V22 Osprey discussion thread Mk II [Archive]

21stCen

12th Feb 2012, 11:47

Exclusive: Pentagon budget eyes $178.8 bln for R&D, procurement

By Andrea Shalal-Esa (http://blogs.reuters.com/search/journalist.php?edition=us&n=andrea.shalal.esa&)
WASHINGTON | Sat Feb 11, 2012 3:33pm EST

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Pentagon's $525 billion budget plan for fiscal 2013 calls for spending of $178.8 billion to develop and buy new warships, fighter jets and other major weapons, a 7.5 percent drop from the level initially projected for the coming year, according to a detailed budget document obtained by Reuters.
The total acquisition spending amount is about 12.2 percent down from the level the Pentagon requested in last year's budget, the document shows.
The fiscal 2013 plan foresees spending of $109.1 billion for procurement and $69.7 billion for research and development, compared with earlier projections of $117.6 billion for procurement and $75.7 billion for R&D.
The document shows that the U.S. military is maintaining high levels of spending on most aircraft and ships as it shifts its focus to the Asia Pacific region, a new military strategy announced last month by President Barack Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.
At the same time, funding for ground vehicle programs will be far lower as the U.S. military reduces the size of the Army and Marine Corps after 10 years of war in Afghanistan (http://www.reuters.com/places/afghanistan) and Iraq.
Panetta last month gave highlights of the 2013 budget, his first as defense secretary and the first that takes into account a deficit-reducing measure passed by Congress that requires cuts of $487 billion from projected spending over the next decade.
It is also the first Pentagon budget since the September 11, 2001, attacks that requests less funding than the year before.
Weapons makers like Lockheed Martin Corp, Boeing Co, Northrop Grumman Corp, General Dynamics Corp, Huntington Ingalls Corp and Raytheon Co have been anxiously awaiting details about their programs.
The Pentagon is due to formally release the details on Monday when Obama sends his 2013 budget request to Congress, which must approve the spending plan.
AIRCRAFT FUNDING DOWN
The plan for the 2013 fiscal year, which begins on October 1, requests $9.17 billion for the Pentagon's biggest weapons program, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, down slightly from $9.25 billion requested in fiscal 2012.
That includes $2.7 billion for ongoing development of the radar-evading supersonic jet, and $6.15 billion to pay for 29 jets, down from $6.33 billion for 31 jets in 2012.
Panetta announced last month that the Pentagon would slow the ramp-up in production of the new fighter to allow more time for testing and avert costly retrofits.
Overall spending on aircraft programs will drop 12 percent to $47.6 billion in fiscal 2013 from $54.2 billion in the fiscal 2012 budget request, mainly due to a 41 percent drop in funding for the Lockheed-built C-130J transport plane, and a 32 percent cut in funding for the V-22 Osprey.
The Pentagon proposed spending $835 million on seven more C-130J airlifters in fiscal 2013, down from $1.43 billion for 12 planes in fiscal 2012.
Funding for the V-22, a tilt-rotor aircraft built by Boeing and Bell Helicopter, a unit of Textron Inc, would drop to $1.91 billion for 21 aircraft, from $2.8 billion for 35 planes in fiscal 2012.
The plan foresees spending of $1.25 billion for six high-altitude unmanned Global Hawk spy planes built by Northrop Grumman - three for NATO and three for the Navy. Panetta announced last month that the Pentagon was cancelling work on the Air Force's Block 30 variant.
The plan would increase funding for the AH-64 Apache helicopter built by Boeing by 55 percent, funding 40 remanufactured helicopters and 10 new aircraft. Northrop Grumman
and Lockheed also have a big role in the program.
Funding for the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter built by Sikorsky Aircraft, a unit of United Technologies Corp, would continue a five-year procurement agreement with $1.3 billion for 59 of the twin-engine helicopters.
GROUND VEHICLE BUDGET DROPS 32 PERCENT
The Pentagon's spending plan includes $10.9 billion for ground vehicles, 32 percent less than the $16 billion requested in fiscal 2012. The new request includes $117 million for continued development of a new light tactical vehicle for the Army and Marine Corps and a heavier new Ground Combat Vehicle.
Funding for the Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles built by Oshkosh Corp would drop to $58.1 million for 1,534 vehicles from $650 million for 9,336 vehicles funded in fiscal 2012.
Missile defense spending would remain fairly stable at $9.7 billion under the fiscal 2013 request, maintaining work on several air and missile defense capabilities such as the Patriot PAC-3 missile built by Lockheed.
It would fund the MEADS joint program with Italy and Germany (http://www.reuters.com/places/germany) at $400.9 million, completing development testing.
Shipbuilding programs would get $22.6 billion in the fiscal 2013 request, down from $24 billion in the fiscal 2012 request. That will fund 2 Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines, 2 DDG-51 destroyers, 4 Littoral Combat Ships and the first year of construction of a second new aircraft carrier.
Space programs would get $8 billion, a drop of 22 percent from the $10 billion requested in fiscal 2012, due to fewer satellites and launches, and the cancellation of Northrop's Defense Weather Satellite System.

Exclusive: Pentagon budget eyes $178.8 bln for R&D, procurement | Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/11/us-usa-budget-pentagon-idUSTRE81A0IF20120211)

SASless

12th Feb 2012, 11:57

Venanzi said autorotation tests have been conducted at altitude, and that “it doesn’t take much altitude” to achieve a power-off full flair to a sink rate of zero fpm.

Agusta Test Piot Veranzi talking of flight tests on the Civil Tiltrotor.

What about the Osprey.....isn't 1,600 feet the number given for the ability to achieve forward airspeed for a fixed wing type emergency landing and no ability to "auto-rotate"?

Certification requirements?

Safety standard criteria difference?

Design difference?

ospreydriver

12th Feb 2012, 15:54

Don't know who is giving out 1600' as a key altitude for a fixed wing emergency landing.

The V-22 does have the ability to autorotate.

SASless

12th Feb 2012, 17:19

Section 2.5 starting on page 27 discusses "Autorotation" in detail, the procedures, probability, shortcomings, and training. It is an older document (circa 2001) but I would assume it is still valid as to describing the situation....and that suggested improvements in training, simulators, and NATOPs procedures have been made.

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/v22-report.pdf

I may be getting old and worry about my mortality more than I used to do...but even at spending 30% of my flight time in a phase of flight where the lack of a viable auto rotational capability might prove deadly....it would give one pause for thought.

If it isn't 1600 feet....what does the H/V diagram look like?

Jack Carson

12th Feb 2012, 18:42

I have no doubt that the V-22 has the ability to establish an autorotative descent. The report provided by SASless clearly states that, “that the probability of a successful autorotational landing from a stable autorotative descent is very low.” As a result the manufacturer implies that the recommend method of landing with both engines inoperative would be an airplane type glide to a touchdown to a hard surface. SASless, it sounds as it 30% is the best one might see. From my perspective nearly 100% of the time a viable autorotation is not a choice. An airplane mode glide to a touchdown gets my vote as the procedure of choice, if for no other reason than that it will provide a little additional time to sort out the situation while inroute to the mishap site.

SASless

12th Feb 2012, 23:17

If I had the time and interest I would go back through the thread and find the information John Dixson posted that detailed the Emergency Procedures and a discussion of the H/V diagram which showed a fair old height being required for the transition from Hover Mode into a No-Engines Operating Airplane Glide. It was startling to see how high one needed to be in order to achieve a proper Glide Speed and descent rate.

As the Marines say...it is not a helicopter....it is a tilt rotor and thus cannot be expected to autorotate like a helicopter.:E

Also...the odds of having a dual engine failure is quite remote....but possible as we all know about "Sod's Law".:{

The trick will be operating in the Hover Mode at heights lower than required to make that transition....where one cannot autorotate or go gliding....not that will ever happen mind you!:oh:

The difficulty of a transition from Hover Mode to an authoritative descent and landing must rather sporty as it is only done in the Simulator....and unless I misunderstand....it was not done in much detail during testing.

The other quote I found interesting is the Civil version has a different system for controlling the prop rotors angles and uses "Detents". I wonder why the difference and which system is the better? Could it be the Military froze the design in order to get into production and decided not to use the "Detent" method as Agusta has for the 609.

Lonewolf_50

13th Feb 2012, 14:13

Ospreydriver: curious.
Do you guys do practice autos in the Sims?

That Rate of Descent I saw in a NATOPS manual (not sure how current it is) looked pretty sporting!

Looks like a tough maneuver from the description.

FH1100 Pilot

13th Feb 2012, 15:00

Venanzi said autorotation tests have been conducted at altitude, and that “it doesn’t take much altitude” to achieve a power-off full flair (sic) to a sink rate of zero fpm.

SAS (and everyone else), what Pietro Venanzi was obviously talking about there was the ability of the 609 to flare (correct spelling) to zero sink rate while already established in an auto. He's clearly trying to appease the critics who say the tilt-rotor cannot autorotate to a safe landing.

Presumably, a run-on landing in helicopter mode would be less risky than a forced-landing in King Air mode. Either way, the landing is going to be breathtaking! With regard to the former, imagine timing that flare? Hoo! But even King Air pilots don't practice dual engine failure landings in real life - probably not even in the sim. Then again, King Airs aren't often asked to hover.

However, one has to chuckle a little at Venanzi's clever use of that vague, "doesn't take much" phrase. Sooooo...how much is "not much?" And how much more "not much" would it take for the heavier V-22 to flare to zero fpm in an auto? Ah, semantics, gotta love them.

When it comes to engine failures, we know that the transition from hover-to-stabilized-auto or hover-to-airplane-mode is going to take up quite a bit of altitude. But let's dismiss the idea of having a dual engine failure while hovering and then transitioning to airplane mode. When would that ever happen? When would a V-22 be hovering high enough to even consider such a procedure?

On the other hand, if both of an Osprey's engines quit when it's cruising along up high, it becomes a bank safe with little stubby wings. Look for something soft to land on (hopefully near a hospital), not Interstate-10.

If you have a dual engine failure at the end of a flight when you're on approach and transitioned back to helicopter mode, you're pretty much screwed; we understand this. But you would have to be having a REALLY bad day. (Hopefully nobody would experience a dual engine failure on take-off.)

It's a compromise aircraft. Those who fly it (and fly in it) accept those compromises that come with the increased capability. They look at the instances of dual engine failures in existing multi-engine aircraft and they consider the risk of that particular emergency to be low enough to not worry about.

SASless

13th Feb 2012, 16:14

Osprey Driver.....found a reference to the 1600 Feet AGL number.

The proper wording should be "....following sudden dual engine failure or failure of the operating engine in OEI Flight....".

Indeed, the 2005 OT-IIG report itself says in reference to “emergency landing profiles following sudden dual-engine failure” that: “dependent on altitude, the aircraft flight manual directs conversions to airplane mode or autorotation.”167 Yet this report’s own executive summary states: “Emergency landing after the sudden failure of both engines in the Conversion/Vertical Take-Off and Landing modes below 1,600 feet altitude are not likely to be survivable. ... The V-22 cannot [author emphasis] autorotate to a safe landing.”168 A subsequent comment in the summary states: “Additional flight tests should be conducted to provide validated procedures for dual-engine failure.”169 Any volunteers? Clearly, safe engine-out landing is a major unresolved issue for the V-22.

SansAnhedral

13th Feb 2012, 17:42

The 1600' remark can actually be attributed to (OT-IIG)

http://pogoarchives.org/m/dp/dp-V22-dote-092005.pdf

Page 35 under dual engine failure

To convert the nacelles from 60 to 0 degrees requires about 8 seconds and the aircraft must be above ground level by 1600' in order to complete the conversion prior to impact

I'm not sure how the 8 second/1600' statistic relationship is derived (a standard decent rate?), and I am even less sure how this conversion time yields a "not likely to be survivable" conclusion.

Emergency landing after the sudden failure of both engines in the Conversion/Vertical Take-Off and Landing modes below 1,600 feet altitude are not likely to be survivable

It seems to me that should read, "Full conversion from 60 to 0 degrees of nacelle tilt cannot be achieved in under 8 seconds of 1600' of decent time @ XXX fps"

SAS, where is your quoted text from?

SASless

13th Feb 2012, 18:17

Page 298.....Operational Suitability

Original quote came from the Gailliard article....

http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2005/pdf/annex/2005v-22xs.pdf

http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/gailliard%20on%20v-22.pdf

Mr. Gaillard seems a bit unimpressed with the Osprey....and reading his paper does raise some interesting questions. One example that I just read....

the countermeasures dispensing system was found to have insufficient capacity for longer missions, and radar reflection from the V-22’s total propeller disc area of more than 2,267 square feet rivals that of two Boeing 707s in formation.146 (Given that situation, one can only wonder at the logic behind the development of top-secret “stealth paint” for the fuselage at a cost of $7,500 per gallon; the one aircraft they painted required 10 gallons for a paint job costing $75,000—but those huge, whirling discs were still there, bouncing back radar signals with gusto.)

SansAnhedral

13th Feb 2012, 22:30

Sure enough, its there, i missed it in scanned version I linked to.

My question as to how that conclusion was arrived at remains.

Mr. Gaillard seems a bit unimpressed with the Osprey

You dont say?

ospreydriver

14th Feb 2012, 03:56

God bless...I can't believe I'm in this discussion again.

To clean up some smaller issues...

"Detents." I'm not an expert on the 609, but to my knowledge, it doesn't have 0-97 degrees of nacelle settings selectable by the pilot, but only some key settings representative of certain flight regimes or speeds. This isn't a flaw in either design. Long story short, the military design allows for more flexibility on the part of the pilot. Some scenarios call for use of nacelles, e.g. big changes in airspeed. Some require nose attitude, e.g. small adjustments. The military environment is tactical, and thus more dynamic than the civil one. The civil "detent" concept is probably easier to fly, but takes some control away from the pilot. The Osprey can set 0, or 60, or 90 degrees or whatever, but allows intermediate settings as the situation requires.

The Osprey doesn't auto as well as a helo. It autos well enough. It is practiced in the sim. That's no secret.

It glides decently as an APLN, and that's the preferred regime.

In a line squadron, it spends the vast majority of its time in APLN.

As others have said, it's a compromise between a helo and an airplane. It takes strengths and weaknesses from both.

The Marine Corps and Air Force have both decided that in the final analysis, those tradeoffs make sense. I concur. There will always be the corner cases where it isn't better, but in the vast majority of flight regimes, it is more survivable than other platforms. As a 46 turned 22 guy, I'll tell you that there are a lot fewer "land immediately" EPs in a V-22 than a 46.

SansAnhedral

14th Feb 2012, 14:44

These are identical sentiments to every single Marine I have ever spoken with who has been involved with Osprey operations...pilots, chiefs, commanders etc.

Cue up the critics conversation shift in this thread back to costs and OTH mission viability. Round and round we go, no doubt...

Lonewolf_50

14th Feb 2012, 14:51

Ospreydriver: thanks for you insights. :ok:

SASless

14th Feb 2012, 15:09

Of course the Marines do not want to discuss the Over The Horizion (OTH) issue as it cannot be defended with any reasonable basis. The concept sounds good...and if achieved would promise good results in budget battles against the other Forces within DOD.

In shrinking budgets of course Costs are important issues....again the Marines want to avoid the spotlight getting shined on the Osprey Program as it is a huge chunk of their budget.

Think what you want about the Osprey in operations it is fit for....but remember it was sold as being the answer to every mission conceivable which it plainly is not and never was.

When you pull out the stops to get your Program and keep your Program...and let yourself get carried away in that process....don't be surprised when a critical review finds fault with the advertising claims.

Now...with that being said....let's hear a Marine Corps summary of the OTH Strategy as it stands now...right now....and where has it been a success and where has it failed to meet expectations. What is the true capability of the USMC/USN re OTH. How many Billions have been spent...and what operational capability have they purchased? Did we (the US Taxpayer) get our money's worth?

I plainly think NOT! Did we get something...sure....but what and at what cost?

Osprey Driver and others that think highly of the Osprey are quite welcome to do so and have a basis upon which to make that evaluation. Likewise, as Professional Marines and probably readers of "Proceedings", "The Marine Gazette" and other DOD related professional outlets...they can form an opinion about OTH and its current status.

Perhaps some googling and quoting from those sources might lay out other informed evaluations.

No matter how one wishes to try....divorcing the Osprey Program from OTH is not reasonable as OTH was the driving motivation for the Osprey. In actuality, even if OTH is finally acknowledged to be a complete failure....the Marines will find valuable uses for the Osprey just not the one it was designed for and sold as being critical in need.

This article discusses the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) which was one of the three legs of the OTH Stool...the other two being the Osprey and the LCAC. If you take the time to read the article...compare the thrust of the argument to that of the Osprey program. Consider the EFV program was cancelled by DOD recently as it was a total failure....leaving OTH without a self deployable armored amphibious infantry fighting vehicle. The author politely evades the OTH discussion by stating it is beyond the scope of the article despite the impact success or failure of the AFV Program has on OTH.

Just as in the EFV Program....does not success or failure of the Osprey program not have a similar effect upon OTH?

The EFV | Marine Corps Gazette (http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/efv)

OD,

Having instructed in Simulators at two different helicopter manufactures....I am curious about the techniques used by the USMC in their Sim Training. What scenarios are used to do the Autorotations? It is well briefed, well planned, and done as a stand alone maneuver....or do you mix it up so at times the need to autorotate presents itself as an unannounced emergency situation. Do you introduce the evolution as being a second engine failure after some OEI flight?

What percentage of authoritative landings in the Sim are successful...no damage to the aircraft or occupants? Does that success rate improve with practice?

Lonewolf_50

14th Feb 2012, 20:32

SAS, having done some sim instructing my self, in the SH-2 and the SH-60, I cannot go back and give you all of the debriefing sheets from all of the events I ran,
but
I do recall more than a few "surprise" dual engine failures, or TRLOS (simulated in the 60 sim by losing the whole tail section aft of the IGB) that now and again got the "red screen of death" to appear in unannounced autorotation, and partial autorotation, scenarios. A surprise need to auto is a game of "behind the aircraft, how fast can you catch up" if there ever was one.

Newer sims are often more "like" the aircraft, but of course there are always "simisms" that you have to account for.

"Think what you want about the Osprey in operations it is fit for....but remember it was sold as being the answer to every mission conceivable which it plainly is not and never was."

Respectfully, no, you are making an incorrect assessment there.
V-22 was not intended to undertake the heavy lift mission.
I cannot understand where you get the idea that it was sold to meet heavy lift mission requirements.

CH-53E (CH-53K in a few years), are the Heavy Lifters, all juggling and shell games in re the CH-53D considered. :p

EDIT: A few years back, I had to become passing familiar with "operational maneuver from the sea" as a doctrinal template. The phasing of bringing assets ashore to the fight needed heavy lift for certain critical tasks and medium lift for most other tasks. Phrogs, at the time, were the medium lift workhorse. What V-22 does for medium lift is pretty good.

I don't know if that buzzword has any currency, since the past ten years have seen more of other sorts of operations, but the basics probably still apply, and are related to your "OTH" template.

SASless

14th Feb 2012, 22:33

I have never said it was to replace "heavy lift" aircraft or do the heavy lift mission. I have said repeatedly that it was billed as the replacement for the 46 and 53D citing official USMC statements that confirmed that. You are quite mistaken when you suggest I ever said otherwise.

The heavy transport task for OTH was to be done by the LCAC and CH-53E/K. The LCAC is seen as being too vulnerable to make beach assaults which is why the EFV and Osprey were seen as the "Assault Vehicles".

As the Osprey can carry only the Growler Vehicle and French Mortar system (Two Growlers each pulling a trailer or mortar) internally and only an unarmored Humvee externally...it certainly cannot meet the heavy lift tasking and was never supposed to do so.

A for instance....it was once going to be a minesweeper....but very quickly that tasking was dropped.

I have read as much as I can about the Osprey's difficult birthing....and if one reads widely it becomes patently obvious the Marines and other Osprey proponents way over hyped the machine and its abilities. They have had to walk back many of their statements.

They were so involved in defending the Osprey at one point intentional false reporting of progress and reliability came to light and resulted in serious repercussions for those found to be culpable.

Rather than continuing to argue about history....lets focus upon current events.

The Navy/Marine Corps are spending Billions of Taxpayer Dollars on OTH based equipment needs....one program was terminated after even its supporters admitted it was a total failure. Now we are left with a growing fleet of aircraft at great cost, a growing number of OTH Amphib ships that are being modified to new standards to accommodate those aircraft, while at the same time removing the multi-role capability they were initially designed to have. The USMC have fabricated at great expense and compromise of safety standards....a specialized vehicle that will fit inside the Osprey, and yet we still have no OTH capability to effectively accomplish that mission as called for by the Marine Senior Leadership.

Pardon me if I sound like I am unimpressed by the situation! All those Billions could have and should have been spent obtaining improved combat capability for the Marine Corps and not plain ol' squandered chasing a pipe dream.

The Marines are used to being at the bottom of the spending barrel....and from what I have seen in the EFV and Osprey programs they certainly suffer from not having the experience of spending money in the past as they sure have pissed away a huge chunk of money for no significant gain in their ability to field unified units of any size all the while chasing the elusive OTH Strategy imposed upon them by the Navy's decision to insist upon keeping Ships further at sea than in the past during Amphibious Assaults.

We have to remember all this spending was to provide the Marines with the ability to do large scale amphibious assaults.....and it has been an utter failure.

http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/MCBQ%20PAO%20Press%20Releases/090430%20CDI%20Docs/CDI_AmphibOps21stCent.pdf

SansAnhedral

15th Feb 2012, 16:06

SGA2012: USMC receives first Block C-configured MV-22 Osprey - News - Shephard (http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/rotorhub/sga2012-usmc-receives-first-block-c-configured-mv-/)

ROTORHUB

SGA2012: USMC receives first Block C-configured MV-22 Osprey

15 February 2012 - 6:41 by Beth Stevenson in Singapore

Bell and Boeing used the Singapore Airshow to announce that the first Block C configurated MV-22 Osprey has been delivered to the USMC complete with a new weather radar, as well as improved EW systems and advances in situational awareness.

The upgraded radar stemmed from the fact that 90% of the aircraft's flight hours are conducted as an aeroplane, and therefore the platform has to fly at high altitudes and in turn requires a radar that is suitable for this.

The remaining V-22s that are to be produced out of the USMC's requirement for 360 platforms will now be built to Block C standards, and officials confirmed that some retrofits on legacy systems will occur.

'The V-22 Block C design upgrade includes a new weather radar system that improves navigation in poor weather conditions, and a redesigned environmental conditioning system to enhance aircrew and troop comfort,' a statement from Bell-Boeing read.

Expanded capacity and effectiveness built into the electronic warfare system-including additional chaff/flare dispensers- increases the Osprey's ability to defeat air-to-air threats.'

'Countries generally don't have a requirement for tilt-rotor because they don't know what it is,' Mike Montgomery, V-22 deputy director of new business at NAVAIR told the briefing.

However, Richard Linhart VP of business development at Bell said of the advantages of the platform: 'We have to break that paradigm. With the V-22 [the operators] are finding new and different ways of operating that they didn't think was possible.'

Bell-Boeing is focusing its efforts on exporting the V-22. However, only the MV-22 variant has been approved, as the CV-22 has special operations enhancements that have not been authorised.

'People want to know about it; it's different,' Linhart explained, saying that although the aircraft was not on display at the airshow, feedback from when it was displayed at Dubai air show last year was very positive.

Tommy Dunehew, VP of Business Development for mobility at Boeing confirmed that five potential customers in Asia-Pacific region are interested in the platform, and he said that it would be a suitable system for this area. The officials also said that Bell-Boeing was still in ongoing discussions with Indian and Israeli forces with regards to acquisition of the Osprey.

The team is also holding out for the US Navy to make a decision on whether or not the V-22 will be chosen for the 50 platform requirement for the Aerial Resupply Logistics of the Sea Base programme, and Linhart said 'we are still hopeful that the navy will come on board.

'We have not been as successful in demonstrating this as we would have liked,' Montgomery concluded with regards to export potential, however officials said that this is something that the team is working on, and said that the platform is of high value, demonstrated by USMC confidence in it.

SansAnhedral

15th Feb 2012, 16:11

Think what you want about the Osprey in operations it is fit for....but remember it was sold as being the answer to every mission conceivable which it plainly is not and never was.

I have never said it was to replace "heavy lift" aircraft or do the heavy lift mission. I have said repeatedly that it was billed as the replacement for the 46 and 53D citing official USMC statements that confirmed that. You are quite mistaken when you suggest I ever said otherwise.

Poor word choice perhaps, SAS? I don't think you are justified in being defensive regarding Lonewolf's reply....based upon your precise posting.

SASless

15th Feb 2012, 16:33

Sans.....The statement I have said the Osprey was to replace Heavy Lift aircraft is patently false. I have never said it...go back through the thread here and find exactly one time if you can.

Trying to suggest the quoted statement you posted does that is also false.

Let's begin with the definition of the adjective "conceivable" shall we....and add to your grasp of the English language and grammar.

World English Dictionary
conceivable (kənˈsiːvəb ə l)

— adj
capable of being understood, believed, or imagined; possible3we

Any reasonable astute individual, knowing the lifting ability of the Osprey, would instantly realize it could not be construed to be a "Heavy" lifter. Thus, it would logically rule out any suggestion it could be "conceived" to be capable of such a mission.

Care to try again?

If you want to challenge the points being made....do so. At least be accurate in your use of language please.

If you or others are going to put words in my mouth...at least do so with some resemblance to the truth. Post a quote showing I said that as purported.

SansAnhedral

15th Feb 2012, 18:46

There appears to be a disparity in our mutual grasp of the English language.

"Every conceivable mission", in normal accepted English parlance, would include any mission capable of being conceived. In fact, the phrase is typically intended to convey the idea of being all-encompassing limited by nothing more than human imagination...not, as you describe, being limited to what an astute observer would consider to be rational or possible.

Whether or not the "heavy lift" mission for a V22 is considered a technically viable possibility by you or any astute individual is irrelevant; it is still a "conceivable mission" and hence the reason for both Lonewolf's and my interpretation of your post as being self-contradictory.

21stCen

15th Feb 2012, 18:52

There is one word that comes from the military vernacular that describes the current discussion: Quibbling!!
Sorry Sas

Lonewolf_50

15th Feb 2012, 19:35

SAS, I understand your frustration with the hype. I don't think there's an experienced military aviator who hasn't looked at the difference between the press clippings for a new system, and the acutal performance on the hardware they fly, and some of the shortcomings (I seem to remember a few: F-18 tail cracks, F-14 engine stalls in high performance maneuvers? T-45 that initially could not meet shipboard requirements due to spool up and nose wheel and ... and ... and ... SH-60 blade de-ice, early years, and a whole lot more).
We all ruefully acknowledge that what we fly is built under "minimum bid" and get on with it.

The B-2, of which there are lest than three dozen, costs over a billion per copy. (nucking futs, sez I.) It was the perfect aircraft for 1983. Didn't IOC till almost a decade later, yes? Should we have scrapped that?

The Bone had troubles with turkey buzzards. It's still flying, and does good work. Should it have never been?

The F-18A had some trouble with fuel legs in a fighter grid when it first came out. Did we scrap that aircarft? Should the Hornet have been scrapped, and an all F-14/A-6 Airwing been made, per Lehman's inane vision?

So the V-22 is expensive.

We agree that the cost is a salient shortcoming, but that cost growth happened over a period of years, the program was stalled or cancelled what, four different times?

But it's operational, and it works.

It seems to me that you are voicing a complaint that doesn't fit the year we are talking in. Every opportunity to scrap that program, as Comanche was scrapped, was presented, and yet it survived. (Remember, C-46 line re-opening decision, negative, happened early to mid 90's. There was never gonna be a new Phrog).

The operator who has posted here likes the bird, and he's an old Phrog pilot.

Maybe, SAS, your frustration is that none of us can go back in time and undo a variety of mistakes or errors. We can't.

As to other vehicles that the Marines need for the mission, I learned one thing a while back: you never get all the equipment you wish you had.

Cheers.

SASless

15th Feb 2012, 23:18

Eisenhower warned us....history is proving him right.

The now cancelled EFV....an armored amphibious tractor that was to scoot across the water at 25MPH....at a unit cost of just over 22 Million USD ...and a program cost of 10, 000 Million USD....encountered some "burps" according to a Marine Officer involved in the program.

Some expensive burping!

What could the Marines have bought they really needed with that wasted money?

The replacement cost of an M-1 Abrams Tank is billed as being 4.3 Million USD as a comparison.

Current issue AAV's the EFV was to replace cost 2.3-2.5 Million USD. Roughly one tenth of the EFV price.

The USS America, the new LHA(R) that has been modified to support the V-22 (the size of the 22 was the reason for the change) at a cost of 2,300 Million USD does not even have a well deck anymore as it's predecessor did.

Again...more expense...less capability....does this seem a pattern here?

Tcabot113

16th Feb 2012, 00:16

SAS,

America may not need a well deck because the Osprey range and speed does not require the initial assault to be fought at waters edge.

As to ability to conduct missions, the V-22 can stol at 60000 lbs+, while the $200+ million Canadian S-92 is not allowed to fly over water.

TC

ospreydriver

16th Feb 2012, 03:05

To back up a bit. Autos are practiced in the sim. They're initially practiced as a set piece in initial fams, i.e. "here it comes." Later, a sim instructor will whip them out as part of a scenario. At least initially, most students will "crash." By the end, they're typically doing okay.

I personally think that the new LHAs should have well decks. Not because of anything regarding the Osprey, but mostly because we don't always get to fight on sunny days. I'm willing to takeoff near 0/0, but landing is another story. Plus, for serious movements, eventually you'll need trucks and such that even 53s can't carry.

That said, I don't think the EFV cancellation negates all of the OTH concept. Many contingencies that the USMC trains for are conducted purely by air, and the Osprey extends the battlespace way farther than it was before. We've been off the coast of NC and were doing hits in FL. I use that exercise example (which is real, BTW) to illustrate the concept. We've done similar long-range ops in V-22s in real contingencies already.

Again, why are we arguing? Is anything going to change? No? Then stop. We have this capability now. Lets put our heads together and figure out how to use the pluses, minimize the minuses, and kill some GD jihadis.

SASless

16th Feb 2012, 12:05

Now I am in full agreement with Osprey Driver....but wish the Pentagon Crew would have arrived at that position without wasting so much money and had used that money buying equipment that could be used to good benefit today.

Having the Well Deck and that basic capability (they are called Amphibious Assault Ships) would make the LHA(R) a true multi-purpose vessel rather than a cheap CV without Catapults or angled deck.

As the Marines have a tradition and history of doing more with less....and in the expectation of massive budget cuts for all of DOD....the loss of capability in the America Class Aviation support ships might come back to haunt the Navy/USMC. I hope not.

The 21st Century article I linked discusses the Marine's view of Amphibious Assault and supports what OD said.

ospreydriver

17th Feb 2012, 03:13

I'm a slightly conspiracy-minded person...when it comes to budgets, anyway. I think the lack of a well deck is there simply to drive the requirement for LPDs that have a well deck. "We've got to complete the San Antonio class--how else can we get all this other gear ashore?"

Split-ARG ops are an essential part of MEU missions, IMO. No well deck on the big deck means this is a huge degrader for the ARG to maintain presence for extended duration. The Kearsarge ARG in '98 provided port/starboard TRAP and humanitarian assistance coverage for the Kosovo bombing campaign, as an example. Can't do that unless both halves of the ARG have both air and surface capability.

jeffg

24th Feb 2012, 19:55

US Marine Corps retires CH-53D

24 February 2012 - 13:24 by Tony Osborne (http://www.shephardmedia.com/author/tony-osborne/) in London

The US Marine Corps has retired the CH-53D Sea Stallion after 40 years of service in a 'sunset ceremony' held on 10 February at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.
The aircraft continue to operate with the HMH-363 squadron currently supporting marines working in Helmand Province as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. When the unit returns, one of the helicopters will be flown from Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay to its final destination at the Pacific Aviation Museum, where it will be displayed.
Some 124 CH-53Ds were built in total. The aircraft have operated with the USMC in a range of conflicts from Vietnam and Iraq and finally in Afghanistan. However the hot and high climate in Helmand has tested the type to its limits, restricting summer operations to the cool of night, with the MV-22 Osprey and the three-engined CH-53E Super Stallion taking the bulk of operations.
'Now that the Sea Stallion has retired, the Marine Corps has begun the transition to CH-53E Super Stallions, which will soon be joined by the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and H-1 Huey and Cobra helicopters in Hawaii,' said Col Robert Pridgen, programme manager for the H-53 Heavy Lift Helicopters Program Office.
'This transition will ensure our fleet is equipped with an aviation capability that is flexible and ready today to complete missions as assigned.'

21stCen

27th Feb 2012, 09:07

U.S. eyes V-22 aircraft sales to Israel, Canada, UAE
Sun, Feb 26 2012
By Andrea Shalal-Esa (http://blogs.reuters.com/search/journalist.php?edition=uk&n=andrea.shalal.esa&)
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, Florida (Reuters) - The U.S. government is eyeing Israel, Canada and the United Arab Emirates as possible initial foreign buyers of the V-22 Osprey, a tilt-rotor aircraft built by Boeing Co (BA.N: Quote (http://uk.reuters.com/stocks/quote?symbol=BA.N), Profile (http://uk.reuters.com/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=BA.N), Research (http://uk.reuters.com/stocks/researchReports?symbol=BA.N)) and Bell Helicopter, a top U.S. Marine Corps official told Reuters.
Lieutenant General Terry Robling, deputy Marine Corps commandant for aviation, said U.S. officials were continuing to drive down the cost of the aircraft and hoped to sell it to allies overseas to keep the production line running past 2018.
U.S. officials plan to show off the aircraft, which flies like an airplane but tilts its rotors to take off and land like helicopter, at the Farnborough Air Show outside London in July. It also made appearances at the Dubai and Singapore air shows in recent months, Robling told Reuters aboard a military aircraft after a Marine Corps event at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida.
Bell Helicopter, a unit of Textron Inc (TXT.N: Quote (http://uk.reuters.com/stocks/quote?symbol=TXT.N), Profile (http://uk.reuters.com/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=TXT.N), Research (http://uk.reuters.com/stocks/researchReports?symbol=TXT.N)), and Boeing issued a news release in December after the Dubai air show, saying the aircraft had received "significant interest" from potential customers, but it did not identify them.
Boeing and Bell have been trying to generate foreign interest for years, but potential buyers were holding back to see how the plane did in combat, and because of the relatively high price of buying and operating the plane -- both of which are now coming down.
Washington is increasingly looking to foreign military sales to keep the cost of weapons systems from rising as the Pentagon cuts its own orders to strip $487 billion from its planned defence budgets over the next decade.
Robling said Israel, Canada and the UAE had expressed interest in the aircraft, but had not received formal pricing and technical information for the Osprey.
The Marines will ask lawmakers to approve a five-year procurement plan for 91 aircraft that will run through fiscal 2017 -- 24 less than initially planned for the period.
But the service still plans to buy those aircraft and has not changed its overall requirement, Robling said, although he acknowledged that postponing production resulted in more uncertainty given the current difficult budget environment.
Marine Corps Commandant James Amos this month told U.S. lawmakers that the Osprey, which can cruise at 290 miles an hour -- twice the rate of military helicopters -- has performed "exceedingly well" since being put into operation. He said it gives U.S. and coalition forces a "manoeuvre advantage and operational reach unmatched by any other tactical aircraft."
OSPREY HAS FLOWN MORE THAN 130,000 HOURS
The plane got off to a rocky start, with 30 Marines killed during its development, but it has amassed more than 130,000 flight hours since being fielded by the U.S. military in 2007.
More than 160 V-22s are now flown by 10 Marine Corps and two U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command squadrons.
Amos told lawmakers the MV-22B has made multiple combat deployments to Iraq, four deployments at sea, and it is currently on its fifth deployment to Afghanistan.
The Pentagon's chief weapons tester Michael Gilmore in December recommended that the Navy, which oversees Marines Corps acquisition, continue development and testing to improve the aircraft's overall reliability.
Gilmore said the plane generally met reliability and maintainability requirements, but its average mission capable rate was 53 percent from June 2007 to May 2010, well below the required rate of 82 percent.
Robling said the plane's operating cost was declining from rates as high as $12,000 per flight hour to an all-time low of $8,300 achieved last month. He attributed the decline to a variety of factors, including more reliable parts and different flying protocols that cut down on maintenance needs.
Robling said the current average cost-per-flight hour for the V-22, including fuel, parts and labour, was around $10,000, but he was pressing maintainers to drive that number down.
"We've shown ... that we can get it down lower. So we just continue to work on it," he said. "At some point we'll sustain probably somewhere around $8,500 at today's cost."
He said Boeing and Bell Helicopter had also been working to reduce the cost of producing the planes. The companies recently submitted a letter with a "not-to-exceed" price for the new multiyear agreement, which achieves the 10-percent cost savings required for congressional approval, Robling said.
Now, the government will start tough negotiations with the contractors to iron the details, Robling said, adding the process could take six to eight months.
Boeing has said it expects to sign the new multiyear agreement by the end of 2012.
He said the Marines could have saved $6 million to $8 million more per airplane if they had been able to keep the 24 aircraft in the five-year plan, but the Pentagon needed the savings to achieve its cost-cutting goals for fiscal 2013.

U.S. eyes V-22 aircraft sales to Israel, Canada, UAE | Reuters (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/26/uk-bell-boeing-v22-international-idUKTRE81P0M820120226?feedType=RSS&feedName=GCA-GoogleNewsUK)

Lonewolf_50

27th Feb 2012, 14:05

I am puzzled at Canada as a potential market for V-22.
Reason?
Cost.
Data point: C-148 helicopter program cost, progress, and criticism that will make any expensive weapons program extremely difficult to sell politically.

(Or, the government could nationalize all oil sands production and afford a whole bunch of stuff ... ;) )

SansAnhedral

29th Feb 2012, 22:08

http://www.marines.mil/unit/mcascherrypoint/Pages/BoldAlligator2012confirmscapabilitiesof2ndMAWaviation.aspx#. T06vW8U7U1I

Bold Alligator 2012 confirms capabilities of 2nd MAW aviation

2/15/2012 By Lance Cpl. Scott L. Tomaszycki , Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION CHERRY POINT, N.C. (Feb. 15, 2012) — U.S. Navy amphibious ships can carry the personnel and air power needed to conduct military operations in a myriad of locations throughout the world. During Exercise Bold Alligator 2012, every aspect of Marine aviation was used in the full range of air operations to showcase the advantages of seabasing.
Bold Alligator, which took place Jan. 30 through Feb. 12 afloat and ashore in and around Virginia and North Carolina, was the first Marine Expeditionary Brigade level amphibious exercise of its size in the past ten years. It granted valuable experience to pilots and aircrews as they reacquainted themselves with the shipboard working environment.

Col. Scott S. Jensen, commanding officer of the aviation combat element for the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade during the exercise, likened the exercise to softball practice. The members of a good softball team already know the mechanics of a double-play whether they practice or not. When the team is getting ready for a tournament, however, they perfect their techniques. Marine aviators know the mechanics of working on a ship but need things like Bold Alligator to get ready for the big tournament.

The ‘tournament’ of Bold Alligator was Feb. 6, when Marines of Regimental Landing Team 2 stormed Onslow Beach, N.C. While RLT-2 Marines secured their frontline positions, and the aviation arm consisting of an array of aviation assets practiced operations supporting the landing.

“Prior to the Marines landing on shore, we’ll spend time clearing the airspace in order to get air superiority,” said Capt. Johnathan P. Stouffer, an AV-8B Harrier pilot with Marine Attack Squadron 231. “Once we have that, we’ll conduct shaping operations to prepare the battlefield for the Marines. Based on intelligence we’ll strike where all the enemy positions are so they can’t harm our Marines while they’re landing on the beach. Once they get on the beach, we’ll transition to close air support and strike where they see the enemy.”

AH-1W Cobras also provided air support during the operation, conducting all air strikes inside authorized bombing ranges at Camp Lejeune. Marine F/A-18 Hornets supported the operation from Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, which role-played as an expeditionary airfield. More Hornets operated from the USS Enterprise. MV-22 Ospreys inserted Marines and coalition troops to take critical objectives. Jensen said inserting troops by Osprey and helicopters provide important advantages in maneuver warfare.

“It’s all about mobility. Our assault helicopters, our MV-22’s and our CH-53’s are just as necessary to move our landing force ashore, to evacuate casualties and be able to connect the ships to the shore in conjunction with the landing craft,” Jensen explained. “The helicopters present rapid mobility; you don’t have to stay on roads. You can get there quick and take care of things that might need to be taken care of.”

This rapid warfighting strategy was represented by a Marine reconnaissance raid into Fort Pickett, Va., to strike against a high value target behind enemy lines. The mission was made possible by the Osprey, because it has greater speed and range than conventional helicopters.

Aviation also practiced long range strikes against strategic targets away from the main battlefield. On two occasions, Marine aviation struck notional missile launch sites, using a package of EA-6B Prowlers for protection against anti-aircraft defenses, AV-8B Harriers and Hornets to engage enemy aircraft and strike the target, and KC-130Js to refuel the aircraft.

Amphibious aviation assets are for more than dropping bombs. According to Jensen, the squadrons have to be ready for any kind of aviation mission. Marine expeditionary units are a 911 force capable of anything, from helping refugees and casualty evacuations to dropping bombs on the enemy. A Marine Expeditionary Brigade, the size of the force used during Bold Alligator, has a more defined purpose when assembled but still maintains a wide range of capabilities.

“If you look back on the island hopping campaigns back in World War II, any time they cut short the artillery preparation of the battlefield casualties were always a lot higher,” said Stouffer. “If we skip out on Marine aviation, it’s going to take a lot more lives to accomplish the goal. Having us there is saving lives.”

21stCen

6th Mar 2012, 16:15

Taliban IED hide-out found near Bastion

6 March 2012 | Afghanistan (http://bfbs.com/news/regions/afghanistan) http://bfbs.com/news/sites/ssvc.com.bfbs.news/files/imagecache/breaking_news_500width_280height/images/internal_articles/operation_backfoot.jpg (http://bfbs.com/news/sites/ssvc.com.bfbs.news/files/images/internal_articles/operation_backfoot.jpg)

Details have just emerged of a joint UK/US/Afghan operation that's seized and destroyed a large cache of Taliban IED-making equipment south of Bastion Airfield.
Operation Backfoot involved 2 Squadron, RAF Regiment, warriors from Afghan Army’s 3rd Brigade and US Marines from 2 Marine Expeditionary Force.
The force deployed by US Osprey aircraft, with its unique tilt-rotor capability, and as well as seizing the bomb making materials also gathered a wealth of intelligence despite coming under fire several times.
The operation took place in the Dasht (or desert) south of Bastion Airfield - a sparse landscape of rolling fields and scrub dotted with compounds and is increasingly being used as a harbour area by Taliban forces who have come under pressure elsewhere by successful coalition operations. Its protection is the task of 2 Squadron, operating as part of 3 RAF Force Protection Wing.
It is an area where insurgents have mingled with the local population - some of them Taliban sympathizers - and their presence has seen attempts to increase poppy production in the area to fund their summer campaign.
Because of the sparse agricultural cover in the area during the winter, the insurgents have based themselves in compounds to fire on ISAF foot patrols from cover.
The string of IEDs that has been sown across approaches to the area, together with their ‘stand-off and shoot’ tactics, was meant to block ISAF forces from approaching.
Sqn Ldr Jules Weekes, who commanded the RAF troops, said: “There is a certain dynamic to Taliban activities in this area. They operate in small teams of five or six, travelling by motorbike as their preferred guerrilla tactic. Part of this operation is to find out how ‘he’ does business.”
Several suspect compounds were targeted which saw the Ospreys land troops at two separate landing zones, either side of the wide Chah-e Anjir wadi.
The dismounted troops - supported by a number of 2 Squadron Ridgeback and Jackal patrol vehicles and a specialist US Marine IED clearance team – did not go unchallenged. A number of small arms attacks were beaten off by the ground troops and heavier attacks were dealt with by Apache and Cobra gunships. One US Marine patrol, temporarily pinned down by heavy small-arms fire, was supported by a show of force from an F18 which was sufficient to deter the insurgents.
As well as gaining vital intelligence the operation found a substantial IED cache in a compound, which contained a variety of bomb-making equipment, mines and several complete IEDs which were ready to be used against ISAF forces.
Wing Commander Jason Sutton, the commander of 3 RAF Force Protection Wing, said: “The open approaches to this area mean that it is hard to gain the element of surprise. However, by using the Ospreys to approach rapidly from an unexpected direction, the operation managed to achieve it.
“The RAF Regiment’s role is to defend airbases and those who operate from them, but the old adage of attack being the best form of defence remains as true today as ever. Targeting the insurgents and their supply networks takes the initiative away from them so that we can dictate the terms of the fight. It disrupts the insurgents’ attempts to attack Bastion and its vital air operations, denies them freedom of movement and supports the Afghan National Security Forces as together we work to protect the population who live around the base.”
PICTURE: Ministry of Defence - Dawn breaks as Operation Backfoot gets underway

Taliban IED hide-out found near Bastion | British Forces News (http://bfbs.com/news/afghanistan/taliban-ied-hide-out-found-near-bastion-55424.html)

SASless

6th Mar 2012, 23:04

One US Marine patrol, temporarily pinned down by heavy small-arms fire, was supported by a show of force from an F18 which was sufficient to deter the insurgents.

Well hellfire....let's just fly the F-18's up and down the Wadi then....and bring the Kids home!

No need to bomb or strafe it seems....just wave your Supersonic Willy!

Who writes this crap?

21stCen

7th Mar 2012, 11:41

Who writes this crap?
British Forces News:
Top Stories | British Forces News (http://bfbs.com/news/)

Well hellfire....let's just fly the F-18's up and down the Wadi then.... No need to bomb or strafe it seems....
I think I'd run if I saw an F-18 coming at me!!
:eek:

SASless

7th Mar 2012, 11:48

Show of Force?

Hopefully that "show" was dropping a pair of 1,000 pound bombs....or a CBU drop! Then I am all into such "shows".

SansAnhedral

7th Mar 2012, 14:22

Pretty sure "show of force" can refer to a strafing run in the vicinity, or even a line up without actually firing. Both of which would be successful in scaring the pants off of the guy holding the duct-taped AK-47.

C'mon SAS, youre all about saving the taxpayer money! This should make you happy they aren't spending $40,000 a pop to drop JDAMs right?

21stCen

7th Mar 2012, 15:36

Show of Force?
I interpreted that "show of force" to include something raining down, but I may be reading more into it.

Remember from your Bristow's days SAS that this is "British English," not "American English"! They tend to be a bit more reserved in their commentary.

SansAnhedral

7th Mar 2012, 16:35

Lexington Institute (http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/military-metrics-understate-readiness-and-versatility-of-mv-22-tilt-rotor?a=1&c=1171)

Misleading Metrics Understate Readiness And Versatility Of MV-22 Tilt-Rotor

Author: Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.
Date: Tuesday, March 06, 2012

Over the last five years, the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft has demonstrated its operational value in 17 foreign deployments while becoming the safest rotorcraft in the Marine Corps fleet. The aircraft has performed raids in Iraq, disaster relief in Haiti, casualty evacuation in Jordan, counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and combat rescue in Libya. Operational commanders are clamoring for more of the unique airframes because, in the words of one Marine briefing, it flies "twice as fast, carrying three times the payload, at four times the range of the legacy helicopter it replaces."
You'd think that after 140,000 safe flight hours, often in harrowing circumstances, critics would begin recognizing that the MV-22 is everything the Marines promised it would be -- agile, versatile, reliable and affordable. Well, no such luck. Even though transition from the ancient CH-46 helicopter to the MV-22 is now more than 50 percent complete, some so-called experts continue to spout misleading information about the aircraft's price and performance. They say the Osprey costs too much to build and operate, and has not demonstrated adequate levels of readiness in combat operations.

No doubt about it, $68 million is a lot of money to pay for the production version of a rotorcraft. However, the performance characteristics of the Osprey make it the operational equivalent of two or three conventional helicopters. The CH-46 that the MV-22 is replacing can carry 12 troops to a combat radius of 75 nautical miles (nm.) at a top speed of 145 nm. per hour. The MV-22, in contrast, can carry 24 troops to a combat radius of 325 nautical miles at a top speed of 260 nm. per hour. The range differential alone is a huge force multiplier. For instance, a CH-46 stationed in Baghdad can't even make it to the Iraqi border and back without refueling, whereas an MV-22 stationed at the same base can reach the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea or the Caspian Sea -- and then turn around and fly back without refueling.

The contrast in performance underscores why picking any airframe other than Osprey for combat search-and-rescue is irresponsible (as the Air Force should have learned when MV-22s rescued a stranded U.S. fighter crew in Libya during the recent conflict there). But it takes time for people to appreciate the full potential of a revolutionary airframe, so it is no surprise that as Canada puts together its own solicitation for a new combat search-and-rescue helicopter, it is making the same mistakes the U.S. Air Force did -- applying dated metrics and assumptions that favor a solution sure to leave some personnel stranded forever in hostile territory. The simple fact is that any solution other than a tilt-rotor can't fly far enough or fast enough to save some endangered warfighters.

In that regard, the critics are doing warfighters a real disservice by citing misleading comparisons between Osprey and various conventional helicopters. For instance, they complain it costs about $10,000 per flight hour to operate the MV-22 compared with about $3,000 per flight hour for the MH-60, the Marine helicopter most closely resembling what the Air Force uses for combat search-and-rescue. However, this ignores the superior speed, range and carrying capacity of the MV-22. When the metric is changed to cost per mile flown, the MV-22 only looks about 60 percent more expensive, and when the metric is passenger seat miles, the MV-22 looks twice as efficient ($1.53 versus $3.21). After all, it can carry three times more people than an MH-60, which like its greater speed and range might come in handy in some rescue operations.

It is also worth noting that the MV-22's computerized reporting system depresses apparent readiness rates compared with the older, manual system used for the legacy CH-46s it will replace. The Osprey actually has high mission-capable rates, but the way the new system measures availability makes it look less ready than it really is. Eventually these matters will all be sorted out, and it will be obvious the MV-22 is far, far superior to a conventional rotorcraft in just about any imaginable scenario. That's why even the Army, which has no formal plans to buy tilt-rotors, is taking a close look at its medical-evacuation potential. Let's just hope the rest of the world wakes up to the revolutionary potential of tilt-rotor technology while there is still time to leverage economies of scale off of a warm production line.

21stCen

9th Mar 2012, 14:35

Osprey to star at RIAT

9 March 2012 | UK (http://bfbs.com/news/regions/uk) http://bfbs.com/news/sites/ssvc.com.bfbs.news/files/imagecache/breaking_news_500width_280height/images/internal_articles/usn_v-22_osprey_free_usage.jpg (http://bfbs.com/news/sites/ssvc.com.bfbs.news/files/images/internal_articles/usn_v-22_osprey_free_usage.jpg)

A unique aircraft that is both a helicopter and an aeroplane will make a rare appearance in the UK when it takes part in the Royal International Air Tattoo at RAF Fairford this summer.
The US Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey stole the show at the Air Tattoo 2006 where it marked its UK flying display debut. It is the world’s first tilt-rotor aircraft and makes a welcome return to Fairford on July 7-8 2012.
A cross between a helicopter and a fixed-wing aeroplane, the Osprey’s rotor blades can tilt mid-air enabling it to take off vertically and then reconfigure to fly like an aeroplane. This allows it to reach speeds twice as fast as a helicopter and carry heavier payloads at higher altitudes.
In 2007, the aircraft was deployed operationally for the first time, supporting routine cargo and troop movements in Iraq. Two years later, the aircraft performed its first offensive combat mission, Operation Cobra’s Anger, transporting US Marines and Afghan troops into Helmand Province to disrupt the Taliban’s communications and supply lines.
In 2010, Ospreys performed their first humanitarian mission, operating in Haiti as part of Operation Unified Response following an earthquake in the country.
The US Marine Corps plans to send two MV-22Bs, one for the flying display and the other for the static park.
An Air Tattoo spokesman said few other modern aircraft have been so revolutionary in terms of their design and operational capability. He added: “In musical terms, adding the Osprey to the flying display is a bit like Glastonbury adding Jay-Z to the bill – it’s sassy, has lots of good moves and looks downright cool.”

Osprey to star at RIAT | British Forces News (http://bfbs.com/news/uk/osprey-star-riat-55549.html)

ospreydriver

11th Mar 2012, 23:06

"Shows of force" are a pretty common thing. Not as effective as actually engaging, but it's enough to make them put their heads down for a bit.

Dropping bombs over there is taken as something of a last resort under current ROE, for better or worse.

SASless

12th Mar 2012, 00:20

After this last bit of force showing.....we might really really think about bringing all our Lads and Lasses home!

The 64 Dollar question....Will there be as much rioting, mayhem, and noise over the murder of 16 Civilians as there was over the accidental burning of a hand full of Qurans?

I bet not! Which to a reasonable person does really make one wonder how in the hell we can ever relate to such folks!

Lonewolf_50

29th Mar 2012, 13:41

For those interested

Flying the V-22 | Vertical - Helicopter News (http://verticalmag.com/news/articles/20112-flying-the-v-22.html)

An Air Force major describes some of the handling characteristics of CV-22.

Osprey Driver may or may not wish to comment.

SASless

29th Mar 2012, 15:27

The Marines are still acting like Cats covering up poop......and defaming two Good Marines in the process....all to hide malfeasance at senior levels of command.

http://http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/marine-corps/218913-jones-widows-seek-exoneration-for-marine-pilots-in-2000-osprey-crash]Rep. Jones, widows seek exoneration for Marine pilots in 2000 Osprey crash - The Hill's DEFCON Hill (http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/marine-corps/218913-jones-widows-seek-exoneration-for-marine-pilots-in-2000-osprey-crash")

Jones said the Marines’ investigation report actually exonerates the pilots — it was the Marines’ statement about the investigation that sparked the “pilot error” blame.

“Unfortunately, the pilots’ drive to accomplish that mission appears to have been the fatal factor,” the release said.

That statement led to years of press accounts that said pilot error was the cause of the crash, Gruber and Brow say. They are asking the Marines to issue a statement that says the two pilots “were not at fault” and include it in the accident report.

As Jones stepped up efforts to clear the pilots’ names last year, he solicited letters from the three crash investigators, all of whom wrote that the pilots should not be blamed for the crash.

Documents reviewed by The Hill and interviews with those involved show the circumstances surrounding the accident do not lead to simple conclusions. While the pilots took actions that contributed to the crash, they and their superiors did not yet understand the flight condition called “vortex-ring state” (VRS) that caused the Osprey to roll over and crash.

Talk about looking out for the Troops.......yeah right!

The Marines remain unconvinced. In his last letter to Jones in 2011, Amos wrote: “I cannot prevent outside observers from using unflattering characterizations about these pilots.”

But some who were involved don’t think the Marines should change their report. Retired Lt. Gen. Fred McCorkle, former Marine aviation chief, said while the crash was heartbreaking, the pilots’ actions still led to the tragedy.

“To me, it was human factors,” McCorkle said in an interview. “That’s what I’ve told the family, and that’s the way it’s going to stay.”

Just as a side note.....this McCorkle fella.....well at least he knows who butters his bread....and would upon his retirement!

While the V-22 was considered for cancellation in 2001, there was heavy political lobbying to save it. The Boeing effort was led by General Richard Hearny, the former head of Marine Aviation, who retired in 1996 and is Vice President for business development at Boeing. The lobby effort for Boeing's partner, Bell Helicopter, was led by its Vice President for government relations, General Terrence R. Dake, who retired from the Marines in 2000 after heading Marine Aviation. The effort at Headquarters Marine Corps was led by the head of Marine Aviation, General Fred McCorkle (left). Soon after retiring from the Marines in October 2001, McCorkle joined the board of directors and as a senior advisor for GKN Aerospace Services (V-22 fuel tanks). He also serves on the Rolls-Royce North America board of directors (V-22 engines), and is a member of the board of directors of Lord Corporation (V-22 components). In addition, he has served as a consultant for Boeing Aerospace (V-22 maker) and Optical Air Data Systems (V-22 low airspeed indicator).

While these Generals receive an $8000 a month retirement check from the Marines, a tradition has emerged in which the head of Marine Aviation is financially rewarded after retirement for not rocking the boat. Questioning the progress of the V-22 is difficult since the current head of Marine Aviation must challenge his former bosses working for defense contractors. This was revealed during a December 2000 news conference when a reporter asked General McCorkle if the Corps might abandon the V-22. McCorkle replied: "that would be something above my pay grade, quite frankly." At that time, McCorkle was a three-star General and head of Marine Aviation, yet he considered the future of Marine Aviation to be in the hands of others. McCorkle saw himself as a just a salesman whose loyalty to the V-22 program would make him a wealthy executive.

SansAnhedral

29th Mar 2012, 19:41

Operating a vehicle outside the defined NATOPS would be grounds for a determination of "pilot error" would it not?

A great comment posted on the article itself:

Descent limits were in place. All rotary winged pilots are trained to observe the 800/40 rule. When ground speed is 40 knots or less rate of descent is not to exceed 800 feet per minute. The NATOPS manual that existed for the Osprey at the time included the 800/40 rule. Brow and Gruber were both trained to observe the 800/40 rule. Gruber himself was an experienced CH-53E pilot. The fact is that if Brow and Gruber had flown any rotary winged platform in the same manner that they flew the Osprey that night, the results would have been the same.

HROD testing of the V-22 showed that the Osprey is less susceptible to entering VRS than any rotary winged platform and when encountered, recovery is achieved much quicker in the Osprey.

http://legacy.vtol.org/pdf/test-60.pdf

"causing one of the rotors to enter VRS and stop rotating,"

Jeremy Herb doesn't know what he's talking about. Due to the high rate of descent one of the proprotors lost lift due to the "dirty air" beneath it; it did not stop rotating, causing the aircraft to roll due to the asymmetric lift.

Walter Jones has been repeatedly rebuked by the Department of the Navy for this crusade of his. He needs to accept that this accident was indeed caused by pilot error and move on. His constituents deserve a Congressman who doesn't spend his career beating a dead horse.
Were John Brow and Brooks Gruber here today they'd admit that they made a number of errors that night in deviating from NATOPS: descending at nearly 3500 feet per minute at ~100 knots, losing situational awareness and violating basic airmanship guidelines. They screwed the pooch and ended up killing 19 Marines in the process. Any other explanation is simply revisionist history.

JohnDixson

29th Mar 2012, 20:29

Sans,

Don't know the source of the article, but the section professing that the 40/800 VRS boundary applies to 53E's ( implying all helicopters ) and that a 53E, if flying the same profile, would have encountered the same result, is simply incorrect. Reminiscent of the old saw about the " Big Lie ".

Thanks,
John Dixson

500e

29th Mar 2012, 20:40

Flying the V-22 | Vertical - Helicopter News (http://verticalmag.com/news/article.php?aid=20112)

SASless

29th Mar 2012, 20:45

John is exactly right.....especially when one considers the 53 is single rotored...and thus not possibly susceptible to differential Vortex Ring State.

Despite the three Accident Investigators clearly stating it is their separate and jointly held opinion the two pilots were not responsible for the accident....I would suggest they are much closer to the issue and thus have a basis upon which to make that statement.

Sans....I really do object to you saying what you just did about the Pilots....both in tone....and more specifically as it is directly opposed to what the Accident Report and the three Accident Investigators had to say.

It is a USMC Press Statement that laid the blame on the pilots.....not the Accident Inquiry.

I submit both you and the USMC are wrong in what you are saying.

It is because of that fatal crash that more testing had to be done and the true dangers of VRS in the Osprey became known.

The two dead men did not have benefit of all that later data.....did they?

Jack Carson

29th Mar 2012, 22:15

John Dixson is absolutely correct. One cannot compare the V-22 to the H-53E. One of my first test flights in the H-53E was a pitot system calibration flight. There were two end points to the test, a 40 KIAS autorotation and a Vne (170KIAS) autorotation. At 40 KIAS and the VSI pegged at 6000 FPM rate of descent our recovery was accomplished with collect alone. To quote the Chief Program Pilot (Frank Tefft) when he instructed me to just increase the collective, he said “that the machine wouldn’t like it but it could take it.” Sure enough, 13,000m ESHP dug us out of the descent with no signs of VRS. Later in my career I was provided with an opportunity to fly in an H-53E with Brooks Gruber. He was a consuement professional and a Great pilot. If there were any mistakes made by the flight crew, it was assuming that the V-22 would perform similarly to the H-53E.

FH1100 Pilot

29th Mar 2012, 23:40

Lone wolf_50:Osprey Driver may or may not wish to comment.

Great article! But I think it was written by our own mckpave, not O.D.

SansAnhedral

30th Mar 2012, 18:08

Sans....I really do object to you saying what you just did about the Pilots....both in tone....and more specifically as it is directly opposed to what the Accident Report and the three Accident Investigators had to say.

You object to what I said? I guess you missed the part where I quoted text written by a commenter on the article in question, and stated as such.

And, as nobody has deemed it necessary to respond, Ill repeat my question from the previous post.

Does or doesn't operating an aircraft outside NATOPS warrant a "pilot error" determination? Simple question.

http://legacy.vtol.org/pdf/test-60.pdf

7. In comparison to the published NATOPS descent rate limitation, it is shown that the V–22 has significant margin for avoiding VRS.

ospreydriver

31st Mar 2012, 21:06

Did the manner in which the meat servo manipulated the controls play a significant role in the mishap? Yes? Then it's pilot error. Stop beating a dead horse. Pilot error is a term of art in the aviation community. I'm sorry if some civilians are butt-hurt by it.

Let's put it another way. Say you're in a King Air taking off and you have a single-engine failure. You goon up the abort and ball the plane up at the departure end. PILOT ERROR. But if the engine hadn't failed you wouldn't have crashed. Tough. It doesn't mean you're a bad person, or even, depending on the circumstances, a bad pilot, just that someone who had applied procedures properly would've not crashed the plane.

Whether "VRS" caused the crash or not, the Marana crew entered a high ROD profile at low airspeed close behind another aircraft. That's bad juju in anything.

BTW, the 40KIAS VRS limit doesn't exist because VRS starts there--it starts there because pitot-static instruments don't give accurate indications below 40KIAS, so that's why most r/w manuals say to avoid high RODs below that airspeed. If one can recover from VRS with power, per the 53 example above, one wasn't in VRS to start with.

Tcabot113

2nd Apr 2012, 00:05

JD

No has stated the 53E would enter VRS at less than 40 Knots and less than 800 fpm sink rate. The statement you object to is that a 53E put into the same (or really lessor) extremes seen in Arizona would have actually entered VRS. Fact is one of the investigating board members took a 53 into VRS as part of the investigation and stated he would never do that again. You can read that for how he meant it.

Truth is truth, physics is physics. The only great lie is the 53 is safer than a V-22.

TC

JohnDixson

2nd Apr 2012, 22:16

BTW, the 40KIAS VRS limit doesn't exist because VRS starts there--it starts there because pitot-static instruments don't give accurate indications below 40KIAS, so that's why most r/w manuals say to avoid high RODs below that airspeed.

I could not recall such a restriction in any Sikorsky Manual, but since I retired a few years ago, I called a couple of still active pilots at SA this morning. Starting with the 53E and continuing thru the UH-60, SH-60, S-76 and S-92, my two friends reported that the manuals haven't changed on that issue, i.e., there are no such proscriptions. Perhaps others can post concerning what is in, for instance, CH-47 and AH-64 manuals, if anything, on this subject.

Let me attempt to explain an aerodynamic reality that occurs in slow, relatively steep descents that I believe several in the forum have incorrectly believed to be the edge or onset of VRS (there are other members whose reports are clearly VRS).

In descending flight at speeds in the 15-30 kt range and at rates of descent in the 700-1500+ fpm range, the advancing tip penetrates the tip vortex from the preceding blade (one can immediately see how the flight conditions for this effect are affected by weight, altitude, temperature), and the instantaneous angle of attack change on that tip results in a lift, drag and pitching moment change that effectively "rings" the main rotor at N/rev and can produce, if air conditions are stable enough to stay in this situation, very high vibration levels at N/rev frequency. One has to consciously try varying the ROD and airspeed to find this effect (in day to day flying we usually we fly right on thru it), but it is there if one goes looking, or if the combinations are just right. SA has always used this manoeuvre (at least since before I started doing engineering flying in 1969), called a "rough approach" as a flight loads survey manuever, as the associated vibrations may impact engine mount loads, or perhaps electrical, hydraulic, or other hardware that is mounted on the transmission deck (they are typically far higher than the N/rev vibrations associated with VRS as discussed below). The blade stress guages clearly reflect what is happening here. HOWEVER, it is key to this discussion to realize that when in this condition the vehicle is rock solid in pitch, roll, yaw ROD and airspeed.

Finding the right combination for a "rough approach" as described above is a piece of cake compared to getting VRS data. Since you are looking for 2500 fpm (ballpark) and a stable situation, one starts at 6-8000 ft. The vehicle has to be coming down exactly vertical relative to the airmass, so on the most recent vehicle we did this on, the S-92, we thought that since we had a super new, state of the art low airspeed system onboard it would be easier than usual, but it wasn't to be, and thus we were forced to use the sides of clouds etc. Once VRS is found, the effect upon the vehicle is dramatic, with rather sharp excursions in the pitch and roll axes, some smaller excursions in yaw due to the power changing (at fixed collective) as a result of non-steady inflow, and increased N/rev vibrations. If not ready for the ride, one can understand the reference offered in Tcabot's posting:
"Fact is one of the investigating board members took a 53 into VRS as part of the investigation and stated he would never do that again. You can read that for how he meant it."

In the case of fully developed helicopter VRS, the vehicle is hardly rock solid.

Two very different rotary wing aerodynamic situations.

Misconstruing a "Rough Approach" situation with the profile necessary for a VRS event can create unneeded restrictions. I mention that because some friends have heard unconfirmed "buzz" about possible regulatory restrictions (civil) on steep approach profiles.

Thanks,
John Dixson

SASless

2nd Apr 2012, 23:35

Bummer.....inconvenient facts again! Yet another learning opportunity from SA and Captain D! Thank you John....always good info from you.

I take it then....when you say "exactly vertical" that means an actual relative wind of "Zero" no matter what IAS is "clocked".

How much leeway does that allow for airspeed variance in actuality before you lose the effect?

Also....in the larger aircraft....it has been said one can simply "power" your way out of VRS without resorting to the CW of "flying" out of the situation.

Is that true....and if so....how much would that apply to the Osprey where only the one Prop Rotor is in VRS?

I cannot recall ever getting into VRS in a Chinook....though when doing a Training Demo it was possible to get some instability and vibration but never ever anything that would have remotely have been described as scaring my socks off.

Any memories of Chinook days you can add?

Lonewolf_50

3rd Apr 2012, 21:06

SAS, show of force sometimes works, sometimes doesn't.

Depends.

I was in the Mideast in 2004, and Show of Force was a typical mission requirement, thanks to the RoE. A lot of times, the powers that be wanted weapons release, like a GBU 12 or GBU 31 or whatever was loaded, to be a last resort. I think that frustrated the ground guys more than a little bit, but at other times, it was the ground commander who was very strict on there not being bombs dropped since he had some political realities on the ground with locals that would be screwed if bombs started dropping in that local area ... yet again.

Nothing is simple in COIN, nor in post-conflict operations stuff.
It's all a bit of a mess.

Now and again, when our ground guys were engaged with folks in houses (in Iraq) and the go fasters (F-16 and F-15 mostly, and Tornados) made that low speed pass, without weapons release, they'd get some of the folks shooting at them to surrender, stop fighting.

And more often, it either got their heads down or had no effect.

As I said, it depends.

There was a story going around about some high speed passes in Afghanistan by B-1's at supersonic speeds that apparently scared some Taliban, or Muj of some sort, into moving, which got them hit by small arms fire from local Coalition forces.

That's another possible outcome of a "show of force" by air assets.

Show of force frustrated quite a few fighter jocks, since making that low speed "scare them" pass also put the jet into MANPAD envelope. :mad: One never really knew how many MANPADS were in anybody's hands ...

My further comments in re the RoE and some of the political crap the operating forces have to mitigate are censored to keep my blood pressure down.

ADDED LATER IN EDIT:

For John D et all VRS flying things ...

The 40/800 guideline, which we used as a rule of thumb when teaching steep approaches in the SH-60B, back when I was an instructor, was used to prompt when to wave off a steep approach so that YOU DON"T PROCEED TO GET NEAR OR INTO VRS.

That close to the ground, below 500 feet, usually somewhere near 300 feet AGL, if you actually enter into VRS and got the RoD and handling changes/problems John describes, your chances of waving off successfully aren't good.

I note that when checking this out, John took the bird up to 6-8000 feet.

There's a very good reason for that.

ospreydriver

4th Apr 2012, 04:32

I was always taught that power made VRS worse. That's been from my first days in the TH-57 (B206) until now. If you can power out of it, then by definition, it wasn't VRS. The only exception, I would think, is if the additional power aggravated the VRS to such an extent that one continued to descend through the bad air and managed to get into better air below.

Even in helos, we were taught to freeze the collective and get forward airspeed.

In the V-22 one rolls nacelles forward, which immediately changes the thrust vector.

Now, the V-22's induced velocity is so high that one has to have a truly sick 2000fpm + on the descent to get VRS. If you have that on short final with less than 40KIAS, your approach is going to end in failure long before encountering VRS.

SASless

4th Apr 2012, 14:29

OD,

What is the Natops approved procedure for dealing with asymmetrical VRS in the MV-22? What criteria is used to define "A-VRS" as compared to "Incipient A-VRS"?

JohnDixson

6th Apr 2012, 14:26

It used to be that Army flight school included, in the second half of the curriculum at Ft Rucker, a demonstration of " settling with power ", which, when one listened to the verbal description, was their understanding of VRS. The demonstrations were usually unsuccessful: only a few of the students in my class had the eye opening experience. I wasn't one, as my instructor, who was an ace in all other things, set the H-19 up in a vertical descent and I received one of those: " do you feel that....there it is.....we are on the edge of it...." recitations, while in the back of my mind I was thinking, " feel what ? ". Two months later I was out of flight school at the Test Board at Rucker in a "lead the fleet " UH-1D with 44' main blades, by myself, and after a few tries I finally got that vehicle into a real VRS event.

The point of the story, is that it is very, very hard to get a single rotored machine ( my only experience in this subject area ) into this aerodynamic situation.

Rotary Wing history seems to prove that to be the case.

Does the logging community have a history of VRS induced accidents?
Does the military heavy lift and artillery haulers have a history of VRS incidents?
Does the special ops community have a history of VRS accidents?
In all of the military H/V testing ( less the V-22 ), and FAA H/V and Cat A testing done all over the world by various manufacturers, has the VRS situation been encountered and reported?

The list could go on, and one would expect, based upon the protestations of the V-22 community that ALL helicopters are subject to VRS if within the dreaded 40/800 boundary, that there would have been accident fields of aluminum shards all over the world, accompanied by the type of FAA and military safety symposiums associated with the current EMS accident situation.

That hasn't been the case, as the entire current VRS discussion has been initiated by the V-22 community following the 2000 Marana accident. Well it should, as far as the V-22 is concerned.If the V-22 manufacturers and operators, based upon their testing, choose to impose a flight limitation, they are correct in doing so.

On the other hand, I have not seen nor read any evidence that justifies applying the V-22 flight limitation to other flying machines.

Two other related observations:

1. One aspect of the V-22 vs single rotored helicopters in VRS to ponder is why the V-22 apparently "rolls off" and cannot be controlled, whereas the single rotored vehicle remains controllable in VRS. I know the latter to be true, and assume the former based upon the accident details that were in the press.

2. Osprey Driver wrote"

"If you can power out of it, then by definition, it wasn't VRS. The only exception, I would think, is if the additional power aggravated the VRS to such an extent that one continued to descend through the bad air and managed to get into better air below."

Never having attempted to exit VRS in that manner, I can't comment from experience, but in the well-known Ray Prouty book, if one looks at figure 2.7 ( page 105 ), there is an analytical argument that says one can, with a slight "predicted" additional power( 10-12 % ) required to overcome what he refers to as a "settling with power" region.

Thanks,
John Dixson

Matari

6th Apr 2012, 23:21

John D. wrote:

One aspect of the V-22 vs single rotored helicopters in VRS to ponder is why the V-22 apparently "rolls off" and cannot be controlled, whereas the single rotored vehicle remains controllable in VRS.

Apologies if this has been posted already, but here is Prouty's take:

For a tilt-rotor aircraft in the helicopter mode, we could make the same scenario for descent in the vortex ring state if both rotors were acting the same. It is probable, however, that they will not act the same because of thrust fluctuations that are always associated with the vortex ring state. If, for some reason, a small roll to the right starts, the right rotor drops, its descent angle increases and it loses thrust in the process. The left rotor, on the other hand, rises and regains some of the thrust that it had lost. This is another unstable situation in which the roll rate will just keep increasing in a divergent manner unless the pilot stops it with his roll control. But since the situation is unstable, he might go into a divergent left roll. It can be represented by a one-degree-of-freedom system with negative damping — a very difficult situation to control!

Rotor & Wing Magazine :: Ask Ray Prouty (http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/training/specialty/Ask-Ray-Prouty_25481.html)

JohnDixson

7th Apr 2012, 19:24

Good post, Matari. It brings up other writings by Ray Prouty:

In the R/W article ( could not get to the associated figures, unfortunately ), Mr. prouty concentrates on the V-22 aerodynamics, whereas in the 1986 ( 1990 revision ) text, his section on VRS has to do with single and tandem rotor machines.

In the R/W article, the main discussion centers on the 40 kt VRS data for the V-22, whereas in his 1990 text ( writing about a smaller tandem helicopter, not the V-22 ), he writes: " The results showed that for the test helicopter, forward speeds above 10 knots were sufficient to avoid vortex ring vibration at all rates of descent." (The cited reference was a 1958 paper and how they could attest to a 10 knot speed in those flying conditions is not stated ).

The other issue I had raised, and which the Prouty article skirts around is one of controllability. I mean controllability in the technical sense: does the pilot have the rotor control moment capability to offset a disturbance ( or "roll-off" to use the term favored by some in the V-22 community ). It is clear from personal experience that the single rotor machines I have flown have no issue there, but the Prouty article leaves the V-22 situation in doubt. Since a Chinook is in one sense a sideways V-22, rotor-wise, isn't an apt analogy a SAS-OFF Chinook hovering in gusty weather, nose into the wind? Is the hands off dynamic stability aperiodic/unstable? You bet. Does the pilot have the control power ( controllability ) to manage the disturbances? Certainly does. All I am suggesting is that the Prouty article does not go very far in explaining the details behind the Marana accident. Doubly so given the experience of the crew.

Oh, I did want to respond to one thing Lonewolf wrote:
"I note that when checking this out, John took the bird up to 6-8000 feet."

Two reasons. First is that it isn't easy to find a fully developed VRS situation, and the second is that once found, a respectable length of recorded data is appreciated by all except the flight crew being bounced around.

Thanks,
John Dixson

SASless

8th Apr 2012, 12:26

John,

In discussions about the Chinook...we are usually seeing the Aft Rotor System being affected by airflow coming from the Forward Rotor system....and I see the V-22 and A-VRS as being a different situation as the V-22 wants to roll off.

In the Chinook....if anything....the aircraft would want to pitch up (actually pitch down on the aft head.....resulting in a felt pitch up movement.).

During aggressive landings at high MAUW's....there was a thing we called "Falling Through" where the Aft Rotor system was less efficient and the aircraft would pitch up....requiring a nose down cyclic input....which now began to match the two heads up lift-wise....and the net result was a Chinook "falling". If there was adequate height....as the aircraft leveled....and if there was sufficient lift in the Rotor System....the landing could be salvaged. If not....the landing could be anywhere from merely embarrassing to really disastrous.

But that was not VRS or A-VRS as a lightly loaded aircraft could not be made to respond the same way.

JohnDixson

8th Apr 2012, 15:05

SAS,

I only used the Chinook as a handling qualities analogy with regard to the Prouty comment.

With regard to your first paragraph, it reminded me of comments made by Jim Campbell, Boeing test pilot who was at Ft Rucker 1963-4 and who signed me off in that aircraft: he had done some of the CH-47 qualification testing and related that when flown into straight ahead blade stall, the aft rotor, operating at higher angles of attack than the forward rotor ( your observation ), would stall first, the aircraft would react nose up, and the situation was, to some extent, partially self correcting.
Sorry for the off-subject diversion.

Thanks,
John

21stCen

8th Apr 2012, 19:09

Anybody who doesn't agree that it takes a higher rate of descent for a tiltrotor to get into VRS than a helicopter will have to argue with Ray Prouty (backed up by the empirical data gathered post-Marana accident by Tom Macdonald and team). Nobody will deny if that higher rate is exceeded in a tiltrotor than A-VRS can result in devastating consequences that a single rotor helicopter would not be vulnerable to.

Ray Prouty's comments after the accident and before it was known that the Marana V-22 entered VRS at 285ft agl at 2500+fpm ROD:
"The vortex ring explanation never made any sense to me," adds noted aerodynamicist and R&W columnist Ray Prouty. "By my calculations, the Osprey should have been coming down a lot faster than it was to get into a classic vortex ring state." The doomed MV-22, he concludes, "must have been hit by a meteorite."

It’s all part and parcel of the many "unknown unknowns" that afflict helicopters—especially revolutionary new rotorcraft like the Osprey, Prouty says. Or, as military aviators bluntly put it: the flight manuals are written in blood.

"I would say the V-22 has had some really bad luck," Prouty says.

Prouty says in the previously referenced article:

Test pilots have found that by tilting the engine nacelles forward, they can get out of this interesting situation, but the main result of the tests was to define a safe flight envelope within which they never would get into trouble.

Rotor & Wing Magazine :: Ask Ray Prouty (http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/training/specialty/Ask-Ray-Prouty_25481.html)

However, at 2500fpm ROD and 285ft agl I think few of us would disagree that it would be too late for either a tiltrotor or a helicopter to recover.

JD says:
Oh, I did want to respond to one thing Lonewolf wrote:
"I note that when checking this out, John took the bird up to 6-8000 feet."
Two reasons. First is that it isn't easy to find a fully developed VRS situation, and the second is that once found, a respectable length of recorded data is appreciated by all except the flight crew being bounced around.

John,
Would you be willing to give that a try at 2500+fpm ROD at 285ft agl?

Just curious...

thanks,
21stC

jeffg

9th Apr 2012, 01:33

On the other hand, I have not seen nor read any evidence that justifies applying the V-22 flight limitation to other flying machines.

Actually it's the other way around. The 40/800 rule was in several NATOPS manuals well before the V-22 came along and it was automatically put into the V-22 NATOPS, before Marana. As recent flight test data shows, the V-22 is less susceptible to VRS than are most single rotor systems therefore those limits shouldn't be applied to it. Why are they? Because those limits are perfectly acceptable for both commercial and combat operations so it doesn't really matter. Fact is that if both types are flown within their limits theyre pretty darn safe from VRS.

SASless

9th Apr 2012, 02:43

What is magic about 2500 fpm rate of descent....most autorotations can provide that ROD....it is staying in the downward moving column of air that is being accelerated by the rotor system that trips you up. 300feet AGL and 60 Knots used to be our approach gate in the Chinook with the Thrust Lever full down....then a transition to full power getting the old girl stopped at a hover. It idd not matter if it was a 105mm Howitzer and A-22 bag of ammo or an internal load. The object of the exercise was to spend as little time between 2500 feet AGL and the Landing site. I would suggest airspeed and power setting is far more critical to the onset of VRS than Rate of Descent. One does not turn into a Frog at 800fpm ROD and 40Kts IAS.....there is far more to it.

21stCen

9th Apr 2012, 06:05

I would suggest airspeed and power setting is far more critical to the onset of VRS than Rate of Descent.

Sas,
Those are of course the other two critical elements in the establishment of VRS that go without saying. It has been discussed ad infinitum on this thread that in the Marana situation the aircraft was slowing rapidly with a tailwind and max power was being pulled in at 285ft agl with a 2500+fpm ROD putting it in an unrecoverable condition whether it be a tiltrotor or a helicopter -- at that point both of them would turn into a 'Frog.'
21stC

JohnDixson

9th Apr 2012, 13:55

JeffG,

What flight manuals ( excepting the V-22 ) do you refer to? See my previous post re Sikorsky models.

21st,

At 285 ft AGL and -2500 fpm, one had best be either, getting ready to flare, if in autorotation, or starting to apply collective/power if not.

Is everyone aware that for civil machines, the FAA certifies an envelope that one tests, and no more? Thus for example the S-76 and 92 were flown thru the vertical rate of descent envelope to include autorotation, and at the extremes of the NR range. One can assume that absent flight manual limitations to the contrary, other civil certified machines were tested similarly.

Thanks,
John Dixson

SASless

9th Apr 2012, 14:08

Jeff,

I would not fully agree with that statement.....as in a helicopter....there would not have been the roll off resulting in a loss of control. In the helicopter at 285-300 feet....there is still time and height to do something....as simple as a slight turn, lowering the nose a bit, easing the collective down....any number of things.

If my memory serves me right....Nick Lappos...once posted a very good discussion on VRS and the 22....and as I recall suggested it would take a much higher ROD than 2500 fpm to cause a problem.

My main issue is the two Pilots are being left to carry the Can as a result of a PR Statement that ignores the Accident Investigators statements about the cause of the crash.

I accept the Pilot's were steep, hot, and downwind. I will even accept there existed an 800/40 caution in their NATOPs data.

I also note they were not the flight lead....Lead put them into the situation they were in. The full dangers of A-VRS were not known at the time. It was a new aircraft to them and they were working to prove the aircraft. When you stack up all the chain in this tragedy.....picking just one link and then forever and again calling it a "Pilot Error" caused crash is just being unfair to two Dead Men who cannot stand and defend themselves.

When we add all the politics and the reasons why the Marines, Bell-Boeing, and way too many Congressmen were loathe to consider the crash to be anything but "Pilot Errror"....it easy to see why all and sundry grabbed onto the idea of blaming the Pilots.

If the proximate cause of the accident was Pilot Error....the Accident Investigators would have said so....yet three have made written statements they did not consider Pilot Error to be the proximate cause of the accident. The Pilots contributed to the accident by not doing an early Go Around.....but that does not mean they were the proximate cause of the crash.

Since when does a Press Release take precedence over investigations for matter of fact.

jeffg

9th Apr 2012, 14:31

JD,

40/800 has been in the UH/AH for a very long time, well before the V-22. It's also in the H-57 manual so every Naval Aviator should be familiar with it. I also believe but can not confirm that it is in the CH-46 manual.

I know its not in the 53 NATOPS. I know this because the morning after Marana our 53 project pilot at NRWATS came over to our section asking what this '40kt 800 fpm rule was'. He was surprised there was such a thing and we were equally surprised he didn't know about it. A difference between communities.
While it may not be in the RFMs I know the Navy, Army and FAA teach different versions of this rule as basic piloting technique.

SAS
"One does not turn into a Frog at 800fpm ROD and 40Kts IAS.....there is far more to it."
True. In fact the V-22 won't encounter VRS roll off at 40 its until at 3000 fpm ROD, at 15kts it will be about 2000 fpm. But it's different for every helicopter. Heavier disk loading equals less susceptibility to VRS, therefore JDs experience in the 53 doesn't surprise me wrt having a hard time finding it and maybe that's why it's not in the Sikorsky manuals? I believe 40/800 is a rule of thumb taken from early VRS testing done well over 40 years ago. That data showed that a single rotor system could get into VRS at less than 800 fpm ROD.
By the way, staying within the limits of 40/800 you can shoot up to a 15 degree glide slope approach.

JohnDixson

9th Apr 2012, 14:55

JeffG,

Did Bell Flight test document the REAL VRS envelope for those machines*, or did the flight manual entry arise due to " other considerations "? For instance, the legal department reviewers playing a " what if " scenario around the HV diagram?

* and not that other, very high N/Rev vibration aerodynamic phenomena that some have misconstrued for VRS and which I described in an earlier post.

Thanks,
John Dixson

jeffg

9th Apr 2012, 16:05

JD
I don't recall seeing the 40/800 in a bell civil RFM so that would lead me to believe it might have more to do with NAVAIR then Bell. I could be wrong. If so why no carry over to the 53 is beyond me.
As far as VRS goes, I know some pilots who got into it in the AH (while testing at Pax, not for VRS though) and they have no desire to encounter it again as it scared the crap of them. For the record they encountered it much higher than 285 agl (800 agl) and recovered at less than 100 agl. So to SAS; at 285 agl, in a 2500 fpm near vertical (less than 30 kts with a tailwind) descent, no matter what you were flying, I would submit bad things were going to happen.
Remember, the aircraft was commanded to that point in space, 3X beyond what the flight manual stated. I think it's a little unfair to blame the aircraft as many want to do.

21stCen

9th Apr 2012, 16:17

JD says:
At 285 ft AGL and -2500 fpm, one had best be either, getting ready to flare, if in autorotation, or starting to apply collective/power if not.

John,
You mentioned to Lonewolf that the reasons you performed a zero airspeed vertical descent VRS demo at 6-8,000 feet was because:
Two reasons. First is that it isn't easy to find a fully developed VRS situation, and the second is that once found, a respectable length of recorded data is appreciated by all except the flight crew being bounced around.
Is it possible that not putting the a/c in an unrecoverable position was a factor also? Do you believe if the CH-53 was in the same scenario as the Marana V-22 a CH-53 could have recovered? (none of the other CH-53 drivers I have spoken to believe it would have been survivable, but perhaps there is some empirical data we are not aware of?)

Sas mentions in those conditions (slowing rapidly with a tailwind and max power being pulled in at 285ft agl with a 2500+fpm ROD) it might be possible to recover with a "slight turn, lowering the nose a bit, easing the collective down." Do you believe the CH-53 could recover using these techniques in that scenario?

thanks,
21stC

SASless

9th Apr 2012, 18:30

I think it's a little unfair to blame the aircraft as many want to do.

If it is "unfair" to blame the aircraft....why is it "fair" to blame the Pilots when we all know there were a whole raft full of causes to this crash? The old "chain" concept is well proven here.

If A-VRS was well understood prior to the crash....might the pilots not been better trained and educated about such risks....and perhaps might have waved off prior to losing control effectiveness?

As this is unique to the tilt rotor design....why can we not assign some fault to the aircraft?

Some of us quite happily blame the Pilots....why not the aircraft?

FH1100 Pilot

9th Apr 2012, 18:30

Is it possible that not putting the a/c in an unrecoverable position was a factor also? Do you believe if the CH-53 was in the same scenario as the Marana V-22 a CH-53 could have recovered? (none of the other CH-53 drivers I have spoken to believe it would have been survivable, but perhaps there is some empirical data we are not aware of?)

At least a '53 would have hit upright (like the Lead V-22, Nighthawk 71 did), not inverted and ensuring that it would be unsurvivable. Below 800 feet or so, A-VRS is unsurvivable. Marana proved that.

21stCen

9th Apr 2012, 19:00

At least a '53 would have hit upright (like the Lead V-22, Nighthawk 71 did), not inverted and ensuring that it would be unsurvivable. Below 800 feet or so, A-VRS is unsurvivable. Marana proved that.

If they "hit upright" but do not survive, I fail to see the benefit.

FH1100,
We are trying to get some "expert advise" from people with experience on the CH-53 (who in mass obviously disagree with you, but JD may legitimately have information not available to all with his Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. experience). I read your web site and congratulate you on making it through the trouble you had learning to hover on your way to your private license a couple of years ago.

Now let's get 'back on point' as you like to say for questions asked of you earlier. Once again, there are a number of questions posed to you that are still unanswered on this thread. Please respond to those anxiously awaiting your informed advise. Here are the questions pending your answers (scroll down about half way):
What's the latest news of the V22 Osprey? (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/204936-whats-latest-news-v22-osprey-71.html)

thanks...
21stC

FH1100 Pilot

9th Apr 2012, 19:38

21st Century, in your misguided zeal to defend the V-22 at all costs, you try to divert the discussion. If you honestly want to stay on point and add to this discussion, then why not address what we're talking about here, which is what I see as the biggest flaw of the V-22: a low-level encounter with A-VRS is simply not recoverable and therefore unsurvivable. I know, I know...all you have to do when you sense that you're experiencing A-VRS is beep those nacelles forward and fly away! I say: by the time you realize you're getting into A-VRS it will likely be too late because you've already aggravated it by making an opposite control input (as happened to Majors Brow and Gruber).

The rates of descent experienced by Brow and Gruber were not sustained; they were merely transitory as they tried to maintain position on their Lead aircraft, the other V-22 (which also crashed, only level). Anyone who thinks that they intentionally initiated a sustained RoD of 2000+ fpm at 800' is insane. But that has become the narrative of the blame-the-pilots-not-the-aircraft group. The problem with Brow and Gruber's V-22 was that once they started coming down, that one proprotor got into VRS and over she went. Would not have happened that way to a CH-53. Would. Not. Have. Happened.

No, I don't know how hard a CH-53 can hit vertically and still be survivable. But I do know that it's better for ANY aircraft to hit upright to allow the landing gear and structure to do the job it was designed for than to crash inverted. Or do you dispute *that*?

Yes, yes, we know that VRS of any sort is difficult to get into when you're trying to demonstrate it. Fact is, the conditions that make it happen are not easily or dependably reproducable - unlike, say, the stalling speed of an airplane wing. Trouble is, when plain-vanilla VRS does happen it usually catches pilots by surprise, like when they're busy doing other things. Even a fairly "easy" shallow-but-fast straight-in landing can put pilots in a "task overload" situation as we saw in the Afghanistan V-22 crash. What makes us think that a steep, circling, improvised, possibly downwind approach (due to conditions being different than planned) won't result in the same thing...only worse? And A-VRS is *much* worse!

Arguing over comparisons between helicopters and tilt-rotors as to relative rates of descent needed to excite VRS is useless and irrelevant. I've said it before and I'll say it again: Only V-22's can get A-VRS. And low-level A-VRS is unrecoverable and absolutely unsurvivable. Saying...praying...pleading...promising it won't ever happen again is just silly. It will. The fact that it has so far not happened yet is no guarantee that it won't, and you know it.

End of story.

SansAnhedral

9th Apr 2012, 20:04

A suggested read for this topic for those who haven't seen it before, as there is a lot of misinformation flying around (no pun intended)

(i.e. a rotor experiencing VRS is not stalled)

https://vtol.org/store/product/the-nature-of-vortex-ring-state-3416.cfm

21stCen

9th Apr 2012, 20:05

FH1100,

Let's bring it back to reality -- in your misguided zeal to attack the V-22 at all costs, what's in question is your experience level to contribute responsibly and intelligently to this discussion to give a level of confidence to those of us reading your comments that you have some knowledge of the subject matter. The one good thing is that most of us on both sides of the discussion have a good laugh reading your comments.
:)

I read your web site and congratulate you on making it through the trouble you had learning to hover on your way to your private license a couple of years ago.

Now let's get 'back on point' as you like to say for questions asked of you earlier. Once again, there are a number of questions posed to you that are still unanswered on this thread. Please respond to those anxiously awaiting your informed advise. Here are the questions pending your answers (scroll down about half way):
What's the latest news of the V22 Osprey? (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/204936-whats-latest-news-v22-osprey-71.html)

And as stated previously on another thread recently:

Get on the Clue Train
Get on board, FH1100.
I am far from being a tilt-rotor proponent but your question apparently comes from ignorance of information that's been published in the trade press for about the last 25 years or so concerning the tilt-rotor's construction, i.e., the XV-15, the XV-22... Look, you can be against the tiltrotor all you want (again, I am myself), but try to make your objections from a position of knowledge rather than ignorance. Because as it is you're making our side look bad.

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/456619-whats-new-civil-tiltrotor-2.html

thanks...
21stC

End of Story

SansAnhedral

9th Apr 2012, 20:26

End of story, FH? Hardly.

A Ferrari can easily overcome the kinetic friction of its extremely high performance tires, skid though a turn and into a wall. Its much easier to do this in a 500hp supercar than it is in a 200hp Hyundai. What can possibly be done to prevent this!??! We drive the vehicles appropriately, avoid entering a corner at high speeds (which is a relative term, high speed for the hyundai might be 80mph, the ferrari 120mph), and learn recovery from skidding by countersteering, braking, and modulating throttle. Do we only drive Hyundais to avoid crashes like these? No.

Fact is, the conditions that make it happen are not easily or dependably reproducable

FH, more uneducated drivel from an aerodynamic layman like yourself exposes your own crusade against the V22, and is causing you to lean heavily on hypocritical critiques of 21stC's contributions. You claim comparisons to the 53 are irrelevant, after filling an entire post of the same.

I suggest you read the above white paper, and the multitude of flight testing reports linked elsewhere in this thread which have fully defined the very reproducible envelope of V22 VRS. In over 120,000 flight hours, no VRS incidents have been experienced. Will wonder's never cease, surely thats merely chance! Sure, it may happen again...if the aircraft is flown outside its well defined parameters. Just like flying a teetering rotor in a -1G maneuver....you sound like Mark Thompson hammering on "this fatal flaw".

SansAnhedral

11th Apr 2012, 20:20

V22 Down in Morocco, no details yet

Two U.S. soldiers die in helicopter crash in Morocco | Agricultural Commodities | Reuters (http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL6E8FB5K020120411)

U.S. soldiers wounded in Morocco crash: media | Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/11/us-usa-morocco-crash-idUSBRE83A16U20120411)

21stCen

12th Apr 2012, 08:42

2 Marines killed in Morocco Osprey crash

By Gina Cavallaro ([email protected]?subject=Question from MarineCorpsTimes.com reader) - Staff writer
Posted : Wednesday Apr 11, 2012 18:08:58 EDT

Two Marines were killed and two severely injured in the crash of an MV-22 Osprey during a training mission in southern Morocco, the Marine Corps confirmed Wednesday.
The Osprey crashed in a military training area southwest of Agadir, Morocco, after taking off from aboard the amphibious assault ship Iwo Jima, said Capt. Kevin Schultz, a Marine spokesman at the Pentagon in Washington.
The four Marines were the only personnel aboard the Osprey at the time of the crash.
The aircraft was attached to the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which deployed from Camp Lejeune, N.C., on March 29. Among the major subordinate units that belonged to the MEU was Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261, an Osprey unit out of Marine Corps Air Station New River, N.C.
The MEU is in Morocco supporting Exercise African Lion, an annual 10-day joint exercise with Royal Moroccan Armed Forces which is being overseen this year by the 14th Marine Regiment, a Reserve artillery regiment from Fort Worth, Texas.
The event was scheduled to conclude April 17, followed by 10 days of breakdown and redeployment. More than 1,000 Marines, and about 200 soldiers, sailors and airmen from across the U.S. are participating.
This year marked the first time the bilateral exercise included a MEU.
Further information about the crash was being withheld until the next of kin were notified, said Rodney Ford, spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Rabat.
The cause of the incident was under investigation, according to a press release from U.S. AFRICOM.
Despite a rocky beginning for the Osprey more than 12 years ago with the deaths of 23 Marines in two crashes during testing, the Marine Corps has rated the MV-22 as effective in a combat environment, first fielding it in an operational capacity in Iraq in 2007.
An Air Force version of the Osprey, the CV-22, crashed in Afghanistan on April 9, 2010, marking the only fatal incident involving an Osprey in the war zone.
Two of the three cockpit crew members died attempting a night landing at a desert landing zone. Also killed were a soldier and a civilian contractor — two of 16 passengers in the cargo compartment. The co-pilot survived.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.

2 Marines killed in Morocco Osprey crash - Marine Corps News | News from Afghanistan & Iraq - Marine Corps Times (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2012/04/marine-morocco-2-marines-killed-osprey-crash-041112w/)

SASless

13th Apr 2012, 12:38

Facebook this morning had an ad by Bell claiming the Osprey has achieved 130,000 flight hours and has proven itself to be the safest aircraft in the Marine Inventory (or words to that effect).

How many fatal crashes so far?

Does one fatal crash per 30,000-40,000 flight hours seem a bit high ?

SansAnhedral

13th Apr 2012, 14:57

Well SAS lets do the math...

Before yesterday:
Osprey serious mishap rate - 1.28 per 100,000 flight hours
Marine air fleet serious mishap rate - 2.6 per 100,000 flight hours

Even if they were only at 100,000, if you include the incident yesterday that would put them at 2.28, which is still lower than the fleet.

(But of course, it looks like your numbers are trying to include accidents that happened before the V22 was out of the prototype/testing stage or even deployed.)

SASless

13th Apr 2012, 15:25

Sans.....just using the 130,000 hour figure used by Bell.....does that include all flight time from Test Flight 1? I am just asking the question....and using their data....so how many FATAL crashes have there been.....and you pick the benchmarks re flight time! What is the percentage of Fatal/Non-Fatal Accidents? If Bell and the Marine Corps PR folks want to throw out numbers....then let's see what they are based upon and how they arrive at their results.

Four Bell 212's I flew in Nigeria exceeded that amount of flight time....high time bird had either 37,000 or 41,000 hours alone....I know one had 37,000 as I flew its last Flight....and kept the Clock as a Souvenir.

It was sold off as scrap....and has been rebuilt and is flying again somewhere in Canada last I heard.

So 130,000 hours is not a whole lot of flight time in reality.

21stCen

13th Apr 2012, 15:44

Sas,

People in the tiltrotor community have died and been severely injured. It is likely that some who are close to them are PPRuners or will read this thread. Undoubtedly there are those on the anti side that will be smacking their lips in happiness and will try to use this to discredit the technology even before any information is forthcoming ignoring the loss of life. I don't think that you are one of them.

Now is the time to mourn the loss as we do in the helicopter community which is very much integrated with the tiltrotor community these days. Let's wait until some facts come forward in this recent fatal accident before using it in a pro/con debate.

thanks,
21stC

SansAnhedral

13th Apr 2012, 16:02

Well here's a good overview

V-22 Osprey Crashed After Dropping Troops At LZ; Mechanical Failure Unlikely (http://defense.aol.com/2012/04/13/osprey-mv-22-crashed-after-dropping-troops-at-lz-mechanical-fai/)

SASless

13th Apr 2012, 16:34

"The fact that the Marine Corps and Air Force have not grounded the V-22 strongly suggests that something other than an aircraft malfunction was at fault here," a military officer who has participated in accident investigations said.

Clear day....near empty aircraft....over land.....and Pilot Error? This is going to be and interesting story. An aircraft destroyed and two Enlisted Crew members dead....let's see how this plays out.

21st....people die in Aircraft accidents...fact of life...and each one is a tragedy.

I firmly believe each one of these tragedies should be a learning experience....investigated to determine the cause....then apply the best measures possible to try to prevent similar occurrences. This forum is not the place for that investigation...that will be done by the USMC and US Navy with much interest in the results by the Air Force.

The good news on this one is two Pilots able to relate what happened as best they can recall, the Data/CVR Recorders will be recovered and analyzed, and there should be some witnesses perhaps. Unlike the USAF crash, there is a very good chance this one will provide some answers to what happened without any ambiguity as in the USAF crash.

Discussing these accidents is not Taboo.....otherwise we would never learn from them....that would be the worst loss of all.

21stCen

13th Apr 2012, 17:45

Discussing these accidents is not Taboo.....otherwise we would never learn from them....that would be the worst loss of all.

Sas,

Discussing these accidents is definitely not 'taboo,' in fact it is an absolute necessity so that as many as possible can learn from the true facts of the event. But to postulate, make comparisons, or give pre-conceived predictions of what may have happened without the facts will not help any of us in the industry (helicopters and tiltrotors are now linked jointly at the hip with crossover on both the operations and maintenance side). Sadly that is going to happen from both the pro and anti sides within the industry no matter what we do, but the rest will wait to hear what really happened before passing judgment. Projecting our pre-conceived notions into what we think may have happened or throwing the accident into a pool of statistics before knowing the facts will not contribute to a true understanding of what actually happened and what the relevant repercussions will or should be.

Again the most important thing at this moment is the loss to families and friends suffered as a result of the accident. We all give them our thoughts and prayers, and after that hope to see a critical analysis of the accident in the aftermath as soon as possible.

thanks,
21stC

SansAnhedral

13th Apr 2012, 17:50

Morocco hints strong wind caused U.S. aircraft crash | News by Country | Reuters (http://af.reuters.com/article/moroccoNews/idAFL6E8FC5WO20120412)

"According to the parties concerned, strong wind appears to have caused the crash," Communication Minister Mustafa El-Khalfi told reporters in Rabat. "But the exact causes will be determined by an investigation that is under way," he added.

KUNA : Helicopter crash kills two US militants, injures others in Morocco - Military and Security - 12/04/2012 (http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2233379&language=en)

The accident was caused by a fire that broke out in the aircraft

?

Lonewolf_50

13th Apr 2012, 18:06

According to the parties concerned, strong wind appears to have caused the crash," Communication Minister Mustafa El-Khalfi told reporters in Rabat. "But the exact causes will be determined by an investigation that --

Not to get all semantic on a non-English speaker (the Communication minister), nor the reporter he is talking to ... but I'd hope that someone who covers aviation (reporter?) would understand the difference between "contributed to" and "caused" a crash. The politician might well not, or, the translation might have been rough.

To amplify:

I've flown in a lot of very crap weather, to include shooting approaches at minimums. Some other pilots/aircraft have crashed in weather close to or at mins, but I didn't. The weather contributed to my risk of a crash, and at times made my task of safe arrival a bit more challenging.

Likewise with high winds, when I've flown in them, particularly when in rotary winged craft when doing maneuvers near the edges of performance margins.

Does the weather (or wind) "cause" the crash, or "contribute" to it?

Will All Journos Reading This Thread Please Take Note of the Distinction?

Thanks.

SASless

13th Apr 2012, 19:37

But to postulate, make comparisons, or give pre-conceived predictions of what may have happened without the facts will not help any of us in the industry....

Who has done that?

Why the pro/con reference?

Are you suggesting there are only two views to be found here....one that always blames the aircraft (no matter the accident chain) or others who always blame the Pilots (no matter the accident chain).....or is there a third group who see accidents (of any aircraft type and model) as being a series of events that lead to a crash, with multiple causal factors with some being more critical than others?

Within a few posts there was an article that suggested it was not an "aircraft malfunction" which was patently premature.

I am on record as saying....."Lets see how this plays out.", and suggested we wait to hear what the Data/CVR recorders, surviving crew, and any witnesses have to say.

So far we have one vote against an aircraft malfunction, one input saying high winds, one saying a fire of some sort, and one saying crew error. All are not from any credible source at this time.

21stCen

14th Apr 2012, 06:00

"But to postulate, make comparisons, or give pre-conceived predictions of what may have happened without the facts will not help any of us in the industry...."

Who has done that?

Answer:
So far we have one vote against an aircraft malfunction, one input saying high winds, one saying a fire of some sort, and one saying crew error. All are not from any credible source at this time.

Why the pro/con reference?

Answer:
Look at every page of this thread...

SASless

14th Apr 2012, 12:13

One must separate the Wheat from the Chaff.....amongst all the traffic noise there is something to be heard.

21stCen

14th Apr 2012, 12:50

That is very true. And of course this is a "Rumor Network," so information coming in "from the field" will likely be inaccurate at first, but will provide some pieces to the puzzle as the true facts come together. Jumping to conclusions using early information that all too often turns out to be inaccurate is where a potential problem lies.
21stC

SASless

15th Apr 2012, 12:56

The USMC wants 38 Amphib Asault ships....the USN says 30.....the Navy Combat folks want 500 ships....the budget folks say 300. The 300 ship fleet contains 66 Submarines and 32 Amphib Assault ships. Congress is holding hearings on all this.

This shall be a very interesting Hearing Process....it shall pit the Navy directly against the USMC....and both against the DOD and Congress ws the Budget Axe is going to have to fall upon some Sacred Cows.

Over the Horizion again will be discussed and the cost of the Osprey Program will yet again hit the skyline..

A 300 Ship Navy with the expected construction rate for new Ships is too small to support the Shipyards thought critical to the National Defense needs.

Pull up a comfy chair....get out your Beer and Popcorn....this is going to be an interesting couple of Months. The Liberal Democrats are going to want to cut the Defense Budget far more than they have....the Republicans are going to try to keep as strong a Military as it can.....but the inability of Congress to agree on a Budget (none in three years under the Obama Administration and control of the Senate by the Democrats) has launched draconian cuts on the Defense Budget. Something will have to give.....either in the way of Programs, Ships, Aircraft.....or an agreement within Congress to raise the Defense budget.

I bet we see a smaller Osprey fleet....a growing reluctance to build the new Aviation Support Ship (think Osprey Carrier)....fewer F-35's....and a real debate over OTH in the guise of Amphib/Surface Warfare capability for the USN/USMC....dictated by a decision on what percentage of the Ships will be Amphib's. It would appear at the outset that Eight Amphib ships will have to be cut from the mix....which ones will they be and how does that affect the Osprey Program?

Which potential task....Amphibious Assault.....or Counter-Terrorism/Freedom of the Sea missions will take priority? Do we really need our Navy to dedicate over Ten Percent of our fleet units to Amphibious Warfare?

Tcabot113

15th Apr 2012, 23:22

Sas,

From my calculations the V-22 is still the safest aircraft in Marine service.

You also need to give up on the cost, the remaining ships are infinitely cheaper than any alternative.

TC

Lonewolf_50

16th Apr 2012, 16:38

SAS, I don't find your ojection to OTH credible.

OTH capability is a good thing to have if you intend to conduct sea borne raids or initial combat operations of a larger phased operation.

Part of the reason it is good capability to have is the element of uncertainty it raises in the minds of (thus prep for a fight), any adversary.

Fast forward 20 years from now.

More and more places and people will have available:

Drones used for surveillance
Access to satellite imagery

This makes detection of an amphib flotilla more likely.

That won't change how OTH is effective, but it will change where in the battle plan, and operational phasing,
the anti drone effort takes place
the anti satellite operations take place.

As an analogue, look at SEAD: suppression of enemy air defense. Look at how that was done in Bosnia, 1995, USS Normandy, Desert Storm, using Apaches, and versus Iraq 2003.

Likewise with the eyes of your enemy in any future operation.
Screw his ISR plan to help you operation be less predictable.

If you intend to project power, which US strategic doctrine tends to be about, see the OCEANS, you still need to get your fighting forces ashore, in a timely fashion.

If timeliness isn't important, the USMC would still be using that inexpensive Higgins Boat. :p

SASless

16th Apr 2012, 17:46

I am not "against" OTH as a concept.

I am against claiming to have the capability, spending Tens of Billions of Dollars on equipment that doesn't work....altering ship designs to fit aircraft while eliminating the seaborne capability of the vessels at the same time....and in the end....not...not....repeat not have the stated OTH capability.

The Navy/USMC would not want me sitting on the Congresional Committees overseeing their acquisition process right now. I would want real capability for money spent.....and the pipe dream of a hydroplaning armored amphibious tractor would never have gotten my unlimited support as it did.

Removing the Well decks from the new LHA class to make it a Osprey Carrier would not have passed Go either.

Amphib ships have always had the flexibility to support all phases of Amphibious assault....sea and air....with LST's being beacheable. Under the current approach....we now will have LHA's with no ability to handle boats, LCAC's, or Amtracs....which is a loss of capability....all due to the requirements imposed by the fielding of the MV-22. The new AFV died....leaving us with the old style AFV which will not work for OTH. I see all this as a net loss of capability at a huge cost in Tax Dollars.

That is what I am against....and a bunch of military bureaucrats, politicians, and industrial complex members getting filthy rich in the process.

Eisenhower warned us about this!

The very technology you mention itself puts and end to Amphibious Assault as we know it. The Marines cling to Amphibious Assault as a means to substantiate its continued existence.

The question is not whether we need a Marine Corps and Amphibious Assault capability but how much capability. I understand the arguments but I see a real limit to what can be done with the state of the budget.

Where does the line get drawn?

SansAnhedral

17th Apr 2012, 17:13

V-22 Ospreys Heading To UK, Okinawa; Will Carry White House Press (http://defense.aol.com/2012/04/16/v-22-ospreys-heading-to-uk-okinawa-will-carry-white-house-pres/)

NATIONAL HARBOR:

UPDATED: Israeli Air Force Flew In CV-22 When In US; UAE May Be First Foreign Sale

Last week's crash in Morocco won't slow down the V-22 Osprey program, which in 2013 can be expected to win its first foreign sale and is poised for visible growth over the next two years, the Marine colonel in charge of it made clear in a media briefing here.

Col. Greg Masiello, V-22 program manager for the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), said in a Monday briefing at the annual Navy League Sea Air and Space conference that 2012 will see the Marine Corps stand up two V-22 squadrons of 12 aircraft each in Okinawa and the Air Force Special Operations Command establish one of its own at Royal Air Force Mildenhall in England.

Neither Masiello nor John Rader, vice president for tiltrotor programs for Boeing Co., who also spoke at the briefing, would identify the foreign nation they think might buy Ospreys beginning in 2013, but we understand the United Arab Emirates could be the first.

Another strong possibility is Israel. When the head of the Israeli Air Force visited the US last week, he flew in the special operations version of the Osprey, the CV-22, we hear. The Jerusalem Post reported that he flew in a V-22, not specifying which version of the aircraft. Last year, Israeli air force pilots received training and flew demonstration flights in the V-22 at Marine Corps Air Station New River near Jacksonville, N.C. Japan's military also has expressed interest in the Osprey in the past.

Boeing and its 50-50 partner in the Osprey, Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. of Texas, have added incentive to seek foreign sales because the number of Ospreys they produce each year is to fall dramatically under a new five-year contract the companies have agreed to, Masiello noted.
In 2013, he added, HMX-1, the squadron that flies the president's Marine One helicopter, will begin receiving 12 Ospreys that will be used to haul cargo and passengers -- including Secret Service agents, White House staff and the news media -- during presidential trips.

"They'll be the only aircraft there in that support in capacity," Masiello said of the Ospreys to be assigned to HMX-1, which will continue to use the familiar white-topped Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. VH-3D helicopter to carry the president. The Ospreys, which tilt two huge wingtip rotors upward to take off and land like a helicopter and swivel them forward to fly like an airplane, are to replace CH-46E Sea Knight helicopters that HMX-1 currently uses for so-called "green missions."

Noting that the Marine Corps version of the Osprey, the MV-22, is now cleared to land on and fly from big deck aircraft carriers following test landings on the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) in March, Masiello said he also thinks the chances are good that the Navy will soon begin buying 48 V-22s that have been in its long-range budget plans for years, perhaps to replace the aging C-2A Greyhound fixed-wing aircraft it uses to deliver cargo and personnel to carriers.

Masiello said he had read a recent Navy analysis of alternatives of the issue that hasn't been released and it "reflects a shift in the cultural mindset" toward the Osprey.

NAVAIR expects to sign a five-year fixed-price contract with Bell-Boeing before the end of the year under which the government would buy 91 MV-22s for the Marine Corps, which wants 360 in all, and seven CV-22s for the Air Force, which is planning a fleet of 50 Ospreys, the Marine colonel said. A foreign sale or a sale to the Navy or both would help Bell-Boeing keep the cost of those additional Ospreys down.

The terms of the new multiyear contract haven't been announced, but under the existing five-year deal, which began in fiscal 2008, the Marines are paying about $67 million per Osprey and the Air Force, whose CV-22s carry secret special operations gear, is paying about $78 million.

Boeing executive Rader said that while the production rate will plunge from a peak of 40 Ospreys under the existing contract to a first-year rate of 21 under the new deal, Bell and Boeing "have committed to the government" to keep prices low enough to produce the 10 percent savings over equivalent annual contracts Congress requires in such multiyear deals. Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendall said in a letter to Congress last month that the new V-22 contract will save $852 million compared to what it would cost to buy the 98 aircraft involved in annual contracts.

Masiello said that in addition to attracting interest among potential new customers, the Osprey fleet made significant improvements in calendar year 2011 to its operating cost and reliability rate. The cost per flight hour, now about $10,000, dropped 13 percent in 2011, he said, while readiness rates improved 19 percent.

Masiello declined to comment on the crash last week of an Osprey from Marine Corps squadron VMM-261, based at New River, during a bilateral military exercise in Morocco, killing two enlisted crew chiefs and seriously injuring two pilots. In answer to a question as to why the rest of the V-22 hasn't been grounded, though, he said that while the accident is still under investigation, "We have nothing right now that would lead us to have any lack of confidence" in the Osprey.

AOL Defense reported Friday that the accident occurred in clear weather as the tiltrotor transport, which takes off and lands like a helicopter but flies like an airplane, was departing a landing zone after dropping off some troops.

Lonewolf_50

17th Apr 2012, 17:24

I am against claiming to have the capability, spending Tens of Billions of Dollars on equipment that doesn't work....

What doesn't work?
altering ship designs to fit aircraft while eliminating the seaborne capability of the vessels at the same time
Concur with your point on well decks, moving stuff by floating it in is an option unwise to delete in seaborne operations. Question is, when you have one LPD, on LHA, and one LHD, do none of them have a well deck? I'd need to go and see, but most Amphibious task groups are mixed ... for a variety of reasons.
I would want real capability for money spent.....and the pipe dream of a hydroplaning armored amphibious tractor would never have gotten my unlimited support as it did.
Didn't they cancel that recently? Or are you referring to the LCAC's ?
Amphib ships have always had the flexibility to support all phases of Amphibious assault....sea and air....with LST's being beacheable.
LST's haven't been in the inventory for quite some time. Try not to fight the 70's war.

We now will have LHA's with no ability to handle boats, LCAC's, or Amtracs....which is a loss of capability.
Aye. Concur with your view on that.
The new AFV died....leaving us with the old style AFV which will not work for OTH. I see all this as a net loss of capability at a huge cost in Tax Dollars.

What it actually points to is a change in capability. Not convinced that "net loss" is an airtight argument. Increase in cost? Yes.

There were Marines I worked with in the 80's and 90's who found the reliance on slow amphibious targets/tractors to be an attempt to fight the last war. There were Marines I worked with on flag level staffs who were bound and determined to get that expensive luxury, the tank, out of the USMC inventory.

Opinions are like navels ...

By the way, a whole lot of that amphibious equipment has gone unused in
Iraq
Afghanistan

But where is it needed next? There's theoretically nowhere on earth that the USMC might not be called to do something, save possibly the South Pole.

Putting together the kit to meet that mission requirement won't be cheap. Flexibility is expensive.

V-22 is one way to give the operational commander flexibility.
In 2013, he added, HMX-1, the squadron that flies the president's Marine One helicopter, will begin receiving 12 Ospreys that will be used to haul cargo and passengers -- including Secret Service agents, White House staff and the news media -- during presidential trips.
Carrying Colombian strippers might be the kind of flexibility a local commander needs! :E

SASless

17th Apr 2012, 20:57

The AFV Program was cancelled. Thus no OTH swim ashore Amtrac's. Which if one argues OTH as it was presented with the Osprey, LCAC, and AFV....there just isn't OTH currently.

LST's went away when the LCAC arrived but landing directly to the beach with heavy cargo, tanks, (now Amtracs), large groups of personnel, artillery....fuel....ammo....still remains necessary if one wishes to support a beach head. Helicopters and Ospreys cannot do the task without the beach landing capability of the LCAC.

Nix the well deck....and you nix that capability and must have the conventional LHA and the new Air Only LHA....which means either more ships or less capability and for sure less flexibility.

The Navy/USMC wrote themselves a Specification they cannot meet.

Lonewolf_50

18th Apr 2012, 21:15

The Navy/USMC wrote themselves a Specification they cannot meet.
Or, that they revised. Take a look at what happened to Paladin and Crusader in the field artillery world. Every so often, the requirement that has been the bedrock of an acquisition program .... changes.

(The USN's helicopter minesweeping capability is one such)

Also, FWIW, "Beachhead' seems to have become a word that is used less and less often in expeditionary warfare.

Put another way, they've changed their minds, and in a different way, have made an argument that "they have changed with the times."

Not sure that's an airtight argument, but it is usable.

SansAnhedral

19th Apr 2012, 17:53

Israel offered Chinooks as service eyes V-22 deal (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/israel-offered-chinooks-as-service-eyes-v-22-deal-370904/)

Israel offered Chinooks as service eyes V-22 deal

By: ARIE EGOZI TEL AVIV 2 hours ago

Boeing is offering a version of its CH-47 Chinook transport helicopter as a possible replacement for the Israeli air force's Sikorsky CH-53 fleet, as the service is also showing continued interest in the Bell Boeing V-22 tiltrotor.

The air force has previously outlined plans to continue operating its existing CH-53s until it can acquire Sikorsky's new-generation CH-53K, now under development for the US Marine Corps.

Boeing's promotion of the Chinook is defined as a "capability presentation", with the manufacturer claiming that the type represents the best available replacement for Israel's upgraded CH-53s. Sources have referred to the aircraft on offer as being a CH-47G, with this suggesting that some capabilities could be comparable with the US Special Operations Command's MH-47Gs.

At this stage the Israeli air force does not have the budget for a CH-53 replacement, but sources say that a decision will have to made in the next three or four years due to the age of its current assets.

The air force also has an additional operational requirement for the V-22, with the service's commander, Maj Gen Ido Nehushtan, having flown on the type during a visit to the USA.

Israeli pilots and technical experts completed a thorough evaluation of the V-22 at US Marine Corps facilities last year, with their report having favoured the purchase of an undisclosed number to perform special mission operations.

The air force had wanted to include the V-22 in a new multi-year plan for the Israeli defence forces. That plan has not yet been approved, because of a major budget dispute between the nation's defence and finance ministries.

21stCen

20th Apr 2012, 19:58

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit honors fallen Marines while at sea

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit
Story by 2nd Lt. Joshua Larson (http://www.dvidshub.net/portfolio/1139270)

Date: 04.18.2012
Posted: 04.18.2012 17:36
News ID: 86943
http://d1.static.dvidshub.net/media/thumbs/258x184/photos/1204/561316_q75.jpg
OFF THE COAST OF MOROCCO – Marines and sailors from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit and Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group gathered together to honor Cpl. Derek Kerns and Cpl. Robby Reyes during a memorial ceremony aboard the USS Iwo Jima April 18.

Kerns and Reyes died during a training accident in Morocco, April 11, when the MV-22 Osprey they were flying in crashed while participating in the bi-lateral training exercise called African Lion 12. Both Marines were crew chiefs with the 24th MEU’s aviation element, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron VMM-261 (Reinforced), based out of Marine Corps Air Station New River, N.C.

The memorial took place in the ship’s hangar bay, where Marines and Sailors stood in formation centered around photos of the two Marines against the backdrop of a clear sky and blue water.

Two of Kerns’ and Reyes’ fellow crew chiefs shared a few words and stories about their friends during the ceremony.

Lance Cpl. Michael Garrison, who had known Kerns since air crew school, described him to the crowd as a “skinny kid from Jersey who always had a story for everything that was going on.”

“I knew him for three-and-a-half years; it doesn’t seem real,” said Garrison. “He was an outstanding friend, an outstanding father, husband, crew chief and brother to everybody. There was never a down time with him; he was always happy.”
Cpl. Lucas Schmidt stepped to the podium and explained that Reyes “wasn’t the kind of guy who stuck out in a crowd. And that’s the way he liked it.”

He described his friend by informing the Marines and sailors that Reyes extended his enlistment to remain a VMM-261 “Raging Bull” for the current 24th MEU deployment, and that when others complained about what seemed like meaningless work, Reyes would roll with it and laugh it off.

“I will never forget him, and we could all learn a thing or two from a man like Robby Reyes,” said Schmidt.

Toward the end of the ceremony, Sgt. Maj. Ricky Jackson, the senior enlisted Marine for VMM-261 (reinforced), marched front and center of his Marines, stood at attention and conducted a ceremonial roll call. This procedure consisted of Marines within the unit responding to the sergeant major as he called their names. When Jackson called Kerns’ and Reyes’ names, there was only silence.

Roll call was followed by the playing of taps and a three-shot-volley rifle salute.

Lt. Col. Brian Smith Jr., the commanding officer of VMM-261 (reinforced), who had flown recently with both Kerns and Reyes, honored them by defining a crew chief’s role in the Marine Corps.

Airplanes require constant work and it doesn’t matter whether it’s hot, cold, or raining. A crew chief’s job is extremely under-appreciated, but they’re the reason aircraft keep flying and they do it with a smile on their face, he said.

Col. Frank Donovan, commanding officer of the 24th MEU, paid homage to Kerns and Reyes by focusing the Marines and Sailors of the 24th MEU on the future.

“Today we honor them through words; tomorrow we honor them through actions,” he said.

Smith’s comments to the Marines concluded in similar fashion.

“There’s no greater way to honor Kerns and Reyes than to continue to do the things we’ve already done. Everyone counts on us, and I count on you,” he said. “The next time we do something amazing… I can look at each one of you in the eye and know that we’re honoring their memory. Because that’s exactly what they would have wanted.”

DVIDS - News - 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit honors fallen Marines while at sea (http://www.dvidshub.net/news/86943/24th-marine-expeditionary-unit-honors-fallen-marines-while-sea)

21stCen

14th May 2012, 13:09

On Defense Cuts, Both Parties Are Far Out of Step With Voters

By R. Jeffrey Smith

An unusual new survey shows the average American favors cutting the Pentagon budget by $103 billion -- far more than Obama or Republicans have proposed.
Wikimedia Commons
While politicians, insiders, and experts may be divided over how much the government should spend on the nation's defense (http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/01/will-cutting-the-defense-budget-leave-america-at-risk/252010/), there's a surprising consensus among the public about what should be done: They want to cut spending far more deeply than either the Obama Administration or the Republicans.
That's according to the results of an innovative, new, nationwide survey by the Center for Public integrity, the Program for Public Consultation, and the Stimson Center (http://www.iwatchnews.org/2012/05/10/8856/public-overwhelmingly-supports-large-defense-spending-cuts). Not only does the public want deep cuts, it wants those cuts to encompass spending in virtually every military domain -- air power, sea power, ground forces, nuclear weapons, and missile defenses.
According to the survey, in which respondents were told about the size of the budget as well as shown expert arguments for and against spending cuts, two-thirds of Republicans and nine in 10 Democrats supported making immediate cuts -- a position at odds with the leaderships of both political parties.
The average total cut was around $103 billion, a substantial portion of the current $562 billion base defense budget (http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/02/the-real-defense-budget/253327/), while the majority supported cutting it at least $83 billion. These amounts both exceed a threatened cut of $55 billion at the end of this year under so-called "sequestration" legislation passed in 2011, which Pentagon officials and lawmakers alike have claimed would be devastating.
"When Americans look at the amount of defense spending compared to spending on other programs, they see defense as the one that should take a substantial hit to reduce the deficit," said Steven Kull, director of the Program for Public Consultation and the lead developer of the survey. "Clearly the polarization that you are seeing on the floor of the Congress is not reflective of the American people."
A broad disagreement with the Obama Administration's current spending approach -- keeping the defense budget mostly level -- was shared by 75 percent of men and 78 percent of women, all of whom instead backed immediate cuts. That view was also shared by at least 69 percent of every one of four age groups from 18 to 60 and older, although those aged 29 and below expressed much higher support, at 92 percent.
Disagreement with the Obama administration's continued spending on the war in Afghanistan was particularly intense, with 85 percent of respondents expressing support for a statement that said in part, "it is time for the Afghan people to manage their own country and for us to bring our troops home." A majority of respondents backed an immediate cut, on average, of $38 billion in the war's existing $88 billion budget, or around 43 percent.
Despite the public's distance from Obama's defense budget, the survey disclosed an even larger gap between majority views and proposals by House Republicans this week to add $3 billion for an extra naval destroyer, a new submarine, more missile defenses, and some weapons systems the Pentagon has proposed to cancel. Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney has similarly endorsed a significant rise in defense spending.
When it comes to military forces, respondents on average favored at least a 27 percent cut in spending on nuclear arms -- the largest proportional cut of any in the survey. They also supported, on average, a 23 percent cut for ground forces, a 17 percent cut for air power, and a 14 percent cut for missile defenses. Modest majorities also said they favored dumping some major individual weapons programs, including the costly F-35 jet fighter, a new long-range strategic bomber, and construction of a new aircraft carrier.
"Surveyed Americans cut to considerably deeper levels than policymakers are willing to support in an election season," said Matthew Leatherman, an analyst with the Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense Project at the Stimson Center, a nonprofit research and policy analysis organization.
While Republicans generally favored smaller cuts, they overwhelmingly agreed with both independents and Democrats that current military budgets are too large. A majority of Republicans diverged only on cutting spending for special forces, missile defenses, and new ground force capabilities.
The survey, which was conducted in April, was designed differently than many polls on defense spending, which have asked respondents only if they support a cut. Its aim was instead to probe public attitudes more comprehensively, and so it supplied respondents with neutral information about how funds are currently being spent while exposing them to carefully drafted, representative arguments made by advocates in the contemporary debate. The respondents then said what they wished to spend in key areas.
The survey's methodology and the number of respondents -- 665 people randomly selected to represent the national population -- render its conclusions statistically reliable to within 5 percent, according to the Program on Public Consultation.
Somewhat surprisingly, all of the pro and con arguments about cutting defense spending attracted majority support, suggesting that respondents found many elements in the positions of each side that they considered reasonable. It also suggests that the survey fairly summarized contrasting viewpoints.
Sixty-one percent agreed, for example, with a statement that the U.S. has special defense responsibilities because it is an exceptional nation, while 72 percent said the country is "playing the role of military policeman too much." Fifty-four percent agreed that cutting defense spending is problematic because it will cause job losses, while 81 percent -- in one of the largest points of consensus -- agreed with a statement that the budget had "a lot of waste" and that members of Congress regularly approve unneeded spending just to benefit their own supporters.
The survey suggested, in short, that most people do not see the issue in starkly black or white terms, but instead hold complex views about the appropriate relationship between defense spending and America's role in the world. "Most Americans are able to hold two competing ideas in their mind and, unlike Congress, thoughtfully recognize the merits of both," Kull explained. "And then [they] still come to hard and even bold decisions."
The survey also showed that Americans react differently when given data on the current defense budget in different contexts -- providing some insight into how partisans on each side of the debate might tailor their arguments to attract support.
When framed, for example, in the context of military spending by other countries, or the portion of the so-called annual discretionary budget devoted to defense, or the amount of money spent for defense during the Cold War, most respondents said they were surprised by how large the U.S. budget is now. But when compared to the overall size of the U.S. economy, or the size of the other two leviathans in the federal budget -- spending on Medicare and Social Security - most respondents said they were not surprised.
By far the most durable finding -- even after hearing strong arguments to the contrary -- was that existing spending levels are simply too high. Respondents were asked twice, in highly different ways, to say what they thought the budget should be, and a majority supported roughly the same answer each time: a cut of at least 11 to 13 percent (they cut on average 18 to 22 percent).
In one exercise, a larger group chose to cut the defense budget (62 percent supported this) than to cut non-defense spending (50 percent) or to raise taxes (27 percent). They then chose to cut deeply as a means to address the deficit. In yet another exercise, respondents first read pro and con arguments for the nine major mission areas that now compose almost 90 percent of the budget; then a majority of Republicans and Democrats then selected lower levels in eight of the nine areas.
For example, two-thirds of the respondents -- including 78 percent of Democrats, 64 percent of Republicans, and 57 percent of independents -- cut spending on nuclear arms. Respondents on average also sought to cut ground forces the largest dollar amount. The sole program that attracted average support for more spending was the Pentagon's effort to development new capabilities for ground forces, but the suggested increase was slight and mostly embraced by Republicans and independents.
Majorities took these steps even though they expressed slightly higher support, on average, for statements in favor of these programs than critical of them. Most notably, they said they were convinced that air power is important (77 percent), special forces are valuable (79 percent), and missile-defense efforts are worth pursuing (74 percent), while giving arguments for the Navy and ground forces less backing (69 percent and 57 percent, respectively).
While most programs got either a trim or a buzzcut in the public salon, several won outright support. A majority opposed cutting the controversial V-22 Osprey, an aircraft that takes off like a helicopter and flies like a plane. Even after being told its cancellation would save $1 billion, a clear majority backed its continued production. And even while most respondents favored killing the new strategic bomber, they solidly backed continuing to use bombers to carry nuclear arms as part of a "triad" of forces, alongside land- and sea-based missiles.

Whether the weight of public attitudes will be felt in Congress and the White House is unclear. As close students of Washington know, legislative outcomes are often determined not by average views but by the passionate convictions of noisy minorities. As a result, it's worth noting which arguments attracted not just support from solid majorities but high rankings as "very convincing:" It is time to let the Afghans fend for themselves (43 percent called this very convincing). There is a lot of waste in the defense budget (39 percent very convincing). Special forces are useful and effective (36 percent very convincing). We are playing the role of world policeman too much (29 percent very convincing). Missile defenses could help defend us (27 percent very convincing). Air power is critical (26 percent very convincing). Nuclear arms serve little purpose now (26 percent very convincing). Defense spending weakens other parts of the economy (25 percent very convincing). "Americans' views as expressed in this survey are a big reason why policymakers -- after the election -- are likely to tighten the Pentagon's strategy and cut national defense spending more deeply," said Leatherman.
On Defense Cuts, Both Parties Are Far Out of Step With Voters - R. Jeffrey Smith - Politics - The Atlantic (http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/on-defense-cuts-both-parties-are-far-out-of-step-with-voters/256960/)

SansAnhedral

15th May 2012, 17:41

Frankly, I'm outright shocked!

Axe, Cox, and Meyer are probably writhing right now. I expect them to try to ratchet up the heat, as this goes to show their propaganda campaign is not paying off.

havoc

25th May 2012, 11:36

Osprey to take on White House transport mission in 2013 - The Hill's DEFCON Hill (http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/operations/229355-osprey-to-take-on-white-house-transport-mission-in-2013-)

Jack Carson

14th Jun 2012, 11:33

HURLBURT FIELD, Fla. – All five airmen aboard a US Air Force aircraft that crashed in northwest Florida late Wednesday have been taken to the hospital, an air force spokeswoman said.
Three of the airmen were flown to local hospitals and two were taken by ambulance, Master Sgt. Kristina Newton said.
The nature of their injuries was not known, the Northwest Florida Daily News reported.
The CV-22 Osprey crashed during a 1st Special Operations Wing training exercise about 6:45pm local time.
The incident occurred on the Eglin Range, north of Navarre, Fla.
Officials will investigate the accident, the public affairs office of the 1st Special Operations Wing said in a statement.

Read more: Five crew members hospitalized after USAF aircraft crashes in Florida | Fox News (http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/06/14/five-crew-members-hospitalized-after-usaf-aircraft-crashes-in-florida/#ixzz1xlZTn6ZQ)

SASless

14th Jun 2012, 13:28

Must be a torn up Osprey if they had to evac the crew for injuries. This one happened in daylight as the most recent USMC crash.

Anything more heard about the USMC crash?

SansAnhedral

14th Jun 2012, 17:26

New details about Osprey crash released | hurlburt, injured, airmen - UPDATE - Northwest Florida Daily News (http://www.nwfdailynews.com/articles/aircraft-50338-crash-.html)

UPDATE: New details about Osprey crash released
June 13, 2012 9:17 PM
ShareThis| Print Story | E-Mail Story
DUSTY RICKETTS / Daily News
HURLBURT FIELD — Five airmen suffered non-life threatening injuries during a training exercise when their CV-22 Osprey air-craft crashed north of Navarre on the Eglin Range Wednesday evening.

Col. Jim Slife, 1st Special Operations Wing commander, held a press conference at 10:30 a.m. today to discuss the accident.

Hurlburt Field was notified at about 6:45 p.m. Wednesday that an Osprey assigned to the 1st Special Operations Wing had crashed on the Eglin Range during a routine training mission.

“This particular mission was a gunnery training mission, so it was a two aircraft formation out performing gunnery,” Slife said. “When the lead aircraft turned around in the gun pattern, they did not see their wingman behind them so they started a brief search and found they had crashed right there on the range.”

View a slideshow of the Osprey in action. »

The Osprey was found upside down and there was some fire, but it did not burn all the way to the ground.

Emergency responders from the base and Okaloosa County arrived at the scene where they found the five members of the aircrew and transported them to local hospitals.

“All five aircrew members on board the aircraft were injured to varying degrees and were transported to area hospitals,” Slife said.

Major Brian Luce, one of the pilots, was transported to Eglin Air Force Base hospital where he is listed in stable condition.

Captain Brett Cassidy, the second pilot, was transported to Sacred Heart Hospital in Pensacola where he is listed in stable condition.

Master Sgt. Sean McMahon, flight engineer, was transported to Sacred Heart Hospital in Pensacola where he is listed in guarded condition.

Tech. Sgt. Christopher Dawson, flight engineer, was transported to Eglin Air Force Base hospital where he is listed in stable condition.

Tech. Sgt. Edilberto Malave, flight engineer, was transported to Sacred Heart Hospital in Pensacola where he is listed in stable condition.

Slife said the Air Force has already begun a safety investigation and will conduct an accident investigation.

Upside down, not totally destroyed, and non-life threatening injuries. That's a rare combination. Can't imagine the circumstances that would lead to that.

21stCen

14th Jun 2012, 18:03

Anything more heard about the USMC crash?

Not much from this recent article:

MV-22 Osprey that crashed in Morocco was mechanically perfect

http://i267.photobucket.com/albums/ii305/tiltrotors/v22.jpg
Jiji Press (http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120608005175.htm)
The U.S. military has found no mechanical flaw in an MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft that crashed in Morocco in April, the Defense Ministry said Friday.

This was unveiled in an outline of a report on the U.S. investigation into the accident that killed two U.S. troops, according to the ministry. The outline said there is no safety problem in the military aircraft, which makes vertical takeoffs and landings.

But it did not specify the cause of the accident and said the probe on the crash, including investigations into whether human error was a factor, will continue until late this year.

The U.S. military has not disclosed the full report, and the Japanese government was only informed of the report's conclusion.

The Osprey aircraft may be deployed at the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture as early as July.

At a press conference Friday, Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto suggested that the timing of the Osprey deployment will not be affected by the U.S. investigation.

Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba said the nation will continue to seek information about the aircraft from the United States so that it can give Okinawa further details.

MV-22 OSPREY THAT CRASHED IN MOROCCO WAS MECHANICALLY PERFECT | Article - Fri 08 Jun 2012 08:10:00 PM UTC | airsoc.com, reach for the sky. (http://airsoc.com/articles/view/id/4fd29626c6f8fa7024000006/mv-22-osprey-that-crashed-in-morocco-was-mechanically-perfect)

SASless

14th Jun 2012, 19:23

Master Sgt. Sean McMahon, flight engineer, was transported to Sacred Heart Hospital in Pensacola where he is listed in guarded condition.

The way I read it.....Msgt McMahon was hurt badly.

FH1100 Pilot

14th Jun 2012, 23:05

Story in the Pensacola News Journal states it was on a two-ship gunnery practice flight. When lead pulled off and looked back, #2 was not with them. They found the wreckage upside down a short distance away.

5 airmen hurt in Osprey crash near Navarre | Pensacola News Journal | pnj.com (http://www.pnj.com/article/20120614/NEWS12/120614006/Osprey-crashes-in-Navarre-on-Eglin-property?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE)

Let's be thankful that so far, everyone has survived.

SASless

14th Jun 2012, 23:48

What kind of gunnery?

Ramp gun or the Star Wars belly gun that the Crewchief operates?

21stCen

15th Jun 2012, 09:23

Latest update from USAF including video of briefing.
(still only preliminary information)
Air Force begins CV-22 crash investigation | hurlburt, investigation, air - Northwest Florida Daily News (http://www.nwfdailynews.com/articles/hurlburt-50377-investigation-air.html)

Jack Carson

16th Jun 2012, 21:51

The Air Force has launched an investigation of Wednesday’s incident, but if it turns out anything like the Air Force’s last V-22 crash probe, politics and denial could obscure the truth. In 2010, an Air Force V-22 crashed in Afghanistan, killing four people. The crash investigator, Brig. Gen. Donald Harvel, concluded that engine failure could have been a factor. But his superiors, eager to protect the high-tech aircraft’s reputation, allegedly leaned on Harvel to shift the blame to the V-22′s crew. “There was absolutely a lot of pressure to change my report,” Harvel told Air Force Times.

SansAnhedral

18th Jun 2012, 13:47

Bottom line is that if you take the time to actually read the report, there was not a single shred of hard evidence that there was an engine failure. Suspicions based on suspect observations do not yield a factual conclusion. Pretty simple. I'm sure there was a lot of pressure to change a factually unsubstantiated conclusion, as there should be. The pilot was indeed flying far outside the envelope once again, much too fast at that altitude and approach distance. Occam's razor.

And Jack, if you're going to repost "contributions" from our esteemed "objective" colleague David Axe, at least have the common decency to link to his article or source your quote.

SASless

18th Jun 2012, 18:33

Unless I am mistaken....did not one of he pilots state there was a loss of engine power just prior to the crash in Afghanistan?

As the CVR and Data Recorders were not recovered....it would be hard to state with definity what the engines were doing would it not? Just saying!

So one's suggestion it was all Pilot Error might be a bit hard to substantiate in my opinion. When a General Officer is willing (in this political Air Force extant) to state publicly he was pressured to change his findings (during what is billed to be an independent and objective investigation) I would have to view such final findings with a jaundiced eye at the least.

SansAnhedral

18th Jun 2012, 19:34

There was specifically no report of any abnormal engine issues from the crew or anyone in contact with them

Generals clash on cause of April Osprey crash - Air Force News | News from Afghanistan & Iraq - Air Force Times (http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/01/air-force-generals-clash-on-osprey-crash-012211w/)

•No one onboard the Osprey or in radio contact with it heard any discussions about engine problems or warnings from the cockpit.

•An analysis of the recovered left engine showed it was working. The right engine was not recovered.

•The V-22 Joint Program Office, which oversees Air Force and Marine Corps Ospreys, concluded engine failure was highly unlikely.

•The crew made several errors, including the pilot flying too high and too fast in his approach; the failure to obtain a weather report warning of a 17 mph tailwind; distraction over unexpected lighting at the landing zone; and self-imposed pressure to make the mission a success.

Now heres a real interesting tidbit I just noticed:

(from same article linked above)

The April 9 crash in Afghanistan was the first loss of a CV-22 Osprey in combat. Two of the three cockpit crew members — pilot Maj. Randell Voas, 43, and flight engineer Senior Master Sgt. James Lackey, 45 — died attempting a night landing at a desert landing zone. The co-pilot survived; he has not been indentified. Also killed were a soldier and a contractor — two of 16 passengers in the cargo compartment.

and from Two airmen injured in Osprey crash released from hospital | hurlburt, injured, airmen - Northwest Florida Daily News (http://www.nwfdailynews.com/articles/around-50404-new-force.html)

Maj. Brian Luce and Tech. Sgt. Christopher Dawson have been released Eglin Hospital, where they were taken after the crash on Eglin Air Force Base’s reservation.

Capt. Brett Cassidy, Staff Sgt. Sean McMahon and Tech. Sgt. Edilberto Malave were in stable condition at Sacred Heart Hospital in Pensacola on Friday...
Luce, one of the pilots, also was a co-pilot in the deadly CV-22 Osprey crash in Afghanistan in April 2010, said Master Sgt. Kristina Newton, a spokeswoman for Hurlburt.

If this is correct, then Maj Brian Luce was the previously unidentified lone cockpit crew survivor from the only other previous CV-22 crash. What luck.

SASless

18th Jun 2012, 20:32

If I were Luce....I would take up a different kind of work....as the third time is the charm so I am told!

He probably was the Aircraft Commander on the second crash....and the Co-Pilot on the first crash.

Fate is a terrible and sinister force.....but a dear Friend when it is favors you.

FH1100 Pilot

18th Jun 2012, 20:42

Wow. Glad he survived his second brush with death.

You'd think that Maj. Luce would've learned the first time.

But nooooooo...

I'll bet you real money that he never sets foot inside a V-22 ever again.

Unless it's on permanent display in the Naval Aviation Museum in Pensacola.

In the section called, "Mistakes We've Made."

TukTuk BoomBoom

18th Jun 2012, 21:29

Yeah he'll probably retire from flying and spend all his time posting on the internet..

Ive worked with plenty of guys that have crashed more than once, ive had one myself.
Im sure he'll put it behind him and get back to work.
"3rd times a charm" ...you guys sound like a couple of old ladies.

SASless

18th Jun 2012, 22:55

Pilot Error was it Tuks?

Tcabot113

19th Jun 2012, 00:32

Well this time he can not claim memory loss. The recorders all survived.

TC

FH1100 Pilot

19th Jun 2012, 00:39

"Yeah he'll probably retire from flying and spend all his time posting on the internet...like I do."

Fixed it for ya! :ok:

And hey, I'm not retired. Why, just this morning I spent some quality time out earning money and cheating death in a Sikorsky S-55 that is...yikes!...older than me. (Maybe older than SAS too! Definitely older than a certain N. Lappos who wasn't even a glimmer in his dear daddy's eye when this one was forged from steel at the iron works in Bridgeport, Connecticut.) I only thought I knew how to fly until checking out in this thing. (And do they even let me fly one of the two turbine conversions we have? Nooooooooooo, I get stuck with the round motor that I can barely kick-start on a good day anymore. Eh- it may be my own fault. I may have said *something* about having all the damn turbine time I ever needed or wanted. Teaches me to open my big fat mouth...)

But I digress.

And I wonder...

After all these years, the venerable S-55 is still dogging around, giving relative "youngsters" like me a chance to fly something my father thought was modern and new! back in 1954

Think the V-22 will still be around 60 years hence?

Somehow I doubt it. They'll all have probably crashed and burned by then. That seems to be their modus operandi.

If Maj. Luce is smart...and we sincerely hope he is and is not permanently grounded...he'll spend the rest of his days flying something safer than a tiltrotor.

And anyways, the question was never answered: What kind of "gunnery" can a V-22 do? Somebody finally figure out a way to mount a forward-shooting gun on that thing? Fifty cal. on the wings timed to fire through the proprotors, perhaps? The answer to this ought to be good!

SASless

19th Jun 2012, 01:32

Yea....I am not very experienced....never done the crash thing....or even a chargeable incident.....guess I still have something to learn yet....but alas....I retired before I got to that chapter of the book.

Hand cranked S-55.....oh my...that brings back memories of Iron Machines and Iron Men! I hate to admit it....but they were still in service when I was a nubbin learning my trade at Rucker.

Used to watch them trundle off down the heliport at Hanchey and disappear out of sight at the end to the south.....and finally re-appear way off in the distance still below takeoff elevation....blades looking like they were going to clap hands. That was with one instructor, two students, a bag of gas....and a verbal message for cargo.

A few rides with a Maintenance Test Pilot convinced me there was a reason I had picked Chinooks for my ride of choice. Almost two years later....the Oklahoma National Guard was still flying them operationally.....that would be 1970 as I recall.

Bristow attempted to lure me into doing a Whirlwind Conversion but Jack Trigg ran out of Beer money before he could get me drunk enough to agree to do so.

Good thing probably or I would have found myself off to Nigeria twenty years earlier than i wound up going.

Now FH.....when you start talking about real Sikorsky Iron....the old Moe JV (S-56 or CH-37 Mojave) to the unwashed....now that was a horse sure enough. Two really really big Pratt & Whitney Round Many Pistoned engines....drum of lube oil in the cabin....ladder up into the cockpit....now that was a Man's machine.

Igor builds helicopters!

Lonewolf_50

19th Jun 2012, 13:50

FH, if you go back a few posts, you'll see two options for gunnery already mentioned.

As to Major Luce ... his decisions to keep on flying will probably be best addressed after the USAF has finished its accident investigation. I hope he heals from whatever injuries he has sustained in the mishap, and am pleased to note that the V-22 is crashworthy, at least to a certain extent.

Regarding how a bird ends up on its back: lots of ways.

SansAnhedral

19th Jun 2012, 13:57

Somehow I doubt it. They'll all have probably crashed and burned by then. That seems to be their modus operandi.

Then it must really bake your noodle that there are any CH53s left that can get in the air.

On 10 May 1977, 54 people were killed in a CH-53 crash in Israel.

On 21 October 1977, 31 US Marines serving in Operation Fortress Lightning were killed in a CH53 crash in Mindoro, Philippines during sling load operations due to a design flaw in the tail rotor drive.

Oct. 18, 1982 A malfunction on a Tustin-based CH-53E led to parts flying off the machine, causing $30,000 damage. No one was injured.

Nov. 30, 1982 A Tustin-based CH-53E lost cargo and fuel tank, causing $71,000 damage.

Feb. 10, 1983 A main rotor sheared on a CH-53E during a flight near San Diego. No one was injured. Damage was reported at $67,000.

On 27 April, 1983, a CH-53D crashed in the Atlantic off the coast of Virginia. The crash resulted in the drowning of Marine First Lieutenant David A. Boyle. The suit brought by Boyle's father went to the Supreme Court.

July 19, 1983 While a CH-53E was taxiing at Tustin after landing, parts in the tail section were damaged when a bearing disintegrated. Damage was estimated at $45,000.

Sept. 27, 1983 A CH-53E about to land at Norfolk, Va., lost tail rotor power but managed to get down. Bearings and disconnect coupling were damaged. Damage was $42,400.

Jan. 19, 1984 A CH-53E landing at the Naval Air Station in Sigonella, Italy, lost hydraulic pressure when its main gearbox cooler fan shattered. Flying parts also damaged the oil lines and the rotor drive shaft. Damage was set at $56,000.

Feb. 14, 1984 A CH-53E with 45 troops aboard made an emergency landing during an East Coast operation after failure of the main rotor damper, which automatically stabilized the bounce of aircraft.

March 4, 1984 Crew aboard of a CH-53E reported hearing a loud bang and severe vibrations. Aircraft made an emergency landing in field. The main gearbox cooler fan had disintegrated. No one was injured.

On 24 March, 1984 A CH-53D crashes into mountain in Korea during a night troop operation, killing 29.

On 1 June, 1984 A Tustin-based CH-53E was lifting a truck from the deck of a ship for transport to San Clemente Island during an exercise when a sling attached to the truck broke, sending a shock wave into aircraft that caused it to disintegrate. Four crewmen were killed.

On 19 November, 1984 a CH-53E on a routine training mission at Camp Lejeune, N.C., exploded in mid-air as it was lifting a seven-ton howitzer. Six killed, 11 injured.

Feb. 7, 1985 A CH-53E crash-landed at Tustin Marine Corps Air Station as it was being put through manuevers that simulate the loss of power in automatic flight controls. Four persons were injured.

April 3, 1985 A CH-53E from Tustin suffered $36,000 in unspecified damages while flying a mission. Specific damage to aircraft was never reported. No one was injured.

On 6 May, 1985, A CH-53D experiences a transmission failure and falls into Sea of Japan while returning to Futenma AB from Iwakuni AB, Yamaguchi Prefecture, killing 17. It belonged to the 462nd Helicopter Squadron, 36th Wing, 1st Group, USMC, based at Futenma AB.

July 12, 1985 A CH-53D appeared to have struck a logging cable during tactical formation training at Okinawa, killing four. Accident under investigation.

July 13, 1985 A CH-53E from a Tustin squadron was on a flight in Okinawa when it struck a logging cable and exploded. Four persons were killed.

July 17, 1985 A CH-53E made an emergency landing on the East Coast after its main gearbox lost lubrication from disintegration of its primary oil pump. Broken pieces damaged the secondary oil pump.

July 19, 1985 A CH-53E operating in the Philippines was hovering at 60 feet when it lost power to the tail rotor, which sheared off. Damage was estimated at $188,000.

On 25 August, 1985 a CH-53E from New River, N.C., was flying a routine supply and passenger run from Tustin to Twentynine Palms during a training operation when it caught fire and crashed in Laguna Hills. One of the three crew members was killed and the aircraft was a total loss.

Sept. 12, 1985 A CH-53E with three persons aboard developed fire in an engine and made an emergency landing near Norfolk, Va., Damage estimated at $38,000.

Sept. 24, 1985 During a routine practice flight at Norfolk, Va., a CH-53E developed problems during its initial climb after takeoff. Bearings in the main transmission had disintegrated. No one was injured.

On 9 May, 1986, four Marines were killed and a fifth was injured in a CH-53E crash Friday near Twentynine Palm. The accident, which occurred during training exercises, was the fifth crash in the previous two years of a Super Stallion.

Oct. 21, 1986 A CH-53E from Tustin was returning to base when it developed transmission problems and the pilot made a precautionary landing in a farm field in Irvine. No one was injured.

On 8 January, 1987, a Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter crashed during night training, killing all five crew members. The helicopter went down on the Salton Sea Test Range about 8:30 p.m. while practicing night landings for troop deployment

On 20 March, 1989, a Sea Stallion crashed and burned while on maneuvers off P'ohang, a town on the mountainous east coast of South Korea killing 22. Sixteen other Marines, including one on the ground, were injured in the crash.

On 18 May, 1990, A Marine Corps CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter en route to its base at the Marine Corps Air Station in Tustin crashed in Imperial County, killing one crew member and injuring five others. At the time in 1990, more than 200 servicemen had been killed in accidents involving the CH-53A, CH-53D and CH-53E since 1969.

On 14 March 1994, A Marine officer was killed and four Marines were injured when their Tustin-based CH-53D landed tail-first and burst into flames on a military runway in Northern California.

On 9 May, 1996, a CH-53E crashed at Sikorsky's Stratford plant, killing four employees on board. That led to the Navy grounding all CH-53Es and MH-53Es

On 4 February 1997, two CH-53s collided in the "Helicopter Disaster" in Israel. A total of 73 people died in the accident.

On 10 August, 2000, a Sea Dragon crashed in the Gulf of Mexico near Corpus Christi and resulted in the deaths of its crew of four. The helicopters were later returned to service with improved swash plate duplex bearings and new warning systems for the bearings.

On 20 January, 2002 a CH-53E crash in Afghanistan killed two crew members and injured five others. Defense Department officials said the early-morning crash was the result of mechanical problems with the helicopter.

On 2 April, 2002, a Navy MH-53E Sea Dragon of HM-14 BuNo 163051 crashed on the runway at Bahrain International Airport. All 18 people on board survived with only a few cases of minor injuries.

On 27 June, 2002, a Navy MH-53E Sea Dragon of Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 4 (HC-4) "Black Stallions" crashed in a hard landing at NAS Sigonella, Sicily. No one was injured, but the aircraft was written off.

On 16 July, 2003, a Navy MH-53E Sea Dragon of Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 4 (HC-4) "Black Stallions" crashed near the town of Palagonia, about 10 miles west-southwest of Naval Air Station Sigonella, killing the four member crew. The flight was on a routine training mission. One of the fatalities was the HC-4 executive officer.

On 13 August 2004 a US Marine CH-53D from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma crashed into Okinawa International University on Okinawa, Japan due to a maintenance error. The crash caused no serious damage or injuries but was a major international incident because of strained relations about the US use of Futenma.

On 25 January, 2005, a Navy MH-53E Sea Dragon of HM-14 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, 30 miles off the coast of Virginia Beach, VA. The helicopter was on a routine AMCM training mission when it suffered a catastrophic main transmission failure. All eight crew members onboard survived but the aircraft was destroyed.

On 26 January 2005 a CH-53E carrying 30 Marines and one Navy Corpsman crashed in Rutbah, Iraq, killing all 31 on board. A sandstorm was determined as the cause of the accident. This crash was the main fatal event in the day of the Iraq war with the highest number of US fatalities

On 16 February, 2005, an MH-53E Sea Dragon from Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 4 (HC-4), based at Naval Air Station Sigonella, Sicily, crashed on the base at approximately 4:20 p.m, injuring the four crew members.

On 17 February, 2006, two American CH-53Es carrying a combined Marine Corps and Air Force crew collided during a training mission over the Gulf of Aden, resulting in ten deaths and two injuries.

On 16 January, 2008 a Navy MH-53E on a routine training mission crashed approximately four miles south of Corpus Christi, Texas. Three crew members died in the crash and one crew member was taken to local hospital for treatment and survived.

On 29 March 2011, a Marine CH-53D from MCBH Kaneohe Bay crashed into the bay, killing 1 and injuring 3.

On 19 January 2012, a Marine CH-53 crashed in southern Afghanistan. Six International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops, all U.S. Marines were killed in the accident.

The CH53 had a worse week in July 1985 than the V22's entire operational history to this point with 4 incidents and 8 lives lost.

There have been 3 incidents in 5 years of operation for the V22, and you think they'll all be gone to attrition over 60. :rolleyes:

SASless

19th Jun 2012, 14:17

Sans.....you over look the common link in almost every one of the events....they were operated by Marines.

If we eliminated that one cause....think how short the list would be?

FH's comment was a bit over the top.....but so is your reply as it would suggest the Marines have problems operating their 53's which is not true either.

The 53 in all of its variants has been an excellent machine...starting clear back in the Vietnam War and continuing on today and with the new "K" model...well into the future.

The Osprey is just getting started and has yet to prove itself as have the 53....46, 47, 60, and other long serving aircraft.

A side note.....the Military Channel had a program on the introduction of the Osprey to Iraq and was filmed on site with the Marine Squadron that was deployed.

What was interesting was seeing how the first big OP they performed had been planned for three full days ahead of time, with dozens and dozens of hours of planning, briefings, and preparation. The security element was made up of Bell UH-1N's and AH-1W's from the same launch site. The Ospreys went off high and wide while the helicopters went to the LZ's and set up for the Ospreys.

Hard to see the real advantage in time or loads carried due to that. Perhaps by being high.....they Ospreys were out of range of small arms fire and light AAA or MANPADS....but that would be the only difference.

Much was made of the Osprey's ability to land in dusty conditions....but with the downwash it creates....it does need that capability.

Also I found it interesting to see the Ramp gun being the only defensive armament on the Osprey. I compare its arc of fire compared to the 53's setup of two side door guns and a ramp gun....meaning coverage from just aft of the nose of the aircraft all the way around to the other side of the nose of the aircraft.....which would be far more useful and effective than just the tail gun on the Osprey. But as we are told....Ospreys and the tactics employed by them doesn't plan for landings in Hot LZ's....right?

FH1100 Pilot

19th Jun 2012, 16:11

Wow! All those '53 accidents/incidents since 1977! (Except that it looks like two of them - reported on July 12 and July 13, 1985 respectively might be the same one.) Thirty-five years and how many aircraft produced?

Sans, you might better have posted all Bell 206 accidents since introduction of the type. That's the ship I normally fly (aside from this wacky summer job flying the S-55). If you'd done that I might never want to get into a 206 again!

But yet somehow the Bell 206 was rated the "safest aircraft ever produced." Not safest helicopter, safest aircraft. How can this be?

Sans, you note that the V-22 has only had 3 "incidents" in the last five years. But this means nothing. It's curious that you minimize (trivialize?) fatal accidents by calling them incidents. In fact, Wikipedia notes seven "incidents" in the last five years if we widen the scope of the word.

However, none of this changes the fact that, unlike the Bell 206, the tiltrotor is still an inherently unsafe, defective design. Has been since Bell started messing with the concept in 1953. Always will be. History will prove this to be so. V-22 production will *not* continue beyond what's already been allocated. There will be no new tiltrotor designs produced. The small number of V-22's that do exist will be long gone in a few years - much fewer than 60.

And that's okay: I can wait.

Lonewolf_50

19th Jun 2012, 18:34

However, none of this changes the fact that, unlike the Bell 206, the tiltrotor is still an inherently unsafe, defective design.
Nope. Check flight hours logged versus mishaps. Nothing inherently unsafe about it. As with any aircraft, the Osprey can kill you.

Welcom to Aviation, FH.

I know a few of the folks who died in those CH-53 accidents. SAS, while I appreciate that you were attempting to be humorous, I'll counter your jab at the Marines with the long standing Army theory of helicopter pilot training: high school to flight school to the grave. :p (There appears to have been some improvement in recent history ... )

FWIW, Sans: a CH-53 (Japanese version) in Japan that went down (suspected swashplate issues) doesn't look to be on the list. Some folks believe that the mishap at Sikorsky in 1996, the one in Japan, and the one in Corpus Christi in 2000 had the same root cause: that newfangled dry swashplate bearing. (Before the bearing monitor panel finally got implemented ... )

Above considered, the CH-53 is an amazing machine, and has done good service for our nation. I hope the K keeps that legacy alive.

SASless

19th Jun 2012, 20:25

Lone.....don't go looking for an insult where there was none.....to the Marines that is. My barb was pointed elsewhere.

Brother Dixson has discussed the 53 crash at the factory here at pprune in the past and also other places.

I do not recall the whole of his explanation of what happened but as I recall the aircraft was in a stable hover at something like 200 feet (maybe) and for some reason rolled inverted and crashed.

If John sees this he will probably weigh in this.

As to the High School, Flight School, Grave comment.....it was very true....expecially during the Vietnam War when about 2500 Helicopter Pilots were killed.....including all services. Even if one took a detour through College for four years....way too many good Men wound up dead. I care not to insult any service about hose losses....or the ones that are happening yet today in Afghanistan.

Last time I checked we all worked for the same Uncle.

SansAnhedral

19th Jun 2012, 21:49

FH's comment was a bit over the top.....but so is your reply as it would suggest the Marines have problems operating their 53's which is not true either.

The post was to mention that the V22 has fared objectively no worse than the CH53 over time. If you consider the CH53 as not having problems (which I find laughable if you do with the tail rotor drive and duplex bearing issues), then you have to concede the same thing to the Osprey.

Thirty-five years and how many aircraft produced?

Apparently 115 Es and 265 A & Ds. Not a huge number, seeing as how apparently 339 service members died in accidents in the CH53 between 1969 and the present..and thats just according to the information in this list.

Sans, you note that the V-22 has only had 3 "incidents" in the last five years. But this means nothing. It's curious that you minimize (trivialize?) fatal accidents by calling them incidents. In fact, Wikipedia notes seven "incidents" in the last five years if we widen the scope of the word.

Ok well if you want to include "incidents" in a similar vein to those in the 7 listed on the Wikipedia page (like compressor stalls), then in a 5 year period in the mid 80s the CH53 had 22 incidents...and that's from from this surely incomplete list.

JohnDixson

19th Jun 2012, 22:20

This was a brand new aircraft on a production hover test flight. The rotating swashplate bearing ( also brand new ) overheated, failed, then as the pitch links were dragged so as to be non-vertical, the main blades followed the pitch links and the blades contacted the tail. The aircraft fell in from approx. 200 ft, but hit upright. Sikorsky crew.
Thanks,
John Dixson

Jack Carson

19th Jun 2012, 22:58

I believe that the discussion is getting a little of track and far too emotional. Comparing the mishap rates for the 53 series to the V-22 is at best misleading. The CH-53A was conceived in June 1962. The first 53A flew in October 1964. There were a total of 522 twin Engine 53’s manufactured including 112 German machines. The CH-53E was conceived in October 1974 as an interim heavy lift machine to bridge the gap for Heavy lift until a new machine could be developed. The first CH-53E flew in December 1975. The E was an Engineering Change Plan to the twin engine D. Only 16 were to be built. Some time in the 1970s a decision was made to continue production of the E. A total of 194 three engine Es were produced, 152 CH-53s for the Marines and Navy, 31 MH-53Es for the US Navy and 11 S-80M-1s (MH-53E’s) for the JMSDF. That brings the total 53 production to 716 units over a period more than 45 years. Just listing mishaps is also misleading.

The Boyle mishap is a good example. It was determined that there was nothing wrong with the machine and that pilot error was most likely the cause. This case was litigated at the United States Supreme where the court decided in favor of United Technologies. As a result, the court determined that Government contractor could not be held accountable if the US Government participated in the design of the machine. It is known in the industry as the Boyle test. Smith vs. Morton-Thiokol and Dowd vs. Textron are two other cases that have come under this rule. I am sure that Bell/Boeing will use this in the future.

SASless

20th Jun 2012, 02:56

Sans,

You cannot seem to take a hint.

Either you cannot help yourself and fall prey to FH who sometimes makes a provocative post and you feel compelled to respond with a full broad side of grapeshot and shrapnel.....or you really wish to be argumentative.

Even the GAO and other government publications point to the design of the Osprey creates issues seen as questionable, unsafe, or at the very least awkward. That the Osprey is burdened with some flight characteristics that beg questioning is going to stay with it until the whole fleet finds itself in the Arizona desert mothballed.

I would suggest posting a laundry list of incidents and accidents for a particular type of aircraft in an effort to bolster your position on the Osprey is fraught with peril. Take the Bell UH-1 series that came into being in the late 50's....was the first turbine powered helicopter....and is still beating the skies into submission as we speak in just about every part of the world in some variant or another.

It too has an impressive list of mechanical failures, short comings, and in the end is an Icon and turned out to be one of the most reliable helicopters every built.

The Osprey has a long....long way to go before you can say it shall be the success legacy helicopters are. I won't be around for that discussion as it will have to take place in 2065-2070.....if we use the UH-1 /47/53/60 families of helicopters. So at best....your claims are premature by about a half a century.

FH1100 Pilot

20th Jun 2012, 04:48

Sometimes?

SansAnhedral

20th Jun 2012, 13:04

SAS

I can't take the hint?

You are only furthering the point I was making.

Yes, the determination is a half century premature.....precisely what I was alluding to. Yes, the UH-1 is another grand example of something that turned the corner. Extrapolate the V22's operational safety thus far.

Sure the GAO can list out a bunch of shortcomings of any project they believe to be expensive and over budget, thats their purpose. Seems to me that every issue they have pointed out was addressed by Bell/Boeing and NAVAIR at some point.

Why you guys on this forum cant seem to give things a fair shake and look at anything objectively is beyond me. I like the Osprey, I think its an amazing machine. The fact it has had no more crashes or incidents in a similar operational timeframe than some very old, very conventional ships seems totally lost on you all. You have tilt-rotor-phobia, and it doesn't matter what the facts are. Despite your paranoia these things aren't falling out of the sky any more often than the "totally safe, 100% proven conventional helicopter"...flight envelope differences/limitations and all.

3 incidents in what, 150k flight hours here on a "deathtrap"? Frankly I would have expected a lot more and I count myself as a tiltrotor fan.

Lonewolf_50

20th Jun 2012, 14:05

SAS: I am more than passingly familiar with that CH-53E accident, and the one in Corpus Christi, 2000.

John: thanks for the very brief summary. Dave Kish was a classmate of mine.

SAS again: Even the GAO and other government publications point to the design of the Osprey creates issues seen as questionable, unsafe, or at the very least awkward.
You do realize that there have been changes in the design, yes?

If the GAO, seven years ago, or five years ago, or nine years ago, was critical of the V-22 and NOTHING had been done, then your point would be worth pondering.

As you well know, the design and configuration of the V-22 (hell, most DoD aircraft), is NOT static. Chinook is on the F model at present, Blackhawk on M, and F-18 is at E/F and G. Huey is on Y, Cobra is on Z. Inside of all that are the usual ECP's, Airframe Changes, Avionics changes, and so on.

Why do you choose to view the V-22 without that "continual improvement" model as your point of reference? I find that to be either dishonest or careless. Yes, we agree, that bird is very expensive. I sense that it is the expense that is your most consistent source of distress over that program.
Back to the 1996 crash in Stratford: you could cite the example of the Kaydon swashplate bearing as yet another incremental configuration change in a basic design, albeit one that ended up getting people killed before it all got sorted out on the engineering and production end. :mad:

Likewise with walnut shells and Chinooks. :(

21stCen

20th Jun 2012, 18:22

The comparison of the V-22 to the CH-53 is not relevant on so many levels. It is incredible that it keeps coming up over and over. This recent discussion does however answer some questions asked earlier, and proves some statements being made repeatedly to be false:

JD was asked:
Do you believe if the CH-53 was in the same scenario as the Marana V-22 a CH-53 could have recovered? (none of the other CH-53 drivers I have spoken to believe it would have been survivable, but perhaps there is some empirical data we are not aware of?) The question referred to the survivability of a -53 in a 2500+fpm increasing ROD from 285ft while reducing forward airspeed to zero with a light quartering tailwind.

FH1100 repeats over and over:
At least a '53 would have hit upright (like the Lead V-22, Nighthawk 71 did), not inverted and ensuring that it would be unsurvivable… No, I don't know how hard a CH-53 can hit vertically and still be survivable. But I do know that it's better for ANY aircraft to hit upright to allow the landing gear and structure to do the job it was designed for than to crash inverted. The response to that was: If they "hit upright" but do not survive, I fail to see the benefit.

And it is now noted:
On 9 May, 1996, a CH-53E crashed at Sikorsky's Stratford plant, killing four employees on board. That led to the Navy grounding all CH-53Es and MH-53Es
JD says:1996 53E Accident This was a brand new aircraft on a production hover test flight... The aircraft fell in from approx. 200 ft, but hit upright. Sikorsky crew.
Thanks,
John Dixson

Conclusion:
The difference between the CH-53 and V-22 accidents above is mechanical vs. aerodynamic (both are now being avoided by design and training/instrument warning modifications that have eliminated repeat accidents to date). The comparitive point is that when dropping from 200ft at a high rate of descent in a Ch-53 hitting upright has been demonstrated (unfortunately!) to be fatal for all on board, just as a V-22 rolling inverted from above that altitude at a high rate of descent has been shown to be fatal for all on board. Is anyone surprised?

This thread goes endlessly round and round unfortunately. To help eliminate the clutter it would be nice if incorrect comparitive claims that have been proven false are eliminated from the discussion. Based on the emotional and other interests I predict this will not happen.

Keeps life interesting I guess...
21stC

Jack Carson

20th Jun 2012, 23:59

Having been part of rotary wing, military and civil, aviation for the best part of 40 years I can appreciate the Marine Corps and the V-22 community’s loyalty to their machine. Over the years I have seen many perish through no fault of their own. I have seen H-1s lost due to stabilizer bar failures, CH-46s due to blade and rotor problems, H-60s lost due to spindle failures, and a T-2 due to an in flight elevator failure just to name a few. At the top of the list are those who perished in my own pride and joy, the H-53. As part of that 53 experience, we endured the wrath of an Orange County Resister reporter that crucified the H-53 in the press looking to a either win a Pulitzer Price or looking to close MCAS Tustin, CA. In the end, the machine survived, in part by having its laundry hung out for everyone to scrutinize. I believe that, in the end, all any of us want to see is an honest scrutiny of the machine. We owe that to those lost up to this point and to hopefully minimize future problems.

SASless

21st Jun 2012, 00:07

Lone,

Yes things are improved, modified, and updated.....but aerodynamics remain basically the same.

I still question the performance of the Osprey on a single engine in hot and high conditions less than 1600 feet AGL when in other than airplane mode. I am using the arbitrary figure of 1600 feet as that is the given limit for a safe conversion to Airplane mode following a dual or failure of the remaining engine when in "Helicopter Mode". There is a sliding scale between height AGL and Airspeed I am sure that describes the combinations that determine if a successful conversion to Airplane Mode can be made....and if not successful....the emergency landing is not going to be pretty.

The difference between the 22 and helicopters in that situation is the shady side of that curve is much larger than for helicopters. The 22 is not over powered on one engine when you take it to altitude.

That works for helicopters as well....but it appears more so for the 22.

I don't fly them.....but I have wandered around in a performance chart for the 22 and my impression was that the you have to really high off the ground if slow....in the Helicopter mode.....as the transition requires a real trade of height for airspeed. Stall speed (from my feeble memory.....) is about 110 knots is it?

FH1100 Pilot

21st Jun 2012, 05:17

Here's what the V-22 is, and why the design is so horribly flawed: Two side-by-side hovering (non-overlapping) helicopters connected by a stick.

What could possibly go wrong? Oh yeah, lots.

No B- or C- or D- or even K-model is going to fix that inherent defect.

henra

21st Jun 2012, 11:54

Here's what the V-22 is, and why the design is so horribly flawed: Two side-by-side hovering (non-overlapping) helicopters connected by a stick.

Could you maybe enlighten me, what makes this so much more dangerous than two helicopters behind each other connected by a stick (Aka the Chinook)?

When in a static hover/descent, how does mother nature discriminate what is front, back, left and right?

Although it always makes for lively reading I'm a bit puzzled by the 'Witch hunt' of some here going on for the V-22.
As long as those who fly it are happy to do so, why are you all so worried? Should they not be the ones to be worried if anything?

21stCen

21st Jun 2012, 15:42

Jack Carson says:
I believe that, in the end, all any of us want to see is an honest scrutiny of the machine. We owe that to those lost up to this point and to hopefully minimize future problems.

Cheers Jack, words of wisdom that cannot be surpassed...

FH1100 Pilot

21st Jun 2012, 16:22

Henra:Could you maybe enlighten me, what makes this so much more dangerous than two helicopters behind each other connected by a stick (Aka the Chinook)?

Henra, the side-by-side configuration of the tiltrotor is MUCH worse than the fore/aft/overlapping/intermeshing configuration of other types such as the Kaman 43 and Boeing 46/47 series. Here's why:

Very simply it has to do with the aerodynamics of two separate helicopter rotors. Unlike the rotors of the CH-46/47, the proprotors of a V-22 act completely individually.

Primarily, let's look at VRS. Let's say that one proprotor of a V-22 starts to go into VRS. It will roll to that side. What does the pilot do? Naturally he will apply a control input to counter the roll. In the tiltrotor this will increase the pitch of the proprotor on the side that is descending. As even the dumbest helicopter pilot knows, increasing collective pitch when beginning to encounter VRS is the exact wrong thing to do.

Meanwhile, the proprotor on the side which is stil in "clean" air (or has not yet decided to go into VRS owing to the chaotic vagaries of Mother Nature) is still producing full lift. As the proprotor that's nibbling on VRS gets worse, the aircraft rolls over and attempts to go inverted. This can occur so quickly that the pilot might not even have time to recognize what's happening. (Chinooks and Sea Knights and Kaman Huskies do not exhibit this same tendency to flip over upside down. The fore/aft rotors do not have the moment-arm that the side-by-side proprotors of a V-22 do.)

Has this rolling-inverted-and-diving-for-the-ground thing ever happened? Yes. Google "Marana V-22 accident." Will this happen again? Yes. Currently there is no "VRS detector." I sure would love one in the helicopters I fly, but nobody has invented one yet. All the military and the manufacturer have done is put arbitrary and conservative limits on descent rates and airspeeds of the V-22...limits that will surely be violated in the heat of battle as the V-22 attempts to land in a "hot" or defended LZ. (I think the 2008 Afghanistan accident proved this; the crew was making a damn STRAIGHT-IN approach/landing and crashed.)

Tests were done that showed that the V-22 is "hard to get" into VRS. Sure, we understand. Even conventional helicopters are hard to deliberately put into VRS, because of the aforementioned chaotic vagaries of Mother Nature.

1) VRS does not always happen at exactly the same place and time. What can be a perfectly non-eventful steep, slow approach in a helicopter on one day can turn into a crash on another day with exactly the same conditions. You cannot predict with certainty when a rotor will go into VRS. If the conditions are right and all the holes in the Swiss Cheese line up- bam!

2) It's nice to do VRS testing up high, where there's plenty of altitude between you the pilot and earth. But where will VRS (or, in the case of the tiltrotor, A-VRS or "Asymmetrical VRS") happen? Correct...down low where there very likely will be little time and/or altitude to recognize and recover.

V-22 proponents swear to us on a stack of Bibles that A-VRS will never happen again because...well...because we know about it now! Ohhhhh, so simple! Why didn't I think of that! All it takes is being aware of a problem and...voila!...the problem goes away!

Oh wait. Helicopter still crash from VRS (or the related excuse, "settling with power") even though we know about it in helicopters too. VRS/SWP happens down low, and it usually happens so fast as to catch even a good pilot by surprise. What hope does a task-saturated V-22 pilot have who's trying to land his machine in a nasty place and maybe downwind? The Marana crash was during a downwind approach, and the hapless Major Luce's first, controversial Afghanistan crash was also at the bottom of a downwind landing. So don't tell me that V-22 crews always, religiously, without fail land into the wind IN THE REAL WORLD. Obviously they don't.

So the side-by-side...the two-helicopters-connected-by-a-stick configuration of the tiltrotor is why I feel that it is a defective, deficient design. That is why I feel that they are unsafe...that there will be more crashes that are just assigned to "Pilot Error." And that is what will ultimately kill the tiltrotor: Sooner or later people will have to admit that I'm right.

Lonewolf_50

21st Jun 2012, 17:44

FH: V-22 isn't a helicopter. You realize that, right?
henra: well said.

Jack Carson: Very well said. :D

SAS: I appreciate your concerns, they are similar to a few of my own about 25 years ago when I was at an NHA and we were asking, back when V-22 was still being figured out, on actual performance and tactical handling.

Even then, the guys from the program office reminded us, particularly as we were asking some "compare to Phrog" questions, that the V-22 isn't just a Phrog replacement, it's an evolutionary step in aviation and capability. (And COST, which wasn't as obvious then).

At that time, there was some rumor of the LAMPS community having a shot at a V-22 variant as a replacement for the SH-60 on escorts, or to replace HS missions on the CVs.
That, in retrospect, was most likely contractor hype. (See also the old proposals of Navalized Apache ... )

Size and scale wasn't going to work out, which I found out later from program office sorts was well understood during the Quad Service requirements reviews.

SASless

21st Jun 2012, 17:46

FH,

Can a Tandem Rotor helicopter get into A-VRS....that meaning one rotor head in VRS conditions and the other not?

Does the overlap of the blades (about eleven feet as I recall) prevent that from happening?

If the Aft head gets into RBS....does the Chinook act as though it is in A-VRS but in pitch rather than roll?

SansAnhedral

21st Jun 2012, 18:04

Here we go again, FH and the A-VRS boogie man. Haven't you been sufficiently slapped down in this very thread over and over enough? As stated at least a dozen times, A-VRS is as much of a problem as say, mast bumping. You understand the envelope, you avoid the envelope, and it just so happens that in the V22 if you are vigilant when you depart envelope, you can get out of it.

from ospreydriver

It's not a weakness of the design though. The V-22 is LESS susceptible to VRS than normal rotorcraft. The rate of descent limitations given for the V-22 mirror those given for almost every other helo--no more than 800fpm at less than 40 knots. Those are the same limits that I was told in the TH-57(B206) and the same as the CH-46E. They are precautionary, and based more upon the limitations of pitot-static airspeed instruments than anything else. Stay above those, and you'll definitely stay out of VRS.

To enter VRS in the V-22, you have to be descending at more than 2000 fpm and nearly vertical. That's crazy fast, and easily avoided. Should you somehow blow through that, the V-22 has an out that no other rotorcraft does--tilting the nacelles.

Granted, the consequences of VRS are worse in a V-22 than a helo, but seeing as it's harder to enter VRS and easier to get out of it, I think that concern is largely mitigated.

I think the cost and reliability criticisms of the V-22 are valid, though both are improving over time. As far as performance, though, nothing else holds a candle to it.

and my personal favorite, picking your last dead horse A-VRS argument apart point by point:

What becomes abundantly clear reading FH1100s post is that he does not understand VRS(or A-VRS) nor has he taken the time to actually read and study the literature available about it. It's also obvious that FH1100 has absolutely zero comprehension of how military operations are flown, how pilots are trained and how crews are scheduled, how tactics are developed and how through training and tactics approach profiles etc. address issues such as VRS (yes A-VRS). Furthermore it's obvious that FH1100 has no concept of how tilt rotors are flown however he has come to his own conclusions based what he has read on blogs and pretty much nothing more. If only he would choose to pontificate about something he knew about, like being a raconteur.

FH, in your first post you asked
"Just HOW is the aircraft different from the one that Majors Brow and Gruber flew in April of 2000? Does it have a reliable VRS indicator now? You know, like the stall-warning horn in an airplane, that can physically sense when a wing is at a critical angle of attack?"
This implies that if it had such a device it would be safer, well it does but now that is not sufficient for you.* No it doesn't have an A-VRS sensor, but if one avoids VRS then one will avoid A-VRS. No it doesn’t sense how close a proprotor is to VRS but provides the pilot both visual and aural cues of approaching limits. Remember that no device can ultimately keep a pilot from exceeding limits. If that is your design criteria then I suggest that we ground every aircraft out there because everyone of them has limits that if exceeded will result in a fatal mishap.
*
In your second post you state:
'However I have never accidentally or inadvertently stalled an airplane. Why?'
So you triggered the stall warning then you inadvertently got too slow and if it weren't for the stall warning you would have stalled.

‘Because the stall-warning horn gave me sufficient warning that I was approaching a critical angle of attack.’

You admit that warnings work! If it worked for you why won't the VRS warning work for a V-22? They indeed have a warning device installed and there have been no further VRS(or A-VRS) mishaps since its installation. You should be happy. Apparently it works. Case closed. Oh wait, you always have a straw man argument to prove why it won't. Sorry, I can't counter those as they are pretty much devoid of reality. Will another V-22 crash at some point due to A-VRS? Probably. Will another fixed wing aircraft crash due to stall? Probably. Will another Biz jet run off a runway because the brakes failed? Probably. Should I continue?

But then you go and contradict yourself by implying that stall warnings don't work, stating the Airbus accident.* In fact you disrespectfully state:
'THREE pilots in that cockpit, stall-warning going off and not ONE of those geniuses suggested lowering the nose and, you know, flying out of the stall.'

Actually I believe if you were to read that report again you would find the facts to be slightly different. However are you suggesting the Airbus a dangerous aircraft with a fatal flaw and should be grounded because pilots failed to react properly?

‘The PFD and audible sink rate warnings are, in my opinion insufficient. I think that in practice, when the sh*t hits the fan, those warnings will be summarily ignored by V-22 pilots just like the stall-warning alert was ignored 75 times by the crew of AF447’
Yet you didn’t ignore the stall warning you received? I wonder why it worked for you but will fail for V-22 pilots? Maybe you’re just a better pilot then they are. No, apparently you think your 206 can do aerobatics (previous post) because your RFM doesn’t say it can’t, you’ve flown yourself into VRS and you apparently need the stall warning to keep you from stalling, I’d say you are about average like the rest of us.

So FH do you think stall warnings work or don't they? Your argument is a bit confusing since you take both sides.

‘Because they were confused. But that will never happen to pilots in combat, will it?’
Yes it will. They will get confused in the V-22 and make mistakes, sometimes fatal. Just as pilots have gotten confused in H-1s and made fatal mistakes. Just as they have CH-53s and made fatal mistakes. What’s your point? That they will only make mistakes in the V-22 or that only mistakes in the V-22 will be fatal?

“Uhh, didn't they actually do just that? Why do you think the military flies UH-60's now and not UH-1Ns? Why are they developing the UH-1Y? Seems to me that if the 2-blade system was so great we'd still be using them. But what do I know...'

That was completely ignorant. Payload, range, speed and other factors. Not safety. The two bladed rotor is perfectly safe but there are gains to be made with more blades. In fact don’t you fly a 206? Is it unsafe? Are you afraid to fly it because it only has two blades? What’s the safety record of the two bladed rotor system?

“I've never said the V-22 is more susceptible to VRS than a helicopter. I say the V-22 is more susceptible to A-VRS than a helicopter. ASYMMETRIC VRS: One proprotor goes into it while the other one does not. Why do some of you guys keep denying the importance of this?”
Thank you for the explanation but unlike you I’ve actually studied the issue. It would be nice if you did the same. Nobody denies the importance of it, we just understand it, unlike you.

'The article that 21st Century posted by Lt. Col. Gross tells us that the V-22 crew now gets a "SINK!" warning on their PFD and an audible warning if the a/s drops below 40 knots and the RoD gets to 800 fpm. Great. Those are pretty conservative parameters.'
The same exact parameters that apply to all rotary wing aircraft, not just tiltrotors. Sorry if you don’t like it, but it’s true.

“Wait a minute. If an equivalent helicopter got into VRS at the same altitude as Majors Brow and Gruber, the helicopter would've settled vertically. If it hit the ground it would have done so upright, on its landing gear...not inverted like the V-22 did. See, for those of you who don't know, it's pretty hard for a helicopter to get into A-VRS.”

2400 fpm is 40 ft/sec. If a 53 were at 285 agl at at 2400 fpm ROD and tried to recover from VRS, if the correct action was taken the pilot would lower the collective and push the nose over, both of which would increase the ROD so it would impact at at least 40ft/sec. I’m sure there is someone on here who can tell us what would happen to CH-53E if it settled vertically and upright onto the tarmac at 40 ft/sec. I’m going to guess that 40ft/sec is well beyond where the gear would yield and the OEM guarantees an chance of survivability. But I could be wrong. You are correct FH, the V-22 in A-VRS would roll over, the 53 wouldn’t. 21 century is right in that the end result would have been the same.

And hard test data, quoted over and over ad nauseum in this humble thread. I can only assume FH has chosen not to read it.

http://legacy.vtol.org/pdf/test-60.pdf

Honestly, have you ever actually spoken to Opsrey pilots? I have on many occasions at airshows, and every single last one of them enthusiastically loves the airplane. It's no show.

SASless

21st Jun 2012, 18:27

Honestly, have you ever actually spoken to Opsrey pilots? I have on many occasions at airshows, and every single last one of them enthusiastically loves the airplane. It's no show.

There we have it.....unimpeachable sources!

Sans....have you ever considered what happens to a Marine that disses the Osprey in public at an air show? Can you say..."End of Career", prolonged posting to the Infantry, speedy exit from the Corps?

It just ain't the done thing!

Lonewolf_50

21st Jun 2012, 18:56

SAS, methinks you overstate the penalty for dissing Osprey.
Reassignment perhaps, but not to the infantry ... maybe another tour as a FAC! :p

The pilot MOS is freakin' expensive to get someone into, so they don't throw them away as they might have back in the Nam era.

jeffg

21st Jun 2012, 19:05

Primarily, let's look at VRS. Let's say that one proprotor of a V-22 starts to go into VRS. It will roll to that side. What does the pilot do? Naturally he will apply a control input to counter the roll. In the tiltrotor this will increase the pitch of the proprotor on the side that is descending. As even the dumbest helicopter pilot knows, increasing collective pitch when beginning to encounter VRS is the exact wrong thing to do.

Yet another strawman argument from FH. No FH, a trained V-22 pilot would roll the nacelles forward and use longitudinal stick as he is trained to do.

FH, an approach turn stall happens in the pattern, if the pilot makes the incorrect inputs the aircraft will become inverted and impact the ground (which is why we practiced it at 7000 agl in flight school, to allow recovery by 5000 agl). Are fixed wing aircraft inherently unsafe because of an aerodynamic trait that is encountered when the pilot exceeds the flight manual limits?

SansAnhedral

21st Jun 2012, 19:22

There we have it.....unimpeachable sources!

Sans....have you ever considered what happens to a Marine that disses the Osprey in public at an air show? Can you say..."End of Career", prolonged posting to the Infantry, speedy exit from the Corps?

It just ain't the done thing!

Well, for Raptor pilots and the OBOGS, it certainly was the done thing.

Plus "dissing" and whole-heartedly praising something are two very different things.

Is there a drama/theater requirement for Osprey pilots as well, since it seems the prevailing attitude here is that you all are speaking for them, airing all their concerns, in total contrast to what they say in conversation?

Occam's razor again. It's not a vast conspiracy. The guys don't secretly fear and loathe the machine like you want to believe.

Lonewolf_50

21st Jun 2012, 21:05

To further that point, there are now a growing number of Osprey Pilots for whom that bird is their first "fleet bird" rather than the crews being "helo pilots converted to Osprey pilots" in one way or another.

You will thus find, as a helicopter pilot, yourself in conversation on this topic with person holding a different viewpoint on flying from yourself: a born young Osprey Pilot. :cool:
Which is fine, since an Osprey isn't a Helicopter.

From the old paragidm of "there are three kinds of pilots -- jet, prop, and helo pilots" you must shift your perspective, and add in "that fourth kind of pilot who flies that contraption designed and produced by Rube Goldberg Skunkworks, Ltd." :}

Without that, the correct sort of dick measuring at the bar in the O Club cannot be correctly sustained. For those who were not aware previously ... if you can't hover ... :E

TukTuk BoomBoom

22nd Jun 2012, 06:30

My favorite quote of this whole thread is from FH1100 on the previous page

" Sooner or later people will have to admit that I'm right."

Talk about conspiracy theory, how's the tin foil hat working out?

21stCen

22nd Jun 2012, 07:19

Sans....have you ever considered what happens to a Marine that disses the Osprey in public at an air show? Can you say..."End of Career", prolonged posting to the Infantry, speedy exit from the Corps?

Sas, you could not possibly be further from the truth about Osprey pilot's motivation when they talk about the aircraft. You've seen a few of them post here on this thread, and none of them were praising the aircraft's capabilities to impress their commanders (anonymous postings). As Sans and LW explained, when you meet these guys and become friends with some of them, you can't shut them up when it comes to their passion for the aircraft they feel fortunate enough to fly! When they get some beer in them, there's no way you're going to stop them! Most I have spoken to have flown the MH-53 and other helos previously and they say as much as they loved their time in them, they would not go back. They feel the Osprey allows them to do things they never could before, and to do it faster!

FH1100 says:
As even the dumbest helicopter pilot knows...
Wow, and we are fortunate enough to have you right here on PPRuNe with us to provide commentary. Aren't we lucky...
:rolleyes:

21stCen

22nd Jun 2012, 13:59

Special ops commander relieved of duty after Osprey crash in Florida
By NBC News' Courtney Kube and msnbc.com's Jeff Black
June 22, 2012, 6:53 am
MSNBC.msn.com

http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/j/MSNBC/Components/Photo/_new/120614-cv-22-osprey-851a.photoblog600.jpg / Crew walk to the U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft at MacDill AFB in Tampa Florida in 2008.

The Air Force has fired the commander of a special operations squadron a week after a CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft in his unit crashed in Florida, NBC News confirmed on Thursday.
Lt. Col. Matt Glover, who commanded the 8th Special Operations Squadron based at Hurlburt Field in Florida, was relieved from his duties because of a loss of confidence, a military official told NBC News.
The Osprey, designed to take off and land like a helicopter and fly like a twin turboprop airplane, crashed on a training mission north of Navarre, Fla., on June 13 in a 750-square mile military training area called the Elgin Range. Five crew members were hospitalized with injuries.
On Wednesday, two of the airmen injured in the crash remained in the hospital with non-life threatening injuries, the Air Force reported. Officials are investigating.
This crash, along with a fatal MV-22 crash in Morocco in April, have raised new safety concerns among Japanese leaders and citizens ahead of an expected deployment of MV-22 Ospreys to Japan, NBC News reported. The MV-22 is the Marine Corps' version of the same aircraft.
Two Marines were killed in that crash and two more were more seriously wounded. The investigation determined that the crash was not a result of mechanical failure.
In an attempt to assuage safety concerns, several senior U.S. military officials at the Pentagon on Friday will brief a Japanese delegation on the preliminary results of the investigation into the June crash, NBC News reported.
The CV-22 Osprey’s mission is to conduct long-range infiltration, extraction and resupply missions for special operations forces, according to the U.S. Air Force web site.
The Air Force version is filled with sophisticated technology, including a missile defense system, terrain-following radar, a forward-looking infrared sensor and other electronic gear that enable it to avoid detection and defend itself on special operations missions over enemy territory, the Associated Press reported.

Special ops commander relieved of duty after Osprey crash in Florida - U.S. News (http://usnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/06/21/12342845-special-ops-commander-relieved-of-duty-after-osprey-crash-in-florida)

FH1100 Pilot

22nd Jun 2012, 15:34

I said, "As even the dumbest helicopter pilot knows..."

20th Century replied:
Wow, and we are fortunate enough to have you right here on PPRuNe with us to provide commentary. Aren't we lucky...

Hey, you don't even thank me when I toss you the easy ones? Sheesh.

jeffg:Yet another strawman argument from FH. No FH, a trained V-22 pilot would roll the nacelles forward and use longitudinal stick as he is trained to do.

Ah Jeff...so ill-informed. Are you even a pilot?

Of course I know of the dangers of the dreaded turn-to-final-stall-spin. I fly airplanes, you know. But we do not use airplanes for combat insertions and the things that the V-22 will be doing. We use helicopters for those missions.

Jeff, your assertion that a trained V-22 pilot will "simply" roll the nacelles forward is so incredibly...galactically naive that it defies comprehension. Do you honestly believe that a V-22 pilot on (perhaps downwind) short-short final to an LZ...a pilot who is possibly being shot at and has a bunch of other things going on and is friggin' BUSY is going to be able to recognize incipient A-VRS and react in time by calmly beeping the nacelles forward, aborting the approach and flying away? Get outta here. Obviously you've never flown a helicopter in your life. Because if you had, you'd know that this V-22 pilot we're talking about is going to crash.

Inverted.

Killing everyone onboard.

Like happened in Marana.

And it'll be "Pilot Error."

I suspect that, deep down you know this but you don't want to admit it because you (and the other tiltrotor advocates) want SO BADLY for the V-22 to be a success. Well...sorry. A-VRS *is* the fatal flaw in the V-22 ("Fatal Flaw" being the working title of my book on the bird.) All the wishful thinking in the world will not make this problem go away.

I know the V-22 does some things that conventional helicopters or airplanes cannot. I know that the pilots who fly it are passionate about it. (Hey, one of the Air Force geeks on this forum is so "passionate" that he even went to far as to threaten my life for criticizing it! No lie. You'll notice that he does not post on here anymore.) I know that there are people who see the tiltrotor as an "advancement" of technology and who desperately want the V-22 to work. The trouble is, it's a defective design from the get-go.

Here's what's going to happen: V-22 procurement will end. Done. Over time, attrition (e.g. crashes) will whittle the fleet down to the point that they'll all be retired. (Probably around the same time the country decides that we don't need FOUR separate-but-overlapping branches of the military. But that's another discussion.) It'll be the government's way of admitting that they shoved this dangerous piece of junk down our collective throats for the economic good of the communities and companies that benefit by building it.

I just hope this happens before too many more of our pilots and soldiers are killed.

21stCen

22nd Jun 2012, 17:03

FH1100 says:
I said, "As even the dumbest helicopter pilot knows..."
20th Century replied:
"Wow, and we are fortunate enough to have you right here on PPRuNe with us to provide commentary. Aren't we lucky..."

Hey, you don't even thank me when I toss you the easy ones? Sheesh.
You're right, thanks for that. But the unfortunate truth is that everything you say are the "easy ones."
:ok:

You should also be asking TukTuk BoomBoom to thank you for the conspiracy stuff that caused him to ask, "how's the tin foil hat working out?"
:eek:

FH1100 says:
Do you honestly believe that a V-22 pilot on (perhaps downwind) short-short final to an LZ...a pilot who is possibly being shot at and has a bunch of other things going on and is friggin' BUSY is going to be able to recognize incipient A-VRS and react in time by calmly beeping the nacelles forward, aborting the approach and flying away?

The answer is almost certainly 'yes' if the training was effective. And after the Marana accident which is ingrained in the minds of all Osprey pilots there should be little doubt of that. But the point is that the intense training they receive is geared much more strongly to prevent them from ever encountering the situation described as key recognition factors should alert them before entering a flight regime that would be unrecoverable (just as all pilots do whether they be in helicopters, airplanes, or tiltrotors). Having said that, a training system is only as good as its weakest link. Whether it be in helicopters, airplanes, or tiltrotors, statistics show the highest percentage of accidents are caused when someone either purposely or inadvertently does not to follow procedures or stay within limits. Training does work, but only as long as we maintain discipline and follow established practices.

A friend of mine who works for NASA experienced what he thought was the onset of VRS in the XV-15 many years before the Marana accident, and he said his reaction was instinctive and automatic as a tiltrotor pilot to push the nacelles forward. He flew out of it immediately without any consequences. Of course he was at high altitude and not under the threat of battle, but it shows as we all know that proper training can create the right mindset to allow pilots to react correctly and instinctively to situations that require immediate reaction responses.

henra

22nd Jun 2012, 17:24

Here's what's going to happen: V-22 procurement will end. Done.

Tell me one aircraft for which this isn't true ?
Happened to the Phantom as well...

Over time, attrition (e.g. crashes) will whittle the fleet down to the point that they'll all be retired.

Again:
At some point in time that will happen.
Maybe in 40 years from now... :E

Seriously, why should this thing be retired prematurely. Once the high initial procurement cost (we are in no disagreement about the fact that it is an EXPENSIVE kit) has been swallowed it makes sense to utilise such an expensive and valuable equipment to the max.
And expect exactly that to happen.

mckpave

22nd Jun 2012, 18:09

(Hey, one of the Air Force geeks on this forum is so "passionate" that he even went to far as to threaten my life for criticizing it! No lie. You'll notice that he does not post on here anymore.)

Oh I'm still here you ignorant, arrogant, loudmouthed jacka$$ and now you've firmly placed yourself on my "idiots I plan on meeting face-to-face with someday" list. If you want to start slinging mud again on here, then game on!!

Ah Jeff...so ill-informed. Are you even a pilot?

This comment is so incredibly stupid and uneducated it's deplorable yet stands to once again illustrate the ridiculous assertions and attacks made by FH1100 Pilot on nearly every subject he chooses to stick his nose into. If you actually took the time to find out and RESPECT the qualifications of those on this message board instead of simply being the imbecile you are, you'd find out that he has more than enough qualifications to answer questions.

Jeff, your assertion that a trained V-22 pilot will "simply" roll the nacelles forward is so incredibly...galactically naive that it defies comprehension. Do you honestly believe that a V-22 pilot on (perhaps downwind) short-short final to an LZ...a pilot who is possibly being shot at and has a bunch of other things going on and is friggin' BUSY is going to be able to recognize incipient A-VRS and react in time by calmly beeping the nacelles forward, aborting the approach and flying away? Get outta here. Obviously you've never flown a helicopter in your life. Because if you had, you'd know that this V-22 pilot we're talking about is going to crash.

Where do I even begin to start with this moronic comment? Yes, FH, despite your vast amount of tactical helicopter flying experience, I must disagree with your "educated opinion." The short answer is YES, that's exactly what competent, encompassing, professional training programs are built upon.

So once again FH why don't you tell us all here what your qualifications are that allow you to post such passionate and omniscient arguments?? Are you an instructor? How much tactical flying experience do you have? Mult-engine experience? Heavy helicopters? Formal training programs attended? NVG experience? Formation flying? When did you attend test pilot school? Are you even instrument rated?

Comments such as yours come from two types of people: 1) Experienced and educated individuals who know what they're talking about but may not always use the best approach, and 2) Windbags wanting everyone to listen to them yet show their a$$es everytime they open their mouths because they feel they have all the answers and refuse to accept anyone else's arguments. I'll let others on this board be the judge.

jeffg

22nd Jun 2012, 19:19

Jeff, your assertion that a trained V-22 pilot will "simply" roll the nacelles forward is so incredibly...galactically naive that it defies comprehension.
Actually FH it is you who is naive. What you don't (or can't) comprhend is that a tiltrotor is not flown like a helicopter. Yes, I do expect a tiltrotor pilot to simply roll the nacelles forward. When in conversion mode a tiltrotors primary fore/aft control is the nacelle switch, not longitudinal stick as in your 206. Tiltrotor pilots are taught from day one to keep the fuselage level and control rate of closure and accelereation with nacelles only. It's a different kind of flying .

Do you honestly believe that a V-22 pilot on (perhaps downwind) short-short final to an LZ...a pilot who is possibly being shot at
Please stop with your feeble attempts and developing a tactical scenario. The only thing you prove is that you know nothing of what you speak. For starters, it's generllay a really bad idea to fly downwind to a hot LZ. Just sayin'. I'm sure SAS can attest to that. There are many better and safer techniques available to a tactical pilot than to fly your typical GA pattern, but you wouldn't know because that's your only experience base.

and has a bunch of other things going on and is friggin' BUSY
What exactly are these 'other things going on' that will make this pilot 'friggin' BUSY' that he can't do what he is there to do...fly the aircraft? Please expound on what these task are that you envision. I'm curious to know.

is going to be able to recognize incipient A-VRS and react in time by calmly beeping the nacelles forward, aborting the approach and flying away? Get outta here.
That's what training is for FH. When the $h!t hits the fan you fall back on training. It the stall warning goes off all fixed wing pilots know to relieve back stick pressure and add power...with competent training it becomes instinctive. Why do you expect less of a V-22 pilot? If what you're saying is true than we can't expect any aviator to react to an extremis situation correctly. This would imply a much higher mishap rate in aviation than we actually have. We must be lucky. Or maybe we have better training than we used to?
By the way I found that in combat (yes I actually have been there, have you) that the tougher things got the calmer most pilots seemed to get. Perhaps SAS has thoughts on that to.

Obviously you've never flown a helicopter in your life.
There are several pprune memebers who can attest otherwise. What exactly are your credentials besides being a blogger and a raconteur? Do you really want to start measuring dicks?

Because if you had, you'd know that this V-22 pilot we're talking about is going to crash.
Then why haven't we had more V-22 mishaps in combat? The V-22 mishap rate in country is less than that of most other platforms so your argument is baseless...once again.

21stCen

23rd Jun 2012, 09:07

There are several PPRuNe members who can attest otherwise.Although I have not met jeffg, I know him by reputation and through other friends. I can attest that he was a military helicopter pilot who flew in combat. I can also say that in his present position he knows more about tiltrotors than most of us ever will!!

SASless

23rd Jun 2012, 12:26

I can attest that he was a military helicopter who flew in combat.

Sort of an Iron Man was he 21st? A Transformer perhaps?

SASless

23rd Jun 2012, 12:30

Jeffg,

Educate us on "Roll Off" and the procedures taught to avoid encountering it....and procedures taught to react to it when it happens if you would?

Also....what are the symptoms of "Roll Off" as compared to "A-VRS" if it were to occur in a formation approach to landing situation......say as at the Marana crash?

Could the Marana crash actually have been "Roll Off"?

21stCen

23rd Jun 2012, 12:49

Sort of an Iron Man was he 21st? A Transformer perhaps? No SAS, everyone knows only you could be held in that high esteem!! Which Transformer were you? Not the one that turns into a 'bus' I hope!!
:ooh:

But "Roll Off" is the serious topic of the day (I believe it has been discussed previously on this thread).

21stCen

23rd Jun 2012, 17:33

Sas,
I know you are sitting back in your arm chair with laptop at the ready, with one hand on the computer and the other on one of those green rum drinks. But if you demand:
Jeffg, Educate us on "Roll Off" and the procedures taught to avoid encountering it....It is not likely to be received as the best way to engage in a two way conversation amongst professionals. How would you respond if JeffG demanded that you educate us on a question he wanted answered in that manner??
21stC

PS: Got the 'Transformer joke' and added the word 'pilot'! :ok:

SASless

23rd Jun 2012, 18:10

21st,

As most of us are not Osprey Pilots...and jeffg is....I was hoping he would be able to explain that situation to us. Nothing sinister in that is there?

My use of the word "educate" was meant to put Jeffg into the position of Teacher....and the rest of us who are not knowing....as Students.

Tcabot113

24th Jun 2012, 01:23

SAS

What tiltrotor have you flown? If none how can you contradict anything a tiltrotor pilot posts here?

TC

jeffg

24th Jun 2012, 03:34

SAS
First and foremost let me state that my V-22 time totals exactly 0.0 hours. 21st speaks of my personal and professional associations with those in the V-22 community from a time when a program I was on shared hangar 109 with the V-22 program, and afterward. Both 21st and I count among our personal and professional friendships one of the very few individuals who has significant time in the the XV, V-22 and 609.
As far as being educated you had that opportunity when Mckpave first started posting on here. Mckpave is a V-22 pilot and is very knowledgeable about the platform. He was very forth coming and tried to answer questions only to be accused of doing otherwise when certain individuals didn't like the answers he gave. Your insinuation that V-22 pilots are either so enamored with the aircraft that they can't see the forest for the trees or that they are afraid about their careers couldn't be further from the truth. Every V-22 pilot I know will tell you that the V-22 has it's warts (what aircraft doesn't), and of it's strengths. They will all also attest that if flown within the limits established in the NATOPS it can and will safely complete the mission it is tasked to do. Go beyond those limits and it will bite (what aircraft doesn't).
Here's my frustration with this thread; I'll give you an example: I've flown CASEVAC missions, I've landed in some very small LZs, I've flown NVGs, etc. I've flown just about every component of an EMS mission. Yet I wouldn't go on an EMS thread and contrive a scenario and tell a group of EMS pilots that someday they would have to admit that I was right. I wouldn't do it because I'm not an EMS pilot! I don't know anything about the pressures that are placed upon them, their scheduling, training, etc. I would look like a fool if I did, wouldn't I? Likewise FH obviously never served, had any form of tactical flight training or practical experience and doesn't know a thing about tiltrotors other than what he has gleaned from the world wide web. For him to come up with a contrived scenario that meets his predetermined outcome (based on false assumptions) in a forum which holds as it's members many like yourself who have served, have been trained and have the practical experience (some in the V-22) and then tell them that someday they will have to admit he is right I find foolhardy.
If anyone truly wants to be educated about the V-22 then the next time someone like Mckpave post they should take the opportunity to listen to what they say and not accuse them of lying, covering up or being part of some vast conspiracy to hide the facts. It's hard to be a student if you've decided the teacher is wrong before they've entered the classroom.

TukTuk BoomBoom

24th Jun 2012, 04:56

Good comments there.
I agree this thread could be really interesting and informative instead its been taken over by a couple of loud mouths not associated with V-22s in any way that spend the whole time telling everyone else stuff theyve read on the web.
When people that are clearly close to the program comment they are quickly drowned out by these two know it all idiots.

FH1100 and Sasless should put a sock in it and let the guys that know tell it.

TukTuk BoomBoom

24th Jun 2012, 16:25

Post deleted: TTBB, you would know that a Private Message is just that, Private. Not for quoting and lambasting the sender on a public forum :=

Senior Pilot

Tcabot113

25th Jun 2012, 00:32

Senior Pilot,

If a poster sends a private message that shows their personal agenda despite what the truth is then it is fair game and for all on this forum to see.

TC

No, quoting and referencing PM's is not "fair game". Endof

SP

helonorth

25th Jun 2012, 00:45

I have to agree with SP, but it would have been fun to read. Sorry I missed it.

TukTuk BoomBoom

25th Jun 2012, 04:26

Yeah as funny as they were I had to tell him to stop PM'ing me!

SASless

25th Jun 2012, 11:13

It is being reported that the Eglin crash of the CV-22 may have been the result of "Roll Off". The formation of two Osprey's were in Conversion Mode, fairly low to the ground doing a Gunnery mission using a tactic carried over from Pavelow Helicopter Tactics.

The Squadron Commander was fired by his Wing Commander after the crash occurred.

That makes three crashes in a row that are being put down to Aircrew Error.

AFSOC Relieves Osprey Commander; 'Roll Off' May Have Caused CV-22 Crash (http://defense.aol.com/2012/06/21/afsoc-relieves-osprey-commander-roll-off-may-have-caused-cv-2)

JohnDixson

25th Jun 2012, 12:20

SAS, your link makes for interesting reading.

Thanks,
John Dixson

Lonewolf_50

25th Jun 2012, 14:59

SAS, thanks for the article. Some food for thought there.

In re crashes due to roll off or other turb/vortex related mishaps ...

Over a decade ago, a Navy T-34C crashed after joining up on an F-14 to perform a visual gear check. If I remember the details right, the F-14 crew had asked tower for someone to give them a visual since their gear was down, or so they thought, but their gear indicator wasn't indicating "safe."

A T-34 was nearby and obliged.

Sadly, the unsafe gear pattern wasn't high enough, in this instance, for the T-34 to recover from the tumbling and buffetting (unexpected) that was induced by a turbulence/vortex originating from the F-14.

The caution about "stay away from 5-7 position" is interesting in re the Osprey formation technique. I suspect that if the T-34 had joined up from abeam, or the 8/4 position, that mishap might never have occurred. (My memory is a bit fuzzy, if anyone knows more about that mishap in detail, please correct what I may have gotten wrong.)

There are some rules of thumb that are taught to every pilot regarding wing tip vortices in the landing environment, typically summarized as "make sure you land beyond the touchdown point of a heavy that you are following" which accounts for the settling rate of wingtip vortices.

It appears that for Osprey, another layer of awareness is added to the wing tip vortex caution, given its method of lift creation in the flight modes that are in more "helicopter" than "fixed wing" configuration.

JohnDixson

25th Jun 2012, 17:57

Does the V-22 have voice or flight data recorders?

Failing that, do the digital flight control computers have a limited time memory function capability?

Thanks,
John Dixson

SASless

25th Jun 2012, 21:45

This Roll Off thing got me to thinking....which is dangerous.

If the requirement is to avoid being within the 5-7 arc and stay further than than 250 feet from the lead aircraft.....just how big does a two Ship LZ have to be? Or....say a Six Ship where you are trying to land a sizable number of troops on the ground in a single quick Insert?

If we consider the AFSOC mission....part of which the MH-53's used to do being given to the Army's 160th Night Stalker Chinooks.....was part of that decision to shift some of the mission tasking driven by this consideration?

Also....if the wake/prop rotor turbulence is so strong that another Osprey can experience a loss of control and be upset by that disturbed air....does a height above ground minimum need to be determined much along the lines of an airspeed/ROD warning as is given for A-VRS?

Any idea what the max rearward speed of the Osprey is?

Lonewolf_50

26th Jun 2012, 15:32

Good questions, SAS. The operators may or may not wish to discuss that in an open forum, however. ;)

SASless

26th Jun 2012, 15:52

At the airshow at Leuchars Air Force MH-53 crews discussed some of the mission sets they were going to have to give up when converting to the 22. They did not go into real detail other than saying their view was it was due to some deal at very high positions on the Totem Pole that was driving it.

The tactical issues can be sensitive I am sure but in reality....as open source documents are bringing these limitations into view....no more damage is going to be done here as anywhere else.

I am sure some bad guys have their scissors, graph paper, and rulers and are comparing public source data and drawing out some layouts. They are pretty smart folks sometimes....and they are very good at thinking out counter measures to our tactics.....and we best be aware of that and doing the same to them.

That is why we have the advantage....we can draw upon some pretty amazing resources well in advance than what they can. We just have to be smart enough to stay ahead of the curve.

FH1100 Pilot

26th Jun 2012, 18:24

"Roll off." Hmm. "Roll off."

Now where have I heard that term before?

Lonewolf_50

26th Jun 2012, 18:43

Right here.

Roll-on/roll-off - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roll-on/roll-off)

FH1100 Pilot

27th Jun 2012, 04:37

HAHAHAHAHAHAH! Oh Lonewolf, so funny!

But I actually meant it with respect to the V-22. We find it used in the following report, when talking about A-VRS.

Dispelling the Myth of the MV-22 (http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_Myth_0904,00.html)

If this turns out to be a genuine case of "roll off," then I wonder why the pilot didn't simply beep the nacelles forward and fly out of it? That is the "so easy a child could do it" response to a roll-off, no?

I don't know...I'm puzzled.

SASless

27th Jun 2012, 04:43

Seems a common occurrence FH....

As in most things....if there is not air between you and the ground....there is not enough air between you and the ground.

The real question is why did it happen. What was done that should not have been....and what wasn't that should have been done?

It does seem interesting that the 22 puts out enough wake turbulence/prop rotor wash that it can cause an upset in another 22 following behind it.

Lonewolf_50

27th Jun 2012, 13:52

SAS, are you familiar with why helicopters, in formation, fly with step up rather than step down, which is what fixed wing typically use?

Lonewolf_50

27th Jun 2012, 14:02

But I actually meant it with respect to the V-22. We find it used in the following report, when talking about A-VRS.
Dispelling the Myth of the MV-22 (http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_Myth_0904,00.html)
If this turns out to be a genuine case of "roll off," then I wonder why the pilot didn't simply beep the nacelles forward and fly out of it? That is the "so easy a child could do it" response to a roll-off, no?

I note that you inserted a term (in quotes) not used by the LTC who wrote the report you cited. Why am I not surprised?

I am not sure how much time in your life you have spent investigating aircraft mishaps. I had to do a few. One of the things you learn in so doing is something I'll call a decision cycle. When something goes wrong while flying, you have a finite time to (while flying the aircraft)

identify that something is wrong
indentify which something is wrong
apply a remedy or correction
if simple correction is insufficient due to malfunction or failure ...

proceed with the correct EP / Malfunction procedures, memory items and maneuvers, without delay and in the right order.
Diagnosis is a critical difference between living through some "something's wrong" events and not.

While the point the LTC made about moving nacelles to 12-15 degress to escape VRS is a simplified summary, what goes into that is first recognition and diagnosis of what is wrong and what is to be done.

Depending upon how close to the ground and what you are doing, if something like VRS or roll off surprises you, your decision cycle is significantly compressed. In the AF mishap recently in Florida, my estimate is that if what happened was in the roll off category, the pilot flying was surprised, which influenced his corrective process.

In your own case, FH, when flying your helicopter, your ability to quickly and correctly diagnose the difference between a loss of power or a loss of tail rotor control is critical to your taking the correct actions to get back down to earth in one piece. If you are at fifty feet, or at a thousand feet, your decision cycle will contract or expand.

FH1100 Pilot

27th Jun 2012, 14:12

Actually, Lone, I have had a tail rotor failure in flight and I did get it down in one piece. Good analogy!

But fair enough comment on my quote. I didn't mean to show that the guy who wrote the article said anything about recognizing and reacting to a "roll off." Here's how I should have written it (hindsight being as sharp as it always is).
If this turns out to be a genuine case of "roll off," then I wonder why the pilot didn't simply beep the nacelles forward and fly out of it? That is the so-easy-a-child-could-do-it response to a roll-off, no?

The question still stands.

SansAnhedral

27th Jun 2012, 14:22

Looks like Major Luce was indeed the pilot in command of the CV

AFSOC Osprey Pilot's Crash Was His Second In CV-22s; Was Copilot First Time (http://defense.aol.com/2012/06/22/afsoc-osprey-pilots-crash-was-his-second-in-cv-22s-was-copilot/)

AFSOC Osprey Pilot's Crash Was His Second In CV-22s; Was Copilot First Time

WASHINGTON: The pilot in command of the Air Force Special Operations Command CV-22 Osprey that crashed at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida on June 13 was also the copilot of an AFSOC Osprey that suffered a fatal accident in Afghanistan on April 8, 2010, AOL Defense has confirmed.

Still unclear is whether Maj. Brian Luce or his copilot, Capt. Brett Cassidy, was at the controls over an Eglin gunnery range when their Osprey went down around 6:45 p.m. on a clear day while flying in formation with another CV-22 during a training exercise. Luce, who like Cassidy and their three enlisted crew members suffered undisclosed injuries in the accident, was released from Eglin Hospital two days after the crash.

Two years ago, Luce, who declined through the 1st Special Operations Wing's public affairs office to comment, was also in the right seat of a CV-22 Osprey that landed hard while carrying Army Rangers on a night raid against insurgents in Afghanistan. That Osprey flipped onto its back after its front landing gear collapsed and its nose went into a ditch, killing four of 19 people on board.

Col. James Slife, who as commander of the 1st Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, Fla., relieved the commander of his unit's Osprey squadron this week as a result of the Eglin crash, declined in an interview with AOL Defense to say whether Luce and Cassidy might also face penalties for the accident.

"The results of the Accident Investigation Board will guide our decisions, if there's some misbehavior on the part of the crew or if they performed in a way that was unsatisfactory," Slife said. "It's too early to say whether they will or won't face any disciplinary action."

Air Force aircraft crashes are first examined by a Safety Investigation Board, whose purpose is to evaluate the cause and safety implications of aviation losses and whose evidence and deliberations are privileged and never released. A separate Accident Investigation Board, whose report is generally released after being redacted, examines crashes to assess responsibility.

The Osprey, which the Air Force designates CV-22 and the Marine Corps MV-22, is called a "tiltrotor" because it swivels two 38-foot rotors on the tips of its wings upward to take off, land and hover like a helicopter and tilts them forward to fly with the speed and range of a turboprop fixed-wing propeller plane.

Made in a 50-50 partnership by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. and Boeing Co., the Osprey became controversial during two decades of development that included three fatal crashes, schedule delays and cost overruns. The V-22 was redesigned and retested in 2001-2002, however, and has since become a useful new capability for the Marines and AFSOC. Despite the Eglin crash and an MV-22 crash in Morocco in April that killed two Marines, the Osprey has also been one of the safest rotorcraft in the military since it went into service. Over the past decade, the U.S. military has lost 606 lives in 414 helicopter crashes, including four soldiers killed in two Army helicopters lost in Afghanistan during the past month.

The recent V-22 crashes have increased anxieties about the Osprey in Japan, where local leaders on Okinawa have cited noise and safety concerns in resisting a Marine Corps plan to deploy MV-22s on their island later this year. Japanese Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials were at the Pentagon on Friday to receive briefings on the Air Force and Marine Corps crash investigations from U.S. officials including Christopher Johnstone, director for Northeast Asia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) and Brig. Gen. Terrence
O'Shaughnessy, deputy director for politico-military affairs for Asia on the Joint Staff.

"The Department of Defense takes the inquiries made by the Japanese government very seriously and provided relevant information to the extent currently possible, and will continue to do so," Pentagon spokesman George Little said. "The Osprey is a highly capable aircraft with an excellent operational safety record, which includes more than five years of worldwide
deployments and 140,000 flight hours."

Luce was quoted in a recent Popular Mechanics article which reported that the V-22's speed and range have "turned doubters into converts" among special operations troops. "Some of the guys have a little hesitancy," Luce told the magazine. "But then they ride with us and get from point A to point B in record time."

1st Special Operations Wing commander Slife said there was "no reason to expect there are any mechanical flaws" that could have caused the Osprey crash at Eglin. He also confirmed that investigators would examine whether the crash resulted because the Osprey that went down, the second in a two-ship formation, got too close to the CV-22 it was following. The aircraft were flying in helicopter mode as a gunner fired at targets on the ground with a machinegun mounted on the rear ramp of the second Osprey.

As AOL Defense reported June 21, a major hazard for Ospreys flying behind others in helicopter mode is the risk of the trailing aircraft getting into the lead aircraft's powerful rotor wash, which can knock the lift out from under one of the second V-22's rotors and cause a sudden "roll off" that may be unrecoverable. Osprey pilots are admonished to keep at least 250 feet between cockpits and avoid the 5 to 7 o'clock positions behind another V-22.

"That phenomenon is well understood in the V-22 community," Slife said. "There's prominent warnings against flying in that flight regime in our flight manual. That's certainly one of the things the safety board is going to investigate."

Slife declined to explain in any detail his reasons for relieving Lt. Col. Matthew Glover of command at the 8th Special Operations Squadron, which Glover had taken over in May 2011, but the colonel said that "philosophically" all the military services hold commanders responsible for what happens in their units.

"The Navy is certainly known for this, but I think everybody acknowledges that commanders are accountable," Slife said. "Accountability and culpability are not necessarily the same concept."

Being relieved of command is usually a career ending event and "a personal tragedy for the person involved," Slife said. "But at the end of the day, our loyalty has to be towards the organization, and in this case, toward the airmen of that squadron. We owe those airmen the very best leadership that we can provide them."

Osprey pilot Luce's name wasn't included in the Accident Investigation Board report on the 2010 CV-22 crash in Afghanistan. AOL Defense confirmed with three individuals who know him personally that he was the copilot. The fatalities in the Afghanistan accident included pilot in command Maj. Randell D. Voas, who was at the controls in that incident. Also killed were Air Force Senior Master Sgt. James B. Lackey, Army Ranger Cpl. Michael D. Jankiewicz and a female Afghan interpreter.

Luce, who was thrown from that aircraft still strapped into his seat, had flown part of the mission in that intended night raid against an insurgent target but wasn't at the controls when that CV-22 touched down at more than 90 miles an hour a quarter mile short of where it was supposed to land. The Osprey's landing gear were down when it hit the ground and the aircraft raced over flat, sandy earth with its rotors tilted nearly all the way up, according to the Accident Investigation Board. Some of the Rangers on board thought they had merely made a fast roll-on landing until the aircraft flipped onto its back.

Following the accident, Luce told investigators his memory was blank about everything that happened after they were about one minute away from their intended landing zone.

"Unfortunately, that was the last thing I remember," Luce testified. "I don't know if it's my mind playing tricks on me or if this is something I actually remember, but I remember watching the radar altimeter" showing stages of their descent. "When I remember seeing this, I felt as if, not that I was outside the aircraft, but I was just not in my copilot position; I was watching this from outside the aircraft. I didn't feel like I was – it was kind of like I was a spectator. I wasn't part of the crew. I was just seeing this happening."

The Afghanistan crash investigators concluded that as many as 10 factors led to that accident but that none could be singled out as a primary cause. They included the crew being distracted as they pressed to make their target landing zone on time, a 17-knot tailwind and, in the view of the eight-member Accident Investigation Board's chairman, then-Brig. Gen. Donald Harvel of the Texas Air National Guard, possible loss of engine power. The vice commander of AFSOC at the time, however, overruled Harvel on the engine issue, citing engineering studies that detected no evidence of power loss.

SASless

27th Jun 2012, 14:59

Lone,

I have done a bit of formation flying in both helicopters (a whole lot) and airplanes (a little bit).

I very much understand why we stacked up in helicopters and not down.

In Roll Off.....my interest is the fact the strength of the disturbed air can cause an Upset of the following aircraft.....as Helicopters do not try to roll upset down when encountering the wake/rotor turbulence of the preceding aircraft.

It is the loss of Roll Control that I find so interesting to consider.

As many have said....these things are Tiltrotors and not Helicopters. (....or Airplanes either for that matter.)

SansAnhedral

27th Jun 2012, 15:00

FH, you seem to accept entering an auto as a fairly routine recovery procedure, and that a conventional helicopter is not "fundamentally flawed" due to a pilots ability to initiate one.

Do failed autorotations indicate that conventional helicopters are a flawed design? Does an accident that occurs when flying below the HV curve indicate the same?

Your inconsistency between these scenarios and similar unique situations in the V22 betrays your claimed objectivity.

jeffg

27th Jun 2012, 15:53

If this turns out to be a genuine case of "roll off," then I wonder why the pilot didn't simply beep the nacelles forward and fly out of it? That is the "so easy a child could do it" response to a roll-off, no?

Because you're confusing two different phenomena. Roll off caused by VRS (to which LtCol Gross refers) and roll off caused by another aircrafts wake...same term different thing. For a roll off caused by VRS forward nacelle is the answer because it sheds the rotor vorticies. I don't believe it to be effective though for roll off caused by wake interaction.

JohnDixson

27th Jun 2012, 16:35

I recall reading the article by Lt Col Gross, but just mentally pigeon-holed the roll-off events as instabilities related to the unsteady flow associated with VRS.

That was an underestimation apparently, judging by the comments from some here with specific V-22 knowledge who propose that it is a potential causal factor in the Eglin accident.

The article does not describe the aerodynamic mechanism related to the roll-off events encountered during testing. It doesn't describe the magnitude of the events, i.e., roll attitude change, associated roll rates, amount of lateral control input required to correct the situation, altitude loss, if any, associated with the event.

Makes one even more curious about the sort of onboard data that might be retrievable from the normally installed flight control computers.

Thanks,
John Dixson

Lonewolf_50

27th Jun 2012, 18:39

John, good points, perhaps as a result of the reports on this mishap some answers to your questions will arrive.

SAS: I figured you were aware of rotary wing formation flying. ;) It was almost a rhetorical question.

Back to the V-22 and how wake turbulence might have outsized effects on the tilt rotor.

I have a picture in my mind of thrust asymmetry rather than what the test pilot was addressing in discussing roll off. I don't know the Chinook well enough to think through this, but am wondering how often thrust asymmetry between the two rotors might have caused handling problems in that model, and how it accomodated that sort of problem. (Or rather, how the pilots did ...)

It seems to me that in the Chinook, a thrust asymmetry would manifest itself in pitch up / pitch down anomalies, while in the Osprey, it would do so in roll. As I sketch it out on the back of a napkin, the force in the Osprey would be generated over a longer arm, which means that the force required to counter such fluctuations would be greater, in proportion, but also that the rate of roll when encountering thrust asymmetry would likely be larger.

I'll leave it at that for the moment. Will ponder on that for a bit.

SASless

27th Jun 2012, 19:46

You got it Lone.....deviations tended to be in pitch attitude....or one end having to follow the other if you "fell through" on an approach (a situation where you are leveling the aircraft and pulling a lot of Thrust (collective). As the cyclic goes forward it is reducing pitch in the forward head and increasing pitch in the aft head....all the while the Thrust lever increase (collective) is adding pitch to both heads......net effect is "less" pitch in the forward head which in an extreme situation means the nose "falls" . The good news is it is a very near ground situation.....but also bad news as it can make for a pretty abrupt landing.

Using pedal to get both heads into clean air is a trick that once mastered....can allow for take off with a much heavier load than normal aligned take offs. The Huey would give you a bit more weight capacity if you allowed it to turn to the right into the wind as you departed. Kicking the Chinook sideways right at the edge of Translational Lift Airspeed....and getting the aft head into undisturbed air worked to your benefit. It got clean air to the aft head and gave the aft head a touch more acceleration compared to the forward head. It was a finesse maneuver.

JohnDixson

27th Jun 2012, 21:16

SAS, in 1963 I was bootlegging an H-21 checkout at Mother Rucker and was lucky to have a recent returnee from the delta as an instructor. Taught that exact same takeoff "when you're out of ideas and the tree line is approaching" technique.

Thanks.
John Dixson

SASless

27th Jun 2012, 21:37

Ah yes....the good ol' days...bless'em!

The rest of the trick was to keep the ol' darling flying and accelerating no matter how slight until you could get her back into trimmed flight and still flying. Straighten her up too soon and you really had diddled the pooch! :uhoh:

Tcabot113

27th Jun 2012, 22:59

All,

What happens to a Chinook or CH-53 hovering low to the ground when another Chinook or 53 crosses slowly directly over that aircraft at a delta altitude of only 25 feet?

Does the aircraft above blow the aircraft below into the ground, or does the low aircraft suck the overflying aircraft into it?

TC

Jack Carson

27th Jun 2012, 23:11

Typical doctrine for multiple ship operations in the H-53 called for the wingmen to get on the ground first during the landing phase. This insured, assuming landing into the wind, that the dust and crud from the leading aircraft minimally affected the wingmen. The reverse took place on takeoff. The wingmen would lift off first and gain step up prior to the leader’s lift off.

We were also trained to never fly directly over another aircraft while it was running.

Tcabot113

27th Jun 2012, 23:35

Came across the linked article. The UH-60 appears to have had a number of crashes and lives lost between Y81 to 84: 15 crashes, 22 dead,and with two fatal in 40 days. Not sure how many of these were the crashes in Grenada in a formation landing. And this is now a revered (though old tech) helicopter.

On Grenada: Wake turbulence? Suck down? Some Sikorsky guy could answer.

As to what caused the grounding. In flight breakup: Tut-Tut!

TC

The Pittsburgh Press - Google News Archive Search (http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1144&dat=19850420&id=bjsgAAAAIBAJ&sjid=HGIEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6952,1761493)

FH1100 Pilot

28th Jun 2012, 01:06

Some people seem to make the mistake of thinking that the Chinook rotors act independantly of each other all the time. This is not...I think...the case. They overlap by, what, 30%? Not only that, the masts are at different angles with respect to each other. Even in a hover the Chinook rotors are interacting with each other.

Not so the V-22. SAS says that it's neither a helicopter nor an airplane and that's incorrect. In a hover the V-22 is most definitely a helicopter...*two* helicopters, actually, connected by a stick, with a WHOLE LOT MORE lateral polar inertia than a Chinook has longitudinal polar inertia (think majorette's baton). How many Chinooks and Sea Knights over the years have done a forward or rearward somersault and crashed inverted because one of their rotors got into VRS and other didn't?

The proprotors on a V-22 do act individually...and need to act individually because it has been discovered that when they interact with each other (as in the shipboard testing) the results can be nearly disastrous. Or have we forgotten that for the sake of convenience? Apparently the Air Force didn't read or listen to what the Navy discovered about proprotor downwash interaction.

We don't know enough about the recent Eglin crash yet to know whether it really was "roll off" or what. Maybe Maj. Luce can enlighten us if he has any recollection of *this* crash. (Personally I wouldn't bet on it. If not, he may go down in history as the most forgetful pilot ever since my 80 year-old Uncle Ned, from whom we finally had to take the keys to his Cessna 140 away after he landed, parked, tied it down and walked away from it while it was still running! We were, like, "Uhh Ned, did you lock your plane?" Then he started patting his pockets for the nonexistent keys.)

But whether the Eglin crash was the result of "A-VRS roll off" or "wingtip vortice roll off" makes no difference. The aircraft rolled over and crashed (we know at least that much) which strongly hints at unequal lift on one side. It still strengthens my point that the tiltrotor concept is DEFECTIVE. When one proprotor loses lift that piece of crap flips over on its back and crashes. It is only a miracle that anyone on the Eglin aircraft survived. (And don't give me that BS about "See how survivable a tiltrotor crash is!")

I've said this all along. And some of you nitwits blather on and on about how, "All you have to do is beep the nacelles forward and fly out of it!" Piece of cake! And now it happens again (maybe?) and the same nitwits are saying, "Oh no, loss of lift on one side of the V-22 is NOT THE SAME as A-VRS!" Yeah, right. Asymmetric loss of lift is asymmetric loss of lift. Why don't you guys just admit it? Okay, geniuses, what's the EP for "Roll-Off That You Think Might Not Be Caused By A-VRS?" And how do you differentiate between the two when you're down close to the ground and the thing starts to flip over on its back? And don't give me that Henny Youngman line: "Don't do this." Do not tell me that the crews should merely avoid any flight regime that *might* cause roll-off.

So what's next? "Let's not do formation flying with them." (And you KNOW that's coming...but...we learned that after Marana and the shipboard trials, didn't we? I guess not.) "Let's not use them for gunnery." (It was never intended to have a gun. There was never a V-22 gunship model proposed.) Let's just keep whittling down what the V-22 *cannot* do until we find what's left that it *can* do safely. Which in my book is nothing.

"Fatal Flaw." I'm telling you. Watch for it soon.

SASless

28th Jun 2012, 04:12

"Nitwits!".....just who do you refer as "Nitwits"?

Come on now FH....surely you are trying to be humorous and unfortunately failed.....you were being funny right?

TukTuk BoomBoom

28th Jun 2012, 08:15

I heard the blackhawk Grenada crashes ( where #3 landed too close to #2 and #4 hit them both) were from the guys just coming in too hot.
It was a quote from one of the pilots behind them who aborted and while screaming back to the airport was told to slow down by the C&C bird that had seen the whole crash sequence happen and assumed that was the cause.
Could be wrong, it was a History Channel program!

I put the AVRS/lift differential or whatever you call it I'm the same category as twin engine props losing an engine after take off. How many mishandled it and rolled in. We haven't stopped flying King Airs because of it.

Lonewolf_50

28th Jun 2012, 15:05

FH, do you consider Mast Bumping to be a fatal flaw of the Huey? Just curious. It is a feature that comes with the rotor system and head, as designed. It can kill you, if you don't account for it in your handling of the aircraft.

For some reason, I get the idea that this has been discussed before, possibly even in this very thread.

Some people seem to make the mistake of thinking that the Chinook rotors act independantly of each other all the time.
No, I don't think so.
This is not...I think...the case. They overlap by, what, 30%? Not only that, the masts are at different angles with respect to each other. Even in a hover the Chinook rotors are interacting with each other.

That is irrelevant to the point that you can end up with thrust asymmetry if the forward rotor and the aft rotor are rotating in different quality air. Thats aero 101, but depending upon the magnitude of the difference, may not create a substantial handling problem.

A scenario: landing on the back of a ship, like a destroyer, that has a tall hangar. The mini-version of the Chinook, CH-46, has to account for this during approach to land. If you are making an "up the rear" approach, you may find, as you move forward over the deck, that the front rotor disk will begin to hit the turbulent air that swirls off of the superstructure before the rear rotor does. Typically, it isn't of sufficient magnitude to make controllability a problem, but you will find in the NATOPS wind limits for such approaches. As with most transitional maneuvers, there is an adjustment to be made, depending upon the wind and aspect.

Your point is well made, however, that the distance between the centers of thrust are proportionally greater when comparing the V-22 to the Chinook or its baby brother. That is what has the gears churning in my brain.
The proprotors on a V-22 do act individually...and need to act individually because it has been discovered that when they interact with each other (as in the shipboard testing) the results can be nearly disastrous.

Indeed, they are not the same as the tandem rotors in the Phrog or Chinook.
But whether the Eglin crash was the result of "A-VRS roll off" or "wingtip vortice roll off" makes no difference.
It might to whomever is writing the NATOPS manual, or the Dash 1, as there may need to be a change in guidance for handling.
The aircraft rolled over and crashed (we know at least that much) which strongly hints at unequal lift on one side.
You are being redundant there. Unequal lift in a system that produces lift from two sources requires, by definition, that one side's lift production isn't equal to the other. ;)
It still strengthens my point that the tiltrotor concept is DEFECTIVE.
I don't think your point is supported by the evidence of the thousands of hours of successful operation.
When one proprotor loses lift that piece of crap flips over on its back and crashes.
I am not so sure that's right, in terms of design. As I understand the design, if one of the engines fails, or some of the subsystems fail, you will have torque asymmery and thus transient uncommanded rolling moments. (Best translation from the NATOPS (old) that I have access to).

In other words, not every asymmetry in thrust / torque causes a roll to inverted state, but the risk is there. The handling issues are both addressed and as I understand it, part of the training program: just as you or I would be aware of how to deal with stuck pedals in a Jet Ranger or a Huey. The handling is a bit more difficult, and if not done quite right can result in a wreck, but if done right can result in a safe landing.

Critical engine and rudder in twins, fixed wing, anyone? ;)
It is only a miracle that anyone on the Eglin aircraft survived. (And don't give me that BS about "See how survivable a tiltrotor crash is!")
Not buying your argument here. Are you aware of the significant efforts the Army went to in order to upgrade crashworthiness and crash survivability for the Blackhawk versus the Huey? That isn't the only aircrft to have benefited from the work they did.
Asymmetric loss of lift is asymmetric loss of lift.
No kidding. I hear an Israeli F-15 flew home missing a good portion of a wing. I've flown fixed wing in split flap condition (annoying as hell) due to a system failure. I didn't roll inverted.
Let's just keep whittling down what the V-22 *cannot* do until we find what's left that it *can* do safely. Which in my book is nothing. "Fatal Flaw." I'm telling you. Watch for it soon.
Methinks you overstate the case.

FH1100 Pilot

28th Jun 2012, 16:14

Tuk-Tuk weighs in:I put the AVRS/lift differential or whatever you call it I'm the same category as twin engine props losing an engine after take off. How many mishandled it and rolled in. We haven't stopped flying King Airs because of it.

Tut-tut, Tuk-Tuk, WRONG!

The King Air pilot you desribe has a couple of things going for him. 1) For one thing, there's a big "ENGINE OUT" caption up on the panel in front of him to warn him about what's going on. 2) Most King Airs I've flown also have this thing called "AUTOFEATHER" which takes the load off of the prop that's not being driven by its engine anymore.

The V-22 pilot HAS NO SUCH DEVICES. An "A-VRS Detector" has not been invented yet. So when a wing of a V-22 drops on approach, the pilot has no idea whether this is just an errant gust of wind, A-VRS or "roll-off caused by some other reason," all of which may have different responses required of him.

Definitely NOT the same as an engine failure in a twin-engine plane.

And see, that's what I'm getting at here. Some of you people THINK you "know" a lot about a V-22. You make these asinine and irrelevant comparisons to airplanes or helicopters, without fully understanding what we're dealing with here. And what we're dealing with is an aircraft with an inherently defective design.

Lone, rather than debate all of your inane statements point by point, let me just address one:
In other words, not every asymmetry in thrust / torque causes a roll to inverted state, but the risk is there.

Asymmetric thrust and asymmetric torque are two different things. As you should probably know, a single engine failure (asymmetric torque) will not cause asymmetric *thrust* as the proprotors are shaft-connected together.

Asymmetric *thrust* WILL cause the V-22 to want to roll over and dive for the ground. Only split-second detection and proper reaction on the part of the flight crew can even hope to save the day.

Your analogies about fighters losing wings and split-flap situations in fixed-wing are amusing but irrelevant to a discussion about asymmetric lift/thrust in a tiltrotor aircraft. (Oh, and by the way, the fighter pilot can eject if his a/c departs controlled flight due to loss of a wing. The hapless passengers of a V-22 can do nothing but enjoy the brief-but-exciting roller-coaster ride to their doom.

JohnDixson

28th Jun 2012, 17:47

Tcabot,

Not sure I recall the accidents in their proper chronological order, but two Army accidents from that exact period stuck in my mind, and one that occurred at Sikorsky.

One occurred at Hooper stage field within the Ft Rucker complex, with all fatally injured, and was caused by a main rotor servo failure. This failure resulted from "hydrogen embrittlement " of the main rotor servo material, a phenomena which markedly reduced the fatigue strength of the servo. Main rotor servos had severe ballistic survivability requirements and Hydraulic Research Co had used a mfg process which led to the embrittlement proble.

Another occurred at Ft Bragg, where two A models were flying low level, next to one another, with the infantry troops waving at one another, when one simply nosed over and went in upside down, with all fatally injured. They were going pretty fast, so the rotor, control system etc, wound up all over the place and some of it buried fairly deep. Of course the media and rumor mill immediately pronounced the cause as the stabilator failing full down. That investigation took six months before we found the cause. Maintenance records were available, and we knew the control mixing unit had been worked on, but subsequent flying had produced no flight gripes. It took some months before we found all the parts, and found a bolt in the longitudinal mixer control missing a nut, then found the non-safetied nut with damage marks which fit some curious indentation marks in the longitudinal control limiter within the mixer.

Think I've mentioned this previously, but the only stabilator caused accident was the test aircraft at SA, which was caused by two separate human errors. But scuttlebutt can be a powerful influence, and it turned out that we at SA learned, after the Grenada assault, that with the Ft Bragg units, they were putting the stabilator in manual, zero degrees incidence, when they started in on the approach, ensuring that the pitch attitude would be far higher than normal when the main rotor down wash impinged upon the tail. BTW, did I ever mention that when I first got a close look at an AH-64, and looked at their stabilator installation, the actuator part number began with: 70-xxx-xxx, I.e., it was a UH-60 part! This was awhile ago, of course.

Thanks,
John Dixson

SansAnhedral

28th Jun 2012, 18:48

I've said this all along. And some of you nitwits blather on and on about how, "All you have to do is beep the nacelles forward and fly out of it!" Piece of cake! And now it happens again (maybe?) and the same nitwits are saying, "Oh no, loss of lift on one side of the V-22 is NOT THE SAME as A-VRS!" Yeah, right. Asymmetric loss of lift is asymmetric loss of lift. Why don't you guys just admit it? Okay, geniuses, what's the EP for "Roll-Off That You Think Might Not Be Caused By A-VRS?" And how do you differentiate between the two when you're down close to the ground and the thing starts to flip over on its back? And don't give me that Henny Youngman line: "Don't do this." Do not tell me that the crews should merely avoid any flight regime that *might* cause roll-off.

So the fact that in 150,000 hours of operation, we have a single speculated case of "roll-off" and here you go hammering away about how big of a flaw this is, and how recovery is so difficult.

Lets throw you a bone and make a hypothetical case that the V22 is extremely sensitive to asymmetrical thrust in hover, which is the argument you are trying to make if I understand your rambling, mostly incoherent posts. If that actually was the case, then the V22 would have doubtlessly encountered these roll-off events numerous times in its operations, and was successfully recovered in ALL BUT ONE OF THEM!

The reality is, and you seem hellbent on ignoring this, that the V22 is not as sensitive as you love to believe, as it knocks down your strawman. In addition, I have heard recovery from rare roll-off events does and has indeed happened in operation without incident.

Basically, your constant yammering on about how it actually isn't so simple to detect, react, and recover from an asymmetrical thrust event is directly countered when you ignore both the hard facts of 150,000 hours of operation with 1 crash SPECULATED due to this phenomenon, and your complete lack of knowledge regarding successful recoveries to date.

You cant have it both ways!

The evidence at hand proves either the V22 isn't the over-sensitive unstable top that you claim, or recovery is as easy and routine as others have suggested. And then there's the third option, which is mostly supported by our friend Occam and his razor, that the V22 is both largely stable and recoverable.

SansAnhedral

28th Jun 2012, 18:53

BTW, did I ever mention that when I first got a close look at an AH-64, and looked at their stabilator installation, the actuator part number began with: 70-xxx-xxx, I.e., it was a UH-60 part! This was awhile ago, of course

SAC part numbers (for UH60/S70) are 70XXX-XXXXX-XXX (i.e. 5-5-3)

I cant imagine how in the world a Sikorsky part would end up on a Hughes

Lonewolf_50

28th Jun 2012, 19:09

FH, I don't think you understand what terms are being used here, nor their relationship. "Inane" would apply to a few of your comments in this discussion.

If you are in helo mode, the torque on your proprotor, be it on the right or the left, is an indication of the thrust you are producing in the vertical direction. A change in torque will be an indication of a change in thrust.

Let's talk about something you know well: a helicopter.

Case 1 is hover at Gross Weight X, with 70 % Torque required to hover.
Case 2 is hover at Gross Weight Y, with 77 % Torque required to hover.

Which hover requires more thrust? Thrust is a vector. Your torque is indicated in the cockpit, hence the thrust / torque in my discussion, since there isn't a THRUST gauge in the cockpit.

A pilot would know this, right?

For John: thanks for further enlightenment on Blackhawk stab failures, and others. A point that might be related to the V-22 mishaps may be germane: control authority. If that linkage broke, so much for flight control authority. :(

Aside: we were warned in the Seahawk about the limits in pitch authority with the stab at various angles of 'down." There was a placard in the cockpit, and as well as typical NATOPS test questions on airspeed limts for various stab down positions. Loss of control authority in the pitch channel can be fatal. (Related note: If you check the news from last year, the Navy lost a T-45 due to loss in pitch control authority, pilot bailed out. Appears to be a cause similar to the hardware issue found in the Bragg crash.)

We had cautions in the Huey NATOPS about tail rotor control authority limits (IIRC due to the chain / sprocket) such that on a hot day, at the bottom of an auto, IIRC the TH-1E, you could hit the stops and not have the control authority you had expected. Jack Carson and I discussed this a while back, I think he remembers it better than I.

Might the Osprey team want to look at control authority limits?
I am not sure.
It's not like the control linkage to an aileron or a tail rotor control linkage.

From the AF 447 threads, I have learned that control laws in some modern planes limit the control authority, or the "throw" you can achieve with a max deflection. There was a passenger liner near New York that lost its Vertical Stab due to what I think was exceeding design stength via over control, or excessive control authority.

FBW systems have plenty of limiting features.

IIRC, V-22 has an FBW, or FBW type system. Is there enough control authority for the operating environment?

That's a hard question. See the airliner above. If you increase control authority X amount, you may risk Y or Z damage or fatigue in a given control channel.

Interesting point to ponder.

SASless

29th Jun 2012, 01:49

Some of you people THINK you "know" a lot about a V-22. You make these asinine and irrelevant comparisons to airplanes or helicopters, without fully understanding what we're dealing with here.

OK FH......everyone here are ignorant about the Osprey.

Do explain to us why you are the only expert who can attest to the Osprey's fitness for flight!

Are you an Osprey Pilot?

Have you done any Flight Test Work on the Osprey?

Do you hold an Aeronautical Engineering degree with a specialty in Tilt Rotor flight?

Are you an accomplished Googlier even?

Please do explain your Bonafides to hold forth as you do!

You called us "Nitwits"....now back up your claim please.

What makes you the Resident Expert extant on all things Osprey?

JohnDixson

29th Jun 2012, 17:00

Sans, remember that the stabilator was not a part of the original AH design, so when they decided on having one, the Army could quite properly ( the UH-60 design now being in the public domain, so to speak ) offer them the technology and hardware. I might have mis-remembered the p/n format, but that was a 60 stabilator actuator on that 64.

Thanks,
John Dixson

21stCen

29th Jun 2012, 19:15

…Please do explain your Bonafides to hold forth as you do!
You called us "Nitwits".... now back up your claim please.
What makes you the Resident Expert extant on all things Osprey?
Sas, Congratulations thanks, you are calling 'a spade a spade.' This is normally the point where FH1100 slithers away and crawls under his rock. You can see him 'lurking' in the background on PPRUNE without responding for days or weeks when he is called out on his ineptitude and complete lack of knowledge on the subject of the V-22 or tiltrotors, and helicopters/aviation in general. He will normally wait for things to 'cool down,' and hope that the fact that everything he said previously that had been knocked back and discredited with the facts will be forgotten. He assumes that a few pages later everybody reading will not know about his previous repetitive statements that have been answered with no response from him.

Here are just three recent examples of the unanswered comments and claims of the same dribble that he keeps repeating over and over again despite the fact that they have been responded to without any rebuttal on his part. There are many, many more prior to add to that, all with no answers when his comments are discredited.
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/204936-whats-latest-news-v22-osprey-71.html (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/204936-whats-latest-news-v22-osprey-71.html)
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/456619-whats-new-civil-tiltrotor-2.html (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/456619-whats-new-civil-tiltrotor-2.html)
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/204936-whats-latest-news-v22-osprey-82.html (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/204936-whats-latest-news-v22-osprey-82.html)

This sort of monotony is why many on PPRUNE have tuned out of this thread, including the majority of those who have firsthand experience on the V-22 and tiltrotor technology. We could have real answers to the questions being raised if there was a serious discussion of the facts here instead of one or two individuals with a propensity to cling to their opinions in spite of the fact that they are based on ignorance of the technology regardless of whether it be from the pro or negative side. Very sad...

As jeffg said, Osprey pilots are more than willing to discuss the 'warts' that truly do exist with the aircraft, and we could hear more about those true problems here if we allow them to speak without drowning them out with false claims and exaggerations being put forward about the technology from those who have a personal agenda.

All of us who are serious about getting truthful answers about the technology and how the Osprey really performs should give those who fly it the opportunity to speak freely without childlike banter from those who declare others to be ‘nitwits’ when in fact they are the ones who do not have a clue.

Honest and forthright input from those who are or were with Sikorsky (aka the ‘competition’ to the V-22 in some regards) can also play a valid role in the discussion particularly if the discussions focus on the facts and not the marketing side.

21stC

21stCen

2nd Jul 2012, 13:42

V-22s Cleared For Okinawa And Heads To UK Air Shows

By Richard Whittle (http://defense.aol.com/bloggers/richard-whittle/)
Published: June 29, 2012
http://o.aolcdn.com/mars/20102/635/357/v-22ospreyoversea.jpg

The Pentagon and the Japanese government announced early Friday that a dozen Marine Corps MV-22 Ospreys are being shipped to Japan for deployment on Okinawa but the planes won't fly until investigations into two recent crashes of the tiltrotor troop transport are complete.

The announcement – issued the same day four MV-22s were scheduled to fly from North Carolina to England to take part in two international air shows – emphasized that "Japan will be the only location worldwide where the United States will suspend MV-22 flight operations. The United States will continue uninterrupted flight operations of the MV-22 and (Air Force) CV-22 elsewhere around the world, including the continental United States."

The Marines have long had plans to deploy two squadrons of Ospreys on the island of Okinawa (http://defense.aol.com/2012/04/16/v-22-ospreys-heading-to-uk-okinawa-will-carry-white-house-pres/) to replace aged CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters based at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. Local residents and politicians have resisted the plan, citing noise and worries about the helicopter-airplane hybrid Osprey's safety -- a concern heightened in the wake of an MV-22 crash April 11 in Morocco (http://defense.aol.com/2012/04/11/osprey-crashes-in-morocco-two-killed/) that killed two Marines and a CV-22 crash in Florida June 13 (http://defense.aol.com/2012/06/14/afsoc-v-22-crashes-in-training-five-injured/) that injured five Air Force Special Operations Command crew members.

The DoD announcement said Japanese officials agreed the Marines could go ahead with the Osprey deployment to Okinawa after being briefed on preliminary findings of investigations into those two crashes. As AOL Defense has previously reported, aircraft malfunction has been ruled out in the Morocco crash (http://defense.aol.com/2012/04/13/osprey-mv-22-crashed-after-dropping-troops-at-lz-mechanical-fai/), and the commander of AFSOC's 1st Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, Fla., has said (http://defense.aol.com/2012/06/22/afsoc-osprey-pilots-crash-was-his-second-in-cv-22s-was-copilot/) there is no evidence of any mechanical problems or design flaws in the Osprey that crashed at Eglin Air Force Base. The Osprey, a revolutionary design, tilts two large wingtip rotors up to fly like a helicopter and forward to fly like an airplane.

"In recognition of the remaining concerns of the Japanese government about the safety of the aircraft, the DoD will refrain from any flight operations of the MV-22 in Japan until the results of the investigations are presented to the Japanese government and the safety of flight operations is confirmed," the Pentagon announcement said. "The Defense Department anticipates presenting this information to the Japanese government in August."

As the debate in Japan shows, the Osprey's reputation remains marred in some quarters by three crashes during its 25-year development that killed 30 people between 1992 and 2000, including 15 Marine infantry who were taking part in an operational test. Even with its two recent crashes, though, the Osprey has been one of the safest rotorcraft in the U.S. military inventory since 2001, a period in which the armed forces have lost 414 helicopters at a cost of 606 lives. During the same period, six people have been killed in three Osprey crashes.

The Marines and the makers of the Osprey, 50-50 partnersBell Helicopter (http://defense.aol.com/tag/Bell+Helicopter/) Textron Inc. andBoeing (http://defense.aol.com/tag/Boeing/) Co., have high hopes of making a first foreign sale of the V-22 sometime soon, which is why the four MV-22s are being sent to the upcoming air shows in England. From July 7-8, they'll will be used to take senior air commanders from around the world on demonstration flights during the world's largest military air show, the Royal International Air Tattoo at Royal Air Force Base Fairford, two hours northwest of London. From July 9-15, the Ospreys will offer flights to military brass and foreign VIPs during the Farnborough International Airshow (http://farnborough.com/trade-aircraft/trade-flying-display-aircraft), which alternates biennially with the Paris Air Show as the world's premier aviation trade fair.

An Osprey was on display last November at the Dubai Airshow, and the United Arab Emirates are thought to be the most likely first foreign buyer of Ospreys. UAE and U.S. military representatives have recently been meeting and exchanging paperwork on a possible Osprey purchase in a "very active dialog," said a government official privy to the discussions. "Looks pretty serious. Until the contract's written, though, the contract's not written."

V-22s Cleared For Okinawa And Heads To UK Air Shows (http://defense.aol.com/2012/06/29/v-22s-cleared-for-okinawa-and-heads-to-uk-air-shows/?goback=%2Egde_3898142_member_129653116)

212man

2nd Jul 2012, 13:50

four MV-22s were scheduled to fly from North Carolina to England to take part in two international air shows

Sitting here in FSI FAB looking out of the window at them!

21stCen

2nd Jul 2012, 18:00

Sitting here in FSI FAB looking out of the window at them!S-92 sim training at FSI?

Last time I was at Farnborough was the first time the Osprey came to visit (2006?)...
http://i267.photobucket.com/albums/ii305/tiltrotors/OverLondonBigBen.jpghttp://i267.photobucket.com/albums/ii305/tiltrotors/OverLondonEye.jpg

21stCen

6th Jul 2012, 17:34

The V-22 / Bin Laden Connection

Posted by Amy Butler (http://www.aviationweek.com/UserProfile.aspx?newspaperUserId=47475) 2:42 AM on Jul 06, 2012

Bell/Boeing is starting an aggressive international sales push for its V-22 tiltrotor at the Royal International Air Tattoo in Fairford today.
The U.S. Marine Corps has brought four of the Ospreys, which takeoff and land like a helicopter but can fly up to 300 kts like a fixed-wing aircraft, to RIAT. And, they will be on static and flying display next week at the Farnborough air show.
The history of the V-22 is well known; the tiltrotor has survived many attempts by defense secretaries to kill it owing to four crashes in its protracted development. Though the aircraft has recently proven itself during deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. And, an MV-22 based rescue of an F-15E crew downed in Libya got the attention of the United Arab Emirates, which is eyeing the CV-22 version for its military. Israel and Canada are said to be interested as well.
But, a little known tidbit has been circulating in the Pentagon that will add to the V-22’s credo – according to some – and notoriety – according to others. After U.S. special forces raided 9/11 mastermind Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan last year, a CV-22 was used to transport his body to the USS Carl Vinson. Onboard the aircraft carrier, officials prepared the body for a burial in the North Arabian sea. Pentagon officials said no nation was willing to accept the remains.
It is notable that the MV-22 only recently conducted trials on a U.S. aircraft carrier. Because the CV-22 was designed for transporting special operations forces, this aircraft has likely been used on decks and instrumental in covert missions for some time.
The Pentagon is buying 360 MV-22s for the Marines; 53 CV-22s for U.S. forces and, potentially, around 50 for the Navy.
Despite some notable operational achievements, the Bell/Boeing team will have to address concerns from customers about the high cost of the aircraft. Pentagon officials put the per-unit price at $67 million, though they say the cost-per-flying-hour is coming down. Company officials often say the price of the aircraft is balanced by its operational flexibility owing to a mix of speed and vertical lift. Aviation Week & Space technology
The V-22 / Bin Laden Connection (http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog:c757984d-8899-488d-bc38-5d2824ba71b3&plckPostId=Blog%3Ac757984d-8899-488d-bc38-5d2824ba71b3Post%3A3ea18afc-be5e-430b-9d0e-2de22d50910f)

212man

7th Jul 2012, 21:37

Breaking news - quasi helicopter has landed on aircraft carrier! What next - men on the moon?

SASless

7th Jul 2012, 22:19

Trash haulers....always putting on airs!

Granted that particular piece of trash would have been a pleasure to haul out to sea knowing it was a one way trip for it.

Tcabot113

8th Jul 2012, 02:03

SAS, 212

The V22 had the range and speed for the escort fighters to escort it out.

One more thing it did three things a Canadian H92 can not do:

Fly at night

Fly over water

Land on a ship

And seeing that 50% of the Sikorsky products crashed before the action started the Osprey was the best choice to actually complete the mission.

TC

Ian Corrigible

9th Jul 2012, 17:28

C21 - Note, the reporter in question subsequently corrected herself, confirming that the aircraft used was indeed an MV.

I/C

21stCen

9th Jul 2012, 17:37

Thanks I/C,
Post deleted on 'CV vs. MV' until confirmed. Do you have a link on the correction? Will check other sources.

Ian Corrigible

9th Jul 2012, 17:57

Here you go: The V-22 / Bin Laden Connection (http://www.aviationnow.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog:c757984d-8899-488d-bc38-5d2824ba71b3&plckPostId=Blog%3ac757984d-8899-488d-bc38-5d2824ba71b3Post%3a3ea18afc-be5e-430b-9d0e-2de22d50910f) (scroll down to second comment)

I/C

21stCen

9th Jul 2012, 18:44

Thanks for that I/C, that does verify her correction in the AWST post-comments. The original claim that it was a 'CV-22' and not an 'MV-22' that gave significance to the article appears to have been withdrawn. Will advise if any corrections to that are heard.

There are another couple of minor errors she made that are not yet corrected in post comments. The reporter was correct that 'the Navy never cancelled its order,' but quotes that are 'not quite there' are when she says they have on order, "potentially, around 50 for the Navy," and "53 CV-22s for U.S. forces." It is actually 48 for the Navy and 50 for the USAF (SOCOM).

SansAnhedral

9th Jul 2012, 19:31

Its also nice to see our old friend mud-slinger Carlton Meyer sticking his nose into blog post comment sections in his long standing attempt to sway public opinion against the Osprey.

Posting as "carlo" and pasting a link to his G2mil site is about as unabashed as it gets.

21stCen

9th Jul 2012, 19:37

Thanks I/C, it has been externally verified that it was an 'MV-22' and not a 'CV-22' that carried the body of bin laden to the USS Carl Vinson...

As Sas would say, it looks like the Marines 'took the trash out...'

21stCen

10th Jul 2012, 05:30

Safety top priority for Osprey operation in Japan: Clinton

Kyodo
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Sunday pledged to ensure the safe operation of Osprey military aircraft to be deployed at a base in Japan later this year, suggesting there is no change in Washington's schedule for the transfer, despite strong local opposition.
Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba said at a joint press conference with Clinton after their talks in Tokyo that they will speed up the ongoing realignment of U.S. military forces in Japan to produce some positive results "by the end of this year."
Gemba and Clinton agreed to stick to the two countries' plan to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station within Okinawa Prefecture, from a residential area in Ginowan to the less densely populated Henoko district of Nago, a Foreign Ministry official said, although a majority of local people are hoping for the air base to be moved outside of the southwestern island.
Gemba and Clinton also said they will continue to cooperate on issues related to maritime security, Afghanistan, North Korea, Syria and Iran, among other topics.
Gemba said he conveyed the concern in Japan over the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey transport aircraft at the Futenma base following recent crashes in Morocco and Florida, while Clinton promised to share all necessary information with Japan once the results of investigations on the accidents are ready.
"The United States cares deeply about the safety of the Japanese people," Clinton said. "We will work closely with our Japanese partners to make sure that any American equipment in Japan will meet the highest safety standards."
But she suggested the United States has no plans to change the schedule for the tilt-rotor aircraft's deployment to replace the aging CH-46 helicopters currently at the Futenma base.
Clinton said the MV-22 Osprey has "excellent safety records" and the replacement will "significantly strengthen our abilities in providing for Japan's defense and performing humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations and other duties as a key ally."
A civilian cargo ship carrying MV-22 Ospreys has already left the United States and is expected to arrive at the Marine Corps' Iwakuni Air Station in Yamaguchi Prefecture in late July, before the deployment at the Futenma base. A ship believed to be carrying the planes left Hawaii on Saturday for Japan, according to a Japanese peace group monitoring the U.S. military.
During the one-on-one talks on the sidelines of an international conference on Afghan development in Tokyo, Gemba and Clinton discussed some economic issues as well.
As part of efforts to strengthen bilateral economic ties, Clinton said the United States "welcomes Japan's interest" in a new multilateral free trade accord, called the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Gemba and Clinton will both attend a regional security forum in Cambodia next Thursday. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea are expected to dominate discussions at ministerial meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and its dialogue partners in Phnom Penh.
Gemba and Clinton said the two countries are hoping to see progress on crafting a regional code of conduct to reduce territorial and maritime conflicts in the South China Sea.
On the sidelines of the ASEAN meetings, Clinton said the United States, Japan and South Korea will hold a trilateral meeting, during which North Korea's nuclear program is expected to be a major agenda item.
Before meeting Gemba, Clinton also held a brief meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda in which they reaffirmed their commitment to working closely on bilateral issues as well as regional challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, according to Foreign Ministry officials.

Safety top priority for Osprey operation in Japan: Clinton | The Japan Times Online (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20120709a2.html)

jeffg

10th Jul 2012, 19:32

Carlos back and apparently he still hasn't bothered to learn a thing about aviation or the V-22.

SansAnhedral

10th Jul 2012, 20:59

Well here you have it

Marines Peg 'Bad Flying' As Cause of April V-22 Crash in Morocco (http://defense.aol.com/2012/07/09/marines-peg-bad-flying-as-cause-of-april-v-22-crash-in-morocco/)

Marines Peg 'Bad Flying' As Cause of April V-22 Crash in Morocco

By Richard Whittle
Published: July 9, 2012

An April 11 MV-22B Osprey crash in Morocco occurred because the pilot committed a fundamental flying error which investigators have found was rendered irreversible by a tailwind neither he nor a second pilot in the cockpit noticed, AOL Defense has confirmed.

The Defense Department announced June 29 that the Marine Corps had ruled out any "mechanical or material failure" in the accident, in which two Marines were killed and the two pilots were injured.

"This wasn't a tiltrotor accident; it was bad flying," said a government source with detailed knowledge of the findings, which are still being reviewed by Marine Corps leaders.

Two military officers familiar with the findings separately confirmed that the pilot of the mishap aircraft started the sequence of events that culminated in the crash by violating an explicit instruction in the Osprey's flight manual.

"No-kiddin' human error is involved here," one military officer said. Another said of the pilots: "Unfortunately they put the aircraft in a position beyond the (flight manual) limits that are advertised and that are trained to, and they made an error."

The Osprey, which can carry as many as 24 troops loaded for combat, is called a "tiltrotor" because it points two large rotors housed in wingtip pods called "nacelles" upward to take off and land like a helicopter and swivels them forward to fly like an airplane. The ability to tilt its rotors gives the Osprey far more speed and range than conventional helicopters without a conventional fixed-wing airplane's need of runways to take off and land.

The MV-22B that crashed in Morocco was attached to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 (VMM-261), based at Marine Corps Air Station New River, N.C. VMM-261 was participating in a joint military exercise with Moroccan armed forces when the accident occurred.

Just prior to the accident, with the less experienced but fully trained copilot at the controls, the Osprey had set down helicopter-style to drop off at least the second load of troops its crew had delivered that day to the same austere landing zone. As the pilots took off to return to a temporary on-shore base, the following events unfolded in quick succession:
Under a clear, daylight sky and with no dust interfering with the crew's view, the pilot at the controls lifted the Osprey into a hover 20 or 30 feet above the ground with the plane's nose pointing into the wind, as it had been when the aircraft landed a few minutes earlier.
The pilot flying then used his foot pedals to turn the Osprey in a half-circle to the right, rotating in mid-air to head in the direction from which they'd arrived. As the aircraft turned, it climbed to about 50 feet.
As the Osprey turned, the pilot pitched the aircraft's nose down about 10 degrees by pushing the control stick forward with his right hand. At the same time, using his left hand, he turned a small thumbwheel on the Osprey's throttle, or Thrust Control Lever, to tilt the nacelles and rotors down from 90 degrees and brought them to an angle significantly less than 75 degrees – a position that violated flight manual limits on nacelle angles at low forward airspeed. The effect was to shift the Osprey's center of gravity too far forward, causing the nose to plunge downward.
As the nose went down, the pilot was unable to hold it where he wanted by pulling back on the control stick because the horizontal stabilizer at the aircraft's tail was being pushed up and forward by a 20-knot tailwind. The tailwind's speed and direction were depicted on a digital map inside the cockpit, but vegetation in the area was too sparse to alert the pilots to the wind as they looked outside the aircraft during takeoff. The tailwind pressure on the horizontal stabilizer reduced the stick's "aft control authority" while adding downward leverage on the nose. "By the time the pilot realized he was out of back stick authority, it was too late," one source observed.

The aircraft plunged nearly straight down into the ground, hitting nose first. The cockpit was crushed, but the two pilots – whose identities haven't been released – were strapped into their seats and survived, though with severe injuries. The two enlisted crew chiefs, Cpl. Robby A. Reyes, 25, of Los Angeles and Cpl. Derek A. Kerns, 21, of Fort Dix, N.J., were killed. MV-22B crew chiefs, like those on Marine Corps helicopters, ride in the back cabin and often stand during flights, secured only by a long strap attached to the aircraft to keep them from falling out if the back ramp is open.

Despite being loaded with more than half the fuel an MV-22B can carry, the Osprey didn't catch fire after crashing, and its Crash Survivable Memory Unit, or "black box," was recovered. The CSMU, which records aircraft operating data, showed conclusively that there were no mechanical problems with the aircraft.

"Flight data information indicates that the aircraft performed as expected and described in the MV-22 Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Flight Manual," the Defense Department's June 29 news release said. "The U.S. Marine Corps has determined the aircraft did not suffer from a mechanical or material failure and there were no problems with the safety of the aircraft."

Additional analysis determined that the combination of the pilot violating the NATOPS limit on forward nacelle angle at low airspeed, the resulting excessive forward center of gravity and severe downward pitch of the aircraft's nose, and the tailwind pushing the bottom of the horizontal stabilizer as the tail of the aircraft angled upward all contributed to the crash.

"The combination of those factors made the aircraft unrecoverable at low altitude," one source said. "Below 40 knots calibrated air speed, there is insufficient wind moving across the conventional airplane control surfaces to add roll, pitch or yaw control authority. The aircraft relies on the controls of a helicopter."

A helicopter's controls change the craft's position by changing the angle at which its rotor blades hit the air they're moving into, known as the "relative wind." An airplane's controls change the angles at which control surfaces such as elevators and ailerons hit the relative wind. The helicopter-airplane hybrid Osprey's computerized flight controls work like a helicopter's at slow speeds and like an airplane's once a V-22 gains enough forward air speed for its wing to produce more lift than its rotors -- usually 110 knots or more with the wing horizontal. At nacelle angles between 75 and 30 degrees, the Osprey's flight control computer blends helicopter and airplane controls.

Despite those characteristics, veteran Osprey pilots said the root aerodynamic cause of the Morocco accident wasn't peculiar to a tiltrotor.

"As with any aircraft, there are center-of-gravity limitations," said a pilot who agreed to discuss the crash on condition of anonymity because the results of the investigation have yet to be released. "Too much forward center of gravity in any aircraft, the aircraft will not have enough pitch authority to counter the nose-down pitching moment. Too much aft center of gravity and the aircraft will not have enough pitch authority to counter a nose-up pitching moment."

Contrary to at least one report, the crash in Morocco had nothing to do with a well-known Osprey peculiarity known as Pitch Up With Side Slip. Aerodynamically, what happened in Morocco was the direct opposite.

In Pitch Up With Side Slip, the downwash from the rotors of an Osprey flying at a slight angle into relative wind of 20 to 30 knots, or hovering with a front quartering wind of 20 to 30 knots, can push down on the horizontal stabilizer at the tail, pitching the aircraft's nose up. Osprey pilots are trained to compensate for Pitch Up With Side Slip by pushing the control stick forward a bit or turning the aircraft's nose directly into the wind. The Osprey's computerized flight controls also automatically compensate for Pitch Up With Side Slip by tilting the nacelles forward a touch when necessary.

The pilots in the Morocco crash could face penalties, depending on the findings of a Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation, whose purpose is to assess responsibility, and a separate Field Flight Performance Board review, whose purpose is to determine whether the flight crew are fit, motivated and worthy of continuing to fly. The flight performance review isn't complete. Marine leaders are reviewing the findings of the JAGMAN investigation as well as the report of an Aircraft Mishap Board, whose role is to assess safety lessons or issues raised by an accident and whose evidence is privileged and never released.

The Flight Characteristics chapter of the MV-22B NATOPS manual contains several sections relevant to the crash in Morocco, including one "Warning" -- a designation used to highlight risks that can lead to injury or death.

The Warning cautions pilots that "severe pitch down and altitude loss can occur if nacelles are rotated too far forward too quickly at takeoff."

A separate note advises that when accelerating by tilting the nacelles forward, an Osprey pilot should apply "aft stick movement to maintain pitch attitude due to thrust and cg (center of gravity) effects."

The Operating Limitations section of the NATOPS manual explicitly instructs: "When transitioning to forward flight from a hover, limit nacelles to greater than 75 degrees until 40 KCAS (Knots Calibrated Air Speed) is reached."

The Defense Department issued its unusual June 29 statement about the Morocco crash because the Marine Corps has long planned to deploy the first of two 12-aircraft squadrons of Ospreys to Okinawa this summer. The MV-22Bs are to replace CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters based at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

Local officials on Okinawa, where a CH-53D crashed in 2004, injuring three Marine crew members but harming no civilians, have expressed concern about the Osprey's safety record in the wake of the Marine Corps crash in Morocco and the June 13 crash of an Air Force CV-22B at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. The CV-22B accident, which occurred during a training flight, injured the crew of five and destroyed the aircraft but killed no one.

AOL Defense has previously reported that in the CV-22B crash, still under investigation, one possibility being examined is that the pilots flew closer to an Osprey in front of them than the prescibed separation of 250 feet. Under such circumstances, turbulence created by the rotor downwash of the lead Osprey can knock the lift out from under one rotor of a trailing V-22, causing the aircraft to roll suddenly in that direction. At low altitude, such roll offs can be unrecoverable.

After being briefed on the findings of the investigation into the Morocco crash, Japanese officials agreed to allow an initial squadron of Ospreys to be shipped to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni on the Japanese mainland for eventual deployment to Okinawa. In exchange, the United States pledged that no V-22s would fly over Japan until the findings of investigations into the Morocco and Florida crashes are made public.

The June 29 DOD statement also emphasized that Marine and Air Force Ospreys would continue flying elsewhere in the world, and four MV-22Bs are at this week's Farnborough International Airshow southwest of London to provide demonstration rides to potential foreign buyers. The Naval Air Systems Command and the Osprey's makers, 50-50 partners Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. and Boeing Co., have high hopes of making an initial foreign sale of V-22s soon. Foreign orders would lower the Osprey's current unit cost from about $67 million for an MV-22B and $78 million for a CV-22B.

Critics who distrust tiltrotor technology or would prefer to see the money the Marines and Air Force spend on Ospreys go to other uses have long contended the V-22 is unsafe. Based on major mishaps per flight hour, however, the MV-22B has been one of the safest rotorcraft the Marine Corps flies over the past 12 years, with the crash in Morocco the service's only loss of an Osprey since Dec. 10, 2000.

Even counting two crashes of Air Force CV-22Bs in the past two years, the Osprey's safety record has been exceptionally good since the aircraft was redesigned and retested a decade ago. Since Oct. 1, 2001, three Ospreys have crashed with a loss of six lives. During the same period, the U.S. military has lost 414 helicopters at a cost of 606 deaths.

I honestly cant wait to see how this gets spun by Axe, Cox, and Meyer. Here's my prediction (Axe especially): "USMC quick to blame pilots for latest MV-22 incident", and then cue the rehashing of the pilot error determination for Marana and Afghanistan.

rotorboater

10th Jul 2012, 21:45

I was looking in the cockpit of one at RIAT this weekend and it doesn't seem to have a collective, it does have a big lever for the nacelle but it looks a bit unwieldy, how do you control it in a hover?

Its a big Fu@@er though but looks like a nice bit of kit.

Tcabot113

10th Jul 2012, 22:04

Rotorboater

The cyclic/stick controls pitch and roll just like an airplane or helicopter.

The thrust lever (collective) controls the thrust.

The nacelle angle is controlled by a thumb control.

Simple.

TC

SASless

11th Jul 2012, 00:13

The Warning cautions pilots that "severe pitch down and altitude loss can occur if nacelles are rotated too far forward too quickly at takeoff."

Jeez Louise....you reckon?

Now let's add a 20-27 knot tail wind....throw in a pedal turn at the same time....out of wind to down wind....and bad things happen.

Must be all that rapid acceleration can be addictive.

It does seem counter-intuitive to have to apply aft cyclic as you accelerate by rotating the nacelles forward. It makes sense when you consider the objective is to maintain a reasonably level airframe pitch attitude during such transitions.

SansAnhedral

11th Jul 2012, 18:42

V-22 Osprey a shape-shifter that has come of age - The National (http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry-insights/aviation/v-22-osprey-a-shape-shifter-that-has-come-of-age)

V-22 Osprey a shape-shifter that has come of age
David Black

Jul 11, 2012

Derided as an unsafe ugly duckling during its development, the vertical takeoff V-22 Osprey aircraft has indeed blossomed into a swan. Now widely deployed by the US air force, this high-speed plane is attracting widespread attention, including from the UAE. David Black reports

Helicopters transformed the battlefield, moving troops and equipment directly to where they were needed at 150kph and depositing them vertically on a landing zone. The V-22 Osprey can do all of that - but travelling to its drop-off and pick-up points at a maximum speed of 463kph.

"It can do everything a helicopter can do," says Major Fernando Zapata, an operations officer in the 8th special operations squadron of the US air force. "Except you get there quicker."

Maj Zapata is out on the flight line at Hurlburt Field air force base in the Florida panhandle, home to the USAF's special operations command, which "has a requirement" for 53 of the CV-22 Ospreys.

The tanned, shaven-headed Maj Zapata is a helicopter pilot by trade, but from the evangelical language he uses to describe this unlikely looking aircraft, he is a convert. Obviously there is more to the Osprey than just being faster than a helicopter.

"It's the greatest fun to fly," he says. "Pretty much a dream. You get behind that stick and you know you're not flying a helicopter. You're not flying a fixed-wing [aircraft] either. It's a tilt-rotor, and I guess we're still finding out just exactly what that's going to mean."

The UAE Air Force is also keen to find out what it's going to mean. Since the Osprey's crowd-pleasing appearance at last year's Dubai Airshow, Boeing-Bell has been in discussions to sell the aircraft to the Emirates, India, Japan and Canada.

This week the Osprey is strutting its stuff at the Farnborough International Airshow in England. But it has taken a long time to get here.

The aircraft began life as a result of a US department of defence requirement issued in 1981 for a joint-service vertical take-off and landing experimental aircraft. It first took to the air in 1989, but it was to take two decades, four fatal accidents, a reputation for unreliability and several attempts by politicians to kill it off, before Boeing-Bell managed to turn this ugly duckling into a swan.

Now, despite having US$500 billion (Dh1.83 trillion) chopped out of its budget, the Pentagon is buying 360 MV-22s for the US Marine Corps in addition to its USAF special forces quota, and potentially, a further 50 for the US navy.

Yet seldom has an aircraft encountered so much public hostility. There were problems - leaking hydraulics, engine mounts that had a habit of catching fire and its rotor performance in certain flight configurations made the aircraft unstable. Three training crashes killed a total of 30 Marines.

In 2007, a Time magazine cover story labelled the Osprey "A Flying Shame" and in the past year The New York Times has described the V-22 as "accident-prone" and "unsafe".

But as Richard Whittle points out in The Dream Machine: The Untold History of the Notorious V-22 Osprey, his book on the development of this revolutionary aircraft, the engineers were working at the cutting edge.

The V-22 is a complicated aircraft, engineering-wise. It takes myriad hydraulic and fuel lines to tilt and drive almost 500 kilograms of 6,100-horsepower engine on each wing tip. And it is a shape-shifter, so the wing must take all the stresses as the rotors tilt at full-power and transform the aircraft from turbo-prop transport plane into helicopter.

The fuselage must also be tough enough to resist all the resulting structural stresses. Adding to the challenge, the engineers had to design rotors that folded to save space so the V-22 could operate from ships.

This was a new type of aircraft, with new kinds of challenges. Yes, there were engineering problems - but problems are what engineers fix.

A redesign on the hydraulic feeds to the engine tilt-mountings cured the fire problem. The aerodynamic problem was an old one.

Vortex ring state (VRS) occurs when a rotorcraft descends too quickly and dips its rotors into its own downwash. The result is that rotor blades lose all lift. On the Osprey if one rotor dips into downwash and the other does not, the aircraft flips over.

VRS killed 19 Marines in one accident during the aircraft's development.

Now, Ospreys have audio and visual warnings alerting pilots to VRS, and they are trained to tilt the rotors forward to build speed and escape the effect.

The aircraft has now been in service for five years, flying in some of the most inhospitable conditions imaginable, mostly with the US Marine Corps. So far, there has been only one fatal combat crash: in 2010 in Afghanistan, aUSAF CV-22 missed its landing zone, killing four of the 20 aboard.

"Over 10 years, Ospreys have been the … safest combat rotorcraft," said Mr Whittle, the author of The Dream Machine.

The rest of the world is starting to listen to the Osprey's "war stories". In 2010, a special forces operation in Kunduz in north-eastern Afghanistan ran into trouble, leaving troops pinned down by enemy fire.

Dust storms prevented helicopters from launching a rescue, but two USAF CV-22s from Kandahar, 643km away on the other side of the 4,572-metre-high Hindu Kush, made it to the landing zone and had 32 US personnel back at base in less than four hours.

And last year, an F-15 pilot who ejected from his aircraft over Libya was rescued by MV-22s flying from an amphibious assault ship 241km away in the Gulf of Sirte. The Marines had the pilot back aboard in just 30 minutes. Sitting in the simulator at Hurlburt Field, Maj Zapata powers up for a flight.

"This controls the tilt rotor angle," he says, indicating a tiny roller on the control stick. "Completely different from a helicopter where you are hauling on the collective to adjust your angle of attack."

A short roll forward, and up we go at an improbable angle and incredible speed.

He spins the roller, the rotors tilt to horizontal and we transition from fast to faster. Pilots who qualify on the Osprey will have flown fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Here they learn all the trades they will be expected to master as tilt-rotor jockeys.

V-22s, with their crew of two pilots and one other airman, can fly as many as 24 troops into battle at 262 knots, and evacuate casualties on 12 stretchers. The craft has a cargo hook to lower and retrieve from the hover, and it is much more "tactically agile" than a helicopter, according to the manual.

"That means you can get in and out of Dodge fast," according to crewmen on the flight line.

It can land on runways, or hillsides, in all weathers, including the dust "brown-outs" that frequently defeat helicopters. It can also land on ships of all classes from aircraft carriers to frigates.

It is, however, expensive. The V-22's research and development programme was supposed to cost $39bn, but independent estimates put that at $56bn now, meaning a price tag of about $100 million per aircraft.

It is hoped to get that down to $67m, but Boeing says buyers have to balance the price of the aircraft against its operational flexibility. Say you wanted to fly supplies to a disaster zone: there's the cost of flying a C-130 Hercules to a forward airfield, the cost of transferring the supplies to helicopters and flying them to the scene.

Or you can use an Osprey. One mid-air top-up with fuel, and refuelling at the other end, and the V-22 has a 2,200km range to a disaster area. And did I say it's fast?