Legal Responsibility of Pilot in Command. Thoughtful article

[sheppey]

Have we forgotten our command responsibilities? – aviationadvertiser.com.au (http://www.aviationadvertiser.com.au/news/2012/11/have-we-forgotten-our-command-responsibilities/)

The author makes the point that the buck stops with the pilot in command and although he may rely on support for his decisions from various agencies, it still boils down to the fact he wears it. A thoughtful article indeed.

[601]

From the article

If the company couldn’t supply the required information then the pilot in command is required to source it and if that cannot be done then that calls up one of the most difficult decision a pilot in command sometimes needs to make – the ability to say “NO”.

During my time, I encouraged, advised or outright told pilots to say "no" if they were asked to conduct a flight that was "bending the rules".

The majority took that advise. Sadly, some of the minority are no longer with us.

[Kharon]

Ring the RTA get them to remove school traffic zones and zebra crossings; the kids are responsible. Save a motza.

Send 'Don't worry Mum' emails to all saying relax if your kid gets lost in a National Park, the kid is responsible for navigation.

Dismantle the ATC, do away with T&C, burn all COM, throw out OH&S, stop pilot training at first solo, abandon instrument ratings, remove all aircraft lights, turn off approach and runway lights.

Ring the Senate and tell 'em to knock off, all gone pinis; the pilot done it.

Silly when you really think about it. When a total cock-up like Norfolk occurs responsible adults get weaving, they want to know why, they want to know how and they want to make sure it cannot be repeated – ever.

Adults do not find a multitude of corporate errors, supporting numerous normalised deficiencies approved by the regulator, ignored by a national safety authority, then bury them. Certainly not under a pile of pony pooh.

Adults do not ignore essential data which can determine how the event occurred which can be used to ensure that swimming lessons are voluntary, pleasurable events.

Did James make a complete dogs breakfast of the flight, he sure did. That's old news; now, the who, why and how of the orchestrated cover up is much a more provocative, intriguing argument.

All of the rose coloured 20/20 hindsight in the world will not shade the fact we have been internationally disgraced by the dishonesty of the very authorities entrusted with the safety of air travel.

The plain fact that every future statement made or result published by 'the' authorities cannot, ever be relied upon, is just one symptom of a very, very sick system: which, on present evidence is of no practical value to the industry or public whatsoever.

But, no worries, blame it all on the catch cry 'Pilot error', then we can all relax.

Steam off – Confirmed.

[virginexcess]

There is no doubt that what is stated in the article with regard to Pilot legal responsibilities is correct, but the application in the real world can be a far different thing.

Of particular importance is the culture of the operator. If young pilots are bought into an operator that has a poor safety culture, and he/she has no significant experience to fall back on to measure the culture against, then it is should be of no surprise that the young pilot accepts the culture as being "normal".

I don't know what the culture in this particular operator was like, it may have been good, and the pilot may have been operating to a different standard than the operator required.

My point is that the legislation on it's own isn't enough. The culture of the Company has a huge impact. This pilot may have thought that he was doing everything that was required of him, if that was how he had been trained/conditioned to behave by his company.

The ever increasing cost of operating aircraft, combined with the self auditing nature of the Australian industry, will continue to put pressure on Companies and pilots to cut corners.

[Sarcs]

VE and "K" both top posts:

Adults do not find a multitude of corporate errors, supporting numerous normalised deficiencies approved by the regulator, ignored by a national safety authority, then bury them. Certainly not under a pile of pony pooh.



It would seem that the 'normalised deviations' in this saga also extended to the 2nd in command, the operator and the regulator. This "ND" culture is especially highlighted in the CASA investigation (hidden) report and Special Audit report where they highlight that both pilots had not completed a CRM course...hmm in Airline speak isn't that "green on green" and why wasn't this fact ringing alarm bells, instead all it got was a cursory almost dismissive remark by both the auditors and investigators!:ugh:

No there is a lot more needles to be found in this pile of pony pooh me thinks!:E

[Sunfish]

Horse****. Another of these "high priests". "Our calling is so special that we must accept the criminal sanctions provided by the law as a mark of our importance"

Let me tell you mate, a surgeon is going to shove a camera up my backside in a few weeks and I have been advised that there is a one in one thousand chance he might perforate the bowel.

Will he go to jail if that happens? Even if he kills me? Look at that prick Patel in Queensland - his victims died vomiting their own feces thanks to his handiwork.

Yet you expect pilots to operate to impossible standards and then take it from CASA up the khyber?

The entire regulatory minefield exists because the regulators regard all pilots as uncaught criminals, and your high priest crap about the nobless oblige of pilots belongs exactly where that camera is going to go.

[Lookleft]

Interesting that the same blog has been praised for its raising of the issues in the past but when it raises an issue that is contrary to a certain way of thinking then it is clearly out of step with modern thinking. Given the author's CV I don't think he can be accused of being an amateur in the field of aviation.

There are two issues surrounding this Norfolk incident. One is the pursuit of why the ATSB released a report that did not cover organisational issues and human factors that previously had been investigated to great depth. On that score K and S have been tag teaming very effectively.

Lets not ignore though the issue of PIC and F/O responsibilities when commencing a flight. The impression I get from the particular PIC is he is seeking exoneration for what happened. The F/O has been MIA and could contribute a lot to the discussion about why as a crew the situation developed.

Lets not develop a culture amongst the pilot fraternity that it doesn't matter what happens its ultimately the organisation and regulator that are to blame and that you as PIC are a victim of the machine. The thinking that needs to be developed is just as awareness of human factors can help you stay out of trouble so can an awareness of the deficiencies of an organisational culture and the ineffectiveness of the regulator prepare you better for taking on the role of PIC. Too many pilots now consider the role of PIC to be just sitting in the LHS. I see that in my work place where after 2-4 years of flying a jet they demand their spot in the LHS because it pays more. No discussion about what it really means, no discussion about why certain decisions were made, no discussions about what the ops manual says and how it is applied.

The discussion on the responsibility of the PIC is valid in terms of educating pilots of all levels just what legal and moral expections rest on his/her shoulders. The pursuit of why the regulator allowed an operator like Pelair to conduct jet operations with inadequate safe guards and why the ATSB produced a sub-standard report should be continued with vigour.

Lets hope that everyone from the relevant agencies. the operators and the "last line of defense" aka the PIC's and crew members learn from this and lift their standard of professionalism and integrity.

[Lookleft]

Sunny I would recommend that you don't go flying until well after you have had that procedure done. The legal responsibilities of PIC go way back and have their basis in maritime law. What is impossible about the standards and what standards are you refering to? No one can force you to abrogate your legal responibilities, they can try, but at the end of the day the only person that turns the key or moves the start switch is you.

[Sarcs]

LL well said mate and probably enough said! It is interesting though that we have almost gone full circle on pilot training and standards (i.e. previous Senate Inquiry) and that includes 'command responsibility'.

May I suggest that what that shows is that despite the good intentions of the Senate RRAT committee in the previous inquiry and the constructive 22 recommendations generated, there has been nothing learnt or embraced by the Minister or his department or indeed the relevant interested parties.

Since that inquiry was intitiated there has been numerous examples of poor airmanship and poor flight management by airline operators let alone the GA sector. Here's one example that is very definitely relevant to 'command responsibility':


At 1845 Singapore Time on 27 May 2010, an Airbus A321-231, registered VH-VWW and operating as Jetstar flight JQ57, was undertaking a landing at Singapore Changi International Airport. The aircraft was not in the correct landing configuration by 500 ft height above the aerodrome and, as required by the operator's procedures in the case of an unstable approach, the crew carried out a missed approach.

The investigation identified several events on the flight deck during the approach that distracted the crew to the point where their situation awareness was lost, decision making was affected and inter‑crew communication degraded. In addition, it was established that the first officer's performance was probably adversely affected by fatigue.

The investigation did not identify any organisational or systemic issues that might adversely impact the future safety of aviation operations. However, following this occurrence, the aircraft operator proactively reviewed its procedures and made a number of amendments to its training regime and other enhancements to its operation.


http://atsb.gov.au/media/3599204/ao2010035.pdf

It even contains the very 'limp' and what has become the ATSB 'standard' phrase.."The investigation did not identify any organisational or systemic issues that might adversely impact the future safety of aviation operations". Also what was obviously a significant event didn't generate one relevant safety recommendation instead we get the other ATSB standard phrase: "The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) expects that all safety issues identified by the investigation should be addressed by the relevant organisation(s). In addressing those issues, the ATSB prefers to encourage relevant organisation(s) to proactively initiate safety action, rather than to issue formal safety recommendations or safety advisory notices."

So LL if the ATSB is leaving all safety actions in the hands of the operator so such actions carried out become essentially 'invisible' to all other industry stakeholders how will it ever be possible to reveal such systemic issues such as the erosion of 'command responsibility' that your very good post alludes to?

[Oakape]

The article must be wrong. The PIC can't have all of those responsibilities. After all, they are only bus drivers you know. And mostly their pay packets prove it!

I really get sick of all & sundry wanting it both ways. According to management & the public, pilots are nobodies who aren't worth much & should be paid as such. But when it all turns to poo & those same parties are looking for someone to blame, the focus gets turned on pilot responsibilities & where someone on the day may have fallen short.

If everyone believes that pilots should be paid bus driver salaries, then pilots should have bus driver responsibilities & all the regulatory resposibility should be passed to the CEO of the company. Maybe then the CEO will be actually worth what they are getting paid.

[Lookleft]

Sarcs I think we might actually be in furious agreement! I agree totally that the current path the ATSB is taking in regards to safety action is dangerously inadequate as it is akin to self-regulation. What I am saying is that all pilots at all levels need to learn from, not just this incident but what the Senate is highlighting; that the regulator doesn't have your back covered, the ATSB is not going to produce a full and honest report and your employer is not going to be held to account.

The decisions a PIC makes has to take this all into account and if the situation or task you are faced with doesn't give you options that you are happy with then come with solutions that do.

[Dark Knight]

One could always use the JGillard defence that `I was young and naive at the time'

As a young, naive 27 year old plus I recall undestanding fully ANRs, ANOs, etc and my responsibility required by them.

They were however, somewhat more sensible then as was the regulator regardles of how we pilloried them.

[Brian Abraham]

The impression I get from the particular PIC is he is seeking exoneration for what happened.With all due respect Lookleft, Dominic has put his hand up and accepts fully his role in the accident. The impression I get is that he objects to being thrown under the bus by all and sundry, without them accepting the role they had to play in setting the stage.

[LeadSled]

Of particular importance is the culture of the operator. If young pilots are bought into an operator that has a poor safety culture, and he/she has no significant experience to fall back on to measure the culture against, then it is should be of no surprise that the young pilot accepts the culture as being "normal".

Virginexcess,
Very well put, as were the rest of your points.
This is where the culture of "normalised deficiencies " comes from.
Tootle pip!!

[Lookleft]

The impression I get is that he objects to being thrown under the bus by all
and sundry, without them accepting the role they had to play in setting the
stage.

I'll admit that my assessment is probably wrong so I'll move on.

[puff]

Oakape, don't mention to Rex you want to pay pilots bus driver wages, because if so they'll be giving their fos a pay rise !

[aussie027]

This is an old saying but very true in many, many past cases as we have seen recently with this Pelair accident report-

'"There is no problem so complex that it cannot simply be blamed on the pilot."

[Denzeldude]

From the article:
“Success has a thousand authors – failure mostly none.”

I find it interesting how he's using this proverb in support of his opinion that 99% of the blame should land squarely on the PIC. Well, that's the impression I get from his article. So it's used to support the preceding paragraph which discusses that when things don't go as planned, blame gets directed to others.

Oh, you mean like when CASA's damaging reports are hidden and a weak-as-piss ATSB report is released (after a thorough 3 year investigation:D:rolleyes:) with zero weight placed on every slice of swiss cheese except the last one, the last line of defense, the PIC.

Dom does accept his role, but as Brian mentions, he wants others and their organizations to accept theirs. It's such a shameful blight on the industry when it's regulators are ducking and weaving and intentionally diverting full blame on those throw away commodities...the pilots.

Maurie Baston may have many, many years of experience working in aviation, but there is law... and then there is reality. The law is a good framework and by all means should be used and referred to for situations it covers, but just like a Pilot's Operating Handbook, it can't cover everything (and everyone) to the expectations that some have.

I find it amusing that so many agree that full responsibility should be placed on the PIC. "The buck stops here" they say. I could imagine Prof Reason asking himself "what have I been doing all these years?":ugh: and trying to explain yet again "I'm not selling cheese, I provided a rational model to help investigations understand fully what happened and why."

All of the people I have met who decided to get heavily involved in flight safety and accident investigations are the kind of people who have a very strong interest in that field and I have no doubt that they have pride in their work. I can only imagine there are disgruntled ATSB investigators out there who want to do the right thing but are probably shaking their head at the quality (or lack thereof) of that report.

Yes we as pilots have a good job (well, those of us with a job), and yes we have a lot of responsibility, but for God's sake open your eyes people. There's more to it than standing on your pedestal and saying "I am the King of this plane, and if the pooh hits the fan, I will fall on my sword". We as pilots are not God :eek: and should not be held to account as though we were. Just look at my salary and you'll see that I'm not regarded as a God.

Be the most professional pilot you can and accept responsibility for your actions, as you should, but there's nothing wrong with expecting others to do the same.

[Jabawocky]

40/40/20

It is that simple.

The rest is very complex.

[shortshortz]

Great post Denzeldude and Sunfish again.

LL, no idea of the multitude of risks there is to the pilot when turning that key. Humans are flawed, unfortunately we make errors, I hope if you are in a tough situation you make every decision 100% perfect under pressure. If you don't, you will be under attack and your opinion will change very quickly. And that's even if as a PIC you made the best decision on the day.

[Kharon]

For those who remain firmly convinced that DJ is the sole perpetrator of these events, consider a short reading session, commencing at page 39 of the "very special audit" CASA audit ending at page 103.

The CASA signed confession begins at p.39; the items discussed did not occur overnight. If CASA can identify these problem areas after the event; it follows that they could have done so before. These issues, identified and addressed may have prevented the infamous 'group cluster' now referred to as the Norfolk ditching.

Pages 40 – 41 : CASA identifies experience and cultural 'contributing factors' which had been in effect long before DJ decided to ditch the aircraft. Once again, if CASA can define these issues, so very clearly identified after the event, why were they not identified beforehand by CASA and corrected. It is amusing that the issues are laid at the company's door due to a lack of internal audit, what were CASA auditing, the biscuit tin or the lunch menu ?

Then we come to the RCA section, no page numbers but start at PDF 45 – through 78:-

RCA 321058 – it's a bit difficult to blame DJ for dodgy evacuation procedures when the company had not provided the training.

RCA 321059 – training, including V1 cuts conducted by 'non approved' supervisory pilots.

RCA 321060 – more 'non training', this time for ACAS.

RCA 321061 - more 'non training', this time for CRM.

RCA 321062 – operations conducted with no DGA certificate

RCA 321063 – operations without medical certificate.

RCA 321064 – Deficient Fuel policy.

RCA 321065 – Deficient flight preparation documentation and procedures.

RCA 321066 – Deficient/ non existent navigation log and audit procedures.

RCA 321067 – No RTOW or OC charts or procedure.

RCA 321068 – Westwind fleet pilots with out of date of no COM.

RCA 321069 – No formal training for international operations.

RCA 321071 – Systemic failure to report defects.

RCA 321072 – Pre fight passenger and crew briefing deficiencies.

RCA 321073 – Multiple deficiencies notes related to training not provided.

There are a further 22 pages of the same thing to be analysed, but the above certainly gives an idea of the background and culture DJ was in. The company failed to correct the issues, CASA failed in previous audit and surveillance to either identify or correct any of these post accident 'discoveries'. Airtex was raped, pillaged, burned and buried for a whole lot less than this, by the same manager I might add. Polar was a stellar exemplar in comparison and poor old Tiger, their administrative policy dispute pales to insignificance. Yet PA survives.

This is the audit that did not merit the attention of the ATSB. This is the audit that still has not been presented to the Senate. This audit page count is growing daily, firstly we have a humble 45 pages, then a solid 103 pages; I hear there is more of this audit to come under the FOI, unless 'I'm a star see' can find a way to avoid it by skimming around the edges of the Act without actually, technically breeching it, we shall see.

But that's OK it was all the pilot's fault. Right Blackie, but do try to remember who issues operational approvals, who oversights operations and who signs it all off as 'acceptable'. Give you a clue, it is not Dominic James.

[Lookleft]

Just had a read of the SAR that PAIN has made available and as you point out K it is really the smoking gun in the failure of CASA to do its job and the failure of the ATSB to independently investigate. I find the scyophantic opening statements about how wonderful all the staff at PA and the organisation itself has been in cooperating truly self-serving. Hopefully the Senate Inquiry will generate enough interest beyond the small group of interested parties that have been following events to get real change, but the Senate on its own cannot. I am also hopeful that the ATSB can learn some hard lessons from this and distance itself from CASA so that it regains its voice. That will however require a complete rethink on who leads the organisation and as long as the Minister is being shielded I can't see that happening.

On the topic of the thread all this highlights is that the PIC is not only the last link in the chain but he/she needs to have a good look and take interest in the rest of the links as well.

[Brian Abraham]

On the topic of the thread all this highlights is that the PIC is not only the last link in the chain but he/she needs to have a good look and take interest in the rest of the links as well.Very good point Lookleft, except that it may be very difficult for a line pilot to know what is going on behind the chief pilots, and all those other managers, doors.

A real world case.

Management produced a aerodrome analysis detailing the V1 speeds in tabulated form, and it was SOP to refer to said chart post engine start and set the bugs. The only trouble was, in drawing up the chart they had only considered the abort case, and not the fly away if the failure was post V1. What position would the PIC be in if he had a failure post V1 that put him in the scrub, all because of the charts incorrect data?

If management, on being made aware of the issue, refuses to correct the chart, does the PIC then make his own chart drawing on flight manual data, and not comply with SOP?

The ops manual did have a clause saying compliance with its content was mandatory, and failure to comply would meet with disciplinary action, including termination. It also had a get out clause that CASA regs took precedence if there was any conflict.

[Lookleft]

it may be very difficult for a line pilot to know what is going on behind the chief pilots, and all those other managers, doors.

Couldn't agree with you more on that one Brian. A lot of pilots (me included) would have been blissfully unaware that the charts did not cover the post V1 case.

A bit like the application of water-meths on the Metro11 at places like Mildura or Cooma on a hot day. No idea what to expect with the performance if we lost an engine as the vspeeds did not take the water-meths into account. What we did pay attention to was what would happen if only one side fired and we were going to depart the runway, we briefed where the best escape path was (or where the worst one was). You can only prepare yourself as best you can but you have to prepare yourself. What is becoming more obvious is that the traps in the system extend a lot further than just the flying side of the operation.

[Bongo Bus Driver]

I got told a story once by a young pilot that took off knowing he had a flat tyre. I asked WTF he was thinking and he said the boss approved it so it was ok! Yep there are pilots out there that have no idea of their responsibilities.