RAF Rivet Joint [Archive] - Page 3

Chugalug2

19th Apr 2014, 17:50

Mickj3:-
Just out of interest. If MOD/RAF are having such problems with crossover of US to UK acceptance/standards/airworthiness/documentation etc with Rivet joint that has been flying all these years what will be the situation with the F35. Would that were all there was to this shambles. It's not so much the problem as you describe, more a problem with the MOD/MAA, which doesn't 'do' airworthiness. It doesn't do airworthiness because it rid itself of anyone who could and, just for good measure, binned all the Regs.

Of course, none of that happened according to the Haddon-Cave Report, which now has the status of the Holy Grail, so instead new Regs are made on the hoof as and when required. That is no way to run a whelk stall, let alone Military Airworthiness and it's all now coming to a head, with RJ just this week's item on an ever lengthening list that no amount of stove-piping can conceal.

For those who are of a mind that if someone else is happy then so should we be, I would remind them that others were happy with the airworthiness of the Chinook Mk2 and the Nimrod Mk2, which together killed 43 people in just two airworthiness related accidents alone.

UK Military Airworthiness Provision and Military Air Accident Investigation are both in dire need of reform. To achieve that they must be freed from the MOD and from each other.

Only then can the rebuilding of UK Military Air Safety commence.

Only then can we have confidence in being told that any UK Military aircraft is airworthy or not.

Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation it Kills!

cpants

19th Apr 2014, 19:13

cpants makes proper reference to RC-135 (62-4127). Rivet Amber was not a player in his 2008 disclosure to Congress.

Rigga

19th Apr 2014, 21:19

Bit Twiddler said:
"Say, for example, part of the fuselage needed changing and L3 swapped it with a part off the rest of the RJ fleet which had an incomplete history and completely different flying hours, then what happens."

This "exchange process" is actually quite common throughout the world's aviation regulations. However, it is (in 99% of all the requirements I've dealt with) based upon confirmed knowledge of the status of the replacement part prior to installation.

This works well where you have properly logged and documented parts removed, preserved and stored, from airframes withdrawn from service for economic reasons or even some that have been designated BER.

To use parts that have no known history or documented record of usage is just playing with fire. They may have the look and feel of OEM parts but they are no better than Bogus Parts.

dervish

20th Apr 2014, 05:34

Novanav

The only accurate statement in the whole article was: 'The fact it is a re-engineered older aircraft doesn’t affect the capability on board; it just means that a different safety case has to be presented.'

Agree about the Daily Wail. The point contributors are making is this is the bit MoD just don't get!

Won't be any as it is a new aircraft and RAF are participating from the start.

This doesn't necessarily follow!

Heathrow Harry

20th Apr 2014, 08:25

The desperately sad deaths caused in the Chinook & Nimrod crashes was made much worse by the rush for VCO's and the MoD to shift the blame

We have to ask though if these two incidents should drive the whole policy of RAF equipment purchase and use.

The RAF has loses between 12 and 20 people every year in simple accidents, many of them related to vehicles. Are we saying that we shouldn't allow anyone to drive or ride in a vehicle?? Or is there an "acceptable" level of risk based on experience (e.g the chances of being struck by lightning) AND the need to get the job done??

A and C

20th Apr 2014, 08:52

Until the RAF resolves the two conflicting matters of military discipline and a blame free culture for honest mistakes ( not negligence ) it's flight safety culture will be unable to move forward.

A senior ex- RAF officer and airline post holder once said to me that if the RAF was an airline it's flight safety culture would result in the CAA removing its Air Operators Certificate .

Wensleydale

20th Apr 2014, 09:23

"Or is there an "acceptable" level of risk based on experience (e.g the chances of being struck by lightning) AND the need to get the job done??"

Sadly, since the abolition of Crown Immunity then ambulance chasing lawyers combined with the modern vengeance culture will encourage claims against an individual. To protect themselves, the seniors of any company introduce "Health and Safety" regulations which are, in reality, anti litigation measures designed to protect said managers. If anything happens then someone somewhere must have broken the rules - preferably someone quite junior, who will carry the can and face the consequences. Under such conditions then higher management will NOT accept any risk to either their pensions or their freedom.

Lima Juliet

20th Apr 2014, 09:26

I saw this adorning the walls of an MAA building the other week...

If there were no risks it probably would not be worth doing. I certainly believe an airplane is capable of killing you, and in that sense I respect it.

— Steve Ishmael, NASA Test Pilot.

...if only they practiced it!

LJ

tucumseh

20th Apr 2014, 09:51

We have to ask though if these two incidents should drive the whole policy of RAF equipment purchase and use.

When asking such a question it is necessary to acknowledge one simple fact. The aircraft were not airworthy due to quite deliberate policy. This was not an oversight. The failures were notified well in advance and a conscious decision made to make false declarations that the regulations had been followed.

One cannot compare these illegal acts with the accidental loss of servicemen in road traffic accidents. There are exceptions of course. Snatch is one. Declared unfit for purpose in Northern Ireland in the 90s, and a replacement fully endorsed and funded (then cancelled), this was conveniently ignored by politicians and VSOs when declaring it fit for purpose in the, one assumes, infinitely more benign environments of Iraq and, especially, Afghanistan. Funny how that fact is never mentioned. MoD worked hard to hide that one as well.

downsizer

20th Apr 2014, 10:11

So what was the fully funded and then cancelled replacement for Snatch, out of interest?

Chugalug2

20th Apr 2014, 10:32

It is not only the MOD/MAA that 'doesn't get it' it seems. Certain PPRuNe members too share that affliction, given comments posted here.

This is a canker lurking within the fighting ability of the UK Armed Forces' ability to wield Air Power. If the airworthiness of UK Military Airworthiness cannot be relied upon then, merely to take examples from airworthiness related fatal military air accidents posted in this forum, our aircraft can self destruct with the loss of 63 (becoming 65?) lives instead of being able to take the fight to our enemies. In such a manner are wars lost...

This was not the result of oversight or honest mistake, it was deliberate planned sabotage of UK Military Air Safety by RAF VSOs. That it continues to blight UK Military Air Safety is because those RAF VSOs are protected by a cover up perpetrated by succeeding RAF VSOs. Time perhaps for today's Royal Air Force to put a stop to such corruption and look to its very survival instead? Or don't we do leadership anymore?

Lordflasheart

20th Apr 2014, 10:34

Heathrow Harry - to add my own take to the intervening posts -

There will always be risk with military activity. However - I think the point generally being made here (very well IMHO) is that the deaths involved in this particular group of accidents were in part or in whole caused by or contributed to by certain improper decisions or other failings at the top – going back 25 + years. Those decisions seem to have had little to do with airworthiness, safety, honesty or fitness for purpose and much to do with cost saving, incompetence, negligence, siloing and politicking – followed up by lying, concealment and ass-covering after the probably inevitable or predictable accidents. In other words, if a proper system was in place, and it worked properly, many of those deaths might have been avoided.

LFH

Cows getting bigger

20th Apr 2014, 10:45

Err, can anyone prove that (lack of) airworthiness caused the Mull crash? Thought not.

The argument we (and I was part of it) presented about the Mull was that it couldn't be proved that John and Rick were grossly negligent. From that tortuous battle it was demonstrated that the aircraft was not airworthy and there should have been some very important lessons learnt. However, we should be careful not to assert that airworthiness issues directly, or indeed indirectly, caused the crash.

Nimrod is a different story.

Rakshasa

20th Apr 2014, 11:32

So what was the fully funded and then cancelled replacement for Snatch, out of interest?

Vector (Pinzgauer).

Distant Voice

20th Apr 2014, 11:45

Let us remind ourselves of a couple of statements made by Haddon-Cave in his Nimrod Review report

(1) Like a case in law, the Safety Case is a body of evidence presented as a reasoned argument. Unlike most areas of the law, the activities are not presumed innocent until proven guilty: the Safety Case must prove that a system is safe.

(2) The concept of an“implicit Safety Case” does not comply with Lord Cullen’s concept of a “thorough assessment” of the risks posed by a platform. This is because, in effect, the notion assumes that a legacy aircraft is safe merely because it was built to design and has been operating without mishap for a number of years.

"It seems to have function safely for the last x years", is not acceptable

DV

downsizer

20th Apr 2014, 12:06

Vector (Pinzgauer).

The same ones we operate now? How was it cancelled then? Did we go back and re-order it later or something....:confused:

Chugalug2

20th Apr 2014, 13:39

Cgb:-
Err, can anyone prove that (lack of) airworthiness caused the Mull crash? Thought not.
No, and AFAIK no-one has ever claimed that because no-one has ever proved what caused the Mull crash, least of all of course the RO's. What has been proved was that whatever caused the crash it was an Airworthiness Related Accident because the aircraft, along with all its sister Mk2's at the time, was released into RAF service in a knowingly Grossly Unairworthy Condition under an illegal RTS.

If airworthiness had been accorded a higher priority, indeed any priority, by those fighting the RO's Grossly Unjust Finding then not only might it have been reversed years earlier but the malevolent attack by VSOs on UK Military Air Safety might also have been revealed years earlier.

So much water, so many bridges...

tucumseh

20th Apr 2014, 16:07

The Snatch replacement programme was called Future Northern Ireland Patrol Vehicle (FNIPV). Its ISD was, from memory, mid-00s. It was an endorsed programme in the late 90s. To achieve such a timescale it would have been staffed in the mid-90s. The Pinzgauer was already in service in, for example, 2002, before FNIPV selection had taken place. (Perhaps before, I'm only going from personal experience). I don't know if it was actually selected, or shortlisted, as the programme died a death. As of 2003 it was not part of FRES.

My point is that it is another example of MoD misleading by omission and commission when challenged over deaths, and similarly of them misleading/lying in Ministerial briefs. When Ministers of the day said Snatch was fit for purpose, effectively what they were saying was Iraq/Afg were more benign environments than NI.

The links to, for example, C130 XV179 are clear. Threat and Vulnerability Assessments would have immediately flagged Snatch was due for replacement, and why. This would, or should, have immediately brought forward the replacement programme, with an updated spec due to the T&VAs. This didn't happen until after many deaths and adverse publicity. In the same way the T&VAs for C130 showed she did not meet the design and airworthiness requirements for the use to which she was being put. Similarly, Nimrod and Chinook. The latter was deemed vulnerable to SAMs, but on 2.6.94 the status of any self protection kit was "not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever".

The common denominator is senior staffs in MoD knowingly took the decision to conceal these risks. One cannot say "Accept" because the facts were withheld and attempts made to conceal them from subsequent inquiries.

Army Mover

20th Apr 2014, 19:55

The Snatch replacement programme was called Future Northern Ireland Patrol Vehicle (FNIPV).

Not sure if this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saxon_(vehicle)) is the same, but it's what we ended up with; dreadful vehicle!

cpants

21st Apr 2014, 00:46

I understand why NoVANav is upset with my post regarding the Rivet Joint maintenance program. Pride is a very difficult barrier to overcome. In posting #506, Tucumseh asked that I provide a link to my eBook, “Cowardicein Leadership”. Other forum members have privately asked for the link. Please pass this information on to the MAA and the MoD. I’m certain that it was withheld from them. https://secure.mybookorders.com/order/george-sarris (https://secure.mybookorders.com/order/george-sarris).

tucumseh

21st Apr 2014, 06:06

Not sure if this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saxon_%28vehicle%29) is the same, but it's what we ended up with; dreadful vehicle!

I cannot say what happened after 2003, but at that time Saxon was a separate "legacy" programme, albeit both Snatch and Saxon were designated Rural, whereas Tavern was Urban. Saxon's main attribute (officially) was battlefield mobility. There were many Saxon variants; ambulance, REME recovery, Internal Security, Command; so I guess it is entirely possible some were re-roled to Snatch replacement. I think there was a subtlety in the designation APV (e.g. Snatch) and APC (e.g. Saxon), because an APV could not carry a section, but I stand to be corrected.

Chugalug2

21st Apr 2014, 08:50

cpants, thanks for the link to your ebook re the harassment you have experienced, following your revelations of RC-135 airworthiness to Congress. Those who have followed the painful and tortuous threads on this Forum, re the demolition of UK Military Airworthiness, will immediately pickup on a similar process visited upon one of our members on this side of the pond. Another aspect no doubt of our 'special relationship'!

I revealed to Congress in 2008 that the United States Air Force was operating a fleet of specialized reconnaissance aircraft (RC-135s) that were not airworthy. The agency retaliated with an immediate attack on my character to divert attention away from the maintenance issues that I had reported. The diversion included a trip through the Pentagon, Congress, and the Nebraska State Court system. Eventually, government investigations substantiated the non-airworthy conditions that I had reported, but not before the United States had secured a 1.3 billion dollar foreign military sale to the United Kingdom for the same type of aircraft.

For those of us who do frequent this region, your book may be found in Kindle form here:-

Cowardice in Leadership: A Lesson in Harassment, Intimidation and Reprisals eBook: George G. Sarris: Amazon.co.uk: Books

I would beg the mods to let this stay, for this is hardly a premium priced article, and is completely in accordance with the OP. It is also a matter of vital importance to the RAF, a matter literally of life and death!

Jet In Vitro

21st Apr 2014, 15:36

Wow,

An interesting read. How many other stones need to be turned over.

JIV

Heathrow Harry

21st Apr 2014, 18:04

DV & others

I can see the issues of the past are seared into everyone's brain - my question is it possible to move on?

I totally agree with " The concept of an“implicit Safety Case” does not comply with Lord Cullen’s concept of a “thorough assessment” of the risks posed by a platform. This is because, in effect, the notion assumes that a legacy aircraft is safe merely because it was built to design and has been operating without mishap for a number of years.

On the other hand IF an aircraft has been operated for many years without mishap there is clearly a body of evidence (or a statistical number) that it is not as unsafe as (say) the F-104G or an Indian Mig-21.

For example the Boeing 777 has many years of safe flying with (perhaps) one airframe incident - it is statistically clearly safe - or safer - than just about any other airliner.

Does the Safety Case have to examine every possible issue and put a risk on it??

And how do we risk the "known unknowns"??

FYI I have been involved with a number of Safety Cases outside the aircraft industry and this is a problem everyone has to deal with when legacy infrastructure & systems are involved- I'm seriously interested in how different people approach this......

dragartist

21st Apr 2014, 21:45

CPants you are one angry dude. I hope in writing your book you have cast aside some demons. I wish you a long and happy retirement. Spend time maintaining the Warbirds at your Commemorative Air Force or what ever you call it. I am sure that is more rewarding than the 55th and your skills will not be wasted. I do have some empathy for your situation.

WRT these three airplanes we have acquired I hope they have not been through the facility at Offurt you describe. Out of date rubbers, no inspections on high pressure cylinders. misplaced spacers, incorrectly routed cables chaffing through fairleads etc. As I understand, these three aircraft which may have been subject to blue fluid leaks and urine have been completely rebuilt by L3 at Greenville. You state that the TOs (APs in English) have been updated to reflect the latest build standard. I am sure our representatives will have validated the publications and maintenance schedules by crawling all over the aircraft at Greenville and over here. I know when I bought some US kit that was subject to ITAR we were forbidden from taking the lid off the box. This was the first thing we did and found out why! not all us Brits are that gullible.

I hope the MAA the Royal Air Force and the Air Seeker IPT can find a way to understand and mitigate the "known unknowns", demonstrate that the safety target is achieved etc.

Not sure if it is down to Tuc to send them a copy of your book.

tucumseh

22nd Apr 2014, 06:42

Harry

Excellent post.

On the other hand IF an aircraft has been operated for many years without mishap there is clearly a body of evidence (or a statistical number) that it is not as unsafe as (say) the F-104G or an Indian Mig-21.

As dragartist says, the aircraft have been stripped and rebuilt by L-3. The problem you have to contend with is how to reconcile the differences between the new standard (rebuilt to different standards) and what has "operated for many years without mishap".

If the differences are minor, then the MAA may choose to give more weight to this historical evidence.

However, if the cumulative differences are great, there is no supporting evidence to plug gaps in knowledge and the Aircraft DA is reluctant to sign up to changes, then the MAA may play the red card. The evidence suggests something like this has occurred.

It boils down to "engineering judgement". As MoD admits it lacks this expertise, Philip Hammond will presumably bring his to bear. :}

Wensleydale

22nd Apr 2014, 07:37

There is, of course, another less worrying possibility... maybe the full documentation, including the performance figures, is quite expensive and therefore delivery (and hence the payment for this) has been slipped to the next financial year to save costs? (not an unknown state of affairs). If this is the case then the aircraft will certainly be up and operating by the end of the year as stated by the MOD to local TV.

W. (clutching at straws).

Willard Whyte

22nd Apr 2014, 09:42

Knowing the raf the font used for the 'ROYAL AIR FORCE' lettering is probably causing sleepless nights, as is the shade of gray paint.

CAEBr

22nd Apr 2014, 09:48

"If this is the case then the aircraft will certainly be up and operating by the end of the year as stated by the MOD to local TV."

'Operating' may be a mute point that will continue to fuel the debate, but 'up' is more tangible. With Waddington's runway due for major work from early July if its not 'up' by then it won't be for some considerable time.

Part of the plan - we would fly it but unfortunately can't because of the runway repairs.....??

CAEBr

Willard Whyte

22nd Apr 2014, 10:11

Tut tut, such cynicism CAEBr!

NoVANav

22nd Apr 2014, 10:20

The aircraft and incidents CPants writes about concern RC-135E Rivet Amber, which disappeared over the Bering Sea in Jun 1969. This WAS NOT a Rivet Joint aircraft!

My error in reading very similiar tail numbers. The aircraft in question was a TC-135, converted into an aerodynamic Rivet Joint configuration as a "bounce bird". It does not carry mission equipment.

CPants made the local news with his claims for about one day. Not a factor in fully-configured Rivet Joint aircraft.

For the record, two Cobra Ball RC-135s have crashed at Shemya AFB and one RC-135 trainer near Valdez, Alaska, in addition to the Rivet Amber. All except Rivet Amber were the result of pilot error.

No Rivet Joints or Combat Sents, current operational RC-135V, W, and Us, have ever crashed or caused an airborne loss of life.

dervish

22nd Apr 2014, 11:42

The aircraft and incidents CPants writes about concern RC-135E Rivet Amber

Just to clarify, does this mean the book is completely irrelevant to Rivet Joint? I wouldn't want to waste my couple of quid!

Jet In Vitro

22nd Apr 2014, 12:45

The book I have is RJ not RA.

Lordflasheart

22nd Apr 2014, 14:12

I refer you to post 510 (Orac's question) and cpants reply at post 517

To ORAC
cpants makes proper reference to RC-135 (62-4127). Rivet Amber was not a player in his 2008 disclosure to Congress.
I understand Rivet Amber was the name given to a single aircraft which was lost in 1969. Plenty of learned stuff readily available. LFH

dervish

22nd Apr 2014, 15:06

Thank you guys.

Distant Voice

22nd Apr 2014, 17:49

Harry you ask;

Does the Safety Case have to examine every possible issue and put a risk on it??

And how do we risk the "known unknowns"??

I believe that the safety case must include an a assessment of all known and potential hazards, all of which should be managed to ALARP. Potential hazards are identified through experience and brainstorming. Just because it hasn't happened does not mean it will not happen. A fire in Dry Bay No 7 of XV230 had not happened in 35 years of Nimrod flying but it did on 2nd Sept 2006. The coroner's verdict was that the aircraft had never been airworthy.

DV

dragartist

22nd Apr 2014, 19:32

I read C pants $3 book. The incidents he refers to were all in the 2000 era long after Rivet Amber.

I do have some sympathy for his plight but I don't think I would have gone about it that way.

I do not believe for one minute that the conditions he describes will prevail on our 3 aircraft.

the summary he makes at the end of his book, having been allowed back into the hangar, suggest that corrective actions are in place.

Keep raising the F765s, F760s and all the ASIMs (or what ever they call them now)

Lonewolf_50

22nd Apr 2014, 20:29

The coroner's verdict was that the aircraft had never been airworthy. With 35 years of successful operations, I'd call that assessment risible on the basis of that one incident.

Roland Pulfrew

22nd Apr 2014, 20:38

Lonewolf
With 35 years of successful operations, I'd call that assessment risible on the basis of that one incident.
With over 2000 hrs on type and a friend on 230, so would I. :ok: Just for pedantry the MR1/MR2 combo made 40 years of service.

Distant Voice

22nd Apr 2014, 21:30

Lonewolf and RP

I am afraid you like many others confuse serviceability with airworthiness. On the day of XV230's accident the aircraft was serviceable, it just wasn't airworthy. Whilst MoD did not agree with the coroner's findings, initially, the aircraft was "prematurely" withdrawn from service less than two years later, despite an extensive replacement programme of fuel and hot air pipe couplings.

DV

Party Animal

23rd Apr 2014, 09:00

DV,

the aircraft was "prematurely" withdrawn from service

Agreed but I thought this was purely as a cost saving measure rather than any aircraft safety issues being a factor.

Roland Pulfrew

23rd Apr 2014, 10:55

it just wasn't airworthy
Well DV, that is where you and I disagree. I think I understand the difference between serviceability and airworthiness thanks. A combination of unforseen events may, or may not, have caused the accident. Hundreds, if not thousands of similar AAR events happened without incident, so for a coroner to say that the aircraft was unairworthy was somewhat disingenous. What was deemed safe engineering practice in the 1960s or evene the 1980s might not be deemed safe today, but it might just as equally not be unsafe.

The MR2 was taken early, as a savings measure, by the previous government. Most of the people I know who were flying the aircraft at the end were not concerned about the airworthiness and would have been happy to continue flying the jet.

Chugalug2

23rd Apr 2014, 11:24

RP:-
A combination of unforseen events may, or may not, have caused the accident.
Were the events not 'foreseen' by the Airworthiness Regulations? Did they not forbid the passing of fuel lines joined by couplings through a dry bay that included a source of ignition? Wasn't that the situation with XV230? Wasn't it therefore unairworthy? So how was the coroner being disingenuous?

Pot calling kettle black?

Roland Pulfrew

23rd Apr 2014, 12:09

Did they not forbid the passing of fuel lines joined by couplings through a dry bay that included a source of ignition?

Chug

You will have to forgive me but I do not have a copy of the accident report to hand, but my (somewhat faded) memory seems to remember the fuel came from elsewhere leaking into the dry bay not from any couplings within the dry bay. Am I wrong? I thought the fuel came from one of the centre tanks. Back to you.

As to airworthiness regulations, when were they written; before or after the aircraft was designed and built?

Druid77

23rd Apr 2014, 12:16

"What was deemed safe engineering practice in the 1960s or even the 1980s might not be deemed safe today"

And getting back to the RJ isn't this the problem being faced today. Even ignoring all the excellent points being made about build standard, eng records, availability of documentation etc.

Is an aircraft designed tested and built to standards of the 60s/70s/80s (even if we assume that it was tested to, and fully met these standards) acceptably safe to bring into the inventory?

Chugalug2

23rd Apr 2014, 13:01

RP, I'm not arguing about what was the cause of the tragic loss of 230 and its 14 occupants. Like other UK Military Air Accidents it is compromised by being investigated to all intents and purposes by the operator. The freeing of the MAAIB from the MOD is as vital to UK Military Air Safety as is that of the MAA being similarly free, and just as important is that they be freed of each other.

The point about the dry bay plumbing is that it was contrary to the Airworthiness Regulations and known to be. As with similar 'anomalies', they were suborned by the UK Military Airworthiness Regulator, aka the MOD, aka the Operator. This Forum is littered with UK Airworthiness Related Fatal Military Air Accidents where the cause of the accident is disputed. So be it, for they were all investigated by the operator anyway. The point is that whatever the causes they were all unairworthy, and an Air Force riddled with unairworthy aircraft faces a bleak future, especially if it has to go to war with one that has respected and sustained its airworthiness.

In this country it took a 700 year old institution to tell its Air Force, not yet 100 years old, that 'there is something wrong with its bloody aircraft'. High time it took note instead of sneering at such warnings.

tucumseh

23rd Apr 2014, 13:49

Regardless of personal opinion, the irrefutable facts are;

1. MoD (specifically, Alcock, Graydon and Bagnall) were advised by the RAF's Inspector of Flight Safety that Nimrod (and other types) were not airworthy. The specific failings with regard to fuel systems were advised in 1996 by DRA. The systemic failings were first reported in detail in January 1988 by civilian staffs, and in general terms by RAF engineers in 1985. These notifications were supported in reports by Director Internal Audit, Equipment Accounting Centre, Man(S)Org and others; the DIA one submitted direct to PUS in June 1996.

2. All were ignored.

3. More detailed evidence, expanding upon all of the above, was submitted to both the XV230 Coroner and Haddon-Cave.

4. Both agreed with IFS and the later submissions (although neither was told about IFS's evidence in any great detail, as MoD withheld it. It was made available in detail to Lord Philip, who accepted it in full. Not that he had much choice!).

5. Government accepted the findings and established the Military Aviation Authority (not the Nimrod Aviation Authority, thereby accepting that the failings were systemic).

"What was deemed safe engineering practice in the 1960s or even the 1980s might not be deemed safe today"

Much is made in the press of Rivet Joint not meeting "new" regulations. It doesn't meet the old ones either, an inconvenient fact bodyswerved by the MAA. It has NEVER been deemed safe for an aircraft not to be under configuration control and have an invalid safety case or safety argument. The press can be forgiven for not understanding this, but MoD/MAA are being highly disingenuous.

Like most, I eagerly await Philip Hammond's decision. Does he refuse to issue a waiver and face castigation because his department has made the same mistake yet again. Or does he sign, and drive a bus through Haddon-Cave and, effectively, negate the need for the MAA. Think about that last one. The MAA has, effectively, recommended to Hammond that they need not exist.

If he signs, he is sending out a powerful message. Mandated Airworthiness regulations are optional. That is, we're back to square one, as this is what his predecessors ruled so many times in the past, killing so many in the process.

Roland Pulfrew

23rd Apr 2014, 14:27

It doesn't meet the old ones either

Whose old ones? I'm guessing that the USAF might argue slightly differently.

Or does he sign, and drive a bus through Haddon-Cave and, effectively, negate the need for the MAA.

That's quite a leap. Surely this is what risk management is all about? If he accepts that we can never achieve the safety case that you, DV and Chug want because the evidence simply does not exist (because the aircraft is one that has been operated for many years by a nation with different requirements and regulations) then he passes the waiver and he accepts the risk.

Bengo

23rd Apr 2014, 15:27

RP,

Indeed, Hammond personally will be accepting the risk and imposing it on the servicemen and women who have to fly in the aircraft. I wonder if he will be able to accurately quantify that risk for them? "Duty of Care" is the phrase that springs to mind.

If he does accept the risk he is also waiving his own requirement for the probability of a life endangering accident to be less than 1 in 10-6, which tucumseh quoted in detail above. If that level of safety is not required for RJ why is it different to the other a/c operated by the Services?

N

Heathrow Harry

23rd Apr 2014, 17:04

he may of course take into account the risks of NOT having Rivet Joint in service and the losses to British servicemen and women and British interests that might thus occur......................

damned whatever he does I beleive

tucumseh

23rd Apr 2014, 17:07

Surely this is what risk management is all about?Well, it's about identifying the risk, mitigating it and preventing recurrence. Importantly, assessing whether it applies elsewhere and preventing compartmentalisation.

In this case, the basic risk (flat refusal to implement mandated regs) was identified, but neither mitigated nor recurrence prevented. So, it has happened again, and again. The same risks have recurred with monotonous regularity; the issue I have is that some have mitigated them with effortless competence, while others have ignored them or failed miserably to mitigate them. Yet MoD prefer to endorse the latter while vilifying the former.

If he accepts that we can never achieve the safety case that you, DV and Chug want
No, it is the Safety Case HE DEMANDS, and legislates for in law. DV, Chug and myself merely point out that his predecessors have ruled that VSOs were correct in issuing orders that this legislation, and the direct orders they were under from SofS, could be ignored and false declarations made that they had been implemented.

I infer from this that you do not see a need for a compliant Safety Case, so perhaps you could offer an alternative? I have said before, if he signs a waiver and a viable alternative means of assuring safety is agreed, then I'm fine with that. What worries me is that this programme is some years old now, the first aircraft was delivered last October (?), and here we are 6 months later asking for a waiver of supposedly mandated regulations. If MoD had identified all the risks (as they claim), and they could not be mitigated, why was the request for waiver not on Ainsworth's desk all those years ago? As I said before, no-one in MoD has the authority to proceed with expenditure under such circumstances. (Or, even if Bernard Gray has been granted such authority recently, then he'd be foolish to sign given the "novel and/or contentious" nature of the risk. And given his background, I wonder if he CAN be granted such delegation? Or if he even wants it!).

Tourist

23rd Apr 2014, 17:47

Tuc

Gratifying though it is to have those like yourself trying to keep us safe, you seem to believe that the safety of the aircrew should be of paramount importance.

It shouldn't.

If you want safe then don't join the military.

Military is about operational capability.

People trying to make us safe have pretty much destroyed ours.

We now have vastly more capable aircraft than when I joined but a reduction in capability because we are not allowed to operate them to the limit or anywhere near the limit or even get them airborne because nobody can prove it's safe!

It never was safe!!
"safety" will make us lose the next war. Lets see how "safe" that is.

Single Spey

23rd Apr 2014, 19:11

Tourist,

Whilst I applaud your 'can do regardless' attitude, airworthiness is not there just for you to agree to accept the risk - airworthiness is also there to protect third parties. Would YOU be willing to underwrite the liability if a Rivet Joint came down in the middle of Lincoln due to a risk that hadn't been mitigated and demonstrated to be ALARP?

Chugalug2

23rd Apr 2014, 19:11

Tourist, we've threads here on the Reds 0/0 ejection (1), the Sea Kings' collision (7), the Tornado blue on blue (2), the Hercules in Iraq (10), the Nimrod in Afghanistan (14), and of course the Mull Chinook (29), and that's your conclusion?

Yes, the idea is to keep you alive and your aircraft intact, not for your ultimate survival, but so that you can do what we pay you for, to close with our enemies and to destroy them. If instead you are killed by your ejection seat, so blinded by your HISLs that you switch them off, cannot be seen and suffer a mid-air, unwarned of your IFF failure and hence shot down, destroyed by as little as a small arms round penetrating your tactical aircraft's fuel tanks, destroyed by your aircraft's AAR system, or simply ordered to fly a grossly unairworthy aircraft that kills you and all its occupants, then you are poor value for money and the enemy prevails. Is that the good operational capability of which you speak?

tucumseh

24th Apr 2014, 06:13

This forum (Military Aircrew) is like MoD in microcosm.

After spending years becoming a "Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person" (which notably excludes proven competence, but that's MoD for you) you are granted Airworthiness & Technical and Financial Approval Delegation. (Two different, but related things). Your letters of delegation spell out your legal obligation, and point you to the laws that say how long you can be imprisoned for if you fail in that obligation.

At no point does your delegation permit you to waive this obligation just because aircrew don't want you to implement the safety regulations.

Then an Unsuitable, Unqualified and Inexperienced (and incompetent) Person self-delegates and instructs you to ignore your legal obligation, ordering you to make false written declarations, exposing yourself to legal action.

When you meet your legal obligation and refuse, he has a hissy fit and runs to his boss, the very man who has granted you your delegation. The boss delegates the matter downwards and instructs the UN-SQEP to judge his own case. He rules in his own favour.

You escalate, in accordance with the regulations. At each stage you are simply going back up through the airworthiness chain, with the odd diversion into Personnel. At each stage, all the way to PUS, you are knocked back. How dare you try to keep our aircrew safe. You MUST obey the order to commit fraud. The disciplinary action taken against you stands, and will remain in your personnel record for all time.

On the occasions (plural) it happened to me, the airworthiness chain was (dis)graced by, variously, Senior Captain (RN), Commodore (RN), Retired Admiral (RN) - by now the Chief of Defence Procurement, Air Commodore and Air Vice Marshal. To be fair to the Senior Service, they only gave me a formal warning. The Junior Service threatened dismissal. The action they took was immaterial; the point is they took action against those who sought to protect aircrew, and aircrew died. The direct linkage was accepted by Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip, and various Coroners.

But, if that's who you want looking after your skin, then I'd love to be a fly on the wall if you showed your family this post and the fully verifiable evidence.

ancientaviator62

24th Apr 2014, 07:36

tuc,
Is it not also an offence to obey an illegal order ? I seem to recall that this was so in English Common Law long before the Nuremburg trials made it explicit.

tucumseh

24th Apr 2014, 07:47

I've been reading cpants' book.

What particularly impressed me is the fact the US "system" acknowledges the concept of civilian staffs being unfairly disciplined for meeting legal obligations, and provides various independent redress routes. In MoD, the system simply cannot cope with such a concept and permits offenders to judge their own case. Yes, you can pursue redress to PUS, the final arbiter (you are expected to resign if you disagree with his decision), but in practice PUS simply sends it back down to the offender to uphold his original ruling. So, PUS is seldom seen to actually issue a decision.

There is one notorious and well known exception. The victim (ex-RAF, then civvy Principal/Grade 7) appealed to the Cabinet Secretary, who over-ruled PUS and awarded an enhanced pension as compensation. However, the Cabinet Secretary is no longer Head of the Home Civil Service; that is now a separate post and the incumbent Sir Robert Kerslake has reverted to type and ruled refusal to commit fraud is an offence. In writing. Got the letter.

Also, early on, cpants hints at making recordings of interviews at which he was bullied and harassed. :D:D I was once told by a V senior RN officer, if someone lies to you, record all subsequent conversations. I have some very interesting ones, including one of the VSOs I mentioned above acknowledging I had been instructed to commit an offence, that the person issuing the order had done no wrong, whereas I was guilty as charged because I'd refused to commit fraud. MoD deny this interview took place. :ugh: Which is another reason for recording it. When I asked for the minutes, the minutes secretary had been mysteriously posted. Much to her relief probably. Who'd want to work for Baker?

tucumseh

24th Apr 2014, 07:49

ancient

Correct. But in the above cases it has been formally ruled no illegal order has been issued, and God+1 has said so. Due to the process I describe, you go round in circles as the issuer of the order is the one who decides if it is legal. It is probably easier to fight such a case if you are a serviceman?

Cows getting bigger

24th Apr 2014, 09:08

Tourist, we've threads here on the Reds 0/0 ejection (1), the Sea Kings' collision (7), the Tornado blue on blue (2), the Hercules in Iraq (10), the Nimrod in Afghanistan (14), and of course the Mull Chinook (29), and that's your conclusion?

Chug, that is slightly disingenuous. Just as there isn't enough evidence to say that the Mull crash was gross negligence on behalf of the pilots, there is also a lack of evidence that (un)airworthiness caused the crash. Please don't use the Mull as an example of how people have died due to a failure of the airworthiness system; we simply cannot make that assumption.

Wensleydale

24th Apr 2014, 09:47

"Is it not also an offence to obey an illegal order ? I seem to recall that this was so in English Common Law long before the Nuremburg trials made it explicit."

Yes, but you may well get the comment in your ACR "...is overly rule-bound" after asking your Boss (politely) to switch off his non-authorised personal laptop during flight! (the more immediate response was to tell me to "f*** O**").

Chugalug2

24th Apr 2014, 10:02

cgb, you are quite right, we do not know why 29 people died on the Mull, principally because it was investigated by a compromised BoI (ask the CAS!) which in any case was overruled by the operator (thank God the civvies can't do that). The point I was making to Tourist is that the aircraft was Grossly Unairworthy and 29 people died in it. Its unairworthiness was not even considered a possibility as a cause by the BoI, giving us some clue as to the degree of that compromise.

I have already raised my concern and bewilderment that those fighting the Wratten and Day infamous finding discounted airworthiness also. Are the Armed Services now given a lecture following attestation about the evils of airworthy aircraft? Some of the hostility raised by those challenging airworthiness beggars belief. It is cheaper simply to retain fully qualified airworthiness engineers and have them implement the Regulations than have the present system whereby they have been got rid of and their places taken by the unqualified, inexperienced, obedient, and pliant. Simply finding fault in the crew in the inevitable subsequent fatal accidents fools fewer and fewer. Of course you have a right to your beliefs, but the RAF has a right to airworthy aircraft. If it went to war now in a hostile air environment it would be 1939 all over again IMHO.

Roland Pulfrew

24th Apr 2014, 10:21

If it went to war now in a hostile air environment it would be 1939 all over again

Seriously? In case you hadn't noticed, the RAF (and FAA and AAC) have been to "war" a few times in recent years. I'm not quite sure why any of the aircraft that have operated successfully in those relatively benign environments would be any less successful in a more hostile operation??

Lordflasheart

24th Apr 2014, 10:38

Cows Getting Bigger - Re post 575 – and also referring back to your post 528.

Would it be too disingenuous to suggest that if the 'airworthiness system' had worked 'properly' as some here would wish, the Chinook RTS might possibly have been withheld pro tem (ie - it would not have been released to squadron service) while certain issues were examined ? If so, is it then a step too far to suggest that that specific flight would not have taken place on that specific day and therefore that specific accident would not have occurred – might never have occurred - at least not in the circumstances and terms we know about ?

LFH

Cows getting bigger

24th Apr 2014, 10:47

Chug, I think we are both barking up the same tree albeit from opposite sides. It is my view that there has to be some 'wriggle room' within the airworthiness system. Taking my previous example of not being allowed to stick a red cross on the side of an SH asset, it is clear that the tail was wagging the dog. There was not safety or capability related issue in that scenario but the Hels staff in the UK were clearly process driven and would not issue an authorisation until the defined process was followed; we were task driven and took the 'risk' in ignoring the UK directive.

OK, that relatively small issue does not even compare to Nimrods in Afghanistan or Chinooks which should have been locked-up in hangars rather than playing in the mist with a load of important people on board. However, it does make one wonder whether the processes are fit for purpose.

Lordflash, how far do we take that argument? Should I not pop down to the shops at risk of being knocked down? My point about the Mk2 and the Mull is that it may have been a Mk1 instead - we just don't know. The only truly safe answer was to never task any asset in the first place.

downsizer

24th Apr 2014, 11:08

Chug, that is slightly disingenuous. Just as there isn't enough evidence to say that the Mull crash was gross negligence on behalf of the pilots, there is also a lack of evidence that (un)airworthiness caused the crash. Please don't use the Mull as an example of how people have died due to a failure of the airworthiness system; we simply cannot make that assumption.

Likewise there is no guarantee that ESF would have stopped 179 going down.

Chugalug2

24th Apr 2014, 11:48

RPI'm not quite sure why any of the aircraft that have operated successfully in those relatively benign environments would be any less successful in a more hostile operation?? I'm sure that much the same was thought by the heroic crews of the Battles and Blenheims pre '39. As I said, it is only my honest opinion and I pray that I be proved wrong were that day ever to come. My fear though is that the RAF would be then revealed to be what I now suspect, thoroughly riddled with unairworthiness. Who would have thought that an Emergency Escape System of all things could turn out to be unairworthy!

My list of Fatal Airworthiness Related Accidents in which 63 died had enemy presence in only one instance. Talk about doing their work for them! I'm afraid that the flat earthers will only be proved wrong after the event. At least in the last big bit unpleasantness we had time to introduce self sealing tanks, armoured windscreens, armour plating behind pilots, etc, in the light of bitter experience. Next time it will be decided 'as is' I suspect. The MAA do not even know what the 'as is' is though. Time to get UK Military Airworthiness sorted, not forever sabotaged!

Haraka

24th Apr 2014, 12:28

Didn't the Argosy (of all aircraft) actually have self-sealing tanks, in contrast to the Herc?
If so, why the difference, all those years ago?

Chugalug2

24th Apr 2014, 12:58

cgb:-
It is my view that there has to be some 'wriggle room' within the airworthiness system. Just how much wriggle room do you want? tuc has already confirmed that it is official MOD policy, confirmed up to SoS level, that it is correct to issue an order to suborn UK Military Airworthiness, ie to disregard the Regulations but sign that they have been complied with, and that it is a disciplinary offence to disobey such an order. Surely that is sufficient for any coach and horse combination that the MOD has in mind?

The MAA? I suspect that they are about to realise just how peripheral they are in such matters...

Roland Pulfrew

24th Apr 2014, 13:55

I'm sure that much the same was thought by the heroic crews of the Battles and Blenheims pre '39

Chug

I think you are confusing operational capability with airworthiness - 2 very different things. Those Blenheims and Battles were probably very airworthy, but they were just outclassed by the opposition's capabilities.

Chugalug2

24th Apr 2014, 14:11

Well, I wasn't RP, merely pointing out that both then and in my future scenario the RAF could be flying aircraft unfit for purpose, for whatever reasons. Your aircraft can only be destroyed once whether it be because it is too slow, unable to defend itself, or self destructs with the entry of a small calibre round into its vitals, or entirely on its own unaided.

I take your point that you make, mine is that it would be entirely theoretical if the day is lost anyway.

VX275

24th Apr 2014, 14:18

Didn't the Argosy (of all aircraft) actually have self-sealing tanks, in contrast to the Herc?
If so, why the difference, all those years ago?

The Argosy's wing was derived from that of the Shackleton which in turn used the wing from the Lincoln, which was a modified Lancaster wing, which had its own origins in the Manchester a medium bomber design from the late 1930s, a time when integral fuel tanks were unknown.
The Hercules wing was a clean sheet design from the late 1940's early 1950's.

Haraka

24th Apr 2014, 15:09

VX275,
Ah, yes , many thanks, I do remember the early Shacks' bag tanks.
My question came from a remark I heard at Cottesmore in the early 70's when an Argosy man stated that he would rather not be in a Herc. in a combat zone as it did not have self-sealing tanks, unlike his steed.
Unfortunately it seems to have been a prescient remark.

Wensleydale

25th Apr 2014, 07:55

If you wanted dodgy fuel tanks then you couldn't beat the Fairey Fawn from 1926. The over-wing tanks would leak all over the pilot and with sparks coming from the exhausts..... No wonder that the regular RAF decided to keep its DH9As and handed the Fawns over to the Reseve Squadrons in the UK. (This one from 503 Special Reserve Sqn at Waddington).

https://encrypted-tbn1.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcQAKQAf6McIjOvm5Db0xdHNYYrxOb-CLRzXI0XZgC0C3do1dAzjmQ

Willard Whyte

26th Apr 2014, 00:24

...rather not be in a Herc. in a combat zone as it did not have self-sealing tanks, unlike his steed.

'Twas an optional extra, which naturally 'we' chose not to option. ****ers.

Single Spey

28th Apr 2014, 20:27

A number of USAF C-135B-04-BN, Boeing Model 717-166 were converted to RC-135M then RC-135W.

New build RC-135-01-BN, Boeing Model 739-445B subsequently became RC-135C, then RC-135V or U.

UK purchases KC-135A-27-BN, Boeing Model 717-148, subsequently converted to KC-135R, and now converted to RC-135W by L3.

For starters, how much does the difference in Boeing Model numbers contribute to lack of read-through evidence for UK certification? This is going to get interesting.....

SS

Lonewolf_50

28th Apr 2014, 21:19

The picture I have in my head is of buying three custom build Cadillacs from GM ... except they were a prior model year.

dervish

29th Apr 2014, 06:36

Chug

The MAA? I suspect that they are about to realise just how peripheral they are in such matters...

CGB

It is my view that there has to be some 'wriggle room' within the airworthiness system.

This is the interesting bit of this thread. How do you explain "wriggle room" in regulations? Tuc already said it is a matter of engineering judgment and I know he's right. But if the MAA have to go to the secretary of state for Defence every time what does that mean? The Military Aviation Authority don't have the authority or don't have the judgment? Both?

Cows getting bigger

29th Apr 2014, 11:21

dervish, to be honest I don't know. I do know that dogmatic application of overly restrictive regulation encourages people to find ways around regulation (Health & Safety, Tippex sniffing and sharp edges on sheets of A4 paper spring to mind). If the airworthiness rules, as they stand, are felt to be overly restrictive I can understand (not condone) people finding ways around them.

Of course, the problem arises in identifying things that do affect airworthiness against those that don't. I have come across engineers who have refused to sign-off aircraft because of the most minor divergence from the procedure (ie, seats have been recovered in the same leather as before but the audit trail is wrong). Clearly the only airworthiness issue here is that a specified paperwork process has not followed - there is nothing inherently unsafe in what has been done. Conversely, a poorly fitted fuel line which does not have an EASA Form 1 (or equivalent) is most definitely a very major issue.

I don't have an answer other than suggesting a root-and-branch review of airworthiness processes in line with guiding principles of ALARP and/or 'proportionate and risk based'. Perhaps a clearer or more expanded definition of the very word 'airworthiness' is a good starting point? We certainly cannot continue writing regulation and then flagrantly ignore it when we see fit.

Maybe Tuc is right with the 'engineering judgement' bit but this judgement has to be at the right level. Otherwise if every man with a spanner was allowed to exercise his engineering judgement we would quickly see divergence of standards and safety.

Engines

29th Apr 2014, 15:43

CGB and others,

I think that the point Tuc (and I) are making is that it's not the regulations, and it's not the 'processes'. They aren't great, but they are sufficient for the job of producing safe and airworthy combat aircraft.

The main problem is that the regulations and processes just aren't being followed. And not 'down in the weeds' (type of leather on seats), but right at the core of the system. Configuration control, management of modifications, maintaining proper records of decisions, requirements management, effective project management - you name it, I can guarantee that there are areas of the MoD that no longer even know how to carry out these basic tasks properly.

Why? Lots of reasons, in my view mainly dilution of technical expertise and over-reliance on project management as a substitute, coupled with an obsession at senior level with meeting schedules, not requirements.

Way forward? Rebuild a bit at a time. Give just one PT a chance to rebuild around a strong technical core with hand picked managers, watch them excel and then apply the lessons across the piece. Utopia, i know....

Best Regards

Engines

Tourist

29th Apr 2014, 17:07

Chugalog

You keep spouting off about airworthiness related fatal accidents.

I have knowledge of only one, the Seaking 7 crash.

I, and every single seaking pilot, will tell you that the HISLs did not cause or contribute to that accident, but you, and other non-pilots who frankly have no clue still use it to add to your statistics. That brings the rest into doubt for me.

We used to turn off the previous lights before HISLs were fitted because they also bounced distractingly off the water/clouds at low level.

It is in the very nature of light that it is bright and bounces off things.

What would you have them do?
Invent a light that does not light things up?

We are all trained to operate silent and dark anyway because in a real shooty war we would leave everything turned off fitted and airworthy or not!

It did not cause or contribute to that accident!!

You might as well say that an enormous 200ft thick bouncy shield would have stopped the fatalities so the aircraft was un-airworthy because they had not fitted it.

The 200ft bouncy shield does not exist and neither does the strobe which is not distracting at low level.

Chugalug2

29th Apr 2014, 17:53

Tourist, the point about the baggers HISLs is that they were not fitted IAW the Regulations (see engines post above about not following them) they were simply swapped for the anti-collision lights, without testing per the mandatory procedures. That automatically made the fit, and hence the aircraft, unairworthy. Surprise, surprise the forward ones were then found to cause excess glare under the conditions you describe and it became customary to switch them off. I am not saying whether that caused the mid-air between the i/b-o/b changeover, which seems to have been a classic Swiss Cheese affair anyway. Indeed the BoI carried out specific trials that discounted the HISLs as a possible cause.

What I do say is that it was an airworthiness related accident along with all the others listed. That is all we can say about them all, for they were all both regulated and investigated by the operator, ie the MOD and its subsidiary Services. That is the root problem here, if the regulation and the investigation were independent of the MOD and each other we would then know if the first had provided for an airworthy aircraft (it hadn't) and the second had revealed that (it didn't). We can all huff and puff about wriggle room and Service pride as much as we like. Quite frankly aviation doesn't give a damn and will kill given half a chance. Give it an unairworthy aircraft and its chances of doing so are then greatly increased.

Cows getting bigger

29th Apr 2014, 17:56

Engines, your post makes sense and you are obviously better placed to provide expert comment. For sure, rebuilding experience levels is a must but this will take a generation to achieve. I find myself asking why did the hierarchy choose to circumvent process? Were there operational/budgetary imperatives? Were the VSOs naive/ignorant? Had the rot already set in? This clearly takes us back to Haddon Cave who threw the pebble (or should I say hand grenade?) in the pond. Do we just ensure a return to compliance with the process(es) or also take the opportunity to ensure that the regulations are wholly fit for purpose?

Chug, we crossed posts. Take my favourite example of a Red Cross on a helicopter. By definition, that aircraft was unairworthy - we had implemented a modification without proper approval. Did that particular unairworthiness 'greatly increase' the chances of the aircraft killing me and some others?

Tourist

29th Apr 2014, 18:38

Chugalug

"Surprise, surprise the forward ones were then found to cause excess glare under the conditions you describe "

No, you are not listening.

It had always been the case that we had turned off the previous flashing lights!

It was not a new phenomena!

The old flashing lights flashed and the new flashing lights flashed. Both were routinely switched off at low level.

To say that the crash was airworthiness related is totally misguided at best and dishonest at worst.

If one of the crew was wearing a t-shirt rather than an aircrew sweater, then that would also by your definition make it un-airworthy, but it does not make it crash.

Indeed as you say the BOI discounted it as a factor so stop citing it as an airworthiness related accident.

Engines

29th Apr 2014, 20:05

Guys,

Perhaps I can help defuse the temperature a bit. Lion's den and all that, but I think it's worth a go.

Aircraft crash for all sorts of reasons. Fact. In almost all cases, there's what used to be called a 'chain of events' (these days it's the 'holes in the cheese lining up') that leas to the eventual accident/incident. In a lot of accidents, there's an airworthiness 'link' or 'hole' somewhere. It may, or may not, have been the 'primary' cause of the accident, or it may have been a 'contributory'. It might not have even been in the chain.

It's clearly over-egging the case to state that EVERY accident where an airworthiness angle was present was therefore an 'airworthiness related' event.

However, it's the job of us engineers to ensure that when a military aircraft enters the operational world (at the 700 desk) , it's as free as practicable (choosing my words carefully here) from potential airworthiness 'links'. Where the skill (and training, and experience) comes in is recognising potential airworthiness issues and using the proven systems to remove them.

But remember that engineers are military personnel as well, and should be committed to fighting the war as hard as they damn well can. That means making aircraft available to the aircrew to go and do the stuff. With my background, where the engineers and aircrew (and everyone else) was floating around on a large war canoe in harm's way, the engineers were accorded the same level of respect and regard that they accorded the aircrew. Lots, usually. I could never have done their job. They could never have done mine. Together, as a team, we kicked serious ass in the name of HM Queen. And all of our squadron came back, thank the Good Lord.

So, my job was, and remained for some time, to get aircrew into the air as often as possible, as safely as possible. That meant judgement calls all the time. Later on, the job remains the same but in the environs of the MoD. Your job as a project engineer is to focus like a killing laser on delivering military capability as safely as possible. Identify the big issues and hound them mercilessly until they fall at your feet screaming for mercy. Then kill them. Then find the next one and kill that. Sounds aggressive? Meant to be. Our aircrew deserve nothing less.

'Nit Picking' is usually the last refuge of the truly incompetent engineer who has too much experience (in one area) and not enough learning. They are best countered by strong and technically aware managers.

I suppose what I'm saying is that taking any argument to extremes usually leads in stalemate or worse, name calling. Even worse, it can obscure the issues. What guys like Tuc and Chug are flagging up is that the system in the UK MoD is failing to deliver the correct level of airworthiness (safety) to the aircrew. it's doing that by not observing its own systems and processes. (Example - Read the recent Hawk SI and see how the BoI had to admit that they couldn't find records of meetings at which airworthiness decisions were made). Why? Tons of reasons, main ones (I think) are lack of technical training and experience and application of 'schedule fear' forcing people into short cuts.

I hope this little rant helps - we are all trying to fight the same battle, I think.

Best Regards as ever to absolutely everyone

Engines

Chugalug2

29th Apr 2014, 20:08

Tourist, what you did or didn't do with or without the 'previous flashing lights' (Anti-Collision ones?), which I have no reason to believe were not airworthy, is between you and your SOPs. I'm talking about the 'later Flashing Lights' (High Intensity Strobe Lights) which are far more intense, as their name implies. You can't simply swap them over like changing a light bulb, the new fit requires trials not only because of the potential for blinding the crew, which is obviously greatly enhanced, but also because of the internal potential to induce unwanted radiation interference with the electronics fit. That's not my idea, that is the mandated requirement of the Regulations, in order that the modification works safely. As this was a UK Military mod the Regulations were ignored of course and the aircraft was made unairworthy. That's not my idea, it is a direct result of the Regulations being thus suborned.

The problem is not with the Regulations, which as engines says are perfectly adequate for the job. The problem is people. People who give illegal orders to suborn the Regulations. People who discard the Regulations, lest they be quoted. People who cover up the suborning. People who subvert Accident Investigations so that the suborning remains covered up. People who hound qualified and experienced engineers out of the airworthiness posts and replace them with unqualified and inexperienced non-engineers so that the suborning continues. Those people shared one thing in common, they were all VSOs. They have now reduced UK Military Aviation to the point where it cannot go out and order a new aircraft without getting it spectacularly wrong, hence this thread.

As to not calling the Sea Kings mid-air Airworthiness Related, I'm afraid it was and I'll go on calling it that unless and until the BoI is recalled to consider new evidence (ie new evidence, not new evidence that the MOD says is not new). That BoI/SI should be convened by a truly independent MAAIB. Unacceptable? Then I go on calling it airworthiness related (not 'caused' though, until so found by the SI).

Ridiculing airworthiness says more about your mindset than mine, you can't pick and choose which Regs you will comply with and which not. Anyway, are aircrew sweaters subject to an airworthiness process? They may well be approved aircrew wear rather than non-approved t-shirts, but airworthy?

Cgb likewise, why is a Red Cross painted on the side of a helicopter a cause of unairworthiness? I'm afraid that playing the 'HSE' card, or having it played upon you, isn't what this is about. I'm not a jobsworth, I simply want UK Military Aircraft to be airworthy so that they can serve our purpose and not that of our enemies. That requires an independent military airworthiness authority, something that the Military Aviation Authority is not.

Chugalug2

29th Apr 2014, 21:50

Deliverance, thank you for the encouragement. You are right, there never was a Golden Age (certainly Haddon Cave's Golden Period of airworthiness is utter bunk!) and there never will be. All I can promise is an independent MAA that will be resented, just as its civilian sister is, and an MAAIB that will be the subject of moaning for the time it takes to publish Accident Reports. It was ever thus and shall be evermore. What I can say is that, were they to be independent of the MOD and of each other, then we can expect UK Military Aviation to reclaim the airworthiness that it once possessed, together with unbiased , objective, and comprehensive Air Accident Investigations that will not be afraid to point the finger at the Airworthiness Authority should it be called for.

I know that many BoI Presidents have not flinched from that in the past (and a word of apology here to the ASaCs President, who did indeed find the aircraft to be unairworthy, mea culpa!), but on the whole the investigation of the operator by the operator is prone to error to say the least (Mull as always being the prime example).

Airworthiness is not a preoccupation at squadron level, it certainly wasn't at mine. It is enough to fill your mind with SOPs, FOBs, ASIs, Pilots Notes, Tech Pubs, F700s etc etc. You assume that airworthiness is a given, summed up by Anthony Alowishus Hancock as he cheerily transmits, "Going well, tell the designer chappie!". It is a terrible indictment of those who set out to destroy it, that they also destroyed that trust and confidence in the back-room boys (and girls!). All that has to be repaired and trust regained. It is going to be a long hard road to regain all that has been lost. Time is of the essence because it has cost too many lives already. Time to put things right by admitting the past, prosecuting the transgressors, and freeing the MAA and MAAIB from the MOD and from each other.

dervish

30th Apr 2014, 06:45

The question isn't about people who do their jobs properly and implement process, but those who don't. Managed properly, very few of us should be aware of this detailed stuff that goes on in the background. We should just get a safe aircraft without any fuss.

The Nimrod case exposed that this background stuff wasn't being done and brought it to the the fore. We should be worrying about those who think it is unnecessary.

alfred_the_great

30th Apr 2014, 07:25

And I have no problem with any of this process, but the moment it is suggested that a fleet should be grounded, in toto, to allow the paperwork to catch up is the moment that airworthiness killed OC. Moreover, if the process demonstrates that an aircraft is not "airworthy", I still think it should be retained in service.

Bengo

30th Apr 2014, 10:59

Alfred,

Airworthy is not a hard-edged condition. That's why the SofS defines airworthiness as a probability. Tuc has posted the full definition up thread. The existence of that probability is why Engines, Tuc, Chug and others all insist experience and technical knowledge is essential to make the judgement that the probability has been reduced sufficiently to meet the definition. Anyone with the competence to make the decision will want evidence as a basis.

BUT, until someone has ploughed through the paperwork trail the decision maker does no know what evidence there is to form the basis for a decision. If there is no evidence, or not enough evidence, the aircraft is not airworthy and should not be flying in peacetime. It's not just about OC or aircrew or engineers or other Service people's lives - it's about schools and hospitals and football crowds not receiving several tons of metal at high speed. It's also about integrity- being able to believe that the weapon system you are handed as safe actually is safe to go and practice with.

Retaining an aircraft in service with a known airworthiness problem can be done Sometimes, often even, the problem can be lived with, by adjustment of what the aircrew and engineers do with the aircraft so that the risk is acceptable. This has been done on many occasions, often as soon as an AAIB/RNAAIU investigation has revealed a potential problem.

Sometimes it can't . In the latter case grounding is the only option. The classic example was the Buccaneer. A spar failed. The airworthiness problem was that the spar design was not suited to the way the aircraft was being used and the ongoing test programme was based on the wrong things. The aircraft was grounded, the spars were fixed and the test programme was fixed.

N

Tourist

30th Apr 2014, 11:45

Bengo

"Retaining an aircraft in service with a known airworthiness problem can be done Sometimes, often even, the problem can be lived with, by adjustment of what the aircrew and engineers do with the aircraft so that the risk is acceptable. This has been done on many occasions, often as soon as an AAIB/RNAAIU investigation has revealed a potential problem. "

That is the problem.

The adjustment causes a loss of capability, otherwise we would have been doing it in the first case!

How about we take a big picture look at the problem, and in some instances just say "the risk is large but the gain is worth it, carry on"

The problem is that though that is the right decision in some cases, the current system will send the officer who had the balls to sign it off to jail when the inevitable accident occurs, thus no sane man including me would sign it.

As an officer in the military it is not unacceptable to send men to their deaths in the interest of the bigger picture. ie winning the war.
99% of winning the war is done in peacetime training.
All Army officers know it. The projected losses of a Para assault or a feint etc are horrifying.
All Navy Officers know it. An engine compartment fire re-entry or damage control in the lower decks is not going to be pretty. For some reason it doesn't apply to aviation though.

alfred_the_great

30th Apr 2014, 12:13

Indeed, the single skin of every warship places it in immense danger everytime it goes to sea. Hell, we conduct RAS at distances of 30ft for hours at a time between 30,000 tonnes of ships: that certainly wouldn't pass an airworthiness test. I am willing to bet my entire career that the steering systems involved don't have a safety chain that the aviation system seems to be demand.

Whilst this should not be a race to the bottom, there are distinctly different levels of "practicable" involved - one involves massive effort for the final 1 or 2%, the other is much more comfortable with the 20 - 80% solution. Unfortunately, the former has taken over as the default process, hence the horrific loads being carried by the infantry in HERRICK, which has probably contributed to the tactical loss on the ground.

Tourist

30th Apr 2014, 13:20

ATG

Well said.

Bengo

30th Apr 2014, 13:43

Tourist,

The simple answer to why we do is it that our political masters demand it. They do that because the risk from military aviation is wider than just to the aircraft and those in it. Ministers don't want an accident which involves lots of civilians. Have one, and as a soon as the cause is attributed to airworthiness failure, then the aircraft fleet involved will at least be grounded.

If we were prepared to fly exclusively on isolated ranges with no-one else there and no risk of interaction with civilian air traffic then I expect the airworthiness bar would be a lot lower. The systems airworthiness requirements for RPAS/UAS/'drones' and the limits placed on their operation are an example of this.

In a RAS (and I've been there for several) it's a handful of warships and an RFA in the middle of the 'oggin practising an activity that has been provided for under the Colregs. When it all goes pear shaped, as it has several times, there is no-one involved apart from those doing it. Ships are required to be seaworthy and someone has to sign to say they are. The systems involved in ships are subject to a process similar, but not so stringent, as airworthiness in design, construction and upkeep. It's not so stringent because the risks to all involved are a lot lower. Sometimes this goes wrong too -Upholder anyone?

I agree that it is necessary sometimes to have people die in order to win the battles and the war, or even in peacetime to preserve the lives of the rest of the ship's company. It helps if you have not killed too many of them with faulty equipment beforehand. That's what airworthiness is about.

Albert,

RAS is not that much different from flying a couple of large a/c similar distances apart for flight re-fuelling. That was done regularly and at night too, albeit usually not with the towline above populated areas I expect. The RAF only stopped because the large aircraft with capability as receivers went out of service. I expect it was at least as safe as a RAS though the consequences of failure were probably greater for those involved

N

Sandy Parts

30th Apr 2014, 13:47

hmm, if your RAS (at what 10knots or so?) goes wrong - 2 big ships collide in the middle of an empty bit of ocean (I would hope it is done in waters clear of other vessels..) However, 1 Typhoon AAR-ing with a tanker at a slightly faster speed :) - if that goes wrong - who knows where the wreckage will end up and who/what may be under it. Risk includes a look at the effects of an unwanted event...

edited to add - snap! with Bengo (wot he said!)

Tourist

30th Apr 2014, 14:06

Bengo

I think you are correct that this comes from politicians, but that does not make it ok.

The public would be upset about an aircraft piling through the roof, yes, but not half as upset as they will be if we end up speaking German/Russian/Swahili etc because we had an ego military that looks shiney in peacetime but can't do the business because we forgot how to live with risk.

Incidentally, in the bad old days before flight safety was invented and the skys were full of crashing aircraft, how many piled into cities causing mass loss of life?

When doing a risk assessment, one should take into account not just the consequences of something happening, but also the chances of it happening.

alfred_the_great

30th Apr 2014, 15:58

Bengo/Sandy Parts - if a RAS goes wrong you could lose upto 1000 people. I'm not aware of an aircraft crash that has killed that many people.

Hell, losing NOTTINGHAM would've lost upto 45 people in one go if it had happened slightly differently. ENDURANCE was an utter fluke to not be run onto shore during her flooding, and she had about 60 people on-board. Aviation is nothing special I'm afraid.

Bengo

30th Apr 2014, 16:22

Tourist,

I disagree that because it comes from politicians it is not necessarily OK. Not always the best decision or for the best reasons, often, but always OK- it has to be unless it is clearly illegal. That's the basis on which the UK military runs. The logical extension of it not being OK is the ability to pick and choose which wars we fight or which Ministers we obey. That's a different debate to airworthiness.

In the bad old days before Flight Safety, the RN were losing so many men and aircraft in preventable accidents that something had to be done. It was done by a programme called 'We have a Problem' aimed at finding and fixing the various causes of accidents. Many were part of what we call the airworthiness process now. Not often in Design or Construction, but certainly in modifications, maintenance and operational practice.

Fortunately the FAA was operating at sea so, as you say, they were not spearing into civilians, but others (John Derry in the DH110 and others at different air displays) did.

I don't disagree with your premise that in wartime anything that should fly (and any aircrew who might be declared fit enough to fly it) are an asset we should get airborne if needed. I have signed off repairs to aircraft that should have gone to fourth line, but Fleetlands were not where the aircraft was and the aircraft was needed for operations. Similar authority to decide on the fitness to fly of an aircraft is (or was) vested in all RN AEO's. However, fitness to fly operationally is not airworthiness.

I also agree there are two elements of a risk assessment, but in assessing likelihood it is essential to remember that whether you have won millions on the lottery or not, the likelihood of winning them in this week's draw is just the same as it was last week and the same as it has been since the lottery started. Not having had an accident is just the same.

N

vascodegama

30th Apr 2014, 17:26

BEngo

E3, C130J?

dervish

30th Apr 2014, 17:44

Tourist

To say that the crash was airworthiness related is totally misguided at best and dishonest at worst.

It was the BoI that stated it was airworthiness related, quoting some of the regulations that were not met. Have you written to the BoI President (Cdre Hawkins) telling him he is misguided and dishonest? Didn't think so.

I'm the first to admit I know very little about how the RN operate that aircraft but I've read the BoI and RNFAISC reports. You have said in the past that both aircraft had serviceable and operating radar and that both aircraft were serviceable. The reports say otherwise and that the effect was to render the HISL their last line of defence, and it was switched off. Or the forward one was, and the aft was dim and obscured.

There are other things I don't entirely understand but seem to have been withheld from the BoI and RNFAISC. At least 4 LRUs in the avionics system that were the wrong type, directly related to the loss of situational awareness the BoI concluded was a likely cause. The only explanation for one of the faults was another LRU was missing entirely. Lots of seemingly minor holes in slices of cheese but put together didn't do the crews any favours.

I'm told (this is a rumour site after all) that all of the above would have been avoided had MoD not got shot of its corporate knowledge at a vital time. I don't like long posts so I'll stop there, at a point Engines, Tuc, Chug etc reached long ago. All I'll say is if you disagree with the BoI then argue with them, not people who quote the reports.

Tourist

30th Apr 2014, 17:54

Bengo

If politicians decide, or through ignorance allow the British military to become a "look pretty and zoomy in peacetime but **** all use at war" vanity project military like so many other around the world, then that is not ok!!

We should obey the governments order as to who and when we fight, but we should not stand by and allow the destruction of our military.

It is a vicious circle.

The flight safety movement was started for the very good reason that our loss rate was affecting our OC, and initially had a very good definition, something like - "To increase operational capability by reducing our unnecessary loss rate"

This was a brilliant idea as these kind of loss rates are unsustainable.

http://i404.photobucket.com/albums/pp121/Tourist_photos/Losses.jpg (http://s404.photobucket.com/user/Tourist_photos/media/Losses.jpg.html)

This was very successful, but has slowly plot shifted to something like - "avoid all avoidable accidents at all costs and sod OC", and the returns are now not worth the effort.
http://i404.photobucket.com/albums/pp121/Tourist_photos/Accidentrate.jpg (http://s404.photobucket.com/user/Tourist_photos/media/Accidentrate.jpg.html)

The initial gains were spectacular, but the law of diminishing returns has flight safety firmly in its grasp.

Because of this, despite the fact that in all other realms of manufacturing things have got cheaper, aircraft have got more expensive!

Every new airworthiness requirement and test costs more money which makes the aircraft more valuable which makes the loss more damaging to the military so we buy less so they become more expensive per airframe to cover development cost which get more expensive as requirements are brought in to avoid more losses etc etc ad infinitum until eventually we have 3 Typhoons and a Merlin which nobody can afford to fly.

Tourist

30th Apr 2014, 18:04

Dervish

This is what exasperates me.

You are talking about LRUs as if they had some effect on the accident.

If you had any, and I do mean any knowledge of how a bagger operates and it's capabilities you would know how much that does not matter in this incident.

If the aircraft had not been fitted with HISLs, it would still have switched of the forward anti col and thus been in exactly the same config at the moment of the crash.
Do you understand what I am saying?
The Anti cols would have been off if fitted.
The HISLs were off.
THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE!!!

Have you ever found a single bagger to support your crusade?
Seriously?
Do you not think that that might be a bit of a pointer that the other baggers-friends of the deceased- have never come forward and said "OI! This aircraft was a unfit to fly and killed our mates!"?
Have you considered that it is because it is not the problem?

Lonewolf_50

30th Apr 2014, 19:16

Can someone explain to me, succinctly, what it is about the RAF variant of Rivet Joint that is expected to not be airworthy? :confused:
Airframe?
Avionice?
Fire Suppression?
ENgines?
Fuel system?
Flight Control System?
Autopilot?

What is it that has somebody's back up?

IF NDA's do not permit this, I understand.

Lordflasheart

30th Apr 2014, 20:06

Hi Lonewolf

Can someone explain to me, succinctly, what it is about the RAF variant of Rivet Joint that is expected to not be airworthy?

I have seen a couple of specific issues mentioned, but without serious provenance.

If I've got this right, it's seems it's the UK Airworthiness process itself that's not particularly Airworthy. With very bad history over 30 odd years, the current setup has yet to prove itself. They stated publicly about two years ago (but without mentioning specifics) that RJ will not comply with current or previous UK regulations ! What they've been doing since then, heaven only knows. Polishing the administrative/political fudge probably, while the only delivered example apparently sits outside in the rain, when it should be in a nice warm hangar with all the experts getting to know every nut and bolt.

OTH in respect of "Known Unknowns" I wonder whether last year's Shell 77 accident and the current Boeing top down (or bottom up) review of all the tail-end smart stuff which might have contributed, might be something that would present a more practical problem for the UK authorities, until the review is complete in a year or so - precisely because the UK won't be able to anticipate or fudge the results of the review. Also, I have no idea whether UK Dutch Roll indoctrination/ simulator/ flight training for E-3 Sentry and RJ, has any of the shortcomings mentioned in the Shell 77 accident report.

LFH

FATTER GATOR

30th Apr 2014, 20:28

Quote:
Can someone explain to me, succinctly, what it is about the RAF variant of Rivet Joint that is expected to not be airworthy?

I'm told the RAF 'variant' of Rivet Joint is identical to the American one - or that it is supposed to be

Single Spey

30th Apr 2014, 20:44

FATTER GATOR Quote:
Can someone explain to me, succinctly, what it is about the RAF variant of Rivet Joint that is expected to not be airworthy?

I'm told the RAF 'variant' of Rivet Joint is identical to the American one - or that it is supposed to be

Gator,

See my post #591. Not even based on the same Boeing Model number.

SS

Chugalug2

30th Apr 2014, 22:39

Tourist:-
..."avoid all avoidable accidents at all costs and sod OC", and the returns are now not worth the effort.The aim of RAF Flight Safety has always been to try to avoid all avoidable accidents in order to maintain Operational Capability. Your imagined quote is utter nonsense, so no surprise there. Similarly with Air Safety, it is also utter nonsense to imply that Airworthiness is the enemy of Operational Capability, for that is the role of Unairworthiness.

This is where your proposition founders. The reason an elderly US aircraft (which has been miraculously zero lifed we are told) is standing forlorn and neglected in the rain at Waddington isn't because of MAA Airworthiness zealots, because there are none. The MAA doesn't do Airworthiness, it doesn't know how to, thanks to the deliberate destruction of UK Military Airworthiness Provision. That aircraft is the cost of that malevolence, as was MR2, as was MRA4, as was HC3. It isn't the cost of the aircraft that is the problem, but the cost of ineptness. The jobsworths that are often quoted as the unacceptable face of airworthiness are merely a sign of that endemic ineptness.

The whole MAA structure has to be rebuilt, outwith the MOD and under a civilian DG. Many of those who got us where we are now still inhabit the MAA and have to be got rid of. The old Regulations have to be regained and built upon to ensure a firm foundation upon which airworthiness provision can be reformed. The inevitable cost will not be because of airworthiness but because of the lack of it, so blame those who caused that, prosecute them and even bankrupt them in order to help pay for it. If airworthiness is not regained then OC will suffer, it certainly wont be enhanced!

In the meantime UK Military Airworthiness will remain heavily compromised, and the SoS will be kept busy signing off waiver after waiver. He is about to do so for RJ I expect, for it seems that the paperwork, that alfred so confidently expects to catch up with it, was eaten by the dog. I wouldn't advise the SoS to say so though when he makes his 'courageous' statement to the HoC, which will of course reveal the MAA to be the toothless dog that it really is (so it couldn't have been the one that ate it, could it?).

dervish

1st May 2014, 08:15

Tourist

I'll take that as a NO, you haven't expressed your opinions to the BoI president.

It has been pointed out to me my post was lacking. The 4 wrong LRUs were two in each aircraft, not 4 in each. My phrasing was poor. I understand MoD admitted this under freedom of info but didn't realise it was an admission. :mad: which might explain why it was withheld from the inquiries. But the bottom line was the aircraft were nowhere near the aircraft spec and that contributed to their problems. Is a BoI required to check things like that?

You may be right that poor situational awareness had little impact, but the BoI disagreed. In a head-on it's an obvious consideration. I know others here see the similarities between this and other accidents, and MoD making the same mistakes on RJ.

Tourist

1st May 2014, 11:34

There you go making 2+2=5 again.

Of course situational awareness was the problem! They flew into each other!

What I'm saying is that the LRUs had no effect on their situational awareness or lack of re the other a/c.

What do you think the LRUs did?

I'll take that as a NO them. You have not got a single Bagger to support your crusade.

Chugalug2

1st May 2014, 13:08

You have not got a single Bagger to support your crusade. You make that sound as though it's a sine qua non for our 'crusade'. You obviously speak for all baggers and have full authority to do so. Very impressive, but even if you were right in what you say it would only be par for the course. We dug out the gross unairworthiness of the Chinook HC2 and were imediately attacked by those that thought we were having a crack at their aircraft. Ditto the Nimrod, ditto the Hercules, ditto Tornado, ditto Hawk. The Hastings was once grounded for gross unairworthiness following the Abingdon tragedy. If t'internet had been around then no doubt I would have been piling in as 'concerned of Changi' to oppose it. I would have been wrong, and count myself lucky that the RAF had a leadership that knew the importance of airworthiness in order to maintain its Operational Capability.

Don't shoot the messengers tourist. UK Military Aviation is riddled with unairworthiness. I cannot see how the MAA can point to any fleet or any system and declare it airworthy, for they do not know how to. As fatal air accident after fatal air accident occurs, as often as not it turns out to be Airworthiness Related. That may not be flagged up by the SI, it certainly wont be flagged up by the MOD as it settles with the family, nor with the Coroner, and certainly not with us, but turn out it often does. That is no way to run a whelk stall let alone an air force. Prevention is better than cure and a competent and independent authority is essential for that. That is where we have to start. It will be a long process because repair takes time, only destruction is instantaneous. We have to repair airworthiness before we go to war with an operationally capable air force, or we will not prevail IMHO.

tucumseh

1st May 2014, 14:13

I remember the aftermath of one accident. When the BoI report was published, pinpointing an unairworthy system as a contributory factor;

1. DEC order a separate investigation into who approved the fit of the offending system and why.
2. IPT staff lie to the investigator, naming a civilian programme manager as the guilty party, claiming they know nothing of (a) the system fitted to their aircraft despite it being the subject of a Service Deviation in their RTS, or (b) the staff in their IPT who had approved its use without first testing or trailling it.
3. When written and photographic evidence clears the programme manager and proves the IPT staff have lied to an official investigation, the investigation is stopped on the grounds that the “guilty” party is too senior to be pursued. The staff who lied to or withheld evidence from the investigation are praised and advanced.
4. None of the above is revealed to the BoI or Coroner, except by the programme manager who is not called as a witness.
5. MoD continues to this day to name and blame the civilian programme manager in correspondence with families, denying the aircraft in the photographic evidence is the aircraft type in question. (Yes, really! Photographs taken from 50 feet away and tail number clearly visible).
6. At the inquest MoD witnesses lie and mislead, refusing to provide evidence to the Coroner. Their successors continue in this vein.
7. Subsequent questions in Parliament force the IPT to admit they knew of this system going back to the 1980s, yet the previous lies are still condoned and repeated.
8. When they ask for the BoI to be reconvened to hear the above, the BoI President offers to help families expose the truth. When told the truth, he withdraws; possibly because the evidence proves the RTS does not reflect the crashed aircraft, but a different, older Mark.

An example that will ring bells with those interested in, for example, the Chinook Mull of Kintyre crash, where MoD knowingly blamed the wrong people, withheld evidence and lied to inquiries. And the aircraft had an invalid RTS.

And still you say the above is acceptable behaviour ......... Follow the lies because that is where the truth can be found. Alone, the offending system may not have caused the accident, but a behavioural trend like this tells you something is making MoD very nervous. Why else do they lie?

RIP….
Lt Philip Green, RN
Lt Antony King, RN
Lt Marc Lawrence, RN
Lt Philip West, RN
Lt James Williams, RN
Lt Andrew Wilson, RN
Lt Thomas Adams, USN

Died 22nd March 2003

tucumseh

1st May 2014, 14:29

Just read Tourist's last post.

Do you know what LRUs dervish is talking about? Or why they are designated LRUs in that aircraft? dervish, you are a naughty boy but absolutely right. I don't think the IPT would be able to answer that one either.

Where I'd agree with tourist is it was less critical in this case (as there was so much else that went wrong), but nevertheless a contributory factor and most definitely a situational awareness issue. Another similarity with Chinook Mk2 is the crash occurred just after a very immature variant entered service too quickly; but experience has hopefully ironed out these fatal wrinkles.

Tourist

1st May 2014, 17:10

Go on.

Somebody explain to me in small words how these incorrect LRU's affected SA on that occasion?

Tuc

Your description of the Mk7

" a very immature variant entered service too quickly"

The entire aviation description of the Mk7
"The best bit of procurement in recent military history"

"And still you say the above is acceptable behaviour "

No, I don't.

I honestly don't give a flying **** about their behaviour as long as decent aircraft get to the front line. By decent I don't mean safe, though that is nice to have. By decent I mean capable.

Lonewolf_50

1st May 2014, 17:21

Tourist, I think you do perfer safe, operable aircraft. What seems to be the point in question is how many places to the right of the decimal must be shown for reliability to render an aircraft safe/airworthy.

The Sea King collision reminds me of a similar collision off of the coast of California, VP-50, two P-3C's, back on March 21, 1991. That wasn't an airworthiness issue, it was two aircraft being to close to each other at the same altitude. Bad vis, of course. Won't comment further, as this seems to be a pet peeve for some folks.

Tourist

1st May 2014, 17:27

Yes, Lone, you are correct.

When the whole flight safety thing was begun it was for very real reasons, but the pendulum has swung too far to the point that it is now driving the entire process and making a joke of our military.

Single Spey

1st May 2014, 18:06

. Tourist
When the whole flight safety thing was begun it was for very real reasons, but the pendulum has swung too far to the point that it is now driving the entire process and making a joke of our military.

Tourist, I think you are the one who is making a joke of our military.

I honestly don't give a flying **** about their behaviour as long as decent aircraft get to the front line. By decent I don't mean safe, though that is nice to have. By decent I mean capable.]

There is a whole bunch of guys and gals doing their utmost to ensure that your (and lots of innocent civilians) little pink body is not exposed to unnecessary risk, knowing full well that if it all goes pear shaped they are the ones who will be left to answer in front of the man wearing the white curly wig, while you are happily dining at the table of St Peter.

Do you really want to return to the days of 1952 because that is what you are advocating, and that would certainly put an end to military capability.

You still haven't said if you would take personal liability for a RJ coming down in the middle of Lincoln; are you man enough to take on the challenge?

SS

tucumseh

1st May 2014, 18:26

" a very immature variant entered service too quickly"

The entire aviation description of the Mk7
"The best bit of procurement in recent military history"The two are not mutually exclusive. If you look at the RTS at date of accident, crucial parts of it reflect the AEW Mk2 circa 1996. As did the interoperability procedures with CVSs, the necessary contract to reconcile them having been cancelled by non-technical staff. The RTS was a cut and paste job without checking validity of, especially, read across. Hence the problem whereby speech intelligibility and the comms system in general was seriously compromised. (i.e. What you characterised as having "no effect on their situational awareness" which, coming from a pilot, I suppose I must concede. Just glad I don't have to implement any spec you have written!). In the same way the Chinook Mk2 RTS didn't come remotely close to reflecting a Chinook Mk2 in June 1994.

"Maturity" has a formal definition in MoD, measured (at the time) in technology and system integration readiness levels. ASaC was close, but short cuts had been ordered in critical Safety Case areas by the same non-technical staffs; for example, structural and electrical integrity. The Critical Design Review for the whole aircraft was waived by a non-engineer, which of course would have flagged the contributory factors noted by the BoI (yet again, because they'd been flagged in 1994-97). Similarly, system integration was largely waived. This crucial work was conducted in the background by Westland (a sub-sub-contractor, but actually leading player) and the programme manager, and hidden from the non-engineers and beancounters. That is what resulted in the "best bit of procurement in recent military history"; not the formal contracts and behaviour of ASE, DHSA, the IPT and parts of MoD(PE). Therefore, in a way I disagree with it being the "best bit of procurement", because it was actually the willingness of a small team of 2 (!) to serially disobey orders that made it SEEM a success. But you wouldn't want all programmes to be run like this, if only because there are so few willing to risk their careers, and even fewer who would know how!

As the aircraft had not been "Proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions", by (Secy of State and Chief Scientific Advisers') definition it was still a prototype. I'd slightly modify that statement if 849 had conducted trials on the way to the Gulf and the results had been fed back and plugged into the ongoing conversion programme, and ADS retrospectively amended - but I know the latter was not. One of the unproven parts (because the RN had stated there was no requirement at all for HISL and hence trials had not been scheduled) was using HISL or the new avionics off a ship, at night. When non-technical staff agreed HISL could be fitted to the 2nd Mk7 trials aircraft, no trials took place. (MoD claims it was in the first aircraft, but the pictures don't lie). Thus the first HISL trial was conducted by the BoI, who confirmed the installation (not HISL itself) did not meet the laid down design and airworthiness criteria. (With respect, this is where you don't recognise the difference between HISL and the HISL installation. No one has ever said HISL was not airworthy; it was the installation, which is much more than the strobe, combined with concept of use and lack of other defences in depth). The BoI were not told others had concluded the same some years before, so presented it as a revelation.

Unverified read-across was granted from HAS Mk6 (not AEW Mk2) to Mk7. Forgive me as a mere civilian, but the HAS Mk6 is quite different, and operated quite differently, with different systems, so read across would be so difficult to justify it would be cheaper and quicker just to trial the Mk7 properly, on an opportunity basis during a scheduled trial sortie. Which was recommended; and rejected, again, by non-technical staff. An order was issued that the regulations should be ignored, but a declaration made that they had been complied with. To this day MoD serially lies about this issue, despite the probing questions of various MPs representing the families. (Come on, all this stuff is freely available).

Every single mandated regulation governing Naval Service Mods was breached by this act, yet doing the job properly would have been easier and cheaper (because the NSM was deemed physically non-compliant by Westland, and functionally unsafe by the programme manager - the latter confirmed by the BoI). What the BoI failed to address was the fact the Safety Case was not updated by the IPT when they fitted HISL behind the PM's back. How could it be - there had been no trials and Westland had snagged the installation design.

However, an upside was the RN's renewed interest and support for the Mission System part of the programme (ASE having withdrawn RN support in 1995), epitomised by the superb 849 team at Boscombe. Good guys, let down a little by a rather oblique reference to safety criticality misleading the inquest, when a firm statement was needed as to the content of their IFF MAR recommendation report. (The original one, before succumbing to pressure to retract). That was fixed and made safe in the Mk7, but Tornado refused to, resulting in the Patriot shootdown of the same day. Another story......

Tourist

1st May 2014, 19:05

Spey

"You still haven't said if you would take personal liability for a RJ coming down in the middle of Lincoln; are you man enough to take on the challenge?"

Nope, and the challenge in itself is indicative of the problem.

If there is a one in a million chance of something happening, then it will eventually happen.
Should the man who made the decision to take a one in a million risk be penalised because it eventually happens?
No, the world should sit back and say "Sh1t Happens"

This idea that commanders should have personal liability if a reasonable risk is taken and the unlikely happens is stupidity and is calcifying our militaries ability to fight.
It is easy to see in todays military that nearly all commanders are becoming risk averse. They are constantly worried about going to jail rather than winning.

"Do you really want to return to the days of 1952 because that is what you are advocating"

I have never advocated that actually, but a quick glance at the graph I posted earlier would make 1968 seem optimum. The big easy gains have been made. The low hanging fruit have been plucked, but we still have the ability to operate.
Every year after that has been totally ineffective at reducing accidents at a growing cost to capability.

Tourist

1st May 2014, 19:18

Tuc

How, exactly does the un-airworthy installation of HISL cause to aircraft to crash?

It was turned off.

The previous fit would also have been turned off.

The pilot may also have been wearing incorrect underpants. The Observer may have had a non cleared crayon.
To say that this makes the accident airworthiness related is b@llocks.

In the regime of flight they were in, the bagger and a pinger were operating in exactly the same way.
And I have both Mk6 and 7 in my logbook.

Incidentally, you know that after all this palava, they decide to leave HISLs on the Mk7?

So the process did not tick the boxes, but the bit of kit has a clean bill of health.
So if they had followed the correct process, the HISL would have been fitted and the accident would still have happened.

The military now lives in a world where if you need something done quickly and effectively, you step outside the military framework and get it cleared the civilian route!!

We deployed a UOR to Afghan totally bypassing Boscome because it was the only way to get the capability to theatre inside a decade and a billion dollars..

How crazy is it that the civvys can pretty much glue anything they want to an airframe and the military cannot!!

FATTER GATOR

1st May 2014, 19:28

Farewell PPRuNE

It started so well and has descended over the years into a mediocre shop for one-sided vitriolic diatribes and personal insults. I hope the 'crusading' does more good than satisfying the cyber ego's of faceless commentators.

The thought of reading through another depressing essay on airworthiness will help me resist the urge to look at this site again.

If your intentions are well-meaning, I wish you goodbye and good luck.

FG
Inverness.

Chugalug2

1st May 2014, 20:11

Fatter Gator, if I have been instrumental in your abrupt departure then please stick around and take me to task. I can assure you that all I want is to see the airworthiness that operated on my behalf and of which I was blissfully unaware be there for those who do Military Aviation today. Why else would I be forever chuntering on about it? Self aggrandisement? A bit difficult being, as you say, that I post anonymously. On the other hand if you support Military Air Safety then stick around and post accordingly.

This isn't an entertainment, it's supposed to be an exchange between aviation professionals. Now we can all slip below the high bar that infers, self most definitely included, but if our intentions are honourable and we are not being two faced then we can all gain from the process, whether we be pro or con. The problem about announcing one's departure is that it can follow the Law of Diminishing Returns as one comes and goes...

Which Law brings us of course back to you Tourist. I'm confused as to why the previous practice of switching off fwd Anti-Collision lights in the conditions that pertained at the time of the accident somehow means that switching off the later fwd HISLs was not a factor in the mid air collision of the two i/b o/b Seakings? I know that the BoI said they were not, but that trial was then the only formal one to date, ie no such trials had been carried out on the Mk7 previously. Even your can-do civvies would have trialled them, having 'glued' them on, wouldn't they?

Now I am an old retired fixed wing truckie, with very few rotary hours and they all pax, but isn't the whole raison d'etre of such devices to avoid collisions (there's a clue there somewhere in the name)? So with both aircraft having switched off said devices it follows that the risk of collision is increased doesn't it, yet the BoI finds that it wasn't and indeed that the HISLs had no bearing on it. Can you see the difficulty here? Operator illegally fits HISLs, 7 killed and two a/c lost in a mid-air, operator investigates accident, operator finds HISLs not to be a factor. Perhaps they weren't, but that is why the civvies have a regulator and an investigator separate and independent of the operators and of each other. That is all I ask for, all we ask for. Is it really so much?

Willard Whyte

1st May 2014, 21:35

This isn't an entertainment

Ah, but it is.

Tourist

1st May 2014, 21:49

Chug

This has become like arguing with the chemtrail freaks.

If you cannot see that an incorrect process, no matter how incorrect it is, for fitting a good piece of kit has no bearing on an accident then you need a tinfoil hat. You are questing for conspiracy.

Personally I think a straight read across from the mk 6 is perfectly reasonable. All bagger pilots at the time were ex mk6 and comfortable with its operation. Apart from its spacky wobble it flies the same too plus generally operated in the vicinity of the ship the same.

Chugalug2

1st May 2014, 23:09

Ah, but it is.Well I should get self-righteous I suppose and go off on one about life and death issues, but better perhaps to admit that I fed you the lead in and you delivered the punch line, Willard. Well done you.

Tourist,
Nimrod was an incorrect process. Chinook was too many to list, Tornado was, etc. The Mk 10 seat was just about missing paper, the Safety Case. It killed its pilot by not doing what its job was, saving him from a zero zero ejection. And how do you know that your 'good piece of kit' wont wait 30 years before killing you, Tourist? How do you know that it ever was a 'good piece of kit' in the first place? How do you know if it still is?

Anyway, my question was not about whether the HISLs were good or bad, my question was how do we know that switching off the fwd ones on both baggers was not the cause of them colliding with one another? You say it wasn't, you say all the other baggers say it wasn't, the BoI President said it wasn't, but you tell us it was your custom as operators to switch them off anyway, and the Anti Collision Lights that preceded them, so you would all say that wouldn't you? You may all be right, but it would be better if that were confirmed by a truly independent MAAIB rather than the same operator, wouldn't it?

Lonewolf_50

1st May 2014, 23:27

how do we know that switching off the fwd ones on both baggers was not the cause of them colliding with one another
chug:
At the risk of incurring your wrath ... if both pilots reported to the controllers that they had visual on the other, and if the procedural control of altitude separation were being maintained (or not), then perhaps the lights being on or off is only part of the problem and not quite the "smoking gun" that it is being protrayed as. (If not being sold as such, that is how this line is coming off, perhaps unintentionally).

Night formation has its share of hazards regardless of kit installed. Closure rates can be deceptive day or night, and certainly much tougher at night.

FWIW, a very good friend of mine made a small mistake in closure rate back in 1984, flying an A-6 over the Med, during a low level rendezvous with his flight lead.
Daytime. (RIP, Pat. :( )
If these two Sea Kings were doing a join up in the dark ... it only takes a small mistake for things to go wrong.

tucumseh

2nd May 2014, 07:29

How, exactly does the un-airworthy installation of HISL cause to aircraft to crash? I again refer you to the BoI President. Other failures (which I know you agree occurred), necessary events (e.g. inbound radar mode change) and faults (e.g. outbound without radar/JTIDS/IFF) left HISL as their last line of defence in a situation that required them to see and be seen.

You continue to ignore repeated statements that no-one has ever claimed HISL caused the crash. It was a contributory factor, and the point is that WHY it was a contributory factor is part of the systemic airworthiness failings within MoD, which link this discussion to the thread subject. Specifically, in this case, refusal to obey mandated regulations.

To say that this makes the accident airworthiness related is b@llocks. I again refer you to the BoI President. However, if you have tried to get him to listen, I appreciate your frustration, as he won’t.

In the regime of flight they were in, the bagger and a pinger were operating in exactly the same way. And I have both Mk6 and 7 in my logbook. Interesting. Didn’t know that. How far from the ship did the Mk6 need to be before switching on, in her case, radar, IFF or secure comms. And how far out did an inbound have to start switching off?

Incidentally, you know that after all this palava, they decide to leave HISLs on the Mk7? Irrelevant; you are fixated on the strobes themselves, which no one has ever said are unairworthy. The key question is, was the installation design or the way it is maintained changed, and was the Service Deviation amended? (Yes)

So the process did not tick the boxes, but the bit of kit has a clean bill of health. I again refer you to the BoI President! There's a trend here.

So if they had followed the correct process, the HISL would have been fitted and the accident would still have happened. You reveal a very narrow mindset. If MoD had followed the correct process, NONE of the contributory factors noted by the BoI would have been present and more defences in depth would have been intact. I agree the fact Ark Royal’s IFF being unserviceable would still be a factor, along with other ship-side failures, but that is why you have defences in depth.

For example, If the HMS Liverpool Lynx had not encroached into the Carrier Control Zone without permission, flying across outbound ASaC’s nose at a critical point (on the precise track inbound would have been on a couple of minutes later on final approach), with lights off, then perhaps outbound would not have called “Visual”. (The diagrams derived from radar traces later published by RNFAISC demonstrate this vividly. When asked about the Lynx, MoD only ever talk about Inbound's perspective, avoiding the question of Outbound confusing her with the Inbound ASaC. In fact, at the critical point, the Lynx was directly behind the Outbound ASaC (as seen by Inbound), but the question as to how these converged targets would appear on their radar was not asked). Why did MoD lie about this? One witness said the Lynx was half a mile from Liverpool when the collision occurred. Another said the aircraft was on deck with the crew speaking to maintainers. An obvious conflict, so why did the Coroner shout down the father of outbound’s pilot when he asked for the conflict to be reconciled? Mr Green’s understandable outburst of "WHAT A FIX" sums up the inquest and post-BoI investigation (which MoD now claim didn’t happen).

The military now lives in a world where if you need something done quickly and effectively, you step outside the military framework and get it cleared the civilian route!!

We deployed a UOR to Afghan totally bypassing Boscome because it was the only way to get the capability to theatre inside a decade and a billion dollars..

How crazy is it that the civvys can pretty much glue anything they want to an airframe and the military cannot!! Not sure I understand all this or its relevance to this case or RJ. Are you advocating that the military be permitted to “glue anything they want to an airframe”? Neither RJ nor ASaC were endorsed as UORs, so a quite different process kicks in, which only converge at key points. However, I wholeheartedly agree that the norm should be, shall we say, a "UOR+" route, rather than the convoluted and often unnecessary process forced upon DEC and DE&S.

This programme is a classic example of requirements not being set properly, but MoD getting very lucky. You call it a success, and from the very narrow viewpoint of front line operators, who didn’t see and probably don’t care what their seniors formally endorsed, then of course it was a success. But you should tell your bagger friends what the RN DIDN’T endorse, and so were a “gift” from the civilian PM. The Full Mission Trainer. Ask them how they’d have got on since 2003 without one! It wasn’t accidentally omitted from the requirement. It was specifically stated it was not wanted or needed. They’d still be flying under the late 2002 Switch On Only release, which did not permit operational use. Active Noise Reduction, Airborne Video Recording System (a vital source of data to the BoI, whose endorsement of it was the first), a working and safe IFF, a working comms system; and so on. So much of what they have was unendorsed and/or rejected, with robust lobbying to cancel critical components of the Mk7 programme supported by RN staffs.

Do they realise the endorsed requirement was a simple radar transmitter power upgrade with a few minor upgrades to various LRUs? Hence, the original project (not programme) title of “Radar System Upgrade” and the RN's insistence that 849 would simply shut down for a week-end while all cabs were converted (only 8, not 13), and the modified LRUs stuffed into the old decrepit Trainer. You couldn't make that up. (RSU was re-named “Mission System Upgrade” in 1995 at PE’s behest, but it was but one project within a much larger programme. It was a device to gently point out the RN hadn’t asked for anything that could actually be put to any use – which is a common cause of failed projects). The programme (not project) only got back on track when ASE(N) withdrew RN support, leaving the civilian MoD(PE) staff relatively free from interference, and to set the requirements and do the job properly. Is there a lesson there? It is little wonder the senior staffs didn’t want the Post Project Evaluation report written, or anywhere near the powers that be. It is a conundrum that is very relevant to the thread subject.

Chugalug2

2nd May 2014, 09:47

Lonewolf 50, I'm not saying why these two aircraft collided because I don't know. What I am querying is why the operator was so sure that it was not because both their fwd HISLs were switched off. As tuc rightly points out all the other holes in the cheese slices meant that this compromised their last line of defence. As to both calling visual, visual with what? You mentioned a smoking gun, might that not have been the Lynx?

I don't expect anyone to know why these aircraft collided, and if they say they do I would suspect an agenda of some sort. My point all along is that, in common with all other Military Air Accident investigations to date, this was investigated under the auspices of the operator. That does not make for objective conclusions on which one can build in order to avoid avoidable accidents. That is the whole point of Aircraft Accident Investigation.

In the meantime a question mark hangs over this tragedy. One thing we do know though is that the HISLs had been fitted in contravention of the Airworthiness Regulations and had not been subject to trials, as well as other LRU discrepancies mentioned by Dervish . That is why it remains an Airworthiness Related Accident.

Engines

2nd May 2014, 11:35

Guys,

Perhaps I can help here.

As I posted before, it's rare for any accident or incident to have a single, lone, cause. I almost every case where a BoI (now an SI) takes place, there are a number of factors involved. Some are what used to be called 'primary' - they were in the direct chain. Some were called 'contributory' - in old speak, they had an influence on the chain, but weren't actually part of it. And some were just observations. I hope you can already see that there is plenty of scope for disagreement and variation in how these factors are assessed and reported. And that's in an accident where the cause is definitely established. When the cause can't be established (as in the MoK crash), the field is left open for speculation, dispute and disagreement. This thread shows that in spades.

The difficulty that Tuc and Chug constantly highlight is in the area where shortcomings in 'airworthiness' are a factor.

Achieving an 'airworthy' aircraft (which I see as one that is safe to maintain, fly and operate, including on ops) starts with requirements, runs through design, acceptance, configuration management, and then into maintenance and operation. Oh, and that old bug bear modifications. The issues Tuc and Chug are highlighting is that the actions of VSOs (some in the MoD, some in the RAF - and there's a difference) have damaged the MoD's current ability to properly manage and deliver that 'airworthiness' process.

So, when an SI finds that there was a shortcoming in the MoD's 'airworthiness management system', the question arises whether it is a result of historical decisions by those VSOs, or the failure of those on the ground at the time to do the job. Here's a hard idea - it could be both. Or either. The decision is harder if the airworthiness factor is probably the primary cause. The real challenge (at least in my view) is how the MoD moves forward.

What I don't think what necessarily helps is trying to use casualty figures from accidents that don't have 'airworthiness' as a primary cause as a main argument for change. (Sorry, Chug, if you disagree). But what I do think is absolutely flaming vital is that the MoD gets its 'airworthiness house' in order as soon as practicable. And if that means highlighting some of the more horrible lapses that have occurred and are occurring (Chinook RTS, abuse of STFs, lack of basic technical competencies, putting schedule before safety), then I'm all for that. The arguments for fixing these can stand on their own merits, in my view.

I've already posted my ideas for change on the ground. My preferences for organisational change would be, for a starter, to see the MAAIB removed from the MAA, expanded and made directly accountable to the SoS for defence, or his PUS. MAAIB reports could then be separate from any MAA SIs, with their own chain of conclusions and observations. Oh, and published separately.

Next, policy and strategy for 'military air safety' should be stripped out of the MAA. Location? I'd say an independent Commission reporting to the SofS for Defence.

That would leave an in MoD' 'MAA' developing the detailed regulations and orders required to implement them.

What I think also needs a thorough scrub is the MoD's system for 'assurance' and even 'inspection' We've seen any number of recent scandals in the NHS where alledgedly responsible 'assurance' organisations couldn't find their own a**e with a map, let alone problems on the ground. My own view is that many areas of MoD have been too ready to shrug their shoulders and let the MAA have responsibility for seeing that things are done right. That responsibility starts with the person doing the job, and should run right up through every department. The recent Hawk accident SI should be a wake up call for this area.

I suppose there aren't any easy answers. My parting thought is this - we must never let 'airworthiness' (or 'air safety') become such a 'holy grail' that it damages our ability to deliver effective and acceptably safe kit to the front line in a timely way. I'm with Tourist all the way on this one. The teams doing the 'airworthiness' job need to be professional and brave enough to tell the politicians when they can't do that, and to defend (and explain) the trade offs that will have to be made to achieve the military aims.

Best Regards to all as ever

Engines

dervish

2nd May 2014, 13:16

tuc, I suggest you stop. You have a distinct advantage. :ok:

tourist, atg, can we please have your thoughts on how the current problems on Rivet Joint could have been avoided and how MoD should now proceed? You criticize excessive process. You criticize tuc, who has said he agrees with you and has presented his own thoughts. What alternatives do you suggest? Alternatives don't mean the other is wrong. It seems to me more good has come out of this thread by discussing what does and doesn't work than has come out of RJ so far. MoD has admitted it knew of the problems years ago yet 7 months after delivery of the first aircraft it is going cap in hand to Hammond. What should Hammond do?

Chugalug2

2nd May 2014, 15:24

Engines:-
What I don't think what necessarily helps is trying to use casualty figures from accidents that don't have 'airworthiness' as a primary cause as a main argument for change. (Sorry, Chug, if you disagree). But what I do think is absolutely flaming vital is that the MoD gets its 'airworthiness house' in order as soon as practicable.I'm not using casualty figures as a main argument for anything other than to underline the gravity of a situation whereby the operator is judge and jury of its own conduct as well as of its own accidents. We have time and again seen instances whereby evidence has been withheld from BoI's, witnesses have been withheld from BoIs, BoI findings have been changed upon 'review', families have been serially lied to, coroners have been lied to, and evidence offered to address this subversion refused as not being 'new'. All that is over and above the deliberate suborning of Regulations to the extent that knowingly grossly unairworthy aircraft were illegally released to service.

Given such conduct I cannot see how anything can be taken at face value from such a source. That is why I call accidents 'airworthiness related' whereby the only reason that proven airworthiness shortcomings were not found to have contributed to an accident was because the operator said so. Air Safety has to be founded in trust or it is nothing. UK Military Air Safety has now reached that nadir and must be placed in independent hands to restore that essential trust, ie an independent MAA and MAAIB, both of the MOD and each other.

With respect, the MOD will never get its house in order, and airworthiness will remain unsafe in its hands. As to:-
we must never let 'airworthiness' (or 'air safety') become such a 'holy grail' that it damages our ability to deliver effective and acceptably safe kit to the front line in a timely way. Who on earth is proposing that? The whole point of Air Safety in Military Aviation is to enhance Operational Capability. The reason there is an OC problem now is because of the unairworthiness infecting the whole military airfleet, which in turn is because of action/inaction by the MOD. It is nothing less than a national scandal.

Heathrow Harry

2nd May 2014, 16:19

"That responsibility starts with the person doing the job, and should run right up through every department."

I thought that was what Cullen said...........

certainly a lot of oil companies moved to that - no special safety department, safety is a line responsibility and it's on your head as a director/manager/supervisor if the brown stuff hits the fan

pity BP never managed to get their US subsids to recognise it..............

Roland Pulfrew

2nd May 2014, 16:19

Bl00dy Hell :eek:

The reason there is an OC problem now is because of the unairworthiness infecting the whole military airfleet

That is some kind of sweeping statement!! And probably a gross over exaggeration. Just think about all those military aircraft out there flying around serially un-airworthy.

I used to fly one type where paperwork grounded the fleet ensuring we delivered NO capability. The F700s ended up so big they had to be split into 2 because of the "husbandry log"; no airworthiness issues recorded, but lots of trivia and aircraft spent weeks, if not months, NOT flying. That's an example of the airworthiness tail wagging the OC dog. I'm beginning to think that Fatter Gator was right.

Heathrow Harry

2nd May 2014, 16:24

be fair RP!

Tecumseh at al have spent pages explaining how they believe that "airworthy" means it meets the specs especially on failures and failure rates - if it doesn't meet those then it cannot be "airworthy" by definition

The others reckon if it can stagger off the ground and get back without killing any of the crew or taxpayers it must be fine

the MoD obviously haven't a clue otherwise SOMEONE should have stood up and said "Will this pass any Safety Case review?"

Hammond is now on the grill - say No and the SO's and the Treasury will go mad, they will breif against hm in the Press ("Minister wastes Zillions")

say YES and be placed, if something goes wrong, to be viliified ("Murderer of our brave lads .......")

Engines

2nd May 2014, 16:50

Chug,

I really don't think we are very far apart, and I fully support the brave and proper stance you and Tuc have led. However, we have to bring the aircrew with us on this.

The point I was making was that it is possible for the less competent engineer to make airworthiness a 'fetish', a sort of 'holy grail', instead of applying their professional judgement and expertise to solve the problem and get the aircraft into service. I've had first hand experience of that (thankfully uncommon) side of the argument. Out of date Def Stans don't help when they are used as a sort of 'holy writ'. To be brutally honest, Boscombe lost a deal of cred because of attitudes like that. I don't think it was fair, but it happened, and the RAF managed to build a whole slew of OEUs to replace the AAEE function off the back of that perception.

I absolutely support using all best means to get the point over - but one thing I was always told in HQ staff was that you have to carry all the stakeholders with you. If 'airworthiness' is sen as an obstacle to effective combat operations, then I fully agree with you that it's an indictment of the attitude of generations of VSOs and those customers (aircrew). However, we also have to realise that there's a perception problem out there.

I suppose my focus is on the people at the sharp end doing the job properly. The regs aren't great, but they are sufficient for the job. The system isn't fab, but if the project engineers do their job right, the system won't stop them. The biggest challenge I see is getting the people on the desks back up to a level of technical expertise and experience that allows them to properly manage and deliver the kit. Of course, they need the support and encouragement of their superiors, and that's where your excellent points come in, in my view.

A more independent MAA? I've offered my thoughts on that. A more independent MAAIB, to produce really independent reports, yes. A rework of the currently flawed SI system? Definitely. But whatever you end up calling it, there will have to be some sort of MoD 'air safety administration house', to keep specs and regs up to date, and to carry out the 'QA' function (sorry, old speak there) to keep the desks honest as best they can.

Very much hoping that we stay on the same(ish) page here,

Yours ever

Engines

Genstabler

2nd May 2014, 16:50

I apologise for being a thick, geriatric Pongo, but can someone explain for me in one, max two simple sentences without abbreviations, acronyms and other coding what exactly the problem is that keeps the beast grounded?
And try to be polite. I may be a trained killer but I am a sensitive one.

Tourist

2nd May 2014, 16:51

Tuc

"You call it a success, and from the very narrow viewpoint of front line operators"

I appreciate that you only have our best interests at heart, but that quote pretty much sums up how badly you misunderstand what a military's purpose is.

I struggle to find a more valid viewpoint other than that of the front line operator.

Dervish

I have no knowledge of the RJ so have refrained from commenting on the
situation.

If pressed I would just say that I would have no issues with flying it. The US produce good aircraft.

Chugalug2

2nd May 2014, 17:25

I'm all for taking everyone with us on this, Engines, particularly the men and women at the very sharp end. What I'm not for is the good old British fudge, whereby we make lots of changes, rename everything and everybody and basically carry on as before with the same jobs being done by the same people as before, ie pre and post Haddon-Cave.

It is because that Report dodged the real issue, of naming and shaming the real culprits responsible for this mess, and instead in time honoured way fed a few sacrificial lambs for slaughter that the MAA is the incompetent inept bunch of jobsworths that it is. If that is what you mean by:-
it is possible for the less competent engineer to make airworthiness a 'fetish', a sort of 'holy grail', instead of applying their professional judgement and expertise to solve the problem and get the aircraft into service. I've had first hand experience of that (thankfully uncommon) side of the argument.
then we are indeed in violent agreement. It is that kind of jobsworth attitude that raises the hackles of the likes of Roland and has the effect of alienating the very people for which Air Safety strives, Military Aircrew. That is why the MAA and MAAIB have to be free of the MOD's malevolent dead hand. Their civilian DGs will have to have a lot of discretion to exercise thanks to the dysfunctional mess that is UK Military Air Safety. An unenviable task which will mean coming clean about the extent and cause of this scandal. For a start they need to show Haddon-Cave for the sham it is, and tell us all about what really went on during the so called 'Golden Period of Airworthiness'. At least then crews will be better informed about problems involving their fleet, their systems, and what is planned to deal with them.
It won't be easy, there will be many problems, but at least there will be the chance to get the military fleets airworthy again. At the moment that just isn't going to happen.

Tourist, you say you know little about RJ, well me too. I'd want rather more to reassure me that it was a viable prospect than a 'made in USA' sticker (dated presumably 1964, though that is quite close to your chosen Golden Year of 1968, I guess).

Lonewolf_50

2nd May 2014, 18:13

in common with all other Military Air Accident investigations to date, this was investigated under the auspices of the operator. That does not make for objective conclusions on which one can build in order to avoid avoidable accidents.
Chugs: If by "operator" you refer to the Royal Navy, or the Mod, you and I shall part company on this point in disagreement.

Having investigated accidents in the USN, I find your assertion that military investigations do not make for objective conclusions on which one can build in order to avoid avoidable accidents to be false.

Back to RJ, the topic of this thread, and its various program challenges.

Cows getting bigger

2nd May 2014, 19:12

Genstabler, in simple terms, there isn't a complete set of paperwork to say that the design, build and continued provision of the aircraft is safe. It may be safe, it may not, but without the paperwork it is automatically assumed to be unairworthy.

Not wanting to marginalise the argument, it's like buying organic food at the supermarket without the shop being able to confirm, with complete certainty, that the food is actually organic.

Genstabler

2nd May 2014, 19:25

Bloody hell! What idiot authorised the deal?

4mastacker

2nd May 2014, 20:36

Bloody hell! What idiot authorised the deal?

Whoever held the reins on 22nd March 2010.

Rigga

2nd May 2014, 21:54

I'm not sure who said this:
"The military now lives in a world where if you need something done quickly and effectively, you step outside the military framework and get it cleared the civilian route!!

We deployed a UOR to Afghan totally bypassing Boscombe because it was the only way to get the capability to theatre inside a decade and a billion dollars..

How crazy is it that the civvys can pretty much glue anything they want to an airframe and the military cannot!!

The fact is that whatever UOR you installed without Boscombe's advice is likely to be undone at the soonest possible opportunity because it is...NOT AIRWORTHY. The mere fact that it currently works does not make it airworthy.

The main reason that MOD can't do this work unaided is simply because...THEY CAN'T DO IT.

The above collection of statements utterly supports Chug's & Tuc's fully justified drive to get a properly qualified and independently operating MAA...as opposed to the one masquerading as an aviation authority in Bristol today.

In my limited experience of working with one rather significant IPT they were severely understaffed, totally unqualified and generally incompetent in their designated tasks.

Those that were held responsible for the Maintenance Schedule had no concept of what was required - I considered their whole department as "Document holders" rather than Schedule Managers. They'd done no reviews in at least five years and their Data was a mess. Literally, they were a bunch of "City Fathers" sitting around clumps of desks waiting for their pensions. I remember one particularly pathetic Sqn Ldr who literally couldn't/wouldn't talk to me without a support crowd behind him.

It took me just 6 months to convince their (AOC's) bosses of the mess their most dependant data was in and for them pay "us civvy's" to take it off them. (£6m for the initial investigation, I believe)
It took a further two years to clean the triplicated "records" that were handed over.

I will stop before I go too far...Red Wine, and all that, leading to Red Mist.

GreenKnight121

3rd May 2014, 01:11

Genstabler, in simple terms, there isn't a complete set of paperwork to say that the design, build and continued provision of the aircraft is safe. It may be safe, it may not, but without the paperwork it is automatically assumed to be unairworthy.

Actually, it would be more correct to say that "there isn't a complete set of UK-standard paperwork"!

As far as I can see, they haven't gone through all the US-standard paperwork yet to see if all the info needed to meet the UK-standard is present, and it appears they feel it will be quicker/cheaper to get a waiver than to work to transfer that info to the UK paperwork.

There may well be gaps (some significant) between the info in the US-standard paperwork and that required for the UK-standard paperwork, but I have not seen anything saying that the MOD has actually found that out.

The fact is that whatever UOR you installed without Boscombe's advice is likely to be undone at the soonest possible opportunity because it is...NOT AIRWORTHY. The mere fact that it currently works does not make it airworthy.

No, it will be pulled out because it didn't go through all the bureaucratic channels and get all the right boxes ticked.

It may well have no detrimental affect whatsoever on the actual safety of flying & operating the aircraft, but that's not what is the issue - if it didn't get the full process then it is automatically assumed to be unsafe, whether it actually is or not, and whether removing it degrades the combat capability of the aircraft (and thus decreasing the safety of those relying on the aircraft to fight the enemy) or not.

There is a difference between being NOT AIRWORTHY because it actually is unsafe and being labeled NOT AIRWORTHY because the right paperwork wasn't done - but the MOD and many posters here believe the two are one and the same.

Yes, the ideal purpose of the paperwork is supposed to be to insure the actual, real-world safety of the aircraft with the modification, but the real-world purpose often ends up as insuring the paperwork is proper without regard to what happens outside the office.

Testing is as (or more) important as the paperwork process, but from what I have read testing is no longer a priority, as it costs more than a couple of office-workers checking tick-boxes.

andrewn

3rd May 2014, 08:44

Couple of thoughts...

The USAF have been operating RJs for years and, AFAIK, they don't fall out of the sky on a regular basis
The USAF operates RJs out of the UK on a daily basis - often with UK crews. Somebody must have authorised this and "taken the risk"

I've read all the arguments about paperwork and audit trails and I understand the point that Tuc, etc are trying to get across, and I also understand the pain of the needless loss of family members due to negligence and cost cutting by those who had a duty of care to protect them (to the best of their ability).

Unfortunately, as is often the case, I feel that the real issue (Govt cost cutting and negligence by key service individuals) has been lost in the noise and everyone is now hiding behind the "audit trail" argument. Common sense and logic has gone out of the window and no doubt in part due to the authorisers being terrified of ending up in jail if the unthinkable ever did happen.

All the while the crews and jet sit around and we as a nation miss out on a valuable capability.

Only in blighty!

Chugalug2

3rd May 2014, 08:57

There is a difference between being NOT AIRWORTHY because it actually is unsafe and being labeled NOT AIRWORTHY because the right paperwork wasn't done - but the MOD and many posters here believe the two are one and the same.

And many posters here ascribe themselves the powers of the Almighty. How on earth do you know if something is safe when you instal it, when you service it, when it gets older and older if you don't keep a fully audited paperwork trail of its history?

All the bits that were installed on the Nimrod MR2 to provide it with AAR capability were presumably considered safe but the installation did not conform to the Airworthiness Regulations. As is the way with airworthiness shortcomings fate took its time to strike, but strike it did.

All the bits that comprised the MB Mk10 ejection seat were considered safe, so safe indeed that a Safety Case did not even exist, lots of paperwork saved there! As is the way with airworthiness shortcomings fate took its time to strike, but strike it did.

Would you buy a used car purely on the verbal assurances of a glib salesman, or would you insist on seeing written evidence of a full service history? After all, it's just so much bloody paperwork...

GreenKnight121

4th May 2014, 03:14

Ah, yes - the "if the paperwork doesn't outweigh the aircraft then no paperwork exists" argument.

There IS a "full service history" of the aircraft in question, and of the modifications in question - as well as of the other aircraft (which are closely-related to the ones you bought) with those modifications.

But since it isn't a UK service history, then... :rolleyes:

Yes, there should be an examination of whether there is any potential conflict or difference that hasn't been tested - and then test them to determine if there is or isn't an actual conflict or problem with the difference(s).

Re-read my post. I never said that we shouldn't have the safety paperwork, I said that we shouldn't let "following only the UK process" become the only goal!

Jet In Vitro

4th May 2014, 05:00

How many aircraft do not have an indication that pitot heaters are on other than a switch position?

Chugalug2

4th May 2014, 09:02

Greenknight, it isn't the quantity rather than the quality of the paperwork that is of concern. Are you saying that the RJ standing at Waddington is fully airworthy according to the US Military Airworthiness Regulations? That at least would be a start, but we have as yet to clear that first hurdle. Certainly there seems to be a problem with the UK Regulations, or why else isn't it even now being lovingly caressed by the very people waiting to take it to their bosoms?

Does the word 'ringer' mean the same there as it does here?

TBM-Legend

4th May 2014, 11:06

Who signed this baby out of L3? Aircraft don't just levitate without someone signing her off...how did it get to the UK???

From Aviation Week:

The aircraft — ZZ664 — arrived at Waddington on Nov. 12 after a flight from Majors Field in Greenville, Texas, via Bangor, Maine. The aircraft, which was converted from a 1964-vintage KC-135R tanker, is the first of three RC-135s destined for the RAF under the Airseeker program, filling the capability gap in electronic and signals-intelligence gathering left open by the retirement of the Nimrod R1 in 2011.

The RAF is the first export customer for the Rivet Joint, and the $1 billion program is considered to be one of the most complex Foreign Military Sales purchases ever completed between the U.K. and the U.S.

ZZ664 was rolled out of L-3’s facilities in Greenville in early May and made its first post-conversion flight at the end of July. According to RAF officials, the aircraft achieved its flight trials ahead of schedule, allowing it to be delivered early.

The RAF is due to declare an initial operating capability with a single RC-135 in October 2014; new aircraft will then be delivered every two years, with full operating capability expected in mid-2017, six months earlier than initially planned.

Rigga

4th May 2014, 21:35

"Who signed this baby out of L3? Aircraft don't just levitate without someone signing her off...how did it get to the UK???"

Well, it's unlikely to have been an SAC Tech on a detachment from Waddo. Whomever it was will have been under quite some pressure to deliver "something" at the required time...and probably with an IOU in his back pocket for delivery to the MAA and Waddington.

GreenKnight121

5th May 2014, 03:42

Well that's an "interesting" position - "the only reason an aircraft modified to USAF specifications was allowed to fly in the US was bribery"!

I have nothing to say to that, nor anything more to you - ever.

Of course, this* is an attitude I find rampant on this site, so it shouldn't surprise me.

* The US military only operates via corruption and bribery by the contractors - nothing ever actually meets specifications or regulations - everything is authorized by someone who was bribed to do so.

tucumseh

5th May 2014, 06:02

Anfrewn

Couple of thoughts...

The USAF have been operating RJs for years and, AFAIK, they don't fall out of the sky on a regular basis
The USAF operates RJs out of the UK on a daily basis - often with UK crews. Somebody must have authorised this and "taken the risk"

I've read all the arguments about paperwork and audit trails and I understand the point that Tuc, etc are trying to get across, and I also understand the pain of the needless loss of family members due to negligence and cost cutting by those who had a duty of care to protect them (to the best of their ability).

Unfortunately, as is often the case, I feel that the real issue (Govt cost cutting and negligence by key service individuals) has been lost in the noise and everyone is now hiding behind the "audit trail" argument. Common sense and logic has gone out of the window and no doubt in part due to the authorisers being terrified of ending up in jail if the unthinkable ever did happen.

All the while the crews and jet sit around and we as a nation miss out on a valuable capability.

Precisely the point I made some time ago. One is not permitted to use, exclusively, the historical argument to justify future safety. (That's a regulation, not an opinion). But one is required to exercise engineering judgement if, for example, the audit trail is lacking. This has been done successfully for many years, and obviously applies to most UK military aircraft after the 1991 policy to knowingly NOT have a complete audit trail.

This is where the current drift of this thread, and those commenting on airworthiness, has gone astray. It is advisable, indeed a mandated requirement, to have a complete audit trail; but if the "system" has its own defences in depth (experience, competence, resources etc) then it is not the be all and end all of airworthiness.

But a major problem arises when you also get rid of most of the staff who were specifically trained to exercise this engineering judgement. And then raise the grade/rank of those who are permitted to exercise it. The former is now openly admitted by MoD. The latter is kept quiet. So, where we are now is past the critical point. Far too many savings have been made at the expense of safety. What I, certainly, moan and groan about was we saw this coming over 20 years ago, notified the powers that be; and they abrogated their responsibility to such a degree as to be criminal.

One other point I'd make. Try to remember that one first attains airworthiness, then maintains it. Attaining it is a prerequisite to deciding on Fitness for Purpose - the practical Operational Capability that is mentioned. And airworthiness facilitates serviceability. What MoD now lacks is a clearly defined boundary of responsibility between Attaining/Maintaining and FFP.

The Attaining and Maintaining should be largely invisible to front line; more so the former. The reason you are hearing so much of it is not because of too much process. It is because the process has been willfully ignored and, having been caught out, MoD no longer has anyone who knows how to resurrect the system. The system grinds to a halt as many decisions have to be taken by too few.

As for Rivet Joint. Who is underwriting the aircraft? Boeing, L-3 or the USAF? Pick any one and it is the wrong answer. All 3 must be involved, and the first question I'd ask is the nature of this relationship in the contract. It is a procurement strategy fraught with risk.

tucumseh

5th May 2014, 10:04

tourist

"You call it a success, and from the very narrow viewpoint of front line operators"

I appreciate that you only have our best interests at heart, but that quote pretty much sums up how badly you misunderstand what a military's purpose is.

I struggle to find a more valid viewpoint other than that of the front line operator.

I think I've posted often enough on the subject to have demonstrated the safety of aircrew has always been my primary concern. To make my position clear, I think the front line operators should be able to rely upon those behind them to do their jobs properly. Operators have enough to think about without worrying about things going on in DE&S, the MAA and London. They rightfully expect to be presented with an airworthy aircraft that meets its specification (or has acceptable limitations) and has an acceptable Aircraft Data Set. That is what I meant by narrow viewpoint. It is not a criticism. What I criticise is when operators are distracted by suspicions that all is not well; like Flt Lt Tapper was on Chinook. It was utterly extraordinaruy that he felt the need to visit Racal and even more so that he was allowed to. That single fact, and what lay beneath, should have been a bloody great red flag to his superiors. But they were too busy actively preventing those at the rear doing their jobs.

Having said that, I always wanted and encouraged aircrew involvement. Again, and I know you're sick of me saying this, it is actually mandated yet the necessary resources were chopped and it is seldom implemented now. How many routinely attend Design Reviews? Believe it or not, the regulations actually acknowledge aircrew are pretty busy, and make provision for Design Reviews to be taken to them, at (in your case) Typed Air Stations. Another regulation that is routinely ignored nowadays. The aim here is that what turns up on Day 1 comes as no surprise and the limitations are acceptable, understood and manageable. To cite Chinook again, none of this happened and what they were given came as a huge surprise and had no clearance whatsoever.

To cite Rivet Joint, the aircraft that turned up is lying unused with the airworthiness certification process slipping daily. By definition, the Aircraft Data Set is incomplete and grossly immature. Question: did this come as a surprise to Rivet Joint users? If so, why? If not, when did they know, what did they know, who did they report it to and what action was taken?

Lordflasheart

5th May 2014, 10:52

If not, when did they know, what did they know, who did they report it to and what action was taken? ..... Seemingly the MAA and DE&S knew over two years ago.

NB I've been trying to guess what's been blacked out (and whether it would fit the black bit or has been lengthened or shortened to fool us nosy beggars.)

http://i1271.photobucket.com/albums/jj632/LFH99/55dfd2d7-cb5d-4111-95d4-a2bd04f8e995_zps550b6fa1.png?t=1399285570

As for Rivet Joint. Who is underwriting the aircraft? Boeing, L-3 or the USAF?Seemingly the US Government through L3 at Greenville though the extract doesn't use the U word

http://i1271.photobucket.com/albums/jj632/LFH99/9e8660cc-c4f6-49fa-bcbd-667a452d1853_zps6a4425d1.png?t=1399286657

Provisional Apologies in advance ....

I'm not sure if these extracts answer Tucumseh's questions, or even if I've understood his questions correctly. This may also be old stuff that's been posted before. It seemed vaguely relevant.

LFH

reetired

5th May 2014, 12:56

If the MoD is not yet satisfied with ZZ664 which remains parked at Waddington, why is it OK for 51 Sqn to continue to accumulate thousands of flying hours on the USAF fleet of very similar aircraft?
51 Squadron Personnel Reach 20,000 Operational Flying Hours | The Insight Online (http://www.theinsightonline.co.uk/features/51-squadron-personnel-reach-20000-operational-flying-hours/)

RAFEngO74to09

6th May 2014, 01:23

I may be wrong but I'm pretty sure that when the procurement of Rivet Joint aircraft for the RAF was first announced, it included a statement that a "pooled fleet" of USAF/RAF RC-135Ws would be created. Presumably this means that when major upgrades take place throughout the life of the system, the RAF will get "issued" with a different airframe from the Depot (L-3) to maintain the size of the operational fleet (the alternative would be to only operate 2/3 at a time) as agreed by the Joint Program Office. Presumably, the way airworthiness is being handled currently, this will cause significant delays whenever the RAF gets back a different airframe to the one it gave back for upgrade, particularly when the earlier model it is based upon is different - as eluded to earlier in the thread (various previous RC-135 variants and KC-135Rs).

I also came across this:

UK May Waive Rivet Joint Certification Requirements | Defense News | defensenews.com (http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140413/DEFREG01/304130009/UK-May-Waive-Rivet-Joint-Certification-Requirements)

NoVANav

6th May 2014, 03:40

Pooled fleet means the RAF aircraft will enter the upgrade and maintenance PDM flow as part of the overall RJ fleet. The RAF will only be flying the three designated airframes, 664, 665, and 666. This means two aircraft will probably be available at any one time for ops, not three.

Although L-3 has tremendously improved the time required for PDM and Block upgrades, usually a third of the overall RJ fleet is in Greenville at a time. The flow chart of this looks like a cascading series of PDM periods with the individual RJ aircraft coming through about every three years. This has worked to keep the fleet upgraded with the latest aircraft operational and mission equipment since the 1970s, and should be good enough for the RAF.

Unless, of course, the whole certification disaster discussed in the previous 34 pages of comments screws the whole thing up. Biggest loser will then be the RAF, MOD and the UK---left without a premier airborne SIGINT platform.

RAFEngO74to09

6th May 2014, 16:24

NoNav,

Thanks - I didn't realize a third of the USAF fleet was at L-3 at any given time - makes perfect sense now. The UK often only had 2 out of 3 x Nimrod R1 available (and presumably less for a while after one was lost and had to be replaced by converting a MR2).

andrewn

6th May 2014, 19:49

If the MoD is not yet satisfied with ZZ664 which remains parked at Waddington, why is it OK for 51 Sqn to continue to accumulate thousands of flying hours on the USAF fleet of very similar aircraft?

The question above is the one I posed in an earlier post, see #2 below....

Couple of thoughts...

The USAF have been operating RJs for years and, AFAIK, they don't fall out of the sky on a regular basis
The USAF operates RJs out of the UK on a daily basis - often with UK crews. Somebody must have authorised this and "taken the risk"

Although Tuc gave a very comprehensive response to my main points (thanks Tuc:ok:) I am not sure that particular point was directly addressed.

From a pure airworthiness point of view then the current failure to progress to RTS does not stack up. Surely if there was a known issue with RJs that meant they were more likely to suffer a catastrophic failure then UK MoD would not allow them to continue to operate over the UK and/or with UK crews. I fully realise these RJs are operated under US jurisdiction but not sure that would wash very well with Joe Public in Newmarket if one landed on his house and it was proven to be airworthiness related (and even worse if it were proven that UK SoS for Defence, Service Chiefs, etc knew about it!)

Hence my assertion in original post that any delays in Safety Case approval and RTS are NOT inherently related to lack of airworthiness but much more related to a collective unwillingness to accept the risk of an incomplete audit trail. Might be a slightly easier decision for someone to make if the basic design of the thing didn't pre-date the Ark!

As others have alluded to all of this was well known at time of procurement but some bright spark decided to accept that particular risk - can only assume he's NOT the same individual now involved in sign-off.

Iwasaspotter

6th May 2014, 21:12

One point that has been brought up a couple of times already, but does not seem to have registered, is that the RAF RJs are unique aircraft, not merely more USAF RJs with different roundels.

All the USAF RJs were originally built as EC135B, and have served their 40+ year careers in the relatively benign environment of communications platforms or intelligence gathering.

The RAF RJs are converted from surplus KC135A (latterly KC135R) which will have led a very different operational career. I am sure that L3 and Boeing have taken the different stresses involved in AAR into consideration, as well as the complications or removing the boom and associated plumbing.

These changes will surely have generated a mountain of unique paperwork which will presumably have to be (or have been) checked and verified by the UK authorities.

Summarizing: The RAF RJs are NOT merely more USAF RJs, so please don't use that argument.

Lonewolf_50

6th May 2014, 22:03

These changes will surely have generated a mountain of unique paperwork which will presumably have to be (or have been) checked and verified by the UK authorities.

Summarizing: The RAF RJs are NOT merely more USAF RJs, so please don't use that argument.
Thanks for making that point.

As to that mountain, and the point we discussed a few pages back on configuration control:

It appears that the obstacle to IOC is a due diligence action in the UK.
If they identify documentation either missing (part of the original order) or gaps that need to be filled ( a contract mod to get ahold of same documentation) then once again UK MoD due diligence function is on tap for that.

If the assertions that nobody is left in the MoD who can do such due diligence, where does one hire that specialized skill set?

PPRuNe Consulting Services? :E:ok:

NoVANav

7th May 2014, 03:15

Sorry Iwasaspotter,

That argument does not carry any water, except literally.
The impact of a career as a KC does not put any additional stress on a -135 airframe as service in any other of the many, many special missions the 135 fleet has performed.
Besides, the RCs did NOT come from EC-135s. Most of the current W fleet were modified from M-models which were originally converted from C-135Bs. Some additional aircraft were converted from Bs directly to Ws when the fleet increased (61-4125, 126, 130). The U and V models were purchased directly for the RC-135B role. Being in the last batch of KC-135As purchased, the three RAF aircraft are 19 years younger than the original KC-135A batch. Just ahead of the RC-135Bs, which were the last of the 135 production.
Since the airframes have all had the same wing re-skin, TCTOs and other general airframe work then the only additional modifications are the ones undertaken to convert them to the RC-W version.
There is no difference between the RAF conversions and the original existing RC-135Vs, except designation as a W. (Done recently for standardization as the original B models have electric flaps and the KC-135Rs, RC-135Vs have hydraulic.

Give it a rest! The modified aircraft are NOT different, except for the retention of water heaters for the required UK "brew-up" requirement.

Single Spey

7th May 2014, 06:19

NoVANav

Give it a rest! The modified aircraft are NOT different, except for the retention of water heaters for the required UK "brew-up" requirement.

So what is the Boeing model number of the UK aircraft?

A number of USAF C-135B-04-BN, Boeing Model 717-166 were converted to RC-135M then RC-135W.

New build RC-135-01-BN, Boeing Model 739-445B subsequently became RC-135C, then RC-135V or U.

UK purchases KC-135A-27-BN, Boeing Model 717-148, subsequently converted to KC-135R, and now converted to RC-135W by L3.

Are you saying that Boeing had 'rebuilt' the aircraft from the ground up to a different 'Model' standard?

SS

Rivetman

8th May 2014, 00:39

An interesting question. From what I understand it was delivered several months ahead of 'schedule' the original date being Q1 '14 but BS promising the UK / DE & S Project Lead that all was well; thoroughly tested and the evidence trail fully available and substantiated hence the delivery advanced to Nov 13. Alas it appears that the US forgot one crucial piece of the jigsaw....please generate and provide the substantiating evidence to the UK so the certification process can proceed.

Having sat on the sidelines and reviewed the various posts on this forum with interest, it is reassuring to know that there are many educated colleagues who appear to know more about 664's certification criteria/ substantiation evidence available to the UK than the Procuring PT and those involved in trying to get this aircraft into the skies above the UK....I too sit here with interest, but am a realist, and the BS programme office are no more profficient at providing evidence than those departments within the UK community generating the plethora of UOR's to which no proven; auditable and certified modification exist.

Regrettably, many posts do not seem to be factually correct and, to be honest, there are many inaccurate posts starting to appear. Whilst in accordance with US processes the aircraft may be both Airworthy and Certifiable, the evidence available to the UK is not sufficiently robust to provide a comprehensive Safety Arguement to both the Duty Holder and MAA. It appears as simple as that!!!!!

Many flying hours does not make an aircraft safe....Concorde; Nimrod; Chinook.

Either a platform has sufficient evidence or it does not. The choice for those who decide to recommend and endorse the Safety Case is simple. Put your neck on the line and hope 'Hadden Cave 2' never occurs, or follow due diligence as defined and mandated by the MAA Regulations and seek sufficient; robust; ACCURATE and substantiated data, or bow to political pressure and hope that those 'politicians' and RAF Officers who have many fat stripes, but limited substance when it comes to holding a pen to the paper support you when the going gets tough.

I therefore pose one question......which may/ may not be true, but the the rumours abound.....why has the current Engineering Authority (EA) for the platform now declined/ rejected/ returned his Letter of Airworthiness Authority.

If the truth be known, and this proven to be accurate, then there is no smoke without fire and perhaps those who advocate a rapid clearance for the aircraft would like to accept his responsibility....I am sure there are those within the DE & S; DH; MAA; CAS community who would only too gladly provide you with both the pen and the noose should you wish to take up this offer.

Rigga

8th May 2014, 12:44

I was sure there was a "like" button on here somewhere.

If there isn't one? - there should be!

Lonewolf_50

8th May 2014, 15:32

Nice post, Rivetman, but can you answer me this:
Alas it appears that the US forgot one crucial piece of the jigsaw....please generate and provide the substantiating evidence to the UK so the certification process can proceed.
Was that paid for and required in the original contract/documents/agreements, or is this an over and above requirement now levied?

Who is "the US" in this case?
USAF?
State Department?
DoD?
L-3?
Boeing?

Thanks. Again, your post was well worth the read. :ok:

tucumseh

8th May 2014, 15:44

In previous posts I’ve mention the importance of having a properly appointed Design Authority or Design Custodian (and explained the difference).

The main submission to Lord Phillip noted;

This last (referring to the AAIB report in to ZA721 in 1987) .... aligns closely with the CHART criticism 5 years later highlighting the difficulties caused by Boeing never having been an MoD-appointed Design Authority. That is, the procedures for selecting and appointing Design Authorities had broken down.

When was this “difficulty” removed? ( I don't know as I rather luckily avoided working with Boeing; if indeed anyone actually works "with" them). It is a fair question because if it still exists then that is a huge hole in any audit trail. And if it was removed, what action was taken to ensure previous records, which have no formal status as far as MoD are concerned, are accurate? That is a huge task. Chinook teams over the years had no proper means of managing this, and didn't, so what chance RJ?

Noting part of the MAA's remit will be to ensure the recommendations of these ARTs have been implemented (because they weren't before the MAA was formed).

Rivetman – Excellent.

Lonewolf_50

8th May 2014, 16:03

Can anyone in the room explain to me how Boeing is not a MoD appointed design authority?

It beggars belief that somehow, the UK MoD never got the memo that Boeing, one of the premier aircraft manufacturers on the planet Earth, who (with original producer Vertol) deliverd over 1200 Chinooks to date, is somehow not worthy of being appointed by someone in the MoD as capabile of fulfilling that role. Please forgive my across the pond exasperation here, but this sort of "difficulty" strikes me as having nothing to do with substance, and all to do with illusions of form, chauvinsim, and rice bowls.

This last (referring to the AAIB report in to ZA721 in 1987) .... aligns closely with the CHART criticism 5 years later highlighting the difficulties caused by Boeing never having been an MoD-appointed Design Authority.

(If anyone can answer the question I posed to Rivetman, much obliged. If some of that question falls into "not suitable for discussion on open forums," please advise.)

Rigga

8th May 2014, 17:33

Of course, it could be that Boeing did not want to be the DA/DO responsible for the UK forces Chinny (and Patchy?) heli's?

tucumseh

8th May 2014, 17:34

Lonewolf

Can't answer I'm afraid, but I do remember when I asked (many many years ago) being told Boeing flatly refused to act as a sub-contractor to ANYONE on an MoD contract, and MoD (or more likely Government) permitted this. So it isn't necessarily a reflection of what MoD think, or thought, of the company.

Having said that, the context of the IFS comment was Chinook (lack of) airworthiness, and had roots in the cause of the ZA721 crash and the appalling lack of Quality Control and technical know how at Boeing on the device that had been improperly manufactured and assembled; and whose failure was widely accepted as the cause. (I've seen the photos that remain unreleased; they're pretty damning). This was raised in evidence at the ZD576 (MoK) Fatal Accident Inquiry by an RAF officer. That MoD/Government took no action speaks volumes about who has primacy here. Later, similar evidence about Chinook Mk2s was given during the campaign to clear the pilots, and again Ministers took no action.

MoD's Design Approved Organisation Scheme, a complementary process to that which appoints DA/DCs, permits one to take account of such historical failures and refusal or inability to fix them, so you never know, MoD may have finally flexed muscle. But I doubt it!

Single Spey

8th May 2014, 17:41

Lonewolf

all to do with illusions of form, chauvinsim, and rice bowls.

Bit like why Concorde wasn't allowed to operate Stateside then. :ok:

SS

Lonewolf_50

8th May 2014, 18:25

Lonewolf
Bit like why Concorde wasn't allowed to operate Stateside then. :ok:
I might agree, but it appears that LHR to JFK was a regular run. :confused: What is it you were pointing to? JFK airport is very much Stateside.

Tuc, Rigga, thank you for the answers. In that light, it makes more sense.

Engines

8th May 2014, 19:10

Guys,

Perhaps I can help. Boeing Helicopters in Philadelphia have been accredited under the DAOS scheme, for at least 18 months now.

To get this, they had to submit a 'DAOS Exposition' that set out their credentials and demonstrated that they met the MoD's criteria. That exposition was examined and 'signed off' by the MAA.

So everything's just fine then...

Best Regards

Engines

Lonewolf_50

8th May 2014, 20:35

So everything's just fine then... It would be if the RJ were a helicopter. :}

tucumseh

9th May 2014, 06:43

Thanks Engines

Well done the MAA.

But it does make you wonder about the RAF Chief Engineer's statement that all such recommendations were fully implemented shortly after CHART was published (but only distributed to the CE and ACAS, and withheld from all inquiries).

Mind you, he does have form in this regard, having stated CHART has nothing to do with Chinook HC Mk2 and doesn't mention it. (Only 373 times!)

Perhaps he should have read the Team Leader's Terms of Reference. Oh, he wrote them.

MoD still have a long way to go and RJ is a major test of resolve.

Engines

9th May 2014, 07:47

LW50,

Sorry, my bad - I was responding to an earlier post about Boeing's role with Chinook. The DAOS accreditation I referred to was only for Philadelphia and the Chinook programme for the UK, not RJ. My sincere apologies for contributing to inadvertent thread drift.

In any case, if (as I understand it) RJ was bought FMS, the Design Organisation will be the USAF Program Office, not Boeing. It's one of those aspects of the US system that is not well understood over here - in many cases, the manufacturers are effectively a 'build to print' organisation. The relevant DoD program office authorises all drawings, owns them, and carries the responsibilities of the Design organisation, managing and 'owning' the design in detail.

What this means is that when the UK MoD goes to a US aircraft company and request that they prove that they are an accredited ADO, the first response is often blank incomprehension. Boeing in Philly have got over the bar, but it would be interesting to compare their DAOS 'exposition' with that of, say, Agusta Westland.

It's another area where lack of detailed knowledge within the MoD (in this case how the US DoD procurement system and the USG work) can lead to projects being launched with very limited understanding of the actual risks faced.

Best Regards to all those trying to make it work,

Engines

ancientaviator62

9th May 2014, 07:58

I have raised the 'flag' of Design Authority (DA) before and it is my belief that the USAF assumes the role of DA for the a/c in its inventory. In respect of the initial Chinook purchase the refusal by Boeing to assume this role for the RAF Chinook fleet caused problems for MOD. I do not know how this was resolved if it ever was.

Engines

9th May 2014, 08:35

AA62,

See my post above. At least as far as the Chinook is concerned, it's been resolved as Boeing Helicopters in Philadelphia are now a DAOS accredited Aircraft Design organisation (ADO) for that aircraft, following MAA acceptance of their DAOS exposition.

I'm quite sure that there was no pressure placed on MAA at all to accept the exposition. No, perish the thought.

Just as an aside, each of the US services (Army, USN, USAF) acts as the DO for their aircraft. So, for the Chinook, the US DO is the Army's Heavy Lift Program Office, located in Huntsville, Alabama. One of the fun things dealing with Boeing - they are not allowed to tell the UK a single thing about any of the US Army's programmes. Modifications, trials, problems, incidents, accidents, configurations, build programmes, you name it, the Uk MoD gets nothing about the US in-service fleet from its ADO. They have to go separately to the US Army for whatever the Army feel like giving them. Of course, this also means that Boeing could get to charge twice (or thrice) for doing the same bit of work on two almost identical aircraft. You understand that I'm not for one second saying that they do, just that they could.

Regards

Engines

ancientaviator62

9th May 2014, 10:40

Engines,
my point was that at the time of purchase of the Chinook (done at the last minute because there was money left at the end of the financial year after cx of the original order a few years before !) Boeing refused to act as DA.
In respect of info from the USAF when I was a member of the HEART we visited Marshalls and were informed that they had been contracted to look at other air forces experience of Hercules serviceability. The USAF refused to co-operate, so most of their info came from the RAAF. Problem was a large percentage of it was 'A' model stuff. A very different beast in many ways to the 'K'.

NoVANav

9th May 2014, 10:40

I have it from knowledgeable sources that the RJ at Waddington will be flying within a couple of weeks. RJs will be "accepted" into the force.

The 'new' MAA rules are great for modern procured aircraft, but do not fit the program of aircraft built in the 1960s is the reasoning.
After all, the airframes had around only 19,000 flight hours as KCs and some of the RC-W models in USAF have over 52,000 airframe hours. Seems safe enough for all concerned.

Everyone in the UK hierarchy will 'declare' victory, the RJ will begin flying RAF ops, the SIGINT capability will be added back to RAF inventory and the world will return to normal.

A side benefit will be the end of this entire blog. We can all move on to something less bureaucratic and more interesting.

Heathrow Harry

9th May 2014, 17:01

I wish you were right Novan...

but the thread will continue forever with all those who believe the RJ shouldn't be approved rending their clothes and wailing and pouncing on every small issue and the other side ("the "kick the tyres, light the fires" merchants) coming on to gloat

it REALLY shouldn't have come to this pass.............

NoVANav

9th May 2014, 22:51

Heathrow Harry: Thanks for the sanity comment.

I guess we have read many examples of what we Yanks observe as "bloke bloody-mindedness".

Sometimes a good thing, as when everyone in the UK got bloody-minded about Operation Corporate. Sometimes a bad thing, when it involves mindless, bureaucratic "dog-chasing-his-tail" silliness.:bored:

And, after watching a few episodes of MI-5 over here, I am very aware of how anti-US many Brits can be (in this case the show's writers). Not at all the case with the many aviation friends, RAF friends, and a the girls I dated while flying out of Mildenhall.;)

tucumseh

10th May 2014, 05:46

but the thread will continue forever with all those who believe the RJ shouldn't be approved rending their clothes While I can't think of a single post advocating this, there are indeed those who sit back in amazement that the MAA is having to go cap in hand to the Secy of State over such an avoidable problem.

Good posts from Engines. We (UK and US) have very different procedures in this area and, had our authoritative Def Stan not been cancelled without replacement a few years ago, most US companies would topple at what it asks of Design Authorities and Custodians. They wouldn't say "impossible"; only, as Engines says, others do some of it but they could easily do it if required (and paid). A major difference is responsibility for safety. We choose one way, the US another; neither is wrong but we need to appreciate the differences. One of the major problems reported in the various ARTs by IFS was the UK tendency to drift toward MoD assuming more responsibility (e.g. retaining Special Trials Fits without design incorporation), but not understanding that we were assuming more responsibility and the obligations that come with it; while absolving industry of their obligations but continuing to pay them.

If you break both systems down, the same work has to be done, but it is simply not MoD policy to have the necessary expertise or resources to do it. A simple example. In 1989 (eighty-nine!) AMSO informed the Fire Control and Surveillance Radar IPT in MoD(PE) that, henceforth, the RAF at Harrogate would act as Design Authority for the Sea King HAS Mk3 radar - brought about by a minor problem involving AMSO not bothering to train users, leading to a misconception that the DA wasn't doing his job. I simply had the DA show the supplier the archive holding the master drawings and room with the Sample & Reference Rigs, and asked him when would he have the facilities and expertise in place to maintain this minor aspect of the work, then we'd transfer it all to him. Didn't hear from him again. (Nor would MoD have the necessary resources to prepare and maintain Safety Cases, which is done on the same contract).

The US forces are an infinitely better resourced outfit and probably have such capacity, but I suspect they contract out a lot of it to industry. MoD used to be the DA on, for example, some Rolls Royce engines, but if you studied the contract RR actually did most of the work while MoD had a very knowledgeable engines specialist in charge. Nothing wrong with that, but where is the recruitment ground nowadays for such internal specialists? We don't own Fleetlands and its engine shop any more.........

But MoD has gone too far the other way, starting with the policy that we don't need ANYONE who understands how to do it. (CDP, 1996). This means we are no longer seen as an intelligent customer in many areas (yet superb in others). In practice, industry wanders off at a tangent sometimes and loses sight of the goal as there is no one in MoD to set the requirement and guide them towards it (2 entirely different skills).

In respect of the initial Chinook purchase the refusal by Boeing to assume this role for the RAF Chinook fleet caused problems for MOD.
Indeed. I've mentioned before that an RAF team went to Philly in 1993 to find out about FADEC, so they could prepare the material to "train the trainers". Boeing were horrified, as they were expecting the MoD team to train THEM. This is the reason why FADEC behaviour was so poorly understood in 1993/4. Despite MoD having two distinct teams (MoD(PE) and RAF) resident in Philly, there was no real understanding of just how little Boeing knew about the aircraft and, as Engines says, what they were prepared or allowed to release. Yet, as stated above, in 1987 the AAIB had reported to MoD that Boeing had very poor knowledge of the device that caused the ZA721 fatal crash in the Falklands. Doesn't say much for MoD management oversight, which just so happens to have been the major criticism of MoD by the PAC in their Chinook Mk3 report. We don't learn, do we?

Chugalug2

10th May 2014, 08:13

tuc:-
We don't learn, do we?
No, we don't. Mainly I suspect because we don't want to. There is a theme running through this thread, and elsewhere, that Airworthiness is for wimps. Real men would jolly well go to Waddington and simply kick the tyres and light the fires - job done!

This simplistic attitude in a profession that should know that going to war in the air means confronting two foes, the enemy and the air! All you have to do to make sure that the latter prevails, before you can even close with the former, is to do nothing. That has been MOD policy for nearly thirty years. The only difference now is that it professes, via its subordinate MAA, to want to change all that. The irony is that now it doesn't know how to, thanks to the thorough demolition of Airworthiness expertise that it presided over.

This isn't just about Rivet Joint, or Nimrod, or Chinook, or Seaking, or Tornado, or Hercules, or indeed any other fleet. It's about all fleets. It's about your fleet. It's about your ability to go to war in the air!

"La, la, la! I can't hear you!"

triboy

13th May 2014, 22:14

I Apologise for trivialising this very well informed thread but it has parallels across MOD. Workflow below taken from JSP000 - MOD policy for dummies.

1. Draft a policy without properly assessing the consequences - especially the cost of compliance.
2. Realise that as a country we have outsourced most r&d and de-skilled the procurement element with generalists.
3. Pay a manpower sub to write a risk/safety/security/<add specialism here> case to explain why complying with the policy is a bit difficult.
4. Escalate until you reach the top of the pyramid.
5. GOTO 1.

Jet In Vitro

14th May 2014, 14:19

Rumour is that someone has made a decision!

Jet In Vitro

16th May 2014, 05:41

Looks like RAF RJ will open Waddo Airshow.

VX275

16th May 2014, 07:44

Looks like RAF RJ will open Waddo Airshow.
With a bang?

Chris Kebab

16th May 2014, 13:53

...cleared display flying only!

Melchett01

16th May 2014, 16:12

Did hear at a conference yesterday that it was about to get an emergency clearance for use on ops only, that it would then go out to HERRICK to cover the drawdown, but there was a chance of it being grounded once back to enable the full clearance process to be sorted.

Jet In Vitro

16th May 2014, 16:22

Emergency clearance for ops and fly pasts do not sit comfortably together.

Glad to see the Hog starting to earn its living.

pr00ne

16th May 2014, 17:33

So, it's grounded apart from when it needs to fly?

reds & greens

16th May 2014, 19:26

Oh dear
This would be embarrassing if it was the military...

glad rag

16th May 2014, 19:39

So, it's grounded apart from when it needs to fly?

On ops.

now what do they do about training?

Onceapilot

17th May 2014, 08:06

Training is done on Ops these days Gladders. Wonder how that would look in the case of a big nasty? God forbid!

OAP

dragartist

17th May 2014, 08:19

If the RJ is anything like the R we had a Rear Crew Trainer (RCT) it was set up just like the real thing. (Apart from not having an automatic hot pie dispenser!)The boxes were interchangeable with those on the aircraft. Some of the rack assembles were also made to aircraft standard at one time. (Up to the early 90s) As far as the back end was concerned it was like having a forth aircraft.

glad rag

17th May 2014, 10:16

Training is done on Ops these days Gladders. Wonder how that would look in the case of a big nasty? God forbid!

OAP

So thats the way it is these days huh? I was always led to believe that you make your mistakes BEFORE the critical mission....

http://www.neimagazine.com/uploads/newsarticle/993052/images/199173/large/3-swiss-cheese.jpg

Lordflasheart

17th May 2014, 10:19

now what do they do about training?

From this - dated May 2013

51 Squadron Personnel Reach 20,000 Operational Flying Hours | The Insight Online (http://www.theinsightonline.co.uk/features/51-squadron-personnel-reach-20000-operational-flying-hours/)

Less than two years since their first aircrew members graduated from the training school at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, 51 Squadron is celebrating a milestone achievement, with 20,000 operational flying hours on the USAF RC-135 RIVET JOINT aircraft.

and this - dated Nov 2013 -

http://www.offutt.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123371162

Upon graduation, RAF aircrews are allowed to fly on U.S. Rivet Joints as part of a co-manning agreement. Their first operational mission flown on June 21, 2011, and since then RAF crews have flown more than more than 1,800 sorties and achieved in excess of 32,000 flying hours with the Fightin' Fifty-Fifth.

- 51 Squadron personnel might justifiably claim they were already quite well trained.

LFH

PhilipG

17th May 2014, 11:14

Whilst a decent number of hours have been clicked up by RAF crew, have RJ missions been flown by totally RAF crews, possibly with a USAF observer? Team dynamics.....

Heathrow Harry

17th May 2014, 16:38

wellll there always has to be a moment when there are NO USAF personnel on board

TBH this is just allowing creeping acceptance - we fly it at a few airshows so the GB Public see it , and no doubt lots of pics in the papers, we are ready to use it in action "immediately if needed" and no doubt we'll see a gradual buildup in "necessary training"

I'm willing to bet that no-one will ever sign off a full release but they will just work round it a little here, a little there :rolleyes::rolleyes:

Single Spey

17th May 2014, 21:32

Creeping normalisation, well we did it with RJ so it must be OK for JSF, and Watchkeeper, and Chinook 6, and Wildcat etc etc etc.... :{

SS

Rigga

17th May 2014, 23:20

I beg to differ about the start of Normalisation: It started as soon as the MAA started.

DCThumb

18th May 2014, 07:41

Must be a Waddington thing - new aircraft, RTS CLE, kit 'switch on only' clearance and only flying on ops.....

Chugalug2

18th May 2014, 11:21

HH:-
I'm willing to bet that no-one will ever sign off a full release but they will just work round it a little here, a little there :rolleyes::rolleyes:...and therein lies the irony. If military airworthiness provision had remained unmolested by RAF VSOs almost 30 years ago all this hiatus would have been avoided. You would have experienced fully trained airworthiness engineers in post who would have simply turned to the established procedures and regulations to provide a solution for this aircraft to go into service, whether for training, displaying, or for war. You can't even call these unexpected consequences, for they were predicted at the time by the very people being given the order of the boot, ie those who refused to suborn the regulations and strove to the very last to enforce them.

The creeping introduction of this aircraft into RAF service, no doubt correctly predicted here, would be as cynical and potentially disastrous as was the illegal RTS issued to a knowingly grossly unairworthy Chinook Mk2.

Chickens are coming home to roost now, and the MOD has to face up at last to the consequences of subverting Haddon-Cave and consequently the MAA. It can only get out of this situation of its own making by admitting the past, and reforming Military Air Safety. That means an independent MAA and MAAIB, both of the MOD and of each other. That means some people's collars being felt.

Or, on the other hand, the avoidable accidents and pointless deaths can simply continue...

Rigga

18th May 2014, 18:45

Nimrod II perhaps?

NoVANav

18th May 2014, 21:06

Response to previous posts:
No. I am sure there are no all RAF crew ops flying a USAF aircraft. Why? To quote a rather disastrous recent Sec State: "What difference does it make anyway."
Please, I beg you guys, give UP on this ridiculous circle target shooting on the matter of RJ operations.
The RJs have been flying since the 70s. They have all gone through numerous modifications at Greenville. They have ALL gone through extensive flight systems testing at Greenville. They have ALL gone through extensive backend equipment upgrades and certifications. And, the RAF RJs are just the same as the USAF RJs. They are all considered ONE FLEET.
Someone in the MoD should 'man-up', make the RTS decision, tell everyone else to concentrate on brand new aircraft procurement under the "new" rules and put the RJ into operations ASAP.

Single Spey

19th May 2014, 06:00

NoVANav

The RJs have been flying since the 70s. They have all gone through numerous modifications at Greenville. They have ALL gone through extensive flight systems testing at Greenville. They have ALL gone through extensive backend equipment upgrades and certifications. And, the RAF RJs are just the same as the USAF RJs.

Funny, you could have said something like that about XV230, (replace Greenville with BAE) however it didn't make it airworthy..

You still refuse to give any definitive information about Boeing model numbers, block numbers , type design designation for the US and UK RJs? If they are all the same then surely it should be simple to back up your assertion?

SS

Heathrow Harry

19th May 2014, 10:58

Chugalug

I suspect that everyone involved at the top has decided the damn things will fly in service come what may

no-one will put this in writing and by "phasing" full time ops they think they can extend the time frame for some (possible) dreadful accident out beyond their time in service/retirement from the Civil Service/next election

what gets up my nose is that if we said "Fly them anyway" then everyone would know we're taking a risk and could probably monitor things carefully

As it is creeping acceptance means that there will be little or no formal extra monitoring allowed/paid for/listened to

Worst of both worlds IMHO :ugh::ugh:

Chugalug2

19th May 2014, 15:07

HH:-
they think they can extend the time frame for some (possible) dreadful accident out beyond their time in service/retirement from the Civil Service/next electionIn other words exactly the same mind set that triggered these three decades of needless waste of both life and materiel. Your summary perfectly illustrates why Air Safety is not safe in MOD hands and has to be removed from them forthwith.

If this a/c goes into squadron service without an RTS that signifies it to be airworthy, where does that leave the MAA as presently constituted? What is the point of the MAA as presently constituted?

Wensleydale

19th May 2014, 17:20

"The RJs have been flying since the 70s. They have all gone through numerous modifications at Greenville. They have ALL gone through extensive flight systems testing at Greenville. They have ALL gone through extensive backend equipment upgrades and certifications. And, the RAF RJs are just the same as the USAF RJs. They are all considered ONE FLEET".

Like the E-3Ds you mean? Seven aircraft built in the same factory at the same time. One of the frames has different wings (believe from RC 135 with no specific routing for ESM/coms cables which were just passed through the ribs as and where - no surprize that HF comms had an affect on ESM performance). One aircraft had been hit by a vehicle during construction - the bent pressure hull was "beaten out" and declared serviceable. On insistence of QA, the aircraft tail was removed and a replacement from further down the line bolted on. There is no sign of the old bent tail which could have been fitted to a later aircraft. I could go on.....especially with an area below the floor which was full of swarf on one aircraft.

Davef68

19th May 2014, 18:40

Like the E-3Ds you mean? Seven aircraft built in the same factory at the same time. One of the frames has different wings (believe from RC 135 with no specific routing for ESM/coms cables which were just passed through the ribs as and where - no surprize that HF comms had an affect on ESM performance).

Unlikely, as not only a very different airframe, but the last -135 was built in the mid 60s. Could have been from a wing intended for the E-8B, new-build J-STARs which was cancelled or for an E-6?

NoVANav

21st May 2014, 03:44

Wensleydale,

I have no idea what you are talking about?
The RC-135s have absolutely nothing in common with the E-3Ds. The E-3s are an entirely different aircraft. The fuselage is different the wings are different. What do you not understand about DIFFERENT?

As to the original "Block" numbers hash of questions from an earlier poster. Minor block number changes in the manufacture of aircraft make no difference in service. Any additional equipment or modifications on the line are incorporated in all the earlier aircraft. I never saw any reference to manufacturer block number differences in any of the KC-135s or RC-135s I flew in. Once accepted into service a particular MDS designated aircraft was just like any other in the same MDS, unless modified for a special mission equipment fit.

Since the RJs have all been maintained by E-Systems/Raytheon/L-3 folks at Greenville, TX, under the Big Safari Program, for over forty years, the changes between aircraft (Vs, Ws, Us, Ss) are all well understood and documented.

Please, I beg you blokes, give it up, fly the aircraft, re-enter the world of airborne SIGINT collection, and take on the Germans/Spanish/et al over the Typhoon.

Besides, you can re-open this whole argument when the first Boeing P-8As Poseidons are delivered to the RAF.