Army Air Corps - Take me on a Revolution.....Please?

[ChristopherRobin]

When the Apache eventually wends its ponderous way into service what will we have? A new helicopter? Of course. Better capability? Obviously. Does it not seem though, as if the Air Corps appears to be underwhelmed by what exactly it is they are getting? Does the complete lack of even an attempt to address what seem to me to be fundamental questions on the impact it will have?

Since the AAC has known they are getting a new and highly advanced attack helicopter what have they done?

“we need bigger hangars!” <hurray!>
“we need new training areas!” <some people are on the pitch!>
“we must train our pilots!” <they think it’s all over!>
“we must change nothing else!” <it is now!>

In fact they have done everything to convert the necessary number of people to a new airframe….er…and that’s it.

Right then. Let’s remember people that this is a totally new piece of kit – not just for our military but the Americans as well. The Apache Longbow system has the potential to revolutionise warfare.

The potential to revolutionise warfare. The ability to see what you are facing in terms of enemy dispositions and type; the ability for your squadron to see it without ambiguity at the push of a button. Command and control on an unprecedented scale. Force multiplication and acceleration. Make no mistake - this is a revolution that makes the advent of the tank look like “not a bad idea”.

Like the tank, however, I fear that it is being strangled by a lack of imagination, in perhaps its deployment (although I will be delighted to be brought up to date), but almost certainly through its Achilles heel – the Army Officer system.

The AAC actually believes that it will be OK to continue to push officers through the same system that the rest of the Army uses. It seems unable to see the flaws that are glaringly apparent to even the most slack-jawed of people (I’ve asked them) and that is “Why will all officer apache pilots still be sent off to staff jobs?”.

Those of you who have read my previous post on this (“the tank will never replace the horse” ;) will know where I’m coming from, but I raise it again because it is so fundamentally important. NCO pilots will no doubt be stifling yawns and going “who cares” but if you are an NCO then you should care. It will be those inexperienced officers who will be commanding you after they have done great things for paperclip procurement. Those same officers will be up front in the Squadron Daddy’s aircraft commanding you as well as sorting out his own life in his aircraft. They are not the sort of person you want to be an amateur are they?

No! You want them to be the best commander/gunner in the Squadron. The guy with the experience and ability to make things happen as they should. He should be the guy who lightens the load, not the dead weight that adds to it. Apache Squadrons should be the best led by the best and who can be the best when they have spent years in jobs unrelated to flying?

Some officers have to do staff jobs but not all. At the minute they all have to go that route and the cop-out excuse from the AAC is that “we’re only 1.5% of the manning vote so we have to do what the Army tells us”

Pathetic. They have 10% of the budget and 20% of capability. They can change if they want to. Don’t be like the Army of post WW1! Embrace change! Be radical! Revolutionise the Air Corps!

If you want officers in these things (and we know you do) then go to the Army board and say “hey your Generalships!!! we have got a great idea that will cost no money, but will improve cohesion, retention and motivation and all it will cost you is a few less AAC officers for SO3 Shuffle and Bluff. Whaddya say?”

Remember that many AAC officers leave because they are forced down a career path they do not want to take. Now we know fine and well that the AAC is over budget on captains anyway and that some need to be shed but ask yourselves this:

Why are we shedding the good ones?

Because they are military aviators one minute and paper drudges the next.

Please change. Imagine the difference in 1917 if the Generals had listened to “radicals” like Fuller. All he did was talk of change. All the generals did was ignore him. Admittedly that was about tactics, but this is more fundamental than that.

Please will somebody show that Generals are capable of vision?


------------------
Christopher Robin

[Preciousboy]

Great post mate!

I think though, that unfortunatly your service will take a long time to sort this out. As you so rightly point out, Longbow IS the weapon to bring the AAC into the 21st century.
Hopefully, you will get the training and HQ support to insist that the best OPERATORS, regardless of rank, are the people who fly the bastard!

[smooth approach]

CH, couldn't agree more. Apache needs professional pilots, not just people who are flying at the whim of the career managers.

Look at the RAF, now I'm not saying all is rosy, in fact far from it. However, we regognise that, first and foremost, the investment we put into aircrew needs to be properly used.

Dear Army, get out of your tanks and in to reality.

PS I thought that the Apache budget was nearer to 40% of the total Army equipment budget.


Smoothie

[Twilight]

CR

You are on the nail. The AAC has some very sharp capable officers, not all aviators I might add - you do need some (the majority http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/confused.gif )to go up the chain in the normal manner. However you also need to keep some of them flying, you can not rely on the SNCOs thay have other jobs to fulfill. By the time some of your officers reach senior Capt/Maj level they have a wealth of experience to command night missions safely and effectively.......so why do you then send them away from flying? :mad:

Hopefully Apache will give you what you want. I just hope you don't have to learn the hard way, 'cos if it takes time to realise that this aircraft needs competent able operators then the RAF is ready and waiting...so get it right first time. It is not about the airplane it is about the people in them.

:)

[This message has been edited by Twilight (edited 02 December 2000).]

[Mr.Proach]

Chris,
e-mail me.
Mr A [email protected]

[PTT]

Officers in the Apache? Maybe the RAF should fly them???

[smooth approach]

PTT, wash your mouth out. How on earth could a mere crab understand the intricacies of the modern battlefield?

[Charlie Luncher]

and put an RAF AEop in the front what a perfect combination.

Modern battlefield hah!
piece of pxxx

[Edmund Blackadder]

I generally try to avoid discussions about pieces of kit I know little about but I have to say that the way the Apache needs running is not currently within the Armys mentality. The senior army command (and quite rightly so to a certain extent) insists on officers who can run an infantry regiment. The Apache is such a huge leap forward in AAC capability that it needs an equivalent leap of faith and imagination and forward thinking to get the most out of the beast. These are all things that the senior staff have hardly ever been required to do before.

This is not a dig at the Army or their staff just an observation. The Army has operated in virtually the same manner for hundreds of years and is bloody good at it.

Wibble

Ed

[This message has been edited by Edmund Blackadder (edited 03 December 2000).]

[TimC]

Charlie: Are they really thinking of doing that, or is it just a good idea?

Also, as I understand it, in the AAC the aircraft commander is the PNF (well left hand seat anyway), this will be different in the Apache though?

[This message has been edited by TimC (edited 03 December 2000).]

[ChristopherRobin]

Well the RAF may want the Apaches but they haven't got them so no amount of wishful thinking on their part will make that happen - not in the next 8 years anyway.

At the moment the challenge sits squarely on the shoulders of the Army and so it's back to the original thrust of my argument which concerns how the ARMY will deal with the challenges, not how the airforce wishes they could.

It is my personal view that the reason why an element of the officer corps has not transferred to some kind of specialist aircrew system is precisely because that is the RAF way. This emninently sensible solution is continually ignored because some brass hats are simply too blinkered and reactionary to even entertain the idea that the RAF might actually be able to teach them something new(such as the crewing of advanced combat aircraft for instance)

Once again they will remind us that NCOs are the AAC's spec aircrew and indeed they are. They shoot themselves in the foot, however, because of the irrefutable evidence of up to 4 times as many officers present in an air corps squadron as there are in an equivalent infantry/cavalry unit.

Now either they cannot recruit enough NCOs to do the job, or they haemmorage so many officers that they have to over-recruit to sustain the essential posts. Making some of the officers into spec aircrew would go a long way to solving both problems.

...And a final note. I do hope that people such as my learned friend Charlie Luncher realise that it would be unwise to use this potent new force in isolation (except in very unusual circumstances). This new force is merely an additional element in the all-arms battle and therefore requires someone who has an intimate knowledge of precisely where he fits in so that force multiplication can be achieved. From his throwaway comment above one can deduce that he actually hasn't got a rat's-@rse clue what he's on about and should join us all in heaving a sigh of relief that people of his ilk aren't calling the shots either.

However the bottom line remains: will the Army do the job any better during these days of opportunity? Or will they screw it up like Charlie here?

------------------
Christopher Robin

[smooth approach]

CR, are you my love child? Or is it the other way round? Regardless, I couldn't agree more. Just one point:

When you use the term 'all-arms battle', I hope you mean all arms in the widest sense (RN, Army, RAF). Otherwise, Apache will never realise it's full potential.


Smoothie

[Edmund Blackadder]

CR,

Much as I agree with a lot of what you say I fear that you are falling into your own trap. You are being a bit narrow minded just to discount what Charlie says (all be it a little flippantly). You either feel that more imagination is required in the operation of Apache or not. With a small amount of forward thinking why not have RAF SNCOs working alongside the AAC? For that matter why not have AAC pilots operating Harrier? We have to get away from the boundries of service if we are to make the most of the opportunities presented to us (heaven knows they are few and far between). With lateral thinking there is no reason at all why we cant all benefit and make the most out of the equiptment we have by using the best people for the job! I'm not talking about the RAF taking over Apache just using its experience in the right places. Try not to let the colour of your uniform blinker you to the oppourtunities. You talk of revolution but only think about a slight reshuffle.

(stepping down carefully from my soapbox)

Ed

(edited cause I thought of something else)

[This message has been edited by Edmund Blackadder (edited 03 December 2000).]

[Col Lective]

Dear All,
Valid points all round - but please spare a thought for us minions on the Army shop floor. If people in the other services are waiting for the whole Apache malarky to implode on itself how do you think we feel when we actually see how dire things are at the moment. Here's a thought (and please feel free to correct me if I'm wrong), someone mentioned to me this year that the US Army has the resources to allocate a Blackhawk/Chinook per Apache for support/spares etc. We in the AAC have enought DAF 4 tonners but no-one to drive them..... http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/redface.gif

[smooth approach]

I've said it before and I'll say it again: Apache is going to be bloody expensive to sustain (regardless of who operates it!). The RAF blundered on for years with a similar logistical nightmare (Harrier). Col Lective is right, there's c**k all use in having beautiful aeroplanes if you cannot operate or sustain them.

[This message has been edited by smooth approach (edited 03 December 2000).]

[supermunk]

How can you have any faith in the AAC when they build b***dy great lamp posts on the edge of the pan at a certain airfield in the north. The same people cut down all the trees around a hangar because of "flight safety" problems with a/c taxiing on the peri track. Those a/c can't even drive down the taxiway now without dinking a wing on a lamp standard. Military intelligence is a contradiction in terms...

[Lu Zuckerman]

The Apache is Viet Nam Era technology and has proved to be highly unreliable. The equipment and weaponry that is carried by the Apache has proved to be quite effective however if the helicopter can't get off the ground due to maintenance then the quality and effectiveness of the weapons systems means nothing. Even the chain gun has shown to be unreliable. I plan on posting more if I can get it all together. This follow on post will explain in full why the Apache is so unreliable and requires such a high level maintenance to maintain a semblance of availability.

------------------
The Cat

[Lu Zuckerman]

The following letter was sent to Rotor & Wing in response to an article about the Apache Helicopter


August 30, 1999

Editor, Rotor & Wing
1201 Seven Locks Road
Potomac, Maryland
20854

Dear Mr. Persinos,

I am submitting this letter in response to your column in the July issue of Rotor&Wing as well as the article by Giovanni de Briganti in the August issue. Both of these articles addressed the failings of the AH 64 Apache Helicopter. The purpose of this letter is to shed light on the reasons why the Apache was and is such a poor performer. The letter will be broken into several segments referencing the following:

 Why the Apache has such a low degree of reliability and availability.

 The operational philosophy of the U S Army Aviation Command and how it influenced the training of Apache pilots and maintenance personnel.

 What the U S Army told the pilots regarding the survivability of the Apache relative to the ZSU 23-4 weapons system.

 How the Apache performed when placed in a combat situation.

 The investigation of the Apache by the Government Accounting Office outlining the serious logistical support problems and how these problems effected the Apaches’ combat readiness.

 The Apache night vision system: the selection of the vendor and how responsive the system is to combat demands.

In 1973 the writer was a technical consultant hired by Hughes Helicopters to prepare the response to the U S Army RFP for an attack helicopter. The writers task was to establish the Maintainability program per Mil documents 470 and 471 and to define the design for maintainability parameters for the various systems in response to the Army requirements, These included the number of maintenance personnel that would be involved in various maintenance activities and the length of time that the Army prescribed for each of those various maintenance actions. These activities involved extensive interface with the Hughes design team. It was obvious to the writer that the so called design team had exceeded their level of competence. Hughes Helicopters, at that time was not technically competent to take on a program as complex as the Apache. To top it off, they had absolutely no idea regarding Reliability and Maintainability and, for the length of the program that was managed by Hughes, that situation would not change. By the time McDonnell Douglas took the program over, the design with all its’ faults was cast in concrete.

The writer performed his assigned task and the response to the RFP was submitted to the Army. Having finished his assignment, the writer went on to other pursuits. Several months later, the writer was called back, as the entire submittal had to be re-written. With the completion of the re-write, the writer went to work for Bell Helicopter International in Iran as manager of service engineering and Reliability and Maintainability. Three years later, the writer returned to California and was invited to return to Hughes Helicopters as a senior R&M specialist with responsibilities of incorporating Reliability and Maintainability into the design of the AH 64 Apache. When the writer returned to Culver City he was shocked. Absolutely nothing had changed. It was as If the writer had left work on Friday and returned the following Monday. The only thing that did change was a sign in the Project Engineering offices. This sign had 10 elements defined in their order of importance to the contract. The first was performance and the second was Reliability and Maintainability. Upon his return, the writer looked at the sign and performance was near the bottom of the list followed by Reliability and Maintainability.

Absolutely no progress had been made relative to incorporating Reliability or Maintainability into the design. It seems that Hughes like many other defense contractors discovered that the incorporation of R&M into the design equates to increased costs. In dealing with engineering management, the writer felt that he was talking to a brick wall. The department managers absolutely refused to discuss R&M and they refused to recognize that the R&M requirements in the specification applied to engineering. After all, they told the writer,” R&M was not included as a part of the engineering design portion of the spec and therefore was not their responsibility”. This situation is quite common in the defense industry. When the military prepares the specs for a piece of equipment, they segregate R&M from engineering and in some cases, they include R&M as a part of the commercial section of the spec which further separates R&M from engineering. Not only were the department heads non-responsive to the requests of R&M, they were in most cases not qualified to manage a design program as complex as the AH 64 Helicopter. Examples of this were the department head of the hydraulics group. His claim to fame was the design of the shock strut for the Hughes 269 Helicopter landing gear. He also sat in the tail of the Spruce Goose monitoring the control actuators for leakage. This early on relationship with Howard Hughes placed this man in the position of a “House Guest”. This kept the man on the payroll no matter how ineffective he was in the performance of his assigned duties.

The head of the structures design group had in his resume’ that he supervised the design of the skid gear for the Model 269. This in no way equipped him to head up the design of such a complex helicopter. Since Hughes had never built a helicopter to Mil Specs prior to the Apache, they had never had to interface with R&M and Human Factors Engineers and they elected to ignore personnel from those groups. Later on they realized that the pilot interface could not be ignored so, the engineering department hired an ex Army helicopter Gun Ship pilot to supervise cockpit design.


The engineering department not only ignored R&M, the also ignored the Logistics Support organization. The engineering department viewed the input of these organizations as an infringement on their authority.

The R&M group was just as guilty of not having qualified management personnel. The department manager was a long time quality control manager while the manager of Reliability had a background in statistics. The manager of Maintainability was a former clerk who kept records on the Hughes OH 6. None had any experience in R&M. R&M was a part of the quality assurance organization which was headed by a “House Guest” that spent most of his time on a golf course. He had long ago exceeded his level of competence. The entire management structure was weak and because of their lack of understanding of the requirements of the spec and the importance of R&M in the design, they would not support the R&M personnel in arguments with engineering.

On one occasion the writer prepared a memo to be sent to the U S Army R&M program office in St. Louis. This memo outlined 27 different elements of the design that impacted R&M. This memo had to be submitted by a specific date relative to the contract start date. The memo was prepared well in advance of that date and it was submitted to the Manager of R&M for approval and he was to forward it to the Army program office. Instead, the memo ended up on the desk of the assistant chief engineer who was not involved in the review of R&M related material , and he refused to forward the memo on to the Aviation Directorate. The assistant chief engineer refused the writers requests to release the memo and would not say why. He later stated that he disagreed with the writer in his use of the terms shall and will. When the writer showed the assistant chief engineer a U S Army writing style document that upheld the writers use of the terms shall and will, the memo was returned to the writer. But by that time, it was too late. The Army accepted the design as it was and not as it should be. Each of those 27 items would later manifest themselves when the AH 64 went into service.

On frequent occasions, engineering would deny the requests of R&M to review the drawings while they were being created. R&M by contract was required to sign off on the drawings. Instead, the engineering department would accumulate several hundred drawings and they would call the R&M personnel on a Saturday giving them about two hours to perform their review. If the review could not be
Completed in that time, the drawings would be rolled up and the engineering department signed them off for R&M.

The engineering department suffered from the NIH (Not invented here) syndrome. During a final design review for the flight control system, the writer suggested that a component in the cyclic, collective and directional control systems be classified as Reliability Critical.
The component was a shear pin. The pin would be broken when the cyclic, collective or directional control system jammed and the pilot exerted sufficient force to break it. This allowed the effected control system to be operated “Fly by wire”. The writer raised the point three times during the meeting and three times he was told to shut up by the lead flight control engineer who was directing the meeting. In attendance at the meeting was a U S Army rep. He just sat there and listened. Evidently, the writer must have ticked the design engineer off by doing what was he was supposed to do. Fifteen minutes after the meeting was over, the writer returned to his office to be told that he was fired. The writer left that Friday and two months later, the U S Army rep that sat in on the meeting told engineering to make the shear pin a design critical item.

Hughes Helicopters was not equipped internally from a design and manufacturing standpoint to develop and manufacture the AH 64. From the very beginning, the design of the major life cycle items were farmed out to other firms. The only firm that the writer could interface with was Ryan Aeronautics in San Diego. Ryan assisted in the design of the fuselage and they built the entire airframe at their San Diego facility. The writer made twice-weekly visits to Ryan and found them to be very cooperative although none of the suggested changes could be incorporated because Hughes engineering would not approve them. All other vendors were off-limits to R&M

When McDonnell Douglas took over the program, all of the design flaws were cast in concrete. It didn’t take them long to realize that a major shake up in management was required. Most of the top managers that were let go ended up at Hiller Helicopters where it didn’t take them long to run that program into the ground.


Hughes Helicopters was not alone in the mismanagement of the AH 64 program. The U S Army shared much of the blame. The Army had recently cancelled the Cheyenne and they were looking for a replacement. The writer had worked on the Cheyenne program and he quickly realized that it was extremely complex and could not be maintained by the standard issue Army helicopter Mechanic in a combat situation. The Apache was even more complex and less maintainable in the field. The Army at that time was loosing a lot of maintenance personnel due to expiration of their first enlistment. Because of this, the Army was reluctant to send a new recruit to maintenance school to be trained on such a complex system as the AH 64. Instead, the new recruits would attend a basic maintenance-training program that was not system specific. These trainees would then be sent to Apache support companies where they would work under the direction of an experienced mechanic. To support this concept, the Army directed Hughes to develop technical manuals that were made for someone with a Junior High level education

There were more pictures than text and the pictures showed things such as a component with further smaller pictures of screws and nuts on that component. The text would direct the mechanic to pick out a specific screwdriver or a specific wrench and to place the tool as shown. Next to that was a picture of a clock with an arrow to indicate clockwise or counter clockwise direction. The text would then tell the mechanic how many turns to rotate the tool. Some of the illustrations were very complex. They were like the old medical texts that had multiple layers that could be peeled away to show the inner workings of the device. The total cost of this program was over 16 Million Dollars and the books were so expensive and so heavy that they could not be taken out to the aircraft. The Army had to revert to the same system used to support other aircraft in the fleet. Work cards that could be printed out and then discarded. There is no telling how much this added to program costs.

The Army also had their problems in the training of Apache pilots. Normally after training a pilot in basic flying skills he would be streamed into an organizational unit flying a specific type of helicopter where he would learn advanced skills. Many pilots that had been selected to fly the Apache were later found to be unable to adapt to the monocular sighting device on their helmet. This meant that his previous training to get to that point had been wasted. Later the Army tested all pilots early on to see if they could adapt to the monocular sight prior to being assigned to Apache training. By that time the Army had wasted Millions of dollars.

In every combat assignment the Apache proved to be a poor performer. In Panama the black boxes had to be opened up and dried out using a hair dryer. The boxes were designed for use in a European combat situation and not the high humidity of the tropics. In Desert Storm the Apache was used as a stand off weapon and never got “Down and Dirty” because the Army had come to understand that the Apache was not as invulnerable to ground fire as the design specification said it should be and, it didn’t stand up well to the dusty and sandy conditions. In the Balkans two Apaches’ were lost. One to pilot error and one to systems malfunction. Up to their transfer to that area of operations, the Apaches’ had been mainly maintained by civilian contractors. In the Balkans,they were being maintained by lower skilled Army personnel. Another situation that may have been rectified since the writers direct involvement, was the night vision system had to be operated for fifteen minutes to allow the cryogenic generator to bring the system down to operating temperature. This meant that if the Apache had an emergency flight assignment at night, the pilots would be flying blind for the first fifteen minutes.

The Army also lied to the pilots of the Apache relative to its’ invulnerability to the ZSU 23 weapons system. This was the primary weapon that would be used against the Apache if it were to attack a group of Warsaw Pact tanks.


This weapon was also being supplied to all of the governments that were in league with the Warsaw Pact. The U S Army commissioned a study by a so-called”Think Tank” to study the effectiveness of the ZSU 23 against the Apache. It was their considered opinion that the ZSU 23 was inaccurate, It had a low degree of reliability and that if the ZSU 23 did hit the Apache with one round, the pilot would have sufficient time to evade any further hits by dropping below the tree line. The uninitiated reader should understand that the ZSU 23 has a rate of fire of 1200 rounds per minute and that if one bullet hit its’ mark, there would be forty or fifty rounds right behind the first round. When the writer was on contract with Agusta helicopters he took a two week holiday in Yugoslavia. While there, the writer watched a T V program which was describing the weaponry of the Warsaw Pact. One of the weapons demonstrated was the ZSU 23. In the demonstration the weapon was pointed on a line parallel to a stand of trees. A helicopter popped up from behind the trees and in an instant the weapon acquired the helicopter and was pointed directly at it. The helicopter then dropped below the tree tops and at that time the gun was turned off. The helicopter was allowed to fly away and the gun was turned on. It immediately started to fire and it swept an arc approximately 30 to 45 degrees on either side of center. The trees started to explode. It looked like there were hundreds of chain saw wielding loggers in the tree stand felling trees as fast as they could. It appeared to the writer that if a hail of 23mm bullets didn’t hit the helicopter,it would be destroyed by a falling tree.

In 1990 the U S Congress commissioned the United Stated General Accounting Office to study the Apache and its’ poor performance relative to logistical support,reliability and other problems effecting the Army’s’ ability to maintain high availability rates. This report was requested by The Honorable Les Aspin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services and The Honorable John D. Dingell Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. The report went on in great detail to describe the problems of the Apache and , in reading the report, the writer felt that it was “Déjà vu all over again” Referring back to the 27 items outlined in the report which the Army never received, almost every one was addressed as a failing in the design of the Apache. The writer felt vindicated, but at what cost.

Another problem as perceived by the writer was the selection of the vendor for the TADS/PNVS. The problem didn’t arise when the contract was let but it did show up much later. As previously indicated the problem may have been in the writer’s own perception. At the award of the AH 64 contract the Army assigned a colonel to manage the program. This individual was influential in the selection of prospective vendors and signed off for the Army when a vendor was selected. The colonel was eventually promoted to one star general a position he maintained until his retirement.

This is where the writer sees the problem, as shortly after his retirement the General went to work as a Vice President of the firm that was the successful bidder on the TADS/PNVS. This is done quite often but the government specifies a waiting period. The writer feels that the waiting period had not expired. In fact, the waiting period had not even started.

The writer quite often questioned his superiors and the assigned Army personnel about how the Army would react to the discovery that the Apache could not be maintained in the field and that it would cost almost twice what Hughes Helicopters had bid to get the contract. Their collective response was that the Army would approach the Congress and request a supplemental budget to make up the difference in operational costs.

The writer has been involved in several programs which include the following helicopter designs; Agusta A 129, The Bell AH 1J, The Bell-Boeing V 22, The AH 64 and the Cheyenne. All of these air vehicles are designed to get “Down and Dirty “ in support of the ground forces. It is this writers opinion that the first four designs will not survive when exposed to a hostile environment. The pilot workload, under these conditions, will be so severe, that he, the pilot will be overcome while operating his systems, while trying to evade hostile enemy ground fire. He will be incapacitated by the IOP. The IOP or Intensity Of Pucker will manifest itself under these conditions and the pilot’s attention will soon be diverted from his assigned mission and he will be thinking mainly of protecting his butt.. The V 22 and the Comanche are made mainly from composite material which means that if either of these aircraft sustains major damage whether in peacetime or in battle, the aircraft will be lost to the operating unit because repairs can only be accomplished at the factory or depot. True, on paper a composite airframe can be shown to be more reliable than a metal airframe but when a metal airframe suffers damage it can be repaired locally. Even when a metal airframe has to be taken to the depot, it can be repaired in less time and at lower cost. It is this Writers personal opinion that the best combat attack helicopter ever made was the MD Defender. The U S Army could purchase 14 MD Defenders for every Apache. Look at the cost effectiveness and multiplication of the weapons capability when a unit commander has 112 MD Defenders instead of 8 Apaches. The MD Defender only requires one pilot so the only difference would be in the number of pilots that would be required. From a pilots point of view there are no sophisticated elements in the MD Defender and if the airframe is involved in an accident or it is shot down it is highly survivable.

Hopefully The writer has shown some of the basic reasons behind the poor performance of the AH 64 Apache. Just think, what would the Apache be if the writers’ memo got delivered on a timely basis.

Very truly yours, S L Zuckerman






------------------
The Cat

[Lu Zuckerman]

The report referenced in my posting above is:

United States General Accounting office
Report to Congressional Requestors

APACHE HELICOPTER

Serious Logistical Support Problems Must Be Solved to Realize Combat Potential

GAO/NSAID-90-294
Dated September 1990

This report is ten years old but most of it still applies.

The report is available through the US Government Printing Office
Washington, DC

In my opinion the UK MOD should have read this report prior to committing to the Apache.

------------------
The Cat

[MightyGem]

Tex!! At long last, an Army Aviator from the US. I was beginning to think that none of you had a computer. Lets have more of you on this forum. Do you have the same problems that our guys do? What's the Apache like in service?

[Tex]

Yes, US Army types do own computers. In fact many active duty Aviators have issued computers.

To comment on the Apache...In my opinion...we would be much better off to have a modernized Cobra supplemented with the MD.

We had the OH-6 converted to the AH-6 and it performed with excellence.

The Apache and Commanche are expensive. So expensive that US Army commanders feared putting into battle. The well publicized movement of Apaches from Germany to Kosovo was a dark day for the US Army Aviation Corps which it has not completely recovered from.


The Apache is expensive to maintain and for pilots to stay current in. If I were paying the bills, I would go with something else, say a modern AH 1 Cobra.

Fraternally,

Tex

[This message has been edited by Tex (edited 04 December 2000).]

[Nil nos tremefacit]

Lu

From your incredibly long, but very interesting post:

“Déjà vu all over again” :)

Made I smile!

In all seriousness, that is one of the most damning posts I've seen written in a long time.

:)

[Junglie]

Dear Tex
I have just had a conversation with a a guy running the air int in Bondsteel, Kosovo( he is a uh60 driver but works closely with the Apache crews and oh58d crews) and discussed both the apache problems and the crash in Macedonia. He told me that alot of the problems to do with the A model were avionic based due to a number of different computers trying to interface. This has apparently been bettered in the D as it only has 2 or 3 computer systems to interface. He also said the gun jammed when filled up so now they just don't put quite so many rounds in the feeder.

Tex are you USMC? and how is Honolulu?

CR couldn't agree with you more about the career path for the AAC.

As for Apache and any other new bit of kit lets have the most capable people operating it whatever service they may be from, at the end of the day we are all on the same side and that needs to be the winning one.

Bring back the Royal Flying Corps (as long as its not crab uniform!!)

As for all you AAC officers being battlefield experts (pre JDSC) is that based on the 1 week tactics course at Middle Wallop
and your 6 month attachment with the argylle and bolton wanderers getting drunk in Scotland?

All three services operate battlefield helicopters in one shape or form and all have vast experience within that field so stop being quite so blinkered.

Bowing to the crowd i put on my helmet and shout INCOMING!!

[This message has been edited by Junglie (edited 04 December 2000).]

[Lu Zuckerman]

Regarding the comment made by Tex about using an upgrade Cobra in place of the Apache. As far as downtime for maintenance the Cobra is slightly behind the Apache for Maintenance Man Hours/Flight Hours (MMHFH).

On my assignment in Iran I had to monitor the AH1J Cobras along with the Bell 214s for maintenance activity. The AH1Js had been in service for several years in the US Marine Corps and the mechanics maintaining them and the pilots flying them were all experienced ex US Marines. When the month of observation was over, it was determined that the AH1J had a MMHFH of 70.

In retrospect I can account for much of the high maintenance rates on poor build quality but even with that, the rates should have been considerably lower.

Here are several points of comparison:

AH-1W Sea Cobra 15.0
UH-1N Huey 16.3
SH-3H Sea King 37.2
CH-53E Sea Stallion 39.1
SH-60 Sea Hawk 21.0

Here is a paragraph taken from the report referenced above.

Maintenance Man-Hours Have Been Undertstated

Army test data has shown that the Apache needs 5 or fewer maintenance hours per flight hour--well within the requirement of 8-13 man-hours. However, this measurement of the number of maintenance man-hours conflicts with the large maintenance work load experienced at Apache battalions and contrasts with the much higher maintenance man-hours reported by the other services on their tactical aircraft.(See Above) The recorded number of maintenance man-hours appears unrealistically low because the Army narrowly defines what maintenance man-hours are counted and because its' man hour data is incomplete.

What the report was stating is that the Army didn't want to look bad.


------------------
The Cat

[This message has been edited by Lu Zuckerman (edited 04 December 2000).]

[Col Lective]

Dear Junglie, most of us in the AAC do not think of ourselves as "battlefield experts" and regard the young inexperienced officer who thinks he does in the same way your post suggests. I think what most AAC soldiers mean is that we have the experience "down in the weeds". No one is suggesting for a minute that the other services do not do an excellent job on the battlefield - we are not all blinkered!! - but maybe your idea of what we actually do isn't all that clear. However you may have actually been on the Army Pilots Course (are you a bootneck?) if so then I shall take my foot from my mouth!!
Please don't tar us all with the same brush! :)

[Charlie Luncher]

Christopher Robin

My Flippant post was not meant to rile you(oh ok it was). My point being the AEop trade has been dealing with multi-sensor operation for many years and the experience that goes with it. The advances in the last few years probably give the trade as a whole more experience than any other in the British armed forces. I dont want to take your new toy it should stay in the hands of the Land Commander but in this world of jointery why not establish exchange posts, as it is logical and makes sense.
But if you are hampered by tradition I can not help you.
As an aside the Littoral Maritime Environment is probably just as complex if not more so than your battlefield. Without us you dont get ashore to fight, it is worth a thought you might suprise yourself.
Charlie sends

[Jeep]

CR how is your desk handling? Hope you manage to fly it in balance more than your last type.

Remember, you have been chosen, because of your ability, education, commission and poor looks to leave the flying game to be a professional 'Captain Darling'. Once you have been educated, achieved your 1000 CASH email badge, been educated again achieved your 5000 CASH email badge you will then qualify for a lottery ticket on the command board and perhaps, who knows, command an Apache Sqn.

The moral of the tale? Even at the end of your tunnel there is light, it’s just that you need to don some NG700s again to see it. If you need some executive stress relief or just wish to smell some OX27 again, give me a call and you'll be sorted out. We have had some very nice postcards of lynx made with a scratch and sniff oil sample.

Of course it could be worse, they might remove your flying pay - now wouldn’t that be a cost saving measure and a half.

[Twilight]

Great article highlighting all the problems the AH64 A! had, very interesting but the AAC hasn't bought Apache As, it has bought Longbow D Models. I am reliably informed by a man in the know that there are huge differences. I didn't understand all of them but to recap what I took on board-

new airframe
new engines
new radar
new RFI
new DAS
new cockpits
new flight controls
higher AUW capability
new rockets
new missiles
improved 30mm accuracy
improved fire control

So all in all you may as well dig out an article about the problems the Phantom had and relate them to Eurofighter Typhoon. The AAC has bought a great bit of kit - the main question is can they use it?

We, the RAF, have alot to offer and maybe Harrier/Apache exchange posts are the first thing. Surely there will be lots of role overlap. Equally we must seize this oppurtunity to gain a closer understanding of the ground war - maybe the aircraft will generate increased joint ops and further enhance our mutual understanding.

The point about support is hugely valid - one thing the RAF knows about is supporting high intensity air operations. I am guessing the Apache D models will use more fuel and a ton more ammo than the Lynx. Who is going to provide that?

Spec aircrew is not necessarily your answer either - what you need is experienced commanders. Our Sqns are commanded by Wg Cdrs, Stations by Group Captains - if you matched our command/rank structure you would find your young officers have much more time to get to grips with safe aviation and get some flying under their belt before being whisked away to do staff jobs and can then get on with commanding from experience.

Spec aircrew quite often (and most admit it) don't have the breadth of expereince to command anything more than a flight (nor do they want to). We all do staff jobs in the RAF and I am sure the RN do too. We just do them much later and therefore have 'the big picture' coupled with lots of flying experience. Your guys have 'the big picture' but can't impliment it 'cos you are too busy trying to stay in balance. The answer is stop promoting people so fast and let them fly more (2 more 3 yr tours in flying posts would suffice compared to what you do now).

Finally stop letting your QFIs run everything - my god if the RAF was like that we would all fly in straight lines and never get anything done. Get some people on the QWI course, even as observers (especially your Apache pilots).
:)


[This message has been edited by Twilight (edited 04 December 2000).]

[Jeep]

Twilight - Are you sure the AAC is run by QFIs? At a rough count there are about 5. I know there is defo 1 QWI, well until he gets out in Jan. I do like your rank system though. lets see how it would work in the AAC. All pilots are captains, flight commanders major, squadron comd as Lt Col and my CO could be a full colonel. hmmm in JIFNI that would make him the same rank as the stash, so he would have to be promoted. if he was promoted, other stash's would have to be. then to make it even every other crab would have to move up one rank and ahhhhh i see where you are going with this.

[This message has been edited by Jeep (edited 05 December 2000).]

[fobotcso]

You guys talking QFIs? P'raps you mean QHIs. Lot more than five.

[Twilight]

QFI/QHI - all the same to me.

[Gary Astazu]

"Twilight" Here Here to flying in straight lines. If the Crab QFI's had the same ethos as Army QHI's you blue JOBS might have some B@lls!!!

[Tandem-Seater]

Jointery will bring with it all sorts of benefits which many of you seem to be alluding to. Yes the Army will have problems overcoming the logistical nightmare of supporting the Apache and yes there will be a whole tranche of other problems which we will have to overcome in the non too distant future. But as long as we all take off the blinkers and embrace this new technology, then between the best military aviators (of any cap badge) supported by the most professional military support system I have ever come across (in my 23 years this has consistently been the case) we will make this thing work.
As for the Harrier/Apache exchange, I can foresee a lot of water passing under that particular bridge before it happens as there would be many hurdles to cross. As I recall, it takes quite a long time to get a fast jet mate to the front line, so to make it worthwhile he/she would need a fair time in the job in order to become effective(just a thought here, why don't we look wider than the Harrier force?). At present, the AAC officer system doesn't give him enough time to learn his craft as a rotary pilot let alone a jet, so when is he supposed to learn how to be an effective AAC Sqn commander? Just a thought. Everybody in the forces whether on the ground or in the air will benefit from the Apache so lets just hope that the powers that be adopt a non partisan pragmatic approach and allow us all to do our jobs effectively and make the bl**dy thing work!!

[Userper]

<A HREF="http://www.army.mod.uk/aht/" TARGET="_blank">http://www.army.mod.uk/aht/</A> Just as an interlude, have a look at this. At least something is progressing.

[Col Lective]

I've just visited said site - someone's having a giraffe!

[ChristopherRobin]

Charlie, now of course I realise that you guys have lots of expertise but unfortunately it is so hard to resist having a laugh at the air force's expense. Lets call it jealousy on my part.

Lu - that is almost certainly the best piece of info on the AH (US version) I have ever read - thanks.

Everyone - no arguments from me that the AAC has a lot to learn from the other services, particularly the length of time between training and "combat ready" in SHAR et al.

And Jeep - thank you for that kind offer mate, and we must grab a drink soon when I join the great xmas rush for Calais.

Some great ideas on tri-service stuff. I think that cross-training is the gold-plated option, but lets face it, it costs more than the government will cough up, but if we have a JHF, then why shouldn't all the rotary guys get posted within the 3 services? Rather than penny-packeting exchanges why not make it policy? Exchanges are something you do with other countries' armies for christ's sake! Let's make all spec aircrew CWs like (I think) they do in the States!

Let's have more joint courses (Like they do at the AWC) because that's always a good way to exchange ideas (at the bar naturally).

Basically: why don't we listen to what aviators of all arms are saying and implement it.

We are all very keen that the AH should be a success - we don't want it to fail! So is anyone prepared to let us reorganise our system of crewing beyond the obsolete arrangement we have now?

Does anybody know of any such moves that may ease the pain of my ulcer?

anybody?

------------------
Christopher Robin

[Junglie]

Dear Col Lective

Best you take proverbial foot from mouth then!!

Et Al - Looks like there is a general agreement from alot of people that exchanges between services need to be changed into ordinary appointments/postings. Surely a wider experience base across the whole rotary community can only benefit all three services. Wonder if anyone with any might is reading this thread. Lets turn JHC into the leader for cross service appointments.

I can't see the benefits or cost effectiveness of re training a fast jet mate to fly the apache there are plenty of capable people in the rotary world to do the job. I don't suppose you'd get a harrier mate off his bang seat anyway!!

[Jeep]

Christopher Robin, an alarm bell has gone off on your flying record folder. Have you found the yellow and black handle on your desk?

Just a rumour of course.

[cobaltfrog]

This wouldn't be the same AAC that sends pilots to the states to train on the Apache, brings them back to UK and then doesn't let them fly for a year is it?!?

Or gives them a job on 651 flying a desk!

Just asking !!

[You Aint Seen Me. Roit!]

MCM Glasgow has always maintained that the AAC do not have an Aircrew shortage, but is this all about to change, especially those associated with the AH.

MCM may be correct with regard to bums on seats, but who would agree that we have sufficient experience across the Corps to continue to man the Gazelle, let alone the Apache. Not me, thats for sure.

The numbers of those banging out may not yet be significant, but the identities of those individuals leaving is very significant.

A WO trained in the States has already gone. A Major with as much Apache experience as any Brit has resigned with rumours that another WO is soon to play his card. 1 Wallop based QHI earmarked to join the programme at the next phase of training has recently signed off with rumours of another just waiting for his QHI Course timebar to run out before he does the same.

The Corps may well be overmanned, but what with? A lack of quality in my opinion.

[Mark IX]

Christopher,

You are so boring.

Mark xxx