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Centaurus
25th Apr 2012, 12:10
Voss Says Pilots Must Back Up Automation

"Five years ago we passed the point where automation was there to back up pilots," said Flight Safety Foundation CEO Bill Voss at last week's Flight Safety Foundation Corporate Aviation Safety Seminar in San Antonio. "Clearly today, the pilot is there to be the backup to the automation." Voss told AIN "This is simply a realistic assessment of the world today, except we are not training pilots to be backups to automation. We have to own up to the fact that we need develop new kinds of pilot training," he said.

Voss added that human pilots too often lose the mental picture of the aircraft's automation. "If pilots have no idea of what the automation should be doing, they also have no idea of whether everything they observe on the panel represents a normal operation. That's what happened to Air France 447," he said.

"This is not just about better stick and rudder skills though," he explained. "What you die from is not understanding what configuration will keep the aircraft in the air safely. If pilots don't understand that level flight means two-and-a-half degrees of pitch and 93-percent N1, they have no way of manually controlling that aircraft if something breaks. But the training department can't fix everything. This is also an operational problem out on the line."

Maybe I am missing something here in reading Voss's comments - but surely the opposite is true - it is about pure flying skills or in his words "stick and rudder skills". Part of those pure flying skills is instinctively knowing what attitude and power settings are required to meet a set performance.

Superb automation skills will never equate, for example, to the manual handling skill and flight instrument interpretation required to safely recover from an unusual attitude in IMC that have been the proven cause of recent Loss of control accidents. After all, it is L of C caused primarily by poor piloting skills that have caused the plethora of airline crashes that Voss is concerned about.

Huck
25th Apr 2012, 12:14
Maybe I am missing something here but surely the opposite is true - it is about pure flying skills or put another way "stick and rudder skills". Isn't that what has been causing the plethora of airline crashes under the title of Loss of Control?

Yep.

Keep your skills sharp. Earn your money. No excuse not to.

RetiredF4
25th Apr 2012, 12:32
"This is not just about better stick and rudder skills though," he explained. "What you die from is not understanding what configuration will keep the aircraft in the air safely. If pilots don't understand that level flight means two-and-a-half degrees of pitch and 93-percent N1, they have no way of manually controlling that aircraft if something breaks. But the training department can't fix everything. This is also an operational problem out on the line."

What he is trying to tell is the fact, that without basic knowledge of the principles of flight the pilot will not be able to use his stick and rudder skills in the correct way. These principles of flight apply during automatic as well as manual handling of the aircraft. Not grasping the situation the automatics operate in the moment of disengagement might lead to mishandling the aircraft in manual mode (as has been demonstrated with AF447).

What kind of pilot would have pulled up from near level flight into a significant climb above the top of the performance envelope and not exspect an imminent stall?

It comes down to the old saying: A bold pilot uses his superior skills to get out of bad situations, whereas the expierienced pilot uses his expierience to stay out of situations, where he would need his superior skills.

Being alert and staying in the loop is necessary besides sick and rudder skills.

wiggy
25th Apr 2012, 12:48
Though I think he's right when he says:

"This is not just about better stick and rudder skills though," he explained. "What you die from is not understanding what configuration will keep the aircraft in the air safely. If pilots don't understand that level flight means two-and-a-half degrees of pitch and 93-percent N1, they have no way of manually controlling that aircraft if something breaks.

I do however think the culture of training, perhaps worldwide, has to take some of the blame. When 90% of the time during a recurrent check is used to check/teach/examine the latest cost saving automated procedure (e.g.GPS/RNAV, approaches, CATIII work) your're "lucky" to get much had flying other than the mandatory engine failure above V1. It would not surprise me at all if the newer generation of pilots see absolutely no benefit in keeping manual skills above anything other than an "adequate for sim" level.....

16024
25th Apr 2012, 12:59
Jazz Hands, I think that there are two subtly different points here, and I agree with RetiredF4 (if I understand him correctly).
Yes it's true that the ability to pole the aircraft to the required standard is a vital, underrated and diminishing skill, and yes, that includes power/attitude solutions plus throttle, flap, gear, oil pressure, clock and everything else you can think of.
But most of the loss of control incidents aren't caused just by a pilots' scan breaking down. It is in the "where's it going now" phase whilst the automatics are still doing thier job that the accident begins to happen.
It's one thing to be handed control of the aircraft in level flight, quite another when you are roaring through the localiser toward high ground on a foul night, and presented with whatever electrical failure caused the automatics to quit in the first place.
So I think the point is that we should use automatics to enhance, rather than degrade situational awareness, and should be looking at the power, attitude, position etc that they have established and asking, "what would I be doing right now, if I was handling it".

Otto Throttle
25th Apr 2012, 13:17
Voss is spot on. There is a whole generation of pilots now who simply don't fully understand how their aircraft works, and not just those flying the highly complex modern jets. Even relatively straightforward turboprops seem to leave some pilots completely confused with regard to systems operation and abnormal configurations and failures. Add to that, pilots who don't understand that their feet are more than pretty apendages on which to hang their shoes and you have a whole heap of trouble brewing.

tubby linton
25th Apr 2012, 13:25
Children of the magenta line:
Children of Magenta - YouTube (http://youtu.be/h3kREPMzMLk)

sevenstrokeroll
25th Apr 2012, 13:31
Fundamental confusion about what it means to be a pilot. Let's face it...if there were no elevators in buildings, we would all be better at walking up stairs, or there would only be one story buildings.

what does that mean? it means without automation, planes would be much simpler and a bit less efficent moneymakers. but remember, the golden age of jets , we had plenty of flyable, fast, jets. The F106 is still the fastest single engine fighter that ever was...computers? not much!

so...while I think Voss doesn't fully understand ''stick and rudder'', the real meaning, he does hint about TRUE AIRMANSHIP...that is knowing everything that is pertinent to the safety of flight.

I could never fly those computer games well...they truly don't represent FLYING. But give me a DC9 with no computers (to speak of) and I'm just fine.



I can see the day that simple planes make a return and that pilot skill will be paramount.


Yes, we back up automation....even in an automobile with GPS...the GPS has lead people out logging roads to their doom! It takes driver/pilot thinking to say: gee I don't want to drive on a dirt road, I'll turn back even though the GPS is yelling at me.

Please redesign modern planes to more easily present vital information (the stuff the wright brothers knew, like AOA) to the pilot.


AS to training the modern pilot...do go back to simple ''stick and rudder" planes, keep your paper chart on your knee, know vital pitch/power combinations (remember the 757 that had paint/tapes on its static sources?) and know what makes sense.

Tinribs
25th Apr 2012, 13:41
I flew the b737 for 15 years with extra bits of f70/100 so I am familiar with the concept of EFIS and autopilots and so on, I accept my mental image of the airbus is blurred but;

How can 3 skilled airbus pilots out over the ocean descend in a stalled condition for about 4 minutes without a recognising the state and doing something about it.

I was spoilt by having the Queen, God bless her, spend unlimited amounts on my initial training and so my view is biased but surely about cruise power with the nose say 3 degrees above the horizon then whatever corrective action is needed to remedy the crisis, full power if slow reduced if fast and then refine the position when safe

I suppose the three knew there was a problem but could not decide which it was and which instrument to trust

Anyway this is the most recent of several slightly similar events to confirm the worries that our stick and rudder is not what it should be to allow us to meet the unusual crisis requiring in depth preception of events

DB6
25th Apr 2012, 13:55
Never flown an Airbus (and probably never will) but every aircraft I have flown gives some sort of feedback through the stick - real or artificial - to tell you that you have stalled.
I'm surprised the boffins at Airbus didn't think that was as good an idea as I do.

beardy
25th Apr 2012, 14:00
RTFQ

This is not just about better stick and rudder skills though

Key words:

JUST, BETTER and THOUGH

:):):ok:

Mac the Knife
25th Apr 2012, 14:12
And how, in the current climate, are they to acquire, hone and maintain these essential skills?

Just asking....

2EggOmelette
25th Apr 2012, 14:18
Given the current climate, the answer is easy. In their own time and at their own expense :ouch:

Dream Land
25th Apr 2012, 14:33
How can 3 skilled airbus pilots out over the ocean descend in a stalled condition for about 4 minutes without a recognising the state and doing something about it. By tinribs Well apparently the same as the 757 crew did it coming out of the Dominican with a bad pitot tube.

Sorry, don't want to start this again, but not paying attention to common things like attitude and thrust (or pitch/ power) are not strictly an Airbus problem. :ugh:

bobdazzle
25th Apr 2012, 15:06
Deny it as much as you want. Truth is, skills have deteriorated over the last ten years. Button pushers are flying airplanes relying on reliable automation and in the event of a failure which requires FLYING skills are falling short (very often near the runway or the ocean)
Instructors and trainers don't have a mandate to effect a change in the training syllabus because a large number of pilots will not make the grade and HR can't understand WHY!!
A quick search on you tube: Aircraft accident investigations will reveal the shocking number of crashes because of stalling the airplane and not knowing how to recover. If this is not deterioration of flying skills then i don't know, What is?

deSitter
25th Apr 2012, 15:40
How effective is the simulator for practicing stall recovery? Engine out on takeoff? Go around at low altitude with full flaps? Do you guys get enough time in it?

Capot
25th Apr 2012, 15:54
And for an example of when flying skills saved the day, look no further than the Qantas B707 incident on route to Bahrain in 1969, described euphemistically as a "Steep Dive and Recovery', in reality a total loss of control.

I was among those who met the crew on landing in BAH, and we heard the Captain say that he only got back in control, at 6,000' or so (from FL360 or thereabouts), when he went back to basic training days and "recovery from unusual attitudes" in a Tiger Moth.

Mind you, in those days the pilots could move the control surfaces with the control column and rudder bar, even on a B707, and all the primary instruments were there.

There were many injuries in the cabin as the aircraft pulled large positive and negative G forces, rolled and generally behaved badly. Flying debris accounted for much of it, especially the 3 bottles of liquor allowed per passenger, bearing in mind the stowage arrangements of that time.

"Steep Dive"? Ho, ho, ho.

The aircraft was ferried empty, skin wrinkles and all, for sale as scrap.

SLFinAZ
25th Apr 2012, 16:01
I'm curious about a few things...

From a "PPL/SLF" perspective a few commonalities seem to exist. As automation has created more of a system manager persona I think that actual command authority has deteriorated. since 96% (to put a rough number on it) of every flight is "commanded" by the autopilot has that effected how the crew actually thinks.

If we look at three incidents (AF, Turkish boeing and Lebanon) all are "command authority" driven in my mind.

In AF the PM was aware of the incorrect inputs from the PF but never took control. Beyond that I'm unaware of any specific comments regarding pitch and/or power...which is airmanship 101 in the event of unreliable speed indications.

In the Turkish crash you have 3 pilots who apparently have all failed to maintain any type of basic situational awareness and instrument scan.

The Lebanese crash highlights the actual transfer of command to automation. Neither pilot was actually monitoring the aircraft after "command" had been given to the autopilot (which of course never engaged).

Leaving the abject failure in airmanship by the AF PF the others are beyond CRM (IMO) and reach a fundamental state of mind. Have things reached a point where in the mind of many pilots actual "command authority" now rests with the autopilot.

In my mind i've always felt that overwhelmed and confused the PF of 447 was in effect "instructing the autopilot" not attempting to fly the plane. At some fundemental level he was imploring the AP to keep the plane "up" and expecting the AP to do all the heavy lifting...even though it was no longer "in command".

4Greens
25th Apr 2012, 16:36
The simulator does not give the physiological effects of 'g' etc, so recovery from unusual attitudes needs to be practiced in a suitable real aeroplane.

safetypee
25th Apr 2012, 17:47
Centaurus, you choose to focus on stick and rudder skills, but overlook the message in the remaining text – ‘not understanding’ … ‘pilot’s don’t understand’.
Aspects of understanding reappear in the video link (#8), where situation awareness is an important factor.

Stick and rudder skills may assist awareness, particularly during manual flight, but different skills are required when using automation, which together with the basics of thinking are required to generate awareness, similar to those required for instrument flying.

If automation skills training are restricted to the ‘button pushing’ stage – ‘do this then that happens’, then the deep understanding which enables experience is missing. This understanding is more than technical knowledge and principles of operation/flight, it involves the mechanism of how to apply this knowledge in other situations, and in turn, enhance experience (an alternative view of RetiredF4’s #3).

The age old training question is how to teach experience – it’s difficult.
Experience can be gained; skills of awareness and application – which are used in manual flight, can be taught, much like teaching people to think. An alternative view of airmanship is good thinking in aviation.
Thus it’s the lack of this teaching and practice in the application of these when using automation is where the problem lies.

Does the industry understand this?

Northbeach
25th Apr 2012, 21:17
Voss Says Pilots Must Back Up Automation

"Five years ago we passed the point where automation was there to back up pilots," said Flight Safety Foundation CEO Bill Voss at last week's Flight Safety Foundation Corporate Aviation Safety Seminar in San Antonio. "Clearly today, the pilot is there to be the backup to the automation." Voss told AIN "This is simply a realistic assessment of the world today,



Without being present to hear and see Mr. Voss deliver his remarks in context it is difficult to comment. Additionally who am I (just a 15K hour line pilot) compared to the CEO of a prestigious institution such as Flight Safety Foundation?

However I need to ask what happened 5 years ago that resulted in this monumental shift where the industry went from the automation's job was to back up the pilot,to now the pilot backing up the automation? I missed that memo (wouldn't be the first time that happened).


Clearly today, the pilot is there to be the backup to the automation


I do not ascribe to the view that my flying partner (Captain in training) and I are there to "back up the automation". My own myopic view of the industry worldwide is limited to my experience with my company; perhaps Mr.Voss has a difference audience or reference in mind.


"Clearly today, the pilot is there to be the backup to the automation." Voss told AIN "This is simply a realistic assessment of the world today, except we are not training pilots to be backups to automation. We have to own up to the fact that we need develop new kinds of pilot training," he said.


If I correctly understand Mr. Voss' comments he is advocating a new kind of pilot training aimed at producing pilots who backup the automation. If I understand his premise and intent correctly then I would have to disagree. I run the automation and the flight, I access all the resources available to me including the automation, but I am in control here; not the programmers, the software version or some remote drone operator buried in a corporate bunker somewhere.



Concerning raw flyin skills, I was never better than I was when I was flying singlepilot multi-engine hard IFR with no autopilot in and out of busy commercial hubs and into remote non-radar areas 6 days a week. My "stick & rudder" skill were honed. I was not able to move from 250 hours and a commercial license to the right seat of an Airbus or Boeing. In retrospect I am glad I had to put in the years flying on demand charter, freight and corporate before moving on to the airline job. That experience and training has made me a better pilot. Of course the extra 12 to 15 years of seniority, if Ihad skipped the intermediate steps, would be nice.

Keylime
26th Apr 2012, 01:14
Part of the problem facing this industry is the lack of skilled, experienced pilots. Worldwide, the shortage that is already upon us is being sold to operators as "You can get away with a less experienced pilot because the automation will save you". And, it will 90 something % of the time.

If you look at the majority of major accidents, many of them(not all) are in the entry level aircraft and in the majors in the Airbus 320 family and B-737 types. Why is this? This is the entry level aircraft. Because of this shortage, pilots that years ago would never have been in the left seat are now there. They may be able to go into the simulator and perform to a necessary level to pass the ride(which in many cases they already know the profile), but put them out on the line and they don't know how to "think outside of the box"(pun intended).

You can't put everything into the book, and when you give them something they have never seen before or "not what I was expecting" things get interesting. Some acquiantances of mine working over in Asia tell me about how the F/O's can flying the sh@t out of an ILS but give them a visual and it is all over. Unfortunately, they will try to fly the ILS all the way to the ground. Everything is done from rote. Turn off the flight director and it is all over. Good flight training is expensive. Many of the instructors are young pilots trying to build flight time. I am sure they do a good job, but there is no substitute for experience.

A37575
26th Apr 2012, 01:31
The simulator does not give the physiological effects of 'g' etc, so recovery from unusual attitudes needs to be practiced in a suitable real aeroplane.

Yes there is that limitation -but not insurmountable by any means; but in my opinion it is not the seat of the pants feeling that is the problem but more the lack of IMC basic manual instrument flying competency whereby the pilot lacks the rate of scan skills to react correctly to what the flight instruments are telling him.

When you see pilots as I have many times in the simulator `pulling through` from an inverted attitude in the 737 simulator instead of rolling level to the nearest horizon using the sky pointer for reference, you realise that the pilot has either not been trained properly - which often means most of his simulator sessions have been regulatory box ticking exercises - or he simply hasn't got a clue for whatever reasons.

RadioSaigon
26th Apr 2012, 02:33
A fascinating thread, on many levels!

The aircraft was ferried empty, skin wrinkles and all, for sale as scrap...

hmmmm... to my way of thinking, this incident as reported would alone make a nonsense of Qantas' claim to have never suffered a hull-loss.

The thread in its entirety brings to mind the age-old axiom of: make something idiot-proof, watch somebody come along and make a better idiot.

before landing check list
26th Apr 2012, 04:00
And how, in the current climate, are they to acquire, hone and maintain these essential skills?

Just asking....



The airlines should hire pilots with more actual flying experience not clones that go to and leave some aviation academy. A lot of these pilots learn how to use a checklist in a C172, some twin time then move to a right seat of a jet with so much automation almost any average person can handle the aircraft in a benign/normal/canned (Same approach to same place with same altitude and speed restrictions to same runway). However get these pilots out of their canned environment (hold them a bit higher/closer/faster due to traffic) and they have NO IDEA how to make the aircraft go where it needs to go to make a safe approach and landing. The same pilots will start almost all the time to look towards the autopilot to fly them out of a dangerous situation not because it is the right thing to do (sometimes it is) BUT THEY CANNOT DO IT WITH THE HANDS.

What to do? Quit hiring these guys with the cookie cutter education, put these new guys with a regional airline and have them fly a lot of approaches with the hands with a good dose of automation in weather that is a challenge and runways less then 2 miles long.
Give them once a year 2-4 hours in an acrobatic aircraft or a real glider. That will actually cost less in the long run when there are fewer accidents.

However the new normal appears to be leaning toward the use of automation as the primary focus and hoping nothing serious happens. The sad thing is the pilots with actual flying experience (hours watching the water go by from a flight level is not actual flying experience) are retiring and there will be NOBODY up front with flying skill soon. Unless the bean counters turn this around I fear this will happen.

bubbers44
26th Apr 2012, 04:30
Unfortunately most of these hands on pilots haven't been hired much in the last 30 years. Diminish that number as you get closer to now. We have lost that quality pilot unfortunately thanks to the pilot mills and regional airlines aiming for the cheapest help. We will pay for this as more accidents happen due to airlines choosing the lowest qualified pilots to keep costs down.

before landing check list
26th Apr 2012, 08:10
Or am I missing something?

Not at all.

FullWings
26th Apr 2012, 08:20
I think some of the problems have come from the gradual removal of little bits of training, both initial and recurrent, over the last few decades, plus ever-tightening constraints over what you can do to keep current on the job. This has arisen for budgetary reasons but also, strangely, from safety analyses.

There was a large delay or lag in the effects of these policies because the average experience levels (not just flying hours but hours dealing with low-tech airframes and automation as well as EFIS/FBW, etc.) were pretty high. Now we have captains who have used nothing but autothrust for their entire airline careers, excepting a few scary minutes in the sim and have little/no experience of pitch/power couple or basic performance attitudes. This has been compounded by ever-reducing technical training, to the point that answers to questions are learnt individually rather than deduced from a broad knowledge base or even from first principles.

I remember when a large fleet in my airline went to autothrust only, on the back of safety concerns (probably more legal arse-covering, really). At that precise moment in time, yes, you could probably have made a case that it was slightly safer and you always had the pilot(s) to fall back on who were fully up-to-speed on manual thrust control. Fast forward 10 years or so and almost nobody is current or even ever *has* been current, yet it is allowable under the MEL to dispatch with A/T U/S...

As far as the pilots being the backup to automation, then I would agree that that is a fair assessment of much of what we do today. The difference being that today's pilot is much less of a backup than one with a few decades experience, simply because they have not had (and maybe never will have) the exposure and/or training to allow them to take control in an effective manner.

Technical advances such as EGPWS, TCAS, RAAS, OWM, etc. have made the skies much safer in their own respective corners. Unfortunately, I think we will see, percentage-wise, more accidents with prime causes in mode confusion, loss of SA and inadequate basic handling skills, to mention but a few areas.

Tinribs
26th Apr 2012, 09:31
While I would never claim my first aviation employer, God Bless Her,
always employed wonder thinkers they were sometimes right.

As I recall we had a slightly similar problem with the Lightning in the 70s. It cruised close to Mach 1, was the first proper supersonic and so some concessions had been made for performance, it had very swept wings, it could get itself into some tricky situations because of the role.

We kept loosing them through loss of control in stall spin type situations, usually in combat exercises.

The solution was to take the pilots once a year and let then play with a JP, stalling spinning aeros. The losses ceased

We could not do that with Boeing/Airbus of course but maybe a session in a light aircraft while we wait for simulators to catch up.

Microburst2002
26th Apr 2012, 10:43
"He who does not truly master hand flying skills cannot truly master automated flying skills"

Do you guys agree or disagree with the above statement?

2EggOmelette
26th Apr 2012, 11:06
Agreed. One compliments the other.

before landing check list
26th Apr 2012, 11:08
Agree, however we are not bean counters.

FullWings
26th Apr 2012, 11:29
I think I'll have to disagree a little. :eek:

You could teach someone from ab-initio to fly near-perfect profiles in the sim or on PC flight-simming software, using only automatic functions. At that point they would have never touched a real aircraft or even a stick/yoke/rudder. OK, they might have problems taking off or doing anything other than an autoland, but the concept is there.

Hand flying skills and automation skills are neither complementary nor coincident; they are overlapping. You don't *have* to be good at one to be competent in the other but it sure does help...

Desert Dawg
26th Apr 2012, 12:19
If you allow me a small thread drift.. but on the same meaning as the current topic:

I watched an episode of Top Gear where Jeremy Clarkson played a computer game, racing a Subaru around a well know European track. His "sim" track times were impressive.. up with the top times from professional racers.

However, when he took a real Subaru around the actual track in Europe, his times were crappy and he openly admitted that due to the lack of real feedback from the car, he could never achieve the same lap times as he had in the computer game.

I agree that an aircraft simulator has far better feedback than sitting in an armchair with the car computer game, however there is no substitute for the real thing - real feedback.

I agree 100% that it is imperative that ALL airline pilots should get some mandatory hours in a glider/acrobatic aircraft to get real feel for stalls and spins etc. to learn what it feels like -in your gut - to stall and spin an aircraft. Once that sensation is learnt, I am sure the number of incidences will decline.

Just my two pence worth...:}

A37575
26th Apr 2012, 12:48
"He who does not truly master hand flying skills cannot truly master automated flying skills"

Do you guys agree or disagree with the above statement?
Microburst2002 is offline Report Post Reply

I thought carefully about that statement and have my reservations. My experience is that automation operating skills are an entirely different animal to pure flying ability. I have seen pilots in the simulator operate the automatics with great aplomb with the result usually a splendidly flown ILS by the automatic pilot. OK so they may spear off the centre-line on to the grass after touch down sideways on a wet runway but hey - you can't expect perfection after a career on automatics:E.

Now disconnect the automatic goodies of FD and AT and ask the same pilot to hand fly an ILS with a mere 15 knot crosswind and you may as well expect him to send out a precautionary PAN call, such is the awful handling skills (?) displayed.

The situation becomes positively scary now that Pay-to Fly schemes are in vogue with a vengeance. We are seeing a significant number of brand newly qualified (?) pilots with 200 hours plus and only the minimum legislative command time for their licence, rushing to USA or Asia for a 737 NG rating then paying huge money to the purveyors of Pay-to-Fly schemes who place them in an Asian airline as trainee first officers for an agreed number of hours with a hapless local captain who is forced to fly single-handed.

Almost all of their training on the NG/A320 is autopilot controlled and this continues during their short stint of maybe 500 hours RH seat. Then they may be out on their necks until the next newby arrives for his "training" on revenue flights. All the while the passengers haven't a clue what is really happening up front...

Yet by dint of plenty of money generally supplied by adoring (or desperate) relatives, eventually some of these newby's will make it in short time (3-5 years?) to the left seat -all the while "monitoring" the automatics and with no serious flying skills. The old adage from when glass cockpit flying first came in 40 plus years ago, of "I can't fly for nuts but I can type at 80 words a minute", is as true today as it was then.

Cornish Jack
26th Apr 2012, 13:45
Did NOBODY else watch Tubby Linton's link! That and the rest of that series should be compulsory and REPETITIVE watching for anyone in this line of business!

Rabski
26th Apr 2012, 14:29
"...have my reservations. My experience is that automation operating skills are an entirely different animal to pure flying ability. I have seen pilots in the simulator operate the automatics with great aplomb with the result usually a splendidly flown ILS by the automatic pilot. OK so they may spear off the centre-line on to the grass after touch down sideways on a wet runway but hey - you can't expect perfection after a career on automatics"


Not sure how to react to that comment. I'm 55 years of age and now exclusively short-haul, but I still spend some of my 'play time' in gliders and single engine VFR, and helping teenagers acquire a PPL. My day job involves the ultimate in automation (;)) but I still need to keep my eye on the ball.

Most of the time, I trust the electronics. However, I have a food-processor that sometimes bites me and a digital alarm clock that takes the p155 on occasion. Basically, anthing electrical or mechanical has the ability to go wrong, just as does anything human.

Automation is wonderful, but it's still an assistant, rather than a master. Basic flying skills will always triumph in the (admittedly very) few occsasions when it all goes totally t*ts up.

Frankly, the training of pilots to become slaves to automation is worrying in my opinion, but hey, I may be wrong. Still, in the very few cases where all the holes have lined up, it seems that the times it's all come right were when good old basic skills were employed. Far too often quoted, but Sullenberger did the job right by using glider-pilot skills, not by trusting electronics.

Rely on machinery by all means, but have the basic skills to intervene when the hounds of hell escape from their cage, or you'll just end up as a statistic.

Bergerie1
26th Apr 2012, 14:44
Desert Dawg,

I think all civil pilots, during their basic training, need to fly some hours on an aerobatic aircraft. They don't need necessarily to learn aerobatics, but the do need (1) to know how to recognise and recover from stalls; (2) to know how to recover from spins; and (3) even more important, to know how to recover from unusual attitudes on instruments. This latter exercise needs to be trained on a fully aerobatic aircraft where the instructor can throw the aircraft around to thoroughly disorientate the pupil before handing over so that he has to recover on limited panel instruments.

Having done this, it is likely that a reasonable tolerance of the 'g' forces and the basic knowledge of how to cope will remain with him for the rest of his career. Whether or not further practise is required is an open question. But I would guess that an airline pilot who also flies light aircraft in his spare time and who practises such manoeuvres is more likely be able both to avoid, and to recover from, a loss of control incident.

Dustertoo
26th Apr 2012, 16:22
Recovering from unusal attitudes and stall recovery needs to be learned while in intial training. In two cases we have read how pilots reached back...707 captain remembered his Tiger Moth days and more recently...Sully and his glider skills. Yes we will always need to be the masters of the basics if we want to manage automation when the unexpect presents itself.

captplaystation
26th Apr 2012, 19:06
Not just learned . . . but probably practiced too.

Where, in any syllabus for recurrent training, is this mandated by ANY aviation regulator, where might one find that ?

As usual, Bean-Counters rule, and the Regulators, even if empirical knowledge/accident report conclusions dictate otherwise. . will dither.

Bucks rule, not Buck Rogers (unfortunately)




Refer to post #8, some , if we are sufficiently interested, we can do ourselves, but some of the rest, is expensive. Do our employers/regulators get involved ? Nah . . a certain number of accidents ARE acceptable :yuk: . . . . . for the Beanies, sure, but for us, no way !

fireloop
26th Apr 2012, 22:51
Disconnect the AP/AT on departure/arrival... and no; not at 500ft. That will keep your stick 'n rudder skills reasonably sharp... regardless what your company's 'rulebook' says about the use of automation during flight. You have an obligation to yourself and to your pax to keep proficient.

I know... it's easier said than done... just do it.

bubbers44
27th Apr 2012, 05:59
When conditions are right hand fly using only standby instruments including wet compass to know you can if you ever get down to nothing but those to get the job done. If you don't practice doing that once in a while those last basic instruments aren't going to help you. Just ignore the magenta line stuff and see how you can fly like being in a J3 cub again. Remember the compass lead and lag stuff? It works in a 767 just like a J3 cub.

Volume
27th Apr 2012, 07:23
I think what started this discussion is the fact that what pilots lack today is neither the "basic stick and rudder" nor the "pitch and power" knowledge. What they totally lack is the ability to fully understand their automated machines and how they (if if the automation pretends to fail) still interfere with the pilot using basic flying skills. Flying an aicraft with failed or malfunctioning systems is different from flying a basic, fully mechanical aircraft.
Pilot training still includes the basic stick and rudder training (we may argue how much of that is required), probably most pilots still fly pitch and power during their basic training. What pilots are not trained for are all possible combination of automation failure (or worst: malfunction) they might have to cope with and tu fully understand how the machines systems will react to his attempt to "basically" fly the aircraft.

We need basic stick and rudder training AND full understanding of all aircraft automated systems and how they could fail and interfere with the pilot.

Bergerie1
27th Apr 2012, 09:42
Volume,

I agree, but pilots also need to be able to tolerate and to be able to think clearly when resisting the disorientation that can accompany a loss of control. Even if you know how the automatics work, and how they do so in certain degraded states, it is stlll necessary to keep one's wits when one's world is turning upsidedown.

irishpilot1990
27th Apr 2012, 10:28
Children of the magenta line:
Children of Magenta - YouTube (http://youtu.be/h3kREPMzMLk)


Very good video. Should be compulsory watch at the next LPC/OPC.

fizz57
27th Apr 2012, 14:06
Just to show there's nothing new under the sun, scroll down to the cartoon at the bottom of this:

flight director | selector knob | course indicator | 1956 | 0079 | Flight Archive (http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1956/1956%20-%200079.html)
.... in 1956!

Petrolhead
28th Apr 2012, 09:00
Yes Children of Magenta is a good video and makes many valid points - great idea to take out the autothrottle if you fly Boeings but not such a good idea on the Airbus. Airbus teach autopilot off then flight directors off to get the autothrust into SPEED mode.

The point missing so far is not so much can pilots fly manually, but do they authorise themselves to do it.

The call should not be " what is it doing now?" but " I do not want that - Do this!

An hours aerobatics/upset recovery training should be part of the CPL/ATPL!
How many non aerobatic/military pilots understand "You cannot stall a wing at zero g"?

before landing check list
28th Apr 2012, 15:29
An hours aerobatics/upset recovery training should be part of the CPL/ATPL!
How many non aerobatic/military pilots understand "You cannot stall a wing at zero g"?

Not to mention a wing can stall at any attitude and airspeed, however it may break first. Also pointing down may not unstall a wing however pointing the nose where the aircraft is actually going will work. But of course during a stall situation most of the time the aircraft is going down, but not necessarily all the time.

Denti
28th Apr 2012, 15:39
An hours aerobatics/upset recovery training should be part of the CPL/ATPL!

That isn't standard? Thought it was, we had a couple hours of spin awareness and aerobatics training in our flight school as part of the mandatory syllabus. But then it was just a normal 200 hour wonder factory.

Desert Dawg
29th Apr 2012, 04:51
@Bergerie1

Agree 100%. What I meant was - commercial pilots need to learn the feeling of a spin, stall, unusual attitude, upset etc... Not that they need to learn full acrobatics.

It's like playing guitar, or piano... to be able to sing and not look at the instrument. To know where the keys/strings are innately... mind map the notes.

A lot of great comments coming regarding the necessity for pilots to accrue mandatory hours in a glider/acrobatic type... We live in hope that the safety people out-vote the bean counters and we get pilots into glider/acrobatic aircraft.

Oh well... we can dream eh?!?

FRying
29th Apr 2012, 07:57
Only yesterday did I get myself into very strong and gusty winds on my 320. I decided I'd let the autothrust do the whole job on final. Just forget about it ! You just cannot trust this system in adverse weather. It simply doesn't work past a certain level of gust/wind/turbulence. I disconnected it and it all went so much smoother and quieter (and safer on the very last few feet).

Wingswinger
29th Apr 2012, 08:46
Yes Children of Magenta is a good video and makes many valid points - great idea to take out the autothrottle if you fly Boeings but not such a good idea on the Airbus. Airbus teach autopilot off then flight directors off to get the autothrust into SPEED mode.


Not true. Airbus golden rule number 6: When things don't go as expected - TAKE OVER.

That includes the ATHR. "Children of the Magenta" is a good video and it is even more valid today, for both Boeings and Airbuses, than it was in 1996 when it was recorded. Today we have a vast army of new entrants to the profession who have NO IDEA how to fly a swept wing jet transport aeroplane without AP/FD and ATHR because they have little or no bank of experience to fall back on when it doesn't go as expected. Too many are even scared to fly manually.

This stuff is BASIC, folks. A basic understanding of power and attitude = performance and a basic ability to fly an aircraft manually is still essential. That is why manual raw data flying exercises are an integral part of every check at the company where I work.

iceman50
29th Apr 2012, 09:03
FRying

Do you really "know" your aircraft, which is what this thread is really all about. What were these conditions, were you in managed or selected speed, did you "bug up", when it was so much smoother and quieter did you just go to idle, any sinking shear? A much too simplistic comment by you about a complicated system.

Rabski
29th Apr 2012, 11:41
...If only the bean-counters would allocate a measly few quid to putting pilots into single-engined, basic machines or gliders once every few months.

Like many here (I presume), I used PPL instructing to supplement funds on the route to commercial. Unlike many (I suspect), I started to do it again a few years back and still do it now. There is nothing like teaching someone with ten hours to recover from a spin or stall to refresh some basic skills :E.

It's not, of course, all transferable but much is.

Like it or not, our basic skills do deteriorate if they aren't used. I didn't do any glider or single-engine stuff for a good few years and the first day I took one up again was a real shock in terms of how much my fundamental 'feel' for things had diminished. I thoroughly recommend it to all here. As much as anything, it's FUN. Remember fun?

As for the basic premise, I thoroughly disagree. It is certainly true that we need to understand how the automation works (and I mean REALLY understand it) and work with it, but we are not a bolt-on accessory. Automation is not at the level where it can be in charge, and the other 'bus drivers out there know as well as I do that it has its limitations. It's good, damned good, but perfect? Oh no sir. Not by a very long way.

A37575
29th Apr 2012, 13:23
For many new pilots, the children of the magenta line syndrome starts right from the first simulator session on a jet transport and goes downhill from there.

Instead of the first two or three sessions being used for basic jet handling without the automatics and FD and AT etc, the usual syllabus get stuck into automatics from the very first take off. The profile descent (idle thrust and DME v altitude) needs to have the new pilot flying the profile by hand raw data in IMC with the instructor coaching him. And I mean coaching - not shouting as often is the case. Skill at hand flying a profile descent with its variation of wind and airspeed changes is essential knowledge in preparation for later monitoring an automatics descent. Learning to crawl before learning to walk?

The effect of engine power up and down on the pitching moment while maintaining level flight - basic single engine handling (forget checklists at this stage) by hand sans FD -basic ILS in crosswinds raw data - unusual attitude recoveries, stall recoveries at high level (37,000 ft) and low altitude on approach (500 feet). Conventional circuits and crosswind landings are ideal for sharpening hand flying skills. Hand flying raw data before the introduction of automation goodies, gives a new student a sound grasp of the essentials of jet transport handling before he is introduced to the intricacies of serious automation.

Then if something goes wrong or ATC throw a curve-ball, the student will be confident of going click-click-click to reduce the level of automation to something more manageable (hand flying) because by now he knows how to hand fly a jet with confidence. It is a good bet that 95 percent of the world's airline pilots have never seen the video Children of the Magenta Line - which is a great pity for its value to the new generation of airline pilots is inestimable

The mistake in simulator training is to throw a new student into a type rating without first allowing sufficient time to consolidate the basics of jet transport handling. And that means no automatics until competent at basic handling. The hand-wringing hue and cry about loss of pure flying skills in airline pilots has been going for years - yet politically correct management speakers at international flight safety forums seem to avoid the obvious - and that is lack of interest by managements to tackle the problem because it might cost more money in simulator training. Funny how the big fatal accidents always happen to some other foreign airline - never your own. Thus no incentive to change the status quo.

Rabski
29th Apr 2012, 13:49
Absolutely.

Further, it's not just the basics of jet flying, it's the basics of any flying.

Automation is currently an amazing assistant. One day it might be capable of dealing with anything and everything, but at the moment it isn't. And to assume it is, is a disaster in the making. More to the point, with the current level of automation, to subsume pilots to the electronics is insane.

Sure, 90% of the time the 'bus flies itself. However, as most of us know, the 10% is the difference between a landing where a few tonics get spilled and a landing where dental records are essential.

Petrolhead
29th Apr 2012, 23:07
Hi Wingswinger,

I absolutely agree with you that when everything else has gone horribly wrong having everything manual is a good idea.

However, look at Golden Rule 7 " Use the proper level of automation for the task". We are not a single seat operation and the aircraft has been designed to be flown by a team.

Teaching people to leap straight from full FMS guidance to full manual contol every time they have minor concerns has major drawbacks and can lead to more serious problems as you have just trebled the other pilot's workload and drastically reduced the ability to cross monitor each other, you are also out of the loop. Having the PF take out the AP and Autothrust just to follow the cross like a single seat pilot is a real pain as PNF as you have to do his job as well as your own.

Rule 6 of the Golden Rules does say "Take Over" - but there are 2 levels of control between FMS guidance and fully manual which may be a safer option. Lets say the aircraft is not following the noise abatement properly, you have "taken over" by pulling heading and still kept the PNF in the loop - going fully manual at that point is not the best option, and even if you have to tighten the turn you are better of with the speed being controlled while you overbank. This is what Airbus teaches.

My point was that people do not cascade down from full FMS guidance early enough. Yes it may need to go straight to fully manual ( inadvertent selection of Go Around or stalling for example), but the Airblue 321 would not have crashed if he had just checked it had gone into heading mode on the FMA.

Wingswinger
30th Apr 2012, 09:49
Hello PH,

However, look at Golden Rule 7 " Use the proper level of automation for the task". We are not a single seat operation and the aircraft has been designed to be flown by a team.

Indeed. That may be no automation at all depending on the circumstances. In a rapidly changing situation the AP does not react quickly enough to FCU inputs. This does not imply single-crew operation nor did I mention it.

Teaching people to leap straight from full FMS guidance to full manual contol every time they have minor concerns has major drawbacks and can lead to more serious problems as you have just trebled the other pilot's workload and drastically reduced the ability to cross monitor each other, you are also out of the loop. Having the PF take out the AP and Autothrust just to follow the cross like a single seat pilot is a real pain as PNF as you have to do his job as well as your own.

Hmm. Moot points here. Like a lot of flying it's a judgment. Rules cannot be written to cover every eventuality and they sometimes get in the way of effective operating. I seriously doubt if going fully manual trebles anyone's workload. It can actually REDUCE the workload. I recently had to retrain in the simulator a crew who had messed up a visual switch to another runway because one of them was heads down in the MCDU, typing, instead of just looking out of the window. THAT took him out of the loop. As a good crew -member one should ALWAYS be mentally doing one's colleagues job to effectively monitor him/her.

Rule 6 of the Golden Rules does say "Take Over" - but there are 2 levels of control between FMS guidance and fully manual which may be a safer option. Lets say the aircraft is not following the noise abatement properly, you have "taken over" by pulling heading and still kept the PNF in the loop - going fully manual at that point is not the best option, and even if you have to tighten the turn you are better of with the speed being controlled while you overbank. This is what Airbus teaches.


Generally agreed. I prefer to think of it as fully automatic (flown through the MCDU), partial automatic (Selected modes) and manual (AP/FD off, ATHR optional) so that's three levels. It's a simpler concept for the inexperienced to grasp. It helps people gain the experience and therefore the judgement to be able to decide when to drop down a level of automation or indeed when to drop directly to manual.

Petrolhead
30th Apr 2012, 12:19
Hi Wingswinger,

I teach 4 levels of control-cascade (as taught to me in Toulouse in 1989) as level 3 is what is required when doing a TCAS or after breaking cloud on a non-precision approach. "Autopilot off, call for FDs off, leave the A'thrust engaged". Taking out the autothrust on the TCAS often leads to speed problems and another set up!

Taking the autothrottle out in the Boeings is SO much easier than on the Airbus as the power has to disengage at the correct setting, whereas you have to guess or look away from the PFD to set it accurately on the Airbus - but we do have the speed-trend arrow right in front of our face to tell us what is happening, if pilots bother to look at it.

In 1990 we had to fill in a questionaire about what we thought about the Airbus systems and I put in that I wanted the levers to follow the thrust set up to the climb gate then become switches above that - I believe that mod was offered initially but no one paid for it.

I am glad this thread has drifted back to the title: Good flying skills and alpha awareness have been eroded for sure, but most problems I see in the sim are caused by lack of FMA awareness - followed by a desire not to take control from the computer.

Microburst2002
30th Apr 2012, 12:50
"He who does not truly master hand flying skills cannot truly master automated flying skills"

Do you guys agree or disagree with the above statement?

Hi!

I do agree with the statement.

The reason is that if you haven't hand flown enough (so that you haven't had time to master hand flying) it is easy for you to think of flight as a relation between APFD and ATHR modes on the one hand and performance on the other, while totally forgetting about pitch and thrust.

Even the relation with performance is not well understood by many. I have seen low houred pilots and not so low houred getting confused because the airplane refused to meet a performance which was physically impossible to attain no matter what targets you may introduce in FCU, MCDU.

When you master hand flying you will spot malfunctions or (more usually an more importantly) own mistakes quickly when using automation. For the fully automated pilot that is more difficult because he tends to skip the relation between control and performance instruments.

In some circunstances, when complexity of a system plus subtle failures lead to a confusing and dangerous situation, the hand flyer has considerably more chances to get out of danger.

Wingswinger
1st May 2012, 07:51
Hello PH,

Absolutely agree about ATHR and TCAS - the imperative is to avoid a mid-air and playing with the TL could detract from the miss distance! Non-precision approaches are an ideal opportunity to fly fully manually from visual or DA so I encourage that but make sure it's understood that ATHR engaged is always an option.

Fully agree about moving thrust levers. A pity it wasn't base option! The non-moving TL rob the pilot of a tactile indication of aircraft performance and therefore degrades instantaneous situation awareness. It makes it more difficult, in my opinion, to effect a smooth "recovery from a windshear recovery". In my experience, the biggest problem people have in this area is not the windshear encounter itself which is usually dealt with well. It's regaining normal flight parameters following recovery from the shear - A FLOOR, TOGA LK, followed by rapidly increasing speed as the shear abates and no idea how to prevent the flap overspeed despite the pre-briefing! Some are not even AWARE of the A-FLOOR/TOGA LK FMA. Often the gear is left down. Its all exacerbated by this reluctance you mention to move the TL from whatever gate they're in. I refer them to the good attitude and power advice contained in the Unreliable Airspeed procedure and advise them to use that as a starting point. And to disconnect ATHR with all haste, control the thrust manually to stabilise speed then select a "known" attitude/power combination e.g. 10 degrees/CLB power then clean up and reselect ATHR on the FCU. Making the standard Go-Around call (not an SOP in these circumstances) serves to prompt a known set of actions and the gear is then not forgotten.

But it really shouldn't be this way.

cbfkoh
1st May 2012, 11:08
Re stick and rudder skills. Many years ago on the BA One Eleven we had a page in the manual which prescribed the pitch angles plus power settings applicable to all stages of the flight, to use when deprived of airspeed indication. When we practised in the sim, we were shown, briefly, at various points, the airspeed reading. It was usually within 5kts of the correct speed. The exercise rammed home the point that the basics worked. Incidentally, never having used one, does a sidestick have stick shake and stick push inputs ? If not, why not ?

Dan Winterland
1st May 2012, 12:21
The QRH on my company's A320 fleet has the same. And we have practiced the attitude power combinations. Plus, the more recent airframes have the Back Up Speed Scale (BUSS) which uses GPS information to provide a ball park speed and altitude reference should the ADIRS fail.

Airbus FBW sidesticks have no tactile feedback. As, in normal law there is virtually no possibility of stalling - they are not required. In Alternate law, if getting near the stall, the pilot will have no doubt about the situation with the audio "STALL STALL" warning.

safetypee
1st May 2012, 13:16
Northbeach, re #22. A very interesting observation.
So Mr. Voss' comments appear to propose a solution – different training, but without first considering (or even understanding) the problem or consequences of change, and particularly the historical objectives of automation?
If the intent is to redefine the role of automation, then much more has to be considered, e.g. certification, reliability, and system interface; I agree with your concerns; humans have the higher level of intelligence (even if at times we fail to employ it), and thus must stay in control.

Children of the Magenta – a lengthy video for the key message (click click; click, click), and this misses the main problem. Knowing when to disconnect, then doing it. Many changes during flight are routine and crews are expected know when to fly manually as opposed to use technology (and vice versa), but on occasion, situations are misjudged or not understood, which provides opportunity for error – automation dependency.
Petrolhead "Use the proper level of automation for the task", "Take Over", I agree, but how do crews judge these. What is the task demand, the situation, workload. The video provides little guidance apart from the routine; how is management of non-normal situations taught?

Re "He who does not truly master hand flying skills cannot truly master automated flying skills."
A pedantic point, but neither of these skills is fully defined. If the hand flying skill are limited to ‘handling’ (stick and rudder), then using the same categorisation, automatic skills may only involve the switching selections and button pushing. I suspect that many posts do not mean that.
The problem is in managing situations and therefore it is the management skills for that task which are lacking.
Managing, either manually or with automation involves similar skills – awareness and decision making, according to the situation.
Are these management skills being taught, practiced, reinforced; or do we decide to delegate them to technology thus both manual and autoflight competency deteriorates?

Armchairflyer
1st May 2012, 14:19
Don't know whether it is indeed a useful distinction, but after having read the thread IMHO a quite crucial question is whether "stick and rudder skills" refer to a) handling an aircraft at the edges of the flight envelope (stalls, aerobatics) or b) feeling at ease flying an airliner by manually operating the flight controls and referring to raw instrument data.

While increased skills in a) certainly do no harm I doubt that putting the emphasis there would make such a significant contribution to safety. Here, I agree with Voss's initial quote. By contrast, becoming overwhelmed and falling behind the aircraft and one's current situation as soon as one has to make the usual maneuvers by hand-flying is IMHO a completely different story.

So, if "stick and rudder skills" means being able to aileron roll a 707 (or a Decathlon) I agree with the claim that "this is not about better stick and rudder skills". On the other hand, profoundly knowing and understanding one's aircraft and its systems (which is IMHO the point) would include being at ease manually flying it through the normal gaits and maneuvers, wouldn't it? Nice side effect: without the need for organizing and scheduling extra hours in gliders or aerobatic spam cans or relying on simulators that lack an authentic seat-of-the-pants feeling, b) can largely be trained and kept up to par in day-to-day operations.

BTW, I think that the outstanding performance by Capt. Sullenberger and the rest of the flight crew(!) is not even remotely limited to pure handling skills acquired in glider training (and AFAIK the PF in the AF accident had been trained to fly gliders, too).

PW127-B
1st May 2012, 19:23
It is not about what kind of pilot would do that, in the example of AF447 you have to take into account that those guys were in a situation that probably a lot of pilots would not have walked out of it.
Take turbulence (probably moderate/severe) precipitation and other Wx related factors that might make you want to go out of there as fast as you can, then you have an aircraft that is basically dying in front of you, and most important , the aircraft lost the ADR's and you need at least ADIRS #3 to maintain the ISIS working and they lost it aswell , so at night inside of a Cb you don't have any visual cue to maintain 5 degrees NU.
Any way back to topic I think pilots will never be backup to automation and You do need to hand fly the aircraft whenever you can
Just IMO.

safetypee
1st May 2012, 19:26
Armchairflyer, good points.
Adding to – “knowing and understanding one's aircraft and its systems”, it’s also the understanding of their relationship to the situation and the task. Pure aircraft/systems knowledge, or even aircraft automation handling skills, is of little value without the ability to apply that knowledge. To some extent this depends on experience – being in situations, learning from them, and being able to relate these items to similar situations.
Thus, also agreeing in part with Mr Voss – (This is not just about better stick and rudder skills), the choice of ‘backing up automation’ is a poor analogy. Crews require existing or enhanced skills adapted to technology, enabling the human to remain in command.

Re ditching in the Hudson. I also agree that physical flying skills were irrelevant; it was the decision to choose the ditching option, and at a time where it could be completed safely, which contributed to the success. The Captain understood the situation, the options, and chose wisely: – how do we identify, teach, and improve those skills.
Many are normally regarded as skills of airmanship – managing flight situations; this is not “new kinds of pilot training” (Voss), but the use and/or adaptation of old skills, many of which have been discarded with the advent of automation.

P. S. see http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/481350-man-machine-interface-anomalies-3.html#post7166053 EASA Automation survey.

Armchairflyer
1st May 2012, 20:02
safetypee; 100% ACK, even though situational awareness in the sense of being on top of both the aircraft (whether actually flown by George or oneself) and its (prospective) environment could IMHO be seen as a topic of its own not directly related to aircraft handling skills.

Concerning the successful Hudson ditching, I don't think that Sully's flying skills were not an asset, but fully agree that it was his decision skills and the effective functioning of the whole crew that saved the day. Put differently: a pilot with less stick-and-rudder prowess but equally outstanding situation awareness and decision making would IMHO be much more likely to achieve the same or a similar outcome than a mere stick-and-rudder ace.

Wingswinger
1st May 2012, 20:24
John R

I'm sorry for the innocent question, but how is it possible to obtain an ATPL / type-rating if the above statement is true? I understand entirely that for many new entrants to professional flying, the first jet they may fly is a 737/320, but these new pilots must surely have had to demonstrate their proficiency in basic flying skills as part of their professional licence/type-rating training?

They have done it in light piston-engined aircraft, the handling techniques of which are not like those of a swept wing jet. They have never been taken up to 40,000ft in a jet aircraft, and experienced the different control response, lack of engine power and the effects of compressibility. They will have read about it but that's all. The will never have been trained in recovery from unusual positions or stall at high altitude. The jet orientation course will be in a simulator and the type rating in a simulator. They will then be base-checked in the circuit in a B737 or an A320 and thereafter everything they do above traffic pattern altitude will be with the autopilot and autothrust engaged or following the flight director. Very often they really do not know the basic attitude and power to set in order to fly the aircraft without the automatics. I spend a lot of my time trying to plug these gaps in their knowledge and experience.

sevenstrokeroll
1st May 2012, 22:59
sometimes I read things here and just shake my head. Sure, there are issues of swept wing planes that need covering in any transition. Indeed, it is my opinion that the most difficult planes to fly have been non swept wing.

The B737 is a pussycat compared to a turboprop known as the MU2.

AT 40,000 feet there is a drop off in performance...but come on...what terrain is that high that you have to out climb?

in 37 years of flying, I will say that getting the job done in an underpowered light twin is more demanding than any jet transport built in the last 40 years or so. in a jet, you don't have to ''feather'' a prop and get it right the first time.

there is not so much difference...but one must use their mind to be a better pilot. one must think faster and be prepared for all the little things that a piper cub pilot would have to think about....even a total power failure.

Sully and the hudson have been mentioned...oh come on...looking for a place to set her down in an emergency is private pilot stuff...its just we don't think it will happen in a jet.

4 pilots in the sim were given the sully scenario and all 4 made it to LGA for a landing...of course they knew what was coming. Adding thirty seconds to actually grasp what happened made the hudson a better choice due to the change in energy, altitude and options.

BUT IF WE HAD been as prepared as a private pilot in single engine plane on evey jet flight, the miracle on the hudson would have turned into an incident at LGA.

I encourage anyone moving from a light plane to a jet to invest in a copy of the following books: "handling the big jets" by DP davies, and "Fly the Wing" by Webb.

bubbers44
2nd May 2012, 03:11
I don't think second guessing Sully on a downwind landing hoping he could make it is appropriate. They were stunned by the geese and had to react to the condition of their aircraft. In the sim all they had to do was turn and land because they knew what the conditions were. Sully didn't know the condition of his aircraft so landing downwind took time to consider and that time, in his opinion, didn't give him the option. If he had done an immediate turn back to land at LGA, yes, he probably would have made it but we don't fly airliners that way. First you find out what is wrong and what your options are, you do not dive down and land downwind with no checklists, no restart procedure and no thought process on how we can fix things.

bubbers44
2nd May 2012, 03:35
SSR, I am agreeing with you, Sully did the right thing. As a private pilot I would have probably just landed downwind but you can't do that in an airliner because of procedures we are required to follow. Earlier I got into a debate about how pilots can avoid large birds by looking out the window and maneuvering around them. Most disagreed but I did it for years with success in a valley in Honduras known for hundreds of turkey buzzards in a 757. That would have avoided the whole Hudson miracle. But you have to look out the windshield to do it.

sevenstrokeroll
2nd May 2012, 04:13
bubbers

I'm trying to instill a mindset that you can't fly , fat, dumb and happy all the time...especially the first five minutes of flight and the last five.

our airline had a guy takeoff in a DC9 and both engines quit after he was airborne. well...he didn't do a checklist, or anything,...but he did put it down on the runway, burned out the brakes and stopped the thing.

landing downwind happens all the time (within limits), its just we have forgotten how to fly by the seat of our pants, instead checklists galore...so long that they can't be done before gravity wins.

somethings like relight don't really take that much time...fuel, ignition, engine rotation and it either starts or it doesn't. Fuel should be on, Ignition should be on for most planes during takeoff, and you only have so much speed.

it is my contention that we have been breeding the barnstormer out of us...but the barnstormer can save the day...so, let us have the barnstormer at the ready...just in case the checklists don't work.

stilton
2nd May 2012, 04:26
'our airline had a guy takeoff in a DC9 and both engines quit after he was airborne. well...he didn't do a checklist, or anything,...but he did put it down on the runway, burned out the brakes and stopped the thing'


Quite something.


Do you have any more information on this incident ?

Wingswinger
2nd May 2012, 07:41
Indeed, it is my opinion that the most difficult planes to fly have been non swept wing.

The B737 is a pussycat compared to a turboprop known as the MU2.


Probably true. I've never flown a turbo-prop and my experience of twins was many years ago and, yes, it was hard work at times. That's not the issue - basic attitude and power for safe flight is the issue. Recently I asked a young FO what attitude and power he would set if he were to suddenly lose all airspeed indications at cruise level. He did not know. In a FBW Airbus a malfunction such as that would drop the aircraft into Alternate Law and the AP is not available.

AT 40,000 feet there is a drop off in performance...but come on...what terrain is that high that you have to out climb?

Not terrain but Cb avoidance. I refer you to all the AF447 threads. There we had three pilots who did not recognise that their aircraft had stalled at altitude and did not know what to do. There is a gap in airline training and AF447 found it. I think just about any ex-military jet pilot would have flown out of that situation easily but, and here's the point, they have had the hands-on training in manual flight at 40,000ft and would have flown their jets in the corners of its flight envelope many times. They would have recognised the crisis and known what to do. Graduates of modern airline pilot programmes do not have this skill, knowledge and experience on which to draw.

A37575
2nd May 2012, 12:17
these new pilots must surely have had to demonstrate their proficiency in basic flying skills as part of their professional licence/type-rating training?
John R is offline Report Post Reply

Yes and No. Most will only have flown light twins such as the Diamond, Seminole et al. Obviously basic flying skills will have been learned although these pilots on graduation will have a commercial pilots licence and perhaps in addition they would have passed the theory examinations for the airline pilot licence. But flying a Seminole is light years from flying a Boeing 737 or Airbus. Keep in mind it is well known that students trained for example in China are not necessarily willing keen and enthusiastic. They are ordered to train as airline or military pilots even though they may have previously entered University with another career in mind.

They learn strictly by rote and it is no good pussy-footing about this because it is a fact of life in that part of the world. It has always been thus.

Dream Land
2nd May 2012, 12:48
Graduates of modern airline pilot programmes do not have this skill, knowledge and experience on which to draw. And
They learn strictly by rote and it is no good pussy-footing about this because it is a fact of life in that part of the world. It has always been thus. Like my colleague just mentioned to me concerning this thread:

Someone finally gets it!:D

AirRabbit
2nd May 2012, 13:43
There are several who have posted here who “have it” – and among the first to indicate that fact were RetiredF4, bobdazzle, and SLFinAZ … but the first poster who put it all in context was clearly Northbeach when he said …
I run the automation and the flight, I access all the resources available to me including the automation, but I am in control here; not the programmers, the software version or some remote drone operator buried in a corporate bunker somewhere.
Too many times I’ve seen pretty good aviators turn over complete control of the airplane to “George” (the vernacular reference many of us in the US use to indicate “the autoflight system”). Don’t get me wrong – “George” is great – but I think that putting George “in charge” of the airplane is a huge mistake. George doesn’t “think” – he processes data without thinking, caring, or knowing – and responds within his capability. The benefit that George brings to the cockpit is that he processes a whole lot more data, a whole lot faster, than you or I could. He also follows what he has been taught (i.e., programmed) very faithfully – and exceedingly quickly – again, a lot more quickly than you or I could. However, really good pilots “fly” their airplane at all times – they “use” the “stick and rudder” (and all the other associated bits that go along with sticks and rudders … like throttles, speed brakes, flaps, and the like) and every once in a while those really good pilots will use “George” in place of the “stick and rudder” – but that doesn’t mean that they’ve transferred control of the airplane to “George.” Whenever I see a really good pilot properly using George – that is using George to manipulate the various controls while retaining the decision maker’s authority – and not turning control of the airplane (as well as the lives of everyone on board) over to George … I try to mention it – going into more detail the first few times … as, over the years, I’ve developed an ability to recognize the “not-again-with-the-George-discussion” look from my fellow cockpit occupier(s) when I get into that mode of thinking.

As good as George is … there are times when a wire gets too hot, or a connection gets “challenged,” or something else goes awry … and sometimes, George forgets to “tell” us that he’s having a problem. George is not always as “honest” as he should be – and he conceals minor problems – perhaps not deliberately, it’s just that George doesn’t get tired of “trying it again” … and “again” … and “again” … well, you get the picture. George does not know that the electron sequence/pathway/hierarchy that is programmed and therefore available to him to manipulate the controls may not provide the results that the humans in the cockpit would prefer … but if the humans in the cockpit don’t know what they would do if they were “in control” … things could get “out of control” without them even knowing it – and we’ve all seen examples of just exactly this kind of situation.

So … my compliments to those here who “get it” – and specifically to Mr Northbeach!

sevenstrokeroll
2nd May 2012, 19:25
stilton...regarding the DC9 incident...happened well over 30 years ago...taking off out of KPIT...at that time procedure was to have all fuel pumps on, which would supply both engines from center tank first. Somehow the center tank fuel was contaminated/full of water and both engines flamed out. Landed straight ahead pushing the plane onto the runway with flaps at takeoff setting...gear had already been cycled up...but managed to select gear down and land...wish I had more....changed procedures many years ago to select pump configuration with wing tank to engine to lessen a repeat.

----

wingswinger...please remember that trying to top a CB in any standard transport is unlikely to work out. I too am shocked at the Air France stall/crash. I asked a friend who flys the same type (with different pitot tubes)
what the stall warning was for that type...its not much!!!!

Having flown and taught in both Seminole and 737 I can tell you that the 737 is easier to fly, has more oomph in an engine out and is less work due to many nice things about jets, liike no prop feathering...weather radar, more comfortable seats and air conditioning...and much better anti ice.

so...those learn by rote chinese firedrill pilots are one thing...but there are many types of pilots and many could handle or avoid the air france scenario


I do agree that you should have approximate pitch/power combinations at your fingertips...and indeed my manuals show pitch/power combos for emergency use.

bubbers44
3rd May 2012, 01:00
I have practiced dead stick approaches in a 757 on my flight sim doing a max bank and landing downwind at TGU in honduras with dual engine failures. Yes I would do it but I would be crucified after I did it. There are no other alternatives taking off to the north. Land downwind or die. Sully couldn't do it the way we would have just landing downwind. In Honduras you had no other choice. Sully had to follow the procedure, we couldn't. Staying alive is the name of the game.

safetypee
3rd May 2012, 01:25
AirRabbit, et al; for those who ‘have it’ what is ‘it’?
Is ‘it’ an understanding of the problems in modern aviation, and like Mr Voss “this is not about better stick and rudder skills”, can only relate to what it isn’t?
Or is ‘it’, having the knowledge and skills required in modern aviation; if so, then what are these and how might they be taught?

If the industry does not understand the problem, the contributors, or the interactions, then how can “new kinds of pilot training” help; what would we be training for?
Similarly if those who have the knowledge and skills cannot communicate what they are, or how they might be taught, then again industry will struggle to improve the situation?

IMHO the industry needs to look at everyday operations, at the many people who have got ‘it’ – the knowledge and skills of flight management. Compare these operations with what is expected of pilots, with what they (should) have been taught; consider the opportunities for pilots to gain experience and the situations which they might be exposed to, requiring ‘it’ for safe management.
There are good indications that a gap between training and operation exists, although the risk in this might not be very large (low incident/accident rates). However, the challenge is to close the gap, either through training or with experience – or both.
A significant aspect of the problem is that the required knowledge and know-how is tacit, self-evident, not easily described or taught; its inherent in operations, you have to do it before you have it.

Thus those who have ‘it’, might consider how they could help those without ‘it’. Captains mentoring, leading by example, briefing / debriefing, what-if discussions.
All pilots must practice what has been taught; learn what has not been taught, and fly cautiously while a gap between them exists – being professional.

Wingswinger
3rd May 2012, 07:24
Hello SevenStrokeRoll,

wingswinger...please remember that trying to top a CB in any standard transport is unlikely to work out. I too am shocked at the Air France stall/crash. I asked a friend who flys the same type (with different pitot tubes)
what the stall warning was for that type...its not much!!!!

I didn't write "top", I wrote "avoid". Clearly attempting to climb over a Cb has the potential to end in tears even if the aircraft in question has the performance to do so. It is not to be recommended. However, in northern Europe the Cbs are not often "as high as an elephant's eye" as they are in the States and the tropics and just occasionally there is an active area stretching for several hundred miles but with few tops above FL350. In these circumstances the occasional overflight of a Cb can be all but unavoidable.

Stall warning in FBW Airbuses (I fly the 320 series) isn't minimal. In Normal Law you cannot stall the aeroplane; it won't let you. The control protections stop the pilot going beyond the critical angle of attack and the autothrust system will trigger TOGA power at a preset angle of attack depending on the configuration. The stall warning would only be heard if there is a damaged AoA probe. Once there is a malfunction which drops the aircraft into Alternate Law the game changes; now you can stall it. There is a visual indication of the stall speed (actually it's an angle of attack) on the speed strip and a very loud aural warning "STALL, STALL". This is what happened in AF447. The stall warning sounded over SEVENTY TIMES before the aircraft struck the ocean.

PEI_3721
3rd May 2012, 12:53
Wingswinger, (thread drift) do not extrapolate stall protection to loss of control protection, particularly in highly dynamic situations – in or near Cbs.
Also, just because European ‘humbly’ Cbs could be flown over does not eliminate the risk of encountering very disturbed air, clear of cloud, above them – and some Cb tops climb faster than you can.
Judgement comes from a combination of knowledge, know-how, and know-when to do or not to do something - and that’s not about better stick and rudder skills.

Wingswinger
4th May 2012, 07:06
Hello PEI,

I did say "not to be recommended". I'm sorry, but sometimes in these international forums I forget that people don't grasp British understatement for that is what it was.

I am aware of the dangers of Cbs, even "humble" European ones. In my formative years in flying I had the educative experience of being inside one which was embedded in a front while flying a second-generation single-seat jet fighter (no weather radar; no attitude indicator). It wasn't much fun coming out of it upside down and having to do a limited panel recovery (Artificial Horizon toppled) while still in IMC. I learned about flying from that.

I'm not advocating overflying Cbs. I just said that sometimes, once in a while, it is unavoidable. You turn to miss one and there's another under your path..and so on.

I'm not quite sure what you mean with your remark about extrapolating stall protection to loss of control protection. You'll have to explain. The low speed protections in Normal Law of the Airbus FBW types are clearly designed to prevent the pilot stalling the aircraft. If the wing generates lift you have control. An environmental upset may occur; the problem then is do you have enough control and enough altitude to recover without exceeding structural limits.

PEI_3721
4th May 2012, 11:51
Wingswinger http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/thumbs.gif
My comments were generalities – the problems of language/communicating!
We have had similar experiences, except that my Cb encounters, although planned, were not in such a robust machine.
The loss of control difficulties I was envisaging were like effects of roll coupling, and inertia. Although I have no knowledge of such problems in commercial aircraft, several early military FBW aircraft could exceed their stall protection systems in highly dynamic manoeuvres, or possibly in Cb type turbulence.
My caution is that the industry should not take ‘stall protected’ as being ‘fool proof’; there are enough of us fools out there to find any weakness.
The industry has to be careful in describing systems (problems of language/communicating), and operators need to think about a wide range of unusual consequences - and that’s not about better stick and rudder skills.

AirRabbit
4th May 2012, 20:21
Actually, Mr. safetypee you ask a VERY important and very “ON-TARGET” questions:
“...for those who ‘have it,’ what is ‘it’?.. Is ‘it’ having the knowledge and skills required in modern aviation; if so, then what are these and how might they be taught?”
If the industry does not understand the problem, the contributors, or the interactions, then how can “new kinds of pilot training” help; what would we be training for? Similarly if those who have the knowledge and skills cannot communicate what they are, or how they might be taught, then again industry will struggle to improve the situation...
My compliments, sir. You’ve nailed the obvious questions – obvious perhaps only to those who care about their profession, but obvious nonetheless – and in respect of your question, let me offer the following ...

The “it” described absolutely is (are?) the knowledge and skills required to function adequately and safely in modern aviation ... but the “on target” portion of your question/statement is ... “what is this knowledge and what are these skills and how might they be taught?” At the risk of sounding like I’m setting myself up as THE person who has the definitive answer ... and while that is certainly not my intent ... I think I can describe an appropriate answer. Let me address the “skills” and I’ll get to the “knowledge” portion in a moment...

The individual “skills” are the sets of eye-hand coordination actions that achieve the various airplane flight paths that are selected based on the existing airplane position, orientation, direction, configuration, and airspeed at any given moment, with respect to the desired airplane position, orientation, direction, configuration, and airspeed at the next moment. This is an iterative process, conducted over and over again. While I use the term “flight path,” the concept certainly goes beyond the physical “path” through 3-dimensional space, and includes these other elements. Of course the clear understanding of what is desired for this “flight path” (including ALL of the factors indicated) is necessary to achieve the satisfactory accomplishment of any identified flight task ... such as takeoff, climb-out, descent, instrument approach, landing , and, of course, you know the full compliment of such a list. The educational process to determine what kind of “training” may be needed is to first accomplish an analysis of what specific “tasks” are involved in the accomplishment of that particular job. So ... what are the tasks necessary to perform the job of pilot? You know those answers as well ... but it makes sense to write down a description of those tasks ... followed immediately by determining how to best “train” a person to be able to accomplish each of those tasks. Most often, that effort is taken “bit by bit” – identifying stepping-stones, or building-blocks of lesser or more generic skills and skill-sets addressing the accomplishment of a similarly structured stepping-stone approach to task identification, where each such stepping-stone level is combined to build a more sophisticated set of skills, to be able to accomplish a more completely identified task – all aimed toward eventually achieving a broad skill set applied in such a manner that flying the airplane is achieved in accordance with the design specifications of the airplane, the regulatory requirements, the goals of the company, the goals of the passengers (or those who contracted the shipment of cargo) – and most importantly ... in accordance with all safety designs and desires. I should take a moment and recommend that you acquire a copy of ICAO Document 9625 and read, carefully, the task analysis aspects of that publication.

I said I’d get back to the knowledge issues... There are very few (if any) educational professionals who would not agree with the premise that acceptance of how and why a particular physical movement of controls is the best choice of a pilot is based on an academically and intellectually understood concept of the issues involved. Knowing what happens to an airplane – or a portion of an airplane – at certain points in the profile of an airplane flight – or certain points in the accomplishment of a flight task – usually goes a very long way in understanding the “what” of the task, which invariably assists in the “acceptance” of that “what” and makes the “why” more easily seen and accepted. Understanding of what happens to ... say the effectiveness of an aileron control, as the airflow over the wing and subsequently over the aileron, is decreased is, or certainly should be, of interest to a pilot. He/she needs to know that at slower airspeeds, an aileron must be displaced further to achieve essentially the same airplane response. He/she needs to know that even though the lift characteristics of that wing may be enhanced by extending flaps, he/she needs to know that the enhancement will only occur if the airflow over that wing remains constant – and that to achieve that, he/she may have to do something else to achieve what is desired. These are understandings that can (and I believe should be) accomplished in an academic environment ... and then reinforced in a flight, or today, more than likely, in a simulated flight, situation.

Along with that identification of the stepping-stones or building-blocks, the kind of equipment that would be best utilized is also identified. This used to be some sort of trainer, historically built to look like an airplane cockpit ... but the end point equipment was always the airplane itself. Now, however, we have rather sophisticated simulation equipment – equipment that runs the gamut of capability, functionality, and ... of course ... cost. In some cases of the “higher-end” simulation, used in the training of relatively experienced persons – the concept of using the airplane to conclude the training or conduct the check is no longer the “given” ... in fact, more and more, we find complete training and evaluation programs conducted exclusively in a flight simulator – and the first time the pilot actually “sees” the real airplane ... he or she will have 200 passengers sitting in the cabin – awaiting their professional flight crew to take them to their chosen destination. This cannot occur by some slap-stick guess or by some throw-it-together-to-see-how-it-works process. To complicate the issue, we have seen pilots with little experience moving into positions of significant responsibility. We see pilots with questionable backgrounds through training, but having passed their last check, get assignments with similar significant responsibilities.

Once these aspects have been considered, developed, analyzed, and applied ... it then becomes a matter of how much training is necessary/appropriate. The answer to that question is, at the same time, both easy to answer and difficult to answer. Certainly the easy answer is to require the amount of training necessary to become proficient and competent on the specific task. In addition, the training that is completed would have to ensure that the subject pilot would be able to pull out of his/her “bag of tricks” and acceptable performance on any task asked of him/her during the final training session and for the proficiency evaluation. The difficult part of that answer gets wrapped into the issue of whether that task will be learned to an acceptable level – a proficient level – in one, two, four, twelve, or ?? attempts on that particular task? The answer here, most usually, is dependent on the individual pilot. Simply, some require less ... some require more.

What I can say is that the substantially best way to train a task is to do it over, and over, and over ... and continue that process until the instructor is convinced that the student is performing it successfully based on a legitimate analysis of the student’s performance. I seriously believe that the very best way to instruct is to find a way to describe to the student how to accomplish the task by using that student’s own preferences for measurement or gauging. As many of you know, some instructors teach exactly the way they, themselves, were taught. That is sometimes an “OK” thing ... but more often, it is not the very best way to teach an individual student.

I have not one, but two, “asides:”
1. A simple one to discuss – and not to suggest anyone going off on their own tangent without proper consideration and discussion with appropriate training and management personnel ... I think it entirely appropriate to teach all one can about how to control an airplane – and that would include non-traditional uses of traditional flight controls, power, flaps, speed brakes, etc. (Recall the United landing at Sioux City, Iowa – some call this “crew resource management” – that’s certainly OK, but I prefer to think of it as “alternative airplane control”). A simple example might include an experience with a nose up pitch attitude that is difficult to control, while the airplane seems to be reluctant to respond to direct forward or downward elevator control. An instructor might suggest rolling the airplane to move the upward lift vector off to the side, into a turning vector ... perhaps use of the autopilot will by-pass the non-autopilot control application ... perhaps partial extension of wing-mounted speed-brakes ... perhaps consider the reduction of power if the engines are located under-wing.

2. A more complex instructional technique is one where I seriously believe that the very best way to instruct is to find a way to describe to the student how to accomplish the task by using that student’s own preferences for measurement or gauging. As many of you know, some instructors teach exactly the way they, themselves, were taught. That is sometimes an “OK” thing ... but more often, it is not the very best way to teach an individual student. For example, if you wanted to teach a student how to acquire a “level flight attitude” achieved at the termination of a landing flare prior to touching down on the runway ... how would you describe what you wanted the student to do? Perhaps you would say, “at the conclusion of the landing flare the airplane should be placed in the level flight attitude,” and then explain that this is the best attitude from which a landing touchdown should be made. Would you consider telling that student, “at the conclusion of the landing flare, the airplane should be between 3 and 5 feet above the runway surface; do not allow the airplane to climb; do not allow the airplane to descend; do not allow the airplane to accelerate: do not allow the airplane to decelerate. Once at this point do not let the nose of the airplane increase or decrease from that position.’’ It may be my simplistic way of thinking, but I believe the first choice would result in the student asking what I would recommend for determining “level flight” attitude – and my goal is to avoid answering the “how” question – my goal is to have the student determine “how” they are going meet my demands. The second choice would provide substantial instruction to the student, including specific values to achieve. Of course the issue of power reduction will have to be included in the discussion ... and my favorite way around that issue is to tell the student that the latest point at which power reduction may be initiated is upon reaching the end of the flare (the earliest would be runway threshold crossing) ... and once power reduction is started, any adding of power MUST result in a rejected landing and a go-around – and the latest time that the power MUST be in “flight idle” would be at main gear touch-down.. My only reason for going into this level of detail is (hopefully) to demonstrate that in neither case have I told the student how to land the airplane. If he does OK with the first method ... (presuming I didn’t get or didn’t respond to any “how” questions) I’d leave it alone for awhile to see if the landings get better or worse. If they get better – I’d leave good enough alone. If it gets worse, I’d move on to the 2nd method and go from there. If he/she doesn’t do OK with the first method, or if I have described only the second method, that student will, necessarily get the airplane into a level flight attitude (as that is the definitional result of zero climb, zero descent, zero acceleration, and zero deceleration). As the airplane begins to decelerate (and it will, as we’ve changed attitude without adding power – and at the end of the flare we’ve begun reducing the power) the only thing the student can do to prevent further deceleration (since he/she cannot add power unless choosing to reject the landing and Go Around) is to release back pressure on the elevator control. However, we’ve already said that we don’t want to see the nose moving above or below the position achieved at the end of the flare, so there will only be a limited amount of elevator back-pressure that can be released. We’ve already stopped the student from continuing to pull back on the controls that might increase the nose position – we’ve discussed not moving the nose above or below the position achieved at the end of the flare – which would prevent the airplane from climbing and prevent the airplane’s tail from contacting the runway. If indeed the flare attitude was completed at 3 to 5 feet above the runway – the amount of time the student will be wrestling with him/her-self about releasing elevator back-pressure should be exquisitely short. If the initial flare is “completed” at a height of 20-30 feet above the runway ... I’d ask the pilot to go around and try that “height evaluation” again – and I’d continue to do that until the maximum height above the runway at the end of the flare is 10 feet or less.

OK ... “asides” over.
We were talking doing the task over and over and over and .... until that student is performing the task successfully ... based on a legitimate analysis of the student’s performance. Is it done now? NO. There has to be a revisiting of everything the student learns later in the syllabus – to facilitate the building block process. Some instructors are surprised to learn that a student will take something learned in performing one task, and apply that understanding, control “tweak,” sequencing, timing, speed of application ... whatever ... directly to another task that will make his/her accomplishment of that task easier, better, smoother, something. Good. Instructors should let that happen – fully grasping what that student is doing and why he or she is doing it. I do not advocate the student’s learning to do something in a way or in a sequence that is not recognized by the instructor. What the student is doing certainly “can” be due to an undiscovered process or technique that the instructor can then capitalize upon ... but usually that is not the case. If the student suddenly begins to appear to do something a lot better than before, and you cannot determine what or why – the chances are that student has talked with some of his/her buddies and have developed a temporary cheat-sheet methodology to “get through the check.” That is not acceptable in my book. We are not, or we should not be, teaching how to pass the test. We should be teaching how to fly the airplane. Cheat-sheet approaches usually wind up failing ... and doing so, miserably, at the most inopportune times! I believe instructors should, at all times, know exactly what his/her students are doing and why they are doing it the way they are doing it. If there are exceptions to this ... I haven’t yet come across one that I consider to be legitimate.

Finally, once all the tasks have been discussed academically and are understood intellectually ... once all the tasks have been tried, modified, tried again, and are regularly being accomplished, and accomplished satisfactorily, under the full and direct understanding of the person doing the task – now is the time that individual tasks may be incorporated into more traditional line operations. Some instructors believe that “situational scenarios” are the only way airline pilot training should be accomplished. I don’t believe that. While I think that these “situational scenarios” have significant benefit, I seriously believe that such exposures should be withheld until the student has demonstrated a rather good understanding and an relative ease in accomplishing the flight tasks presented. Intermixing these common or irregular tasks into a normal “line” sequence, does have value as regarding the other things that necessarily must be included in the periphery of any pilot’s daily operational thought-physical response event sequencing. Additionally, Crew Resource Management (CRM) has been talked about for over 30 years. And CRM has become a normally expected inclusion in the airline pilot training exposures. Make no mistake ... that is a good thing. However, as important as CRM can become, spending an inordinate amount of time briefing what you’re going to do to be sure the other pilot is fully aware of what you’re planning is, or at least could be, in my not-so-humble-opinion, a gargantuan misappropriation of time. If the two pilots in virtually any airplane operation are thoroughly trained and operate in accordance with the expected duties, tasks, and expectations ... a complete sequence of line operations can be conducted quite adequately – on time – and quite safely ... without either pilot uttering the first syllable to the other pilot. No, I don’t recommend this practice! No I wouldn’t expect such a thing to be seen ... even irregularly. The point is that well trained crews know what the other pilot is doing and knows what they, themselves are doing – and the critical issue is that each such pilot SHOULD recognize when he or the other pilot is NOT doing what is expected – what is right – what has been trained ... and any such “light bulb” recognition should be addressed – quickly – directly – and if necessary, forcefully.

So ... does that answer your question?

RetiredF4
4th May 2012, 21:19
What a detailed description of few examples of well done instructing. Thank you Sir, you describe instructing not only with knowledge and expierience, but also with lots of dedication.

safetypee
---then how can “new kinds of pilot training” help; what would we be training for? Similarly if those who have the knowledge and skills cannot communicate what they are, or how they might be taught, then again industry will struggle to improve the situation...

Unfortunately such kind of transfer of skills and knowledge -- and let me add "dedication to being or becoming a pilot" takes time and money. With the normal self financed approach into the cockpit the cheapest training approach is the most often used one. This system produces an output of pilots able to manage flights, but with a different understanding of points like AirRabbit mentioned in his excellent post. Afew years later those pilots seek an upgrade to the right seat (wheras the generation of pilots before was glad to have FO time with excellent captains) and train and observe the next generation of FO´s. Where will it end?

sheppey
5th May 2012, 12:35
However, as important as CRM can become, spending an inordinate amount of time briefing what you’re going to do to be sure the other pilot is fully aware of what you’re planning is, or at least could be, in my not-so-humble-opinion, a gargantuan misappropriation of time. If the two pilots in virtually any airplane operation are thoroughly trained and operate in accordance with the expected duties, tasks, and expectations ... a complete sequence of line operations can be conducted quite adequately – on time – and quite safely ... without either pilot uttering the first syllable to the other pilot.I am sure the majority would agree with you wholeheartedly - politically incorrect as you may be perceived:ok:

However, one only has to read numerous incident and accident reports where investigators (and the lawyers hungry to lay blame anywhere they scent a quick buck or ten), rip into the hapless crew member concerned for not having stuck to company SOP and briefed everything in the manual; even if, as you rightly point out, the manual contains an over-kill of numerous superfluous items. It was never really a flight safety issue but a liability arse-covering (aircrew or company) issue.

AirRabbit
7th May 2012, 18:57
I am sure the majority would agree with you wholeheartedly - politically incorrect as you may be perceived

Perhaps I need to make myself a bit more clear ... (I certainly don’t want to be perceived incorrectly ...) I am not at all being critical of CRM or of the necessities to ensure that all appropriate checklists are completed and that proper “crew coordination” is accomplished. I am simply pointing out that well trained crew members who understand what they are all taught and are aware of what the other pilot in the cockpit is supposed to be doing, to the extent that both pilots are comfortably aware that all that needs to be done, is, in fact, done, and done the correct way – isn’t necessarily dependent on one crew member briefing the other. Of course, conducting that briefing, in addition to the probability of its being superfluous, is also a requirement in most airline cockpits, and I’m never against doing what is required.

AirRabbit
7th May 2012, 19:26
What a detailed description of few examples of well done instructing. Thank you Sir, you describe instructing not only with knowledge and expierience, but also with lots of dedication.
Unfortunately such kind of transfer of skills and knowledge -- and let me add "dedication to being or becoming a pilot" takes time and money. With the normal self financed approach into the cockpit the cheapest training approach is the most often used one. This system produces an output of pilots able to manage flights, but with a different understanding of points like AirRabbit mentioned in his excellent post. Afew years later those pilots seek an upgrade to the right seat (wheras the generation of pilots before was glad to have FO time with excellent captains) and train and observe the next generation of FO´s. Where will it end?
First, sir, many thanks for the very kind remarks ... I’m just pointing out what these years of practicing “the art and science of aviation,” and the training that necessarily precedes that activity, has become so evident that you almost trip over it.

My concern is that the “traditional” path that eager young would-be pilots have used in their journey into the airline cockpit – although those sources have not gone away – are, I believe, going to be inundated to the extent that they will become unable to keep up with the demand. Also, I have it on reasonably good authority that if the recently mandated regulation changes that have been discussed (i.e., having pilots have a minimum of 1500 hours of flight time – even if that number is allowed to be reduced by some factor in light of having some sort of specialized training) is going to be a very difficult nut to crack, no matter how it’s struck. And then there’s the cost of that additional flight time ... unless all these folks can find “jobs” that will allow them to log flying time. I think we’re going to need an alternative way to meet those demands ... and, the bigger the demand ... the bigger the nut to crack!

safetypee
8th May 2012, 13:49
AirRabbit, thanks; you provide an example of excellence in training #89. However, I would add ‘thinking’ as an essential skill – thinking can be taught, it is necessary to ‘know’ when to use the other skills.
…”does this answer my question” … it might be unwise to conclude that we have an answer; yes the reply is sufficient, but we should not exclude other views and developments.

Your views on training represent an ideal, perhaps more suited to initial training. An alternative, with emphasis on experience could be an apprenticeship model; training on-the-job particularly for know-how / know-when skills, but this too is an ideal.
Unfortunately we are constrained by the reality of the world today, socially, commercially, and culturally, thus a solution has to be realistic and probably involves compromise. The industry requires more pilots, regulators suggest more training hours, and safety requires appropriately experienced pilots.
A flying licence is no longer a ‘license to learn’, where ability had to be demonstrated before advancement, it’s now a Captain’s ticket by right, thus training must match that and other expectations of industry.

Accidents and incidents involve all crew members; this suggests that existing Capts have already slipped through a poor system – your fear for the future. However, statistically this is not necessarily so; it may be just as likely that the tasks (in situational context) which the crew were asked to undertake were unrealistic, e.g. an aircraft can be flown without airspeed, but not by an inexperienced crew at night in turbulence; or a crew can detect a Rad Alt malfunction, but not under training in a time pressured low altitude approach scenario.
Thus shortfalls in training to meet the perceived automation task may not be the prime contributor to the problems. Safety could be maintained by adjusting tasks, exposure to situations, reduced time/workload pressures, or training.
We probably need to address all aspects, but which will be quicker, cheaper, or more effective?

Tee Emm
8th May 2012, 14:15
We probably need to address all aspects, but which will be quicker, cheaper, or more effective?

The answer has been in front of our eyes for years. Before type rating candidates in the simulator get heavily involved with the intricacy of sophisticated automation, the accent in the first few sessions should be on basic jet transport handling skills. That means flight directors off and automatics off.

Only when the candidate is confident and demonstrably competent at raw data instrument flying, unusual attitude recovery and landing in strong crosswinds, should the first stage of automation be introduced. This would go a long way to preventing automation addiction.

AirRabbit
8th May 2012, 17:25
I would add ‘thinking’ as an essential skill – thinking can be taught, it is necessary to ‘know’ when to use the other skills.
…”does this answer my question” … it might be unwise to conclude that we have an answer; yes the reply is sufficient, but we should not exclude other views and developments.

Two things … first, my rhetorical question of “…does this answer your question…” was meant to be somewhat humorous … in that I tend to (…heck … I don’t tend … I DO…) typically respond to what I call a “water cooler question” with what I call a “fire-hose answer.”

Second, I agree with you completely that there are all kinds of “skills” that need to be brought to any circumstance – and clearly “thinking” and “understanding” are part of those basic skill sets that are required.

The post by Tee Emm where he said:
Before type rating candidates in the simulator get heavily involved with the intricacy of sophisticated automation, the accent in the first few sessions should be on basic jet transport handling skills. That means flight directors off and automatics off.
Only when the candidate is confident and demonstrably competent at raw data instrument flying, unusual attitude recovery and landing in strong crosswinds, should the first stage of automation be introduced. This would go a long way to preventing automation addiction.
…this is exactly what I meant when, in my earlier post, I inserted the first of my 2 “asides” …
... I think it entirely appropriate to teach all one can about how to control an airplane – and that would include non-traditional uses of traditional flight controls, power, flaps, speed brakes, etc. (Recall the United landing at Sioux City, Iowa – some call this “crew resource management” – that’s certainly OK, but I prefer to think of it as “alternative airplane control”). A simple example might include an experience with a nose up pitch attitude that is difficult to control, while the airplane seems to be reluctant to respond to direct forward or downward elevator control. An instructor might suggest rolling the airplane to move the upward lift vector off to the side, into a turning vector ... perhaps use of the autopilot will by-pass the non-autopilot control application ... perhaps partial extension of wing-mounted speed-brakes ... perhaps consider the reduction of power if the engines are located under-wing.
…perhaps I didn’t make myself clear enough (…and I do that often, I guess) what I was referring to was getting the pilot to know and understand his/her airplane … as much of it as we can get across in a not-terribly-extended training profile. Nothing will replace being knowledgeable about how YOUR airplane behaves – and the more you know … the broader your familiarity about how YOUR airplane responds to differing situations, the better you will be able to respond to bring that airplane back to where you want it – or, better yet – not let it get away from where you wanted it in the first place.

But, when we want to turn out pilots in the cheapest, quickest, cookie-cutter time frame … there is likely to be at least something (more likely a lot of “somethings”) that aren’t presented, played with, become comfortable with, understand, know, and ultimately “own” as the person in charge of that airplane (from brake release to resetting those brakes) … and that (those) thing(s) may (it’s not a sure thing … but may…) be important at some time in the future.

This is my concern with going completely to a "scenairo based" training process. While I have NO problem with incorporating such "scenairo based" exposures into a training program - I think it is important to note that when one decides to include each and every task as part of a "line-based" flight profile, the time involved becomes obstructive to the intent of the training we set out to provide. What we need initially is good, precise, repetitive, corrected-when-necessary, training ... task by task ... over and over - and in this I include the necessity to become familiar with YOUR airplane. For example, how long has it been since you've taken YOUR airplane and flown it - turned it - climbed 500 feet - descended 500 feet, while right at the initiation of the stall warning? We can intellectually understand that the flight controls are not as "effective" at those airspeeds - slower airflow means more deflection decessary for the same response. The airplane is the airplane - when it moves it has the same inertia - so stopping the airplane once it starts to move, again requires more control deflection to get stopped what you got started initially. But "intellectually understanding" and "physically experiencing" are two different things - and the more "things" you can experience about any particular aspect of YOUR airplane, the BETTER and more completely you learn YOUR airplane.

I know I'm a training guy ... and therefore I look at everything through that end of the pipe ... but I also am aware that we cannot train 364 days a year and fly for the company (to make a profit) on that one remaining day each year (be still my beating heart!). What I would like to see is our collective provision for each pilot to get the most we can provide out of what we are allowed/required to do ... A dream? Perhaps ... but is MY dream none-the-less.

sevenstrokeroll
9th May 2012, 00:30
maybe the problems is hiring low time pilots? I got on with a ''big'' airline with over 5000 hours. Virtually none of it was autopilot time !

hiring someone with even 1500 hours isn't a whole lot of time.

bubbers44
9th May 2012, 02:04
ssr, it just beats 350 hrs but just barely. 5,000 hrs was our minimum but it doesn't seem to be the standard any more. I guess we need a few AF447 incidents to understand the importance of experience and not just computer monitors flying your airplane. I wonder how many actual hours the 2900 hr pilot had flying and not monitoring an autopilot. Very few is my guess. Maybe 200 a long time ago? Kind of scary, isn't it?

NVpilot
9th May 2012, 04:07
Yes scary, two computer programmers does not equal one pilot! :eek:

framer
9th May 2012, 06:40
Before type rating candidates in the simulator get heavily involved with the intricacy of sophisticated automation, the accent in the first few sessions should be on basic jet transport handling skills. That means flight directors off and automatics off.

Only when the candidate is confident and demonstrably competent at raw data instrument flying, unusual attitude recovery and landing in strong crosswinds, should the first stage of automation be introduced. This would go a long way to preventing automation addiction.
That is the answer right there.
If they can´t get through that phase then they shouldn´t be up the front.
I don´t care if they were born with the skill or developed it by flying light twins for three years in the bush, as long as they have it then proceed to the next phase of type rating.

Ornis
9th May 2012, 09:45
Approaching a stall a warning is announced: stall, stall. Would it not be better if an instruction were given: stick forward, nose down.

Also, had the AoA been prominently displayed, the PIC of AF447 would have surely seen the problem immediately he returned.

I know nothing about flying an airliner, but I would expect the PIC to take control of any aircraft that was out of control. He knew the engines were operating and the aircraft was sinking at 10,000ft/min. Did he not think he could do better?

No doubt plenty could be said about training and recruitment but this much seems obvious to me.

Good Business Sense
9th May 2012, 11:13
There are an increasing number of very well known airlines today who put 200 hour ab initio pilots straight into 747/A340/777 long haul operations.

If you consider the usual SOPs regarding the use of autopilot and that many would be very lucky to get 20 sectors per year (post cruise pilot years) I would guess that the average amount of hands on per year would be in the order of 100 minutes. Of course, the hands on would mainly come after the aircraft has been configured and stabilized 4-6 miles out by the autopilot.

So some 10-15 years down the road when command comes around they would have, post initial training, about 16 to 25 hours of handling, in 2-3 minute bursts, under their belt.

To quote the old joke, I think I've got more time in the flare :)

Just a thought

Sillypeoples
9th May 2012, 17:02
He's an idiot. Plane and simple. He's trying to set the tone, direction, value and purpose so to speak of the pilots and he has it wrong.

His attitude is one that perpetrates the concept that eventually automation will be so good, that a pilot is just there to monitor and fix problems that arise.

When the SOPS, Checklist Guys, Avionics manufacturers can determine how much ice is too much, just how much airspeed loss is too much, then make a decision to head into that airport with an NDB approach barely at minimums that another guy just missed at vs trying to continue the climb to get over the hills, to the other airport, then I might start listening to guys like this. I can cook up a thousand scenarios that can prove him wrong.

This is way more then having pilots that can fly without the autopilot or not, this is about trusting mechanical systems that are known to break, and training pilots to lean on gear so heavily that today, the reason they crash, in simple terms, they can't fly without the gear to do the flying for them.

AirRabbit
16th May 2012, 16:33
I don’t think it’s a matter of hiring pilots with insufficient numbers of hours … it’s a matter of hiring pilots that have been shorted on what and how they have been trained … and then … that shortness in training background has not been taken into consideration for the required training at the airline. Yes, I know, training is expensive … but, as I’m told over and over again by those who have been at this even longer than I have been … you think training is expensive??? … Try an accident!!!

Just a comment on the banter back and forth about a minimum flight time requirement of 1500 hours BEFORE a pilot may seek employment with an airline…

According to information available from the US FAA public website, predictions for the US aviation industry – outside of the US commercial airline portion of that industry (please note … that is OUTSIDE of commercial airline operations) – indicate that ALL other flight operations will average approximately 34.4 million hours per year from now to the year 2023 (slightly less initially and slightly more toward the end of that time as the annual growth rate is projected to be approximately 3.2% per year, on average). An average of 34.4 million hours per year provides an average of 2.86 million hours per month over this period. The estimated "need" for pilots has said that up to 500 pilots per month will be required to fill vacant airline FO seats for the next 10+ years. If each pilot is required to have logged a minimum of 1500 hours prior to applying for an airline job, this would require approximately 750K hours. Or, said differently, in order for 500 pilots per month to be able to log a minimum of 1500 hours prior to being eligible to be hired into the airline business, just a bit over 26% of all the hours flown OUTSIDE of commercial airline service every month would have to be available to these “airline aspirants.” Does anyone have any idea of what this figure means?? Talk about a drastic impact on the aviation industry - either fully one quarter of what is currently flown will have to be flown by those future airline applicants (what happens to the pilots who would have normally flown those hours?) OR all of that time will have to be flown IN ADDITION to what has been projected. If the latter is the method used ... the question would be ... what would these pilots be doing for those hours ... just flying? What would be the rental cost to those folks? Would it be flying for pay? Who's going to have those jobs? Are we going to ask those future airline pilots to bid on the opportunity to fly and log those hours? Talk about "pay-to-fly" .... sheesh! Sounds to me to be a REAL problem looming on the horizon IF that proposed requirement becomes a real requirement.

aviofreek
17th May 2012, 21:04
Have to say this is probably the best thread I've came across in a good while now...
Just my little contribution...

BRAND NEW SERIES 2012 Air Crash Investigation- Turning point- (FULL VIDEO) - YouTube

Good Business Sense
17th May 2012, 22:31
Awesome - Should be required viewing by all airline management !