Charter aircraft catch fire in Turkey

[ManaAdaSystem]

737-800 from Corendon (?). Pax evacuated.

[paparomeodelta]

Brand på turistplan i Antalya | Nyheter | Expressen | Senaste nytt - Nyheter Sport Nöje TV (http://www.expressen.se/nyheter/brand-pa-turistplan-i-antalya/)

Google translation:

A fire broke out on an airplane with Norwegian tourists when it would start from Antalya in Turkey early on Sunday morning. Several people jumped from the plane's wings and injured.
A total of 27 people taken to hospital.
After the smoke and flames in the front of the plane opened the emergency exits. Frightened passengers jumped from the plane's wings and at least one person should have been taken to hospital with leg injuries, according to a witness for Norwegian Adressa.no.
Charter plane was en route from Antalya to Trondheim and Alesund. The airline Corendon Airlines says it was 189 passengers and a crew of seven people on board when the fire broke out.
According to the travel company Detur have 27 people taken to hospital.
One of those who were aboard the plane was Idar Green from Verdal. He saw the smoke from a cabinet in front of the plane and tells Dagbladet.no of panic among the passengers.
- They opened the emergency exits in the front and I opened the one over the wing. Then we started to get out, says Green.
Chose to skip
Passengers first stood still on the high wing, but when they found out how it got up flames from the aviation front, many chose to jump.
- Then people started getting worried and we jumped down. Many injured his leg, says Green to Dagbladet.no.
It is at 09 o'clock unclear how many are injured and how serious injuries they have.
Emergency services arrived quickly to the scene and passengers booked on replacement flights to Ålesund and Trondheim later in the morning.

Picture:

Brand på turistplan i Antalya | Nyheter | Aftonbladet (http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article15605552.ab)

[SimCaptain]

Corendon Airlines - 737-800.
Flight CAI 773 (Antalya - Trondheim, Norway)

From Norwegian newspaper "VG" (http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/artikkel.php?artid=10062205) (in Norwegian):

- Happened before leaving terminal
- 189 passengers
- Lots of smoke in cabin. Oxygen masks deployed
- 27 injuries (some jumping from the wing - breaking their legs)
- Smoke from cockpit-area. (Some reports say flames)

Quick response from AYT ground services.

[Le sok]

In norwegian, but try google tranlation.
Fly med norske turister tok fyr på rullebanen - VG Nett (http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/artikkel.php?artid=10062198)

[paparomeodelta]

Captain got criticized by passengers for leaving the plane too early. And cc for evacuating passengers too late...

Btw, airlines do stink when it comes to communicative crisis management; nothing on the web!!!

[Capot]

Oxygen masks deployed

Really...?

[captplaystation]

SimCaptain,

Best to stick to the Sim :hmm: nothing in Google Translate of the article you posted to say masks deployed. On the ground they would have to be deployed manually, and I doubt even Turkish crew are so unaware of Boeing procedures to imagine that filling the cabin full of chemically generated oxygen would be a good idea in a fire situation.

Fire in the cockpit, Hmnn. . . we have to be really careful about putting our cigarette stubs in waste bins :rolleyes: sorry, couldn't resist. . .anyone who has worked for a Turkish company will understand.



Edited to say, a witness on the 2nd report that I also Google Translated claims masks deployed. . . . . for the sake of the crew, I hope not (or at least we can hope that they flew in the same Squadron as the Chief Pilot. . then all will be OK :D)

[KBPsen]

Btw, airlines do stink when it comes to communicative crisis management; nothing on the web!!! What do you call this then? Or the links provided above, which include parts of emails sent from the airline to newspapers?

[paparomeodelta]

KBP

I am talking about organized communication crisis management. In a situation where all involved are going to get scrutinized by media, the public and all other stakeholders.
Most airlines have great operational crisis management but bad communication crisis management, with exceptions of course, like case SAS/Linate.
You can do all the operative crisis management great, but if you don´t communicate in a both emphatic and organized way, you will get butt kicked everywhere.
I don´t see the airline in this case being active at all...still nothing on their homepage, which of course what I meant, mentioning the web.

For the evacuation, SOP is lowering the flaps to 40 so pax can slide down to make evacuation easier, since no slides there, but maybe they had trouble with hydraulics. Keep seeing repeated info that oxygen masks were deployed in cabin, sounds very strange...

[M609]

As eye witness reports trickle into Norwegian media, some claim that the members of the cabin crew as well as the pilots ran away from the aircraft with people still inside and standing on the wings.

If true, that's not good, or am I expecting too much?

[paparomeodelta]

M 609, seems you could be right unfortunately, here are some comments from pax, google translate:

- It was scary. When we first saw smoke we stood up, but the flight attendants asked us to sit. Only when we actually saw flames , they left the plane immediately - before everyone else, she says.

- I was pretty far ahead of the plane, and saw that the door to the cockpit was closed. Suddenly door opened and the pilots running out of there, while thick smoke billowed out from the door. Then all disappeared, flight attendants as well, they just escaped from the plane, said a shaken Kveli Selvik to VG Nett.

Now, this is hearsay from panicked passengers so far, and has to be investigated, but it does´t sound good

[Pointer]

@ Cptplaystation.. It would not suprise me if you would be very.. Very close the truth with your "Smoking..gun" lol

[paully]

Ah, so thats where Captain Schettino got another job then...:ugh:

[hetfield]

Ah, so thats where Captain Schettino got another job then...

There are plenty of Schettinos, worldwide:*

[Daysleeper]

Given that we know very little of the incident and that, in the one photo on the Internet, (linked above) the fire truck has its snozzle penetrating the cockpit on the FO side I think criticising the crew based on confused media reports is harsh.

Fire in the cockpit seems a distinct possibility.

[M609]

I have no trouble with them exiting the cockpit, but if you can get back to the two front doors, you can also get to the cabin and make sure everyone gets out. If you are down with smoke or burns fine, no argument. But they where fit enough to run away.......

And the cabin crew where not in the cockpit

[J.O.]

A fair amount of Monday morning quarterbacking on here with little in the way of verifiable facts to support these criticisms. What say we wait for at least some level of an investigation before we crucify anyone??? :=

[BOAC]

Oh - come on now...................

[Pander216]

Indeed, quite neglecting for the cockpitcrew to leave a -with smoke filled- cockpit before al passengers were evacuated :ugh:

[IcePack]

In my outfit it is SOP for the Flt deck to exit via cockpit DV windows. & leave the Cabin Crew to get on with it. However capt takes charge Left side on the GND and f/o on right side.
Always wondered what the press would make of it.:D

[lomapaseo]

I can only imagine the true facts here.

It strikes me that if there is a fire in the cockpit that there would be little women & children and passengers first BS beside the crew exiting the perceived and severe threat ASAP at the very front.

Orderly evacuation in that case would be expected only at the mid and aft doors.

I'm happy to be corrected if a published SOP was violated or that passengers were beaten back by the crew with batons

[paparomeodelta]

Norwegian media has followed up the events, and I have edited and featured the parts that has to do with the crew. Translation is Google with minor adjustments to make it understandable:

Rasende flypassasjerer til VG: - Flyvertinnene forlot flyet uten å hjelpe oss - VG Nett om Luftfart (http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/artikkel.php?artid=10062229)

- My boyfriend was the last to leave the plane. He helped a family with children out. The crew was missing. Nobody saw anything of them, and we do not know where they went. There was no one to receive us at the bottom of slides, says Lene Orvik to VG Nett.

AP this afternoon talking with a number of passengers who were aboard the charter plane that night caught fire on the runway in Antalya, Turkey.

Everyone tells the same story: Flight attendants left the plane first. And the crew's behavior reinforced the chaos that prevailed in the dramatic minutes.

When panic broke out on board the aircraft, the crew were the first who left the burning plane, claimed passengers VG has spoken to. - The crew was missing. Nobody saw anything of them, and we do not know where they were, says Lene stator.
- There was a flight attendant right diagonally in front of me who spoke about safety procedures. She was missing during evacuation.I have the impression that it broke out greater panic among flight attendants than among passengers. I saw them afterwards, says Tine Norsted (29) from Trondheim to VG.

Lene Stator, which is one of the most prolific bloggers in Norway, sat in the middle of the plane when she saw smoke poured into the cabin further ahead.

- I shouted that we had fire, but the stewardess told me to calm me down. Then she turned and saw the flames themselves, and shouted, "Get out, run!". Then it was complete panic. People began to push in, the kids were pinned to the floor, said Stator.

- I was sure I was going to die. When you stand in the middle between a hundred people squeezed in a plane with fire and smoke spreading there, you think that this is the end. Luckily we taxied out when it started to burn. Had this happened in the air, we had not had a chance, said stator.

- Those who received the passengers who went out behind the aircraft performed well. But flight attendants inside the aircraft appeared frantic, waving arms and cried, saying Viggo Skålsvik (58) from Verdal.

Others saw nothing of flight attendants at all.

- Flight attendants were gone in a flash right after this happened. No one saw anything of them. Everyone cursed at them because they did not do what they should do. No one saw anything of them, says Ida Marie Kveli Selvik (19) from Namsos.

- Attendant's job is to make sure that passengers get out. So if these statements are true, they have broken with the procedures. Then the airline has an explanatory problem, says Jo Bear Skat Violence, Head of Air Safety Committee in the Norwegian Pilots Association.

- The same rule applies to an aircraft as any other vessel: The captain has the ultimate responsibility. He should be the last to go, says Skat Violence.

[strikemaster82]

- Attendant's job is to make sure that passengers get out. So if these statements are true, they have broken with the procedures. Then the airline has an explanatory problem, says Jo Bear Skat Violence, Head of Air Safety Committee in the Norwegian Pilots Association.

- The same rule applies to an aircraft as any other vessel: The captain has the ultimate responsibility. He should be the last to go, says Skat Violence.

The crew are no use dead.

Perhaps in this instance they gathered upwind at a safe distance?

[A37575]

SOP for the Flt deck to exit via cockpit DV windows

I thought DV windows were tiny - just enough to peer through. At least they were in a Canberra and DC3. You might be just able to push a rabbit through them but nothing larger. What sort of aircraft are you discussing here?

[SLFguy]

"The crew are no use dead.

Perhaps in this instance they gathered upwind at a safe distance?"


I belive you may be clutching at straws sir.

[TT2]

The old Avro 748 had ropes stowed beside the dv windows for drivers to get out with. Bit of a squeeze if you're over 12 stone though.

[BOAC]

A37575 - Boeing DV windows are big enough for most pilots to exit through, although it is no mean feat and the ensuing drop to the ground if you get it wrong can kill.

Regarding 'SOPs', my training said that as a Captain (and F/O) my primary escape route was via the cabin where I would assist with the passenger evacuation ('primary duty' and all that) and only where this was not possible was the window to be used. Note we do not know this airline's procedures.

[paparomeodelta]

But according to witnesses they DID escape via the cabin, but WITHOUT helping the passengers evacuate. Manners...

[RAT 5]

Could this be the classic scenario of "the captain shall be the last to leave the a/c. If I pass you on the way out you are to assume the rank of captain." Safety brief over.

[Herod]

Regarding the size of DV windows, you'd be surprised. I did "dunker" training on helicopters years ago. The cabin window was pretty small, and with a waistcoat life-raft strapped on the average pilot was of greater size than the window. Having been rolled and pitched underwater, everyone managed to get out of the "too small" window. I agree with BOAC though; the DV window is a "secondary" escape. It's a long drop if you get it wrong.

[Akrep]

The B737 has an 'escape rope' that you are supposed to dangle out from when using the windows as an escape route. Being a 737 F/O Myself, training has thought us to use the window has an alternatif if the normal escape route ( Doors ) cannot be used.

[sleeper]

Ok from my company manual and in my opinion how it should be:

Flight deck crew:


- Put on life vest if req, take flashlight


- Captain: take along PBE, if req.


- Proceed to cabin


- Assist with evacuation


- Captain : check all occupants have evacuated.


- Leave aircraft.

[sleeper]

Only if you cannot check the aircraft for reasons as : completely on fire and unable to proceed into cabin, Then it is time to leave and save yourself.

[DaveReidUK]

Barbara Harrison must be turning in her grave ...

[paparomeodelta]

Good point!!!

Wiki:
On 8 April 1968, BOAC Flight 712 left Heathrow Airport, bound indirectly for Sydney. Soon after take-off, the Boeing 707's number two engine caught fire and fell from the plane's port wing. The aircraft managed to land two-and-a-half minutes later, but fire continued to engulf the wing and spread to the fuselage. Harrison and a steward inflated the escape chute at the aft of the plane but it became entangled and the steward had to climb down to free it for use and was unable to return.[5]
Harrison stayed at her station and helped passengers to escape as fire consumed the plane, encouraging them to jump and in some cases simply pushing them out to safety. As the fire spread, escape from the rear of the aircraft became impossible and she led the remaining passengers to another exit. She refused to leave the plane to save herself and her body was found near that of a disabled pensioner, seated in one of the last rows. She is buried in Fulford Cemetery in York.[6]
[edit]

[fireflybob]

Devotion to duty:-

For the gallantry she showed in helping the passengers escape the burning aircraft, Queen Elizabeth II awarded Harrison a posthumous George Cross (GC), the only GC awarded to a woman in peacetime.[7][8] The award was published in a supplement to the London Gazette of 7 August 1968 (dated 8 August 1969).[8] Harrison's medal was accepted on her behalf by her father, Alan.[5] Harrison is the youngest female recipient of the George Cross.

[Prober]

A37575 wonders what sort of aircraft we are talking about. His pseudonym is obviously misleading. All the civil (commercial) aircraft I have flown have DV windows as escape routes. On a light note, on a flight on "the gripper", an old granny of a captain remarked
" You do realise, I hope, that the eyebrow sunshade you are using is blocking your escape rope?"
Bemused F/O, peering down at the Med some 6 miles below:
"I don't think it will reach!"
Also, when teaching in the sim I have often been surprised at how many students do not know what DV even stands for.

[Feathers McGraw]

Barbara Harrison must be turning in her grave ...

Agreed, although she preferred to be addressed as Jane.

[armchairpilot94116]

Looks like this China Airlines crew did a better job with their 738 Okinawa fire. Flight crew came out last with ropes from cockpit. No CC running away either.

China Airlines Flight 120 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Airlines_Flight_120)






INCENDIO FIRE BOEING 737 CHINA AIRLINES NAHA OKINAWA JAPAN 1 - YouTube

[Green Guard]

1capt Non smoking both and an F/o and another cpt Lady on the jumpseat

.... so please clarify:
1. Both Capt and F/O Non Smoking ( or non smokers ??)
2. Capt Lady ( on Jump seat ) was not smoking, but did she extinguish last one properly ? In plastic glass with some or w/o any more coffee ?

Would not be first time, in other airplanes all over the world. Plastic glasses with some tea or coffee used as an ash-tray, BUT when they catch fire they burn real quick. Can anybody refresh: that B-52 on patrol over western part of Greenland and after a fire in cockpit all crew bailed out, leaving airplane to crash with all of its atomic bombs on stand-by, some 40-50 years ago. :E

[T-21]

So some aircrew do not understand what "DV"stands for . That is why all initial flying training for any pilot should take place on gliders. They will learn what the DV window is,able to cope without an engine and a better appreciation of stall/spinning plus better decision making in the circuit.

[TowerDog]

Then the airline has an explanatory problem, says Jo Bear Skat Violence, Head of Air Safety Committee in the Norwegian Pilots Association.


Names does not translate well in Google Translator or whatever programs are being used here: The guys name is "Jo Bjørn Skatvold". :cool:

[BOAC]

I think I prefer the translation:)

[4:th of july]

Skat Violence!
Best translation ever.

There will be a thorough investigation on this. Always
keep an open mind especially if there are witness reports in nordic media. People tend to say just about anything they can to get their 15 minutes of fame especially in these days of smartphones and Ipads with immediate access to tabloid media.
Time will tell. Meanwhile, I´m enjoying the fact that everything went without casualties and major injuries.

[Say Mach Number]

'no time for flap40'??

It takes literally seconds to place the flap selector to F40 in the cockpit. Sounds a bit like panic from the flight deck and no consideration for pax.

Flap 40 would have probably saved most of the injuries of those jumping from the wings.

[A and C]

If the reoport above s correct it sounds like a big electrical fire.

The chances are that the failure of the PA resulted from this and it is likely that the oxygen mask deployment was also as a result of the electrical fire.

[Hotel Tango]

actually the cabin was fine nothing happend in the cabin only the smoke

Smoke can kill and pretty damn quick depending on the source. I can tell you that I wouldn't have gone back in either!

[Pander216]

@armchairpilot94116:

Big difference is that the fire in the China 737 was in the cabin and not in the cockpit!

Once again, if you have a fire and smoke in the cockpit, you do not sit around and wait for 90 seconds! You get out via the cockpit windows or the cockpit door. Imaging the chaos in the little galley there is hardly any space for 2 or 3 crewmembers.

Furthermore, if there is a fire in the cockpit - where all the controls are- there is a big chance that a) there are no hydraulics, B) there are no electrics for the alternate flaps, c) the flap lever console interface to servos's is interrupted by the fire or shorcut citcuit. Furthermore the PA system could be u/s aswell.

Our OM-A says that only when conditions permit, the captain will leave via the rear pax door. If you had to exit trough the cockpit windows I would say this would clasify as a justification for not being able to do so...

Looking at the picture and seeing the firhehoze nozzle harpoon of the fire truck penetrating the cockpit only confirms the severe fire/smoke condition in the cockpit.

[captplaystation]

In amongst all this , it would be nice (for those of us spending our working days in the same type) if some info emerged as to the possible cause of the fire/smoke in the 1st instance.

[Ottoforce]

This whole sad incident seems to demonstrate and confirm the comments and in some cases speculation regarding the standards in the Turkish aviation industry.

I have been in it and it is wholly run by BOX TICKING with no selection standards and in the general no training standards as the training staff both operational and ground school have not been trained, again box ticking, and the English is level 2 at best in most cases with little or no knowledge of procedures , SOP's or technical subjects not to mention a gross lack of situational awareness CRM and crew co ordination." Capt. is boss" rules
The next incident sadly, could be far more serious, it is coming.
THY 737 nearly another Helios recently and 777 landed in ESB with 1900kg😒
Apologies but it is a disaster waiting to happen SOON!

[F14]

The big problem with the B737 is that the wing is quite high to allow pax to vacate. At the gate the flaps are up, selecting the lever to F40 uses the electric hydraulic pump to move the flaps, this takes some time. If the APU is being used to supply electrics, then one of the following items of the EVAC checklist is to pull the Fire Warning switch, thus powering down the hydraulic pump.

From memory, I think the checklist asks the crew to wait for flaps to reach 40 if possible. I think with fire/smoke. Most people would press on and get out.

Ryanair had an evac in STN many moons ago after landing and ran into the same type of problems, the fire crews actually instructed pax to go back into the cabin from the wings!! (it was bearing failure/oil fire from the engine)

[RAT 5]

I've worked for airlines, many years ago, where during an RTO F40 was selected to give it a good chance of having been configured before the evac. Boeing then disapproved because it could cause a reduction in braking effectiveness. We asked why not passing 60kts, but the procedure was cancelled. When RTO was memory items including selecting F40 after park breake was set, there was not problem. Now, with it being a read & do, the F40 comes late in the procedure. It is only advised to wait for F40 if possible. I wonder if they have introduced a threat to a safe evac. I can see some pax opening the overwings before the call for EVAC and before F40 is set. In a Manchester type catastrophe I would not be surprised if that happened.

[Ottoforce]

The point is not flap 40 !! It's the crew ran away and didn't give any help to passengers WHY ?:\:ugh::ugh:

[canmit]

hello there

nobody didn't see anything after accident.I was there and i saw the cockpit after fire.All Technic personnel says the cost of damage to the cockpit around 15-20 million dollars.there is no cockpit there only wreck.

And yes someone from the cockpit left from the plane firstly cause engine number 2 was running and captain went to front of the engine.But all other crew left the plane last. If you have a chance to see video record one day you'll see.(or we can read accident report in the future)

All o2 masks dropped from psu its correct cause a short circuit,and evocation time was 55-60 seconds.

What was the reason for the fire i don't know but in my opinion evocation was successful.Rapid fire in the cockpit,no time for the evocation command,all electrical system gone and only 1-2 broken leg.

[captplaystation]

Was shown a photo of the cockpit yesterday, damn scary & do not wish to imagine the same scenario airborne.

The info I was given, by someone who knows the Capt, is that the fire was caused by electrical shorting/sparking (Gen on Bus? ) which ignited an oxygen leak from the line leading (close to or under the CB panel ) from the bottle to the Capts quick donning mask.

He further stated that Boeing have reputedly said only a few aircraft are affected, suggesting they either found out remarkably quickly, or that this was a known fault.

Anyone know of any AD's relating to this ?

The potential consequences if airborne don't bear contemplation.

[Willit Run]

ok, Last I knew, oxygen itself is not flammable. so, an O2 line cannot ignite. Oxygen supports combustion, but itself is not flammable.

That story is a bit off track!

[captplaystation]

Maybe, but. . . . . . . . . .





Accident: Egyptair B772 at Cairo on Jul 29th 2011, cockpit fire

By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Nov 29th 2012 15:27Z, last updated Thursday, Nov 29th 2012 17:01Z
Egypt's Aircraft Accident Investigation Central Directorate (EAAICD) released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:

Probable causes for the accident can be reached through:

- Accurate and thorough reviewing of the factual information and the analysis sections
- Excluding the irrelevant probable causes included in the analysis section

Examination of the aircraft revealed that the fire originated near the first officer's oxygen mask supply tubing, which is located underneath the side console below the no. 3 right hand flight deck window. Oxygen from the flight crew oxygen system is suspected to have contributed to the fire's intensity and speed.

The cause of the fire could not be conclusively determined. It is not yet known whether the oxygen system breach occurred first, providing a flammable environment or whether the oxygen system breach occurred as a result of the fire.

Accident could be related to the following probable causes:

1. Electrical fault or short circuit resulted in electrical heating of flexible hoses in the flight crew oxygen system. (Electrical Short Circuits; contact between aircraft wiring and oxygen system components may be possible if multiple wire clamps are missing or fractured or if wires are incorrectly installed).

2. Exposure to Electrical Current

The captain (49, ATPL, 16,982 hours total, 5,314 hours on type) and first officer (25, ATPL, 2,247 hours total, 198 hours on type) were preparing the aircraft for departure including reading the checklists requiring the check of the flight crew oxygen system. The first officer conducted these checks and found the oxygen pressure in the normal range at 730 psi. The crew went on with the other preparation procedures, the passengers boarded, the crew was waiting for a delayed last passenger until doors could be closed and the aircraft was ready to depart.

About 30 minutes after the oxygen masks were checked the first officer heard a pop followed by a hissing sound from the right hand side of his seat, fire and smoke came out of the right hand console underneath the #3 cockpit window to the right of the first officer. The captain ordered the first officer to leave the cockpit immediately and notify cabin crew and emergency of the cockpit fire. The captain discharged the fire extinguisher available in the cockpit, however did not manage to put the fire out. The first officer in the meantime notified cabin crew of the cockpit fire prompting an immediate rapid disembarkment via the jetways, then moved on to find somebody with a radio unit, stopped a car on the service way underneath the jetway and radioed the fire department, first fire trucks arrived about 3 minutes after the fire was first observed. Rapid deplanement was completed in about 4-5 minutes. Fire fighters were able to extinguish the fire quickly, all works to extinguish and cool the aircraft were finished about 94 minutes after the onset of fire.

Seven people including passengers, Egyptair personnell and fire fighters suffered from mild asphyxia caused by smoke inhalation and were transferred to hospitals.

The aircraft received substantial damage including extensive fire and smoke damage to the cockpit, two holes were burned through the external aircraft skin at the right hand side of the cockpit, smoke damage occurred throughout the aircraft, heat damage was found on overhead structures aft of the cockpit, isolated areas of heat damage were in the electronic bay below the flight deck where molten metal had dripped down from the flight deck.

The passenger jetway suffered some damage as well including windows were broken due to heat damage, two jacks controlling the canopy at the front were bent due to heat, separation of the canopy, damage to the machine controlling the bridge entrance door due to rushed entry of fire fighters, cracks in the glass of the operator cabin. The jetway was repaired and resumed service on Aug 2nd 2011.

The EAAICD analysed that all actions by the flight crew were prompt and timely, the decision process was efficient and timely. Cabin crew deplaned the passengers efficiently and timely and thus highly contributed to the safety of passengers and crew. Ground crew acted prompt and efficiently after detecting the fire, too.

The aircraft showed no defects that could have contributed to the accident.

The investigation determined there were no fuel, hydraulic or oil lines near the cockpit area where the fire started. The investigation thus focussed on the crew oxygen system reasoning that the speed of the fire development required an accelerant.

The system's stainless steel supply tubes were found without any leakages, the stainless steel spring showed no evidence of arcing/electrical short circuit however most of the wiring was missing near the supply tube with evidence of melting.

The aircraft was found to differ from Boeing's design in that a clamp supporting the first officer's wiring to the oxygen mask light panel was missing. The wiring was not sleeved and a large loop of unsupported wire was found. The investigation determined that about 280 aircraft including all of Egyptair's Boeing 777s were delivered that way.

The flexible oxygen mask hoses were tested for conductivity, some of which were found not conductive with others found conductive.

It was found: "contact between aircraft wiring and oxygen system components may be possible if multiple wire clamps are missing or fractured or if wires are incorrectly installed."

A laboratory analysis concluded: "A short circuit from electrical wiring, which is supposed to be in contact with or routed near the stainless steel oxygen supply tubing, would be the most likely source to provide electrical energy to the spring. It is supposed that the stainless steel spring had been subjected to high energy level, which heated the internal spring until it became an ignition energy source, causing the flexible oxygen hose to ignite and sustain a fire. The time to failure, may took few seconds depending on the amount of energy supplied to the internal spring."

A similiar occurrence, also referenced by the EAAICD, had occurred on a Boeing 767-200 in San Francisco, see Accident: ABX Air Cargo B762 at San Francisco on Jun 28th 2008, on fire while parked, no arson. The EAAICD stated however that the construction of the flight crew flexible oxygen mask hoses of the B762 and B772 differed to an extent that no parallels could be drawn.

Cockpit damage (Photo: EAAICD):


Holes burnt through external skin (Photo: EAAICD):


Smoke damage in cabin (Photo: EAAICD):


Heat and smoke damage in galley (Photo: EAAICD):


By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Jul 29th 2011 21:17Z, last updated Saturday, Jul 30th 2011 20:46Z

An Egyptair Boeing 777-200, registration SU-GBP performing flight MS-667 from Cairo (Egypt) to Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) with 291 passengers, was preparing for departure at gate F7 with the passengers already boarded when a fire erupted in the cockpit causing smoke to also enter the cabin. The crew initiated an emergency evacuation. 5 occupants received minor injuries in the evacuations. Emergency services responded and put the fire out. 2 fire fighters were taken to a hospital for smoke inhalation. The aircraft received substantial damage, the fire burned through the right hand side of the cockpit leaving a hole of about the size of the first officer's side window in the fuselage just below that window.

A replacement Boeing 777-200 registration SU-GBR reached Jeddah with a delay of 4.5 hours.

[captplaystation]

I wonder if this highlighted section from the above report may include the subject aircraft


The aircraft was found to differ from Boeing's design in that a clamp supporting the first officer's wiring to the oxygen mask light panel was missing. The wiring was not sleeved and a large loop of unsupported wire was found. The investigation determined that about 280 aircraft including all of Egyptair's Boeing 777s were delivered that way.




Just remind me, are Boeings built in China ? or the YOU ess of A ? or possibly, in the latter, by the former ?

[DozyWannabe]

ok, Last I knew, oxygen itself is not flammable. so, an O2 line cannot ignite. Oxygen supports combustion, but itself is not flammable.

What you say is scientifically correct, but because oxygen is essentially the Ur-oxidising agent, if anything in an oxygen-rich environment can burn it *will* burn much more fiercely than it would otherwise (case in point - the Velcro in the Apollo 1 Command Module).

[Machinbird]

The Man From Lox explains in graphic terms the problems with an oxygen rich environment. (Hole in O2 line situation is one version of this) If you have never seen the movie, this will expand your horizons.
Man From LOX - YouTube (http://youtu.be/Q9sIT6P_05I)