Air China 767 crashes in South Korea (April 2002)

[J-Class]

From the BBC:

Chinese plane crashes in Korea

A Chinese passenger plane with 166 people on board has crashed in South Korea, officials have said. The flight from Beijing was making its final approach to the airport in Pusan when it came down in mountains.

The BBC's correspondent in the South Korean capital, Seoul, said officials reported low visibility around Pusan on the south coast of the Korean peninsula.

Civil aviation officials said flight CA129 crashed at about 1145 local time (0245 GMT).

There were 155 passengers and 11 crew on board the Air China Boeing 767.

Investigators are travelling to the site of the crash.

More details to follow.

[Flight Safety]

From CNN...

SEOUL, South Korea (CNN) -- An Air China flight carrying 155 passengers and at least 10 crewmembers has crashed near South Korea's second largest city of Pusan.

South Korean television showed a photograph of an Air China jet broken in half and in flames.

Reports said the Boeing 767 crashed around 11:40 a.m. (0240 GMT) near Kimhae airport, which serves the port city of Pusan on the Sea of Japan.

Authorities said it crashed near a residential area containing apartment buildings, but there were no reports of any casualties on the ground.

Firefighters and rescue workers were on the scene.

The flight took off from Beijing and was headed to Kimhae airport near Pusan.

Weather conditions at the time was poor, with fog, winds and rain. A number of international flights were turned back from the airport Monday morning as a result.

The crash comes just weeks before the soccer World Cup is co-hosted by South Korea and Japan.

[Flight Safety]

China Officials Confirm Air China Crash-Xinhua
Sun Apr 14,11:44 PM ET

BEIJING (Reuters) - Chinese aviation authorities Monday have confirmed that an Air China passenger aircraft crashed near South Korea (news - web sites)'s second largest city of Pusan, the official Xinhua news agency said.

"The crash has been confirmed by Chinese aviation authorities in Beijing," Xinhua said.

All 155 passengers and 11 crew members on the flight were feared dead, Xinhua quoted sources in South Korean transportation authorities as saying.

The plane crashed into a residential area in Gimhae, Xinhua said without giving further details.

[Flight Safety]

There are reports of a number of survivors...

That is good news...

Another Rueters report from the ABC News website...

Most Feared Dead in Air China Jet Crash in S.Korea

April 15
— By Cho Mee-young

SEOUL (Reuters) - An Air China passenger aircraft from Beijing with 166 people, mostly Koreans, aboard crashed into a mountain near South Korea's second largest city in rain and fog Monday, the airline and local officials said.

China's Xinhua news agency reported South Korean officials as saying all 155 passengers and 11 crew were thought to have been killed. But a local hospital official told Reuters four survivors had been brought in for treatment. A local police official said fewer than 10 people were thought to have survived.

The crash took place just six weeks before the soccer World Cup finals are co-hosted by South Korea and Japan. South Korea expects as many as 60,000 Chinese soccer fans to visit to watch their country's first appearance at the World Cup.

"The plane crashed into the mountain. No one on the ground was hurt," a Kimhae city official told Reuters by telephone.

He said it had crashed into a 1,600-foot mountain near the city. Television reports said rescue efforts were hampered by fog, rain and smoke from the crash site.

The plane, an Air China Boeing 767 aircraft, crashed into a mountainside near an apartment complex near Kimhae airport, which serves the port city of Pusan on the Sea of Japan.

An Air China official told Reuters in Seoul 80 to 90 percent of the passengers were Korean.

Asiana Airlines, South Korea's second largest carrier, said the Chinese plane had disappeared from radar screens around 11 a.m. (10 p.m. EDT Sunday) in heavy rain and fog.

An officer at Kimhae police station said by telephone less than 10 people had been taken to hospitals nearby.

The edaily financial news Web site quoted an official at Seoul's Inchon International Airport as saying about 10 people are thought to have survived the crash.

An official at Seoul's domestic Kimpo airport said 38 flights from there to Ulsan, Pusan, Yeosu, Pohang and Mokpo and 42 flights from the cities to Kimpo had been canceled so far due to heavy rain and fog that had closed some airports in the south of the country.

More flights were expected to be canceled in the afternoon, the official said by telephone. (Additional reporting by Nam In-soo, Song Jung-a, Samuel Len)

(edited to add the news article)

[Wizofoz]

Another report said he was "Turning for his second landing attempt"

Go around?

Anyone know what overshoot procedures are like at Pusan?

[DouglasFlyer]

Here the procedures for Pusan - hope they are up-to-date!

The airport of Pusan shows two runways:

36L/18R: 3200 m * 60 m / slope 0 --- 36L CAT3 approach lights
36R/18L: 2743 m * 45 m / slope 0

approaches:

ILS36L/DME: MIN QFE FT/KM 200/0.8 QNH FT 220
LLZ36L/DME: MIN QFE FT/KM 310/1.4 QNH FT 330
MISAP: Climb on 001deg to 500 turn left and climb on R320 KMH to 4000, turn right to 5000 to KACHI and hold

ILS36R/DME: MIN QFE FT/KM 200/0.8 QNH FT 220
LLZ36R/DME: MIN QFE FT/KM 320/1.4 QNH FT 340
MISAP: Climb on 001deg to 500 turn left and climb on R320 KMH to 4000, turn right to 5000 to KACHI and hold

VOR36L/DME: MIN QFE FT/KM 490/2.1 QNH FT 510
VOR36R/DME: MIN QFE FT/KM 500/2.1 QNH FT 520
MISAP: Turn left and climb on R320 KMH to 4000, turn right to 5000 to KACHI and hold

RWYs 18L/R: Circling approach:
Cat C: QFE FT/KM 1680/3.7 QNH FT 1700
Cat D: QFE FT/KM 2460/4.8 QNH FT 2480

MINIMUM SECTOR ALTITUDES around KMH (clockwise):
090-180 deg: 3200
180-270 deg: 3700
270-090 deg: 5100

Have a nice day!

[opale4]

Here's a link for the current app chart. Note the caution about minimum climb rate on the MAP. I have an older Jepp chart that says min climb rate on the missed app is 2000 fpm.

http://164.214.2.62/products/digitalaero/terminals/v0203/PACIFIC_AUSTRALASIA_ANTARCTICA/KIMHAE/ILS_DME_RWY_36L.PDF

[newswatcher]

Current reports(Singapore Straits Times) have "at least" 39 survivors, revised upwards from a previous figure of 20. At least some good news.

[Alpha Leader]

Latest survivor count stands @ 54.

[Flight Safety]

Copied from the D&G forum...

ABC News Online

Posted: Mon, 15 Apr 2002 19:43 AEST

More than 100 dead in Chinese plane crash

Officials in South Korea now say 54 people have survived the crash of an Air China jet carrying 166 people, near the city of Pusan

Boeing and Air China crash investigators are on their way to the area in a bid to determine what caused the Boeing 767-200 to crash.

This Pusan crash is Air China's first in its 47-year history.

Local authorities in South Korea say poor weather had caused the closure of the airport before the Air China flight had arrived.

Its crash into a hill near the Pusan airport has left at least 100 dead, but miraculously rescue workers say they have pulled dozens of survivors from the wreckage.

A spokesman with Boeing in the Chinese capital, Beijing says there is still no word from those on the ground in Pusan about what may have caused the crash.

Added by edit...

This is a cut and paste from the current CNN news story...

South Korean transportation ministry officials told YTN the plane, owned by China's largest airline, crashed while trying to land after air traffic controllers told it to take a detour due to bad weather.

Chinese state television said the plane had been redirected to Seoul because of the fog.

And this from farther down in the same story...

All 39 flights scheduled for Monday from Seoul to Busan and other southern cities were canceled due to bad weather, aviation officials told AP.

Then this from the above ABC story...

Local authorities in South Korea say poor weather had caused the closure of the airport before the Air China flight had arrived.

What's up with this?

(edited for other story inserts)

[Alpha Leader]

Flight Safety:

Some great PR in there from Air China. Whilst it is true that this is the first hull loss under the Air China brand for 47 years, the company's predecessor - CAAC - was notorious for its crashes (many of them most likely never reported).

I very much doubt that Air China has been around for 47 years; officially, they were founded in 1988, the only previous operator in the PRC was CAAC, which was then broken up into an international arm (Air China) and into some regional operators.

In fact, there has been some unintentional humour in an ad campaign that Air China have been running in HKSAR, with posters hailing the "47 years anniversary of safety flight operation". It's since been changed to describe 47 years of crash-free operations, and tomorrow it will probably be coming down altogether.

[Belgian Chap]

does the chinese calendar have 365days/year?

[bookworm]

"Poor weather". I also note on the BBC WWW site "The South Korean Government says an Air China plane which crashed into a hillside in South Korea on Monday killing 115 people had been blown off course by strong winds. "

RKPK 150200Z 22007KT 3200 -RA BR SCT005 BKN010 OVC025 16/13 Q1015
RKPK 150300Z 21009KT 4000 -RA BR SCT005 BKN010 OVC025 16/13 Q1015

Erm...?? What am I missing here?

[MrNosy]

According to press reports, the aircraft overshot the turn from base onto final to RWY 18R by 1.8km and hit the hill. Press says aircraft originally approaching RWY 36L then 'circled' for landing RWY 18R but, given the wind, why was RWY 36 ever considered

What is the approach to 18R? Is it an ILS to RWY 36L and then visual circuit to land 18R? That would explain press report but am I wrong to assume that the press go anything right in the first place.

Would welcome comment by someone who knows the place.

[akerosid]

Alpha Leader is quite correct; the current "Air China" grew out of the former CAAC, which effectively ran all air services as well as acting as the aviation regulator. The 767 involved in this morning's crash was delivered to CAAC in October 1985 (L/N 127) and then transferred to Air China when it became the entity it is today, in July 1988.

It's correct to say that Air China has had a very good (safety) reputation since then and this is its first loss, but that's a first in a 14 year history. Not for nothing was CAAC referred to as "Crash All Around China" or "Cancel At Any Cost".

The aircraft, incidentally, was B2552, a -2J6ER.

[JR_wilco]

DATE: 15.04.2002 LOCAL TIME: 11:40
LOCATION: Pusan area / South Korea
AIRLINE: Air China
TYPE: Boeing 767-2J6ER REGISTRATION: B-2552 C/N: 23308 Age: 16 years + 5 months
OPERATION: ISP FLIGHT: Beijing -> Pusan (CA 129)
OCCUPANTS: 155 pax + 11 crew FATALITIES: 110+ pax/crew INJURIES: 40+ pax/crew DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT: destroyed
On approach to Pusan in fog the aircraft crashed into a wooded hill braking into two on impact and burst into flames. The crash site was near a residential area.
NOTE: This accident represents Air China´s 1st hull loss since in its history and the 10th hull loss of a Boeing 767.

for more accident date, check www.jacdec.de

[JR_wilco]

I´m a bit inexperienced in S-Korea.
Can anbody scan us an arrival chart for Pusan ?
thanks very much

[GlueBall]

Why do a circling approach to the opposite runway with only a 6 or 7 Kt tailwind component when 3200 meters pavement is available, at sea level? It's extra work!

[sennadog]

Very sad.....

But great that there are quite a few survivors for a change.

:)

[AeroBoero]

Read somewhere that the pilot(s) survived the crash. Will be interesting to see if his version will make out. (If it's true of course).

[747dreamer]

According to a Korean newspaper which interviewed the captain who survived the crash, Captain Woo, 32, had only 1 year of experience in a 767 as a captain.

Joongang Daily: "How many times have you flown to Kimhae-Pusan Airport?"

Captain Woo: "About 5 times."

Joongang Daily: "What do you think caused the accident?"

Captain Woo: ".................."

Joongang Daily: "Are you admitting that it was a pilot error?"

Captain Woo: "I am not sure."

--------------------------------------------

source: http://www.joins.com/society/200204/16/200204160633325101140014501451.html

[Alpha Leader]

Interesting reference in the front page item on this crash in today's SCMP:

"The final conversation between the pilot and the control tower indicates the cockpit was unaware of the looming disaster. An excerpt indicates that while the tower told the pilot to land on runway 36L, the plane was preparing to land on runway 18R."

[autoflight]

The Korean aviation authorities were advised by email on 31st March 2002 that at least one airline was busting circling weather minima at Busan. A description of the specific commercial pressures was given.
Insurance companies are welcome to contact me. Be prepared for extensive authentication. No investigative reporters will progress.

[Peanut Butter]

From a HK newspaper:

(1) The last transmission from the pilot: CCA129 on base turn on final.

(2) A/C crashed nose-up, perhaps suggesting that this is not a CFIT accident.

(3) Of the 54 survivors, 15 died en route or inside the hospital. (so that's 39 survivors)

(4) Capt. Woo Hsin Lu (Translated) did survive the crash. :eek:

IMHO what happened is that the pilot called missed while trying to land at 36L, turned into downwind for a 18R circling approach and crashed during the turn into final.

[JR_wilco]

for a better orientation
http://us.news2.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/p/ap/20020416/capt.1018950147.south_korea_plane_crash_kim107.jpg

Seems that this kind of accident was waiting to happen.

[Flying Clog]

I think the root cause of the problem might be the fact that this appears to have been a single-pilot operation. I can't imagine how dificult it must be to safely and efficiently fly a Boeing 767-200 in the soup with only one peep in the flight deck.

Maybe Air China need to recruit some more drivers, because this is pretty desperate if you ask me?

(I'm personally getting sick and fuc*ing tired of reference only being made to the skipper, whilst the f/o's final resting place is probably a grease spot up a tree) :mad: :mad: :mad:

[Poke Guy]

Like any other threads related to crashes of Asian carriers, this thread has degraded to show the classic Asian can't fly attitude, and drawing to a conclusion even before the investigation has begun.

[Peanut Butter]

Here's an ad that they'll tear down in a few days.....

http://appledaily.atnext.com/images/apple-photos/640pix/20020416/Article_int/16c4p5.jpg

Flying Clog:
Don't blame everything on the pilots. The ATC should never issue a non-instrument landing clearance at those kind of conditions, as the airport is near very mountainous terrain.

P.S. Air China has 1300+ pilots, almost all came from the Air Force. (No crashes from 1988 till now is quite a miracle compared to Korean Air and China Airlines.)

[gengis]

RKPK 150200Z 22007KT 3200 -RA BR SCT005 BKN010

Light Rain, mist, scattered 500 ft broken 1000 ft.... anyone know what the circling minima is? At first glance, the combination of low cloud bases + rain & mist + close-in terrain + non-precision approach does seem to be stacking the odds against yourself. How often do ATC require this at domestic airports in Korea? Granted you don't have to accept a clearance for any runway, but i'm interested in how often ATC do this in marginal conditions. And don't tell me the choice of runway was anything to do with noise abatement!

[HIALS]

Several of the previous posts are in error and only serve to highlight the ignorance of the writers involved.

Air China has indeed enjoyed an unblemished record for more than 40 years. It is a credible airline.

We in the western world thought of CAAC as a monolithic organisation and didn't understand (or want to understand) the true structure of it. It was always divided into regions or divisions. The Beijing Division of CAAC became Air China - just as the Shanghai Division became China Eastern and the Guangdong Division became China Southern, etc. The Beijing Division of CAAC, latterly known as Air China, had NEVER (until the other day) had a fatal accident.

I am appalled by the alacrity with which some of you have put racial overtones on this accident. As I have seen done before on PPRuNe. This is not an accident involving a fly-by-night airline. It is not an accident involving a small aircraft.

It is an accident involving a flag-carrier. It is an accident involving a wide-body aircraft - and we should treat the Company and the Crew (our colleagues) accordingly.

Until the Official Accident Investigation has been published we should have the professional and moral integrity to keep our speculations to a minimum as well as on a respectful level.

I am certain Air China, as a Company, will be devastated by this accident. For sure the surviving crew will suffer forever.

Have some sympathy, compassion and pity - those of you with racist minds, fast tongues and heartless souls.

[Wiley]

My local rag has an article about a 42 year old professor, (a passenger on the ill-fated flight), calling his travel agent (!) on his mobile phone to tell him the aircraft was about to crash, and then calling the airline after the crash, again on his trusty mobile.

It would be very interesting to ascertain whether the use of the mobile while the pilots were attempting to carry out a BWC in marginal conditions might have had any effect on the aircraft’s navigational systems – as we, (and I assume Air China), warn our passengers before every flight.

[Maxiumus]

Yes, I read that too. Interesting how he, sitting in the cabin, was aware of the impending disaster in sufficient time to make a phone call. If he was so aware, a pity he didn't think of warning the pilots. In fact, its a shame he wasn't flying the aircraft himself. If he could foresee the accident from his seat, no doubt he could easily have averted it, had he been at the controls.

What idiots write this kind of bullsh*t?

[newswatcher]

JR_wilco,

There are some "copied" Jeppesen charts on this site:

http://www.letsfly.pe.kr/default2.htm

you need to look for Kimhae, rather than Pusan.

[HotDog]

Well said HIALS, hear, hear.

[steamchicken]

Sounds like purest BS.....just rejoice that they got 30-odd pax out alive

[RatherBeFlying]

The radar chart (http://www.letsfly.pe.kr/fltplan/chart/pus_radar_36.jpg) shows a 1000' contour 4 miles North of the threshold.

The cat D circling limit (max 165 kt.) has minima of 1100' AGL and 3 miles.

And the spot height not quite 5 miles North is 2067'.

[Lance Rootem]

One thing that screams out at all of us is that it is non-precision approaches that cause the problems. We have to do them in the sim, but obviously not enough, judging by the accident statistics involving them.
When one considers how much attention is paid to AWOPS in the sim, and how few incidents have involved them, it makes me think that we really should work a little harder at getting better at non-precision approaches, and also circlings (as these are often done in marginal conditions).
Any training management reading, please take note.

[Alpha Leader]

Wiley: you'd be surprised to see the local version of "flight safety". Chatting on mobile phones is only one of the favourite pastimes. Another is nearly all passengers on the left side of the a/c getting up and rushing over to look out of over the right wing at the beautiful scenery while on final approach to Hangzhou.

[Geddy]

It is quite correct to say that Air China is telling a porky about it's safety record.

The racial overtones are completely justified, when discussing this accident. It is a fact that Asian airlines have a terrible safety record. This is largely due to 1/ Jobs for people regardless of merit and 2/ The cultural problems arising from "loss of face" and being too deferential to authority.

As someone with lots of experience in the regions airlines, I can assure you looking good is much more important that being good at your job, in Asia.

[747400CA]

Recently heard in Frankfurt:

Frankfurt, Air China XXX, request clearance, spot B48, information Lima"

"Air China XXX cleared to Beijing Warburg 9G squawk XXXX"

Frankfurt, Air China XXX, cannot accept clearance, request runway 18 for departure"

"Air China, runway 25R is in use for departures, you want 18?

Frankfurt, Air China XXX, Warburg 9G departure not in our [FMC] database, request runway 18 departure"

Understood, Air China cleared Warburg 3S [runway 18] squawk XXXX..."

The poor man was clearly lost without a magenta line to follow after takeoff.

[Elevation]

The navigational database is updated every 28 days.
The database for each particular airport is loaded in such a way that all SIDs, STARs, runway(s) data along with the available approaches for the runways are included.
Alternatively, the airport would have no SIDs, STARs and any approaches. And only the runway data is included, this means that the FMC will be able to give you the runway length, orientation and airport elevation.

So, 747400CA, if you want to tell a porkie, get your facts right !:mad:

[Pandora]

Elevation,
Can you clarify what you mean when? Do you mean Air China's nav database, or THE nav database that everyone who has an FMC absolutely MUST have?
I only ask because here at BA we don't have every single SID, STAR, etc in our FMC. Being a regular visitor to Germany I'd particularly like to know where all the DUS SIDs have gone from ours, although I suspect it is due to too many FCRs that the pink line is not accurate and to avoid complaints from noise sensitive DUS we are required to fly the SID according to the book, not the database. LIS is another one I can think of where the FMC shows diddly squat.
So - to quote you; if you want to tell a porkie get your facts right. :mad:

[nice_beaver]

Elevation, I too must agree with Pandora. I've been flying in and out of PMI for over 3 years and frequently get departures off 06L which do not appear in the FMC data base. You get what you pay for or request and everyone is or can be different!!

[747400CA]

For Elevation -

The WRB 9G departure typically assigned to heavy aircraft departing FRA 25 L/R contains a 'ball note' procedure whereby an aircraft not able to meet the 3500' restriction at FFM 8.4 DME must intercept and track the FFM 260 radial outbound until reaching 3500', thence direct TAU until reaching 4400', thence direct TABUM (if memory serves me corectly).

This departure procedure is not, nor has it been for some time, contained in the 747-400 database - perhaps a consequence of the requirement to track outbound from a waypoint (FFM VOR) to a conditional waypoint (achieving 3500' altitude) before turning towards TAU.

A similar departure (WRB 1F) is contained in the 747-400 database, however, and specifies an identical ground track as the WRB 9G prior to the FFM 8.4 DME / 3500' point.

At lesser takeoff weights (below 800,000 lbs for a 747-400) the WRB 1F procedure may be substuted for the 'missing' WRB 9G and flown in LNAV / VNAV with ease.

At higher weights, however, one must either program a 3500' acceleration height on the 'Takeoff' page (delaying flap retraction to make the 8.4 DME restriction) or depart from the WRB 1F 'magenta line' on the FFM 260R and execute the 'ball note' procedure for the WRB 9G as described above.

Such are the facts, mate - nice try, though.

For all -

No racial slagging here, gents. I fly for an Asian carrier and - to put it mildly - enjoy the country, culture, and people to the hilt.

On the occasion of our listening to the exchange between Frankfurt ATC and the Air China flight, my youngish first officer enjoyed a chuckle before

- selecting the similar WRB 1F departure in the database,
- briefing the necessary MCP / ND selections to perform the FFM 260R / 3500' altitude procedure, and
- flying a flawless WRB 9G departure from runway 25R a few minutes later.

That an Air China crew could not demonstrate a similar level of proficiency on one occasion is admittedly unremarkable by itself. Knowing little about the airline, it would have been forgotten were it not for the tragic crash two days ago.

I simply relate the story to suggest that if the event described in the previous post are representative of the level of training and airmanship across the board, then the tragic consequences of the attempt to circle to land in marginal weather conditions - with rising terrain in close proximity - frankly should not come as a huge surprise.

Having said that, those with greater knowledge of the true state of affairs at this particular airline are invited to comment.

[gengis]

Geddy,

Since you wish to play this race card, I'd like to make a couple of my points too.

As has already been pointed out repeatedly, the predecessor to these 'reformed' Chinese airlines - CAAC - did indeed have a less than admirable record. What seems to be missed, though, is that during the seventies & eighties when everyone else was flying DC-9, B737, B727, A-300, B747, B757, B767 with EFIS..... when ILS was almost nearly the order of the day, with autoland pioneered and well nigh perfected..... those poor blokes were flying 30-year old, 5-man crew Russian steam rollers - Illusian IL-62, Antonov AN-24, AN-12, Tupolev TU-134, TU-154, BAC-1-11, Tridents.... to name a few, likely with air driven gyros into airfields with no precision approaches (in fact I recall that until the recent airport modernisation drive in China, ILS was probably pretty much the domain of only the large international airports) usually predicated on NDBs with dubious callibrations, AND on QFE, in some cases into some of the highest terrain in the world - around the Himalayas & also in Sinkiang where there's an airport with 15,000 ft elevation (I believe), and quite often with appalling weather during the monsoon/typhoon season when we'd all by relying on precision approach aids (not a damned locater), with NO flight time limitations (I know for a fact that at least until the mid-nineties airline pilots in China were doing around 120-130 hrs per month of stick time).

Now if you can say with your hand on your heart that if you had yourself been operating for any significant period of time with those constraints with a 100% record, then that's your opinion of yourself. Especially on that day when all the above factors come together with Murphy pulling the strings. Show me the guy who says it can never happen to him and I'll show you delusion.

I am not justifying the crash in any way; I am saying that people who live in glass houses had better not throw stones. Before you use the race card, you'd better take a good hard look in the mirror. I've been fortunate enough to fly a good 20 years in pretty good equipment into pretty well organised places with at least a minimal level of support in all areas. I'm thankful for that.

As has also been pointed out by other contributors, Air China's record over the last ten years, coinciding with the time when their equipment was upgraded to Boeing & Airbus, has significantly not been too far behind the west. That is saying something that though they've got quite some way to go, they are moving in the right direction. When was the last time you converted from an Antonov to B777 with fly-by-wire, dual FMC, full glass, Cat 3B capability? You can talk about face then.

I quote General Chuck Yeager : "I have flown injust about everything, with all kinds of pilots in all parts of the world - British, French, Pakistani, Iranian, Japanese, CHINESE - and there wasn't a dime's worth of difference between any of them except for one unchangin, certain fact: the best, most skillful pilot had the most experience."

For Pete's sake, the crew - though young - are still part of our fraternity. They may not have the same skin pigment, but they sure as hell are still airline pilots, like you and I.

[Few Cloudy]

The Captain is alive in hospital - poor guy. The press have already begun to hound him. No face saving allowed there.

As regards circling approaches in the Far east, I have done very many - in real minimum conditions- many having an ILS or VOR approach only at one end. Quite a few fields have a built in trap:

When you get a hill like that on final, there is a stacking up effect of clouds, so that the vis/cloudbase on final is even less than that which is on the ATIS. This is an insidious trap and the temptation to press on, just a little bit, as you are or were "sure of position", is very great.

Why would the other runway not have been in use? Well looking at the hill, the take off performance with tailwind must be pretty marginal, so the field probably gets changed earlier rather than later. You can (I have done) ask for the straight in - tail wind landing but it takes strong captaincy, when the other guys are accepting the circling approach.

Let us try to learn from the situation (not the cause - which we don't know yet) and have a little sympathy with the flight crew, who will now be "going through it".

[Airbubba]

From the Korean press:

____________________________________________

The following is a transcript of the last contact between the airliner and Gimhae control:


(11:16:14)


Tower: 129 approaching?


(delete)


(11:18:02)


Tower: 700 Approved. Roger.


(11:19:43)


Tower: CCA129 Give me Tower radio check.


Airport Radar: Already sent. No received?



Tower: No contact, CCA129 Gimhae Tower Radio check.


(11:20:03)

Airport Tower: This is Gimhae Tower on guard CCA129 Contact 118.1.


(delete)


(11:20:15)

Pilot: Gimhae Tower CCA129 Circle approach 18R.


Airport Tower: CCA129 Report turning base.


Pilot: WILL CO CCA 129.


Airport Tower: CCA 129 Check wheels down. Wind 210 Cleared to land RWY36L. Not in sight.


Airport Tower: Cleared to land 18R.


Pilot: Circle (?), Cleared to 18R and Gimhae East.


(11:23:00)


Airport Tower: CCA129 Say again.

Pilot:.....


Aiport Tower: CCA129 Say position now.


Pilot: CCA129 on base turn on final.....(no more radio)

[KIFIS]

HIALS :
My sentiments entirely : Some of the comments here are from fools who have never had to circle in the soup. Captain Wu Xin Lu was only doing his best and I`m most definately on his side.This sort of thing can happen to anyone at any time if one is unlucky enough to have it all stack up at once. He is a colleague and deserves to be supported by all who lay claim to be part of aviation. Unfortunately aviation these days seems to have its share of WELL FROGS that look up and see a small piece of blue sky and thats their world. I sincerly hope Captain Wu is back flying again soon.

KIFIS

[autoflight]

Few Cloudy, you are right on the money.
Kimhae is a combined military/civil airfield, where military and any other consideration have priority over the wishes of a non-Korean captain. A Korean crew would also have some difficulty getting rwy 36L under these circumstances. Knowing that, they are very reluctant to "rock the boat" so its hard to imagine the circumstances where they would actually make such a request. What hope would a non-Korean speaking crew have, with a likely imperfect grip on English?
Korean based crews do a lot of Kimhae flights before checkout, and they are all very aware of the need to not delay the base turn for rwy 18R. IMHO there should be a note on the approach charts indicating the danger of extending the downwind. It should not be a requirement to be based in Korea to have this knowledge.

[Captain104]

Even for professional pilots what a temptation to comment on a crash which happened only hours ago and and what a drive to draw early conclusions?!
Remember the Korean Airlines thread some weeks ago? It was the same melting pot: race, culture, loosing face, one-man show, single pilot ops a.s.o. Heated replies, some aggressive.
Some moderate and sensible like gengis post.

Why can’t we all (or at least the real pilots among us) stay back a bit and wait several days for more information and trust the professional investigators before speculating to an extend which is not justified.

Regards

[Alpha Leader]

gengis:

Your point may be valid but for the single reason that Air China is itself falsifying its safety record by consistently claiming 47 years of crash-free operation. The company itself has not been around for that long, and its predecessor had an absolutely horrible safety record.

No matter how often you repeat a lie, it remains just that: a lie.

There are still TU-134s and 154s flying around today, and no one would suggest that this in itself is a reason to expect a higher hull-loss rate.

[holden]

I have done this approach many times.A lot of S.Korea´s airfields involve circling approaches.This particular one is not the most difficult but there is that hill on the extended centreline of 18/36 which proved to be the culprit here.
Apparently the Captain had only been there five times previously,and I am betting that he always had the luxury of a straight-in ILS to 36.If his first attempt at landing a 767(apparently low hours on type) at Pusan on 18R was in poor visibility,he was really up against it unfortunately.IMHO,Pusan is a Cat A airfield if you only ever do the straight-in 36.BUT...if you circle to 18,it becomes a Cat C.The location of the hillock is smack on a visual approach trajectory..about 30 seconds downwind and just west of the runway.
Attention to drift on the downwind has to be meticulous by use of the CTR MAP and track line data(was rwy 18 set up in the FMC???)Attention to the trend vector when turning base is also imperative as a back up to visual reference when in marginal conditions.If you turn base too late in poor conditions,you´ve had it.If you consider that both guys were probably looking 2 O´Clock whilst on base,instead of 11 or 12 O´Clock,it completes the picture.I notice that all sim checks for Far Eastern carriers include a circling approach and if you overshoot the rwy centreline on turning final,its an automatic failure.
We always used to cut the downwind to 20 seconds and turn base early approaching the runway at almost 45 degrees,making the final adjustment onto rwy centreline at about 500 or 600 feet.
If you have the luxury of doing it or seeing it being done in nice weather,you involuntarily make a mental note of what an awful deathtrap it could be in bad weather.Something these poor guys probably didnt have the chance of doing.
If I was investigating the accident I would want to know 4 things straight off:
i)As the pilot survived,was this his first circle to 18 approach at Pusan?If yes,what about the FO?
ii)Did they have the expectation of landing straight in and then were changed at the last minute?ie.did they brief the approach?
iii)What was the config of the a/c on downwind and base?Gear seems to have been down but did they have final flap and ref +5?The radius of turn would be crucial.
iv)Was the autopilot flying?If yes(I am betting yes-use of the AP even on visual approaches is extensive in the Far East),bank angle would be limited to bank angle selector.Its not enough for this approach unless base turn is imediate.You need more..35 degrees and more if necessary.......

(i),(iii) and (iv) are forgiveable and tell a story of a man trapped by bad luck and circumstance as with Erebus.I just hope the crew arent guilty of (ii),as there´s never any mitigating circumstances here.
Whatever comes to light,my thoughts and prayers are with the pilot and his crew and passengers.

[Centaurus]

Gengis. Chuck Yeager's observation may have been accurate in terms of the pilots that he flew with or observed. But in my experience both as an airline captain (retired) and as flight simulator instructor observing different nationalities with their individual ethnic cultural attitude to operating big airliners - I can say I have seen some truly frightening things in the simulator from highly experienced pilots. In particular the alarming lack of situational awareness when faced with simple position orientation without blind use of the magenta line. I have seen personally in the privacy of the simulator basic handling and navigational incompetency from senior check captains that would floor you. When shown a hard copy print-out of their flight path in for instance a cross-wind night circling approach, one sees sheer disbelief in their eyes and a glum embarrassed silence. Yeagers assertation that the best pilots are the most experienced is sheer horse-sh..t.
How could you possibly believe that by quoting it in your post.

Despite basic RMI information directly in front of their eyes these veterans of Asian skies were hopelessly out of their depth as were the compliant first officers in the right hand seat who merely sat watching impassively as the captain flew around in circles below MDA/MSA pressing buttons. True, airliners in this part of the world are not crashing into hills every day in bad weather. Thank radar vectoring and reliable autopilots for that.

The Air China accident and others to come (as they surely will when history repeats itself) can be blamed on culture mores that will never change - despite the most skilful PR spin doctors.

[C-dog]

Few Cloudy[U]

Your reference to 'stacking up' of clouds is spot on. I live about 15nm from Kimhae and the cloud base on the lee side of our local hills was about 300m at that time so you can assume that the upwind side was somewhat less. And it was more or less continuous heavy rain. Our VFR helicopter service from Kimhae to Koje was a non-starter that day.

As SLF I've witnessed a few circling approaches into Kimhe 18R in good VMC and from the LH window seat the high ground to the north looked interestingly close. Not quite as close as I've experienced often over the years at EGPB but for a big jet, close enough.

We use Kimhae almost exclusively and our expat communnity here was very subdued that day.

C-dog

[CPDLC]

Having flown the approach into Pusan several times I will make the following comments.

1- Due to the mountains to the North the Take Off minima for runway 36 is lower than for Runway 18, therefore in order to expedite departures they tend to use runway 18 under this weather conditions.

2- In South Korea in the military airfields (most) it is almost impossible to request the opposite runway to the one in use, one of the reasons is that most of them have the arresting cables for the fighters. Is a norm in these airports that the arresting cables can only cross the runway on the far end of the runway. Even if Busan does not use the arresting cables very often, they follow the procedures of the other military airfields, so even if the pilot ask for runway 36, chances are that he was not going to get it, it would be interesting to know if he actually requested it. Believe me is not easy to convince the guy in the tower to let you use the opposite runway.

3- The circle approach to runway 18 is very tight and is a right hand pattern, what means that for a very good part of the approach the Captain can’t see the runway and the tailwind may blow you way out of your intended track, in Korea one thing may be the wind at sea level and another story at downwind altitude, I have seen 50 to 60 kts. changes in wind speed. In bad weather is very demanding even for pilots that fly there regularly, I imagine that for somebody that is not familiar with low level circle approaches and with Busan airport in particular it may be extremely difficult.

Centaurus; Your comments may bring some sense of confidence to the non-Asian pilots, the less experienced ones may think that just by not being Asians they may never crash in a circle approach. Also remember that the fact of pilot being a checker means absolutely nothing as many times those positions have to do more with the time you spend at the office looking for the job than your flying abilities, actually I’ll rather fly with the guys are in the line every day, they are more current an do not have that false sense of security that the position gives to the checkers, remember the KLM Captain in Tenerife.

Unfortunately crashes happen everywhere, certainly in some Asian countries there is a trend, one of the main problems is cultural, , but another one is the fact that airlines tend to buy airplanes and to open routes even if they do not have enough qualified pilots to fly them, fortunately some airlines (like Emirates) are reconsidering this approach. I hate to say this but if the low cost carriers in Europe continue to grow at the same pace, something like this may happen.

For those of you that are fortunate not to fly these kind of approaches please bear in mind that what this pilot was doing was not an easy task. If you ever have to fly to Busan or any other airport like it in Korea, Japan or any other part of the world be extremely careful, you don’t have to be Asian to make these kind of mistakes, the pilots of Cross-air that had their unfortunate CFIT accident not long ago were not Asians, the only thing you need to be to make this mistake is to be a Pilot regardless of your race of nationality. Please show respect for your colleagues.

[RevMan2]

A rather perverse headline from ATI:

"Air China 767 hit mountain's north side on second attempt"

You mean he missed first time and came back to make sure....?

[RatherBeFlying]

From the FAA TERPS:

260. Circling Approach Area This is the obstacle clearance area which shall be considered for aircraft maneuvering to land on a runway that is not aligned with the FAC (Final Approach Course) of the approach procedure.

a. Alignment and Area The size of the circling area varies with the approach category of the aircraft, as shown in table 4. To define the limits of the circling area for the appropriate category, draw an arc of suitable radius from the center of the end of each usable runway. Join the extremities of the adjacent arcs with lines drawn tangent to the arcs. The area thus enclosed is the circling area (see figure 15 -- sorry no URL available).

Table 4. Circling Approach Radii. Par260 a.

Approach Radius (miles)
Category
A 1.3
B 1.5
C 1.7
D 2.3

[Algy]

Fair comment RevMan2 - not our best headline ever. Not sure perverse is quite the word you're looking for though.

[In the slot]

Well gentlemen, it seems that in spite of some galant efforts by the more moderate amogst us, and those trying to look at the incident operationally, the whole race issue is coming up again. I guess Arafat and Sharon will NEVER agree!
My 2 cents worth is this.....
1/ I have flown heavy jets in Asia into some of the more obscure airports, and believe me flying circling approaches in IMC, setting feet on the MCP with a metres clearance given (not all aircraft can convert the MCP feet to metres!), with QFE, and with a contrller then overiding what is on the jepp chart with different bearings to tracks and step heights to maintain, leads me to have some sympathy for the Air China crew.
2/ I havent seen the chart, but it seems there is insufficient warning of the proximity of the high ground, by what has been said.
3/ I have flown with expat and local pilots and find very good and bad examples of both. However, as an informed generalisation that will no doubt upset many, I would definately say that the situational awareness of many Asian crew is generally less than that of others with similar airline experience (and this is totally accountable to the varying amounts of experience BEFORE joinong the airline).
4/ CRM is increasing in Asia, as with the world in general, though I still see operational inadequacies resulting from unquestioning F/O's and proud captains in Asia.

Lets see if the Air China crash was a result of 1,2,3, or 4. I would imagine a combination of all to a varying degree, in which case the reaction should be both sympathy AND criticism.

[HIALS]

I'm afraid I just can't let the claimants that Air China has a poor safety record get away without rebuttal.

CAAC had a lamentable safety record. I agree.

But - CAAC was a monolithic umbrella organisation underwhich the regional divisions operated their airlines as autonomous, self-managed entities. The Divisions were responsible for all the tasks that constitute "Airline Management" in near isolation from each other.

That is to say - the Beijing Division of CAAC was a totally seperate organisation (airline) to the Guangdong Division of CAAC.

All of the accidents that CAAC aircraft suffered are attributable to Divisions other than the Beijing Division. The Beijing Division had a flawless safety record when it became Air China.

Because of our western ignorance of the structure of CAAC in this regard it is tremendously easy to label the monolithic umbrella organisation as unsafe without recognising valid distinctions. In this case, Beijing Division of CAAC and latterly Air China were the rare and commendable distinction in China. It is accurate to state that Air China and it's predecessor organisation had a 47 year accident free record. It is through ignorance that such a claim appears incorrect.

Why are we able to distinguish good operators in bad regions (like Lan Chile in South America) elsewhere in the world, yet unable to see that similar distinctions might occur in China? We all know that whilst Asian carriers have a dispropotionate rate of accidents, this label excludes the Hong Kong and Japanese carriers which have excellent records and reputations. In this debate, until the other day Air China should have been in the correct category. Rather than being labelled "asian" as a kind of implicit insult, it should have been seen as a worthy and good example, like CX, KA, JL & NH are.

[grange.guzzler]

In the slut

Your point 1. Since when have circling approaches been flown in IMC.

Is this a new procedure I have not been informed of. Please guide me to details of how one is to carry out this dubious manouvre.

GG

[Wizofoz]

GG

A circling approach by definition is a manouvre to land in less than VMC.

You're mistaking VMC with VISUAL. At 100ft on a cat2 ILS you have to be Visual to land, but that doesn't mean you are not still in IMC.

[Alpha Leader]

HIALS:

Some interesting points there.

However, two questions remain:

1) Does anyone really know CAAC's true air safety record. For a considerable time (even beyond the "Great Leap Backwards" era) it was widely accepted that many tragedies went unreported - particularly those that did not involve any foreign casualties.

2) Which CAAC unit did the aircraft belong to that was said to have crashed with Lin Biao on board?

[amos2]

Apart from the bleeding hearts , the tree huggers, those who play the racist game and the amateur pilots ,this has been a reasonably well informed debate...lead of course,as usual, by experienced professional airline pilots!

Anybody who has flown the 36L approach into Kimhae followed by the circling approach for 18R knows that it is a definite "no no"...especially in conditions of reduced vis!

Any professional pilot going there for the first time and looking at the letdown plate with the associated high terrain would give the circling approach a miss! Especially with a ILS to 36L ,or 36R, available.

Having flown the approach many times, albeit from the back of a simulator, I am no longer amazed when we hit the ground...as Air China apparently did!

A previous poster with similar knowledge of the area has stated that unless one had local knowledge then a disaster would surely happen!

Now, doesn't that also say something?

High speed jet transport aircraft should not fly circling approaches! Flogging a 737,767 etc, in min vis, 800 ft or so AGL is a recipe for disaster...and there is usually no need for it!

How many times in your career has that been the only option available to you? :)

[grange.guzzler]

Wiz

I think you are splitting hairs a bit. Technically correct none the less.
Jep definition of a circling app is :- “an extension of an instrument app procedure which provides for visual circling of the aerodrome prior to landing”. Jep ATC 104.
Jepp ATC 4.1.1 (pg 218) goes further in stating :-“ Visual manoeuvring (circling) is the term used to describe the visual phase of flight after completing an instrument approach……………

The point is, it is a VISUAL manouvre. I am quite well aware of the difference between Visual VMC and VFR, thanks.

Amos 2

The following comments are not related in any way to the recent accident, of which I have no extra knowledge and have no wish to comment. They are offered in response to your pontificating re circling approaches.

We should be so lucky as to never to have to do a circling approach in poor conditions. The reality is that in many parts of the world there is no option on many occasions, other than to cancel. I am sure all would applaud an ILS being mandatory equipment for every runway used by commercial aircraft, unfortunately we will all be long buried when that utopian ideal is achieved. Don’t forget that the reason a lot of runways do not have an ILS is because they cannot meet the ILS Approach Procedures Design Criteria. I am lucky in that I now usually only go to places with 12,000 ft parallels with ILS’s to burn. Unfortunately to a lot of our colleagues circling approaches are a daily fact of life.
A circling approach only becomes a health hazard when inappropriate procedures are applied. If you stay within the designated circling radius(as you are required to do), maintain your speed at or less than the mandated speed (as you are required to do), keep the runway in sight ( as you are required to do), keep one head out and one in to monitor sink rates and speed ( as you sensibly should) then the manoeuvre is far less dangerous than many other procedures we are required to demonstrate (single engine rejected landings with a turning engine out procedure for instance). I shudder when I read things like Holden’s procedure for circling, it sounds like he has his head inside the majority of the time and is not keeping track of the ever-changing view out the window. Remember this is a VISUAL manoeuvre and “after initial visual contact, the basic assumption is that the runway environment, (i.e., the runway threshold or approach lighting aids or other markings identifiable with the runway) should be kept in sight while at MDA/H for circling.” (Jep ATC 4.4 pg 219)

Above all, if at anytime you do not meet the visibility requirements turn via the runway to the missed approach heading, bug out without delay, and you will be able to confidently fly circling approaches and live to grow old and grey like me.

GG

[Belgique]

One further observation about circling approaches and "protected" areas. Upon reflection it's rather farcical to lay down a 1.7nm (3.2km) protected area for cat C aircraft and then not have any significant buffer zone before you can bump into such a highly obtrusive obstacle of the order of the one that they hit (about 1.5kms further on). That 1.5kms at a representative 150 to 160kts groundspeed is equivalent to about a 15 second delay. The actual solution to not becoming a grease-spot on a mountain is to look for the minimum manoeuvring area (i.e. chew up the least airspace necessary) for getting safely around onto an abbreviated finals). It's that message that I am sure is just not getting across. Military pilots do very extensive training in low-level (bad weather) circuits specifically because they are exactly what the Doctor ordered - when it comes down to circling approaches.

Different to the non-precision approach (and in fact unique to the circling approach) is the concept that it's a visual flight phase but because the prevailing visibility can be very variable, you don't have to see where you're going (i.e. what's ahead) - as long as:
a. you maintain not below circling MDA until wings-level on finals and
b. remain within the protected area -in this case 1.7nm radius of the airfield reference point (the centroid of a line joining all runway thresholds) and
c. keep the landing threshold within sight - or immediately execute a missed approach (shortest way round climbing turn onto the MAP course).
...but of course the trick is in not exceeding that otherwise difficult to abide by 1.7nm max (cat C) due to wind, disorientation, distraction or procrastination. Therein lies the real hazard - and automation and EGPWS is of little use during low speed tightly manoeuvring flight in the approach configuration - it's all necessarily done with the Mk1 eyeball.

I've run into two different philosophies on a missed during circling. First was turn the shortest way onto the missed approach course and the second (which seems smarter) turn through the runway (i.e. the ARP) towards/onto the MAP course. The shortest way method would seem to put you outside the protected area too promptly, even though you will be established in the climb. One thing is for sure...knowing just when to chuck it in and throw it away is a real test of airmanship. Just like GF072 and the Alliance Air 737 at Patna found out, turning visually cross-cockpit onto a centre-line can be a real challenge. Stir in a tightening tailwind on base and you have all the ingredients for a major stuff-up.

[RatherBeFlying]

There has been talk of a 50 kt. tailwind. A 30 second downwind past the threshold of Rwy 18 plus a rate 1 turn to base produces 60 seconds under the influence of said 50kt. which pushes you an extra 0.83 nm past the threshold -- close to half of the 1.7nm maneuvering area.

Without some 18 degrees of drift correction on your base leg, you will still be getting blown out of the maneuvering area at up to 50 kt.

A 20 second downwind and a rate 2 turn yields 35 seconds which still eats up .49nm of the maneuvering area.

Sitting here in my living room, I'd have to spend some time with the aerodynamics textbook to calculate an appropriate timing for downwind past threshold and required turn rate given a certain approach speed and tailwind.

Perhaps there should be a set maximum tailwind in each category acceptable for performing a circling approach.

Once on final, the 40 kt loss of headwind would make for an interesting approach.

[PaperTiger]

Does anyone really know CAAC's true air safety record ?

Information prior to 1968 is pretty much non-existent. Since then a quick look at http://aviation-safety.net/database/index.html yields the following hull losses for CAAC (all directorates). Not all involved fatalities.

Trident 6
An24 5
IL-14 2
IL-18, IL-62 and S360 1 each.

Lengthy research via 'spotter' sites containing aircraft type histories might bring some more to light, but I doubt the 20 years preceding 1968 were any safer.

[grange.guzzler]

Belgique

Three ponts. Your point a). is incorrect. You are required to maintain not lower than MDA until you intercept the normal approach PATH (3 degrees). Extend your 3degree slope back through your intended flight path and where they intercept is your descent point. Following your procedure an MDA of 1000' would give give you a required final of approximately 3miles. Way outside the circling visibility and area.

Your point b). according to ICAO doc 8168 Vol 1 fourth edition. ".........The Visual Manoeuvring area is "determined by drawing arcs centred on each runway threshold and joining those arcs with tangent lines....." No reference to ARP.

Your point c) is seemingly corrected later in your text. I would point out Jep ATC 4.1 pg 219 Flight Procedures (Doc 8168) ..........it is expected that the pilot will make an initial climbing turn towards the landing runway............

I could cite for you several areas where a "short turn" to the missed app heading will plant you on top of a hill. There should be no significant obstacles between you and the runway because up to the time that you decided to make the missed app you could see the runway (couldn't you). Ergo the safest way is to get you sh..t together as you head to the least threatening area.

GG

[Alpha Leader]

Paper Tiger:

Thanks for the link.

The point remains, though, that any statistics based on official information from China - particularly prior to the late 80's - is suspect.

In the wider context of the reliability or otherwise of China's statistics, it is interesting to note that the current GDP growth figures coming out of China are raising more questions than answers. Some things never change!

[RatherBeFlying]

grange.guzzler I have to stand in agreement with Belgique that the circling maneuver area takes no account of a 3 degree glide slope. If you fly out far enough to intercept it from a circling approach, you might hit something.

[Wizofoz]

THIS time I'm with Capt. Guzzler. Hr doen't mean a three degree slope on the centreline he means a three degree descent on horizontal flight path be it curved or otherwise.

It basically means that you begin descent where ever a normal, three degree descent will have you rolling out on centreline and glideslope.

Now that I've given you one GG, I'm still at issue with your terminology. Visual VMC? If conditions are less than VMC, they are IMC, regardless of what you can or cannot see. Therefore any time you circle with less the 500ft vertical seperation from cloud, you are carrying out Visual circling inIMC conditions . If conditions weren't IMC, you wouldn't be bothering!

[heckez]

I find it appalling when I read the on-going threads about Air China's safety record. So what if what they claim is not true? An accident has happened and lives have been lost. Why don't we try to learn something from it?
Another observation is about the racial issue. If so many of you guys feel that asian airlines are 'second class', why are you still working for them? Could it be that you couldn't make the cut in the west and find yourself elevated in status (expat pilot) after going over to asia? Pls don't be hypocritcal...

[RatherBeFlying]

Wizofoz Yes, you can descend on a 3 degree slope. Just stay inside the circling maneuver area above the circling MDA until on final.

And how do you set that up on the FMC, given that you will either have to level off on the ILS36, or fly high on the glideslope?

[PaperTiger]

Easily appalled then I'd say heckez.

The point about CA admitting/denying their safety record is, it might indicate a willingness to be selective with other truths.

[Wizofoz]

Rather,

No, you don't have to be on final at MDA. It would be impossible. If you had to maintain, say,a 900 ft MDA inside a 2NM circling area, and take into account a turn radius, you would be at 900ft at 1.5nm, around 500ft high and in no position to make a stable approach. Descent can start anywhere on the projected 3 degree flight path.

As to the FMC, easy, you don't!! A centre line and trend vector can help (provided you have a good FMC update), but this is a VISUAL proceedure. Break out the old Eyeball mk1.

[RatherBeFlying]

Wizofoz Show me the chapter and verse. I've been thoroughly brainwashed never to go below circling MDA until on final. [Chicken logo here]
Well, I might start descent on the turn to final if viz is good and/or I know the airport like the back of my hand.

[thermostat]

Hello Douglasflyer, re the circling appr rwy 18, please explain what those numbers mean. I'm not familiar. i.e. qfe ft/km 1680/3.7 qnh ft 1700. It's all quite confusing. What are they trying to tell us?
Thanks.
Also to any Lufthansa pilots-- what is your sop re the use of the FPA knob on non prec approaches (A-320) ? Do you use it prior to the FAF and if so, how far back??
Thanks.

[heckez]

PaperTiger
I understand the implications of withholding the truth but don't you think there's a better time to do this? We were not in the cockpit so lets not second guess what happened. Remember the accident that happened not so long ago and the never ending thread about how inexperienced the Capt and the FO were..lets be sensitive please.

[PaperTiger]

Any thread relating to an accident always seems to bring out at least one sanctimonious finger-wagger telling us what not to discuss and how insensitive etc. etc. we are all being.

Such sentiments have been eloquently refuted by more worthy individuals than I. Safety records, crew experience, airline SOPs, airport facilities and so on are all legitimate issues when speculating (yes !) as to what went wrong. Ethnic or cultural issues may be closer to the bone but absent patent racism, there may be some relevance there too.

The record of this board in dissecting accidents accurately and quickly speaks for itself I think. If you object to the tone of such discussions, maybe you should avoid them.

['%MAC']

From the States: The FAA and TERPs are rather equivocal about when to leave MDA from a circle. If the landing runway is serviced by a VASI or PAPI, then the area within 10 degrees of the extended centerline from the threshold is clear of obstructions for 4 nm. If no visual glideslope indicators are available, then there is not an overlay of obstruction clearance until the 1:20 plane close to the runway (which you wouldn’t be at anyway). However, if the runway is authorized for instrument departures, but has no special procedures, such as minimum climb gradients, then you are clear in a 1:40 plane for 2 miles. At 1.7 nm that means obstacles should not penetrate above 258 feet (good luck). If there are special departure procedures the 1:40 zone may not be clear and you are on your own. Again, the responsibility for obstacle separation is placed on the pilot.

Note on 10 degrees:
If circling at the max distance of cat c (1.7nm from runway edge) a 3 degree glide path would correspond to being 594 ft above the fixed distance markers. The addition of 10 degrees at 1.7 miles gives you a bit less than 1795 extra horizontal feet, which at 3 degrees would be 94 feet vertical. (not assuming a curvilinear flight path)

Note on the 1:40 slope:
Believe that is a half circle that abuts the runway threshold, that is 90 degrees to the runway with a radius of 2nm, it does not go all around the runway it kinda looks like (|==

sorry, can't draw in real life either.

[Ivan Urge]

I wish to relate a situation I observed today:

I was taxing on the parallel taxiway at an airport with similar characteristics to Busan (i.e. an ILS on one end and a circling approach to the other, with high ground in close proximity to the final of the circling runway). As we taxied down I asked the FO to check carefully on downwind and base for any aircraft. As we both could not see any traffic we then asked for an intersection departure. There was a pause (we know why now) and then it was approved. Just as we were about to slow down to turn at the intersection an aircraft appeared out of nowhere on final approach. I had landed only 30 minutes earlier on this runway which was using a visual approach at the time (the only other approach being a circling approach) There was a definite cloud base of 800 feet on base leg and final and I had to descend and turn early in order to remain clear of cloud.

The aircraft was a China Northern MD80 series. He had obviously flown the approach in cloud for some time as we were scanning the approach area for about two minutes and did not see him until he broke cloud on final. As we then waited in turn we watched two Japanese airlines approach, both were clearly visible throughout their visual approach or circling maneuvers.

This is SOP in many parts of the world where they have a magenta line in front of them or else they may just DR in cloud. Even in the company I work for they have an unhealthy dependency on the FMC, indeed we can fly the aircraft around a visual or circling maneuver in LNAV!

IF this accident was indeed CFIT then the Captain will spend many years behind bars in Korea, as the penalties there are severe and his actions will likely be judged as negligent. I have done the circling approach into Busan many times and it is not for the feint-hearted in bad w/x. In strong tailwinds one should turn only a few seconds after passing abeam the threshold. Getting the runway changed is IMPOSSIBLE as it is military controlled. Circling approaches in Japan and Korea, to name two countries, are by their very nature very challenging. We only do them when there is more than 15kt tailwind on the straight in runway and generally when the weather is truly awful. Minimums are much lower than advocated by ICAO (Cat C, HAA 450, OCH300 and vis. 2400m) and circling area is less than half; 1.7nm vs. 4.2nm. 40-50kt on the downwind is not uncommon. It is easy to say as Amos2 has said that we shouldn't be doing them but you have to or else you will very shortly need to go find another job. We don't all fly in and out of LAX, LHR and SYD.

This type of accident (if this is CFIT) is a result of two main reasons; training and experience. Culture has a significant effect on the former. Anyone who has flown in Asia for any length of time would agree. This pilots total experience and his Busan experience did not help either. It would be interesting to find out exactly how good the training was that he received for circling approaches. Good training for circling approaches is some of the most valuable training an airline pilot can receive. Did he get any?

Grange Guzzler, I have seen it written many ways depending on who's AIP or Ops manual you read; No descent below MDA until in a position to make a "normal approach", or when "obstacles can be avoided" or on a 3 degree path as is obviously written in your ops manual. Holden has got it right. He uses all the available information to his benefit including the trend vector. It is as valuable as checking your airspeed during a circling approach. It is called composite flight.

[amos2]

Anybody looked at the let down plate for Kimhae recently ?
I suspect not!

I would suggest that at the same time you look at the Jepp info re the circling radius for Cat 3 a/c in Korea !

Some of the stuff being written here indicates to me that very few of you know exactly what's involved in a circling approach and proves to me once again that high speed jet transport a/c should not flog around at 700 ft AGL in min vis conditions. ;)

[Centaurus]

There is one major flaw with the assertion that once you reach the theoretical extended three degree glide path (which could be on late downwind or on base leg) then it is safe to descend below the circling MDA. In other words, the higher the circling MDA then the earlier you can start the descent on an extended three degrees around the corner, so to speak.

This conveniently ignores the fact that you are descending below the circling MDA with no idea of the exact position of the critical obstacle on which the circling MDA is based. If you can see the ground below and ahead of you, and can be assured of the minimum legal obstacle clearance during the manoeuvre, then no problem - unless it is at night.

But at night, deliberately descending below the circling MDA on downwind or base, where you cannot see and do not know the position of the critical obstacle that dictates the MDA, is most unwise and certainly questionable airmanship.

Granted it might be legal according to the way it is phrased in the Regs - but it is awfully risky. Many fatal accidents involving circling approaches at night have been caused by the aircraft hitting a hill while descending below the circling MDA somewhere in the circuit pattern - but not necessarily on final.

If the descent path for a particular aircraft type requires the pilot to commence descent below the published circling MDA before the aircraft is stable on final approach with the runway visual, then that aircraft should not be executing a circling approach in the first place.

Otherwise there is little point in the authorities publishing a circling MDA (especially at night), if pilots disregard it, simply because their aircraft type cannot be stabilized on finals without the descent starting below the MDA somewhere downwind or base leg.

[Few Cloudy]

Which is why, according to Japanese Air Law, for instance, that you have to have either the runway threshold, or approach lights, or other APPROVED visual aid in sight - and in Japan anyway they often put bright rotating beacons for this purpose around the base leg. Bloody good they are too.

Without them circling in Miyazaki and Kagoshima would require another 200 to 300 feet cloudbase on a dark rainy night.

The question earlier about minimum presentation - the QFE figure means height above the airfield (QFE is the sub setting which will read zero on the field) the next figure is the vis and the last figure is based on QNH ("Altimeter" in the USA) setting and gives you altitude above the sea. The difference between the QNH and QFE figure indicates the elevation of the field.

[Belgique]

Grange_Guzzler
What a name what a life-style. Delay due away. Your points:

a. G/S intercept...Quite agree, although it's a long time since I flew a cat C circle with an MDA 1000ft agl or higher (although I'm sure they exist and most likely at the sort of terrain-girdled airfield where circling is both an unhealthy pastime, yet de rigeur due to civ/mil ops, mid-field arrest chain-gear controlling runway choice, lack of aids, local airspace etc). However the way in which circling approaches normally come unstuck is either/both a lack of MDA maint and exceeding the protected area. At night in particular it is very hard to judge distances and an increasingly flat perspective can be quite insidiously come by. Wings level on centre-line is (I agree) too pedantic...but it conveys the theme of religiously not descending until turning final and you have the VASIS, T-VASIS, PAPI's etc for absolute guidance.

b. Re ARP. Without consulting PANS OPS or TERPS criteria, I vaguely recall that the ARP is derived as being the centroid of a line joining the centre of each threshold and that the way I was taught was to relate your 1.7nm latitude to that (i.e. it will quite closely approximate the area defined by your pukka definition plus a half runway length buffer to the edge of the protected area - unless the main instrument runway is inordinately long). But unless you are lucky enough to have a VOR/DME at that ARP point, even that "safer" 1.7nm becomes very arbitrary and the safest, more expedient course of action is simply to become adept at manoeuvring your airplane as tight in to the field as you feel comfortable with, in the wind conditions. Airbus peeples might be a bit limited with their further bank constraints but the general idea is that you are less likely, particularly in daylight, to lose contact with the landing threshold in heavy precipitation if you keep it close aboard (and far less likely to become an elevated scenic attraction).

Someone smarter than me advocated coping with tightening base turn winds by initially overbanking, rolling it off progressively and allowing the wind to do the centre-line lin-up for you. As QFI I've sat and watched repeated centre-line blow-throughs at high bank angles off low-level night circuits - mostly by experienced pilots on conversion. I would have to surmise that the average airline pilot does not get enough (any?) practise at that sort of thing. That type of training instils confidence, even with the restricted visuals of the average sim. Having to do it like Captain Wu, not having done it before, trying hard but not fully understanding the pitfalls, we shouldn't be surprised if we were were to come seriously unstuck. It's a different type and quality of decision to be cranking into a missed approach off a circling that's gone geometrically impossible. Time and again, failing to "give up", make that quality decision (and instead attempting to salvage a fiasco) proves to be the short-cut to the accident site.

c. In the military, some 30 years ago, I was taught the "shortest way" method and I like many others found that it could be disorienting and whole-heartedly endorse turning onto the MAP course by turning "through" the airfield. ATC sometimes act a little surprised when you do that however.

Re the WisofOZ point about being visual:
The whole problem with circling approaches is that you can be quite legal even though you can't see (ahead) a foot in from of you due to heavy rain - as long as you have the landing threshold in sight on your beam. That's exactly why the protected area is provided, because in the conditions in which you're likely to carry out a circling approach, localised intense areas of precipitation and low scud can reduce the prevailing visibility in certain directions. I'd have to say that I've seen a lot of cunning captains (who felt uncomfortable flying RH patterns with large drift angles towards the runway) just cross the midfield of their planned landing runway and use a continual left turn to finals, the headwind on base resolving any potential "tangle with the angle". I realise that wasn't an option at Kimhae, but it sometimes can be whether you're circling for a cross-runway or the reciprocal..

A Final Thought. Unlike Initial, Intermediate and Final Approach segments, circling areas do not have a "secondary area" for defined obstacle clearance. For cat C it's a design obstacle clearance height of 394ft and then suddenly, outside the "protected area", nix.

IMHO unless training organisations are prepared to train people with a dedicated syllabus on circling approaches, they should be labelled fraught with danger - and as subtle traps for young players.

[Centaurus]

Belgique. May I say very well written indeed.

[grange.guzzler]

Belgique and others

I too have been away so unable to keep up with the flurry on this thread.

I would point out that the circling approach is also carried out by cat D aircraft in many areas. Kimhae Cat D 1100 circling MDA.

Thing a lot seem to forget is the caveat on descent below MDA is that you must still be able to maintain obstacle clearance of 400 on all obstacles within the flight path, which without recent reference, I recall is within 1600 m of the actual path over the ground. If you cannot guarantee that then you cannot descend below MDA until on final, 3 degrees or not. So any arguments (raised by some one earlier) about descending at night into an unknown area are fallacious ( maybe that should be fellatious). If you ain’t got the information, do not go down.

Whilst I do not want to get into specifics of the accident that sparked this discussion, I would point out that this was a daylight approach.

Your statement that ARP roughly equates to the arc’s based on the thresholds is also incorrect, as the centroid will be as you infer, half the runway length from the threshold, given a roughly symmetrical field layout. This could be in the order of a mile, when we are talking of a 1.7 mile radius. That is about 70% out by my calcs. But then again I have been guzzling.

With regard to the concept that you can have zero vis in front but so long as you can see the runway, I would suggest this is also a misconception. You are required to have a minimum visibility and keep the threshold or etc in sight. That vis by my understanding is forward backward every which way. Ergo if you have forward visibility and you have a head outside it is unlikely you will run into anything harder than a rain drop.

Lets dispel the mystery and falsehoods about these manoeuvres. They are in essence no different to a bad weather circuit in a 150 or Warrior. Speeds should only be in the order of 60 –80- knots higher. Altitudes are the same or better and you have an extra set of hands and eyes to help. We have no problem with bad weather circuits at 50 hours total flight time. Why is there such a hang up about the same thing at several thousand hours. Get out there guys and practice. Practice in the sim and where possible practice in VMC for real. Get used to it and get comfortable. And for gods sake forget about driving it around on FMC as some have suggested. If you want something on your PFD, put up a fix 2 miles short of the threshold at 600 feet. This is a comfortable target, but please do not drive around with you head inside. This is a VISUAL manoeuvre. Take the autopilot out, it will not turn quick enough, but leave the auto throttle on until final at least, its cheap insurance. Keep one head out, stay within the circling area, keep the runway in sight and maintain 400 obs clearance until on final. I guarantee you will succeed.

GG

[Belgique]

GG, starting to suspect I was your 2FTS QFI circa 75-77. If you re-read what I said about ARP, I conceded that you are correct on the academic construction of the protected area (per TERPS criteria). My ARP reference was one of those famed arbitrary "rules of thumb" that built in half the runway length as a buffer ("the way I was taught was to relate your 1.7nm of latitude to that - the ARP (i.e. it will quite closely approximate the area defined by your pukka definition but plus a half runway length buffer inside the edge of the protected area..").

Likewise "visibility" on a dark and rainy night is also a misnomer. The laid-down visibility of which we speak is surely a reported prevailing MET visibility. I was always taught (and practised) that as long as you retained orientation and contact with the landing threshold, you were legal. In fact I can recall doing this regularly at a remote island airfield at night where the nearest divert was 1500nms away, there were no obstacles, but the only way to get in (in the bog-standard tropical downpour) was to cross the runway midfield and do that continuous turn to finals. If you didn't keep pointing at (or generally toward) the runway, all you ever saw (ahead) was inky black (which equates to zero vis for all practical intents and purposes).

In all other respects we are on frequency. The saddening aspect of this type of accident is always your abiding suspicion that the young driver airframe knew not what he do....nor had he previously been "exposed".

[thermostat]

This has been a most interesting topic. We are not allowed to do circling approaches in our airline just visual ones.
I have been studying the approach plate for rwy 36L along with the circling info and the various obstacles to the north of the runway.
On close examination a number of things jump out at you. The Capt. cannot keep the threshold of 18R in sight since he is on the left side of the 'plane. For cat "C" at 700 ft and 1.7 nm the FPA is 3.8 regrees. for cat"D" 1100 ft and 2.3 nm it's 4.5 degrees (way too steep for a straight -in)
From the 18R threshold to the peak of each obstacle, here are the FPA's. 719' 2.2 nm =3 deg. 1253' 4.9 nm = 2.4 deg. 2067' 5.1 nm = 3.8 deg. & 2297' 8.2 nm = 2.6 deg.
Going througt the manual :- Circling approach is a VISUAL manoeuver. Cat "C" 121-140 kt / 1.7 nm radius from thresthod. Cat "D" 141-165 kt / 2.3 nm radius from threshold.
The circling minimum provides 300' above all obstacles within the visual manoeuvering area for each catagory.
The basic requirement is to keep the runway in sight after initial visual contact and remain at the circling MDA until a normal landing is assured.
Armed with some mathamatical formulas (which some pilots seem to hate) for radius of turn, angle (track) from VOR to initial base leg turn, gradient, FPA, here is what IMHO would be the safest way to do this crazy approach.
Complete the ILS appr to 36L down to 1000' and 160 kts. Cross the VOR and track the 334R , reduce speed to 140 kts to 3.1 dme (1 nm north of the threshold of 18R). Immediately start a right turn at 25 deg bank and start a descent at 600 FPM/ -2.4 FPA to intercept the 001R at 3.1 dme/ 455 ft then continue descent at 920 fpm/ 3.7 deg FPA to landing.
So much for a VISUAL approach.
There are too many obstacles to the north and the circling is in the wrong direction for this to be strictly a visual approach. Why not use all the resorces available in the cockpit to make this a safer approach??? e.g. radials, DME, FPA, proper speed control bank angles and altitude. Why disregard all this good info?

For those who say you can't start down until on final approach, good luck ! Do you know what the FPA would be like from 700 ft at one nm ? (Remember you are restricted to a 1.7 nm radius) It is 6.4 degrees ! The max recommended FPA for jet aircraft is 3.7 deg.
That's my 2 cents worth.
p.s I still don't understand what the "QFE FT/KM 1680/3.7 QNH FT 1700" is trying to tell me. Why don't they "put it in english" ??
How does it fit in with the 700-2 or 1100-3 circling minima ?

[Few Cloudy]

OK Thermo,

1680 QFE means you are 1680 feet above field (height). 1700 QNH (altimeter) means you are 1700 feet above sea level (altitude) so field must be 20 feet elevation. 3.7 km is the minimum vis for this particular approach and the height/altitude quoted is the minimum cloudbase allowed.

This is an anachronism from the old wartime limey "Q"code. QSY meant change frequency - QGO meant divert etc. QNH is what the USA guys call "Altimeter setting", giving altitude over mean sea level and QFE is a setting not used in the USA but gives height relative to the field. Operators using QFE have to make damn sure that their charts are marked accordingly. There is also QNE but what that means is flight level - the read out you get with 2992 or 1013 set.

Not sure about the other values you mention but they sound like standard minima for a particular type (category) of aircraft. The higher limit on the chart is what counts.

[rehkram]

SLF here: I am puzzled. Would the GPWS have been inactive at that stage of the flight? Please forgive lack of knowledge, a one word answer will suffice.

[Alpha Leader]

rehkram:

on most current a/c types, GPWS is inactive when landing gear is down.

[thermostat]

Few Cloudy, thanks for the reply. I should have been more explicit. The Q codes I know about, it's the other numbers that don't make sense. If anyone would care to give an explanation I would be grateful.
Thanks.

[Feather #3]

Alpha Ldr [& rehkram],

I'd beg to differ. The very reason that circling is flown in 'most current a/c types' with Boeing - Flap 20/Others - Intermediate Flap and Gear Down, is so that ground contact GPWS warnings are NOT inhibited.

"TOO LOW FLAPS" AND "TOO LOW TERRAIN" will still work in this configuration. It is the selection of landing flap which cancels these. Thus, descent below the circling minima until established on the 3 degree final approach slope [albeit using a curved profile if required] has been banned in this part of the world by night and strongly discouraged by day.

G'day :)

[Centaurus]

Thermostat. Regardless of anything else it is foolhardy to commence descent at night below any published circling MDA until on final approach. The designers of the charts are not required to depict the geographical position of the critical obstacle that mandates the MDA. The critical obstacle could just as easily be on base leg - a real trap for those that prefer to get onto an early profile. The chart designers rightly assume that no one in his right mind will descend below the MDA until obstacle clearance is assured. And that is not possible on a dark night circling approach until final. In low cloud fog or mist same problem.

If however this places the aircraft on an unacceptable glide slope angle on final - then stiff cheddar - you go somewhere else to land.
Interestingly in Australia, the circling areas are determined by drawing an arc centred on the threshold of each usable runway and joining these arcs by tangents. This results in a radii for Category A.. 1.68nm
Cat B...2.66nm
Cat C....4.20nm
Cat D...5.28nm
Cat E...6.94nm


These seem a far cry from the circling areas used at Pusan and a lot safer.


t c...

[autoflight]

Do we have any interim report on this one from the Korean authories?

[autoflight]

DouglasFlyer
Circling at Busan was based on speeds, not categories when I last checked 18 months ago. Has it been changed to categories?

[Snowballs]

I am sure you will find the circling approach at Busan was based on and designed using the prehistoric TERPS principles. “Some” countries use this hangover from the age of lower performance aircraft when they cannot design a safe circling approach using the newer PAN OPS principles.
To carry out a circling approach in a large modern passenger jet, air using TERPS minimums is a very dangerous procedure.
On the lower left hand corner of Jepp charts, it usually states if the chart is designed using Pan Ops or some other system. If nothing is stated (as was the case in Busan at the time of this crash) it can usually be assumed it was designed to TERPS specifications. BE very careful in Asia, especially Japan as often they don’t specify the procedures used to design the approaches.
Pilots should really INSIST Jepp includes the specifications used to design the approaches on individual plates and include a preamble to the various design specifications in the Jepp reference volumes.
:(

[autoflight]

Jepps are normally amended weekly. It has been my experience in several airlines that many pilots are too whimpish to even ask for current charts. If they could insist on current charts before departure, we would be halfway towards your suggestion, snowballs. Under these circumstances there is not much chance that we will ever insist on anything.
It is the Korean authorities that need to be more active if charts are inadequate. Of course, thats another worry!
I am still interested to know if current jepp charts give circling minima for speeds less than 140k and another one for 140k and greater.

[cringe]

The final accident report in English:

http://www.moct.go.kr/EngHome/News/data/20050506135923_Final%20report-English2005.4.15.pdf

Appendix:

http://www.moct.go.kr/EngHome/News/data/20050506135924_Appendix.zip

[ExSimGuy]

And don't tell me the choice of runway was anything to do with noise abatement!
Have you ever heard the noise of an airliner hitting the deck?

Seriously though - "One pilot operation"? Does this actually happen on commercial flights? Am I missing something when I assume this means one body only on the flight deck? (I hope so!))

I agreed with those who were less than happy (admittedly sometimes for personal reasons, but there are also safety reasons) at getting rid of the FE. I think that, if I learned that I was on an aircraft with only one guy on the flight deck, I'd seriously consider getting off again

:eek:

[NigelOnDraft]

ExSimGuy....

Not sure what you're on about "one pilot operation". There were actually 3 flight crew on this sector, so your FE comment seems a bit strange as well?

[Centaurus]

Cringe. I got the pages on the accident report OK on Adobe, but they came out all blank. Could you provide the link again, please.

[barit1]

synonymous with "zero CRM", I believe.

[Groundbased]

Centaurus,

I have the same problem, blank report. I tried downloading it directly from the site but I get the same result.

Can anyone post a link to a version that works? It might be an issue with trying to view the document in a later or earlier version of adobe.

[RatherBeFlying]

Centaurus,

You have to allow Acrobat to install the Korean font upgrade -- which seems to include Latin characters. You may need to update your Acrobat to 7.01.

The report is a good lesson on how easy it is to get killed in a circle to land procedure, especially one designed to TERPS criteria.

Perhaps the regs should require operators to provide airport specific circle to land simulator training with the kind of winds aloft that suckered this crew.

[Salzinger_FOO]

Groundbase/Centaurus,

and all having troubles.. you might want to download the Korean language update for Acrobat Reader.

Visit this page
http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/acrrasianfontpack.html

And make the necessary choices and download it...
Should work then...

Cheers

Salz


PS. Funny enough, the report is in English, so I have no clue why this was happening, but after I installed the Korean language package, it worked fine.

[ExSimGuy]

One-pilot Operation
Barin1 - Okay I guess that makes sense of it - it was a quote from the first page of the thread, and had me VERY surprised! (reminded me of the days when the Trident haad a "FE Seat and panel" added to the design to keep BALPA happy (and more eyes on the deck)

So, 3-crew on a 767? I haven't been in the Office of a 76, but I would have thought there was only 2 pilot's seats and a jump seat - what is the designation of the 3rd person there? P3? Like the Tridents? (but without the FE's instrumentation)

and I'm unlikely to ever get a "jump seat" in a 767 now, since the regs (probably rightly) introduced since "9-11". Last time I was "up front" was in a 'Bus BAH-LHR when the Capt allowed me to see what a "glass cockpit" looked like, back a few years, on my way to a GatBash - oh for the old days of flying:{

[Globaliser]

RatherBeFlying: You have to allow Acrobat to install the Korean font upgrade -- which seems to include Latin characters. You may need to update your Acrobat to 7.01.It seems to be working fine in Reader 6.0 for me, once the Korean font was installed.

It looks like one of the appendices (number 6) also needs Chinese Simplified. My Reader was calling for that but I haven't done it yet.

Hope this helps for those who are having problems.

[punkalouver]

It has been a week of heavy reading. Four accident reports. For those who could not download this report, many previous posters had problems, the final report says that South Korea uses American TERPS instead of PANS-OPS. The captain was aware of this. For circling procedures there are differences. The protected airspace is less under TERPS. Also the maximum airspeed during circling is less under TERPS.
The Captain chose Category C circling minimums which are 400 feet lower than category D. At Pusan there are mountains just outside the protected circling airspace to the north. The aircraft was flown significantly longer on downwind than the company standard of 20 seconds once abeam the landing threshhold and at a speed more than 15 knots above maximum cat C circling speeds. 20 seconds was called out but the aircraft continued downwind and further progress north was not ended until 40 seconds past the trhreshhold while on base leg. Consideration of wind effects on ground track do not appear to have been taken.
However this was a daytime visual manouver, but the aircraft continued the circling manouver after flying into cloud and flew into a mountain outside of not only the cat C protected area but the cat D protected area as well.
The Chinese addendum to the report indicates that while they seem realize that their crew has to be held responsible, there are statements in the probable cause that can be interpreted that this was somehow the fault of the Koreans because aside from not noticing a MSAW(minimum safe altitude warning) on the radar(due to the controller visually tracking, or attempting to visually track the aircraft) that "unintelligible frequency transfer instruction and frequent communication with the flight crew had an impact on the flight crew's operation of base turn and final approach". (Aircraft communications were handled by a third pilot on the flight deck).

[jumbowanabee]

Punk, INC and GMP use pans ops the rest of S Korea use TERPS just to add confusion

[Dagger Dirk]

"unintelligible frequency transfer instruction and frequent communication with the flight crew had an impact on the flight crew's operation of base turn and final approach".

Yes this accident did prove that you (as an ATCO) can talk a crew into having an accident. However strangely enough, after the gibbering ATCO had achieved that, they waited another 20 odd minutes before even thinking about pressing the big red button.

That gets a mention in the report too.