Account of Sheffield attack by Radar Operator in Invincible

[Navaleye]

Interesting read that I had not seen before regarding the attack on Sheffield. I'm astonished that the FAAWC would choose to ignore reports from his own Ops team and that from Glasgow and supporting ESM. The full story is here with the relevant section below. Comments welcome.

The Falklands Conflict - Memoirs (http://www.falklandswar.org.uk/memoirs.htm#4)

The Day My Life Changed Forever

I was sitting at my display watching it go round when a contact appeared around 250 and at 180 miles, so I waited for the next sweep and there it was again. By this time my actions were routine, I logged it in to the computer and reported it as I'd done so many times before but this time the A.A.W.O (Anti Air Warfare Officer) who commanded the situation turned round and said there was nothing there. The next sweep of my radar came and there it was so I reported it again, now it was at 160 miles but the same thing happened again with the A.A.W. O contradicting me. Precious time was passing us by, we did not alert the fleet, we did not send planes, we did nothing. The next sweep of my radar and it was still there but now it was at 130 miles so I reported it again, this time the A.A.W.O became annoyed and told me I was chasing rabbits. By this time the contact had gone from my screens range to my mates, who was sitting next to me, his job was to track a contact from 128 miles down to 56 miles. He now reported that there was a contact at 120 miles and closing and the same thing happened. I changed my display down to the 128 mile range and to the 992 radar to watch it move closer.

The contact was now at 80 miles and closing. The radar kept on sweeping and the contact kept on coming, The radar swept again but this time there were two contacts. My mate did not get a chance to log the second contact in to the computer as it was only on our radar display for two sweeps when it disappeared under radar coverage, this indicated to us that we were dealing with an Exocet missile which was designed to skim above the waves but below radar coverage. These missiles have 2 functioning radars in the head, one facing down which keeps it on an accurate horizontal plane so that skims above the water at 6 feet which is well under our radar coverage. The second radar is forward facing and homes in on the target. My mate and I reported the double contact and the fact that one had suddenly disappeared and then told the AAWO and still he would not listen to us. He told us we were riding a bike? What ever that meant? Valuable time had passed. I could not understand how our superior could not have seen what was so obvious to us. But it was his call and it was impossible for an acting Able-bodied Seaman to contradict a Lieutenant Commander.

To understand the impact of the situation that had developed it helps to know about some important training we underwent on route to the Falklands.

We trained for a special procedure which was code named Red Alfa. Red Alfa is a drill that prepares the whole ship for battle. We perfected this drill until we could close the ship down and have it in battle readiness in four minutes. That is all it took, four minutes and we were ready for anything with everyone at their station, men at their radar displays or manning their guns, most at their fire fighting stations. This is a universal naval procedure that occurred on every ship in the taskforce simultaneously. Four minutes and you could defend yourselves from any attack, four minutes and then you could dodge and weave an attacking missile, turning at the last minute which could confuse the missile. Another defense was to fire off chaff into the air around the ship. Chaff is the word used for a cloud of silver paper that when fired into the air may convince an attacking missile that it is a better target than the ship, simple but effective. Another defense tactic was the use of Sea dart missiles. These missiles were short range and were basically full of chain. They were designed to explode directly in front of the incoming missile, thus creating a blanket of steel to rip the missile or other aircraft out of the sky. Another important manouerve was to sharply turn the ship to run on the same course as the missile so that it offered as small a target as possible. We even had helicopters that would throw themselves in the path of the missile as a last resort.
The First British Casualty
It was around 80 miles when my mate and I saw two contacts on our displays although only lasting two sweeps this was followed by one contact for two sweeps until it turned and headed back, it's job was done. Still the AAWO did not believe us and the fleet did not go to Red Alfa.

A few more minutes went by then the reports started to come in. HMS Sheffield had been hit by an Exocet missile. The Sheffield was not at Red Alfa and the men of the Sheffield were caught unprepared . Some were having showers or eating their breakfast, some slept whilst others wrote letters to loved ones, they never knew what hit them, doors and hatches where open and nobody was at their fire fighting stations. A missile such as the this one which resulted in the first British casualty of the war is designed to penetrate the hull of the ship before it explodes thus aiming to damage the nerve centre of the ship making it dysfunctional. I always remembered it as 22 men who died that day although later it became known as 20.

Any respect I had for myself died that day along with those 22 sailors. I should of done something, I should of made the AAWO listen to me. The Sheffield never changed course, it never fired it's chaff or even it's missiles in defence. It was a sitting duck. I'm guilty as charged and I'll always punish my self for the death of those men on the Sheffield. I've carried the shame of that day around with me for 17 years and will do until I die. I could of given those men four minutes four times over if I'd stood up and made myself heard. If only if I had tried. The only defence that I will allow myself is that I had been trained or should I say brain washed in the ways of the ranking system. I was an acting Able seaman, only 19 years old, whilst the AAWO was a Lieutenant Commanding Officer, a much older man, supposedly trained to command a battle situation. Who was I to question his authority? Who was I to break the chain of command and go against all the training I had undergone from day one? I was a plebe in the scheme of things and although I had performed my job to the best of my ability it meant nothing when my word was doubted. I cannot forgive myself and feel responsible for what happened to the Sheffield. I let those men down because I should of been strong, even if it meant getting my arse kicked, because I may have given them sufficient time to prepare, to go into Red Alfa, to successfully defend themselves. Surely coping with the wrath of an officer would be better than hating myself as I do now.

After the news broke there was a stunned silence in the Ops room, everything went quiet, no one talked and when conversation resumed it seemed to concern anything but what had just happened. For some odd reason the AAWO came over to our section offering around a bag of sweets, it seemed a sort of conciliatory gesture but we were too shocked to accept this token bribe at the time and it was only later that it came back to me. The AAWO's change of manner even then, signalled his acknowledgment of what had occurred, it symbolised his guilt and seemed an enticement to forgiveness.

[althenick]

Thanks Navaleye,
I've just read the whole speil on the link and all i'll say is this -

The AAWO was an arrogant tw@t - If you have a team acting as your eyes and ears you dont ignore them.
That Fellow is carrying around a terrible burden of guilt that by rights should not be his.
I hope in the 30 years since he's managed to find inner peace,
Endex

[Navaleye]

I can do nothing but agree. Adm Woodward dismissed the FAAWC's actions as being understandable because he had seen so many false tracks that day. I disagree. Invincible was 20 miles behind the T42 picket, but had a much better radar in the form in the then new 1022 set. This was much superior in definition to the old 966 sets carried on the T42 picket ring. Once the track was handed over to the 992 operator and verified, this should have immediately have triggered a response. A number of questions need to asked.

1. Where were the CAP stations.? Cdr Ward said that his Report of Proceedings was doctored after the event to hide that fact that he was hauled off on a wild goose chase. Otherwise 801 CAP would have been in a position to intercept. Who ordered this and why?

2. Why was this evidence not recorded at the BOI?

3. Why was the the FAAWC's (in)action not questioned by the PWO, Commander or the Captain if either was present at the time.

4. Why was Glasgow's report which supported the threat assessment by Invincible's Ops team ignored.

5. Why was Sheffield's ops team in a equal or worse state of complacency.

The guy at his console did his job and that is all that could be asked of him. So did the Ops team in Glasgow. To my my mind and as Althenic points out there was this general mood of arrogance amongst some senior officers that the Arg airforce was not a threat. The Staff at the time was more concerned with surface actions against the Argentine navy than they were from air attack. Even though this was recognised as much more likely.

[Q-RTF-X]

This has the makings of a good interesting thread. As there seems to be a great possibility that some serious derelictions of duty were present, I only hope different points of view are expressed with decorum.

[Roadster280]

I was but a 14 year old boy at the time, so my views count for nothing. Further, I appreciate that lives were lost in this, and other, actions of the Falklands War. I would be interested to know though, how does one draw a distinction between dereliction of duty and making a decision later proved to be in error?

I also note that in the time for the radar to make a sweep, the approaching aircraft had advanced 20 miles. So you get about 10 sweeps of that radar and that's it. Or have I got that wrong? Surely the kit wasn't THAT bad in 1982?

[500N]

Re "Adm Woodward dismissed the FAAWC's actions as being understandable because he had seen so many false tracks that day."


Were they just false tracks or were some also false attacks to test defences (like the Army probes) to lull them into a false sense of security and then press one attack home like they did with the result the Argies wanted ?

Either way, very sad to read.
.

[allan907]

general mood of arrogance amongst some senior officers that the Arg airforce was not a threat

Prior to the Falklands War the Buccaneer fleet used to operate regularly against elements of the RN. From conversations that I heard in the bar amongst the Bucc aircrew it seemed that the RN rarely, if ever, accepted a "hit" on any ship reckoning that they would have splashed the attacker.

It seemed that the fleet sailed south with a degree of complacency amongst the senior ranks.

[Navaleye]

Quite true. Major changes in procedure were made post 82 to try to oversome this. Even so, not to make the appropriate Zippo (4) response to even a suspected enemy missile launch beggars belief. Admiral Fieldhouse decided after the event that there would be no Courts Martial for anyone involved despite very strong evidence that this was warranted.

[Wensleydale]

there was this general mood of arrogance amongst some senior officers


This comment also seems to apply to the Sharky Ward thread also running at the moment?

[John Blakeley]

I was involved in the research for a programme on the loss of HMS Sheffield transmitted on BBC2 some years ago which if I recall correctly was simply called "Excocet", and I don't think the author of these memoirs needs to feel as guilty as he seems to be. We did not interview the Ops Room operators on Invincible, but it was very clear from talking to those survivors on Sheffield that they were well aware of the potential Exocet contact and had their own problems with command decisions (below Sam Salt's level incidentally). We were also told that the other ships forming the outer screen and getting the same information on the link had gone to battle stations whereas Sheffield had not. Nobody now knows whether an earlier and more "forceful" a warning from Invincible would have made a difference though, and it seems that there may have been more than one AWO who got it wrong that day. If the programme is still available it is worth a look as it gives a wider view of what went wrong on Sheffield, but of course, hindsight changes nothing and what is afterwards seen as a bad, or even negligent, decision may well have looked right and justifiable at the time. It is certainly too late to go down that road.
We were told during our research that it was the PM's decision not to have the full inquiries, that would be normal, into the reasons why any of the ships were lost to enemy action in the conflict. This might have shown more and pointed to the lessons to be learnt, but I have no idea whether this information is correct.

[waco]

Next time I have a really bag day at work.......I'm going to try and remenber the guy that wrote that report................

[peppermint_jam]

althenick - Exactly my thoughts. I hope he has found some peace.

[angels]

Easy to say from here, but the lad did his job and should not shoulder the blame.

[glojo]

War is a bitch and sadly hindsight is only available AFTER the event. Horrible mistakes were made and yes lives were lost, but show me Mr Perfect and I will show you an office bound 9am - 5pm armchair critic.

I am in the corner that feels Sheffield could have carried out her picket duties in a manner that would have comfortably detected that incoming threat, she never and paid a very high price for that failure. Regarding this so called arrogance of the Royal Navy in believing it could deal with any incoming air threat, then I simply ask the question that apart from Sheffield was any other warship lost in deep water?

Mistakes were made and mistakes will continue to be made, but whilst we train and rehearse for scenarios we have fought and never allowing planners to think outside the box, then will the lives of our brace service personnel be lost unnecessarily ... Where are the forward thinkers that have the ability to plan major war games and plan them in ways that will stretch the abilities of our armed forces?

How many times do we carry out exercises where we are familiar with the area, the targets, the rules of the 'game' and are fully conversant with the type of scenario we will be involved in?

Every conflict that takes place, we hear the same excuses of.... 'This has never happened before' How unfair for our enemies to engage our warships from the close proximity of land..

I thought the RAF could guarantee air cover anywhere in the World and there would be no need for the Royal Navy to have its own air power.

Instead of pointing fingers at those at the sharp end, let's think how we would have managed with the old Hermes, or perish the thought the recently retired Ark Royal (R09) Conventional AWAC with both Phantoms and Buccaneers would have won the day at a canter and whilst we want to play big boy games then we need big boy toys. Put up, or shut up..... Project power or be a coastal defence force.

If we are looking at blame games then lets start looking at the farcical decisions made on the day the Sir Galahad got attacked. Not a young, inexperienced junior ranking sailor, but an experienced, highly qualified Royal Marine officer talking to a more senior Army officer. 48 deaths, most of which were avoidable but war is a bitch and mistakes are made.

I feel sorry for any PWO who has the unenviable task of dismissing reported contacts as being false but every day during that conflict there were dozens of false contacts both above the surface and below it. Before we start pointing the finger, we need to accept these men were working an absolute minimum of twenty hours per day, seven days a week and any sleep they could grab would usually be interrupted and quite often for false alarms. I dread to think how many whales were killed and the ribbing those sailors would get for detecting these 'hunter killers'. How nice it would be if our sailors could only work a maximum of 120 hours per MONTH!!! It is never going to happen, fatigue will always see bad decisions and bad decisions in war will cost lives.

Mistakes were made, lives were lost but the cause was just and I just hope that all those decisions were made after due diligence. Right or wrong, they were made in good faith and providing lessons were learned we should all move on and simply,

'Remember them'

[Mickj3]

I think I saw that program John. If I remember correctly members of the crew (Sheffield) had come forward with the true story as they felt that Salt was taking the blame for the inaction on the Shef and they pointed the finger at the arrogant individual who was really at fault. Funnily enough whilst most TV programs regarding the goings on in 82 have been repeated on numerous occasions I have never seen a repeat of this one.

In another program Woodward said that on meeting Fieldhouse after the conflict he had expressed surprise that there were no court martial's pending to which Fieldhouse remarked that the country was not in the mood.

[Heathrow Harry]

yeah we'd won and the politicians would never have stood for anything that made our side, commanders, men & equipment to be anything less than perfect

similarly the almost disastrous failure of some 3 Para officers at Mt Longdon (which led to at least one being punched out by a senior NCO) was also hushed up

and we'll not talk about the Welsh Guards officers.............

[ORAC]

I thought the RAF could guarantee air cover anywhere in the World and there would be no need for the Royal Navy to have its own air power. That was the proposal up to 1965. However, contrary to popular belief it was the RAF "Island Hopping" strategy that was rejected and the Navy carrier/amphibious strategy which was accepted - hence the cancellation of the TSR2 and all RAF strategic reach.

It was the subsequent Defence White Paper of 1996 which reduced the UK to a strategy of having no force projection capability East of Suez and the cancellation of CVA01.

RUSI: Inter-service rivalry: British defence policy, 1956-1968
(http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4C6D2A628B79D/)

Meanwhile, as the RN and RAF squabbled over the expeditionary role, Army interest east of Suez focused on the requirement to fight insurgencies in Borneo and Aden and the need to support them in this often tied down expeditionary forces, particularly the navy's amphibious ships and helicopters, reducing their availability elsewhere.[18]

The JSSF concept was well-suited to British defence needs as they appeared in the early 1960s and on this basis the Macmillan government rejected the RAF island strategy and agreed to build a new large aircraft carrier, CVA-01. As is well known, the carrier did not progress beyond the drawing board still less did the RN get the second ship they had anticipated. In 1966 the Labour government, bequeathed unsustainable spending plans by the previous administration, cut the programme.[19] This did not represent a victory for the RAF's alternative vision as much as an overall reduction in British aspirations. The island strategy did not, could not, provide the flexible range of options offered by the JSSF but the government decided that it did not require such options and with ambitions suitably reduced, the RAF plan would suffice. Quite how a total of twelve F-111 aircraft would truly have served British interests, out of sight and out of mind at airfields remote from many potential trouble spots, was never put to the test.[20] Within just two more years it was decided to withdraw from east of Suez altogether. There were insufficient funds even for this token capability.[21]

[Milo Minderbinder]

"subsequent Defence White Paper of 1996"

1966 ?

[500N]

I went to the web site and read the whole story from the beginning.

This is the paragraph BEFORE the one posted in the originl post.

"Kick Off

I don't remember the exact time at which we reached the two hundred mile Total Exclusion Zone, or the war zone placed around the Falklands, as the 6 hour shifts left little distinction between night and day. My particular job at the radar display was the most important job of the lot as I was the long distance air surveyor. I operated 1022 radar which covered the distance 256 miles down to 128 miles radius from the ship. My job was to report immediately any contact appearing on the display. The whole fleet relayed on me and let me tell you now I never missed a contact, even after sitting at my display for hours on end.

It was an anticlimax that first official day of war. I remember hoping for a satisfactory outcome between the two governments so that we could turn round and go home. The next day I lost any hope of this as things took a turn for the worst. Argentinean fighter planes started to attack us. I'll never forget that very first time a contact suddenly appeared on my display bearing around 240 at 180 miles, the next sweep of the radar and it was still there, "My God this is for real ! ", I thought. I logged it in to the computer then I tried to report it to the next in the chain of command, but I could not speak the words. It was at this moment I confronted the possibility of my own death and that took some time to come to terms with. After a few moments I found my voice and the wheels of war were set in motion. Our planes where sent to investigate, a dog fight took place and the Argentineans were shot out of the sky. "A job well done" I remember the men cheering as the planes went down, cheering because two young men were dead! It went on like this for the first few days and we worked out that the Argentinean fighter pilots could not night fly as they would attack only when it was light and mainly at dawn and dusk. This was to our advantage as a pattern was set and it gave us time to rest and recuperate at night."


So a few days before, he had a contact at 240, 180 miles out that turned out to be Argies and they were shot down but a few days later he had a contact at 250 and at 180 miles and was told nothing was there ?

Seems strange.

[Tourist]

Remember guys this is just one persons account.

I have no knowledge if this is true or not, but to start arguing over whether somebody else should be court martialled because one person has told their side of a story is a little unjust.

Without evidence, it is just hearsay.

[Navaleye]

The engagement mentioned would have the interception of three Canberras by 801 CAP. One kill, sadly crew not recovered.

[glojo]

Remember guys this is just one persons account.

I have no knowledge if this is true or not, but to start arguing over whether somebody else should be court martialled because one person has told their side of a story is a little unjust.

Without evidence, it is just hearsay.

Totally agree, plus it might be wrote by someone who is possibly unfairly but understandably trying to blame someone, anyone for a tragic incident that was beyond their control..

IF ONLY

If only I did this

If only did that

If only I had said

[alfred_the_great]

Would people like some redders for their chips?

What happened happened; while this RP may've been right in this instance I doubt he was right every time. The AAWO has the responsibility for the picture, and frankly he was doing his job. The BOI sat, made recommendations and we've moved on. Rehashing this now achieves nothing.

[Two's in]

Roadster asks the most pertinent question;

I would be interested to know though, how does one draw a distinction between dereliction of duty and making a decision later proved to be in error?

And whatever the events were that unfolded, the narrative tries to set the scene of the poor old honest-to-goodness enlisted guy being screwed over by the chippy Rodney. Great piece of drama, but if you have to embellish that angle, what else has been embellished to make it a good read? There were no shortage of mistakes made during the conflict, many of them great tragedies. Trying to personalise it into an "us versus them'' account does nobody any credit.

[NutLoose]

I would have thought the offer of a sweetie by the AAWO wasn't trying to curry any favour with anyone, simply showing he was human too....he too would be feeling like poo and knew his judgement call had just gone tragically wrong... End of the day someone has to make a decision and stick with it.... If the ratings felt bad about it, spare a thought for the guy making the call..... It's war, and in war everything does not run to the book.... I feel for them all, but while the ratings still feel guilt, think how the other guy feels who had the burden on his shoulders of taking the decision.

[glojo]

It went on like this for the first few days and we worked out that the Argentinean fighter pilots could not night fly as they would attack only when it was light and mainly at dawn and dusk. This was to our advantage as a pattern was set and it gave us time to rest and recuperate at night."What an odd statement...

Odd because it makes NO SENSE.

I was not there but I do KNOW that when not at action stations, ships were working defence watch systems and the ship would be closed up accordingly. My experience has been a six hours on, six hours off routine for the whole period of a conflict. No one, but no one 'assumes' the enemy will definitely only attack at a set time of day, that makes NO sense.

Who would be naive enough to make that assumption? How would anyone know that night attacks were not being held back?

How can that sailor just a few days into this conflict have known that? This statement is made by someone with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight

after the first few days

We....... Does this mean the task group commander decided

The Argentinian fighter pilots could not night fly

Ignoring that claim there was a continuing ASW threat and closing up at action stations was a regular event. Did the capital ships all relax at night?? I think not as we KNOW that a few of the Task Group pilots were flying night operations.

Woodward was very, very protective of the carriers and I just cannot imagine everyone getting a good nights sleep and only fighting the defensive war during daylight hours, it makes NO SENSE?

Just been reading the BOI regarding the sinking of Coventry and she was engaged in multiple day time incidents, NOT at just dawn or dusk. I am not saying that whole statement by the alleged young sailor did not happen but it does ask questions regarding factual content. :uhoh::uhoh:

[Navaleye]

The threat reduction process said that theiy could not manage night flights with the possible exemption on their Naval Air Arm. They never tried it, so we have to assume this was a reasonable assumption.

[glojo]

The threat reduction process said that theiy could not manage night flights with the possible exemption on their Naval Air Arm. They never tried it, so we have to assume this was a reasonable assumption.

Note how you are highlighting the fact that there was a possible exemption... and we are of course talking purely air threat. We should not close our eyes to both surface and under surface threats. Argentinian ships\patrol boats were both detected and sunk during the hours of darkness and whilst our capital ships would not take an active role in this, the rest of the battle group would.

To suggest that nights were for periods of rest is plain wrong... Ships would sneak inshore under the cover of darkness to carry out Naval Gunfire Support or ASW patrols and this was always high risk with the threat of return fire ever present, including attacks from shore based anti-ship missiles.

I have just read the BOI regarding Coventry and the opening observations although slightly off topic are so, so relevant to my remarks regarding training..

Have things changed?? I VERY much doubt it.



MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

Q1. Was Coventry properly trained to cope with the situation at 251820Z May?

A. No She had inadequate training for inshore AAW and massive damage situations

Q2 was Coventry uniquely under-trained?

A. No On the contrary in many areas she was better trained than most

[MAINJAFAD]

Navaleye

Pretty much spot on. The only aircraft that they had which were anything close to all weather capable were the SuE's and navy recce aircraft (Neptune and Tracker) which did track the CVBG at night time, though the Sheffield attack was pretty much the Neptune's swansong.

[Pontius Navigator]

I thought the RAF could guarantee air cover anywhere in the World and there would be no need for the Royal Navy to have its own air power.

That was the proposal up to 1965. However, contrary to popular belief it was the RAF "Island Hopping" strategy that was rejected and the Navy carrier/amphibious strategy which was accepted - hence the cancellation of the TSR2 and all RAF strategic reach.

It was the subsequent Defence White Paper of 1966 which reduced the UK to a strategy of having no force projection capability East of Suez and the cancellation of CVA01.

This was possibly the situation in the 60s but it changed again in the '70s. The RAF undertook air defence of the fleet and tried to prove this during Exercise Highwood in Nov/Dec 1971. I was on a NEAF crew and not directly involved but we met Highwood crews during a week in UK. We met the same 543 Victor crew at Waddington and later at St Mawgan. The weather was so bad that they were unable to return to Wyton and were operating from diversions the whole time. The tanker force was also helping to provide fighter cover.

Given the lack of land-based AEW and the winter weather I think the Navy won the arguement but still lost its carriers.

[anotherthing]

Tourist,

It is not hearsay if it is a first person account. If it was someone giving 'evidence' of what a third party had told them, then that would be hearsay.

However your point about it being one side of the story is valid