ABC Radio Intervew Richard de Crespigny

[RodH]

I am listening to what I believe is an embarrassing interview on ABC Classic Radio by Margaret Throsby with Richard de Crespigny.
This guy appears to be so so full of himself he is over flowing.
What a pain in the butt.
Sad to listen to but have to hear it in full so I can believe the apparent arrogance of this bloke .
No way I would buy his book after hearing this garbage.
:yuk::yuk::yuk::yuk::yuk::yuk::yuk:

[TWT]

QF32: Richard de Crespigny - Breakfast - ABC Radio National (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/breakfast/qf32-richard-de-crespigny/4149944)

[harrowing]

On the contrary Rod, I was quite impressed with that interview.

[TWT]

I heard him mention 'the team',he gave credit to the CC and the others on the flight deck,and he conveyed to me his passion for flying and the job.I didn't hear him blowing his own trumpet.

[Capt Claret]

Mrs C watched the interview on ABC News Breakfast this morning. I only caught snippets, being busy attending to her coffee & breakfast needs :} but what I saw seemed quite reasonable and Mrs C said she found him quite modest and even keeled.

[Arm out the window]

He was talking to Fran Kelly this morning on RN Breakfast (24 Jul), did quite a good job and gave quite a bit of credit to his flight and cabin crew, and the aeroplane itself, for the safe outcome.

He does come across slightly 'hyped' in my opinion; sounds like he's worked up answers to expected questions that are designed to whet the appetites of the book-reading public, but - strangely enough - he's trying to promote his book!

I was at a RAAF squadron with him years ago, for a while, and found him to be a decent bloke. Good luck to him - while perhaps the publicity is a tad over the top (Australian Magazine front page and feature article, radio interviews, TV shows etc), I think perhaps the airline are kicking in to push it too, seeing as it's got all the elements you'd think they'd love to promote - experienced, dedicated crew under extreme pressure handling things well.

He sells books, QANTAS maximises good publicity after all the recent bad.

[Keg]

Of his edited burst in the Oz on the weekend, I thought this paragraph most telling.

This decision to do control checks would be controversial to 90 per cent of commercial pilots. A control check has a certain element of risk to it, sure. However, the greater risk is committing to a landing when you are not certain about the information or the integrity of the systems you are acting upon. I anticipated at least one of the other four pilots might register their complaint because the discussion of control checks never arises in airline textbooks, particularly with passengers on board. I was conscious they might think I was a "cowboy" and reckless. We were being vectored in a long, sweeping left turn onto our final heading. As we headed into the south and straightened for our final, Matt called our altitude - 1370m - and I said: "We need some control checks." I heard the sound of shifting weight behind me but neither of the check pilots spoke. I don't know if Harry and Dave wanted to stop me, but I had timed the announcement to catch them unawares. By the time they'd swapped their glances, it was too late.

I've highlighted the bit that concerns me.

I'm short on time so a couple of quick points.

1. Control checks after abnormals is a normal part of Qantas command training. It's hardly 'controversial'.

2. Not particularly effective CRM to want to do something but not talk it through with the rest of the crew first. If you think it's a good idea, discuss it with them. Perhaps they have ideas and suggestions that will improve the idea.

3. I've not met Harry Wubbin but I've flown with Dave Evans. I've got no qualms that were you to suggest something stupid- even at that late stage of the game- he'd say something. To imply that you suggested the control check so late that someone of Dave Evan's calibre was unable to speak up is a significant slur against Dave's character... and against the character of the remainder of the crew as well.

All those points in that para alone suggest something intriguing about 'character'. I'll leave it to others to consider their own assessment.

[GUARD]

The story needs to be told and he was 1 of 5 who could tell it. I thought the interview was quite balanced.

Should he have not written the book?!

It was a proud day for the tradition and dedication of all our staff. Well done all.

GUARD:ok:

[Arm out the window]

Yes, Keg, that bit in the Australian article did seem a bit odd, the way he put it - as if it was a risky thing to do that the others may have balked at. I think it might just be poetic licence to make it sound more exciting - you know, 'there I was, having to use my superior piloting skills to save the day' in the nick of time kind of thing.

I'm not an airline pilot so I can't comment on standard procedures in the big jets, but your comment about control checks being normal is reassuring.

Better to find out about controllability issues with a bit of altitude under you than on late finals as you slow through a critical speed for the aircraft's abnormal state!

[Keg]

Someone forwarded this on to me today also. I found this equally interesting as the way the article read regarding this was a bit strange:

From: Evans, William WGCDR
Posted At:
Posted To:
Conversation: THIS IS YOUR CAPTAIN SPEAKING
Subject: Your Captain Speaking


Yes, 'twas I with him that day in the Winjeel. A little over-dramatised perhaps, but that's essentially what happened. However, what he neglected to mention was that the sortie mission was spinning, for which he had been adequately prepared. It wasn't like I just decided to get him into a spin for the heck of it on a nice sunny day.

Over dramatised seems to be a common opinion which is a shame given that the story itself would probably be dramatic enough without the little bits of embellishment here and there.

[crystalballwannabe]

It's never "too late" for a check captain to intervene.

Was it 92 when a QF skipper was going to ditch off Perth due fog and the paxing checky intervened....

Insult to QF check captains if you ask me...

I suppose John Travolta would be the logical choice to play Richard for the Movie.

[fire wall]

Quite correct that there where 5 on the flightdeck and the story should be told for the very reason that we all learn from previous incidents, however telling the story does not require the self promotion that has been witnessed in this and previous accounts.

My accolade is directed towards the first officer and I believe inside knowledge also points to such. Well done Sir as those of us whose habitat is forward of the locked door know the true value of a mature professional FO.

[SOPS]

I believe that "ditching and paxing check captain" story is a complete myth.I am sure when Keg is around, he can confirm or deny.

[Helmut Smokar]

Keg
Didn't happen. Control checks done in both the clean and landing Config (less the gear of course) while on downwind after discussion by all in the flight deck.:(

[crystalballwannabe]

The FO is also under no pressure to be an ACE for the rest of his career.

Lets not forget the dangers that can come with being a HERO pilot i.e. KLM Teneriffe.

[Keg]

Any Qantas pilot should be able to tell you the ditching "MYTH" is FACT.

I've spoken to guys who have been around a lot longer than me. It NEVER happened. Kremin has probably spoken to people around longer again than me and he will verify the same. Had it occurred the name would be well known. It's not. Had it occurred people would tell you who the checker was. It's not. Further, the myth wouldn't have morphed into it being an Ansett crew who told them to auto land which is the way it's often told on PPRUNE.

Now, back to the QF32 book.

Helmut. Thanks for info. I suspected as much. I've said on other threads that I'll wait for the report to comment in more depth and the only reason I comment now is on the basis of what Captain de Crespigny himself has written.

[Capt Kremin]

Ditching story is a myth. End of story.

[grip pipe]

Thought this little post would immediately spin off topic, sure as eggs.

Anyway, TV is TV, a very different interview on ABC Classic FM today with him providing a selection of favourite music to be played during the IV and why they are his favourites, which is a standard on that channel for a guest to do so. Interesting back ground and up bringing. Certainly not a media star but seemed solid and likeable, and passionate about aviation. Certainly had good luck and a good run with QF. The music and stories were not about flying but added colour and life to the guy.

Could be anyone of us really.

As for his book well nobody criticised Ernest K Gann for giving us his life story in a book, 'Fate is the Hunter', perhaps more depth and purpose, but why should'nt he? A good yarn is a good yarn. And having RR's finest give up, blow a hole in the wing and then rain hot shrapnel in the form of engine parts onto the fuselage in QF's pride and joy, which by the way, is then transmitted by social media and the fans onboard around the world within 15 mins or so is yet another story. This one was never was going to escape interest or attention.

Yeah and maybe QF is pushing for their own means but guess what the public is interested in the story and your every day man or woman is interested, how many parties have you been bailed up at by people fascinated with aeroplanes and what you do?

It was a good yarn with a good outcome, nice to have one for a change.

[Angle of Attack]

God help us the ditching story is such a myth, I mean think about it, at worse case what would you do? Land in 100m in fog off an ils or ditch into the ocean? Even a first solo student could answer it I'm afraid.....

[MASTEMA]

It is Australian culture to nip tall poppies in the stem.

Based on my observations thus far, Sir Richard has a very high opinion of himself and is sniffing a career outside QF.

Just out of interest, is he any of the following; a Instructor Captain, a Check Captain, a CASA examiner, a Management pilot, a CRM facilitator?

I guess the big difference here is that 'Sully' has remained dignified, humble and oh so USA; "aw shucks it was nothin'."

Something Sully said has stayed with me; "I have spent many years learning to control my emotions in preparation for what happened on the Hudson." Sound advice.

BTW- Do any Airbus pilots think that "LAND ASAP" means continue circling for almost two hours (according to Wikipedia) with a couple of 4000m runways and all the safety equip below, while fuel is spraying out of the wing with the potential to ignite at any moment? Not a wind up, just want to gauge general opinion.

[crystalballwannabe]

Is it true that he was paxing home from Singapore after the incident on the 744 that had an engine failure?

If so.....does he mention this in the book?

[TWT]

Yes and I don't know

Richard de Crespigny, Qantas's Captain Marvel in second mid-air saga | News.com.au (http://www.news.com.au/travel/news/richard-de-crespigny-qantass-captain-marvel/story-e6frfq80-1225948836103)

[crystalballwannabe]

If its mentioned in the book - I will buy it because that's unlucky in anyone's language and I would be interested to what he has to say about that!!!!!!

Hope things don't come in three's.

[MASTEMA]

35yearpilot (Richard?)

LAND ASAP was displayed was it? Reference?

Ummm, yes it was and in red. Ref: FCOM and the ATSB report

What is the burn rate for jet fuel (perhaps in comparison to gasoline) and at what speed might it blow out?

Do you mean fire burn rate or engine consumption? The burn rate of jet fuel was very evident in the Concorde crash (which flies slightly faster than the A380 even at low alts) and it didn't 'blow out' (if that is what you mean). Running out of fuel wasn't a first issue or my point.

The similarities between the Concorde crash though i.e. wing tank ruptured during/after take off, massive fuel leak, fuel ignites... should be reflected upon when considering how long is too long to hold following a serious failure with a serious fuel leak.

What do you think?

[oicur12.again]

"should be reflected upon when considering how long is too long to hold following a serious failure with a serious fuel leak."

My experience in Airline/Airbus flying is that the industry is to focused on completing drills and checklists even with a red LAND ASAP staring at you than just landing the jet. I have flown for airlines where you would fail a sim check by landing without checking landing distance and completing all ECAM's etc.

We are just victims of our training. Hand flown engine out is another example.

[Arm out the window]

Considering the systems were all reportedly so degraded, would you blindly follow a LAND ASAP caption?

Again, I'm not an airline pilot, but if the aeroplane was so badly damaged I'm sure I'd be skeptical of what the information systems were telling me.

[Jimothy]

Mastema.
Ummm No...You are wrong... A "LAND ASAP" was NEVER displayed to this crew.
Source: ATSB report, and speaking to some of the operating pilots.

[Keg]

Does the aeroplane need to say 'land now' in order to make a decision to 'land now'?

I'm going to wait until the report is out to see before I make a more refined judgement but my gut says working through all the messages for an hour plus when you have potential structural damage and fuel streaming out of holes in the wing near where an engine blew up means you haven't quite diagnosed the totality of the situation.

Similarly, sitting on the ground for 60 minutes waiting for the steps to arrive with fuel leaking, hot brakes, an engine that won't shut down which also indicates severe electronic issues in a wing where there is fuel leaking out, is a very brave call when a precautionary disembarkation with slides was available. Sure, I get the desire to not injure anyone on the slides which is a possibility even with a precautionary but still.......

So those are my gut feelings. I'll await the final report and see what the ATSB says about it all. Perhaps my gut feeling is way off the mark. Time will tell. :ok:

[teresa green]

lads, if you were not there, then you don't know. Its that simple. Armchair pilots are a pain in the arse. Take it from one who has been there, just hanging in there. Therefore I have taken a great interest in what this bloke has to say, can relate to how he felt afterwards, and how he handled the situation. The bus is on the ground, no PAX or crew lost, the incident not caused by pilot error, a excellent amount of experience on the flight deck, and a successful outcome. For his book then good luck to him, if he has embellished it slightly well so have we all, especially after having a few, the runways get smaller, and the engine fires get bigger, human nature. I would far rather read his book than his obituary, and I imagine that just about goes for all of you.

[C441]

Reducing to a weight that would allow the aircraft to be stopped on the 4000m runway was also a consideration. With an already-significant fuel leak present, motoring off the end of the runway would not have been ideal. I understand D.E. spent a fair bit of time determining if sufficient runway was available and at what weight it would be, given the failures.

[gordonfvckingramsay]

IF the ECAM did say "LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE". That doesn't mean now, it means as soon as possible i.e. when everything is in order. No point blindly reacting to a message and then crashing off the end of the runway. :rolleyes:

[MASTEMA]

It might be Ramadan, 45deg in the shade and a bit sandy but I am sure I didn’t imagine a post from ‘35yearpilot’. Why the delete?

At the end of the day, the aircraft landed safely with nil injuries. Richard is hailed a hero, makes a motza, has become the darling of the media and maybe the next Flight Centre Captain, who knows? All the kudos, success and motza to him.

Events like these are such important learning tools and there are a few very important factors and considerations worth discussing here. If I had the chance to interview Richard, this is what I would ask;

Richard thanks for joining us…

Q. If you had the chance to do it all again, what would you do differently?

Q. I read in an Airbus safety report that it is strongly recommended that you be on the ground following a fire on board within 15mins, red LAND ASAP within 60mins and amber LAND ASAP within 180mins. From the ATSB report it took 50 mins to complete all checklists and total event time was 109mins. Is that correct?

Q. From the ATSB report; engine two had a fire warning then exploded, you were unable to establish if both fire agents had been discharged, engines one and four were in degraded mode, engine three in alternate mode, you had a severe fuel leak, it was obvious that there was serious damage to the wing, hydraulics and electrical systems. Given the previous question, were did landing sit in the level of priorities?

Q. From the ATSB report; given all of the failures which obviously resulted in a large landing factor and approach speed (166kts), the computer calculated that you had only 100 remaining of the 4000m available. What would have your decision been if the computer said you required greater than 4000m?

Q. Did the QF 001 runway overrun in BKK factor in the decision process?

Q. There was a considerable level of experience and resource available in the cockpit (SO, FO and two CC). Given that you had available; gear down, flap 3, reverse on #3, antiskid, max braking and 4000m of runway, do you think that there was an over analysis of the situation and a mentality of “we can’t screw this up like QF 001 did” rather than prioritise the LAND ASAP and real possibility of the wing falling off or loss of control?

Richard is more than welcome to give actual answers here on Pprune. :ok:

[Arm out the window]

Buy his book and perhaps all will be revealed!

Good points by Keg about gut feeling - obviously there's a sliding scale to be negotiated, with 'this looks really bad, let's get it on the ground as quick as we possibly can before it falls apart and kills us all' on one end, and 'don't rush into it and do something really stupid which kills us all' on the other.

It appears they trod the middle ground, as no doubt most people would, gathering information and processing it before deciding they were ready and it was time to land.

[ChrisJ800]

I just read the book and whilst it doesnt have all the answers (will need the official report due out end of the year for that), you can see it was a good decision not to land straight away. It will be interesting to see what the report mentions on their calculated and actual approach speed and stall speed in their degraded configuration, as it seems like the margin was extremely low.

The book is a good read and there is plenty of praise for the rest of the crew, especially the FO. My hat off to all of them that day. The book does also mention in detail the 744 engine failure on his attempted dead head trip home.

[balance]

I tend to agree with Teresa, in that second guessing the guy after the event is very easy, but put yourself in the same position and you might be left wanting.

The one thing that does cause me a degree of alarm is the point that Keg makes with regard to control checks and CRM. CRM in Qantas has historically been pathetic (though they will confidently tell you that they are the world leaders!). This effort does nothing but reinforce that opinion.

[MASTEMA]

Ummm, Jimothy

From FCOM

If an emergency causes LAND ASAP to appear in red on the ECAM, the flight crew must land as soon as possible at the nearest suitable airport at which a safe approach and landing can be made.

From ATSB report

QF32 had, among other failures, the following;
- engine #2 fire
- engine #2 failed
- engine #3 alternate mode
- engine #1 and #4 in degraded mode
- GREEN hydraulics low pressure and low quantity
- YELLOW hydraulics engine #4 pump error
- failure of AC electrical busses 1 and 2
- flight controls in alternate law
- wing slats inoperative
- ailerons partial control only
- reduced spoiler control
- landing gear control and indicator warnings
- multiple brake system messages
- engine anti-ice and air data sensor messages
- multiple fuel system messages including fuel jettison fault
- center of gravity messages
- autothrust and autoland inoperative
- #1 engine generator disconnected
- left wing pneumatic bleed leaks
- avionic system overheat

Also from the report; "While the SO walked through the cabin a passenger, also a Qantas pilot, pointed out that pictures from the vertical fin mounted camera suggested a fluid leak from the left hand wing. The SO walked down to the lower deck of the passenger cabin and observed damage to the wing and a fluid leak that appeared to be about 0.5meters wide." While back in the cockpit; “They also believed that engine #1 may have been damaged and discussed a number of concerns regarding fuel imbalances that had been indicated by the ECAM.”

There are quite a few FCOM examples to choose from but this will do;

OPERATING MANUAL
PROCEDURES
ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
FUEL
FCOM AJ → 25 NOV 11
FUEL LEAK
A fuel leak may be detected by:
‐ The sum of FOB and FU is significantly less than FOB atengine start, or is decreasing, or
‐ A passenger observes a fuel spray from an engine/pylon, or a wing tip, or
‐ The total fuel quantity is decreasing at an abnormal rate, or
‐ A fuel imbalance is developing, or
‐ Fuel quantity of a tank is decreasing too fast (leak from engine/pylon, or hole in a tank), or
‐ A tank is overflowing (due to pipe rupture in a tank), or
‐ The Fuel Flow is excessive (leak from engine), or
‐ Fuel is smelt in the cabin.
If visibility permits, leak source may be identified by a visual check from the cabin.
WHEN A LEAK IS CONFIRMED LAND ASAP

Not attempting to second guess here, just trying to piece together the decision process and maybe learn from it.

I also recall an excellent video from CRM training years ago. A Delta 767 had an engine explode on takeoff, crew discharged the agents and the warning went out. When they eventually returned to land the tower observed that the engine and wing was still on fire (magnesium fire). They also delayed desembarking pax even though the danger remained.

The class was very divided on the interesting decision process there also.

Maybe that the A380 is built like a tank or there was some incredible luck involved but I am mostly interested to know to what degree the 'QF culture' at the time, determined Capt RDC's decision process.

[Ken Borough]

Some of you Qantas types here need to smell the roses! On the one hand we are told ad nauseum just how good and valuable are Qantas pilots and why they should be paid more etc etc etc. On the other hand, you are all too willing to be very critical of one of your number who has a fantastic story to tell that reflects positively on all Qantas pilots. I should think you should STFU and collectively bask in de Crespigny's glory - to bag the bloke as you do says more about you than it does him. Get over it!!

RdeC was interviewed on commercial radio in SYD today and heaped strong praise on those who were in the flight deck with him. For a longer interview, I suggest you listen to the Conversation Hour at 1100 SYD time tomorrow on ABC702. This interview will be downloadable in podcast form from the ABC website or via iTunes.

[Union Jack]

On the contrary Rod, I was quite impressed with that interview.- Harrowing

Speaking as former resident of your sunny country, I'm with Harrowing on this one. R de C gave full credit in this interview to those who backed him up so well - both flight deck and cabin crew - with an additional word of praise for the cabin crew at the end. Very self-deprecating, but cross too, about failing his check ride, apparently because the check captains "helped" him!

Jack

PS Amused by the interviewer's pronunciation of R de C's last name - is that really how it's pronounced?

[boocs]

Ken,

Sadly I see it more as an Australian trait rather than a QF one. Could be that as well I guess, but definitely an Australian trait... sadly.

b.

[Fantome]

As the long running earlier VH-OQA thread is closed, it wouldn't be a bad thing if our long-suffering VICTIM OF A BORED GOD mod-man did not have cause to apply the gag again.

Last week's interview given on the ABC FM radio program called Margaret Throsby's Guest should not be listened to by any too precious about the 'oh my god .. . wow .. . . ' factor. (It was Margaret after all who asked the late Alex Henshaw . . ' So did the Germans have Hurricanes or Spitfires?')
And anyway it is the interviewed rather than interviewee who is of prime interest.


On a completely minor point, R DE C does say quite erroneously that we get our VH prefix from Victor Holyman, a co-founder of Holyman's Airways and ANA. That cannot be because the allocation of VH and a swag of others round the world occurred in 1928, predating Holyman's by some eight years.


The former closed thread had mention of a book 'Mayday' but no other detail. It did get a run here back in 2003 -

PPRuNe Forums > Dunnunda, Godzone and the Pacific > DG&P Reporting Points > "Mayday" - book by QF Capt. John Winslow (ret.)

B767300ER
3rd Jul 2003

Just finished reading a softbound book, "MAYDAY" by QF (retired) 747 Captain John Winslow. Subtitled "17 Amazing true-life stories of aircrew fighting near impossible odds to bring their crippled aircraft back to earth."

Very good read, and very good commentary by Capt.Winslow.

Introduction by Nancy-Bird Walton, AO OBE

Highly recommended!

Also, it had some very enjoyable stories about checking out/qualifying new Captains/FOs at QF. Very enlightening perspective of QF training, which obviously is very good.

twobigtesticles
9th Jul 2003
I think I saw this book in a newsagent, and whilst i certainly didnt look at it thoroughly, a quick glance appeared to show that some of the articles were just copies or summaries from Mac Jobs Air Disaster Books.


B767300ER
10th Jul 2003
Not copies of Mac Job's fine "Air Disaster" series, but similarly formatted. "Mayday" has photos, but no artwork like "Air Disaster", and the stories are only 3-5 pages long. In "Air Disaster", the stories are much longer and more comprehensive.

[teresa green]

There is nothing quite like your average every day, garden variety, domestic airliner, on which you have quite possibly thousands of hours, turn into a mother that tries to kill you for a wake up call. Unless you have been there (and chances are at least 10% of you will meet that challenge) at some stage of your career, to know what it feels like. The flight deck no longer smells of aftershave, but fear, as the sweat dribbles down your neck, and your back, your training kicks in, you become a team like never before, you become incredibly calm and accepting, and the only urge is to get the mother on the ground as quickly as possible. So his decision to stay airborne for his own reasons, mark the measure of the man. I have been there twice in my career over 49 years, and both times it was a modern airliner of its time, rather than a piston, or lighty. So when you climb into your seat thinking ****, five bloody sectors today, stop for a moment, and think what you are really doing. That mother will kill you if it gets the chance, remember that, never totally trust the bastard to do what it is supposed to do, but at the same time never let it take away the joy of flight. You have chosen one of the best careers in the world, but a career that could ask of you something you never expected, as that A380 skipper found out, and normally not at a time that you expect, think the A330 over WA. but for all of that, I would do it all again tomorrow.

[No Idea Either]

Thankyou Mr Green:D

[TIMA9X]

RdeC was interviewed on commercial radio in SYD today and heaped strong praise on those who were in the flight deck with himDare I say it, I agree with you 100 per cent Ken on this, in this clip RdeC comes over well....

xtWjsZji_E4



At the end of the day, what he says is a positive for pilots and for brand Qantas & staff. (something that has been missing for the past couple of years)

On reflection, I hope management can now see the value of this "positive" to begin the long task of repairing the damage.

[FRQ Charlie Bravo]

Good morning PPRuNers,

Despite my own views on his public stance (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/industrial-relations/hero-pilot-richard-de-crespigny-takes-sides-with-qantas-in-ir-war/story-fn59noo3-1226191973387) on other issues I do have to say good on him for speaking openly in that video (http://youtu.be/xtWjsZji_E4) about two issues:


seeking more than the recommended time off (4 months absolutely indicates a conservative approach and respect for Human Performance and Limitations)
managing his stress with a professional (ditto).

FRQ CB

[OEB]

Nice job on all the CREW getting that A380 on the deck safely.
Doesn't really matter about who did what etc.
SAFE landing = good job in my book under those circumstances.
However Capt RDC is a publicity hound.
The story although interesting is nothing more.
Lets be honest he's no Sully.
However he believes he's earned a place as an aviation hero.
At the end of the day he's paid over $400K per year to do his job and that is exactly what he did.
My mail is that the FO saved the day any way.
But who cares. Nice job.

[Capt Fathom]

Maybe he spent that 4 months off work preparing notes for the book! :ooh:

[Arm out the window]

PS Amused by the interviewer's pronunciation of R de C's last name - is that really how it's pronounced?

I think she said it pretty close - as I recall, it sounds like 'DeCrepiny' - then again, he was usually 'Discrepancy' in the RAAF, so you would have to ask him what the right way is.

[Fantome]

This is an easier to open link than the earlier one on this thread, to the Margaret Throsby interview last week on ABC FM morning radio.


http://mpegmedia.abc.net.au/classic/midday/201207/miv-2012-07-24.mp3

[Fris B. Fairing]

Here is a link to yesterday's interview with Richard Vidler. Any debate about the pronunciation of de Crespigny is settled by the world authority on the subject.

Interview with Richard Vidler (http://mpegmedia.abc.net.au/local/brisbane/conversations/201207/r978505_10680460.mp3)

or

Tinyurl (http://tinyurl.com/bw3fv4h)

[wilcoleaks]

I think he came across very well in that interview too.

Job well done to all involved.

Just out of curiosity - what did he fly in the airforce?

[Al E. Vator]

Heard the Fiedler ABC interview - well done Richard de C.

I liked his presentation, his honesty and calmness.

Australians and Tall Poppy syndromes - get over yourselves for goodness sake. I hope I can handle any similar situation as well as he and the crew did that day.

So what if there is a little self-promotion (and I don't even think that's the case). Surely he's earned that right. Goodness knows the lousy, underperforming CEO's of companies are past masters at self-promotion and are paid far more than Qantas captains. Teresa Greens previous post sums this up nicely. Also the Captain's admission of tears as stress-release and psychologists visits is refreshing. Of course I am superman and I will never need that :rolleyes: but it's encouraging to have such issues discussed!

And comparing one method of post-event presentation to the behavior of Chesley Sullenberger is also pointless. Sully's PR spiel has also been exemplary. Both pilots have brilliantly displayed the calm and able demeanor we would like our much-pummeled profession to be represented by.

And the concentration on possible errors? Other than as a learning experience, why?
I believe the Sully crew didn't action the Ditching p/b item, naturally there was not much time in their case and the shock must have been godawful. Technically it was an error I suppose but I'm just glad not too much has been made of this in the US. If it were Australia, they would have been crucified on PPrune!

Some of Mastemas questions however pose interesting topics for consideration. Specifically, what would you do if the calculated landing distance was in excess of 4000m? I don't know the answer - what can you do if essentially the only runway available to you on the day isn't long enough for the multiple failures you have suffered?

The other, apparently contentious issue (systems checks) before commencing approach has given me food for thought. It's not something I've ever been taught or practiced (whilst I've had EF's in Airbusses there have been no uncontained failures) and if The Australian interview is accurate, not something the two supernumerary check captains were also familiar with. I like Richards' reference to Gene Krantz's Apollo 13 logic (don't worry about what we've lost, find out what we have left). In the QF32 situation, realistically one none of us will ever have, it was a very sensible process and put the crew back in the loop when systems displays and ludicrous volumes of ECAMs and never-ending Master Warnings and Cautions just serve to confuse.

Having myself flown Airbusses for over 20 years now however it is abundantly clear that:
1) The ECAM is crap when there are multiple failures and
2) LAND ASAP, be it red or amber, is a nebulous statement that in the wrong hands will lead to premature landings without full awareness of systems status, potentially until its too late. The fundamental exception to this is of course fire. The Swissair Halifax case is the best example here. Captain Zimmerman was being understandably thorough but fire waits for no man and destroyed the aircraft before it could return to land.

The other item Richard mentioned was an "Armstrong Spiral". I thought I knew everything about aviation but I haven't heard that term! Google searches have been unhelpful - from whom and what event does it get its name? The concept of gaining altitude from 7000' to 10000' above Singapore so as to be able to glide if necessary is also a little out of left-field but I think very sound. Sure I've always hit "speed hold" and possibly "heading hold" (as they did on the day) but invariably never climbed further. I fly a twin so perhaps in similar circumstances, that's even more important.

Neither the systems checks or the "Armstrong Spiral" are defined in Airbus procedures, they are cases of that oft-cliched but in this case appropriate term - airmanship.

Right? Wrong? Armchair/post-event experts fill your boots but the aircraft, despite it's best efforts at self-destruction, was landed safely.

Richard has served as a good example of crew and situation management. He's also given me, an experienced pilot, and others a couple of things to consider, whether or not I'd use them, and for that I'm grateful.

Not that they would ever use a pilot as a role model but Qantas management would do well to utilize the same thought, process and people management skills in running their disintegrating organisation that were demonstrated by the pilots of QF32 on that day.

[ChrisJ800]

...
Just out of curiosity - what did he fly in the airforce?

Mostly the DHC-4 Caribou in Papua New Guinea

[Arm out the window]

Was flying Hueys at 5SQN ops flight when I did my helo conversion there.

[Capt Kremin]

The Caribou flying wasn't mostly in PNG.

[M Taylor]

Just finished the book thought it was very good.

For me the strangest thing was on the last page - 334.

Here De Crespigny says the Sing - Australia flight was a route check and when he contacts QF six days after incident he is informed that Capt David Evans failed him on the route check.

Strange how this hadn't really come out in the general public domain yet. So we see all these happy smiling photos of the five pilots, but one of them has actually failed De Cresigny on his performance:confused:

[kellykelpie]

I don't believe he was failed. The route check may have been voided because of the circumstances but he certainly passed the flight with flying colours.

[M Taylor]

Last four words of his book page 334 just before the appendix

"I didn't pass"

[wilcoleaks]

Here is a link to another radio interview that shows he has quite a good sense of humour.

LISTEN: Merrick Interviews Hero Qantas Pilot Richard De Crespigny | Merrick And The Highway Patrol | Triple M (http://www.triplem.com.au/sydney/shows/merrick-watts-highway-patrol/blog/listen-merrick-interviews-hero-qantas-pilot-richard-de-crespigny/20120726-gtlk.html)

I think the the PA is great:ok:

[What The]

He didn't "pass" due to the route check being terminated when the severity of the problem became apparent. He did not "fail" he just did not complete the check as it was discontinued.

[Arm out the window]

According to the radio interview, once the check captains had an input, that meant the route check was void.

He said when the checker told him that on the phone he was extremely pissed off and said to his wife something along the lines of 'what the hell do you have to do to pass a route check then?'

[Keg]

Lol. Manage the flight without the input of the checkie. Pretty elementary really. :ok:

We've all known that since day dot so I'd be surprised if his mood was one of disappointment and being hacked off? More one of irony. We're those his words though? Was he actually cranky at the check being voided?

[ChrisJ800]

I read the book and took the words that he did not not pass with the irony and tongue in cheek that they were written in. He properly used the 2 check captains eg asked them to calculate the approach speed, so a 'non pass' is not the same as a fail:=

[Mud Skipper]

ChrisJ800 I read the book

OK that's one copy he sold:hmm:

[Arm out the window]

I'm pretty sure the gist of his words in the RN breakfast interview were that he did initially feel angry when told he hadn't passed his route check ... understandable, I guess, in that you would probably feel you'd been through one of the most stringent tests possible and therefore should be entitled to a pass on the strength of that!

Grounds for some early feelings of indignance, but obviously the requirements of the route check had been compromised so the flight didn't count on that score. Plus it's a good tag line to finish the book on...

[wilcoleaks]

Actioned 125 checklists according to the MMM interview.

No wonder they were holding for some time!!!!!!!!!

Does the A380 have a QRH or is it all digital/paperless?

[jaded boiler]

Well done Richard. :ok: (and his crew:D)

[training wheels]

According to the radio interview, once the check captains had an input, that meant the route check was void.

I would have thought that was good CRM to use all your available resources in an emergency situation. :confused:

[BuzzBox]

A route check is supposed to test a pilot's ability to complete a typical line operation from start to finish. This flight was anything but 'typical' and the commander was quite correct involving the entire flight deck crew in managing the situation.

As others have said, the 'check' would have been terminated as a result of what happened, but that doesn't mean he failed. I think the bit about 'I didn't pass' was more than a little tongue in cheek.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Just finished the book and enjoyed it immensely. Have met RdC a couple of times and shared several beers with him one night, and have found him most engaging and not the slightest bit self-promoting.

Celebrate a successful outcome, and let the tall poppies flourish!

[Transition Layer]

Any mention in the book about his industrial relations views and clarification of his absurd statement re: Junior QF pilots and their command "opportunities" abroad?

[Capt Kremin]

Yes, anything there? If anyone here is detecting antipathy towards RDC from the QF pilots here, be advised, it is not due to his actions on the flight deck.

[DutchRoll]

For the non QF types here, any check, ie route check or sim check, can be marked as "incomplete".

A classic example is when the sim breaks down right in the middle of your licence renewal. It's not a pass, but it's not a fail either. It's just marked as "incomplete", but unfortunately you have to start it all over again from scratch on another day. Everybody in QF knows that it just means something happened not of your doing and you couldn't finish the check.

During one sim check I did, we ran out of time due to various circumstances beyond the control of the checky. I was only two sequences from the end, but it didn't count and I had to do the entire sim all over again a week or 2 later. :mad: :mad:

RDC did (and still does) cop some significant heat over industrial comments publicly made not long after the incident which were very ill-advised. Many QF blokes felt extremely let down.

[M Taylor]

Understood it just wasn't completed. Really don't know why he bothered mentioning it, just looked like a parting shots because it was the last words of book. Good read anyway IMHO

[ChrisJ800]

Any mention in the book about his industrial relations views and clarification of his absurd statement re: Junior QF pilots and their command "opportunities" abroad?

No not that I recall. By the way the book is surprisingly highly readable (in my opinion!).

[sru]

Without getting into the nitty gritty of systems etc, the book was well written, and honest, I felt. It was "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate !" Three core principles of our job, that gets lost so, in often the system.

Control checks after an abnormal, may get lost in the airline system and not discussed, but in my experience, starting with my PPL, it was discussed and practiced. On a basic level it was to find the minimum speed you would have control of the aircaft during landing. I have applied the same to a good outcome at least twice.

I think the approach would be varied according to, weather your a dot point man or a feel it in your seat man. In the end there is more than one way to "skin a cat", the result is in the outcome.

This was the best possible outcome ... So who are we to question actions, when the improbable happened, which was unique with no consideration or training.:confused:

This was "airmanship", and was shown by ALL the crew. Well Done !:D

[crwjerk]

The check could have easily been written up as complete if the checker so desired.

[HF3000]

What's the big deal about the control checks? This is a fly-by-wire machine.

You might think it's a good idea in your Seneca but is there any evidence this was wise in an A380?

[...still single]

What's the big deal about the control checks? This is a fly-by-wire machine.

You might think it's a good idea in your Seneca but is there any evidence this was wise in an A380?

Umm... Yes! You're absolutely right! A total waste of time.

On a completely unrelated topic, who do you fly for?

[ejectx3]

Are you serious hf3000? God help us

[Keg]

This was the best possible outcome ... So who are we to question actions, when the improbable happened, which was unique with no consideration or training.


I've said it once, I'll say it again, and I'll keep on saying it. A 'good outcome' does not mean that we can't question what went on, work out whether there were better ways of doing some things, and learning the lessons of what to do or what not to do. The final outcome of a safe landing doesn't mean that it was all hunky dory along the way.

If (heaven forbid) the wing had come off due to the internal damage whilst on final approach, we'd all be saying what dills they were for flogging around for an hour doing ECAM messages. Same decision making process, same CRM, but different outcome and therefore different judgement from the peanut gallery. I'm interested in what decisions went on and how it worked and the considerations that were discussed. The outcome can often be independent of all these things.

So not only is it a good thing to question what went on, I reckon we'd be silly NOT to question what went on. Of course, we need to do that knowing all the facts and that means waiting for the report. I've commented on this thread about my 'gut feeling' on a couple of issues but indicated that I'll wait for the report to firm up those thoughts. I have passed judgement on a couple of CRM points raised by the Captain in his own words so I reckon that's fair game.

[MASTEMA]

Have to agree with Keg. Actually according to the report all the checks were completed within 50 mins and it then took another 50 mins to land.

It appears that most on this forum do not consider RED LAND ASAP as an imperative.

According to the report, there was a fire warning initially and there was a serious fuel leak.

Same scenario, if the fire warning had not extinguished after expending the agents, is two hours too long to get back on the ground?

How long should it take?

[Helmut Smokar]

If the fire warning remained or the turbine overheat condition remained, I guess you would hang the rest of the problems and deal with the greatest threat, an airborne fire :hmm:

In this case the result would have been a confusing approach with contradicting warnings and indications, most properly a runway over run and possible gear collapse, with ensuing fire and emergency evacuation and maybe loss of life.
Guess luck is a bitch!

The one thing I have leaned about aviation is there is no shortage of experts telling the world how they would have handled the latest incident or accident. Tell you what, have a bat for real, not in the comfort of a simulator or even worse your home office, then get back on here and critique the actions or decisions of others. Bet you don't! Because you may actually have a clue by then. :D

[Arm out the window]

Bet you don't!

Bet I would, because constructive critique and discussion is what counts.

Most of us have had heartbeat-raising occurrences airborne which could have ended badly - maybe not as extreme as this case, but bad enough, and it's fair enough to have your say if the conjecture is well-founded and will contribute to a balanced discussion.

[MASTEMA]

Arm otw

Spot on!

Helmut

"...most properly a runway over run and possible gear collapse, with ensuing fire and emergency evacuation and maybe loss of life."

You have lost me here. According to the report the systems assessed to be available after 50mins were; Gear Down, 3 engines, rev #3, flap 3, max braking, anti skid and 4000m of dry runway, with good overrun. (Thank goodness they weren't in SYD or MEL.) Not a bad position to be in, so why would there be a an overrun, etc if you landed sooner rather waiting another 50 mins? I think the likelihood of the fuel leak igniting following the engine explosion is the greater threat. (as per the Concorde crash)
As I asked earlier, what if the computer said you required greater than 4000m, what then?

As far as that bet goes, I lost an engine (birdstrike) on a widebody twin just after takeoff from Vienna and we (three crew) were back on the ground in 35 mins. We didnt feel rushed, the weather wasn't great but it felt just like the SIM and we didnt overrun the runway. Oh and I dont have a book coming out either ;)

35YearPilot (Richard?)

Just received a clip of the interview with you and the girls on The Circle, very nice except you seemed caught up in the gushing moment and misunderstood some of their questions. I haven't read your book and although buying it will no doubt make you all the wealthier, would you mind giving us some straight answers to the questions posed here on Pprune for discussion?

As far as I can see, no one is having a go and all the kudos to you for making a safe landing. It is simply a case of comparision; "how would I have managed it?" and most interestingly, "how would a non-QF crew handle it?" (without QF 001 weighing on their minds).

No doubt it will become a SIM recurrent in the future and I would be very interested in what the QF training department consider a reasonable timeframe for return to land, all things considered.

Also as Keg pointed out, was a percautionary evacuation in order? Personally, after two hours and then the engine not shutting down, I would have.

[noip]

Whilst I know I won't change anyone's mind, a couple of points that appear to have been overlooked..

(Helmut - what you said :) )

Mastema ..

Your list of the available systems to the crew is innacurate. In addition, (from memory) they had only one engine reverser available, increased touchdown speed (about 170 kt or so) from reduced leading edge devices and being overweight, reduced braking owing to reduced ground spoiler capability. At the time of the landing, one of the three captains who did the "best guess" landing capability worked out they had 100m surplus on a 4,000 m runway. Why "best guess"? Because they had so many failures they had to work out which were the most significant. Even so, with manual braking, they had the brake pedals "on the floor".

Whilst I'm pleased your engine failure was so straight-forward, I'd suggest that it bore no relationship to the situation that is being discussed here for complexity.

To those who are puzzled why the crew ignored some "Land ASAP" instruction, you may remember a section of your aircraft's manual which emphasises that checklists do not cover all situations, some of which may need some brain neurons to evaluate the situation and decide what to do based on checklist advice. Seems to me that this was such a situation.

I still rather like Helmut's post on the original QF32 thread, about post no 1035 or so ....


N

[Capt Claret]

It seems obvious that the smart money is on the need for Airbus to change the ECAM warning to read,

Land Immediately.

[MASTEMA]

noip

Not looking for a pissing contest, just quoting from the ATSB prelim report and in the words of Richard (nee Appollo 13) "focusing on what was avaiable, not was unavailable..."

The link and direct quotes are below therefore, I believe I listed the systems accurately. I don't agree that the landing distance was a 'best guess', given the report below.

I also still consider the systems available were very reasonable (considering similar incidents in the past) and they had the other advantage to be in SIN not SYD, where an overrun would not be pretty.

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/2888854/ao-2010-089%20preliminary%20report.pdf

"This second calculation indicated that a landing on runway 20C was feasible, with 100 m of runway remaining. The crew elected to proceed on the basis of that calculation"

"The landing performance application indicated a required approach speed of 166 kts."

"The crew was aware that reverse thrust was available only from the #3 engine, anti-skid was restricted to the body gear only, there was limited nose wheel steering. An ECAM message indicated they could not apply maximum braking until the nose wheel was on the runway. The flaps were extended to position 3."
NB: The A380 only has reverse on Engines #2 and #3

[donpizmeov]

I know its very unAustralian, but I would like to say well done to the crew. Dramatic failure, with an outcome of the aeroplane able to be fixed and no-one was hurt.
I think the no-one being hurt thing would have been different if the PAX were thrown off via the slides. Thank god this crew was professional enough to know that was not required.
To compare this incident with a bird strike, engine shutdown and return is a sign of someone screaming for love and attention. What a Muppet.

The Don

PS. The red LAND ASAP is driven by a failure. It does not consider ALL the failures. Pilots get the rock star salary to determine how long the appropriate ASAP is. Which would appear to be the case in the QF32 incident.

[MASTEMA]

Apologies to all, I have just had a look at the "Qantas A380 uncontained #2 engine failure" thread and now understand that you all have already completely torn to bits we 'muppets' who dare to discuss this incident, in the interest of improving our own flight management skills.

Clearly 'The Don' et al have it scunned and there is absolutely only one way this cat could have been skinned.

[catch18]

Well done to Capt Rdc regarding the inflight emergency.

He handles the media very well, is australian and a hero. Could he be the next CEO?

We have some larger than life Iron ore magnates...

At the very least, he should be on next years dancing with the Stars!!!!!
He can land a crippled jet, but can he Tango?

[Helmut Smokar]

You have lost me here. According to the report the systems assessed to be available after 50mins were; Gear Down, 3 engines, rev #3, flap 3, max braking, anti skid and 4000m of dry runway, with good overrun. (Thank goodness they weren't in SYD or MEL.) Not a bad position to be in, so why would there be a an overrun, etc if you landed sooner rather waiting another 50 mins? I think the likelihood of the fuel leak igniting following the engine explosion is the greater threat. (as per the Concorde crash)
As I asked earlier, what if the computer said you required greater than 4000m, what then?

As Noip said, you don't have the facts. That's my point entirely. If an imidiate return was executed because of a greater threat the crew would not have had the facts either. I'm only guessing the possible outcome because I don't actually know.
Imagine you comence the approach knowing what you have written above, only to find out "flaps 1" **** the slats are locked, during the approach "2500" you have one one LGIS indicating the gear not locked down the other indicating it is, this after discovering the only way to drop the gear is via gravity extension. Suprise! But because you are commited to the approach you continue "1000" amongst the sea of ECAM messages you haven't executed is a couple of gems.
You start flying a speed just above VLS 168kts, that will work. "500" "Stable" the ground is rushing up you have all four thrust levers staggered to maintain symmetrical thrust "SPEED SPEED SPEED" you think **** why is it doing that, you bump up the thrust 175kts. "100" your hunting the aim point "STALL STALL STALL" you give it some thrust and "50" start to flare "40" "30" "10" your on! Not bad, touchdown 1500 Ft in at 171Kts. The nose bucks up, WTF is it doing that for? "Ground Spoilers" "REV GREEN" "No DECEL" No problem you get the nose down and push the brake pedals in, it just isn't slowing down you push the to the floor. Mid field rushes by, It starts to pull up, its hunkers down as the brakes start to really bite in. The far end threshold markers come in to view, just maybe we aren't going to stop? "70 KTS" you still have REV in and your feet to the floors, is it Loss of Braking? No we are slowing down, we just don't have enough runway. Suprise! .............

Post event you hear about the other failures you didn't know about, buried in a mass of ECAM messages you didn't have time to run. Half spoilers, no wing anti skid and so on........... I think if a fire actually existed the result may have been entirely different. But it didn't.

Nice approach RDC :D:D no one can ever take that away from you.


As for your last question I guess you would try touching down on the keys!?? Maybe thats the reason you do visual approaches with no approach slope guidance in the cyclic matrix??

Anyhow keep rabbiting on, when you have had a bat get back to me :hmm:

[Keg]

Seriously?

If we're going to do hypotheticals, imagine its gone down the way the crew did it and then at 1500' on final they get a decent gust, the wing buckles, the aeroplane rolls over and spears in. What if on downwind the fuel leak caught on fire? What if whilst parked on the ground waiting for the stairs, the wing caught on fire and blew up? All of those things were possibilities.

My point is NOT that they should have landed immediately. My question is whether there are issues that I can learn from and do better if faced with a similar situation. The ONLY way to do that is to critically examine what this crew did.

We're I to end up in a similar situation I'd hope people would do the same with my decisions. I hope I'm man enough to wear it and admit the areas where I could have done better rather than fall back on 'good outcome so don't crticise'.

[Helmut Smokar]

As you said previously, I'll wait to the final report. Anything else is hypothetical. ;)

[Helmut Smokar]

Btw Keg the last fantasy outcome was directed at MASTEMA. His Bird strike story was truly touching. :rolleyes:
Remind me to tell you the story of how I ran the City2Surf it was exactly like Robert De Castella's finish in the 1981 Fukuoka Marathon.:E

[MASTEMA]

Helmut

I have only quoted facts from the ATSB report, not made up my own fantasies.

Smoking all those 'helmets' and indulging in all that fantasy (or is it the desert air?) must be the secret to your superior flight management skills.

Again, apologies to all for being so naive to ask if there was more than one way to skin this particular cat and possibly learn something new.

[sheppey]

Am I the only one that gets the uncomfortable feeling that this whole captain hero thing has been done to death via QF PR people, the media jocks etc. And now we have the captain invited to speaking tours about how he and his team saved the day.

I wouldn't mind betting that the captain would have preferred to have just gone quietly home and put another entry into his log book. Instead the poor bugger is forced to play the true blue team member where the team was the collective heros of the plot. In every interview he accentuates the team input. Certainly the politically correct thing to do. The whole hoopla is getting worse than the bloody Olympics.

[theheadmaster]

Ahh, sheppy, you obviously don't know the man personally. The latest round of publicity has not come randomly from the media or Qantas, it has come from the man himself to promote his book. Previous speaking engagements were made by him for money. Look online, you will se he is 'managed' for speaking engagements.

Those that know him can see how the outcomes fit neatly with the personality. The others on that flight deck have quietly gone about their daily lives without seeking fame or fortune.

[amos2]

Am I missing something here?...

Does "Land ASAP" not mean "Land ASAP" ? :rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes:

[sheppey]

Those that know him can see how the outcomes fit neatly with the personality

Oh - I see.:ugh:

[Capt Fathom]

Does "Land ASAP" not mean "Land ASAP"

Well yes, it does!

But what it does not say is Land Immediately, which is what a few people here seem to think the intent of LAND ASAP is!

[Ned Gerblansky]

To MASTEMA,

I was an airbus captain, but fortunately flew Boeings and was taught by the people that built those marvellous aeroplanes in the place where they were built. The red "LAND ASAP" in airbus speak generally means for airbus pilots to go "Woooolllooooollloo! We must put this plastic froggy ****-box on the ground immediately."

This is surely the path to an easy death. More people have been killed by the immediate return, than those who stay clear of the ground (the only thing that can kill you) and SORT OUT THE PROBLEM.

Get the crew and ATC involved, contact company, engineering, and fly the friggin aircraft. Double hydraulics failure in an airbutt is red "LAND ASAP". You really gonna do that? Ever tried triple hyd failure in the sim?

Grow up. You have a brain, two eyes and a crew to help, Those who worked for "The best airline Ever (to go broke)" always told me that you can never land with any outstanding ECAM. Bollocks!

RPTC de Crespingy had used experience to determine what the problem was, what actions had to be taken - and did so. Landed with 84 Ecams outstanding.

Well done, I say

The fact you're capitalising on it now - poor show!

Ned G
Mmmmmmbzzzgdarlingmmzz

[MASTEMA]

Capt Fathom

According to Airbus and many other reputable resources, ‘LAND ASAP' is defined as "within 60 mins".

During this serious (and very important learning) event, all checklists were complete within 50 mins of engine #2 exploding and the subsequent serious fuel leak commencing. (Ref: ATSB report)

It was 236 mins (almost 4hrs) until engine #1 was finally suffocated by the fire crew, while the serious fuel leak continued and various ignition sources prevailed . (Ref: ATSB report)

More than a few people here (including yourself) seem to think this is completely irrelevant and acceptable.

[framer]

I don't really get why people are bagging him. His motivation was no doubt to get everybody off with the least injuries sustained. He made decisions to achieve this to the best of his ability.
If you would have made different decisions that's fine and probably worth discussing, but we know the outcome of his decisions, the only thing that we can be sure of about the outcome of your decisions is that there wouldn't have been less injuries. The outcome would have been equal or worse.

[donpizmeov]

The land ASAP is attached to some ECAMs. In this case, since there was no fire warning, I would guess it would have been linked to the fuel leak ECAM. It refers only to the ECAM to which it is linked. It does not take into account multiple failures. After takeoff, with the feed tanks fullish of fuel the fuel leak may not have been considered as concerning as the stopping problem of being in the highish 400t low 500t weight range, having over half the anti-skid inop, having no slats.
The LPC at that time had a problem doing landing calcs with some combinations of these failures. Hence the best guess result was a number only 100m less than the LDA. There is no page 4.03 in the QRH to help with these calcs. The only way of reducing the landing distance required in this case was to reduce landing weight.
Remember also Vapp was increased due to the no slats. This speed did not consider any lateral imbalance due to fuel leak.
Airbus might suggest landing within 60min of a red LAND ASAP, however it also has 180/240 ETOPS on its twins, I don't think they would expect you to ditch after an hour, but would rather prefer you did some pilot sh@t and risk manage. As I said the land ASAP is triggered by certain ECAMs by the Flight Warning Computers. It is no smarter than that.

[Rashid Bacon]

This what the manufacturer recommends:


LAND ASAP RED


Land as soon as possible at the nearest suitable airport at which a safe approach and landing can be made.
· Fire
· Dense Smoke
· All Engine Flameout
· Emergency Electrical Configuration
· Degraded Aircraft Handling Characteristics

LAND ASAP AMBER


Advice to the flight crew to consider landing at the nearest suitable airport.

· Where the aircraft can land safely
· Possibility to consider other criteria
o Approach navaids and lighting available
o Rescue and Fire Fighting Service availability
o Pilot’s familiarity with the airport
o Information about the airport provided to the pilot by the operator

[Arm out the window]

I think it's fair to say that, given the multiple systems failures and uncertainty about what was or wasn't available, the idea of how quickly they were 'supposed' to land based on recommended procedures was irrelevant.

Clearly there were many reasons to get on the ground fast, but also things to sort out first. I imagine it would have been readily apparent to all that the situation was urgent!

[framer]

The people who wrote the definition of the red LAND ASAP. Had never considered this exact scenario though. If he had quoted word for word the definition of red LAND ASAP aloud to his crew and then over run by 100m because the ramifications of no leading edge devices and degraded brakes had not been understood, folks would no doubt be saying he should have displayed a bit of airmanship and fully understood the situation prior to rushing in. So you see, he was going to stuff it up in the eyes of some folk no matter what he did.
Good on you RDC for the decades of disciplined career development that enabled you to achieve a great result.

[jimmyconway]

I'm enjoying the book. I'm about halfway through and finding it very interesting and well written.

[rob_ginger]

To all the people banging on about the "LAND ASAP" ECAM message - a question for you:

If the ECAM said "MOON PAX NOW" would you immediately open the cockpit door, turn round, drop your strides, and bend over ?

If the answer is "Yes" then please post your name and airline on this thread and I'll make sure *never* to fly with you. I know the chances of that happening are much less than an uncontained turbine failure, but nevertheless I don't like taking needless risks.

[theheadmaster]

I'm enjoying the book. I'm about halfway through and finding it very interesting and well written.

I wonder who wrote it.

[Capt Claret]

The 717 QRH does not use the term As Soon As Possible with regard to landing for any abnormal or emergency.

As best I can recall the DH8 QRH used As Soon As Practicable.

Is it possible that the Airbus ECAM message ASAP is Practicable rather than possible?

[unseen]

Is it possible that the Airbus ECAM message ASAP is Practicable rather than possible?

It does - by requiring the crew to assess the suitability of the airport to land at as well as whether or not a safe approach and landing can be made.

It does not say land right away ignoring all other considerations.

[MASTEMA]

Ned et al

This was intended to be an intelligent discussion of "how would you handle this event"? Nowhere during this discussion have I derided Capt RdC, in fact I praised him in the early posts.

It appears that most here believe (including the QF32) that the greatest threat was a landing overrun.

Using my brain :}and the ATSB report, I would contend that the greatest threat was the severe fuel leak (red LAND ASAP) following the engine explosion and the multiple ignition sources, which remained for 4 hours.

From the ATSB report, all checks were complete after 50mins and the available systems and runway condition known (gear down, F3, 3 engs, rev#3, antiskid, max braking, nws, 4000m dry rwy, etc)

I have never suggested landing without preparation. For this event I would suggest that the long stable approach could have been commenced just after the 50min mark, which fits with the 60min ballpark for red LAND ASAP.

Remember, it is just a discussion based on the facts in the ATSB report, no need to get Neanderthal.

[Helmut Smokar]

Ok Mate
First of all your info is duff.
It took around 50 minutes to get to STATUS! After that there is all the other **** you have to do, Limitations 2 Pages, Review Deferred Procedures, Inop System Redundancy 3 Pages and 2 More pages of Alerts affecting landing performance.
and the calculation required. CRM discussion about the general situation, control checks, it had 2 of 3 ailerons inop on the left wing and half the spoilers! you sort of want to make sure it's flyable before you come charging in! set up for the approach, get vectored for the approach run the deferred procedures, gravity gear extension (that alone takes two minutes!)and land! all up it took about an hour due to the large volume of ****. So it's not like they were just hanging around chewing the fat!:rolleyes:
My recommendations if you are truly interested is 1 Read RDC's book for an overview, 2 wait for the ATSB Final report and read that, I imagine it will be a book in its self. 3 when you have a handle on the facts, start another thread titled Lessons from QF32.
I can't really see any point in continuing a critique of the event. so I give up.
The Book however and RDC's radio stuff (hence the name of the thread) go for it.

[Lookleft]

Did RDC write the book or was it written with someone?

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Straight after finishing RdC's story about QF32, I downloaded Fighter Pilot - Misadventures beyond the sound barrier with a real Topgun by Mac 'Serge' Tucker on the weekend.

Awkward title, but what a great read! A no punches pulled story about his (too short) career as an RAAF Hornet driver, with some great warries and poignant moments thrown in for good measure. As Molly would say, do yourself a favour...

Nice one Serge!:ok: