred under load, or under recharge.
I had a stored Li battery for a marine SART blow a few years back. Battery was brand new and packed in a water proof heavy-duty plastic container. When it exploded it was neither under load nor being charged. I could not believe the damage that small battery caused. Scary stuff.

[cwatters]

Two years old but seems they know one reason why Li cells may catch fire...

BBC News - Cause of battery fire identified in Cambridge study (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/cambridgeshire/8687963.stm)

Cause of battery fire identified in Cambridge study

Scientists have identified a reason why lithium batteries in laptops and mobile phones may overheat and catch fire.

Cambridge University researchers said the growth of metal fibres, called dendrites, could cause short circuits.

snip

"Fire safety must be solved before we can get to the next generation of lithium-ion batteries and before we can safely use these batteries in a wider range of transport applications."

[re-checked]

NTSB Update On 787 Probe (http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/NTSBUpdateOn787Probe_208007-1.html?CMP=OTC-RSS)

"Fire and rescue workers who responded to a Boeing 787 lithium-ion battery fire at Logan Airport last week reported that it was difficult to access the battery for removal during extinguishing efforts, the NTSB said Monday, in an update on its investigation. All the workers who responded to the incident had previously received aircraft familiarization training on the 787. The board said investigators have examined the battery using radiographic and tomography scans to document its internal condition, and will disassemble it this week. The NTSB also has downloaded all the data from the airplane's flight data and cockpit voice recorders for analysis.


In addition, investigators took possession of burned wire bundles, the APU battery charger, and several memory modules. The maintenance and APU controller memory modules will be downloaded to obtain any available data. Investigators also documented the entire aft electronics bay, including the APU battery and the nearby affected structure where components and wire bundles were located. The Japan Airlines 787 had been in service for less than a month when the fire (http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/787FireTracedToAPUBattery_207969-1.html) occurred. All passengers had disembarked before the fire was detected."

[cockney steve]

researchers said the growth of metal fibres, called dendrites, could cause short circuits.
ISTR that this is precisely the same reason NiCad's die.....the charge/discharge cycles cause these Dendrites to grow, eventually puncturing the plate-seperator and short-circuiting the cell internally.. they can sometimes be destroyed (the Dendrites!) by a momentary large over-voltage/high-current (connect a 12V lead-acid to a single NiCad cell) which vapourises the Dendrite . Unfortunately, the insulating seperator is still compromised and the" fix" is only temporary.

There is, to the best of my knowledge, NO way to stop the thermal runaway in a Lithium cell , once it has started....containment is the only option.
(though Boeing "could" redesign the racking etc, so the fireball simply burns it's way down through the bottom of the fuselage and drops to the ground/sea/town 30,000 feet below/school/church/hospital....no, it would have to "plummet" then :E

Given the relatively large size and large energy-storage in the 787 application, the difficulty of seperating cells and individually "sandbagging" them is totally impractical.....older, proven technologies are the safest option.

[oceancrosser]

Is the airplane still in BOS?

[MMC]

I am not sure if it has been mentioned before but yes you can stop the thermal runaway of a Lithium Battery fire (cockney steve) - First extinguish the fire (halon etc.) - then you need to cool it, ideally with water.

I know that this does not sound right, putting water onto an electrical fire - but that is the recommended course of action from of a number sources.

[thomasfo]

Water is actually one of the best fire extinguishers also for low voltage installations. Clean water will not conduct low voltages and water is one of the best substances to cool down the burning material. The water vapor will be about 1600x the water volume and efficiently replace oxygen.

Polluted water and salt water CAN conduct even low voltages like 220V, so make sure the water is clean. Never use water on burning liquids or high voltage installations.

[DaveReidUK]

Is the airplane still in BOS? I'm pretty sure there will be plenty of news coverage when it does eventually depart BOS.

Reportedly the aircraft has now been released by the NTSB back to JAL, but I suspect the airline won't want to have anything to do with it in the short-term.

My money would be on a temporary repair at BOS to allow a one-time ferry flight back to Boeing, but even that could take quite some time.

[Octane]

MMC,

Sorry, you are misinformed. Lithium reacts spectacularly when combined with water. google it....

[Lyman]

Metallic Lithium, surely. But Lithium salts? Then there are those Dendrites.

Extinguishment is for Firefolks. Starting fires is the province of airframer.

As in, don't do it....

[EEngr]

Extinguishment is for Firefolks. Starting fires is the province of airframer.That's fine on the ground. But you've got to get there (in one piece) if the event begins in the air. Someone needs to do the analysis to show that a battery can sit and 'cook' without further damage to the airframe or other equipment.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

Myself and a few other chemists decided to do a little "experiment" with Li-ion batteries. Connected a few laptop and mobile batteries in series and then deliberately shorted them. We managed to get a thermal runaway and ignition. Wasn't spectacular, but when we put it out with CO2 it did reignite. We then tried dry ice, and that put it out but it reignited, we did know the answer which was to quench it with loads of water, which of course worked.

Only problem with this on board an aircraft is that;

a) You don't really want water sloshing about in an electronics bay, and unless you are refilling distilled water every turn around then there will be ions present, hence conductive.

b) The water will react with the Li, forming hydrogen, now that's OK in my back garden, probably not so great in an enclosed space with electronics in it.

As for Halon, I don't know, problem is that isn't it banned, and also there is no use in inerting the compartment as Li batteries have their own oxidizing agent. I'd love to give it a go in the lab though.

Conclusion - I won't fly on an A/C with Li for quite a while

[Squawk-7600]

Water is actually one of the best fire extinguishers also for low voltage installations. Clean water will not conduct low voltages and water is one of the best substances to cool down the burning material. The water vapor will be about 1600x the water volume and efficiently replace oxygen.

Polluted water and salt water CAN conduct even low voltages like 220V, so make sure the water is clean. Never use water on burning liquids or high voltage installations.

I tell you what, fill up your bath with "clean" water from you tap, plug a hair drier in to the power socket, now sit in the bath while dropping the hair drier into it. Let us know how good your theory holds up on the 220V "low voltage" :p

Water is an extremely efficient coolant, hence why it's used as such in so many applications. Any reference to electrical conductivity etc is by this stage immaterial, the prime objective is to cool the thing down by whatever means is available. Water is typically available and is ideal for that purpose. It's not distilled, and even if it was, it would become instantly contaminated by the time it was put to the intended use.

[thomasfo]

It is an old 'truth' that you cannot put out a low voltage fire with water, but it is simply not correct. As long as you keep at least a 1 meter water column between you and the conducting parts, there is no real hazard. This is also a part of the Norwegian DSB's recomendation (http://oppslagsverket.dsb.no/content/brann-og-eksplosjonsvern/forskrifter/organisering-av-brannvesen/veiledning-kjemikaliedykking/9/6/) (google translate it).

You can also take a look at this dude that testet 110V in hos own sink at way below 1 meter Hairdryer in Bathtub Myth 3 - bare wires underwater - YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=Wz7A_003mJg).


Electrical flow is all about a having a path or circuit. If the path isn't there, the electricity doesn't flow. So for a battery that is not connected to the ground you are standing on, there is no danger even if the voltage is higher. That is also why the recommendations for putting out ~600v EV battery fires are water. Water it is the only thing that can stop the thermal runaway and in that case you will not get a circuit anyway as long as you do not touche the vehicle at the same time.

I would not hesitate to stand 5 meters away and use a water hose on a 220v fire, not sure about the bathtub test....

[TURIN]

As the aft EE bay is not accessible in flight, how is one supposed to extinguish this fire? Or are we considering grounding the fleet and an expensive mod?

[henra]

MMC,

Sorry, you are misinformed. Lithium reacts spectacularly when combined with water. google it....

Sorry, in this case I'm afraid it is you who is misinformed.
The amount of Lithium in these cells is negligeable. It is <1,5% of the mass. And it is in bound form ,not pure.
So, yes pure Lithium will burn when getting in contact with water. A Lithium Battery: Not so. I have seen discharged defective cells cut open and water dripped on them. No obvious reaction.

I've personally extinguished a fire of a 1 lbs 5 cell Lithium Polymer battery with water. Works excellently. You need enough water but it extinguished the fire instantly but couldn't prevent the neigbouring cells from going off as well. So each cell had to be extinguished consecutively. Once started it was almost impossible to stop the runaway.
Each of the cells weighing roughly 5 ounces produced a fireball of nearly 0,5m diameter.

Edit: The amount of water to extinguish was almost a litre for each cell so for the 1lbs battery pack it was about 4 litres it took to put it out. And that didn't prevent the next cell from overheating. Therefore you would have needed more permanent cooling and thus more water. It was easier to extinguish the fire than to prevent it from going off in the first place once the runaway started.

[rottenray]

Myself and a few other chemists decided to do a little "experiment" with Li-ion batteries. Connected a few laptop and mobile batteries in series and then deliberately shorted them. We managed to get a thermal runaway and ignition.

How did you manage to defeat the internal fusing and current limiting?

[dmwalker]

Lithium metal will burst into flame in contact with water, the same as potassium metal and sodium metal. Lithium compounds do not burst into flame in contact with water, just as potassium compounds and sodium compounds do not (e.g. sodium chloride – table salt).


I suppose de-ionised water does not conduct electricity but, if it can dissolve any of the battery chemicals, then it will conduct electricity. I don't think there is ever a situation where any kind of water is recommended for any kind of electrical fire. Maybe packing in dry ice (solid carbon dioxide) would be a safer way to cool.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

How did you manage to defeat the internal fusing and current limiting?

We gave it a bit of a "kick start" that's all I'll say. Let's put it this way it wasn't done under lab conditions, it was done in a pumpkin in a back garden (don't ask it was post Halloween), we managed to overload them and then with a little diethyl ether get them to combust. Obviously the ether immediately went, it was the Li polymers burning.

[dmwalker]

To be fair, I have just found a FAA document which recommends fire fighting methods for lithium type batteries in portable electronic devices, which states:

"Utilise a Halon, Halon replacement or water extinguisher to extinguish the fire and prevent its spread to additional flammable materials.


After extinguishing the fire, douse the device with water or other non-alcoholic liquids to cool the device and prevent additional battery cells from reaching thermal runaway.


Do not use ice to cool the device."


Still, I don't know if I'd want to use water for a battery in a compartment with other electrical equipment and wiring.

[bigjames]

apparently another one ANA in Japan this (wednesday) morning. smoke in cabin.

[FlightPathOBN]

dmw,

well, you and others have noted a disconnect, and that is context.

Three issues here...
thermal runwaway,
associated fire,
and context.

While the 'standard' may be to use Halon for fire (which I thought was outlawed on vessels with people), then use water to cool the cells..

it would appear that sequence will not work very well on a passenger aircraft in flight...nor in an electrical bay.

I do agree with the 'standard'..the alcohol should never be used on the aircraft...
alcohol is far better utilized for the crew attempting to put this out in-flight, and the passengers...


apparently another one ANA in Japan this (wednesday) morning. smoke in cabin.

A333......"An inflight entertainment system's display set in front of a passenger seat near the toilet is suspected as cause of the smell."

[Eboy]

Voice of America reports that ANA confirms "battery problem" forced emergency landing for Boeing 787 at Takamatsu, Japan. (today Wednesday). Also Bloomberg reports all ANA 787s grounded.

[cwatters]

I also thought water would be bad for a lithium battery fire but ...

The CAA tested water based fire extinguishers on lithium battery fires...

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/capap2003_04.pdf

They say water works ok.

and in the marine environment...

Lithium Batteries and Marine Seismic (http://www.slideserve.com/liam/lithium-batteries-and-marine-seismic)

They say..

"There is an industry misconception on the use of water to fight or prevent Lithium fires.

Water has better extinguishing properties on burning Lithium batteries
Water will cool down the battery and the surrounding batteries preventing an escalation
Water can be applied from a safer distance
Water is readily available
Our batteries are hermetically sealed and direct contact with lithium metal is not possible on intact batteries



Bit concerned about that last bit. Is it possible that water is fine initially but not ok after the battery has burned for awhile and damaged it's casing?

[edmundronald]

Japan has a LOT of people on a few closely spaced islands. And they are very good at fast-loading and unloading the SLF. This means a lot of cycles on the shuttle routes, maybe an aircraft can be getting 10 cycles a day, which may means 10 hookups to ground equipment and 10 charge cycles a day ...

[cockney steve]

One lives and learns.
I once set a car on fire whilst welding the floorpan (plastic petrol-pipe melted) 2x 2-gallon foam extinguishers proved ineffective but a hosepipe and cardboard sheets solved the problem......water chilled the petrol below it's flashpoint, now sodden cardboard contained any fumes under the "hot-spot"....doors and windows left closed ensured the upholstery ran out of oxygen and self-extinguished!.


The practical issue here, however, is the lack of practicality. hoses that will stretch several thousand miles and supply suficient water at 30,000 feet are a bit thin on the ground 9or in the air) :}

If water dousing is reckoned practical, then a large tank and a distribution system will be required......Having read many a thread about tankering surplus fuel, I conclude that carting this fire-fighting system around is not cost-effective....just change the batteries for something with lower energy-density but greater inherent stability.

Halon has specific exemptions for usage in certain situations. When it was first outlawed for GENERAL use, the legislators actually thought it through!

AFAIK, Aircraft are one of those exemptions.


Risks with Lipo's are well-known in the model-flying world, but people accept the risk with a MODEL as it is far outweighed by the quietness and extraodinary power offered. Also, of course, instant starts, no messy fuel .smoke,smell and oil-residue. Also, the duration is pretty good and packs can be quickly swapped-over.....the downside is the Russian Roulette of "if/when" will it burst into flames :eek:

In commercial Aviation , this is a totally unnecessary risk. IMHO, it's technology for it's own sake.

[henra]

Bit concerned about that last bit. Is it possible that water is fine initially but not ok after the battery has burned for awhile and damaged it's casing?

That is probably not because of risk of fire but rather because the electrolyte in these cells contains a phophor lithium alloy which produces hydrofluoric acid when getting in contact with water.
You want to make sure to keep some distance to the burning cells (which you want to do anyway :E) and not to inhale it directly. That could be a bit of a problem when a huge mass of these cells has to be extinguished in a closed encapsulation (read fuselage). 70 lbs of batteries could potentially be a problem in that regard.

[BOAC]

To save interminable searching, can anyone recall the cause of the first fire on the test a/c - 2010?

[Avionista]

BOAC:

See this link for info on test aircraft fire in 2010:

No split over similar-looking wingtips - FlightBlogger - Aviation News, Commentary and Analysis (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/flightblogger/2010/11/boeing-near-end-to-787-fire-in.html)


It seems the fire was in the aft EE bay.

Also, the following quote describes the implications of electrical power failure on the 787.

US FAA to impose special conditions on Boeing 787 electric power

Boeing (http://www.flightglobal.com/landingpage/Boeing.html)’s “more-electric” power architecture for the 787 (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/07/07/209212/everything-about-the-boeing-787-dreamliner.html) will face special conditions to achieve airworthiness certification by the US FAA.
The extra certification requirements released today by the FAA require Boeing to prove that the 787 (http://www.flightglobal.com/landingpage/Boeing%20787.html) “is capable of recovering adequate primary electrical power generation for safe flight and landing” in the event of an in-flight power failure.
Boeing’s older airliners use pneumatic systems to power the hydraulics controlling flight control systems and landing gear, with comparatively small electric generators needed for onboard electronic systems.
But the 787 design omits the heavier pneumatic system in favor of electric power for the hydraulic actuators.
This change requires the aircraft’s two engines to drive four integrated drive generators providing 1.45MW of electricity, . The flight controls and landing gear depend on the electric generators as a primary power source.
The FAA recognizes the 787’s electric power as a potential safety concern that must be addressed by imposing special conditions beyond its normal airworthiness-proving requirements.
Boeing must show that the 787 is capable of safe flight with the engine and APUs inoperative. Alternate sources of power may include the battery, ram air turbine or a permanent magnet generating system.



The manufacturer also has to prove that the 787 has enough alternate sources of electrical power onboard to descend from the maximum operating altitude to the minimum altitude to attempt an engine and APU restart.

Boeing 787 aircraft profile (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/07/07/209212/everything-about-the-boeing-787-dreamliner.html)
Source: flightglobal.com's sister premium news site Air Transport Intelligence (http://www.rati.com/)news

[mickyman]

I hear Duracell have offered their services......

[Lyman]

BOAC

There was an extensive thread on this website with photography, I cannot locate it. The ZA002 fire was investigated by Boeing. The FAA certifications for Boeing 787 run to distribution, back up, and procedural, I haven't found any addressing fire, either suppression or mitigation (isolation).

I thought the final cause of fire was a "tool" left in the EE Bay. Seems to conflict with the link posted above by Avionista.

Wanna buy a 'Rolex'?

[FlightPathOBN]

The more I think about it, the seatback screens showed re-booting...doesnt that point to a something affecting the system electronics?

Not sure where the control system is for those, or why/what would cause a re-boot....

[sb_sfo]

FPO, most IFE systems I've seen will reboot if a power transfer isn't handled just so, and this may have been the case in an emergency evac?

[Lyman]

Isn't power for IFE supplied by the APU battery? If the "problem" was the main Battery, power interruption at both batteries seems likely. From the outset, isn't the underlying problem distribution?

[sb_sfo]

Lyman,
The Cabin Equipment Center is in the forward EE bay, so I doubt it is powered by the APU battery.

From some training material I have:

7. If the miscellaneous equipment cooling system detects smoke, the COOLING

LOSS light shows and IFE is powered off.

- The airplane must be on ground and smoke cleared to turn the system back on

I think the answer's right there...

[Avionista]

I gather the control surfaces on the 787 are operated by electro hydrostatic actuators (EHA), probably at least two per control surface for redundancy. For an EHA to work it needs an electrical supply plus a pulse code modulation (PCM) signal provided along the power supply wiring. Therefore, a reasonably high capacity electrical supply is vital and must always be available to power the EHAs to enable the cockpit controls to operate control surfaces, raise/lower the landing gear, etc.

Given the above, it is understandable that any doubts about the reliabilty and fail-safe functions of the 787's electrical system is going to make the FAA 'twitchy'. I suspect their review will be re- checking that there is no weakness in the design whereby a single point of failure could 'knock out' all the built-in redundancy.

[FlightPathOBN]

Lyman, sbo,

I think that in this case, the evac was a ground op, so the APU should be handling the power at this point, correct?

The airplane must be on ground and smoke cleared to turn the system back on

To me there seems to be a disconnect between the transfer....and an issue in power distribution system...

I am not clear that the 787 IFE is from the front bay...the 87 has several distribution centers, with an additional aft ee bay to save on wiring costs/weight...

[sb_sfo]

FPO,
From the training material I have, the CEC is in the front EE bay. I don't know if it is possible to specify another location, kinda doubt it. I recall the APU running in the evac video. Don't think it's possible an engine was running during the evac.

As I understand the systems, I think the APU battery is there only for the APU.

[SLFandProud]

This change requires the aircraft’s two engines to drive four integrated drive generators providing 1.45MW of electricity, . The flight controls and landing gear depend on the electric generators as a primary power source.
1.45MW!

:eek:

[sb_sfo]

From Boeing 787 SDS 44-26-00:

"Systems Description Section 787
In-Flight Entertainment System I8000

Component Location

Description

1.
Forward Electronic Equipment (EE) Compartment
These in-flight entertainment (IFE) system components are in the cabin equipment center (CEC) in the forward EE bay:
●
Digital audio video controller (AVC-D)


●
Digital server unit (DSU) - D3


●
Configuration plug.






2.
Crown Area
These IFE system components are in the crown area above the passenger compartment ceiling:
●
Area distribution box (ADB) - gigabit


●
Digital tapping unit (TU)."

[FlightPathOBN]

sb,

thanks for that...so the IFE is controlled from the forward EEC.

ground ops, ie, engines are not online, are a function of the APU or ground connect.

given the engines were off line, one would expect anything on the ac powered by the APU...

this points to the disco between shore power and ac...

[sb_sfo]

You're welcome. One thing I haven't seen discussed in the threads about these troubles is that in my outfit's experience, there is a limitation on APU use. After running the APU, there is a minimum 25 minute cooldown period required because of shaft bowing in the APU. As I understand it, on a short turn like JAL has in BOS, they run the APU during the turn and don't even bother with ground power. Wonder if that will change?

I also heard from a buddy that in the UA incident when they diverted into MSY, they made the decision to divert when they couldn't get the APU started. In that case, they changed a generator only, as far as I know. Lots going on with this electrical beast, and I hope Boeing gets their sh1t together soon.

[FlightPathOBN]

Battery from the forward EE bay..

http://seattletimes.com/ABPub/2013/01/18/2020162338.jpg

also, today the Japan transport ministry investigator Hideyo Kosugi said the state of the battery indicated “voltage exceeding the design limit was applied” to it.

[nathanroberts2K8]

Is this a big a problem as the media is making it out to be?

I mean, how much will it cost for boeing to replace these batteries with
different types in all of the aircraft that have been sold to date?

I have seen on the news that the A380 had it's own teething problems when it came into service, in particular with cracks in the wings. As much of a problem as this may be, from a passenger perspective I'd have to applaud
boeing and the FAA and other regulatory bodies for making quick decisions
to get to the root of the problem without hesitation, for me from a public perspective these decision have upheld boeing integrity and not so much harmed it.

:ok:

[Lyman]

sb_sfo, FPO.

Right. The IFE equipment is in the forward Bay. I think it is Thales derived. Originally, 'CONNEXION', a Boeing company, was to have been the vendor for IFE, then PANASONIC, then THALES. CONNEXION went banko, and the THALES system became severely outdated due the delays...The gen cycle in the IFE field is eighteen MONTHS. The Company (Boeing) developed an offer to operators for a line installed system post delivery.

My concern involved the power source, though I did initially believe the equipment was AFT. With a Main Battery acting up, prior to APU start, as the source of the diversion, the distribution issue is moot until the switch over, if any.

Reviewing the FAA special consideration for LithIon install, I could not locate a rule that addressed charging, only retention issues in discharge... So the issue becomes one of charging, which of course gets very delicate when load is highly variable, as exists in failure condition.

FPO From your picture, I assume the two batteries are displayed after removal from the a/c, both aft and forward EE bay LiIon batteries. The tops are in front, the bulging one from the main battery, post "expansion". I am guessing the cases are Stainless?

Silver lining? If the two emergency landings involved tramp FOD and Gen failure, respectively, we look at a ground problem.

[RR_NDB]

FlightPathOBN:

...Japan transport ministry investigator Hideyo Kosugi said the state of the battery indicated “voltage exceeding the design limit was applied” to it. (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/504572-another-787-electrical-smoke-incident-ground-12.html#post7640965)

This points to a faster solution of this problem (and "threat") Av industry is facing.

Circuitry design or defective part(s)?

[Dak Man]

Why Boeing's 787 Dreamliner was a nightmare waiting to happen | Business | guardian.co.uk (http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/jan/18/boeing-787-dreamliner-grounded)

[Chris Scott]

FlightPathOBN,

Thanks for the pic of the main battery (or batteries?). Not sure why we’re still on this APU bat thread, but I think we’re all finding it tough to decide which to post on.

My questions follow on from Lyman’s. Maybe you or someone else can answer...

(1) Have the 2 batteries been photographed in the forward electronics bay, or in a workshop? If in the electronics bay, the intact battery cannot be the APU bat. If in the workshop, the good battery is presumably for comparison.

(2) Presumably there are 2 main bats on the B787? If so, are they racked in close proximity?

PS
On a better monitor screen, I now see they are apparently on a wooden pallet!

[sb_sfo]

Chris,
The 2 batteries are in separate locations. The main ship battery is in the forward EE comp't, and the APU battery is on a rack just inside the door of the aft EE (for easy firefighting access I presume).

[Chris Scott]

sb_sfo,

Are you saying there's only a single main-ship's battery? That would be unusual in my experience. (I know that the APU has its own on the B787.)

[Lyman]

Getting winded trying to keep up with the different threads....

I haven't heard back from FPO, but my assumption was that the two batteries in FPO's post were Main, and APU, out of the ANA ship, with their respective covers.

It would be reasonable to think that both batteries would be removed post incident, for inspection.

Just posted that it seems unusual to equip such a generation dependent system with only two batteries. Likewise, my experience with LithIons that they should be charged at one time, and used another, charging a discharging unit used to be prohibited....

1.45 MEGA WATTS.... That is a respectable amount of power, to my inexperienced mind, that value does not compute with (16) 3.7 volts cells.

How can the single Main Battery keep up with a 6000 foot cabin at 41000feet?
Does the 787 have waivered generation? Stored battery power waived? With two beefy gensets per GE, is that how it's done?

[TURIN]

Lyman

Don't get hung up on the idea that the battey has to replace ALL of the normally available electrical power. It doesn't.
There are six generators on the 787. Two on each engine and two on the APU. The aircraft only needs a fraction of that power to function. Redundancy etc.
The battery is there to keep insruments and vital computer functions working in the event of main generator failure while the RAT deploys or APU starts.
It's not there to power heavy use electrical motors such as the Cabin air compressors or engine starters.

[TURIN]

Chris Scott
Are you saying there's only a single main-ship's battery? That would be unusual in my experience. (I know that the APU has its own on the B787.)

Lots of a/c have only one battery, many don't even have a separate APU battery.

[RR_NDB]

Bear,

...charging a discharging unit used to be prohibited....

(http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/504572-another-787-electrical-smoke-incident-ground-13.html#post7641397)

When electrons flows toward the positive terminal the battery is being charged. When they flow out of this terminal the battery is being discharged.

:confused: What you are thinking on this? :confused:

[Chris Scott]

Quote from TURIN:

“Lots of a/c have only one battery, many don't even have a separate APU battery.”

Yes, but in my limited experience large modern a/c which depend on complex electrical systems have more than one MAIN battery, even if they have a dedicated APU-start battery as well (which many don’t).

The A310 has 3 main batteries, which are also used to start the APU. Each battery has a separate cockpit switch, and separate indicators of Volts, Amps and ON/OFF on ECAM.

The A320 has 2 main (NiCd) batteries, which are also used to start the APU. Each battery has a separate cockpit switch and separate indicators of Volts, Amps and ON/OFF on ECAM.

The A330 and A340 are like the A320, but with the addition of an APU battery. The A380 has two main batteries, but I’m unable to get further details.

Chris

[PJ2]

Chris Scott;

Re, "The A380 has two main batteries, but I’m unable to get further details."

Based on this FAA Document (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2006-12-13/pdf/E6-21188.pdf), I strongly suspect (but cannot confirm) that the A380's batteries are Lithium-ion.

PJ2

[FlightPathOBN]

pretty specific that the A380 Li batteries are for emergency lighting only...

the image of 2 batteries, one charred was from the recent ac, the charred being from the forward EE bay, the other the rear.

Chris...there are diagrams in the thread somewhere...one battery is in the forward EE bay, the other in the rear APU bay

[RR_NDB]

Hi,

787 is the only airliner using Li Ion as main battery. A380 uses it just for emergency lighting.

Ni Cd is the dominant battery type today.

You may verify this looking to suppliers. (http://www.airframer.com/direct_detail.html?company=121697)

The placement of a Li Ion (mature technology?) in a compartment sharing electronic modules, only accessible from outside of A/C, the only source to start the APU (in a plane with very high electric energy requirements), without (AFAIK) measures to contain a malfunction of the charger or the battery is highly questionable, IMO.

The use of (AFAIK) the same battery as the main one differentiates 787 to all other (new/most) airliners flying today. The risks associated to this decision created a very serious adverse fact to the program.

:sad: