BA245 - Insufficient fuel to divert

[FLR-PSA]

A British Airways Boeing 777-200, registration G-YMMU performing flight BA-245 (dep Aug 30th) from London Heathrow,EN (UK) to Buenos Aires Ezeiza,BA (Argentina), was on approach to Buenos Aires at about 07:30L (10:30Z), but could not continue for a landing due to weather conditions being below minima and entered a hold at 5000 feet. After about 25 minutes in the hold the crew declared "Mayday, we have insufficient fuel to divert!" The aircraft landed safely on Ezeiza Airport's runway 11 at 08:07L (11:07Z) about 12 minutes later.
News: Fog in Buenos Aires on Aug 31st 2012, British Airways B772 has insufficient fuel to divert and other fuel emergencies (http://avherald.com/h?article=4555e531&opt=0)

Another two flights also had fuel issues and made it down safely.

[WHYEYEMAN]

This situation sounds significantly different. To be fair to Ryanair for a change, the Valencia emergencies were declared AFTER a significant amount of holding AND a diversion across half of Spain.
Perhaps the CAT 1 alternate was not CAT 1 as advertised and it wasn't worth diverting to.
Whatever the events leading up to this situation, you have to play the cards you have in your hand at the time. If getting on the ground means declaring a mayday and landing below minimums then so be it.
Job done. Everyone safe.

[captjns]

Air France and American Airlines too:eek:.

News: Fog in Buenos Aires on Aug 31st 2012, British Airways B772 has insufficient fuel to divert and other fuel emergencies (http://avherald.com/h?article=4555e531&opt=256)

[Noxegon]

Presumably there's not a massive amount of scope for carrying extra fuel on LHR to EZE; it has to be fairly close to the maximum range of a B772, no...?

[wiggy]

it has to be fairly close to the maximum range of a B772,

It's getting there but you've still usually got a little wriggle room, and there may be the option to trade payload for fuel if the bad weather is forecast and you know you may need the gas ( the only "close" in alternate for a 777 would be Montevideo - which shares EZE's weather. Failing that you're looking at alternates a significant distance away).

Whatever the alternate when making the fuel decision in London you're working on a forecast that will be well over 12 hours old by the time you get to EZE, and there's also the problem of the quality of the forecast.....and that's a problem not just confined to EZE.

[haughtney1]

Wiggy, are the BA triples satcom enabled? is there any provision to get the latest metars enroute? or how about the flightwatch function back at mission control? just wondering....having been in similar circumstances I wonder if the crew were backed into a corner of sorts?

[DOVES]

Noxegon
Presumably there's not a massive amount of scope for carrying extra fuel on LHR to EZE; it has to be fairly close to the maximum range of a B772, no...?


wiggy
Quote:
it has to be fairly close to the maximum range of a B772,
It's getting there but you've still usually got a little wriggle room, and there may be the option to trade payload for fuel if the bad weather is forecast and you know you may need the gas ( the only "close" in alternate for a 777 would be Montevideo - which shares EZE's weather. Failing that you're looking at alternates a significant distance away).

Whatever the alternate when making the fuel decision in London you're working on a forecast that will be well over 12 hours old by the time you get to EZE, and there's also the problem of the quality of the forecast.....and that's a problem not just confined to EZE.


Those are the reasons why flying from FCO to EZE with the MD11, many moons ago, when I saw that he burn off became more than expected (and we know that in certain seasons the headwind is very strong in those region) and/or the destination=alternate weather worsened next to the minima, I made more than once an intermediate stop at GIG to refuel.

[BOAC]

Before this thread runs to 100's of pages of speculation, we need more FACTS. The crew may well have said "MAYDAY we do not have enough fuel to divert" but it is certainly not in the BA book of words and I cannot see why it would have been said and thus I believe the reporting is (as always?) inaccurate.

MAYDAY is only required (as with Ryanair) when you EXPECT TO LAND with less than reserves and has nothing to do with diversion fuel. In this situation I guess a PAN would have been an option, or some other form of 'advice' to ATC that they were now 'committed' to the field.

As to why they APPEAR to have 'committed' to an airfield that did not APPEAR to meet the EUOPS rules for such we will have to wait and see.

[ETOPS]

Wiggy, are the BA triples satcom enabled? is there any provision to get the latest metars enroute?

Yes, crews routinely use ACARS to update the weather picture. What is being allluded to here (and at GRU) is that the info obtained often bears no relation to the "ground truth" when you arrive.

[B737NG]

One FACT is that economical pressure increases, ammount of extra fuel carried decreases. Flight planning is more accurate the last decade.

FICTION is that environmental forcecasts are always predictable, they aren´t.

There are and will be day´s where my guts feeling tells me to take another zip out of the hose to have something at the other end. It paid off most of the time. In some cases to have the Supersavers going ahead as they where so short you can hear the tension in the voice on the radio, for what reason?

It takes balls and bones to sustain the Beancounters, we are sure not wasters in our profession. The guys who are next generation managers are not the same breed anymore. They jump ship tomorrow for a better candy..... Loyalty to themselves and nothing more.

[Dave Gittins]

A question.

If EZE was below minima for a BA 777 and they'd been going round the hold (presumably in the expectation of an improvement) for 25 minutes; what happened to allow them to land 12 minutes later ?

Was there an improvement ? what would have happened if the weather had got worse ?

[BOAC]

Have you looked at the actuals on the link?what would have happened if the weather had got worse - well, what would you have done?

[Dave Gittins]

Yes ... the METAR immediately before they landed was 175FG .... and it was 1100FG a half hour after they landed. it seemed that 200FG had been the thing driving it below minima which is what my tiny PPL brain is pondering over.

Nobody else landed for another 20 mins which tells me that the improvement was pretty sudden about 11.20 Z and the it was still below or close to minima when the BA landed.

This is more confused because an AF was happy to land CATIII at about 10.30 Z but told it was below minima.

Why AA came in as an emergency at 11.49Z after things were starting to get back to normal isn't explained.

What would I have done ? suffered the same dilema of an approach ban, holding time getting shorter but a forecast for rapid improvement.

[Tay Cough]

In this situation I guess a PAN would have been an option...

I wouldn't bet the farm on anything other than "Mayday" working in that part of the world.

[KOLDO]

Gentlemen,
Sorry to speak about the many unknowns, but let's admit the fact.

Emergency because low on fuel, so...."command A, B, C, D", and all you have to land, otherwise, say good bye. :=

Nothing else they could do, I guess. Once inside the trap, try the best you can.
What about the old re-dispatch practice? You guys think would work here in this scenario? Just asking. ;)

Thanks.

[Wellington Bomber]

I can not believe the BA guy, did not divert straight away, going round in circles just hoping the weather improves and then declaring he did not have enough fuel to divert, he should be arrested for endangering peoples lives, he had how long from London to Buenos Aires to have come up with a plan just in case this happens.

probably more interested in Lobster or Beef for dinner!

How many airports did he pass which were OK weather wise before reaching Buenos Aires?

2 things going to kill you cumulus granitas and fuel, how many stories recently have we heard.

Dont blame Commercial pressures, you sign the bloody tech log and fuel receipts, you have a duty of care for every passenger on board, that takes precedence over every thing, commercial not happy, you go fly the plane

[NordicMan]

I agree with you Wellington. Why did they hang around for so long burning all
the fuel?

[farsouth]

I can not believe the BA guy, did not divert straight away..........

Looking at the TAFs/METARs for Montevideo in the same period, I see that it had very similar weather (as would be expected), but both airports had actuals that deteriorated to significantly worse than their quite acceptable forecasts (as far as I can see). I do not know if Montevideo was his alternate - I do not know all the details of the case, as I suspect you also do not - but I would not be so quick to judge without full knowledge of all the facts. - Maybe he did not divert because his (originally fully acceptable) alternate had also deteriorated below minimums........

[TDK mk2]

I see the skygods have arrived to condemn the crew and tell us how they would never have allowed it to happen. Guess it's easy to do that when you're retired - or fly a computer.

[NordicMan]

I did not mean to condemn the crew and don't have the facts either. Would be
interesting to see what the wx was at the alternate.

[747-436]

What was the weather forecast in the hours beforehand? Maybe the weather was not accuratly forecast, hence the situation that occured.

[farsouth]

What was the weather forecast in the hours beforehand?

Look at the link in the first post of this thread. The worst in the forecast was Prob 40 Tempo 600 metres in shallow fog, the actual was as bad as 100 metres met vis, 200 metres RVR. Montevideo had a similar discrepancy between TAF and Actual.

[Callsign Kilo]

No one knows the variables besides the two up front, their fleet manager and a few other 'need to know' bods in BA. The same can be said about the Ryanair incident in MAD last month. People should learn not to judge on things that aren't as clear cut as they may initially think. I doubt this is a clear cut incident, much like the FR guys who diverted to VLC.

Think before you judge, for the sake of the crew. Put yourself in their shoes. How would you feel if an incident like this involved you and shortly afterwards you had to listen to others being so high and mighty over your actions. It would be bloody annoying wouldn't it?

[FullWings]

I wouldn't say this was "normal" but it is not an unheard of scenario:

You set off with a destination and alternate, both forecasting weather well above minima. When you get close, i.e. commit yourself to landing at one or the other, the weather at *both* goes out of limits.

What to do? Well, you could go off to your alternate, if it looked like it might clear or stay with the destination. If you're at the destination anyway, you get to use your diversion fuel for extra holding, so a better chance of getting in than *having* to make an approach shortly after you reach the alternate.

In the end, if it's low vis., you declare an emergency and land anyway. If there's an ILS, chances are it will work fine, especially if it's CATII or better. The aeroplane doesn't know what the RVR is, so will behave as normal. File the paperwork and carry on.

You don't plan to do this but circumstances sometimes conspire and it's better than flying around in circles and running out of fuel...

[Sir George Cayley]

If your alternate is at max range for a divert and the forecast indicates a chance both might be below limits, is that a reason to load more fuel and offload cargo or pax to compensate?

Could island reserves be one way of helping to ensure adequate room for manoeuvre?

[MungoP]

Anyone who has flown professionally for any number of years knows that circumstances sometimes will lead you to a very uncomfortable position.. the smallest, seemingly insignificant decisions made many hours before are back to haunt you...
How about recognizing the courage of the crew in not hesitating to declare an emergency, to get their plane and passengers safely out of harms way. When they made that decision they fully understood the ramifications.. how many might have tried to avoid doing that and held on just a bit too long.. I suspect not a few. Well done guys.. I hope that it all comes out in your favour.

[bubbers44]

I had min fuel to go to destination and a close in alternate at Barranquilla, colombia. Both were closed because of weather so diverted to Panama City with no com with company because HF didn't work. We landed fine with plenty of fuel but company was concerned. We didn't descend so still had 45 minutes at destination. Sometimes you have to do what you have to do. Screw SOP's.

[Wirbelsturm]

For the benefit of the masses of armchair pilots who have never been to EZE, the airfield lies on very flat ground to the south of the airfield on the rivers, rather massive, flood plain.

The biggest problem with EZE is that the wetlands surrounding the airfield in winter cough up very patchy but very dense fog patches. Many times these won't appear in the TAF/METAR/ATIS but, especially with a southerly wind, they will drift over the airfield with alarming regularity! Given the same southerly wind Montevideo is also suffers from the same problem off the river. Honestly, you are just plain unlucky if you get one sometimes. It seems that has been the problem here.

The fuel decisions would have been made 14-15 hours previously based on TAF's that we all know have to be interpreted. CAT IIIa with 200 meters is promulgated and the weather is acceptable, CAT II is available and adequate at 600m in BCFG. The crew (4 of them) would have made a decision to commit and then declared a mayday due to potentially landing below reserve fuel after an adequate expected 25 minute holding pattern on a long range flight. Thus allowing them to perhaps leap frog aircraft that have a greater holding capacity due to shorter routings.

Perfectly acceptable to me.

[wiggy]

If you as a professional aviator know this, why did the crew not?

Because it's Longhaul, and as a result perhaps no-one in the crew had been to EZE before, perhaps did not share Wirbelsturm's local knowledge, and therefore were relying on the TAF.

Perhaps the more important question is why didn't the MET forecast reflect this local "quirk".

[Sygyzy]

I thought that you were sleeping. Your normal BA bashing took a little longer to surface than usual. Don't let good argument from W get in the way.

It would be interesting to know if you've ever flown anywhere that the simple expedient of picking up the phone to enquire about the weather wasn't the norm.

There there, time to go back under your rock.

[Wirbelsturm]

TAF SAEZ 302200Z 3100/3124 08005KT 8000 SCT020 BKN050
TX21/3118Z TN10/3109Z
BECMG 3103/3106 VRB03KT 4000 BR SCT010
PROB30 TEMPO 3108/3111 0900 BCFG SCT008
BECMG 3113/3116 35006KT 9999 SCT030=


This would have been the TAF at take off (not briefing) Landing time is about 11:00 UTC (13 hour flight)

Remember that LHR CAT I required vis is 550m and the TAF is giving patches of fog (as explained previously) in a slowly strengthening northerly wind of 900m I can't remember off the top of my head what the CAT I rvr is but 900m ain't too bad. Prob 30 does NOT have to be taken into account for the purposes of fuel planning but judging from the fact they could hold for 25 minutes they certainly did take it into account. LH, long range often does not have the luxury of hours of holding fuel purely due to max take off weight limitations.

TAF SAEZ 301600Z 3018/3118 35005KT 9999 SCT030 SCT040
TX22/3118Z TN12/3110Z
BECMG 3101/3103 VRB02KT 9999 SCT040
TEMPO 3107/3111 3000 BR SCT025
PROB30 3108/3111 0900 BCFG SCT010
BECMG 3111/3113 9999 SCT040
BECMG 3116/3118 36005KT=


This would have been the TAF used for briefing. Again, Prob 30 900m in fog patches, improving. Not a problem. The aircraft would have been loaded to max t/o weight I'm assuming and the max available fuel loaded as well. I've flown this route several times and there is often no/little available weight for fuel (1 or 2 tonnes=20 minutes less the burn needed to cart it to Argentina = 10 minutes extra!)

Both of these TAF's show that the forecast was inaccurate/inadequate and the crew based their fuel decision on a forecast that showed and acceptable weather pattern at arrival.

25 minutes holding after a max range flight was pretty good and definately showed that they had loaded contingency to the max, all IMHO of course.

These guys were just plain unlucky that the fog stirred up unexpectedly (see the forecasts) to 100m or so at the time they were there!

[clarityinthemurk]

Summary:

BA does this - GOOOD
Ryanair does this - BAAAD

[FullWings]

If you as a professional aviator know this, why did the crew not?
I'd have thought the crew were well aware of the possibility of fog but their destination had CAT III runways with an RVR limit of 200m, with a probability of 600m at the worst on the forecast. The RVR appears to have dipped to 175m for a short period around their arrival time, coincident with Montevideo going below limits as a CAT I alternate (with a similarly benign forecast).

The BA245 has a block time of 13h40m, according to the timetable, so would have been pretty heavy for a full load down to EZE. Due to the sector length, to get a certain amount of extra fuel at destination would require loading considerably more out of London, possibly compromising the commercial payload.

Occasionally, despite the best planning, things don't quite go the way you'd like them to. All aviation proceeds on a balance of probabilities, so every-now-and-then, you get a five-sigma event or something like that. If 10% of flights were declaring emergencies and landing out of limits, then it would be raising eyebrows, certainly at the regulatory level. Once in several decades of daily operation is interesting but not really significant.

175m RVR on a CAT IIIa would be virtually indistinguishable from 200m, just that the limit is set at 200m. It's not like descending to 4,000' when the terrain is at 4,100' ahead of you. I'd hazard a guess that they probably had the required visual reference (which isn't much) at 50R, anyway. If the RVR had been 200m during the approach, then had deteriorated to 175m below 1,000', they would legally have been able to land, given they got the above reference and there would have been no sensationalist discussion. The difference was that due to legacy rules there was an approach ban in force...

[Wirbelsturm]

BA does this - GOOOD
Ryanair does this - BAAAD

5 flights, all with up to date forecasts and the ability to gain an actual throughout the flight, Short Haul, all with the ability to carry adequate diversion fuel to just about anywhere in Europe but not being given the 'authority' based upon fears of management pressure due to fuel league tables = BAD decision (from the company).

1 LH flight, no company restrictions on loaded fuel, just a minor niggle of max operating aircraft limits, 13+ hours at max endurance to an airfield the other side of the world with an acceptable TAF both for the destination and the diversion resulting in a declared fuel Mayday due to the weather forecast being inadequate/inaccurate? = GOOD decision (by the crew).

IMHO of course!

[JW411]

When we all became part of JAA (soon to become EASA) I became aware at the usual time of "God the sun is just coming up" of BA aircraft coming off the Pond stating to London ATC that "they were committing to LHR".

It took me a while to figure this out.

As a dinosaur, I had enough fuel to get me to my destination, miss the approach and then divert to my alternate where I would still have 30 minutes of emergency fuel in my tanks.

So, under JARs, BA discovered that they could "commit" to LHR on the basis that two runways were available and continue without having enough fuel to divert to even Birmingham.

I would NEVER EVER have gone down that road. Nor did I when the rules changed.

So now it has come to bite them in the arse.

For British Airways to arrive at destination and announce that they do not have enough fuel to divert is, quite frankly, horrific.

At least the FR aircraft that (quite rightly) declared a Mayday to land at their diversion airfield had already been to their destination (Madrid) and had diverted.

This bunch of comedians would appear to have declared a Mayday before they even tried to divert because they couldn't?

[Super Stall]

JW411

What complete and utter nonsense!!

You seem to have picked up 'fag ends' of a conversation, made huge assumptions and come up with a complete pile of drivel. :=

I think we can all see where the comedian is. :ugh:

[JW411]

Oh please tell me that BA can never do anything wrong.

I would be so grateful.

[Shaka Zulu]

Sure they can JW411. Unfortunately you are just talking :mad: wrt our flight planning rules.

[Wellington Bomber]

TDK m2

I hope you dont mean me, in the retired or computer nerd category, current airline captain if you must know, so pipe down.

Nobody has answered the question, in 13 hours they did not get a suitable alternate, they just ploughed on with what they planned 13 hours ago and probably planned the alternate with a prob40 tempo. Big mistake 99 times out of 100 they get lucky and it never appears. As somebody said they may disregard prob tempos, to me if it appears on paper whatever the chances, somebody far brighter than me who studied meteorology thinks it may happen, good enough for me, find somewhere else.

JW, completely agree with you

Somebody told me it is better to make a mistake, and then change than make no decision at all, which is what happened here

[Hand Solo]

I'll dignify it with a response.

It took me a while to figure this out.

No surprises there, you've never read the BA Ops manual.

As a dinosaur, I had enough fuel to get me to my destination, miss the approach and then divert to my alternate where I would still have 30 minutes of emergency fuel in my tanks.

As is standard BA policy.

So, under JARs, BA discovered that they could "commit" to LHR on the basis that two runways were available and continue without having enough fuel to divert to even Birmingham.

As can other JAR airlines, but only on the basis of 'landing assured', a known delay and landing with reserves. There's bugger all difference between diverting from LHR and arriving at BHX with reserves and leaving the BNN hold and landing at one of LHRs two runways with reserves bar you've got more options at one of those airfields if a runway closes.

I would NEVER EVER have gone down that road. Nor did I when the rules changed.

Your choice. Nobodys forced to do it in BA either but statistically it works.

So now it has come to bite them in the arse.

Errm no it hasn't. This took place at EZE, not LHR.

For British Airways to arrive at destination and announce that they do not have enough fuel to divert is, quite frankly, horrific.

Hyperbole alert. No it's not horrific at all, not even close. You find me an aviator who hasn't, with the best will in the world, found themselves facing unforecast bad weather and a reducing number of options and I'll show you someone who hasn't flown much. None of the aircraft at EZE that day were going to run out of fuel. They may have had to autoland below limits. Being a drama queen about it adds nothing to the debate.

At least the FR aircraft that (quite rightly) declared a Mayday to land at their diversion airfield had already been to their destination (Madrid) and had diverted.

But they still had to declare a Mayday and so were in no better position than the BA aircraft.

This bunch of comedians would appear to have declared a Mayday before they even tried to divert because they couldn't?

I agree with Super Stall.

Wellington - have you ever flown in South America? Between GIG and GRU is about three and a half hours flight time with perhaps two or three suitable airfields for a 777. Are you seriously suggesting the crew drop into one of those airfields to uplift extra fuel on the basis that there might be FG at EZE thats much worse than the forecast?

[wiggy]

When we all became part of JAA (soon to become EASA) I became aware at the usual time of "God the sun is just coming up" of BA aircraft coming off the Pond stating to London ATC that "they were committing to LHR".



Well just my twopence worth but in my decades off coming off the pond I have never ever heard any calls from a BA aircraft saying any such thing - and given all the options between the eastern edge of "the pond" and LHR there would be no reason "to commit", as you put it.

[Wirbelsturm]

I'm with Wiggy,

Never 'committed' to anything until the donks have been switched off on stand. The options are always open until they're not. Obviously everyone else has a far better knowledge of the SOP's, fuel planning and diversion criteria than I do. :ugh:

At no point on the forecasts did the met ever go below that required to conduct a successful approach. The met bone chuckers screwed it up. Local effects added to the woes and other airlines got bitten as well. Welcome to EZE. Without Montevideo it is effectively an 'island' destination without the ability to carry 'Island' fuel.

[farsouth]

Wellington, you say ........probably planned the alternate with a prob40 tempo. Big mistake 99 times out of 100 they get lucky and it never appears

But what seems to have happened is that while the Prob40 tempo was quite acceptable, the actual conditions deteriorated to worse than the worst part of the forecast. Are we supposed to second guess the forecasters, who are forecasting an area that they (supposedly) know much better than us???

[beerdrinker]

JW 411

Age 71. So 33 years ago (1979) you were 38. Was it in 1979 that you left the Military and applied to and were turned down by BA?

I agree with Wiggy, in 34 years of Atlantic crossings I NEVER heard a BA aircraft "committing" to LHR as they exited NAT airspace.

[willl05]

Did they never get an updated forecast while en route?

[farsouth]

Did they never get an updated forecast while en route?

The sequence of forecasts that would have been available while en-route as posted in the link in the first post of this thread ALL indicated a forecast of acceptable weather. The deterioration in the destination actuals may have occurred while the alternate actuals were still good - maybe it was a case of once in a very long while all the cards falling against them despite following all the rules and normal "best practice"

[draglift]

Wellington Bomber

Have you considered the possibility that they were continually getting updated weathers and that at top of descent the alternate weather deteriorated to well below what was forecast followed shortly after by a deterioration of destination weather?

Sometimes committing to destination is better than using up fuel diverting to a less suitable alternate. It sounds like in the situation under discussion both alternate and destination went out in quick succession contrary to worst forecast and after prolonged holding some priority was needed.

[fantom]

Age 71. So 33 years ago (1979) you were 38. Was it in 1979 that you left the Military and applied to and were turned down by BA?

I agree with Wiggy, in 34 years of Atlantic crossings

Beerdrinker, my goodness. 34 years of crossings. You must be an interesting person.

What? No Mil? Were you turned down by the Mil? No flying fighters and dropping deadly weapons serving your Queen? No comraderie, only bid-line and seniority list.

Did you apply for Service and were turned down or, did you just not apply?

Answers on a postcard.

[CargoOne]

Read all opinions.
Now solutions - why don't EZE upgrade to CAT IIIb and stop this PPRUNE nonsense?

[misd-agin]

Geez, seems like 3 experienced crews came to the similar decision. BA, AF, and AA. So do all the pilots from the U.K., France, and the U.S. stink or did it just happen that this day 3 lousy Captains with 6 wimpy FO's all happened to arrive at the same place at the same time? Or did circumstances have three different crews, from three different airlines, cultures, and countries, all came to a conclusion that the situation required? I don't know and neither do any of the posters.

Years ago landing in C. Amercia with two alternates(near and distant) due to bad weather. Fair amount of deviatating towards end of cruise and during descent due to weather(more than forecast/expected). On final to destination and it's being hit by a thunderstorm. Nearby alternate also has thunderstorm. Figured out gas to distant alternate, anticipated overburn for deviating, and diverting to the distant alternate, which has no nearby backup field, would be close to an emergency right now. It would be a committment with little room for error. It's decision time. Ask FE then FO what they think? They come up with what I thought was best - take all the gas for the distant alternate and hold between the destination and primary alternate. Probably have 2 hrs worth of holding gas now. Hold about 20 minutes, storm blows out, and we land with lots of gas.

If you only have to make tough decisions every 20 yrs you're lucky.

[cessnapete]

No money!!

[finncapt]

It's threads like this that make me pleased I retired in 2001.

I'm surprised with some of the replies from people who have actually flown large airplanes and who criticise from their retired armchairs with 20/20 hindsight.

I always made decisions, and yes I have declared a fuel mayday in the past (at my alternate which was cavok - how many countries don't use Pan?), on the basis they were mine and not subject to scrutiny on public fora.

Perhaps I was too busy doing the job to read Pprune - oh hang on a minute the internet was still in the dial up era then and you had to think about the cost before you replied!!!

[Wellington Bomber]

I would much rather stop en-route for a splash and dash than have my sphincter twitching overhead a beacon, put it that way

[angels]

And very nicely put too, if I may say so Mr Wimpey!

[airseb]

As usual the news don't know what they're talking about... That's a given.

Anyway, having been to EZE quite frequently these last summers, with a 777, I can confirm that you never get the weather that's forecast. And I mean never.
It's always either fog that was never forecast or tailwinds on the approach (like 20 knots at 200 feet).
Plus Montevideo is always worse (last time the metar said 50 FG) and often doesn't have a valid TAF.

I always insist, but being only a simple FO, I end up with someone else's fuel figures (which are thankfully mostly reasonable).

These transcontinental flights usually arrive at dawn ( the best time for fog...) with long stretches of flight where the wind data is often unprecise. I've already had a 1.5 ton difference on arrival due to winds aloft not being accurate.

Oh and a last detail. In EZE they don't think it a problem to be CAT 2 capable without saying it on NOTAMS or the ATIS (which is broken anyway).

But the wine and the beef are great and it beats flying to ITCZ africa.

[bubbers44]

23,000 hrs, 18,000 with airlines have never landed without required 45 minutes minimum fuel. Dispatch has asked me to hold longer because SEA is improving so I call SEA and they are still below minimums so tell dispatch we are going to Portland. They said we will have to use buses. I said call them and went to Portland.

I was a junior captain then so guess they thought they could save the company some money. Guess what, I am the first airliner into Portland and soon the whole airport is full of them but we have a gate. Don't ever let dispatch let you not use good judgement. You are the captain.

I was planning fuel on a SEA approach, missed approach, and landing at Portland with 45 minutes fuel and we had only 5 minutes to start that. Don't let them suck you in as they tried to do me, just say no.

[wiggy]

I would much rather stop en-route for a splash and dash than have my sphincter twitching overhead a beacon, put it that way

OK can I ask given the route where do you suggest this splash and go is performed? GIG/GRU are the obvious candidates but given the limiting weights on the 777-200 it's not impossible you'd be abeam or even south of GIG before you're down to Max landing weight (unless you're going to dump fuel :mad:....)

[JW411]

beerdrinker:

I don't really know why I am dignifying you with a reply but, just to put the record straight, the only time I applied to join BA it was actually BOAC. The year was 1959 and Hamble was on the horizon. We were told that we would probably have to wait a year which is a lifetime when you are 18.

I joined the RAF instead and had a wonderful 18 years. I never did a ground tour and I reckon I had a lot more fun.

Joining BA at the age of 38 was a daft idea (at least for me).

Nevertheless, thank you for your kind thoughts.

[draglift]

I would much rather stop en-route for a splash and dash than have my sphincter twitching overhead a beacon, put it that way


I agree that sounds a great idea if weather is bad at destination. However if weather at destination and alternate is good and forecast to remain that way anybody who decides to land en route for a splash and dash probably would not remain employed for very long.

I'm off to the Far East later this month. You can sometimes get unforecast bad weather out there. If the weather is looking pretty good shall I land en route and get some more fuel just in case?

[bubbers44]

You have to do what you have to do. Just never let your flight run out of fuel. It isn't that hard to do, just land with at least minimum fuel at your alternate.

[Admiral346]

1 LH flight, no company restrictions on loaded fuel, just a minor niggle of max operating aircraft limits, 13+ hours at max endurance to an airfield the other side of the world with an acceptable TAF both for the destination and the diversion resulting in a declared fuel Mayday due to the weather forecast being inadequate/inaccurate? = GOOD decision (by the crew).


No,

a fishy TAF on the other end of the world, and only 10 min Poss Extra, and taking it, is a really bad decision.

It is the decision of taking the wishfully thought up flightplan from a profit maximising company.
How about leaving some cargo behind? Might that not give you some time (=fuel) to find a better solution down there?

And, your analysis of the weather phenomena at EZE is quite correct - so why leave FRA with only 10 min extra?

You knew better...

[bubbers44]

Of course landing at minimum fuel at the alternate decisions have to be made before descent in case the alternate also goes down as I said in a previous post landing in Colombia ending up in another country. Having minimum fuel at an airport with an NDB approach as an alternate with below minimums wx doesn't get it. Go someplace that is safe.

[Wirbelsturm]

No,

a fishy TAF on the other end of the world, and only 10 min Poss Extra, and taking it, is a really bad decision.

It is the decision of taking the wishfully thought up flightplan from a profit maximising company.
How about leaving some cargo behind? Might that not give you some time (=fuel) to find a better solution down there?

And, your analysis of the weather phenomena at EZE is quite correct - so why leave FRA with only 10 min extra?

You knew better...

Not really.

There was nothing in the forecast that necessitated offloading either passengers or cargo. The primary aim of any airline is to make profit. Both the briefed forecast and the later forecast for both destination and diversion had full acceptable limits for the CAT III approach with an improving picture and acceptable forecast time window limits for CAT II.

Where would be the justification for reducing revenue be? Certainly the 'splash and dash' option would have been an interesting sell to the management as a fuel dump would be required to achieve MLW into GIG!

The company wants the aircraft at a ton or so below max landing weight if it could. The fuel burn wouldn't allow for the carriage of large diversion fuel if the booked revenue load is carried. The difficulties of trailing a heavy 777 into South American airfields are enormous. Cordoba is too far away and Montevideo has the same weather. It's a brave decision to ditch payload based upon a possibility when statistical evidence shows that the chance of the posted event happening is extremely slim. Don't forget it's a daily service.

Start the approach, get and RVR of >200m and then don't ask/request/receive any below 1000' and the approach is fine. We are paid to make decisions and calculate risk. The decisions, in this case, were correct based upon the information presented to the crew (not me by the way). They were also correct for two other companies aircraft from two other continents. What they got when they got there was unforecast and thus, in respect to the local forecaster, unexpected.

We, as a company, operate to masses of airports around the globe and whilst the route information manual is good it doesn't contain every piece of local knowledge on the fleet otherwise it would be the size of the encyclopedia Brittanica. All pilots can't be expected to know the nuances of every airport as they may not have been there before therefore you brief and decide on what you know.

There was no fundamental error in any decisions made by the crew. They just had to deal with an uncomfortable situation when they got there brought about by inadequate met forecasting.

[Wellington Bomber]

Now I am not rated to cat3, only cat 2 but there are so many things that can screw up even a cat2. Namely weather limits, aircraft working properly and also the destinations equipment, somebody even mentioned about the reliability of EZE and not mentionining equipment out status.

But somebody was driven down a blind alley, and eventually it has come out.

You would not have a job if you did this, because management would not like it, so what. Easy sat flying a desk, its my arse up there not yours.

Somebody mentioned 3 other airlines made the same decision, Yes, but 1 at least was from a different part of the world and coming in a different direction. Just because they all made the same decision does not make it the right decision, and how many times Have I sat in the hold somewhere with upto 8 other aircraft,going round in circles for ages, when eventually somebody pipes up I am diverting, all of a sudden everybody does the same they just have not got the bottle to go first.

[Bengerman]

Admiral346,

It is the decision of taking the wishfully thought up flightplan from a profit maximising company.
How about leaving some cargo behind? Might that not give you some time (=fuel) to find a better solution down there?



That's a good idea.........or is it?

Just so that you have the right scenario, the purpose of an airline is, first and foremost, to make money for the shareholders.......now that may seem a radical idea in an industry where profits are something of a rarity, (even in a "profit maximising company") but that is the truth.

And as to leaving sme cargo behind, another top scheme! Why not leave it all behind and get lots more gas on, hey, lets dump some passengers too so that we can fill the tanks to bursting......great. Now we can land with fuel for diversion, hold for 2 hours and fly the trip at FL60, brilliant!

What do you mean? I'm unemployed? The airline's gone bust????

Get bloody real!!

[Admiral346]

I believe that the thinking of the CPTs obviously is drifting more and more towards the max profit scheme of the management, and that seems to be so at many airlines.

What does a forecast of prob30 tempo fog mean? It means that there might be fog or not. Now I have seen these forecasts turn towards the ugly many times, and I always carry fuel for an out then. Even at my homebase, and especially at the "I am not so sure" fields like EZE. During early spring/ late winter time close to a river.

And the "If you don't ask me no questions I'll tell you no lies" like the "what wind do you need?" in Italy is a trick to slip into a field, but it is not what I would like to base my fuel load on. You can make it work that way, but it is not the statistical 10 to the -8th power we are supposed to work with at LH.

I'd still leave some cargo and take fuel, as I have seen done during my time on the long haul flights as an FO.

So what Wirbelsturm described is legal, but it still looks like a gringo mistake to me. Just like the BA. Not intentionally miscalculated, but something that can easily be avoided by a set of balls.

[BOAC]

As said frequently here, many of our posters have no knowledge of airline ops or sometimes even of flying.

It appears that here, just like RY/MAD/VLC/MAYDAY- that the well-known 'Rule 1', sh!t happens' - well, happened.

No airline can operate successfully if, every trip, Captains are putting on 'extra fuel' in case the met man screws up and both dest and any alternates go 'out' or a LAN declares a Mayday ahead of you on diversion. Then of course, there is the 'unforeseen' emergency that I might have which would require another 20 minutes to run the QRH etc - better add that 'in case'?

As I said at the start, we do NOT know what happened in EZE - eg we have no met for alternates. I suspect that if BA's airfield brief does NOT contain this possibility it soon will.

[Admiral346]

Well, BOAC, then I better just shut up.

[FERetd]

Wirbelsturm Quote:- "The primary aim of any airline is to make profit."

You are right, of course.

Although most airlines quote "Safety" as being their number one priority.

Safety margins are being gradually eroded in the search for profit - FTLs for example.

[andrasz]

Safety margins are being gradually eroded in the search for profit ...

This sounds like a great headline, however if you look at the safety statistics, on the whole quite the contrary is happening. SOPs, technlogy, automation and safety audits have made aviation much safer since deregulation, despite all the financial pressures bought about by free for all competition. Safety and push for profits are actually complementary - as someone famously said "if you think prevention is expensive, try having an accident". Lower life forms like MOL know this very well - you can abuse your customers all you like as long as tickets are dirt cheap and safety is not compromised. You can bash FR for a number of reasons, but their safety stats are no worse than any other european mainline operator. You may be right in assuming that all management cares about is profits, but any half-competent airline management will know that nothing hurts profits more than a well publicised accident.

The bad news for the profession is that SOPs+automation+shorter training is actually cheaper and safer than 40+ years hand flying experience.

[Wirbelsturm]

Airlines AIM:

Maximise profitability and return for the investors.

Airlines Priority:

Safe,expedicious transport of paying public to their destination.

We aren't in this business for free and, like all businesses, there is an element of risk. If we had the managers making all the decisions instead of the Captains then the job would be paid alot less. One minor incident in thousands of perfectly normal, safe flights is not going to cause anyone with clout to bat an eyelid. To be honest calling a 'mayday' in South America, India, China etc. when you have a problem is a good way of getting the attention of ATC. Remember that you can always downgrade a Mayday, you just have to follow it up with the relevant paperwork.

I don't see any comeback from this incident apart from a minor update in the Rim, a line on the airfield brief and a rebrief of the EZE met services. The crews took the fuel and payload adequate to complete the flight within the strictures laid down by the companies fuel policy. 4 pilots agreed at the briefing that this fuel was acceptable. They took what extra they could on a full flight without sacrificing revenue, there is little margin for extra fuel on this flight apart from that needed for the destination diversion (acceptable weather at time of briefing). Unforecast weather deterioration screwed them over.

So what Wirbelsturm described is legal, but it still looks like a gringo mistake to me. Just like the BA. Not intentionally miscalculated, but something that can easily be avoided by a set of balls.


It's perfectly legal.

What 'gringo' mistake? The airfield was forecasting acceptable weather limits for both a CAT IIIa approach and a CAT II, possibly, for the landing block, a CAT I visual. The diversion at Montevideo was forecasting exactly the same.

Perhaps blaming the pilots from three companies for not 'epecting the unexpected' and not knowing the local weather effects could have been mitigated by the local weather forecasters, who live there for crying out loud, knowing their own area and acting accordingly on the TAF's.

I am certain (and I certainly would) that revenue payload would have been reduced if the TAF's had accurately reflected what the weather actually was. They didn't. The fuel decision can only be made on the information that the Captain and crew receives, not on if's, but's and maybes.

No 'balls' needed, our company managers stand by the Captains decision IF the situation warrents it. The only 'Gringo' mistake was from an inadequate forecaster who couldn't get a basic forecast right. Perhaps they should be the ones answering the questions?

As to the FTL's, time will tell but for the foreseeable future there will be no change to the crewing levels on our LH services. (EZE 4 crew 2 Capt, 2 Fo) after which I will, hopefully, be retired. :D

[BOAC]

Admiral - my post was not aimed at you, and yours in fact was not there when I composed mine, but having read your post......................

Let me test your 'knowledge' as a 'long-haul FO'

1) What is the met definition of fog?
2) What problems do you (regularly?) foresee at a CATIIIa field with a CATIIIa a/c with a prob30 Tempo 900m and CATI forecasts at dest and alt?
3) If this bothers you, have you thought of a different profession?
4) For the benefit of those of us who have the knowledge and experience, that we might perhaps learn more, what exactly do you consider was "the gringo mistake"?
5) How much extra (%) over FP do you regularly uplift 'in case' (or, of course, ask for as an FO)?

[DOVES]

wiggy
Quote:
I would much rather stop en-route for a splash and dash than have my sphincter twitching overhead a beacon, put it that way

OK can I ask given the route where do you suggest this splash and go is performed? GIG/GRU are the obvious candidates but given the limiting weights on the 777-200 it's not impossible you'd be abeam or even south of GIG before you're down to Max landing weight (unless you're going to dump fuel)

If over GIG you have not yet reached MLW why not to establish a decision point somewhere between GIG and EZE on which, based on consumption and weather conditions, to decide whether to continue to destination or to do the 'splash and go' back in GIG. We all know that the weather in Buenos Aires is similar if not the same as in the planned alternate Montevideo, and then when conditions become critical it’s as you have no alternate.
Just my two cents.

[Wirbelsturm]

Doves,

There was only one actual:

SAEZ 311030Z 00000KT 0100 R11/0175 FG FEW007 07/07 Q1017


that put the airfield out of limits for the planned approach. The surface actual prior was 200m for the CAT III approach and the actual after was:

SAEZ 311127Z 00000KT 0800 R11/1100N FG NSC 08/07 Q1018


1100m to the north of the field. After that the weather rapidly improved.

My point is that the weather was only out of limits for the planned approach for a very short window. It unfortunately happend to be the window that 3 LH aircraft arrived at possibly exacerbating the situation!

There doesn't seem to be a need to plot the PNR between GIG and EZE. Operationally it is an acceptable risk. EZE needs to get it's forecasting in gear.

[FERetd]

andraz Quote:- "The bad news for the profession is that SOPs+automation+shorter training is actually cheaper and safer than 40+ years hand flying experience."

Thirty two years (the last twenty with a Legacy carrier) and 16,000 hours as a Flight Engineer tends to make me stick by my statement.

So shorter training is safer? It is certainly cheaper! Shorter training tends to be aimed at getting students to pass the exams, not particularly to understand the topic. Computer Based Training - where you are on your own until an instructor arrives later in the day to see if you have any questions - if you can remember them.

And what about non fully type rated Second Officers? Are they safer? They are certainly cheaper!

You mention Safety Audits. We could discuss these forewarned exercises at length. I am an auditor. We could talk about the annual morning visits to the Operators by the Regulators. If the regulators were doing their job properly, my job would be a lot easier. (Note, not all Regulators).

As for your comments on automation you might want to discuss that with Air France. Automation is good, but so is 40 years of hand flying experience - which I note you do not have. This topic has been discussed at length in a previous forum.

And you make no mention of FTLs. I can tell you from experience that lip service is paid to circadian rythyms and adequate rest periods (e.g. "rest periods of between 12 hours and 30 hours should be avoided whenever possible.") Certainly the OMA states that these "should" be taken into account, but never "shall" be taken into account and seldom are.

Certainly, equipment has improved immensely, TCAS, GPWS, FMS etc. and engines are extremely reliable, all of which I agree has improved safety. But a lot of today's equipment is required to be fitted to aircraft and is reflected in the M.E.L. This cannot be manipulated by Management.

I do not think that 25 minute turn arounds are conducive to enhancing safety. One person doing the walk round and fuel while the other does the weather and flight plan does not make for good CRM, in my book. There should be more to it than "Fuel's on and weather's good". - I have seen it happen.

If you have not experienced any of the above in you career, count yourself lucky. It is only going to get worse.

[fmgc]

My goodness there is some crap talked about here and a lot of it by supposedly experienced pilots (retired or not).

Those of you that weren't there and think this crew screwed up just SHUT THE :mad: UP! YOU ARE IGNORANT PEASANTS!

Black & Brown, you really are a fool with your 250 hours A319 time and no idea of what a command decision is!!

[Yaw String]

Here here!!!

(from the back of the stalls, thus ducking the rotten tomatoes!)

[DOVES]

If we consider that:
1) Buenos Aires has multiple runways but not independent one each other,
2) The usually planned alternate: Montevideo is so close that the weather conditions are the same all over:
It can be said without fear of contradiction that EZE is an isolated aerodrome and so the following Articles shall apply:
Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.375
In-flight fuel management(b) In-flight fuel management.
(1) If, as a result of an in-flight fuel check, the expected fuel remaining on arrival at the destination is less than the required alternate fuel plus final reserve fuel, the commander must take into account the traffic and the operational conditions prevailing at the destination aerodrome, along the diversion route to an alternate aerodrome and at the destination alternate aerodrome, when deciding whether to proceed to the destination aerodrome or to divert, so as to land with not less than final reserve fuel.
(2) On a flight to an isolated aerodrome:
The last possible point of diversion to any available en-route alternate aerodrome shall be determined. Before reaching this point, the commander shall assess the fuel expected to remain overhead the isolated aerodrome, the weather conditions, and the traffic and operational conditions prevailing at the isolated aerodrome and at any of the en-route aerodromes before deciding whether to proceed to the isolated aerodrome or to divert to an en-route aerodrome.
(See AMC to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.375(b)(2))]
AMC to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.375(b)(2)
Flight to an isolated aerodrome
When approaching the last possible point of diversion to an available en-route aerodrome, unless the fuel expected to remain overhead the isolated aerodrome is at least equal to the Additional Fuel calculated as being required for the flight, or unless two separate runways are available at the isolated aerodrome and the expected weather conditions at that aerodrome comply with those specified for planning in JAR-OPS 1.297(b)(2) [...], the commander should not proceed to the isolated aerodrome. In such circumstances, the commander should instead proceed to the en-route alternate unless according to information he has at that time, such a diversion appears inadvisable.

[ETOPS]

I've just read our colleagues report on this which has been published internally. As I suspected, the "reporting" was wide of the mark and thus the majority of the discussions here equally flawed.

I would have handled this situation in an identical fashion and fully support the decisions this crew took on the day.

[BOAC]

I've just read our colleagues report on this which has been published internally. As I suspected, the "reporting" was wide of the mark and thus the majority of the discussions here equally flawed. - as predicted. We need also to remember that the same may well apply to the Ryanair MAD/VLC incidents. We just do not have the facts in both cases.

[Throb@30wCPDLC]

Thanks ETOPS, having spoken to one of the guys the following day I figured the facts would quickly surface and put an end to some of the cr@p spouted on here!
You had to be there!! (as they say)

[Wirbelsturm]

What a surprise, the company supports the correct decisions of the Commander and crew! Exactly as it should be as the decision made were completely correct.

Doves,

EZE cannot be considered as Island as the definition of Island is as follows and Montevideo can be considered an adequate aerodrome. Plus flight time to Cordoba is under 2 hours but giving approximately a 10 tonne fuel uplift which would drastically affect payload thus revenue. It is not at the whim of the Commander to decide on the day what constitues an Island aerodrome, that responsibility lies firmly with the Operator as stated below.

Island Aerodrome:


(JAR-OPS Part 1 (Commercial Air TransportationAeroplanes))

(1) Isolated Aerodrome: If there is no adequatedestination alternate aerodrome and diversion fuel plus final fuel representsmore than two hours at normal cruise consumption after arriving overhead thedestination aerodrome and if acceptable to theauthority, the operator can consider the destination aerodrome as an isolated aerodrome.

[DOVES]

Wirbelsturm
...Plus flight time to Cordoba is under 2 hours...
GIG too is almost 2 hour to EZE [but with much more fuel O.B. (and almost no **** in the fan)].
But mine was a... only some kind of a... "plan B" to maintain in the back of mind, just in case; next time. Take it or leave it.
It's your choose [perfectly legal BOACwise].

[Wirbelsturm]

But mine was a... only some kind of a... "plan B" to maintain in the back of mind, just in case; next time. Take it or leave it.

Always good to have a backup plan if needed! Sadly revenue doesn't always allow us the comfort. Although, on checking the other day, the Cordoba flight time is only about 44 minutes.

[bleed leak]

ETOPS etc,

Is there any likelyhood of this information / report getting into the public domain or is it purely and simply a company internal ASR?

I ask out of professional interest as have been fortunate enough to not quite get painted into what sounds like a similar corner myself not so long ago, (different operation being Short Haul but similar circumstances).

I'm assuming not which is a shame as 'there but for the grace of God etc'.

[DOVES]

Wirbelsturm
..Plus flight time to Cordoba is under 2 hours but giving approximately a 10 tonne fuel uplift which would drastically affect payload thus revenue…

Sorry: my fault. I understood that Cordoba is 2 hr flight time from EZE but you were citing regs.
By the way:
-Is Cordoba able to handle 777 (stairs, for instance, etc.)?
-Are there enough parkings? (You know that when... the ****... everybody go to the same place; and "First arrived: first served").

[SeenItAll]

As a statistician I would like to say, nothing in life is certain. No matter how much extra fuel is carried, there may always be some unfortunate set of circumstances that cause it to be not enough.

To decide what is "enough," one determines (in advance) what is the acceptable level of risk (which can never be zero), and plans according to that. (I assume that is what complex flight-planning programs are intended to do.) While in this case, the flight did not go as initially planned (i.e., ordinary arrival within minimums), it also did not end up as a smoking hole in the ground. Therefore, while the flight was in the small percent of all planned flights not arriving within minimums, it also was not within the far smaller accepted probability of being a crash.

Further, the ex post fact that the flight did not go as planned doesn't mean that the ex ante planning was wrong. Bad things can always happen after the ex ante planning is complete. One can only conclude that the ex ante planning was faulty if there is a statistically significant excess of actual bad results over what just bad luck would suggest.

So unless someone knows a clear flaw in ex ante the airline planning process, or the crew's execution of that process, you cannot conclude that just because the result was undesirable that there was any appropriate earlier action that should have been taken to prevent it.

[Hunter58]

No, complex (or simple) flight planning programs can only give a basis for decision. They cannot decide, nor can they value the information correctly. This is still a task for the dispatcher and the pilot, and for a quite long foreseeable time to come.

[BOAC]

I know ETOPS and have every reason to accept his post regarding the 'internal enquiry', but I must observe that if a 'supposed' Ryanair insider had said the same about the MAD/VLC events there would be a torrent of 'cover up'/'whitewash' posts. Surely to tease us here with 'its ok, trust me' is not right? We would all probably benefit from a little more, from which many could probably learn.eg for starters, what actually happened - what happened to the alternate weather? When did things go pear-shaped?

[ETOPS]

Sorry - too scared of the consequences to post any detail and I'm not going to respond to PM either.

Sad, isn't it?

[Stanley Eevil]

SAEZ 311127Z 00000KT 0800 R11/1100N FG NSC 08/07 Q1018
"1100m to the north of the field. After that the weather rapidly improved"



1100m to the `NORTH`???? Do you know how to decode METARs?

[Wirbelsturm]

Fair 'nuff,

Rwy 11 touchdown visibility 1100m increasing to unknown.

Military TAF's, many years ago, introduced a visibility to the N,S,E,W etc. to show potential problems at the airfield.

Just mixed up a bit with a previous life. :p

[Stanley Eevil]

"Increasing to unknown" ???

[Wirbelsturm]

"Increasing to unknown" ???

:zzz:

Minimum 1100, minimum recorded touchdown RVR. Thus, maximum, unknown, it depends on what definition you use. Go find something better to do. :ugh:

[Stanley Eevil]

N D or U after an RVR report on a METAR is basically showing the trend of the RVR over a period of time since the previous METAR(S):

D (Down) = Decreasing trend
U (up) = Increasing trend
N = No change

[Wirbelsturm]

Thanks for the lesson,

I'll put it with the rest of the nebulous rubbish such as NDV and dust devils. It's all in the decode book in the flight info supp, I just wrote it after a long US flight and a few beers. :8