SIC Rejected Takeoff Rights

[richjb]

A question for the PPRuNe group. Does your airline permit the SIC or First Officer to make the abort decision and/or execute the RTO maneuver when they are the Pilot Flying?

Thanks,

Rich Boll
Wichita, KS

[STBYRUD]

Nope, stop or go is PICs decision obviously unless incapacitated.

[BOAC]

BA and I suspect other airlines with 'better' P2's do.:)

[Emoclew]

In the airline I am familiar with, it used to be the case that the Capt made the RTO call and the PF, whichever that was, carried out the stopping actions.
It was found that a better RTO resulted when the Capt made both the call and took control to do the RTO actions.
The F/O then was PM for failure drills etc.
Not very familiar with any other system, so I can't comment whether this is the optimum scenario or not. Hope this helps.

[aviatorhi]

"Proceduraly" and in 99% of cases the PICs decision will be the correct one. Regardless of the FOs experience levels.

Practically the FO should take over the aircraft any time it's obvious their life is in danger (CA continuing with fire bell going off after 1 notification of the engine being on fire followed by 2 abort calls from me, luckily in a simulator). Also, years of experience on a particular air-frame has a way of "adding" performance, particularly in smaller A/C.

[Sciolistes]

Nope, stop or go is PICs decision obviously unless incapacitated.
I think that that makes it a "yep" then, because if a reject condition arises and the Capt'n does nothing (i.e. incapacitated), then it is the SIC's responsibility to make the decision and perform the action.

[ImbracableCrunk]

In the sim, I've had to demonstrate both auto-land go-arounds and rapid decompression/emergency descents with PIC incapacitation.

I guess PICs aren't allowed to be incapacitated during takeoff. It's probably in the regs somewhere. Unless you're in a Trident.

[I-2021]

In my current airline and in the airlines I have been working before the decision is taken by the Captain and the actions executed by the CM1, which is normally also the captain unless it is a training flight like a command upgrade. Obviously the Capt may become incapacitated anytime and it is therefore the FO duty (CM2 in normal ops) to carry out the RTO. Other than that I have never experienced SOPS where both the Capt and the FO had the authority to stop the takeoff, except in the above mentioned cases or in case the capt is obviously getting it really wrong like the examples that have been given above in other posts (emergency authority).

[Centaurus]

Boeing FCTM advice is the captain always makes the reject decision and conducts the reject manoeuver. It has been ever so in aviation although various operators empower the copilot to make the decision and the reject actions. Their problem...

[Basil]

I've flown with only PiC permitted to call "Stop!" and also with either permitted to do so.
My preference both as a FO and as a PiC is for the decision always to be made by the captain but, since I don't write the Ops Manual, I do what the company says.

[richjb]

Thanks for everyone's comments. I appreciate your assistance.

The question was not so much targeted at pilot incapacitation or failure to react, but rather who in the cockpit had the authority to call for a rejected takeoff and whether the RTO was to be performed only by the captain or by the first officer if he/she is the pilot flying the takeoff.

Sorry that I'm not familar with the differing nomenclature concerning captain & first officer. PIC & SIC and PF & PM, are terms that I'm most familar with.

Thanks again!

Rich Boll

[frontlefthamster]

Hmmm...

The passengers think they are paying for two qualified pilots to be at the controls...

I've flown with both systems, and there is no doubt in my mind that the best operation is with full role reversal and both having the right to say and do 'stop', provided the RHS occupants are of high calibre and well trained and tested.

I've only had one genuine big engine problem before V1, and the FO, PNF, spotted it well before I did. He called stop and I did.

The points made above reflect the awkwardness of the system, there's history about qualification lost here, too, and there are few operators who meet my criteria above, these days...

[FE Hoppy]

As a FE in the mil I had authority to call stop but in civvy life I was suddenly incapable.

[bubbers44]

Barbados in the carribean in a 727 we were nearing V1 and lost the left generator. We had a rainy day so the runway was wet and we were at max takeoff weight. 1000 and 3. I told the FO flying to keep going and the FE would fix it. He had a check FE requalifying him on that flight. I told the FE to fix the problem knowing the fix was one pak off. He put essential power to number 1 engine and at V1 lost most of our instruments. I said they will fix it and continued. They finally got it sorted out and put essential power back on #3 engine. I don't know what the standard procedure would be then but felt I did the right thing. Sometimes doing what makes sense works.

[JammedStab]

Barbados in the carribean in a 727 we were nearing V1 and lost the left generator. We had a rainy day so the runway was wet and we were at max takeoff weight. 1000 and 3. I told the FO flying to keep going and the FE would fix it. He had a check FE requalifying him on that flight. I told the FE to fix the problem knowing the fix was one pak off. He put essential power to number 1 engine and at V1 lost most of our instruments. I said they will fix it and continued. They finally got it sorted out and put essential power back on #3 engine. I don't know what the standard procedure would be then but felt I did the right thing. Sometimes doing what makes sense works.

Bad selection I would say. 3,1,2, standby as you know was the order for essential power selection, so everything was already O.K. on that part as #3 generator was fine. Turning off a pack lowers electrical consumption big time when flaps are extended as it shuts off its cooling fan. I guess he moved the wrong switch. Oops, hate to lose a bunch of instruments on the PF side near rotation. One time, we had the whole main portion of the captains instrument panel slide out near V1. Maintenance forgot to secure it after some work. We were empty with good acceleration.

[Centaurus]

As a FE in the mil I had authority to call stop but in civvy life I was suddenly incapable.

What a coincidence. These identical sentiments were echoed by a 727 F/E (former RAF Hastings flight engineer) of my acquaintance over a beer somewhere or other. He then gave an example of his awesome power (authority) to call an abort (Royal Air Force ). He was F/E on a RAF Hastings taking off from Darwin. Nearing lift off he noticed an oil pressure anomaly and called "STOP". The captain rejected the take off and after parking the brake said "Why did you call "STOP?" The F/E replied he thought he saw a falling oil pressure needle on one of the engines.

The captain was annoyed and said next time you call "STOP" make sure it is for a good reason. With that, the captain back-tracked for another take off and lined up. Meanwhile the F/E seethed with indignation.

Down the runway they went and again the F/E yelled "STOP".

True to SOP which gave the authority for the F/E to call "STOP" the captain hauled off the throttles and stood on the brakes. Turning to the F/E he said "WTF did you call "STOP" for this time?

The F/E said I called "STOP" because you did not use the full length of the runway and started the take off run well down the runway. That was illegal by RAF SOP so I called "STOP" as I am authorised to do so, SIR.

Draw your own conclusions...but it may explain why as a civilian F/E you are not authorised to make the decision to reject and why a crew member calling "STOP" should never mean the captain must therefore stop blindly without having any idea why the call was made in the first place...

The Boeing FCTM covers this nicely by stating "The PM should closely monitor essential instruments during the take off roll and immediately announce abnormalities such as "Engine Fire", "Engine Failure", or any adverse condition significantly affecting the safety of flight. The decision to reject the take off is the responsibility of the captain...

[FE Hoppy]

What a coincidence. These identical sentiments were echoed by a 727 F/E (former RAF Hastings flight engineer) of my acquaintance over a beer somewhere or other. He then gave an example of his awesome power (authority) to call an abort (Royal Air Force ). He was F/E on a RAF Hastings taking off from Darwin. Nearing lift off he noticed an oil pressure anomaly and called "STOP". The captain rejected the take off and after parking the brake said "Why did you call "STOP?" The F/E replied he thought he saw a falling oil pressure needle on one of the engines.

The captain was annoyed and said next time you call "STOP" make sure it is for a good reason. With that, the captain back-tracked for another take off and lined up. Meanwhile the F/E seethed with indignation.

Down the runway they went and again the F/E yelled "STOP".

True to SOP which gave the authority for the F/E to call "STOP" the captain hauled off the throttles and stood on the brakes. Turning to the F/E he said "WTF did you call "STOP" for this time?

The F/E said I called "STOP" because you did not use the full length of the runway and started the take off run well down the runway. That was illegal by RAF SOP so I called "STOP" as I am authorised to do so, SIR.

Draw your own conclusions...but it may explain why as a civilian F/E you are not authorised to make the decision to reject and why a crew member calling "STOP" should never mean the captain must therefore stop blindly without having any idea why the call was made in the first place...

The Boeing FCTM covers this nicely by stating "The PM should closely monitor essential instruments during the take off roll and immediately announce abnormalities such as "Engine Fire", "Engine Failure", or any adverse condition significantly affecting the safety of flight. The decision to reject the take off is the responsibility of the captain...


Or perhaps it's down to the generally lower selection and training standards in civil aviation?
:E

[Anotheravatar]

No good answer.

In the past, they created CRM for a weak FO to keep the captain from killing everyone.

But with the airlines hiring the weakest FOs they can find, I suspect they just don't if they are in trouble short of aliens trying to shoot them out of the sky. So it's back to the captain having the experience to make the call.

[misd-agin]

FE Hoppy - oh puleeze. Some military SOP's are because they have inexperienced crews flying high performance and/or demanding a/c.

Because of that the military has numerous policies and SOP's that are dumbed down to the lowest common denominator, just like the civilian world.

[c100driver]

The real difference between Mil ops and Civil ops is the strict liability.

The Rules say:-

The Pilot in Command is responsible for xxxxxx (add in what ever you are talking about)

I have never seen "the first officer is responsible for xxxxx" in any of our rules.

So the first officer sees the big orange light on prior to V1 and screams "STOP". The pilot in command responds to the instruction, as we are conditioned from childhood to do, as well as being at a heightened state in a takeoff roll and poised to react. The aircraft slides off the end of the runway due to the big orange light being ANTI SKID INOP.

Who is responsible? The Captain is because the law says that the P in C is responsible! Yes the F/O made a dumb call but it is the P in C that carries the can!

Good training and respect between the seats will usually get a good outcome, but at the end of the day P in C is the one in Command!

[frontlefthamster]

C100driver,

By which piece of magic does the pilot who calls 'stop' for anti-skid inop suddenly cease to do so when sitting four feet to the left of his previous place?

Notwithstanding that a certain amount of human error will always be with us, proper training and testing are key.

The trained flight crew members are responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft. Your argument, I'm afraid, is about culpability and liability, not safe operation.

Yes, the military fly inexperienced crews and have SOPs to reflect that (but those are stil very good SOPs). They do not fly inadequately trained or insufficiently able crews. History tells us that the civil world does, and personal experience backs this up to the hilt.

This, of course, is why the sensible manufacturer will inhibit the anti-skid inop caution from 80 knots to 1,000 ft, and this, in turn, is why Boeing should never have been allowed to make the NG without updating then flight deck properly).

[Ivor Fynn]

Misd-agin,

Maybe on your side of the pond.

Ivor:E

[cosmo kramer]

According to Boeing either crew member should call out the malfunction, who ever sees it first. Regardless if it is the captain or not.

Only then will the one that holds the throttles (the captain in the case of Boeing) call stop. It would be pretty stupid to have the first officer call stop, as long as he is not holding the throttles.

The benefit of having this responsibility placed on the same person on every take off, is that there will be no confusion as to who should do the abort and the captain will always be in the state of mind to perform the about. The maneuver itself, while uncomplicated, is (should be) a reaction based on memorized reflexes, hence his muscles are instinctively ready to perform those reflexes on every takeoff. If the responsibility changed with every takeoff, the brain would have to process who is to perform the reject before the muscles take action causing an unnecessary delay.

But as said either can call out the malfunction, and the rules are clear cut when a rejected takeoff should be performed or not. The first officer calling "engine failure" before V1, is effectively the same as calling stop. The actual "stop" callout from the captain is a confirmation that the actions are being taken.

Only ambiguity in the rules are the "unable or unsafe to fly". Which in my opinion is a ridiculous wording. Unless you had a collision on the runway where a wing is torn off, it's pretty much impossible to say if the aircraft will fly or not until you reach VR in which case you would be out of luck with regards to stopping anyway.

[aviatorhi]

...it's pretty much impossible to say if the aircraft will fly or not until you reach VR...

Have you thought of;

1) multiple engines stalling or failing
2) reverser deployment (severity varies by type of reverser)
3) structural failure
4) gear collapse (goes with 3)

There are a slew of unlikely scenarios (which have, nonetheless, happened) which would cause me (and caused those involved) to prefer running off the end rather than going in the air.

[cosmo kramer]

Before V1, you stop for an engine failure - that means for more than one in my book as well (isn't that a bit pedantic?).

An uncommanded thrust reverser deployment is a severe systems malfunction, which I would brief and stop for too before V1.

A gear collapse?? Do I have a choice to continue?

A structural failure (that is not due to a collision which I did consider above), can I have an example of that happening in the past (Wright brothers, Santos-Dumont etc. not included)?


Or did you mean after V1? In which case they are all a given too, but not really relevant to the topic. Anyway, two engines out on a twin you are not going anywhere for sure. Unlocked reverser (737) between V1 and VR you better hope for a false indication since you are sure to immediately loose control (VMCG). Collapsed gear, and structural failure - see before V1.

In my opinion the phrase "unsafe or unable to fly" was written by Boeings lawyers, not pilots.

[RainingLogic]

On PPRUNE, all planes fly after Vr.

In fact, because of this website, the military is considering abandoning all fighter aircraft, because once planes hit Vr they can't be shot down due to the magic force field created by the airspeed indicator after Vr.

[safetypee]

cosmo, #23/25 … "unable or unsafe to fly" .... is a ridiculous wording" :ok:
I agree with the hint of futility, the phrase does little to enhance practical safety.

For those who insist on only the Captain taking action in an RTO, do you add a speed/distance margin to account for the time taken to change control if the FO is handling? Failure to consider this might invalidate the basis of aircraft performance certification. AC25 7C (www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/media/airAC25_7C.pdf) page 37 onwards.

[aviatorhi]

Cosmo, I'm referring to after V1 and before Vr (and even after Vr as well, though obviously still over the runway with some useful length remaining). While the phrase has a hint of Boeing covering it's *** to it, it does make it clear that not all circumstances can be accounted for in the book.

safetypee... Personally I believe that you should actually have a quicker reaction with the CA taking over from the FO as he should have been the first to notice the condition necessitating an abort and should already have his hands guarding the throttles and feet guarding the rudders. Where the CA is flying you have to account for some delay in response as he may not be aware of exactly what is going on until some time (even a second) is taken for evaluation.