FIT TO FLY??

[Dancing Bear]

There surely has to be a lot more to this than the DT covers?

Mother of plane crash cadet says RAF 'utterly failed' her son - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9096660/Mother-of-plane-crash-cadet-says-RAF-utterly-failed-her-son.html)

I personally enjoyed many hours AEF with the ATC and would be saddenned if this lack of effective personnel management resulted in a dramatic reduction of that activity as a result of this tragedy and the "risk adverse" culture we seem now to exist within.

How was it possible for this 62 year old guy to be at the controls, where were his buddies to tell him it was clearly time to hang up the goggles long before? A severe medical condition for over 30 years??? Come on, it beggars belief and tarnishes the RAF's already downtrodden image for safety and duty of care.

[Yellow Sun]

Yes there is a lot more to this than published in the DT, in fact a Google search reveals the following within the first half dozen returns:

AAIB Report on the accident (http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1394.pdf)

Convening Authority comments on the BoI findings (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/7A62F548-B81B-4056-A7CB-66F9929E5EE5/0/tutorgbyxr_convenauthority.pdf)

Best you read them thoroughly.

YS

[ShyTorque]

The medical standards for flying cadets have already been reviewed and changes made as a result of this accident. They have have been effectively been brought in line with public transport regulations.

[Wycombe]

The chap who passed the Flt Lt as fit to fly clearly has a lot to answer for.

On checking back, he did my first CAA Medical (for PPL) at a large airbase in Oxon around 20 years ago - now that I think about it, others that I had subsequently were much more thorough, but considerably more expensive :hmm:

[BEagle]

This link appears to work better: http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/5-2010%20G-BYXR%20and%20G-CKHT.pdf

I note that to jettison the canopy of the Tutor requires '3 separate actions', the last of which is to reach across the body using your 'inboard' arm to move the canopy handle.

In the heat of the moment, following the severely disorientating motions likely to be experienced immediately after a mid-air collison, can pilots really be expected to perform these 3 actions without error? Surely a single 'jettison' system, which works reliably throughout the entire flight envelope, should be fitted? Didn't we learn that with the Spitfire?

Is any action in hand to improve the Tutor's canopy jettison system? Given that the Tutor is a military operated civil registered aircraft, does the MAA have any say in the matter?

[upsdaisy]

I have read thoroughly!

Nothing mitigating in my opinion, pretty damning infact! Very, Very sad for all concerned, ask yourself this? Had you known in advance of the instructors condition(s) would you have allowed your own child to fly?

What I mean by that is is, we trust that all persons in the chain assuming responsibility for our children have made every effort to protect them, this clearly was not the case.

Absolutely diabolical failing within the service, I understand this mothers anger!

[1.3VStall]

I, too,have read thoroughly.

The basic question to be answered is why would any sensible system permit someone who could not adquately look out in the vertical plane perform aerobatics in an AIAA - and with a cadet on board?

[Peter Carter]

An even more basic question is: why would one want to fly aerobatics in an AIAA anyway. I understand there were hundreds of gliders in that area at the time.

[teeteringhead]

More to the point, my understanding is that civilian/VR(T) AEF pilots need (at least) a Class 2 medical.

Assuming that "Bertie" had one, how many others are out there aerobatting in unrestricted airspace with a comparable condition??

And he used to display Spitfires too .....

[Pontius Navigator]

Was aerobatting authorised?

I know we were not permitted to do aerobatics in the Metor nav trainer. The pilots were very specific on that point before going into an aerobat routine.

[airborne_artist]

Two of my daughters have flown from that AEF in the past seven years. I'm not sure I'd have been at all comfortable with them flying having just read the AAIB report.

[uncle peter]

Sad tale.

I think the issue for those currently serving is for how long can we justify having retired senior officers taking up a flying post when so many front liners are being posted to ground tours.

[The Old Fat One]

I have read thoroughly!

Nothing mitigating in my opinion, pretty damning infact! Very, Very sad for all concerned, ask yourself this? Had you known in advance of the instructors condition(s) would you have allowed your own child to fly?

What I mean by that is is, we trust that all persons in the chain assuming responsibility for our children have made every effort to protect them, this clearly was not the case.

Absolutely diabolical failing within the service, I understand this mothers anger!


This is yet another example of the modern world tendency to polarise and simplify the participants of every accident into those that are victims and those that are responsible, whilst ignoring the complications and chains which inevitably contribute to every accident, flying or otherwise.

This was tragic accident, for which the RAF accepted procedural errors in the medical reporting chain was a contributory factor. The procedures have been tightened. The families grief and anger is understandable and justified, but pointing the finger at the RAF to the exclusion of all else does not put back the clock, nor prevent accidents of this nature happening again.

Flying is not risk free (very few ventures are). The safety standards of military Cadet flying are way higher than the standards of safety in general aviation. (Read the accident reports in GA...there are plenty of them). The medical standards in GA are absurdly low (I've worked in flying school...I've seen guys signing out aircraft as PIC, with pax, who could barely climb into the kite).

The RAF was guilty of a number of things in this accident...jobs for the boys perhaps being the worst. But the overall safety record for Cadet flying over the past 10-15 years is exemplary.

If you want zero accidents, then you have zero flying. End of story.

[Ken Scott]

But the overall safety record for Cadet flying over the past 10-15 years is exemplary.

I'm not sure that three aircraft lost (in 2 accidents) and 3 cadets killed (along with their 3 pilots) is exemplary....

As has been alluded to by other posters this horrendous accident came about because of the 'jobs for the boys' attitude that prevails amongst the AEFs where retired SOs can continue to indulge their hobby pretty much to the exclusion of other lesser mortals. With so many serving pilots occupying made up ground jobs at the present time there is no valid reason why the AEFs couldn't be manned by them on a semi-permanent basis in order to keep them flying pending the arrival of new aircraft types in a few years when they will be needed.

[ShyTorque]

Sad tale.
I think the issue for those currently serving is for how long can we justify having retired senior officers taking up a flying post when so many front liners are being posted to ground tours.

Aren't you forgetting that these VR(T) posts are unpaid (hence the "V" in VR(T)?

Perhaps some more junior officers in front line posts should be "retired", which would free them up to volunteer for an unpaid job such as AEF flying. But I doubt they would want to do that as they would prefer to continue to make a living.

In this financial climate I can't see that MOD would remove all unpaid VR(T) pilots from AEFs, in favour of making an AEF a full-time posting, like all other squadron jobs.

As I posted earlier, the rules for medicals have already been tightened and upper age limits have very recently been introduced for flying cadets.

[26er]

It is perhaps a generalisation to say that AEF pilots are retired senior officers. Some are but some are not - often ex service of junior rank but now airline etc and usually very much qualified and experienced and happy to give some of their free time to air minded youth. Think how many serving aviators had their interest whetted by visiting an AEF.

And interestingly 6 AEF had one VR(T) flying officer who's claim to fame was that he had been commissioned on joining the organisation, having retired as a master pilot. (Bill Ryall)

[dead_pan]

A sad tale indeed. I'm not sure the inquest has really got to the bottom of this particular accident, nor am I sure any of the hard lessons will be learnt, especially regarding the selection and monitoring of said instructors.

I read the AAIB report some months back and was intrigued by the comment that the Tutor sustainable 'relatively' (I use this word guardedly) minor damage during the collision was essentially flyable, also that some time elapsed (20+ seconds?) between the collision and its impact. Was any comment made at the inquest as to what may have happened to incapacitate the instructor?

Was aerobatting authorised?

The Tutor came down in a field a few hundred yards from one of my mate's house. The area is well used by Tutors out of Benson - I've seem them doing aeros in the vicinity on many occasions. Not sure its perhaps the best location to do so given it is right in the 'squeeze' between Brize and Benson MATZs. There is a high level of civilian traffic in the area during the summer months.

[Yellow Sun]

26er

It is perhaps a generalisation to say that AEF pilots are retired senior officers. Some are but some are not - often ex service of junior rank but now airline etc and usually very much qualified and experienced and happy to give some of their free time to air minded youth.

I think that you are getting very close to an important factor here and that is those pilots whose currency is due only to their AEF flying. I have always had a feeling of unease about those retirees who gravitate towards the AEFs having flown little or not at all for a number of years previously. I know from my own experience that senior officers anxious to get some flying can pose quite tricky supervision issues.

YS

[Chugalug2]

Pilot with a medical condition that severely reduces ability to carry out a thorough look out, whether prior to aeros or not. A crowded AIAA full of powered and unpowered aircraft reducing the wisdom of authorised aeros anyway. An aircraft abandonment procedure that as BEagle reminds us harks back to the 1940's. The words holes and slices of cheese come to mind...
As to;
Given that the Tutor is a military operated civil registered aircraft, does the MAA have any say in the matter?
They are more likely to say:
Flying is not risk free (very few ventures are)......If you want zero accidents, then you have zero flying. End of story.
Personally I'd put more faith in the CAA to tighten up aircrew medical examinations, and issuing mandatory modifications to make abandoning easier and safer. As to carrying out aeros in crowded AIAA airspace by AEF aircraft, that would be one for the MAA perhaps. Right, I'm holding my breath now.....

[ShyTorque]

Not sure its perhaps the best location to do so given it is right in the 'squeeze' between Brize and Benson MATZs. There is a high level of civilian traffic in the area during the summer months.

I agree.

Some will undoubtedly disagree with this, but perhaps inside the MATZ might actually be a less congested place for AEF aeros, rather than in a choke point in Class G airspace.

(Telephone directory already down the back of trousers, in preparation for a "lesson" by someone who considers himself "more in the know" on the defintion, legal standing and rules appertaining to a MATZ).

[Brian 48nav]

As a sufferer of Ankylosing Spondylitis I find this report so sad and, am absolutely amazed that the pilot was not only permitted to continue flying but was foolish not to retire voluntarily.

My Class 1 medical, which is a basic requirement for a licensed ATCO (no medical = no licence), was withdrawn in 2000 when I was aged 53 at SRG Gatwick by a visiting specialist. He was in fact a serving RAF doctor of Group Captain rank, later an AM I believe. His take was that due to my limited mobility, similar to the pilot in this case ie poor neck movement and sideways flexing at the hips and,in my case associated constant fatigue,it would be unsafe for me to continue, particularly as I worked in the tower at LHR.

At my 2 or 3 previous annual medicals with Doc Morgan, retired aviation medicine specialist at Boscombe and CAA licensed doctor,he had told me that had I been a pilot he could no longer continue to sign me fit. He thought that I would not have been able to cope with extra loading of flying controls in various emergencies.

The examination at Gatwick had come about because my GP and Rheumatologist were sure my health would be better if I retired.

As for the 'burn out' mentioned in the report, this is a bit of a misnomer because, although the sufferer may no longer have any active symptoms of AS, the fusing and calcification is there forever.

[cats_five]

<snip>
As for the 'burn out' mentioned in the report, this is a bit of a misnomer because, although the sufferer may no longer have any active symptoms of AS, the fusing and calcification is there forever.


And so is the fragility of the spinal column. Someone asked:

Was any comment made at the inquest as to what may have happened to incapacitate the instructor?


I suspect his back broke, possibly in several places, with the shock of the collision, and that incapcitated him.

[Chugalug2]

cats five:
I suspect his back broke, possibly in several places, with the shock of the collision, and that incapcitated him.
Indeed:
"14. The impact of the collision probably fractured the Tutor pilot's spine, leaving him incapacitated" (P83 "The mid air collision", last bullet point):-
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1394.pdf

[Could be the last?]

This is a very sorry story but explains why 'Pilot Incapacitation' is figuring so highly on various risk registers.......

More importantly, having been involved with various ac escape systems, I found the procedure and the physical effort required to exit a tutor, probably one of the hardest of any platform past or present. One can only imagine the terror the young lad was subjected too trying to get out!!!

Also, with the thread touching on jobs for the boys, the Med Cat was auth'd by a civvy doctor. Surely, in light of various admissions a more robust and independent medical system needs to be introduced?

RIP

[dead_pan]

the shock of the collisionI do find that hard to believe, given the point of impact was some way down the leading edge. Also, if this medical condition is so debilitating and the spine so susceptible to further damage, what on earth was he doing flying?

This is a very sorry story but explains why 'Pilot Incapacitation' is figuring so highly on various risk registersThen maybe cadets need some basic instruction on what to do in such an instance? Its no wonder given the briefing the cadet's instinct was to try and bail-out - he may have stood more of a chance had he attempted to recover the plane, given its altitude. Abingdon airfield was only a few miles distant.

No answers as to why the Tutor apparently flew on for so long?

[teeteringhead]

Re abandonment training:

had a trip a few years ago in a US Navy Turbomentor T-34 at Pensacola - more of a Tucano equivalent I guess.

http://t2.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcSRabGSqkCk0yggO1IQDPddl-9QUWhDvNDM4EmBxbQcrbVmaJrp

They had static line 'chutes rather than bang seats, and before my trip I had to do the "sim ride" from a mock-up aircraft high up on a scaffold in a hangar, egress the cockpit and then "dive for the trailing edge" in classic style - into a safety net! :eek:

Gave a lot of confidence in the system, did that. I guess we haven't (hadn't) advanced much since the "Jump John Jump" Chipmunk days ... :(

[Geehovah]

At the risk of putting my head above the parapet, I knew the pilot in question and his skills cannot be questioned. Above all, my sincere condolences to the family who lost their youngster,

Even with full mobility, flying can be hazardous to your health. I took the risk as a kid. I took the risk as a consenting adult. I loved every minute. If we really want to take up military flying as a lifetime vocation we take that risk.

I must be mad. I still do!

[WASALOADIE]

As an ex-RAF aircrew member and now a CO of an ATC Sqn. I would question the capability of someone I suspected to be unfit if they were to fly my cadets. But the majority of cadet CO's do not have the knowledge that I have and trust in the AEF staff to ensure their cadets are going to be safe.

The cadets 3822 (record of service) is signed by the CO to the effect bthat the parents have given their consent for the cadet to fly in a variety of aircraft. The parents do not have the slightest understanding of the fitness of the pilots, again, they put their trust in the ATC staff and those flying their children.

Its a great shame that it took these accidents to trigger action to be taken but this is not the first and I doubt it will be the last time that such an event occurs. But thats what military flight safety does, it improves things to try and prevent further occurences.

There has been a dramatic review of the regulations and monitoring of the conduct of flights and supervision since these accidents. I have witnessed the briefings and they are now very comprehensive and there is a good check of understanding.

[cats_five]

<snip>

No answers as to why the Tutor apparently flew on for so long?

It didn't. It entered a spin, recovered on it's own and entered a dive right down to the ground. If I read the report correctly there was slightly over 20 seconds from collision to impact, nearly all of which was in a dive.

[dead_pan]

Geehovah - I wasn't questioning the instructor's skill, just his suitability for the job given his medical condition.

cat five - fair enough. Still it does seem like a long time given it was still under power and didn't crash that far away from the point of collision.

[cats_five]

Geehovah - I wasn't questioning the instructor's skill, just his suitability for the job given his medical condition.

cat five - fair enough. Still it does seem like a long time given it was still under power and didn't crash that far away from the point of collision.

The RAF should be very, very deeply embarassed that he was allowed to continue flying as long as he was. So far we have heard that the MO had a drink problem, and the AAIB report shows lots of holes in the way the paperwork was done that let him slip through - or be allowed through if you believe in conspiracy theory.

As to the time - the collision was at approx. 4,000'. Work out the average speed to cover that distance in 20 seconds and I don't think you will wonder why it took the time it did.

[Duncan D'Sorderlee]

ST

"Some will undoubtedly disagree with this, but perhaps inside the MATZ might actually be a less congested place for AEF aeros, rather than in a choke point in Class G airspace."

Minimum height for aerobatics (for AEF sorties) is 3000' agl - ie the top of the MATZ. You cannot, legally, perform aeros in the MATZ.

Duncs:ok:

[davejb]

I don't think it's correct to point to the drinking MO or a conspiracy to suggest that Mike was allowed to fly as a fiddle of some sort - he flew Nimrods whilst significantly affected, and was genuinely passed fit to fly regularly by a variety of people, over an extended period of time. That the paperwork trail was not completely as it should be is not a sign of devilry, in any walk of life perfect paperwork is the exception rather than the rule.

With respect I think - were I an MO - I'd be reticent about grounding somebody for a condition that had been repeatedly tested over many years, with the condition being described as (essentially) stable...

Mentioned elsewhere (can't recall which doc now) several dozen US pilots with this condition had been reviewed and the majority passed fit to fly - now you can argue that anyone significantly affected by AS should not fly, or should not fly without a qualified co pilot, or whatever you wish... but at the time of this accident such a rule did not exist.

My belief is that NOBODY ever realised that Mike could be incapacitated (or killed) by a relatively minor impact - so the potential for tragedy was not appreciated until after the event....hindsight is, as ever, 20:20 vision.

[ShyTorque]

Minimum height for aerobatics (for AEF sorties) is 3000' agl - ie the top of the MATZ. You cannot, legally, perform aeros in the MATZ.

OK, good point, but over the MATZ, then? ...possibly still a less congested place by offsetting laterally from the choke point / corridor?

[dead_pan]

With respect I think - were I an MO - I'd be reticent about grounding somebody for a condition that had been repeatedly tested over many years, with the condition being described as (essentially) stableGiven the reported restriction of neck movement, do you think it was wise to allow someone suffring this condition to perform aerobatics with an inexperienced passenger?

On the subject of look-outs, the Tutors I have seen of late usually do a wide orbit before commencing aeros. I'd be interested to know if this was standard practice prior to accident.

My belief is that NOBODY ever realised that Mike could be incapacitated (or killed) by a relatively minor impact - so the potential for tragedy was not appreciated until after the event....hindsight is, as ever, 20:20 vision.Have the rules regarding AS have now been tighened as a consequence?

a less congested place by offsetting laterally from the choke pointGiven the attraction of Didcot power station to the gliding community, I would suggest offsetting some distance west along the Vale of the White Horse.

[Flying_Anorak]

I've been following this sad tale with interest as I was flying a glider in a competition THAT day and passed through THAT area of the collision only a few minutes before the sad event. Indeed, I heard another pilot report seeing the collision on the radio and there but for the grace of whomever, it could very easily have been my glider rather than the Cirrus that was hit.

To put things into context,this is a VERY busy piece of sky and my logger trace is one of those included within the AAIB report identifying the choke point that others have mentioned. The day in question was also a VERY good day as I recall, with a cloudbase of circa 5,500ft, strong lift, cloud streeting and seemingly anything with wings taking to the air that day. With all this in mind I must question the wisdom of conducting aerobatics in the area that they did.

As an instructor, I like to think my look-out is good, but I can honestly say I wouldn't have been expecting aerobatics there and indeed when I flew through only minutes before, I wasn't especially looking for aircraft doing so and rapidly climbing from beneath me.

A sad event all around though and especially so when it seems that it SHOULD have been survivable.

[orca]

Geehovah,

I disagree with you. AOC 22 Gp does as well. He says that lookout is a fundemental and critical skill and the Tutor pilot, sadly, couldn't do it sufficiently. From my stand point as a fighter jock. If you cannot rotate your head so that you can see past vertically upwards, whilst being able to also look wing tip to wing tip, then you cannot look out sufficiently in any vertical manoeuvre, of which the most basic is the loop.

I, along with the 2 star, therefore have no problem questioning his skill.

I also took the risk you identify as a child and continue to do so as an adult. But I don't agree that a child or parent makes the same decision I make. When I did it as a child; I and my parents, both assumed that the risk was mitigated to the correct degree which in this case it wasn't. AOC 22 Gp is again correct when he states that both the medical screening and supervision of the AEF were ineffective.

I would not let my children fly in a unit where that was the case. I would let my children fly with the RAF because (despite the fact that my cloth and their's struggle to get along) I would ordinarily assume the reverse was true, that my children would fly in a system of effective medical screening and supervision.

I would also assume that they would be thoroughly briefed on abandonment to the point of at least being able to demonstrate touch drills. I have done this whenever I have flown passengers. It seems that no-one really checked to see if the cadets really understood the brief. Given the shock of what happened, the spin and the 24 seconds available I am not convinced it would have saved the poor bloke. But that's besides the point. His friends couldn't explain how to jettison the canopy in a static interview room.

I have only supervised for 9 years. But I (as we all must have) can think of occasions when I told aircrew they weren't going on a sortie because of illness/fitness or frame of mind - and one case of telling the boss that an individual wasn't going flying at all until we'd sought expert advice. People knew that this pilot couldn't look out. His supervisory chain must have known. He must have known.

A point no-one has yet mentioned is, given his condition, would he have jumped anyway? If a parachute opening was likely to be crippling (at best) he was probably pre-disposed to attempting a forced landing as opposed to abandonment. Not directly relevant - but again someone I would not let my children fly with.

An absolutely horrid accident. My condolences to that poor cadet and his family.

[Geehovah]

Orca, not disagreeing with your points and I appreciate that any counter view in such a tragic situation is fraught. Like you I would never condone a medical being granted where it should not nor would I accept poor supervision. Both are wrong. My point was that the pilot was skilled in his art, albeit his abilities as we now know were limited by his condition. As we both know, lookout in a fighter brings its own problems which are vastly different to that in a light aircraft but I accept the point fully about aeros.


I guess the point I was making, badly, is that there is a danger of such tragic incidents preventing air cadets from enjoying that vital experience that we all took for granted a few years ago. If someone had asked me when I was 15 whether I would still wish to fly knowing that there was a risk of a mid air or an engine failure, I would have been first in line. I would have pestered my parents into submission. I saw the problem first hand when, recently, I offered to fly some local cadets in a light aircraft at my own expense. The Flying Club is well run, the aircraft well maintained and the profile was benign but not risk free. There are no parachutes in a GA aircraft. The offer nearly had to be refused for reasons of risk/insurance. There can be a danger that we lose the very oxygen that attracts kids into the air cadets.

Could a mid air collision happen again? Sadly yes, on even the best run unit.


Again, my thoughts are with the family.

[astir 8]

I know someone who Mike Blee flew some years ago. He says that MB was a great guy, enthusiastic about flying and keen to encourage young would-be pilots.

Unfortunately it's such great guys who can be a problem to flying clubs, gliding clubs etc. They've been there since God was a lad, probably sent half the club solo, taught the current CFI to fly etc etc.

But medical problems or old age catch up even with great guys, but their enthusiasm makes them want to ignore the reality and keep going.

It's then than "someone" has the difficult job of telling the GG that it's time he stopped instructing, or flying solo, or whatever. And like telling my 95 year old mum that it was time she stopped driving, it's not easy.

It looked to me from the AAIB report that there had been "buck passing" on the issue between the medics and the flying branch. The medics expected the CFI (or equivalent) to tell MB to stop, the Flying supervisors expected the medics to do it, so MB kept flying because he must be OK because no-one had said otherwise.

"Someone" failed to step forward. Very familiar situation, very human. Best of intentions all round. The road to hell is paved with good intentions. Hopefully it's fixed now within the AEF scenario but everyone, especially within aviation needs to be aware of the danger of ageing great guys and if ncessary ACT.

It's the poor cadet I really feel for. Very nasty way to end a life.

[R 21]

Such a terrible, preventable accident. I must agree with Orca the systamatic failures from the MO (Doc Wyper oh we could discuss that can of worms for a while but I will stay on target) to the AEFs failing to stand up and say no you can no longer fly in the RAF.

It happens all over the airforce with a 'jobs for the boys' attitude with people comming to the end of their service in a comfortable easy non deployable job which they convieniently engineer into a FTRS post and they leave the regulars and fill as FTRS. When people are on their last tour at aged 55 for the RAF to allow them into the Aux/Res/VR(T) as aircrew they must surely be A1 fit or close to it. I can't believe there is a shortage of pilots to fill these positions so can we not afford to pick the very best?

I realise that the AEF is staffed by VR(T) pilots but surely we need to be perhaps a bit more choosey in who we allow to fly our children? There is no doubting the AEF pilots skill but someone surely must have realised that he shouldn't be flying any more?

A terrible, preventable, tragic accident and my thoughts are with the cadets family.

[Pheasant]

A very sad tale and my condolences to all.

But,

"Someone" failed to step forward.

Actually at least 2 people did step forward...the instructors at Cranwell who questioned his ability to scan properly did so....but they appear to have been overruled by their CO who passed him off with only a "minor" restriction.

All of my experience doing aeros emphasises the "full and free" movement required of the neck area, particularly in a loop!

[Wwyvern]

davejb.

The rule about flying without being accompanied by a qualified pilot was in force in 1975. I was an RAF pilot then and, after a civilian ME missed an ECG anomoly at an annual medical, was classified at my next medical as being unfit solo pilot. My grading was "as or with a qualified co-pilot". I was told that, although there were several appointments in the RAF which would enable me to fly in a multi-crew, in order to gain promotion I needed an unrestricted medical category. I was told that in order to become the CAS, which of course was my intention, I needed to be able to fly single seat aircraft. The strong recommendation from the Air Sec's Dept was for me to leave the RAF.

The "as or with" didn't stop me pursuing a reasonably successful flying career in a major British airline, and the heart problem was corrected some years later by a microwave hit so that my flying medical became unrestricted.

But the rule about flying without being accompanied by a qualified pilot was definitely in force from at least 1975.

[davejb]

Wyvern,
I don't doubt it - I was just mentioning this as one possible 'off the top of my head' options that one might apply when a pilot is so badfly affected by a medical condition. Of course it would prevent somebody like Mike from flying cadets around - I am unaware of anyone who was concerned at being flown by Mike during his Nimrod days, including myself.

[astir 8]

Pardon my saying, but flying multi-pilot in something like a Nimrod where the ability to do a full scan lookout is not high on the list of priorities is a tad different to the circumstances of the accident.

[Yellow Sun]

Pardon my saying, but flying multi-pilot in something like a Nimrod where the ability to do a full scan lookout is not high on the list of priorities is a tad different to the circumstances of the accident.

You are wrong.

YS
Former Nimrod QFI

[Red Line Entry]

Clearly he is not, or Mike Blee wouldn't have been flying Nimrods!

[26er]

Apolpogies in advance for thread drift.

Further to the comments made about medical conditions affecting piloting ability a colleague of mine was found to suffer from a heart condition when his intermittently stopped working for a short time (can't remember the technical term) so he was grounded. I said to him "so you have given up driving then?" which I would have thought to be a far greater accident risk than operating in a two pilot environment. Politeness pervents me from repeating his reply. How many others are on the roads today who are unable to turn their heads sufficiently? How many PSV and HGV drivers are tired before beginning their legally scheduled work?

[cats_five]

You are right, we need to be able to see when driving, but we don't have potential hazards coming up from below or down from above, we don't have to look there before performing a manouver, and we have mirrors which should help. And for many junctions, we are stationary and in what should be a safe place (behind a stop or give way line) when we look, so there is plenty of time compared to when flying.

[oxenos]

When flying Nimrods, I never once saw a submarine above the aircraft. Mind you I never looked for one up there.

[Pontius Navigator]

The talk of look out in a Nimrod and submarines above is pure drivel. Try a MAD hunting circle at 300 feet at night. Try bouncing another aircraft - yes we did and got bounced in turn and they weren't NATO aircraft.

[oxenos]

P N

I did my share of night MAD. Not sure why submarines/above is drivel. Did you see any up there?
That said, there was indeed a need for a good all round look out on the Nimrod, but it did not require as much vertical movement as you would for a loop, which seems to have been what MB was doing.

[SOSL]

What a sad event. Very, very sad. A little boy died because the grown-ups fxxked up!

[EnigmAviation]

Whatever the merits of being a former Nimrod pilot, whether anyone was happy in his crew, busy Class G airspace, blah, blah blah - tragically this pilot caused a fatal accident because of his demonstrable failure to effect a series of essential checks and observations before and during aero's QED - there simply is no other cause, no excuses ! Of course, it is a fair bet that his medical condition was a contributory factor in this context ( and the guys at Cranwell who said so should be congratulated, but I guess they won't be !). Even the best make fatal errors - the recent tragedy of Al Mathie walking into a propellor a few weeks ago underlines that - and he too was a massively experienced retired Wg Cdr Jaguar man with a huge experience of prop aircraft.

I did find it rather remarkable that the RAF Reviewing Officer ACM Sir Chris Moran stated in the RAF SIP Report that " we will probably never know for certain why Tutor G-BYXR collided with Cirrus G-CKHT" - whilst the Convening authority AVM North stated that "it must be assumed that the Tutor pilot did not see the glider in time to prevent a collision" . Indeed !

Top marks to the AVM - the pilot didn't obviously see it otherwise there would have been NO accident ! As to the reason he didn't - well maybe should start off with a question to yourself "Would you be pulling up spontaneously in well populated airspace without carrying out a continuing set of observational checks ?" - Would you think it was good airmanship? These are basic questions, even leaving aside any medical issues that arose.

Good airmanship must prevail at all times, the penalty for a moment of omission or error is a very high price a we have seen.

[ShyTorque]

In which seat are RAF cadets flown during in AEF flights in the Grob Tutor?

Is it usual for cadets to be allowed to take along cameras and to use them during aerobatics?

What is the minimum altitude for AEF aerobatics in the Grob Tutor these days?

[Peter Carter]

Left
Pilot's discretion
4000Ft

[ShyTorque]

Thankyou, Peter.

If I recall correctly, the rules I flew under when with the UAS were transition level plus the height of the ground (strange wording but I think that's how it was worded back then). So not much of a change over the years, for the majority of the UK.

[Peter Carter]

UAS rules are still the same (TL + Ht of Gnd), but additional restriction of 4,000ft AGL for cdts (and LOTS of other rules).

[angelorange]

Many of the points raised by the St Athan 2x Tutor collision are relevant to this post see:

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/401205-tutor-mid-air-report.html

[greenedgejet]

Seems this thread's title sums up what has been emphasised in the press and by the SI into the tragic collision.

The AAIB investigation sees the spinal issue and medical oversight as two of many contributory factors - not the sole problem!

1. TRAFFIC DENSITY v PERFORMANCE - huge glider activity that day and no fast way for a Tutor to climb above them for a short Famil flight.

2. CANOPY DESIGN - TWO problems:

(a) LOOKOUT: Ability to lookout (large obscuration by arches as with previous collision), fixed harnesses (no go-forward straps)

(b) EGRESS: The "Jettison Handle" does not function in the sense that the AEF video claimed (and most cadets believed) at the time ie: it does not jettison the canopy! Indeed the canopy removal drill is long and complex for a student to understand without practice. Even if attempted the Grob was never tested beyond 100kts for canopy removal under LBA certification. Seasoned pilots know that during venting (for simulated fumes in the cockpit drill), the canopy is difficult to move rearwards even at 80kts.

3. CONSPICUITY:

The SI report goes as far as to categorically say Tutor conspicuity was not a factor despite the glider pilot witness stating he heard the Tutor before he saw it and then only at very close range.

In the AAIB report a little more is made of how difficult a Tutor is to see.

Although not as significant a factor as in the St Athan collision (weather, contrast with ground etc), the AEF aircraft was not seen until it was too late.

What has been done to mitigate these factors that affect all Tutor Ops?