Pursuit of excellence - the X-Factor in training accidents

[Centaurus]

With already 81,930 views and six Pprune pages on the Darwin Air North Brasilia crash, a fresh perspective is needed. Hence this point of view which it is hoped the Mods will not submerge literally with the current thread.

As it is, the Brasilia accident report should be vital reading for airline check pilots, flying instructors, and their ilk. In particular, the ATSB animated picture of the Brasilia flight path is a graphic example of the adage “A picture is worth a thousand words”

Several years ago, an ATO friend of mine died of injuries sustained in a similar asymmetric accident at Camden. In his undoubted enthusiasm to be realistic, he cut the mixture control to simulate engine failure on a Duchess shortly after lift-off. The student, himself a current Boeing 767 captain and flying instructor, was momentarily caught unawares and the aircraft yawed sharply. The ATO was too slow to set up zero thrust - the resulting drag from the windmilling propeller causing severe loss of climb performance. The Duchess clipped tree tops at the departure end of the runway and stalled wings level into rising terrain. The impact was not severe but during the ground slide the aircraft hit an unseen iron girder in long grass and a fuel tank ruptured. Both pilots evacuated the aircraft unhurt but were caught by fire. The student survived although badly burned. The instructor was not so fortunate and died in hospital of his injuries. He was a former student of mine in the RAAF where in 1959 I did his conversion to the Lincoln four engine bomber at Townsville. I remembered him as a keen and enthusiastic pilot.

Recently, I was reminiscing with another former Lincoln pilot about the good old days. He was a retired airline pilot and I was still involved in aviation training. He recalled that during his Lincoln training in 1957 it seemed to him we were rarely flying with four engines going– grumbling with good humour that I was always pulling engines on him. To be fair, in those days the Rolls Royce liquid cooled piston engines on the Lincoln were not as reliable as today’s power plants - engine failures being relatively common. For that reason, simulated engine failures were often practiced after lift-off while feathered propeller landings were part of conversion and recurrent training.

Despite over fifty years between our Lincoln flying and present conversation, I felt a twinge of guilt at what he perceived as my over-enthusiasm for practice engine failures. I wondered how many former students had felt the same way and why on earth didn’t someone tell me about it at the time? In those days, the squadron QFI worked almost single handed for conversion of new pilots to the Lincoln and with twenty or more pilots to worry about, he was a busy man. Commanding Officers ran the squadron while the QFI ran the training. If pilots privately felt the QFI’s enthusiasm for the job was a bit beyond a joke - especially with engine failures – it was a pity that their concerns never reached their Commanding Officer. As result, QFI’s often operated unsupervised in the job, except for an annual flight check at the RAAF Central Flying School.

There were a few hairy moments during conversion training on newly graduated 200 hour pilots who had never flown a multi-engine aircraft - let alone a big four engine tail-wheel bomber. All they had flown were Tiger Moths and Wirraways. Over-confidence is a close relation to over-enthusiasm and looking back at those years of instructing on Lincolns, I am sure over-enthusiasm for training excellence was a factor in close shaves some QFI’s experienced on other types over the years. The 1991 RAAF Boeing 707 fatal accident near East Sale was one such example, attributed to simulation of asymmetric flight training that resulted in a sudden and violent departure from controlled flight.

In later years, this scribe tried his hand at instructing in general aviation. One mellows with age and I soon became cautious of pulling engines at low speed and altitude - whether in a multi-engine type or a Cessna 172. From previous experience I was aware it takes only a momentarily wrong rudder or high nose attitude to cause an accident such as the Air North Brasilia.

Mixture cuts or sudden throttle closure to simulate engine failure at low speed after lift-off can be potentially dangerous, with any training value far outweighed by the risk of mishandling by the student or the instructor.
The two instructors on the Brasilia in Darwin, and the Duchess at Camden, were experienced on type. But I can’t help thinking that in the end their over-enthusiasm for the job may have led to their demise. If only someone in authority had pulled them up sharply when it was clear to others their very enthusiasm to impart knowledge was bordering on perilous for their students. It took 54 years before someone sorted out this writer and made him realise the potential dangers to which he had exposed his students in real aeroplanes all those years ago. Nowadays, simulators are the way to go. Yet, even in the safety of the simulator, instructors need to sit back sometimes and smell the roses, rather than overdo engine failures at V1. While an enthusiastic instructor is generally regarded as an asset to an organisation, over-enthusiasm has been known to lead to dangerous practices in flying training.

[FGD135]

Prior to conducting EFATO exercises in the real aircraft, how about the pilots be made to sit and watch that EMB120 animation a few times over?

Imagine if somebody had walked into that Air North briefing room just as those pilots were preparing to go out to the aircraft and said something like:

"Hey guys, don't you forget about VMCA now - it's a dangerous thing that VMCA - make sure you keep that airspeed comfortably above VMCA."

What would the reaction by those pilots have been? Their immediate reaction would probably be to look at the speaker with some bewilderment that he is bringing up something so basic.

Then they would probably say something like:

"Yeah ... don't you worry about that ... we've been instructors and training captains for a long time now ... we know all about VMCA ... "

[4dogs]

There is much truth in what Centaurus has to say.

One of the difficulties as a flying supervisor is actually knowing what the boys and girls are doing when they are not aware of being scrutinised.

However, the biggest problem these days is the level of ignorance of those very things that can bite you badly. The aviation world is awash with poor training, research apathy and declining knowledge standards. Instructor courses are a joke in terms of quality and depth of training and airline training pathways are embarrassingly bad. Operators won't pay enough for decent training to be provided and the regulator doesn't demand it. It is a vicious cycle, because the unknowing will set the future standards for the uninterested.

I think it is time to get a bit old fashioned about some of this stuff and to demand real knowledge and real skill from our trainers - which means we have to do some work providing the information and the propoer training.

Stay Alive,

[Sarcs]

Excellent post Centaurus! I think you, FGD135 and 4dogs have all hit the nail on the head i.e. the loss of older, wiser heads and in particular instructors!

Too many times I have been witness to overzealous ATO/Checkies who think they are re-inventing the wheel. However they all seem to lack knowledge/experience in the basics of physics i.e. what keeps the blue bit up top!:ugh::ugh:

Examples of shoving the power lever back to the flight idle stop on rotation or killing the inside engine while in the middle of a reversal turn, all come to mind.

All of this seems to come back to a lack of good basic initial training and the product these flying school factories are putting out!:=

[Baxter Dewall]

Very good Centaurus.

However, in this day and age, I think the relationship between Training and allocated budget are diametrically opposed.

[PLovett]

Excellent thread. Sometimes it may not only be the enthusiasm of the instructor either than can lead to problems. I was recently having a check flight in a C404 and had been briefed that there would be an EFATO and how the simulated failure would be achieved. The aircraft was nowhere near MTOW and I was expecting a spirited performance. I should add that my previous experience in a C404 was in one equipped for survey and was, therefore, quite heavy.

The takeoff was effected using 10 deg flap setting and following retraction of the gear and flaps the simulated exercise was conducted. I completed the phase 1 actions but was stunned by the lack of performance and was pushing the nose down to keep the airspeed above VMCA. We were not climbing (or only just) which was the complete opposite of what I expected. I was looking for an answer but not finding one when the engine power was restored.

After the engine power was restored I noticed that although the airspeed had increased it wasn't by as much as expected. It was then discovered that the flaps were indicating takeoff setting although the selector handle was up. On checking the emergency checklist and finding nothing that dealt with the situation we set the selector handle to match the flap indicator and returned to base. After landing that the flaps were at full extension which had not been commanded. We handed the aircraft over to the engineers.

They discovered that the wiring leading to the flap-limitation mechanism had shorted which they believe had led the flaps to self select to full possibly during the takeoff (which I admit didn't feel right but I put down to the aircraft being light), when I selected flaps up they retracted to the takeoff setting. On landing they returned to full flap due to the shorting.

On thinking back over the experience I realise that we came very close to a serious problem through no fault of the check pilot. He had briefed me extensively on what we would be doing and how he was going to do it. I should have been more quick in announcing a problem but there was little time and apart from the quickness that the aircraft left the runway (which I put down to the light takeoff weight) there was little else to indicate a problem apart from the flap indicator which I must admit I don't watch at the time of selecting flaps up. It could have ended very badly if the aircraft had been heavy.

[4Greens]

Correct me if I am wrong but:

CASA do not detail how failures may be given, including appropriate limits. They only say there should be a failure on take off etc.

Perhaps guidance should be given in a training manual backed by the regulator.

[KRUSTY 34]

IMHO all EFATO's at any multi-crew airline level should only be conducted in a simulator. If said airline cannot afford that sort of training, then maybe they shouldn't be allowed to operate.

Back in the late 90's a young collegue of mine was undergoing transition training on the company's RPT metro. After a grand total of one hour on type, the next phase of training was to be V1 cuts at night. The check captain occupied the LHS, my young friend occupied the RHS, and a third student sat down the back.

Wise beyond his years, the RHS student questioned the wisdom of such a maneuver, especially considering his lack of experience on type (as recorded by the CVR). The Check captain (also relatively young) assured him that it was legal, he had done this sort of thing before, and so it wouldn't be a problem.

The aircraft failed to achieve stable flight after take-off, clipped power lines, and crashed inverted approximately 1 kilometer from the end of the runway. Both students were killed and the Check captain escaped with non life threatening injuries! The airline folded shortly after.

There end'th the lesson. :sad:O

[Seabreeze]

CAAP 5.23-1(1) July 2007
Multi-engine Aeroplane Operations and Training

states

4.17.9 Engine failures may occur during any stage of flight and could require considerable time flying around with a propeller feathered. Therefore, a pilot must safely manage the aircraft when in this configuration. Propellers should never be feathered in flight during training below 3000 ft above ground level (AGL).

and
5.5.1 .......It would be folly to simulate an engine failure at low level by selecting the mixture to idle cut-off or turning the fuel selector off.

and

5.8.1 Flight instructors often simulate an engine failure by rapidly closing the throttle or moving the mixture control to idle cut-off. The latter method should never be used at low altitude.

and

5.15.1 Engine failures after take-off must never be practiced at night. History has repeatedly shown that a disproportionate number of fatal accidents have occurred while conducting this exercise.

seems CASA now has it covered, but maybe no one reads CAAPs.

SB

[greybeard]

Even in the simulator, REALISTIC training is so important. The instructor must know what he expects to happen but be aware what may be a totally unexpected reaction/result of the introduced task.
Whilst the survival rate in the Simulator is a given, the emotional scars of a mishandled and unrealistic task can be carried to the line side of the process.

Even after all that has been written above, the history of events, I rgrettably will still expect to see/read about further disasters in live training.

One other thing, sometimes forgotten, is the right of the "student" to call NO if he feels that the safety of the operation is in any way compromised. This is a fundamental process to be considered by all as on the day, at the time anyone is entitled to call it OFF as stress can reduce the ability of even the so called "guns" of our industry.

Better to be a live NO than an impared acceptor of the process.

Sometimes your so called "best pilots" are NOT the best instructors, carefull vetting of who does what is so very important, the difficulty is the people who do the choosing are not always skilled in the task of choosing.

Please stay safe, I may need to fly with you in row 66

:ok:

[Anthill]

A great thread! I'm in agreement with Krusty on this one. There have been too many fatalities involving asymetric training over the years. All multi-engine, multi-crew turbine operators should be compelled to use simulators for all recurrency training. If they cant afford this, they cant afford to be in business.

[Centaurus]

One other thing, sometimes forgotten, is the right of the "student" to call NO if he feels that the safety of the operation is in any way compromised.

Good point of course but has its limitations. For example in the Duchess accident at Camden, the ATO had briefed before the flight that he would be giving the instrument rating renewal candidate a simulated engine failure after take off at Camden. The flight was after dark. The candidate objected on the basis that night engine failures apart from cruise flight was not permitted. The ATO then agreed not to fail the engine on take off.

Shortly after lift-off at Camden and just as the candidate had selected the gear lever up, the ATO placed a map between the mixture levers and the throttles and cut the right engine mixture. The candidate was caught unawares since the briefing indicated it was not going to happen. Thereafter things happened quickly and power was not re-introduced despite the candidate asking for the mixture to be put back to rich and power made available. None of this came out in the ATSB report but came from the candidate after he had recovered from his burns and returned to Canada where he lived.

[LeadSled]

------- seems CASA now has it covered, but maybe no one reads CAAPs

Seabreeze,
People read the CAAPs alright, but then ignore same, because "they know better".
More particularly, "some" FOIs make it quite clear that the CAAPs are ONLY advisory, but "the law" must be complied with, and the various CAOs "require" an "engine failure" ----- and generally conducted in aircraft NOT certified to survive an engine failure on takeoff.
"The Law" does not recognize zero thrust, goes the twisted black letter law logic.
As far as industry pilots are concerned, just have a look at the number of posts on other threads that still not only condone pulling mixtures or shutting the fuel off at low level, but positively encourage same ----- and some of them go on to become FOIs, with the same attitude, now reinforced by their "authority" as an FOI.

What I observe on a regular basis illustrates that we have collectively leaned nothing from the steadily rising toll of fatalities ---- including the Brazilia in Darwin.

Tootle pip!!

Re. the Camden fatal mentioned, the PIC was well known for doing what he did in this accident, that finally took his life. He had been counseled on the subject ---- but the accident proved that it is not easy to teach an old dog new tricks.

[4Greens]

Another issue that comes to mind. There appears to be no guidance on multiple failures. A near accident comes to mind involving this was an examiner's call for a late go around. This was closely followed by a simulated engine failure in the middle of the go around.

[Centaurus]

A near accident comes to mind involving this was an examiner's call for a late go around. This was closely followed by a simulated engine failure in the middle of the go around.

Yes, there are idiots that up the ante in tests `because they can`.

The Australian CASA ATO manual states in several places that: "after a simulated failure, the prescribed ATO or prescribed person must ensure the aircraft is configured back to a normal operating mode before another simulated failure may be introduced except where the simulated failures are linked (e.g. electrical failure leading to a flapless approach and landing).

[Homesick-Angel]

Excuse my ignorance here, but why not just set an altitude as zero (say 5000ft) put the aircraft in the required config and then go from there. I know that the point is to test the ability of the pilot at the critical phase of flight, but there is a reason so many problems occur close to the ground. There is NO room for error.
Surely that and solid work overs in the sim could cover the requirements?? Why risk another life?

[Sarcs]

Excuse my ignorance here, but why not just set an altitude as zero (say 5000ft) put the aircraft in the required config and then go from there. I know that the point is to test the ability of the pilot at the critical phase of flight, but there is a reason so many problems occur close to the ground. There is NO room for error.
Surely that and solid work overs in the sim could cover the requirements?? Why risk another life?
....because that would be a commonsense approach that would be backed up by any risk management system..." 'commonsense' nah harden up you lot we are going to stick with 'high risk' "!:ugh:

Seriously HSA why don't they legislate your suggestion?:O:ok:

[Chimbu chuckles]

Simulating OEI at 5000' bears no relationship whatsoever to just after takeoff. There would be absolutely no training benefit.

The Duchess is a very fine training aircraft and has enough performance to fly away from an EFATO on one engine, at typical training weights, climb to 2000' odd feet and return to land or divert to a nearby alternate.

Flown well of course.

I know because I have done exactly that during an IF renewal with John Chesterfield (neither of us light weights) and near full fuel - we were at Lismore having departed Cooly with full tanks, flown a RWY 15 GPS NPA and landed.

For our departure I briefed what I would do before and after the gear was up including a practical escape route on one engine in IMC away from the terrain that feature of Lismore. It was summertime too.

Just airborne with the gear in transit he failed one engine on the mixture and I flew the entire escape route (under the hood) I had briefed to the 2200' MSA.

I had never flown a Duchess before that day - ended up with an endo as part of my IF renewal - and was mighty impressed with that capable little aeroplane:D

In those days I had CASA ATO approval for the Falcon 200 including initial issue and renewal approvals for command and copilot instrument ratings. I have previously held training approvals for all manner of piston twins.

NEVER EVER do you fail an engine at night for training - you just don't.

Having said all that by way of laying out what I know the BE76, and a well trained pilot, is capable of the crash at Camden could have been averted by the pilot under training by simply pushing the mixture back in and calling the rest of the detail off.

He was 'caught unawares'?

So a real engine failure would have led to the same result?

What happened to 'an amateur is surprised when an engine fails but a professional is surprised when it doesn't'?

I am sorry but he would have had adequate warning of what the ATO was intending to do (despite assurances he would not) when he stuck the map into the throttle quadrant. Anyone with more than 5 minutes ME time knows what happens next when an instructor/examiner does that. All he had to do was say "NO" firmly and either block the mixture from being pulled to ICO or pushed it back in again if his hand was busy with the gear. There is just no excuse for being caught flat footed in this scenario.

The aeroplane WAS capable of climbing away on one engine but was mishandled.

Darkness complicates the situation inordinately which is why we train in the daytime and HOPE we can pull it off if it happens on a pitch dark night - I sincerely hope I am never tested thus. I only THINK/hope I could manage based on 1000s of daytime mixture cuts in piston twins over 30+ years and a ****load of EFATOs in class D jet sims in IMC/dark.

Having climbed away on two engines and reached a safe height you end the training detail and RTB. You don't have a big discussion/argument in the cockpit - you merely say "I am calling this flight off, we will return to XYZ and discuss it further on the ground. Do not touch another thing in this cockpit"

Yes I have done exactly that.

Whether it goes further than that is up to the individuals concerned - if you felt strongly enough and depending on the reaction of the miscreant instructor/examiner you might take the nuclear option.

Yes piston twin EFATO training is higher risk than just flying around. That is not an argument for not doing such training in real aircraft absent a sim with realistic fidelity.

Whether you simulate failure by pulling throttle or mixture is a wash in my experience in both seats. What elevates the risk to unacceptably dangerous is the attitude, experience and skill of the instructor/examiner not whether you pull the mixture or throttle. I prefer the mixture for good engineering/physics reasons.

It is a disgrace that young instructors with bordering on zero ME time, and certainly no meaningful ME time, are able to obtain META purely so they can get more hours in the ME Command column (despite the fact they won't typically be the flying pilot for most of it) for their airline application.

By 'meaningful ME time' I mean hours logged in the real world as opposed to the circuit/local training area while they get the minimum (10-20?) hours before applying for a META.

I had several hundred hrs in the Islander in PNG before I was initially tested/approved for BN2 (and ONLY BN2) training. Similarly I had several hundred hours on C402s before I was granted approvals for that aircraft...couple of hundred on the Aerostar etc. This system of young instructors with little, if any, real world experience endorsing pilots on any twin they happen to have a handful of hours on is just crazy. The only time I have ever had to put my foot down and end a flight was with just such a instructor while on leave from PNG and renewing my Oz rating. I defined the parameters of what I would accept and I guess he either thought I wasn't serious or mentally dismissed my requirements as irrelevant.

Big...BIG mistake.

I have never been in a piston twin with a young ME instructor since. I happily fly with people like Chesty.

And yes it is also a disgrace that very experienced ME instructors who show ONGOING disdain for safe practices are not stripped of their approvals.

Certainly I have been guilty of that same 'overzealous' trait early on in my ME training experience as centaurus alludes to. That is just human nature but also quite different to an sustained disdain for what is 'safe' and what is plain stupid. I can honestly say that at my 'most zealous' I NEVER raised my own, or my trainees, pulse to alarming levels.:ok:

[maui]

I concur completely with CC in what he has said.

In my case I got META in about 1970, only after I had accumulated 2000 hours, recieved some some specific instruction, been ground examined, and flight tested by an Exminer of Airmen. IIRC that approval was valid only for ME aircraft in which I had in excess of 200 PIC. Further it was subject to renwal at my annual Instructor Rating check. Candidates were randomly vetted by the local Examiners, for a considerable time after the issue.

Simulators were simply not available for GA aircraft, so it was all done for real. Failures were generally introduced by way of mixture cut (manufacturers recommendation), and dexterous lever manipulation for the establishemnt of zero thrust. Yes it had it's risks, but with good tuition and a sensible approach a reasonable level of safety was achieved.

I despair when I hear that these days one only has to be an instructor, and endorsed, to be able to give ME instruction. Same goes for IR instruction. Is it any wonder that airlines are having difficulty with pass rates when the basics are dished out by instructors barely off their own training wheels.

I have been involved with "real time" engine failure training in aircraft from the dear old Twin Comanche thru to the A300. All have had an element of danger, but in each, that risk has been mitigated by proper briefing, and, maturity and experience in the right seat.

If high fidelity simulators are available then obviously that is the way to go. Unfortunately such is not always the case. This is not a reason to abandon proper training, but an imperative to ensure that those imparting such instruction are properly qualified.

Shame CASA shame!

[Sarcs]

CC said: It is a disgrace that young instructors with bordering on zero ME time, and certainly no meaningful ME time, are able to obtain META purely so they can get more hours in the ME Command column (despite the fact they won't typically be the flying pilot for most of it) for their airline application.



and maui said:In my case I got META in about 1970, only after I had accumulated 2000 hours, recieved some some specific instruction, been ground examined, and flight tested by an Exminer of Airmen. IIRC that approval was valid only for ME aircraft in which I had in excess of 200 PIC. Further it was subject to renwal at my annual Instructor Rating check. Candidates were randomly vetted by the local Examiners, for a considerable time after the issue.


So gents with your combined wisdom and experience how do we fix the problem? How do we lift the standards of ATOs/'Examiner of Airmen'/Checkies/META Instructors?

Because I can see the day when an individual pilot bounces around all the available flying schools trying to get his/her MECIR renewed only to find he/she had to stop the test over and over because the instructors were all trying to kill him/her!

So how do we get back to the 'good old days'?

[sheppey]

So how do we get back to the 'good old days'?

That's easy. Simply cut the mixture just after lift off and risk losing the aircraft:ok:

[maui]

Pretty hard.

CASA will have to grow a spine and a brain.

M

[The Green Goblin]

A) Mandate 500 hours multi command for META and/or 200 hours on type or an equivalent type to teach on it.

B) Offer the professionals who possess these prerequisites a competitive salary.

C) Contract the role of FOI to industry professionals (such as ATO delegations) who are respected by their peers and work in the capacity or role that they are inspecting in other operations. If a guy is not performing, industry can vote them out.

D) If a or b can't work, open up CAR217 training departments to the industry.

[Chimbu chuckles]

sheppey how is it then that 10s of 1000s of hrs of safe ME training has happened over the last 5+ decades?

Yes there have been a bunch of accidents and people have been killed - I'd love to see a true and accurate break down of the overall accident rate for assy training but I very much doubt that statistic even exists. With huge effort you might be able to find out the number of accidents but you'd never come close to an accurate total number of twin training hours.

Too no one could ever seriously claim that reducing the accident rate to zero in training, absent piston twin 'Class D' sims, will reduce the overall rate of people killed in piston twins. People make claims along the lines of 'more people are killed training for EFATO than are killed in actual EFATO' - an utter BS statement because you could NEVER know how many people would die in piston twin actual EFATO if, to take the opposite extreme, NO EFATO training occurred close to the ground. How many people were saved by the training is also an unknowable number...but its not zero.

The numbers killed in accidents that result from no effective training would likely be larger/accident that in training accidents. In a typical assy training accident 2 people die. A pilot with only ineffective training could take anywhere from 1-9 others with him.

You just don't get to make statements along the lines of "If we stop training accidents we will save lives" because you will only save some lives 'over here' at the expense of other lives 'over there'. Anyone who makes such a statement can be immediately dismissed as a fool.

I can only go on personal experience as a line pilot and training pilot in piston twin (and light Turbine twin) airline operations in the 80s/early 90s in PNG. In those days airlines like Talair, Douglas and Airlink in PNG and Hazeltons, Kendals, Tillair, Easterns, Bushies etc in Oz ran fleets of 20-30+ piston twins and similar numbers of small turboprops.

I think in my time in Talair we had 35 odd Islanders/C402s/Barons and 26 Twin Otters and Bandits. When I worked for Airlink we had probably 10 piston twins (Islanders, 402s, 404s, Baron), 2 or 3 Twin Otters and 2 Bandits.

Over the years these airlines employed 1000s of pilots and conducted 10s of 1000s of hours of safe ME flying training. I can't speak for Australia in those years but I cannot remember a single fatal ME training accident in PNG in my decade in PNG GA. In fact off the top of my head I cannot remember a single ME training accident period let alone one that could be sheeted home to assy training.

About now my old mate Chimbu Warrior will come out of the woodwork with one:ok:

I could reel off the top of my head a half dozen actual EFATOs - and a bunch more en route type - that had happy endings - I had 2 just off the ground for starters...and not at training weights either:hmm:

We have the resources - the John Chesterfields, Ray Villiermans and that nice fella at Ingham whose name escapes me - but they are not exactly in the first blush of youth - there are of course others.

I think CASA is addressing the issue slowly. The new Instructor rating they are mumbling about is a great start if they are smart about it and follow through with it. That would allow appropriately experienced and qualified people to put back into the industry we love on days off from airline flying or after retirement - or indeed after they lose their class one medicals - I know of several people who would very much like to get back into more advanced training if the barriers were lowered. ME, IFR training etc.

The first step is to raise the minimum experience requirements to conduct ME training. 500 hrs ME command (or as someone else suggested 2-300 on type) would be a good starting point.

And I want to stress this next point. The high minimum experience requirements are not ALL about what to do in the first 5-10 seconds after the engine fails - its as much or more about the 5-10 minutes after that.

Some of us who were ME training pilots in the old supplemental airline days are still around and 'only' in our early 50s and some remain current in light GA. Clearly still current in GA to some extent would need to be a requirement. I am not suggesting someone who last set foot in a Baron in 1990 and hasn't been near a light aeroplane since is a likely candidate for fast track back into a ME training. You'd probably want some sort of vetting system too - probably an informal one would work best.

CASA might be pleasantly surprised at the number (and I am not suggesting its scores, or even dozens, of people - you are probably looking at a small handful in each state) who would be quite happy to saddle up again part time...as long as the BS is kept to an absolute minimum.

Its actually easy - a one or two day (tops) ground course (could be waved if you are a current airline checker/trainer) and then a comprehensive practical test with someone like a John Chesterfield or a Ray Villierman for each area you were qualified in and want to do again.

CASA just has to want to...and I think they do.

[Sarcs]

GG and CC excellent answers and ones that, if CASA had enough foresight, could quite easily be written into Part 61 before it gets 'officially' released!:ok:

Next question, CC said:And yes it is also a disgrace that very experienced ME instructors who show ONGOING disdain for safe practices are not stripped of their approvals.
We have probably all had one or two of these rogue ATO, Checkies, Instructors even FOIs who have sailed through their careers till they have ended up in the seat beside you. They obviously meet all the min reqs but some how or another they escaped serious scrutiny (Bud Holland comes to mind!).:sad:

So my question is how do we weed out this rogue pilot element?:ugh:

[Aimpoint]

Isn't it a shame the more practical ATOs like Chesterfield get chased out of the industry by CASA? And then they wonder where all of the experience goes...

Interesting how Mr. Chuckles talks about mixture cuts being ok and no one objects:

Whether you simulate failure by pulling throttle or mixture is a wash in my experience in both seats. What elevates the risk to unacceptably dangerous is the attitude, experience and skill of the instructor/examiner not whether you pull the mixture or throttle. I prefer the mixture for good engineering/physics reasons.

I agree with the above fully, but all the 'experts' came out swinging in a previous thread saying this was unacceptable. If a piston ME instructor sets themselves some ground rules they shouldn't run into too much trouble I.e. I won't fail an engine below 400ft, I won't let the speed drop below vmca+10 etc. A good preflight brief, about failure methods, CRM etc., goes a long way too, from light pistons to turbines. It's a shame many instructors and T&C captains forget this.

[Chimbu chuckles]

Chesty was chased out of the industry?

I last flew with him probably 8 years ago - he was an awesome instructor/ATO. His set up at Cooly was very good.

[john_tullamarine]

but all the 'experts' came out swinging in a previous thread saying this was unacceptable

I think that the concerns were more with the philosophy of cuts at very low level on a GA twin rather than the actual technique adopted ?

[Oktas8]

It did seem to me that there is lots of criticism of using the mixture lever for it's own sake.

I'm glad some experienced pilots are pointing out the danger of continuing the exercise down to zero feet AGL, independent of cockpit lever position.

I did some advanced training in western Europe (mixture cuts banned, EF at night &/or in IMC routine). They seem to have a very robust training system with an enviable training safety record. Perhaps it's worth looking at what they do right, in terms of culture rather than just minimum experience? I will say that the culture of the senior pilots was different to what I have sometimes observed in this corner of the Pacific. I never had the feeling that an examiner would let an asymmetric scenario continue down to tree top height for example. There are reasons why an examiner would do that, but only very bad ones.

[haughtney1]

I did some advanced training in western Europe (mixture cuts banned, EF at night &/or in IMC routine). They seem to have a very robust training system with an enviable training safety record. Perhaps it's worth looking at what they do right, in terms of culture rather than just minimum experience? I will say that the culture of the senior pilots was different to what I have sometimes observed in this corner of the Pacific. I never had the feeling that an examiner would let an asymmetric scenario continue down to tree top height for example. There are reasons why an examiner would do that, but only very bad ones.

My thoughts and experience as well, moreover when I did my JAR multi-conversion on the Duchess, mixture cuts were mandated as verboten, the reason being as outlined in previous threads. I'm not saying don't practise/demonstrate it, but give yourself enough altitude to recover if it's screwed up.
All my multi piston s/e work was based around setting zero thrust.
On the BN2t as well as the B200 and bandit, it was the same thing....zero thrust, auto feather was demonstrated at higher altitudes.
We ran into a similar discussion on the F900 as to the cost vs safety implications of doing an LPC in the jet or in the sim, in the end it was harder and yet less expensive to head over to Le Bourget and get it done in Dassaults' lurching cave.
To me it's a simple equation of risk vs reward, nobody to the best of my knowledge has killed themselves in a sim practising s/e work, but on piston twins generally the sim option doesn't exist......so mitigate the risk, improve your margins and train people effectively based on evidencial and experience derived concepts....that have existed for a long time.

[Kharon]

JAT - I think that the concerns were more with the philosophy of cuts at very low level on a GA twin rather than the actual technique adopted ?.

Spot on, despite much 'discussion' the argument sanity v black letter law has been beaten onto the back burner at various GA airports. Sad, but very true, don't believe me ask the 'experts' at your local GA airport.

Huaghtney - .so mitigate the risk, improve your margins and train people effectively based on evidential and experience derived concepts....that have existed for a long time.

Yup, but try to hold an ATO delaegation at ASBK and see what happens; 3 down 1 to go.

[sheppey]

My thoughts and experience as well, moreover when I did my JAR multi-conversion on the Duchess, mixture cuts were mandated as verboten, the reason being as outlined in previous threads. I'm not saying don't practise/demonstrate it, but give yourself enough altitude to recover if it's screwed up.
All my multi piston s/e work was based around setting zero thrust.Like all things in flying there are different points of view based upon personal experience. But in a court case for instance,the legal eagles would quickly seize on such recommendations taken from Lycoming Flyer magazine (2002 issue) - edited extracts. Page 49 under the heading NTSB Warning On Simulated Engine-Out Maneuvers.

Quote: "The fatal crash of a light twin in which a flight instructor and an applicant for a multi-engine rating were killed prompted the NTSB to issue an urgent warning to all pilots simulating an engine-out condition on multi-engine airplanes. The Board's investigation revealed that some flight instructors do use the fuel selector or the mixture control to shut down an engine to test a multi-engine applicant. Although this is a recommended procedure, the urgent warning was aimed at flight instructors who were using this procedure at altitudes too low for continued safe flight. The NTSB observed that use of such procedures at traffic pattern altitudes may not permit instructors enough time to overcome possible errors on the part of the applicant.

The recommendation by the NTSB means that all simulated engine-out operation at the lower altitudes should be accomplished by retarding the throttle and this should be done slowly and carefully to avoid engine damage of failure. The current technique will protect the engine and at the same time provide for instant power if it is needed." Unquote.
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Personal comment only: The subject has been discussed numerous times in Pprune with good arguments for and against mixture cuts. The problem has always been the startled and possibly unpredictable reaction by students and this can happen equally with a throttle or mixture closure. One could argue that if it is safe to cut the mixture at low level to simulate an engine failure on a light twin, then why not do the same with a light single at say 500 feet agl after take off during ab-initio training as practice engine failure followed by a simulated forced landing glide?

After all, in all cases the instructor is counting on the engine to successfully restart when he opens the mixture control to rich and opens the closed throttle.

Few sane instructors will deliberately cut the mixture to simulate a low level engine failure in a single engine type simply because of the fear (risk) the engine may not pick up after the mixture is set to rich. That is a reasonable precaution. Same then with a twin because if the engine fails to pick up quickly after the mixture is returned to rich in a twin, then things quickly get serious with the inevitable loss of airspeed associated with a windmilling (not feathered) prop. Perhaps that is one reason for the NTSB recommendation of "The current technique will protect the engine and at the same time provide for instant power if it is needed."

[maui]

Sheppy.

For what it is worth,the only post EFATO engine I have had that failed to respond was after a throttle cut, fortunately there was a convenient paddock 30 degrees off the starboard bow.

Never, I say again Never, have I had a mixture cut fail to pick-up, and I have done literally thousands of them, in aircraft from new to totally clapped out.

Maui

[Oktas8]

I have my own preference regarding mixture vs throttle. But it's a bit irrelevant these days, with so many regulators enforcing the "official line". It's only time before CASA does the same.

I think it's more important to address the reasons why instructors or examiners continue an asymmetric exercise down to an unsafe height or down to an unsafe speed - whatever that height or speed may be in the circumstances. It seems that the industry has not asked itself the tough questions - what skills the regulator actually asks to be measured, what the examiner intends to measure and what the examiner actually measures.

For example, what is gained by simulating an engine failure in a twin below 300' agl? What is gained by persisting with the exercise even though it looks like it's not going to work?

[Aimpoint]

Chesty was chased out of the industry?

I last flew with him probably 8 years ago - he was an awesome instructor/ATO. His set up at Cooly was very good.


Affirm. I only know the details third-hand, but from memory it happened about 4-5 years ago. I've been told CASA weren't happy with his 'lax' methods and his different view on certain CAOs, including when one could obtain a META (vs. use it).


but all the 'experts' came out swinging in a previous thread saying this was unacceptable

I think that the concerns were more with the philosophy of cuts at very low level on a GA twin rather than the actual technique adopted ?


The thread I was thinking of was in the GA forum about six months ago. I'm glad this thread has a lot more fact and less opinion than that one.


Never, I say again Never, have I had a mixture cut fail to pick-up, and I have done literally thousands of them, in aircraft from new to totally clapped out.



Me either. But there were plenty of times fouling was experienced when the throttle was opened, despite the normal warming/cycling of the throttle on the way down. Those that oppose mixture cuts the most seem to be the pilots who've never actually done it. There is a big difference between leaning the mixture vs. shutting off fuel systems.

[sheppey]

There is a big difference between leaning the mixture vs. shutting off fuel systems. There is some confusion here. There is clearly a world of difference in leaning a mixture and selecting cut off with the mixture control.. Some years ago, at Tyabb in Victoria, an instructor on initial twin endorsement training with a student entered the circuit and cut the mixture (Seneca 2 I think) before entering downwind. In misplaced enthusiasm (the subject of the original post of this thread) he deliberately left the engine dead (mixture cut off) all the way around the circuit to simulate a windmilling prop (he didn't have to simulate it did it by itself). The purpose of the exercise in his mind was to give the female student the experience of the heavy foot force needed to maintain level flight on one engine while the other prop windmilled.

On final in the same configuration (windmilling dead engine prop) he told her to do a touch and go and that he would bring the mixture from cut off to rich on touchdown so when she opened both throttles to touch and go she would have symmetric power.

It didn't quite turn out as the instructor planned. Sod's Law in action. He opened the mixture on touch down and she pushed both throttles open to commence the touch and go. Unfortunately it appeared the prop had been windmilling sans power for so long that the fuel in the injector lines had diminished with the result that engine failed to deliver power when the throttles were positioned for take off.
The Seneca yawed under asymmetric power and neither the student or instructor (who belatedly took over as the aircraft went off the strip) were able to control the ensuing ground roll. It hit a log or something to one side of the strip and caught fire. Both pilots were lucky to escape with minor burns. There is a moral to this story somewhere but I am sure readers will think of something appropriate:ok:

Back in the old Mac Job DCA Air Safety Digest 1960-70 days, there was a report on a Chieftain that crashed into rising ground during a night take off when the check pilot cut the mixture soon after lift off at Port Lincoln. The prop was never set to zero thrust and the aircraft simply was unable to out-climb the invisible terrain ahead. One or both pilots were killed in that accident. Yet to this day throughout Australia, the mixture cut technique after lift off has continued for years and by the sound of it, still does. .

Of course we never get to hear about the close shaves. No names, no paperwork - therefore no CASA pack drill. As one contributor stated quite vehemently in an earlier post, in all his career he never had an engine fail to pick up following a mixture cut after take off. I am sure that applies to hundreds of flying instructors.

I can well believe that. And why do I believe that? Simply because it is a well known theory that these sort of accidents will never happen to you - but always only to some other poor doubtless incompetent sod.. The perception of danger diminishes in your mind the more you get away with it.

[Chimbu chuckles]

sheppey both those stories are examples of egregious stupidity...nothing else.

Neither makes a case against using the mixture to simulate failure. Like maui I have never seen an engine not respond to the mixture being pushed back in. The engine was running fine before you pulled the mixture it will run fine when you reintroduce fuel 10-15 seconds later.

Yes a linkage could break - same with the throttle and the end result of either is identical.

The main reason for mixture cuts being uncommon in single engine EFATO training is simply that if the throttle linkage breaks in a SE aircraft the engine will go to full power whereas in a twin it will go to idle. In the larger piston engines, like the C404's GTSIO520 with its gearbox and counterweights, the mixture cut is much kinder to the engine whereas it is irrelevant with an O320.

With a mixture cut you also still have the pistons sucking air which cushions them as they slow down. You can't get plug fouling when there is no fuel.

The mixture cut is just more mechanically sympathetic to big bore engines and with no additional risk (in a twin) over a throttle chop - less in fact.

I have already expressed my opinion on night assy training in piston twins. Not setting zero thrust (or feathering the prop if that is the exercise) after demonstration of the correct memory items at any time is stupid - at night it is suicidal gross negligence. If someone pulled an engine in a piston twin on me in the dark I would break his fingers getting everything back against the stops.

Even when I was endorsing people on the Falcon 200 (no sim available) I didn't simulate engine failures during the night circuits portion of the endorsement - the brief was 'there will be NO simulated engine failures tonight. If one happens its real" - and that aircraft went like a dog shot up the ar$e on one engine. The rear pod mounted engines produced only minimal control challenges. In fact at training weights you had to pull the nose up around 15 degrees to stay at V2. At < 10 NU you were quickly through 200Kts, climbing and still accelerating fast, on one engine.

Re introducing the mixture to an engine that has been windmilling for 5 minutes or so on a touch and go and expecting the engine to pick right up - the way it does after windmilling for 10 seconds - just demonstrates a lack of understanding that is breathtaking. The pilot under training should have simply made it a full stop and argued about it later.

[Aimpoint]

The mixture should be enrichened to enable a zero thrust setting anyway, therefore the outcome two posts above shouldn't have happened.

I remember I started to become a bit overconfident after a couple of years of instructing and started to 'push' things a little further. I didn't really consider the risk vs reward in many sequences. Luckily I soon identified this mindset and went back to doing things by the book and only with prior planning (I.e. no knee jerk engine failing - planning out the sequence of events prior to departure after considering even little things such as how the crosswind would effect yaw during OEI landings). Hopefully most trainers or instructors pick this behavior up within themselves when it eventually surfaces before things go too far.

[Lookleft]

When I did my ME endorsement my instructor was ex-military and had been CP for a regional airline. He stated right from the beginning that no simulated EFATO would be conducted below 400' as he had too many pilots stuff it up. When I started doing ME endorsements I kept his advise. He is still flying as am I. Is it because of his insistence on no EFATO below 400'? Who knows but given what has been written on this thread and on the Airnorth accident I thank him for his wisdom.