RAF future fast jets

[typerated]

So let me get this straight:

Two more Typhoon squadrons still to come and will be based at Lossie along with 6 Sqn.

Presumably two Tornado units will make way for them? And then the remaining Lossie Tornado unit (the OCU?) will move to Marham.

We will buy approx 50 (if I remember right) JSFs . The remaining Tornados will then be retired.

The RAF will then only have one fast jet type as the JSFs will be for the FAA?

Or have I got it all wrong?

[Pure Pursuit]

I very much doubt that the FAA will have fast jets on its books again. Any JSF that come into service will be RAF.

[typerated]

Irrespective of the service name on the side of the machine probably all we will be buying is enough to populate one carrier – not enough to have RAF land based squadrons?

[alfred_the_great]

Pure Pursuit I very much doubt that the FAA will have fast jets on its books again. Any JSF that come into service will be RAF.

Your cabin is on 2 deck, port side, right aft. Enjoy the stay.

[Bismark]

alf,

you've got it in one. If the ABE LINCOLN passing through Hormuz this week did not convince Cameron of the utility of a visible floating sovereign base with an embarked attack capability I suspect nothing will. I didn't see the USAF or RAF conducting a show of force or demonstration of the right of innocent passage through an International strait!

[Courtney Mil]

No matter who owns them, the JFSs will have a land base at Lossie - Scottish indepenence not withstanding. I went to a briefing about it some time ago and they discussed the enormous amount of work required to kit out the base and local area for it - including a LOT more sound-proofing for local houses. The upshot was that it would operate from Lossie when not embarked and, apart from landaways, it wouldn't really be able to operate from anywhere else, which could make things interesting. Of course, that was B-model so may be different now.

Senior thinking at the time was that we would have a Joint Force Strike Fighter. The tribes will want to be involved, I suspect. By then, of course the FAA won't have anyone FJ qualified so it would be a fresh recruitment, therefore the RAF would have to provide enough single-seat suitable pilots from Tornado (presumably) to kick things off - OEU, OCU, first squadrons, etc. If RN gets in, it probably won't be until much later.

My guess would be, as Alfred the Great said, RAF pilots on 2 deck, port side.

[Pontius Navigator]

I didn't see the USAF or RAF conducting a show of force or demonstration of the right of innocent passage through an International strait!

Right of passage is the preserve of ships so apples and pears.

I recall in 1964 that the RN stated that it would exercise right of passage through the Sunda Strait with the Victorious. She was back up with the deployment of 8 Victor and 4 Vulcan aircraft, a squadron of Javelin FAW9, a couple or more of Canberra, a Shackleton sqn, an RNZAF Canberra sqn as well as the resident Hunters, RAAF F86 Wing and sundry others.

In the event she took a different less provocative route and a single destroy exercised right of passage.

The Lincoln may have been the most visible SoF but I bet there were a few B2/B52 around the bazaars.

[Bismark]

By then, of course the FAA won't have anyone FJ qualified so it would be a fresh recruitment,

The FAA has both a continuation flying and a training stream in the USN with aircrew flying F18s off current CVNs. It will be the RN that will have the only aircrew current in cats and traps and thus form the training and command element of future UK JSF Sqns. With the F18 programme there is a commitment to operate from the sea both now and in the future...something the FAA are totally comfortable with. This is not a jibe at the RAF but if they want to be part of this game they need to commit to it now. That means volunteer maritime FJ aviators.

[Courtney Mil]

Yes, indeed, Bismark, I'm aware of the F18 guys, but are there enough to go it alone and are we going to keep doing that for so many years? I would imagine the initial cadre will go to do manufacturer's course, which would have to include C&T training (probable a bit basic without experience at it). In that respect (this is a question, not an attack) don't you think it likely that the RAF could start working guys up in the same way? The RN can obviously use their maintained capability as a strong argument, but whether that's enough to convince MoD that it's a good enough reason to be in the game, I'm not sure.

Actually, you would be perfectly entitled to make that dig at the RAF; there isn't exactly a history of planning ahead for these things, is there?

But, as I said before, perhaps it comes back to a JFSF?

[Bismark]

Courtney,

The FAA and the RNAS before it invented carrier aviation and all the main tools that the USN now use (and some they don't - ski jump) - until the RAF's successful campaign to get rid of the RN's true FW carriers we still were world leaders. They tried again in the 2000's to get rid of the FAA FW once and for all and have, so far. failed in this attempt. Cats and traps is not a turn on capability that is picked up in a quick conversion course - this is what the junior joes do but the Sqns need to be run by experienced CV operators. In addition the LSOs need to be very experienced C&Ts pilots - again something the RAF shows no interest in developing.

If JSF goes very badly wrong timewise, the FAA would be able to stand up an F18 Sqn fairly quickly and certainly in the timeframe of a capable QE Class. Again this is not anti RAF banter but they need to refocus from their daily attempts to diminish the FAA (and AAC) and get on with delivering this new (for a while) capability in a Joint fashion.

[Finningley Boy]

I understand that following the extended lease given to the R.N. Buccaneer and Phantom squadrons, in 1970, they were run on but increasingly with R.A.F. Air and Ground Crews. Something the then C.A.S. Sir John Grandy wasn't happy about at all, but that is what was decided. Do any of you recall this being the case and were the Navy Phantom/Buccaneer squadrons made up of a significant number of light blue people by 1978 when all came to an end.:confused:
FB:)

[GeeRam]

Not sure if there were many (if any) RAF ground crew embarked on Ark back then.... but, the honor of making the last ever RN cat launch went to a light blue pilot, when Flt.Lt M.MacLeod RAF, departed Ark's waist cat on 27th Nov 1978 in Phantom/012, XT820.

IIRC......about half of 892's aircrew were light blue on that last Ark embarkation....??

Edit:

Not quite 50% judging by uniform colour in this 1978 photo.

http://www.phantomf4k.org/resources/4271/assets/images/892%20Sqn/Copy%20of%20892%20Sqdn%20St%20Thomas%201978.jpg

[P6 Driver]

RAF Future Fast Jets?

Whatever the yanks decide to let us have (witholding certain electronics or keeping the avionics/weapons software access codes for themselves, of course).
:rolleyes:

[alfred_the_great]

I would suggest that future RAF FJ are something along the line of X-47 or Taranis.....

[SASless]

I would think....the question better asked is there going to be an RAF that needs Future Fast Jets....and can afford them? The other question that is begged...is just how many Fast Jets can the RAF/UK MOD afford?

What Threat must the RAF consider from future adversaries?

Just who is going to be the "Enemy" and what capability do they have and will have in the future?

Will the FFJ even be a manned aircraft?

[Finningley Boy]

A recent editorial in one of the glossy magazines, by Jon Lake, says that Senior Air Force officers are not that convinced that the unmanned fighter is not quite the future its been all cracked up to be. I can't quote nything more specifically because I don't have the magazine article to hand. But I can look it out later.

FB:)

[alfred_the_great]

says that Senior Air Force officers are not that convinced that the unmanned fighter is not quite the future its been all cracked up to be

And in other shock news, turkeys think 25th Dec is over-hyped.

[Easy Street]

Senior air force officers don't fly fast jets, perhaps bar a once-in-a-tour jolly, so I wouldn't say they have any inherent motivation to favour manned aircraft. As and when the unmanned option surpasses the manned one in capability and flexibility, I would bet the farm on their airships chopping cockpits in double-quick time. They've had their fun already and probably don't care if we get ours or not.

[Backwards PLT]

Jeez it must get awfully tiring being that paranoid, Bismark. The entire RAF isn't out to destroy the FAA, believe it or not, although I suspect nothing that I or anyone else says will convince you of that. Does the RAF want to operate F-35? Yes, of course - it is Airpower, just as the RN want to because they see it as maritime power. You could turn the RN argument around and say the carrier is only a moving airfield to deploy air power so should be run by the RAF. :ok:

JSF will be a joint RN/RAF endeavour, which is the correct way ahead, imho. With only 9-12 embarked and far more on land you cannot argue that all RN is the way ahead and when they are embarked those RN pilots will be useful (for example explaining that it is a ship NOT a boat).

Now if everyone could stop bitching and get on with it that would be great.

[Justanopinion]

From The Times a couple of days ago.

Tom Coghlan Defence Correspondent
Last updated January 26 2012 12:01AM
The Royal Navy may have to buy French fighter jets for Britain’s new aircraft carrier amid growing doubts over the American-designed Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a senior officer has warned.
Admiral Sir Trevor Soar, who retires as Commander-in-Chief Fleet in March, told industrialists that there was mounting concern within the Ministry of Defence about the increasing costs and delays to the JSF programme.
In a detailed note of his speech to the ADS Maritime Interest Group, which has been seen by The Times, Admiral Soar warned that US defence spending cuts could jeopardise the deal.
He was quoted as saying that Britain might do better to invest in what he called an “interim aircraft capability” and named two potentially cheaper alternatives – the American-built F18 Super Hornet or the French Dassault Rafale jet. The carrier is due to be ready in 2019 but Britain might not acquire the JSF until a decade later, Admiral Soar suggested.
The US is due to cut $487 billion (£312 billion) from defence spending over the next decade but this could rise to a $1 trillion. And as the Pentagon cuts its order of JSF aircraft, the overall cost per aircraft rises steadily. They already cost $100 million each.
Leon Panetta, the US Defence Secretary, acknowledged last week that the JSF programme may be delayed.
Admiral Soar told his audience last month that the developments were potentially “game changing” for Britain and predicted that the purchase of JSF will be the big question in Britain’s 2015 strategic defence review. Britain has invested £2 billion in the programme and components for the JSF will be made in British factories. The aircraft was due to be delivered in 2018.
MoD officials said that contingencies are now being considered with discussion on whether to change the variant of JSF Britain buys, or to purchase a different aircraft.
Elizabeth Quintana, of the Royal United Services Institute think-tank, said: “Most of the JSF partner [nations] are having to look at other options. There are no fixed costs; they are going ever upwards and if they cross a certain threshold Britain will have to look to buy elsewhere.”
In the Strategic Defence Review of 2010 the Government said it would change the JSF variant it was buying from the short take-off Variant B to the Variant C. Now, The Times understands, there is a renewed MoD consideration for Variant B, backed strongly by Mr Panetta this week.
Jim Murphy, the Shadow Defence Secretary, said: “There will be very grave concerns that problems with JSF may lead to the Government purchasing an interim aircraft at a time of deep defence cuts. We need to know whether money already spent on this project would be wasted.”
Peter Luff, the Defence Equipment Minister, said: “We continue to plan on delivery of JSF; however, we will not set a firm in-service date until after 2013.”

[Kitbag]

Easy Street, where will that leave selection of CAS, or will all future ones not have the proven intellectual capacity of Sir Glen?

[Ken Scott]

Bismark:

..until the RAF's successful campaign to get rid of the RN's true FW carriers we still were world leaders. They tried again in the 2000's to get rid of the FAA FW once and for all and have, so far. failed in this attempt.



Again this is not anti RAF banter.....

Two rather contradictory statements methinks.

And anyway I thought the Harriers (incl RAF ones) & carriers went because we were broke & not because the RAF wanted to be topdog & bully the poor FAA?

[Pontius Navigator]

Bismark:

..until the RAF's successful campaign to get rid of the RN's true FW carriers we still were world leaders. They tried again in the 2000's to get rid of the FAA FW once and for all and have, so far. failed in this attempt.

Bismark,

I am not throwing out a challenge, I am just curious about the basis for your assertion. A friend of mine was on the Ark; she was a rust bucket with several compartments below the waterline flooded all the time. She had to have watertight doors shut and only opened one or two at a time in case of another leak.

I think then, as now, there was only so much cake to be cut - V-force was replaced by the SSBNs. The new carrier needed new escorts like the Type 82. The army needed new kit etc etc.

Where did the RAF fit in getting rid of the true carrier?

[typerated]

When we were planning to gets lots of JSFs – some for the Navy, some for the RAF the picture was quite rosy – now we will have more deck space on the carriers than airframes it looks like a bun fight on who will own them and where they will fly from - nice!

Two more Typhoon squadrons still to come and will be based at Lossie along with 6 Sqn.

Presumably two Tornado units will make way for them? And then the remaining Lossie Tornado unit (the OCU?) will move to Marham.

But then I forgot that we are planning to retire the tranche 1 Typhoons before the end of the decade.

So by 2020 or so the RAF might be down to 4 frontline Sqns of Typhoons and part owner (maybe) of 50 JSFs?

[Finningley Boy]

IMHO, there is nothing clear about the future of H.M. Forces at all. With Eck Salmond looking to railroad a yes vote for the People's Democratic Republic of Caledonia, essentially by affording petulent, rash 16 and 17 year olds the right to vote on the matter and current problems around the globe from Iran to China not to mention American defence interests shifting away from Europe to the Far East and Pacific, prompted in no small way by European attitudes toward their own defence arrangements and casual, indeed, at times, mild contempt for American efforts to contribute to our ability to sleep safely in our beds at night. I think the future looks very interesting, including what may affect the R.A.F's future front line up!:ok:

FB:)

[Bismark]

Where did the RAF fit in getting rid of the true carrier?

My banter is not anti-RAF per se, it is just comment based on experience and comment from people far more knowledgeable than I.

The last true carrier was to be CVA01 (ARK was just living out her useful life). As well as some pretty poor staff work by the RN in the 60's the most famous incident was the redrawing of the map of the Indian Ocean by the RAF to demonstrate the reach of shore based air defence. The same trick was attempted in the 2000s by the then CAS but spotted by an astute PSO to the Minister.

Talk to any senior FAA serving officer and ask him about the daily grind of fending off the RAF from constant dimunition of the FAA and AAC. Has the directed Merlin transfer started - has it h**l, are the RAF trying to replace RN engineers with RAF (because they trained too many) yes they are. The one area where the RAF are holding back is FJ Maritime in the USN because no RAF aircrew want to commit to a maritime, embarked, future.

Not ant-RAF but I do want to see fair play. In general terms if the effect is to be delivered by embarked capability it should be flown by maritime crews in the FAA who want to be there and who willingly accept the trials and tribulations of life at sea.

Way off thread but needs to be said.

[denachtenmai]

Following on from FB's post about Salmond and independence, why on earth are we contemplating basing anything at Lossie?
Regards, Den.

[Mach Two]

Because this all started before the Scots started getting all upity(sp?) and we don't yet know if it's all sulky foot-stamping or real tantrum that will lead to actually stomping out and slamming the door! If the latter, we'll have to rethink that one.

[denachtenmai]

But, by the time that we find out either way, money is going to be spent at Lossie. So until the jocks have their vote, let's not spend any defence money north of the border.
Regards, Den.

[Mach Two]

Indeed! Maybe another good reason to sort it out sooner rather than later!

[BEagle]

As well as some pretty poor staff work by the RN in the 60's the most famous incident was the redrawing of the map of the Indian Ocean by the RAF to demonstrate the reach of shore based air defence. The same trick was attempted in the 2000s by the then CAS but spotted by an astute PSO to the Minister.

Nope, that's pure folklore peddled by the fisheaded ones. The so-called 'map' issue was probably down to something as simple as a staute mile / nautical mile error. Something similar nearly caused the loss of the Spitfire Vcs from USS Wasp to reinforce Malta, when the RAF worked in statute miles and the Navy in nautical miles....:\ The Spitfires were then launched rather too far from Malta for comfort.

CVA01 was binned with our 'East of Suez' policy when the Labour Government decided that we'd stop playing world policeman...:rolleyes: A great shame - but with Earl Mountbottom having royally shafted TSR2, understandably there wasn't much love lost between senior officers in the MoD-box at the time.

As for the F-35 and the Queen Elizabeth class carriers, what an utter goat this whole issue is. Aircraft carriers with no fixed wing aircraft able to be operated from them? Does the UK go back to the F-35B and no CATOBAR capability, given that the F-35C is years away from success - or an interim F-18/E/F/G acquisition and modification of both carriers to CATOBAR state to remove the risk of the whole F-35 programme going tits-up in a big way?

[ICBM]

There are certainly a lot of questions being asked about our real requirements and the [very] expensive bits of gear in the current procurement pipeline to fulfil said requirements....

It's been said before however, does the UK really need 2 huge carriers, one of which will get sold off because it doesn't meet our requirements? I pose the question not to enflame but because it is absolutely right to do so. Can we protect our sea lines of communication without such behemoths, instead relying on faster, more agile intercept craft with enough onboard firepower to get the job done? Op Ellamy proved to an extent that UK could send a stark message of international condemnation to a belligerent government without the need for embarked fast air. Sure, perhaps it would have been more flexible to have Harrier on Lusty or Ark but ultimately in that scenario it wasn't essential. Other scenarios may suit a carrier completely but equally may not; so it comes down to the sad situation we're in: if we continue wanting the 'kit' to cover every eventuality then we're sadly deluding ourselves given our financial disposition. The carriers are monumentally expensive but do they offer value for the taxpayer?

On the aircraft thread, there are some pretty strong reasons for remaining in the F-35 programme; a return on investment for every aircraft sold (££ to HM Treasury), enduring manufacturing work for UK employees at a time when unemployment is rising, and a lot of stuff that's not just stealth including fuel capacity, payload, radar, network capability, and the most important.... growth potential. The last point is one which puts an F-18 solution firmly as a stop-gap, giving us another headache further down the line. Do you think that procuring and supporting two types (F-18E/F into F-35C) within the next 10 years is going to cost more or less than staying the course on just F-35? IMHO, I don't think we need the aircraft carriers as much as we need an aircraft that can take UK's air power role well into the middle of this century. To me that means an F-35C that can be embarked onto a US CVN when required - could we foresee having a squadron permanently assigned in the USA onboard CVN while the land-based squadron(s) are in the UK? Maybe..

[Finningley Boy]

ICBM,

I'd by a cheaper type, like the F18 E/F or Rafale, or even investigate the Sea Typhoon idea being floated (pardon the pun). This given the we can't do anymore attitude creeping through the U.K. from the top down ought to find such an arrangment agreeable. We ditch the horrendously expensive magic jet once and for all and we buy some existing proper ones and perhaps a few more of them than we would the magic one. I understand that the Australians, already getting Super Hornets, as an intended interim, are looking at making it the chosen one for the long term!:ok:

FB:)

[ICBM]

FB,

I see the attraction of buying something proven and tangible 'now' but we really don't have the money for it and like I said F-18E/F, though capable for a few more years, is at the end of it's run. The Americans and Aussies can afford an interim solution and we cannot.

[Pontius Navigator]

Bismark,

Thank you for that.

However the RN was not beyond a bit of flag waving (or the other waying) too. Think the Atlantic Air Race apart from the fact they needed RAF Tankers. THE STORY OF THE DAILY MAIL TRANS-ATLANTIC AIR RACE - The Education Forum (http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=14321)

I recall the Buccaneer unrefuelled hop across the pond. It started up and taxiied at Goose then had to be topped up at the end of the runway.

There was certainly an anti-Buccaneer lobby in the RAF which did not want the Buccaneer 2* as it might have affected their F111 and then AFVG aspirations. Almost a rerun of the pre-war procurements whee the FAA was the ugly sister.

[Capt P U G Wash]

A little more truth required I think:

The JSF aircraft will be procured by the RAF and the operational duty holder chain will be RAF. A deal has been struck to share the cockpits equitably, with the RAF getting the majority share.

The RN will rightly press for embarked supervisory roles, but they will probably have to share these with the RAF as the Force will not be big enough to grow sufficient FAA FW critical mass.

It is true that the RAF will have to step up to the plate – so start painting those cabins light blue inside! The RN aircrew in the US now are there to keep the FAA FW cadre alive (at a feed in rate of 2 per year!) as much as it is to grow cat and trap skills. The RAF want their share of the USN slots and are currently letting the RN take the lion’s share – small issue of how they are being paid for needs to be resolved!

With a significant distance away from full operating capability and the small size of the Force, it means that the RAF will be able to take the role on in a more measured way because of its fast jet strength in depth. The lack of RAF crews in USA is not an indication of reluctance to partake, but one of FAA survival instincts and necessity. Anyway, we bought the aircraft to deliver airpower away from the deck, not to be a vehicle for a macho landing contest (as deck ops so often become).

The more important issue here is how long is Defence, the RN sailors, HMG and the UK public going to be bombarded by FAA propaganda. We can’t afford to c**k this up (it has enough problems without infighting), so some of the old and bold who are peddling nonsense (regurgitated by certain posters here) about RAF intent need to let the generation who will have to make this work get on with it – together on board!

Those who are "leaking" (untrue) stories of Rafale and F18 have two agendas: to try and deflect the overrun costs of the whole programme, and/or to try and steal a march for FAA ownership. The fact is the F35 (once it is sorted out) brings far more capability than the “cheap” alternatives ever will – we would have some serious capability gaps elsewhere that F35 was planned to fill. The Treasury might also have a view, as we will make more money through the F35 work share (that is dependent on our tier 1 participation in the programme) than the costs of the programme by a number of factors. We could throw them away and still make on the deal, but only if we buy them first. So all those who are peddling the alternatives need to come clean about what it would do to our UK sovereign industrial capability, GDP and our resultant tax bills.

[Justanopinion]

F-18E/F, though capable for a few more years, is at the end of it's run.

Still a couple of hundred more to go on its run and no reason that SuperHornet would not have a life as long as Typhoon, and is more capable right now.

[500N]

"I understand that the Australians, already getting Super Hornets, as an intended interim, are looking at making it the chosen one for the long term!"

Do we have much choice if we don't want a capability gap ?

We also have a minister ATM that is prepared to ask some hard questions and make decisions, not that everyone agrees. Being "in favour" with the US at the moment and with our dollar good as well doesn't do any harm either.

[Backwards PLT]

Wise words, Capt PUG. Bottom line is the RAF wants a fifth generation capability so are keen that the UK gets F35. The RN are desperate to preserve the carriers so will suggest sacrificing the air capability in order to do that. I don't think that the RN have a hope of winning the argument because a. The F35 will be far more capable, b. The F35 will actually be cheaper to UK plc due to industrial workshare (not ticket price) and c. The politicians will never change their minds twice - they would look very stupid.

Btw, I don't think that the plan was ever for the RN to purely fly from the carriers and the RAF from land - there was always going to be a mix, although sqns would be biased to one service, exactly like JFH. Given the current CEPP philosophy, the RN have shot themselves in the foot (although clearly it is RAF scheming) by planning on only having 9-12 F35s embarked. With a single carrier that, optimistically, will have 75% availability it means that maritime will be a relatively small part of JFSF, although probably a disproportionate training burden.

Finally. Of those currently in the US flying, or training to fly, the Hornet, how many do you think will fly F35 for the RAF/RN. I would hazard a guess at none but there may be one or 2, if you are optimistic, so little sense in the RAF committing money there just yet.

[Finningley Boy]

Those who are "leaking" (untrue) stories of Rafale and F18 have two agendas: to try and deflect the overrun costs of the whole programme, and/or to try and steal a march for FAA ownership. The fact is the F35 (once it is sorted out) brings far more capability than the “cheap” alternatives ever will – we would have some serious capability gaps elsewhere that F35 was planned to fill. The Treasury might also have a view, as we will make more money through the F35 work share (that is dependent on our tier 1 participation in the programme) than the costs of the programme by a number of factors. We could throw them away and still make on the deal, but only if we buy them first. So all those who are peddling the alternatives need to come clean about what it would do to our UK sovereign industrial capability, GDP and our resultant tax bills.

But Capt P.U.G. Wash, the F35 is Bloody Ugly!:(

FB:)

[Courtney Mil]

And the F-18, FB?

[Milo Minderbinder]

Theres a third option
See which of Rafale / Sea Typhoon is finally purchased by the Indians, and join them in a production run of whichever they choose
You could even take it a stage further and have a joint OCU based in India, where the weather is so much better.

[Finningley Boy]

And the F-18, FB?


Hmmmmmmm? OK I think the Rafale presents the best proposition, all things considered!:ok:

FB:)

[BossEyed]

But Capt P.U.G. Wash, the F35 is Bloody Ugly!:(

Oh, I don't know.

It scores pretty low on a scale of 1 to X-32.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/39/USAF_X32B_250.jpg/300px-USAF_X32B_250.jpg

[Finningley Boy]

Uurrgh!:yuk:

FB:)

[Courtney Mil]

Yes, Uurgh, indeed, FB. It's too butt ugly to fly. Actually, I have to be honest, I think F18 is rather good looking. But what would I know about looks!

[Finnpog]

If, and it is perhaps a big if, the RN decided that they did not need to provide the whole training infrastructure for FW training, but entered into a pertership with the USN, this would save the duplication and also be a buffer to the vagaries of recruitment.

Is this not what the French Aeronavale do?

With a change of mindset, the matelots could tap into all of the institutional knowledge of CV ops for the last 70 years, and provide sufficient experinced staff overtime to take on instructional roles too.

Hopefully they will also get some CV combat experience, as well as buddy-buddy tanker experience and some Growler action over time.

If JFSF is such a good idea, why not this time let the RN lead it, seeing as how JFH was RAF based.

There would need to be some key light blue personnel in certain roles - but this might create the "embarked bias" in the ethos of the force that would be needed. At least that way Team F-35 (or whatever) is a truly amphibious force, that also deploys from land bases - a bit like the Junglies.:E

[Kitbag]

TBH I don't think FAA has the 'critical mass' to man an F-35 force, I believe they couldn't fill the seats or other posts they were meant to in JFH. After the current culls across the Services any pretence at regenerating an effective Naval force of 12 aircraft is a joke.

[TurbineTooHot]

I've often found it funny that die hard FAAists presume that us "Crabs" could not cope and more importantly would not want to "come aboard." Reasons I've heard include not joining up for that, not understanding nautical ways etc. whereas the WAFUs are equally at home on dry land as on ship. By FAA logic this could not be the case as they joined to fly off ship, which the strip at KAF certainly ain't!!

On my last tour, I spent 5-7 months away each year. Where to me was not important, what was important was that I was away doing my job.

I think you'll find that if the JFSF becomes light blue in nature, you will have a happy bunch of aviators. The USN exchanges are much sort after, and I didn't hear much beaking from mates on JFH. From this, I can't deduce that the RAF could operate from RN vessels with little fuss.

Holy Sh:mad:t I sound like Torpy.

[Pontius Navigator]

Yes, Uurgh, indeed, FB. It's too butt ugly to fly.

Looks like it was repelled by the Earth.

You know what they say - if it looks right . . .

Or if it looks like a Pig . . .

[Bismark]

Beagle,

Nope, that's pure folklore peddled by the fisheaded ones.

Wrong. Both cases I quoted are fact.

PUG,

I hear much of what you say but whether the FAA take on the major role in the end or not the fact is someone has to develop the competencies for operations of "cat and trap" aircraft from the sea. It is a whole different ballgame from JFH and as CNO himself said "Once qualified for day and night deck ops you have to stay qualified for the whole commission....that means staying embarked and operating from the sea for up to 12 months. it has to be a mindset from the start and not a hop-on hop-off mentality that is often spouted by current and recently retired RAF SOs.

Many of the current FAA aircrew operating F18s are not there to become F35 pilots but to be the LSOs, Cdrs(Air), CAGs etc - competence is needed beyond the cockpit and you can't just career manage a Typhoon jock into these roles.

I simply do not believe the RAF are serious about the whole thing. If they were they would be demanding slots in the USN and directing aircrew to follow a "maritime" career path.

[Backwards PLT]

Bismark, perhaps you should tell the USN that they need to stay permanently embarked, because they aren't, they spend extended times ashore. When they are going to deploy they do a work-up and off they go. The deployment may then be a long one, but probably not so much in UK aircraft carriers, but it's hardly a FOB in the USV is it?

And how will it work when the sole aircraft carrier isn't available, will all the pilots suddenly forget how to do it and turn into pumpkins or will they do what every other maritime air operation does and do a short work up, get current and crack on? I'm not suggesting that carrier ops is something you can try once on the OCU and pick up 5 years later, but it isn't as difficult as you seem to be espousing, at least not according to the many people I've talked to that have actually done it.

ps they're not all out to get you.
pps I don't know your background but I get the distinct impression it isn't flying aircraft?!?

[Milo Minderbinder]

surely the fact is that the RAF view is that the carriers will never go into service, so whats the point in preparing for them?

[Backwards PLT]

Milo

Interesting comment, where did you get it from? Everyone I know works on the assumption that the carriers will enter service, in some form. Just as expensive to cancel and all that. Mind you if you didn't do all the support and upkeep stuff and sold for scrap as soon as they were delivered it would save a bucketload of money, now you mention it.;)

[alfred_the_great]

Kitbag

TBH I don't think FAA has the 'critical mass' to man an F-35 force, I believe they couldn't fill the seats or other posts they were meant to in JFH. After the current culls across the Services any pretence at regenerating an effective Naval force of 12 aircraft is a joke.

Let's be precise about this - 800, 801 and 899 could fulfill their requirements perfectly well (and did so for 25ish years). What they couldn't do is arbitrarily move to a RAF dictated Sqn size and shape within 8 years. Nor were they given enough GR7/9 airframes to constitute a full size squadron.

A subtle, yet important, distinction.

And why will a 'Naval Force' consist solely of 12 jets? The point about a full C buy is the fact all of them can embark, depending on the pilots capability and currency.

And lets not think that this is a Dark Blue bite - having been in a carrier with 800, 801, 1 and IV Squadrons, frankly you're all as big as pricks as each other. :ok:

[Bismark]

Backwards,

You are as bad as the others. You can't just do a "short work up" and hop aboard with C&T ops....ask any F18 etc driver. This is exactly the reason JFH was never fully day and night qualified (notwithstanding Afgh ops) - they were never onboard long enough to qualify all the pilots, because the RAF command did not buy into the concept of carrier operations.

Believe me when CVF gets its jets they will be embarked for very long periods, like the USN.

I am an aviator with plenty of experience of CV ops on both sides of the pond.

[Backwards PLT]

OK so exactly how long is the work up? The USN Air Wings don't spend their entire lives on board, they spend extended periods land based so what does the work-up involve? I know they do a lot of it en route to wherever they are going, but that just emphasise that carriers take quite a while to get anywhere, unless you are lucky or have a crystal ball, which the RN don't like to talk about.

JFH was, quite rightly focussed on Afghan. They could of course have done less of that in order to be "fully day/night quald" on the carrier, which would have pleased the RN but perhaps not the right thing for defence. A good example of why Maritime/Land agnostic Air power is a good thing!

Just to reiterate my position - JSF should be jointly manned and run and we should have at least 1 carrier (pref 2). This is the view of the majority of the RAF, we dont prescribe to the "only we can do it, you just don't understand" view that the RN is peddling.

[GreenKnight121]

Bismark, perhaps you should tell the USN that they need to stay permanently embarked, because they aren't, they spend extended times ashore. When they are going to deploy they do a work-up and off they go. The deployment may then be a long one, but probably not so much in UK aircraft carriers, but it's hardly a FOB in the USV is it?



No, when they are "ashore" they regularly (weekly) conduct practice carrier landings on an airfield with a carrier deck marked out, and at least monthly fly out to a carrier that is working up towards deployment and conduct first "touch&go" landings then actual arrested landings and catapulted take-offs.

I was in a USMC squadron that got assigned to a carrier air-wing in 1985... and despite all our pilots having been carrier-qualified during their advanced training, they all had to take a full refresher course, followed by re-qualification.

Each time we went back aboard CV-61 Ranger after at least a month ashore, the entire squadron had to do a week of "refresher" landings & take-offs from the carrier before the ship actually set out on its deployment (we were part of the air-wing until the end of August 1989).

[Bismark]

Thank you Greenman....but of course the USN have a training carrier on which to conduct such practice, we do not which is why the UK force will spend plenty of time embarked. And, of course, to generate 12 FE@R will require most of the JSF force to be so qualified.

Backwards,

carriers take quite a while to get anywhere,

2 weeks to the Gulf (all jets, personnel, ammo, fuel, stores, GBAD etc. How long (and at what cost) did it take to establish Gioa as a UK operating base? Didn't we have to resurface major areas to make it fit for purpose? Also, I believe the last convoy home was welcomwed by CAS only last week? Not exactly expeditionary!

"only we can do it, you just don't understand"

This is the line your 3and 4*s have been peddling to the ministers, and particularly so since the Torpy/Anderson years.

[Backwards PLT]

Greenknight thank you for agreeing with my point (perhaps I expressed it badly, but I understood it) - have a "Carrier Wednesday" (airfield with carrier deck) and other training periodically, you aren't embarked all the time. Somewhere earlier I specifically said that you can't just do it on an OCU and expect to pick it up 5 years later.

The problem that the UK will have is training on a proper carrier as I suspect our one and only will either be several thousand miles away or alongside - not sure how we can get around that other than throw in a nebulous "use allies". Or catntrap the second carrier!

These issues are of course service blind, the RN are no better able to overcome them than the RAF.

ps Bismark, I'm going for Rotary Observer.

[Engines]

Backward,

I have to come in here (reluctantly) to comment on one or two of the comments going around here.

Quote: 'JFH was, quite rightly focussed on Afghan. They could of course have done less of that in order to be "fully day/night quald" on the carrier, which would have pleased the RN but perhaps not the right thing for defence. A good example of why Maritime/Land agnostic Air power is a good thing!'

I am afraid that this is off beam, in my view. As someone who was involved in setting JFH up, perhaps I may be allowed to offer clarification. JFH was, indeed, in its latter days, 'focussed on Afghan'. But they were so out of necessity and numbers.

JFH was set up to be a fully dual capable sea/land force, exploiting the unique flexibility of a STOVL aircraft. They were required to maintain required numbers of aircraft at specified levels of readiness, including carrier capable. Staying 'day/night qualified on the carrier' was never done to 'please the RN', it was done to maintain a required readiness state.

When the RAF took the decision to retire the SHAR, the plan to re-brigade into four front line units was taken so as to be able to maintain that dual air/land capability, two RAF heavy, two RN heavy, with the RN heavy units maintaining embarked capability. That plan never came to fruition, and JFH stayed at three front line units, only one RN heavy. (Many reasons for that, none relevant here). This drastically reduced the numbers of aircraft available to go to sea, and the ability to maintain maritime currency was weakened. Sadly, that weakening was not declared to the politicians or, seriously, to the Navy. The maritime capability was still declared.

Afghan then came along, and the Harrier was needed as it had the best capability from the strips then available in theatre. So JFH was 'focussed' on Afghan, but the ability to maintain shipboard currency once again traded away. And that then turned into a problem - the last embarkation of JFH was marked by a series of significant safety shortcomings.

In the end, in my view, JFH failed because, under RAF leadership, there was insufficient emphasis placed on maintaining its declared dual air/sea capability. This happened because senior airmen simply did not attach any importance to the sea capability.

I don't think that RAF airmen, senior or junior, are bad people, or stupid, or 'worse' than RN aviators. I've said, and say again, that the RAF is chock full of highly professional people. However, it's a fact that, as a service, they are basically uninterested in flying from ships. It's not surprising, and even understandable, viewed through the lens of independent 'Air Power' that seeks to make its case as an alternative to 'conventional' land and sea power.

Sorry, but as long as a 'Joint' aviation unit is led by the RAF, it will not, in my view, commit the necessary resource to maintaining an effective maritime capability.

As ever, best regards to all those actually doing the job, whatever the location, whatever the uniform.

Engines

[Not_a_boffin]

Posted a link to the USN NATOPS manual for LSOs in the F35 thread, which appears pertinent to this debate.

www.navyair.com/LSO_NATOPS_Manual.pdf

which pretty much makes GKs point. Joint Force Dave is going to have to spend an awful lot of time embarked one way or the other, whether it's the whole force or just a significant chunk of it.

The US haven't had a training carrier since Forrestal briefly did the role in the early 90s, but they do manage to get the non-embarked squadrons aboard the 2nd/3rd fleet carriers with some sort of frequency. BPLT does make a good point about changing mindset - it's a no-brainer the practicing carrier-landings should be a given when ashore for all JFD and as the preferred method of recovery. But so are other things to do with the embarked role, not just deck procedures etc.

Those who see Carrier Strike as a GR4 role, just delivered from a ship need to have a fundamental wake-up call. The requirement to provide air defence over maritime forces, which is emphatically NOT just defending the carrier, has not gone away. That means they are going to have to be qualified in OCA/DCA as well as Strike, as per the USN F14 (as was) and F18 communities.

One possible way forward and probably the best use of QEC (and Charles de Gaulle) for that matter, is to provide the ability to "replace" a US CVN in the deployment cycle, which ties in with the demand for Europe to pull its weight and with the US desire to shift effort to the 5th and 7th Fleet AOR. In essence, the European ships tie in with the US work-up cycle, which might also allow access to US decks when our ships are in upkeep.

Engines' post just emphasises the need for a mindset change. JFD may well replace some or all of the capability that GR4 currently delivers, but it is going to have to do it in a very different way and deliver other capabilities concurrently. The RN head-shed also need to (re)learn the lesson that the Foo's are not something that can just look after themselves - they need supporting, such that AOC 3Gp (as was) does not default to light blue after a token FAA opener, nor that capability is declared available, when clearly it is not.

[Engines]

Guys,

NAB hits this one right on the head. The issue is what the F-35 is being bought for, and who is going to own it to do that role.

Let's just remember that this whole programme started as the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft (FCBA), for the RN. It then became FJCA (Future Joint Combat Aircraft), before mutating into JCA. It has always been linked 'at the hip' with the endorsed UK policy to deliver a Carrier Strike capability - from the carrier.

What's now happening (and very understandable) is the realisation that the F-35C offers the only real way for the RAF to achieve a GR4 replacement. And the (unsaid) realisation that Typhoon is not that replacement.

The F-35C is not being bought to do the RAF's GR4 role. it's being bought to deliver the UK's Carrier Strike capability. There's nothing (given the right sized fleet, and the right commitment from its owners) to stop it doing both - a properly shared RAF/RN F-35C fleet would, in my view, be a great deal for the UK. Unfortunately an all RAF owned F-35C fleet would, again my view, be used as a GR4 replacement, and the carrier capability would be stillborn.

I'd like to think that all our service chiefs recognise the political direction they have been given and are going to get on and deliver the required capabilities, including Carrier Strike. Sadly, I don't believe that the RAF do. Doesn't make them bad people, nor stupid - just wrong.

Best Regards as ever

Engines

[Easy Street]

I think it stretching credibility to believe we'll end up with any more than 2 (maybe 3 at the very most) F-35C squadrons across the whole of Defence. Therefore we'd better get some damn good sims, because it will be nigh on impossible to maintain training and proficiency in OCA, DCA, SEAD, AI, EW, CAS and carrier ops simultaneously with such a small footprint. If you have a near-permanently embarked air wing, maintenance of any semblance of harmony (even using the RN definition) once you have factored in other essential training would require a fleet-wide aircrew-to-aircraft ratio that exceeds current norms. Therefore we would actually have to do training in the simulator without being required to 'consolidate' it in the aircraft afterwards, as happens in most current FJ roles. 12.5 hours per month just isn't going to happen in that situation, either - so somebody high up is going to have to accept sim hours as 'real' hours for currency puposes...

[pr00ne]

Engines,

"The F-35C is not being bought to do the RAF's GR4 role."

Yes it is. There have been numerous statements over the past few years that the future RAF fast jet fleet will be a combination of Typhoon and F-35. In the days of the JCA being the F-35B there was serious talk at ministerial level of a wing of 2 squadrons of F-35 type aircraft IN ADDITION TO THE JOINT FORCE LIGHTNING with a unit establishment of 9 ac each and a dedicated OCU to serve as the manned fast jet element of the GR4 replacement.

There is a widely held assumption that the UK buy of F-35 will only be around 30 to 40. This is not backed up by any statements of force levels post 2020 for the Joint Force Lightning OR the GR4 replacement.

There is little likelyhood of the F-35 being ordered in quantity in the next few years, but one of the many advantages of the F-35 is it's anticipated production run with the USAF committing to a very large quantity in the most recent DOD review, and consequently there is no NEED to buy the thing now, we can order it when the defence budget is less squeezed and there is a need for the Carrier based AND GR4 replacement fleet.

While there is absolutely no possibility of a one for one replacement of the GR4 fleet, I think that there is a very strong likelyhood of at least an additional two squadrons in addition to the Joint Force Lightning force flown by the FAA and RAF.

[Not_a_boffin]

F35 may be being considered to replace GR4, the point Engines & I are making is that the original requirement (which has not gone away) is for the FCBA, embarked air to provide carrier strike, which means the ability to do OCA/DCA and Strike.

The assumption that only 30-40 frames will be bought will inexorably lead to a stillborn JFD of whatever colour. If 60-odd Harrier GR frames could only support 18FE@R (admittedly with the GR7, 7a, 9, 9a fleets within fleets issue), then 30-40 would be lucky to support a dozen FE@R in total, which isn't going to be worth having (for anything!).

However, what should be the absolute priority soon ought to be the generation of a sustainable FE@R requirement for both the CS and GR4 capabilities. There is too much talk of this or that number being the final and definitive answer, ignoring the fact that FE@R is a number that can change upwards as well as downwards, when there is an open production line outside the current financial horizon..

[LowObservable]

I suspect that Engines and NaB are both right here, and that the original (and still formal according to MoUs) goal of 138 UK F-35s was calculated on replacing GR4 as well as equipping two carriers for strike and air. I'm sure the basic idea was that all the aircraft would be Bs belonging to JFD, but I suspect that there was some RAF hankering for a small contingent of As or Cs.

The two big problems facing that plan at present are, first, the acquisition and operating cost of the F-35, which is kicking the 138-aircraft goal far into the deep weeds (and making it the problem for a very future government), and deferring until Gawd-knows-when the point at which both a single robust CV wing and a land-based strike capability can be supported.

Second are the delays to F-35C IOC with the USN, raising the empty-deck nightmare since the only way for the RN to operate is to shadow the USN. (Dog in the night-time: where is the UK going to get a CV trainer? Same place as the Aeronavale.)

I would also submit that there will be no interim solutions. Letting the camel's nose inside the tent is one thing, but Rhinos' noses have big pointy things on them, which make them even harder to dislodge.

[Bismark]

goal of 138 UK F-35s was calculated on replacing GR4 as well as equipping two carriers for strike and air.

There will be others better qualified to comment but the original 138/150 had nothing to do with the GR4 aspiration. It was the through life requirement to deliver 4 x 12 (14?) a/c frontline sqns + an OCU for Carrier Strike. I think the original intent was 36 FE@R embarked in the CVF. The GR4 issue arose as manned FOAS started to die an early death.

As far as JSF workups and embarkations go I am sure we will follow the USN lead, including working up at FALLON etc so that the RN CAG can co-operate off the US CVNs in theatre.

With an aviator CinC and soon to be 1SL/CinC perhaps the RN may get more robust on this issue.

[zerva]

As a small aside, now that we have got Dave C sorted, seen as most on going AirOps are Reaper dominated, is there a plan for a navalised Reaper of some sort to operate from the deck?:rolleyes:

[Engines]

Gentlemen,

Bismark is absolutely, deadly, right on, bang on the target here. The FCBA/FJCA/JCA numbers were all built around equipping and sustaining the two CVFs. There was never a 'GR4 replacement' line in those numbers.

Now we are down to one carrier, and now that we are a few years down the line, yes, looking at F-35C as a GR4 replacement makes eminent sense, but not at the expense of the main and original justification - Carrier Strike. Of course, i would not expect the RAF to share that view.

PrOOne raises an interesting point when he puts the idea of 'two more squadrons in addition to the 'Joint Force Lightning flown by RAF and FAA'? Surely, what he means is 'two more squadrons for Joint Force Lightning'? Or does he mean (as I suspect) 'two RAF squadrons, not shared with the RN'? Following his logic, would the best result not be Lightnings (As?) for the RAF and Cs for the RN? Why 'Joint Force'?

Zerva - navalised Reaper - not a hope for the prop driven version - it's basically a powered heavy glider, not a carrier aircraft unless you give the whole deck over to it. General Atomics are pushing a 'navalised' version of their new Reaper, but the airframe looks wrong for deck ops. Early days yet, though.

The dog that REALLY hasn't barked yet in this thread - future RAF fast jets - has to be RAF UCAVs. I'm surprised at the level of attention being given to X-47 (a long way off as a usable capability) for naval use compared with the undoubted potential for a UCAV replacement for GR4. If they are the way forward, leave the RN to do manned stuff from the deck, and get the RAF UCAV'd up as the GR4s retire. Any comments on that one?

Best Regards as ever to those out there in the dark doing it for real

Engines

[Finnpog]

The planned (wished for?) sensor fit for F-35, with the look-anywhere-and-see helmet would be an ideal sensor suite for a UCAV to enable visual identification for those RoE ops - together with an 'n' strong flight crew to monitor the rest of the sensor suite back at the operating base.

The would be some inevitable delay / lag with routing the signal via satellite, however this must be being overcome currently.

[LowObservable]

I stand corrected - was the 138 set so long ago that there was still a potential manned FOAS?

Seems like ancient history now.

[orca]

Yes. FOAS/ FCAC was completely seperate to the 138 frames being procured to fulfil the FCBA/FJCA/JCA requirement.

[Finningley Boy]

The replacement for the GR4 has remained a foggy issue since the FOAS requirement was abandoned. I don't fully recall, but I think it was so about the same time that the last Government ordered 138 F35Bs.

I think pr00ne's comments are perhaps closest to the mark, as well as the least despairing on here, the mooted figure of either; 30, 40 or 50 is a number which current financial circumstances can comfortably allow planning for, it's not necessarily, nor even intended to be, the final purchase. Indeed, its not even a settled order. But I imagine that, subject to improved economic circumstances and a recognised need which the government of the day can be brought to appreciate, there'll be some more F35s purchased on top and the possible addition of Taranis, not to mention the full deployment of Typhoon, given time.:ok:

FB:)

[Capt P U G Wash]

Engines:

“I don't think that RAF airmen, senior or junior, are bad people, or stupid, or 'worse' than RN aviators. I've said, and say again, that the RAF is chock full of highly professional people. However, it's a fact that, as a service, they are basically uninterested in flying from ships. It's not surprising, and even understandable, viewed through the lens of independent 'Air Power' that seeks to make its case as an alternative to 'conventional' land and sea power.”

After JFH returned from Afghan it was well on its way to recovering the embarked role – only the savings measure stopped it. AURIGA, the last embarked full exercise, was with 1(F) Sqn on deck.

As for the “Independent Air Power” argument, you are living in the past. That was Trenchard’s argument. The argument now is that the environmental expertise can only be vested and protected by a specialist Service. If the RN took the embarked aircraft; there is a strong possibility that they would trade away JSF for a cheaper option in order to save the Carrier Programme and consign us to the second division for ever (militarily and industrially).

And for those suggesting that we buy this very costly capability merely to take our time in the US CV deployment rota, they will see it taken as a savings measure very quickly. We need to find a new way of operating that makes one ship do. We cannot copy the US model.

[Red Line Entry]

Capt PUG Wash,

I think you are spot on with the 'consign us to the second division' comment if we binned JSF. However, I would suggest that as a military, we can no longer afford to have first division capabilities across the board.

Within a constrained resource limit, we are going to have to realise that our previous aspirations to have night one capabilities against a tier one opponent are unaffordable, certainly in every area of our orbat.

Clearly, the economics of JSF are complex, and I don't pretend to understand the true value to the UK economy of each £ spent on the programme, but perhaps the aircraft is (or soon will become) just too damn expensive.

[Bismark]

PUG,

A valiant attempt to plea for the RAF but it doesn't wash. The senior RAF use the "Trenchard " word whenever they can - as recent studies/camppaigns attest. It wasn't the last savings measure that killed off a viable JFH (OK it did literally) it was the vindictive one before it which was aimed solely at removing the RN from the force by making the numbers unviable....the ploy didn't work.

The RN seniors may demonstrate a certain ambivalence towards the FAA but there is little evidence from the past that they would allow the capability, if owned, to wither on the vine. The reason is that for all thier "envy" of the FAA they know that it delivers in spades and far more efficiently than the RAF - fact. Every study in the recent past (5 - 10 years) has demonstrated that the RN runs "air" more efficiently and to higher safety standards than the RAF. The most recent study by the MAA has shown that the FAA understand and treat safety and risk better than either the RAF or AAC.

The above is not intended to be anti-RAF banter but a real attempt to stop comments that the FAA are somehow inferior to this "superior" being called the RAF. If the RAF is superior the studies would say so and the AAC and FAA would die an instant death.

[cokecan]

Cap'n wrote ''If the RN took the embarked aircraft; there is a strong possibility that they would trade away JSF for a cheaper option in order to save the Carrier Programme and consign us to the second division for ever (militarily and industrially)''

conversely, without meaningful carrier strike, could we really be said to be first division?

'first division' means, to me at least, the ability to give a good slapping to anyone (bar the US) anywhere in the world at a time of our choosing and without relying on basing rights courtesy of whichever local tin-pots we've bribed with overseas aid and jump-leads.

however brilliant F-35 may be, if it can only give us, in extremis, slapping rights over western Europe and north-west Africa, then we aint first division.

i would argue that in divisional terms, CVF with 36 F/A-18F's with Storm Shadow ALCM, Meteor BVRAAM, EPavewayIV, ALARM, Harpoon, and a slack handful of E-2D's supported by half a dozen SSN with TLAM is more top trumps than 100 utterly brilliant F-35's whose range is only as good as the 'front-loaded commision' deal that we've struck with whatever dodgy dictator who owns the runways we need.

[Finningley Boy]

Cokecan,

Admittedly the present suggested figure of F35s can change at any moment, and I would expect up rather than down otherwise there'd be no point in proceeding with it, but how confident are we that we'll get as many as 100? ....eventually?? :confused:

FB:)

[cokecan]

FB, i'm not. i think its cost is going to be so eye-watering that the BG will order less than 30 and keep them for 'special occasions'. which means that there'll be **** all flying hours, and then a spate of accidents whenever they get wheeled out.

i just do not believe we can afford the F-35 package - the airframes in sufficient numbers (what? 200 airframes to give a land based strike force, a CVF based force, attrition replacements and training aircraft?) and all the enabling capabilities - the ELINT, Tankers, AWACS, and the CVF (and all support that it needs) to make having F-35 justifable.

having a sharp spearhead is useless if the shaft is rotten.

[ICBM]

Engines,

You said:

When the RAF took the decision to retire the SHAR, the plan to re-brigade into four front line units was taken so as to be able to maintain that dual air/land capability, two RAF heavy, two RN heavy, with the RN heavy units maintaining embarked capability.

My understanding was that it was the RN who decided that the SHAR should go early - RADM S L, though a nice chap, was rather instrumental in its early demise for the FAA. Although the RN aspiration was to man two FLS the truth was they could not. They barely had enough aircrew (though by the end they were around 1.5 sqns worth) but the critical point was engineering manpower which the RN did not have in sufficient numbers and experience to stand up two full NASs. The fact that there were draftings from NMA to both 800 and 801 NAS was seen more as preservation of FAA history rather than anything meaningful to Ops.

I think there are many who feel the RAF want to see the FAA go but I don't think that's true - maybe at the top there is a battle for resource and identity but it should NOT be forgotten that if the current First Sea Lord had been correctly staffed with credible arguments (of the required potency) to win him over, he would have saved Carrier Strike/GR9 for the RN and sacrificed other ships/programmes to pay HM Treasury their kilo of flesh at the time. He did not. The RN should therefore look inward at their leadership at the time and admit that if CS was that vital their arguments weren't robust enough. 1SL even admitted he'd reverse his decision if given the chance in a public statement but, alas, it's too late now. I don't care if anyone states that the arguments were there and were strong enough; they blatantly weren't or the FAA would be having a cocktail party on the quarterdeck in some far-flung port right now.

A lesson for all...if you want something that badly you have to fight for it tooth and nail. The RAF ARE willing to fight for it because, simply, it is the air power of the next 50 years with the capacity for growth to keep it value for money over its life. It is a game-changing platform to everything out there on t'other side and it is worth the oodles of effort being spent making it work. Yes FCBA was a requirement 15 years ago but requirements change and have a habit of being behind the times - as I've said, my opinion is that the RN no longer need huge carriers as much as they did when the CVF requirement was written. We're selling one for God's sake! Again, if the arguments were there and sacrifice was willing to be made we'd pay everything we could muster to get two flat-tops, but we aren't.

Through various cost options the RAF lost an entire type (and the FW FAA was a victim too sadly) in order to look ahead to afford what we need...ahead. We lost 2 sqns of GR4 and probably will lose more in a few years; all to pay for Typhoon growth and F-35; people are wasting precious energy on conspiracy theories now and it's bordering comedic.


Bismark,

Every study in the recent past (5 - 10 years) has demonstrated that the RN runs "air" more efficiently and to higher safety standards than the RAF.

That may be across the board (i.e. Helos) but on JFH it certainly wasn't so. I operated on both light and dark blue for years with many ship dets there but my opinion and examples against this statement would be unfair on a public forum. Stats also have a habit of being susceptible to what the compiler WANTS them to say...assuming everything gets reported in full.

Capt P U G - I agree! I never ever encountered an ethos of not being willing to embark....ever, ever so again, people need to stop peddling urban myth - there were teething issues in the late 90s with embarking and an attitude by those who did but it was not there shortly afterwards (bit of do it once, remember it forever syndrome by some)

[ICBM]

i just do not believe we can afford the F-35 package - the airframes in sufficient numbers (what? 200 airframes to give a land based strike force, a CVF based force, attrition replacements and training aircraft?) and all the enabling capabilities - the ELINT, Tankers, AWACS, and the CVF (and all support that it needs) to make having F-35 justifable.

having a sharp spearhead is useless if the shaft is rotten.

That's the point of F-35! It doesn't rely on AWACS as much, has less reliance on Tanking support than Typhoon, Rafale and F-18 and does a lot of ELINT itself.....it has less reliance on all these platforms than current platforms making it a force multiplier.... what am I saying? F-35 has a lot of in-built shaft to its spear already

:ugh::ugh:

[Not_a_boffin]

Pug

merely to take our time in the US CV deployment rota is to completely misunderstand the political and influence impact that might bring.
I suggest that actually being able to shoulder some of the load on a regular basis may be more useful and deliver more daily effect, as opposed to running a standard training cycle out of Lossie, once current Herrick ops have finished.

To suggest that would lead to it being taken as a "savings measure" emphasises that light blue don't "get it".

As for operating with one deck, we've done it before from 72-78 and the MN have done it from 2000 onwards. What is being suggested are ways to reduce the Carqual load for the CAG, such that the single operational ship spends more time available for deployment / ops.

[Finningley Boy]

I would still imagine that even 50 is a hell of piddly number!

FB:)

[cokecan]

ICBM,

can F-35 fly to Tripoli and back with 2x AMRAAM and 2x 1000LB JDAM without tanker support?

how much tanker support would 4 F-35 require to get to the Falklands on a re-inforcement operation?

how much tanker support would an F-35 in an ELINT role require to sit off Pakistan for 6 hours?

or, is that not what you meant by 'it doesn't need tankers'?

[ICBM]

Cokecan

Re-read. I never wrote 'it doesn't need tankers' at all. It has less reliance - greater range and fuel efficiency that's all chap.

ELINT isn't just sitting off PK for 6 hours. How about up close without the need to stand off? Be less traditional wouldn't it?

Less reliance on traditional assets doesn't render them obsolete or replace. It does make things very efficient though

[Capt P U G Wash]

Bismark

“ It wasn't the last savings measure that killed off a viable JFH…it was the vindictive one before it which was aimed solely at removing the RN from the force by making the numbers unviable....the ploy didn't work.”

Using the RAF Squadron model for JFH wasn’t designed to kill of the FAA, if anything it was a challenge to grow to 50% of the Force – a challenge they accepted but failed to meet.

“… the FAA … delivers in spades and far more efficiently than the RAF - fact. Every study in the recent past (5 - 10 years) has demonstrated that the RN runs "air" more efficiently and to higher safety standards than the RAF. The most recent study by the MAA has shown that the FAA understand and treat safety and risk better than either the RAF or AAC.”

Care to back that one up! My answer to your first point suggests your efficient force might be cheap but not more effective. You are in danger of using the Treasury definition of efficient! You will be calling savings efficiencies next.

From my experience the FAA and the RAF have an equally enviable record in safety issues – so I would not seek to point score there (although the last few years of JFH may not back up your case). You may be referring to recent MAA audit; the FAA were done last so they had all the other audits to learn from and a lot more time to prepare for the Admirals audit! I would be surprised if they hadn’t been best in show – but since the reports are personal neither you or I have seen them!


Not a Boffin:


so what happens when we take our turn in the NAG deployment cycle and another UK priority turns up (Falklands, Libya etc). If we commit our readiness cycle to someone else's needs we will not have the flexibility of use we desire. So, not a light blue issue, but one for the politicians. Not sure if you have read the US newest strategy but they are heading further East and I am not sure the MoD's budget can stretch to filling US holes as they appear. Are you recommending the UK can now afford a Pacific policy? I am afraid you are thinking old alliances and they may not be as relevant when QE2 turns up. Now work share with the French might be another matter......try that with JSF!

[Not_a_boffin]

Pug

If you look at where the US CVBG are currently deployed away from CONUS, ALL of them are in the 5th or 7th Fleet area. The ones in 2nd/3rd Fleets (CONUS) are either in post deployment stand-down, refit / refuel or pre deployment work up. That means that there is a gap EastLant and the Med (6th Fleet) that would usually have a US carrier deployed and that is precisely where we (and the FR) can add real value.

I'm not for one minute suggesting that we fill a slot in 5th/7th Fleet as a matter of routine, or resurrect the Far East Fleet - far from it. The Pacific-centric nature of future US engagement is old news, they have been working towards this since 2006, it's just that Europe hasn't listened. A UK/FR commitment to provide a "real carrier" in areas where the US recognises a need to have presence, but due to commitments elsewhere cannot actually provide a carrier is what I meant by "effect". Might have to take a turn occasionally in other areas, but that is more likely to be when all is going to ratsh1t, in which case the UK is unlikley to have higher priorities.

As far as UK priorities are concerned, as with all these things, it's a matter of making choices. If SouthLant became an issue, you disengage from your presence mission and head south, with all your stores, airgroup personnel and log support already in place. No different from having a land-based squadron committed to a particular op and then being confronted by another priority - only potentially more supportable.

You'd think that a co-ordinated UK/FR carrier force able to operate in the EastLant, SouthLant, Med would take care of most of the likely UK areas of interest.

[Capt P U G Wash]

Boffin, I cannot fault your analysis; but I don't think that your conclusion is watertight.

Whilst I recognise that the US approach insists on a little bit of good ole USA ready to respond; I just done think we have the luxury or money to attempt a forward deployed posture. In any event in many cases the US CVBG assets may not be the first to respond. ISTAR will come from elsewhere and strike assets may be back in CONUS. Moreover, even the USN will admit that they are heavily reliant on land based air to support.

So a UK forward QEC posture is going to cost a lot - far more than the cost of the units themselves. That coupled with the challenge of both maintaining ship currency and airborne competencies will not survive contact once the facts become clear... IMHO.

[BEagle]

Why is there such an utter obsession with minimum different aircraft types across the services these days? Does a GR4 replacement really need to be carrier-capable? Or a fleet defence interceptor really need to be 'day one' stealthy?

Wouldn't F-18E/F/G for the RN's carrier strike wings and CF-35A for the RAF's Tornado GR4 replacement be a more cost-effective mix?

And an end to all this purple 'Joint Force' bolleaux!

The Andrew does jets on ships best - let's have both the QE class carriers with CATOBAR systems and capable Sea Hornet strike wings operated by the FAA. The RAF can afford to wait until Lockheed Martin have got their $hit together and then follow the RCAF's lead with the probe-equipped CF-35A a few years down the road.

Then and only then, perhaps in 15 years time, it might be sensible to replace the F-18E/F/G with F-35C?

[Not_a_boffin]

Pug

We may have to agree to disagree. The land-based support you refer to tends to be theatre product from true national assets like the EC/RC135s, and LRMP by P3. The AAR aspect is heavily used when you're supporting OEF from the IO, or in other combat ops, but not necessarily in normal presence deployments. We don't have access to those assets nationally, but we could probably get support / the product from those US (or FR!?) units deployed in the Med.

There will be an increased consumables bill for the ships and probably the aircraft (as fuel dump to optimise landing weight will be needed), but other than that no reason to suspect that there will be massive cost differentials. People are paid for, ships and aircraft paid for (a/c will be flying possibly at a higher rate), no 5* hotel bills (:E) - what's not to like?

[cokecan]

Beags wrote ''Why is there such an utter obsession with minimum different aircraft types across the services these days? Does a GR4 replacement really need to be carrier-capable? Or a fleet defence interceptor really need to be 'day one' stealthy?''.

the obvious answer is £££££££££££££££££££££££££££££££££££, but another is flexibilty.

lets say we had, as you suggest, an RN CVF with F/A-18F, and the RAF went with Typhoon, GR4, and then further down the road swapped GR4 for CF-35A. if we subsequently faced an adversary, or series of adversaries, against which land-based airpower was the answer, then the RN's F/A-18's could join the party in a surge capability. if however we found ourselves engaging in a series of conflicts in which carrier based aviation was the only way to engage the enemy, then the RN's F/A-18's are quickly going to get shagged out, with the RAF's great pool of hugely capable fast jets unable to assist.

the real answer is a single type fast-jet fleet that can undertake all the fast jet roles. F-35C can do land and carrier based strike and AD, as can F/A-18F. Typhoon, even at T3, is much more of a one trick pony.

i wouldn't be remotely surprised if its one of the reasons the Indians went for Rafale over Typhoon. being carrier capable may not have been part of the requirement, but having a carrier capable multi-role aircraft in the back pocket gives them options in the future - an aircraft that's tied to one basing type does not give you the same options...

[TurbineTooHot]

Could someone who knows enlighten me on the commonality of the F35A and C and the potential relative cost of each.

I've been mulling Beags and Cokecan's response and a have pondered on the efficacy of a "mixie-buy" of both types. Thus keeping all content: a decently strengthed (a word I've made up btw) RAF OS force and a well placed FAA and Carrier Strike
Fleet.

Just an idle ponderance.....

[Bismark]

Beags etc,

What GR4 replacement? The currently funded FE@R does not allow for a GR4 replacement - it will be provided by Typhoon from land and JSF from the sea...that's yer lot.

PUG re recent audits, talk to the MAA.

[Foghorn Leghorn]

Bismark,

The FE@R will be provided by Typhoon and F-35C, that's it. It has nothing to do with where it comes from. The F-35C element could equally be provided from land basing.

[Bismark]

Foghorn,

That's an SBO! I differentiated as Typhoon cannot operate from CVF.

Turbine,

The A has bigger wings, thus more fuel. It would be nonsense to buy a mixed fleet of As and Cs even if there was funding for increased numbers (which there isn't).

[Not_a_boffin]

I thought the C was the big-wing variant, lower approach speeds at lower alpha and all that.....

However, Bismark is right - no sense at all in buying mixed fleet. Every UK fast jet or UCAV from now on ought to be specified as CV-capable from the off.

[Bismark]

Slip of the finger, you're right. The C has wingtip ailerons etc.

[Engines]

ICBM,

As I've pointed out many times before (but don't mind in the least saying again) the decision to retire the SHAR was taken by the RAF, who owned the aircraft. The RN agreed, sure, but the driver was the fact that the GR7/9 upgrade programme ran hundreds of millions over, and the SHAR needed a DAS upgrade. The RAF then mandated that JFH had to solve its own problems, (nice) so the only course available TO THE RAF was to can the SHAR.

As far as the recent Carrier Strike decision went, again, the decision to can the GR7/9 force was taken by the RAF to meet its own budget cuts. The decision to do so was taken at short notice and sprung on CNS from high level (PM office) after intervention from CDS and CAS. It was not up to the RN to give up Navy funds to retain an RAF asset. Of course, had the Harriers belonged to the RN a different set of decisions may have taken place.

JFH manning - as one of the staff officers involved in the decision, I can state with utter certainty that lack of engineering manpower was NOT a factor in the problems in standing up two NASs. (We already had two front line NASs plus an 'OCU'). Now, if the problem were reframed as 'standing up two front line NASs complemented to RAF requirements...different beast. I don't mind a grown up discussion over JFH, but rewriting history is not, in my view, productive.

But that's all in the past now. The people on the front line are buckling down and doing what is required, and the work is in hand to regenerate a FW naval aviation element. let's just all try to support that.

Best Regards as ever,

Engines

[orca]

I think we have reached the nub of the issue here.

The future of RAF FW is an equitable share of JCA plus the Typhoon force. Even to a fishy type that sounds appalling.

So where are the 'Sons of Trenchard' going to get their day 1 fighter from. Answer: A little bit more of JCA - hence RN anxiety.

Why are the RAF anxious? Because JCA is being bought to go to sea. Doesn't really sound like the RAF's patch. (Although they've been there before)

Why are both anxious? Because Joint was a great idea, but actually turned out to be a goat. And the buy is now so small that Joint really isn't needed at all.

And as a parting shot. I have personal experience of the staff environment and the frontline both in the formulation and delivery of JF2000 which became JFH. I don't think it worked brilliantly. You don't have to believe me but my view from someone who 'lived in the nightmare' is that the RAF hierarchy weren't committed to Maritime Strike, and I was personally there when 1, 2 and 4 starred RAF officers demonstrated it in public.

[typerated]

I'd be interested to know if the Navy would really rather have just F-35s along with an empty boat (ship?) for a few years

or

F/A-18E/F (or Rafale) and then with the money saved buy some Hawkeyes? and have them on deck sooner.

[Capt P U G Wash]

Engines:

"JFH manning - as one of the staff officers involved in the decision, I can state with utter certainty that lack of engineering manpower was NOT a factor in the problems in standing up two NASs. (We already had two front line NASs plus an 'OCU'). Now, if the problem were reframed as 'standing up two front line NASs complemented to RAF requirements...different beast. I don't mind a grown up discussion over JFH, but rewriting history is not, in my view, productive. "

You are correct, it was an acute lack of aircrew!

[Engines]

PUG,

Ok, aircrew.

The RN had two front liners, running at about 7 jets each (equivalent to 8/9 RAF, as jets at second line were not counted) and a second line squadron 9'OCU') with about 9 jets. These units were manned and declared operational. So, the problem?

The RN's SHAR training pipeline had been underperforming for some time, and needed to be fixed. Some of the best 'joint' interaction I saw at JFH was the way that, at the initiative of highly professional and well respected RAF officers, RAF principles and knowledge of aircrew training were being applied to and exploited by the SHAR force to improve matters. Within the first year, pilot output was more than doubled, and the RN had the RAF to thank for that. But that was what JFH was supposed to be about - using best practice to get the best results.

However, once the decision to remove SHAR was taken, a bunfight started over how the RN and RAF aircrew that had once supported five front liners and two OCUs were going to be rebrigaded into four front liners and one OCU. Deletion of the SHAR wasn't helping with RN retention, but a plan was put together (and very much a joint plan) for the new JFH squadron manning, as I've said before, two front liners RN heavy. two front liners RAF heavy, OCU shared.

That plan was on track, and 800 established, when the decision was taken to delete 3 Group and the dark blue AOC post. Once 1 Group had the reins, a unilateral RAF (not joint) review of JFH squadron manning added a number of senior aircrew posts to the squadrons that the RN wasn't in a position to fill straight away. This situation was used, openly and at short notice by senior RAF officers, to delay and then cancel the formation of the second RN heavy front liner. Once that had gone, the rationale for more RN aircrew was, obviously, weakened.

In my view, (and I'm happy if you don't share it) this was the final nail in the coffin for JFH, as trust broke down pretty completely.

Here's my point. The RAF and the RN are two professional services. They were and are both capable of delivering properly manned units to deliver operational capability. They may not do it in the same way, but if there is mutual respect, understanding and flexibility, then they can work together to very good effect. Sadly, that did not happen in JFH, not at the coal face, but at the upper levels (one star and up). And as JFH was owned by the RAF, the RAF bear the responsibility for letting that happen. Blaming the RN aircrew community is not, in my view, right.

I have always, and continue to, make it clear that I have deep respect for the professionalism and expertise of the very many RAF aircrew and engineers I have worked with. The fact that they are not, as a service, really interested in the aviation I spent my working life delivering does not make them bad people in the least. But they shouldn't be entrusted with the future of naval strike aviation.

Best Regards as ever to all those still out there doing the business,

Engines

[LowObservable]

One detail point: Although the C does carry more fuel than the A, I suspect that the difference is not so much the capacity of the wing tanks as the elimination of the gun and ammo feed system. And any aero gain from the bigger wing in cruise will be offset to a great extent by 5,500 pounds more OEW and more fuel used if the profile calls for supersonic.

If you want a long-range JSF in the strike role, buy an A/C hybrid without a gun. Unless you think you're going to get into, and win, a guns fight against an Su-35...

[Capt P U G Wash]

Engines, we need to lance this boil once and for all, because the bitterness to which you refer is being fed by lies by certain individuals who actually shoulder the blame for non-delivery and the lack of a coherent counter argument:

“That plan was on track, and 800 established, when the decision was taken to delete 3 Group and the dark blue AOC post. Once 1 Group had the reins, a unilateral RAF (not joint) review of JFH squadron manning added a number of senior aircrew posts to the squadrons that the RN wasn't in a position to fill straight away. This situation was used, openly and at short notice by senior RAF officers, to delay and then cancel the formation of the second RN heavy front liner. Once that had gone, the rationale for more RN aircrew was, obviously, weakened.”

The plan for the RN to fill half the OCU and the lion’s share of 800 and 801 was agreed, accepted and supported. There is documentary evidence with Joint signatures and I challenge you to give evidence where this was not the case.

The RAF bent over backwards to allow RN aircrew through the system at a faster proportional rate than RAF aircrew. This was necessary because the RN had the added challenge of only being able to recruit against a demanding single seat role – failure rates were higher as a result. The RN even had to recruit ex-RAF aircrew who had failed to gain a single seat recommendation for Typhoon, thus seeing an opportunity to go single seat through the FAA.

The RAF (and RN endorsed) requirement for the correct number of senior supervisors and instructors (flying and weapons) on each Squadron made that challenge even harder. The RAF had accepted the slower RN growth path and was backfilling to facilitate. If it had wanted to kill the FAA FW it could have done it there and then. When JFH took its first reduction under PR10 (and a 2 squadron front-line (effectively ending any hope of 801 growing)), the RAF took a disproportional hit on the reductions; to my knowledge not a single RN pilot was removed from the cockpit when the first reduction happened. In other words, 801 existed in name only.

The key to this argument is two-fold:

The RAF did not stop FAA aircrew meeting their share of the Force – they couldn’t meet it.

What does this mean for an even smaller force in the future – can the RN sustain such a small cadre without RAF support?

By all means supply some evidence that the RAF restricted FAA FW growth. It may have set high standards but the FAA was at liberty to meet them.

[Engines]

PUG,

Thank you for a courteous and constructive reply. I absolutely agree that 'lancing the boil' is the right way forward. (and by the way, I think you are being very honest here.)

Yes, I absolutely agree that the plan for filling aircrew posts in the new 'non-SHAR' JFH was agreed and signed off. I saw the papers myself, as I was involved in the early efforts to do the same for the engineering side. However, there were issues with the plans.

JFH had made no real progress in moving to a 'Joint' way of working. RN aircraft were operated under basically RN rules, RAF aircraft under RAF rules. 3Gp GASOs (an entirely foreign beast that the FAA had never required) had been built so as to preserve these two distinct rules. Even the JAPs had failed to do much more than merely list out the RN/Army/RAF ways of doing 'aviation'. Plugging two sets of people together on RAF owned units without that progress in place generated some major issues.

One early problem was that RAF squadrons had many more aircrew per aircraft than RN. (Not worse, but different). They also had more people at higher ranks in squadrons (Wg Cdrs in command drove that structure), although the RN had started moving that way. The JFH team agreed to 'move the RN towards' an RAF style manning structure, but to be honest they did not have the time to flesh out exactly how that was going to happen. It was a case of 'we're going to get to here and we'll work out the details along the way, with a bit of give and take'. Very much the JFH ethos.

Sadly, that ethos did not survive the abolition of 3Gp and the integration of JFH into 1 Group HQ. At that point, things started going downhill rapidly.

I stand by my view that the RAF hierarchy took a deliberate and orchestrated decision to stop 801 forming by sudden imposition of RAF rules for senior aircrew manning levels. I have solid evidence for that. I won't 'supply' it on this forum in public. Happy to PM if you want to but probably not the point now.

You are right that the RN could not meet their share of the force. The reason was that the 'share' was suddenly and arbitrarily changed to a figure that the RN could not meet for some months. The cancellation of 801 forming then followed at the rush, as we navy types say. (The fact that senior 801 squadron RN personnel had already been appointed and were in the process of moving up to Cottesmore to set up the unit shows how sudden this move was).

I'm really sorry that you seem to infer that the problem was with the RN meeting RAF standards. As you know, I make it a point never to belittle the RAF's professionalism, in fact I go out of my way to recognise it.

Where we should try to agree (if I might suggest) is that JFH was a sad affair that reflected badly on all concerned. It takes two to make an argument, and I believe that JFH was set up to fail by a lack of genuine commitment from all parties to go for a truly 'Joint' unit with new and better ways of doing things.

Going forward (and that's got to be the focus now), I feel that everyone needs to realise that when a new and different way of doing aviation is being considered, any organisation needs to react, adapt and change to meet that challenge. But first it has to recognise it. My concern is that the RAF is interested in, understands and professionally executes land based air power. However, it has no reason, desire or inclination to do the same for maritime aviation, as it really does not recognise that it's any different to a land base. I say again that this does not make the RAF bad, evil or of a lower standard than the FAA or the AAC. It just makes them poorly equipped to meet the challenge that (like it or not) our leaders have set the Armed Forces - to generate an effective and sustainable maritime strike capability.

Best Regards as ever to those still out there doing the job - whatever views we exchange on these forums, let's all try to maintain our unflinching support for them.

Best Regards as ever

Engines

[exMudmover]

Cap’n Pugwash

What an excellent post. As one who was intimately involved in both RN and RAF Harrier pilot training for the duration of JFH, ( and many years before that during the initial setting up of the SHAR force), I totally agree with you.

In particular:

“The RAF bent over backwards to allow RN aircrew through the system at a faster proportional rate than RAF aircrew. This was necessary because the RN had the added challenge of only being able to recruit against a demanding single seat role – failure rates were higher as a result. The RN even had to recruit ex-RAF aircrew who had failed to gain a single seat recommendation for Typhoon, thus seeing an opportunity to go single seat through the FAA.” (My italics)

And finally:

“The RAF did not stop FAA aircrew meeting their share of the Force – they couldn’t meet it.”

[Bismark]

Mud,

The RAF bent over backwards to allow RN aircrew through the system at a faster proportional rate than RAF aircrew.

So they should have done - the RAF already had a full force and was in fact in reduction mode, the throughpput should have been wholly in the RN favour.

But Engines is nearer the truth in this matter. The QFI issue became a major sticking point where the RN operated their Sqns differently but the Senior RAF (AOC 1Gp etc knew it was a means to make the RN force unviable. They also stopped the creamy route and the route for "almost theres" to complete a tour in the Tornado force prior to returning to Harrier.

If there was an obstacle that could have been put in the way, it was. There is shedloads of evidence for this which may be available under foi.

[Engines]

Bismark, PUG and others,

I really feel that this is now water under the bridge. I took the time to reply to PUG solely because I don't think that offering various partial views of what went on helps in any way now, as it just keeps polarised views going. What I really am sorry about is that the debate seems to force some people to question each others' professional capabilities.

The fact is that JFH, by any objective view, failed. Personally, (and I know it's a view that some will disagree with) I feel that the idea of putting a 'Joint' force into a single service HQ is basically flawed. There's no pressure or desire to develop new ways of doing things, nor to look at other ways of doing things. Shame, but true. And in my direct and informed experience, it didn't save the taxpayer a single penny - in fact, the growth in numbers of staff officers required to service 'Joint' HQs has been significant.

I'd propose capability elements that are clearly 'owned' by one service, using 'joint' arrangements (like training and logs support) to reduce costs where those arrangements can support the targets, which wil include reducing costs.

Let's try to agree that ownership of the capabilities, going forward, needs to be decided on a 'best athlete' basis. My put? If the RAF want to operate F-35s to replace GR4 as land based strike assets, just fine - they are the best qualified to do that. If the RN want to do the same for maritime aviation, let them go ahead and do that. I don't see why having separate duty holder chains would be a problem.

Commonality of aircraft, logs support and basic training can deliver the cost savings. Separation of command and organisation chains could generate 'virtuous competition' that the Centre could use to drive down costs. It's more likely, in my view, to deliver capabilities more efficiently than the failed 'Joint' model.

Best Regards as ever

Engines

[Wrathmonk]

Bismark

the route for "almost theres" to complete a tour in the Tornado force

IIRC this was only on offer when the RAF had shortfalls in cockpit manning themselves. As you say

the RAF already had a full force and was in fact in reduction mode

so why on earth should they offer up cockpits to the RN "almost theres".

BTW, a well worded FOI request would also reveal the number of additional 'flex' hours given to RN "almost theres" at RAF Valley to try to get them "there" which weren't on offer or available to RAF "almost theres"....:E

[Justanopinion]

The only posts the RN struggled to fill were the QFI slots.

Why? Because as Engines has said, the RN SHAR Squadron set up was different and did not include the requirement for a QFI on 800 or 801. It then took a long period of time to "grow" a QFI , front line tour, Linton /Valley for a tour then back for another year or so on the Harrier before C to I.

The RAF bent over backwards to allow RN aircrew through the system at a faster proportional rate than RAF aircrew

RN students entered the OCU at the same time as their RAF counterparts and finished at the same time on courses that were 50/50 split RN RAF.

The RN even had to recruit ex-RAF aircrew who had failed to gain a single seat recommendation for Typhoon, thus seeing an opportunity to go single seat through the FAA

Not withstanding the fact that pilots at the time of the Harrier would have been in need of a single seat recommendation for Harrier and not Typhoon, the pilots "recruited" by the RN were;

An RAF QWI (already Harrier Qualified)
Two RAF QFIs (already Harrier Qualified)
An Ex Jag Pilot (had left the RAF and rejoined the RN)
An ex GR1 Pilot and QFI who had spent many years at Valley (did not pass 20 Sqn)
An ex GR4 Pilot (did not start/complete 20 Sqn due to the closure of the Harrier)

Yes, the RN were in need of QFIs on the GR7/9.

Don't forget that the RN also had Squadron execs on IV(AC) and 1(F) as well as junior pilots and engineers, just as 800 had RAF pilots.

[Bastardeux]

On the topic of JSF vs F18/Typhoon, with airframe orders down to 50 (and realistically, more cost increases waiting to jump out at us and possibly further cuts to numbers?), I'm incredulous to the fact that the RAF are willing to sacrifice so much for an aircraft that is completely unproven and is showing some very worrying problems...and it still has the rump of its testing to fulfill. The only thing that, to me, makes this worse, is that we'll only be capable of deploying them in a laughably small number.

I agree that it will inevitably end up being a superb aircraft, but isn't the F35 going to be in production until 2035? If it was my reich, I wouldn't be getting it until it's a war-winning aircraft in practice rather than just on paper...chin off the F35 for the F18 & Typhoon and re-visit an F35 order next decade.

Keep the actual capabilities alive, in significant numbers and then replace them in significant numbers with working, proven, capabilities next decade.

[pr00ne]

Bastardeux,

"with airframe orders down to 50.."

Why does this bolleaux keep getting spouted? NO production order has been placed and will not need to be placed for quite some time. The only UK order has been for three development airframes.

[Bastardeux]

Although it's not official, it's the number that has been generally accepted in the MoD, with reasonable assumptions on post 2015 budget... Whether a second or 3rd tranche of orders are made after 2020 isn't something I have any knowledge about, but certainly the planning at the moment is for 20/25 frontline aircraft. Does the order not have to be placed by 2014...get deliveries 2016???? and IOC 2018?...I don't know the exact timetable.

the ????? signifies that I think this delivery date is complete and utter bolleaux. Canada have just come out and said they don't expect to declare their jets operational until after 2020.

[typerated]

JSF Testing Finds Additional Problems | AVIATION WEEK (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=dti&id=news/dti/2012/02/01/DT_02_01_2012_p41-416284.xml&headline=JSF%20Testing%20Finds%20Additional%20Problems&prev=10)


a bit about RN JSF on page 2

[Capt P U G Wash]

Engines, you are a proper gent and I will let sleeping dogs lie.

I suppose the differences over structures and standards are, to a degree, to be resolved by the formation of the MAA. We also have a chance to start from scratch as both services learn new skills on a new aircraft and carrier.

Who knows the next generation might just make work what our generations failed to do.

[Engines]

Pug,

Nicely put and thank you for your gentlemanly understanding.

I wholeheartedly join you in wishing only the best for the future team. Land based air power is vital to this country's interests. I'm just thankful that we have a great service like the RAF looking after it. I think sea based air power is just as vital. Let's hope that the country gets the right team, of all the talents, running that bit.

Very best regards as always,

Engines

[Bastardeux]

Typerated-

This is excellent news, absolutely excellent... so even having 6 jets deployed on our humungo-carriers seems highly questionable.

But hey-ho at least we can say "we've got stealth planes", at which point the reply will be "yes, but how many?"..."err a deployable force of"

(The number is muttered under the breath so quietly, it didn't qualify being included in the quote)

[Obi Wan Russell]

Engines, PUG:

Can we at least hope for the future that by the time the new 'Joint Force' comes into frontline service, it will be run by those who served at the coal face of JFH in both shades of blue and made the herculean effort necessary to make it work for the good of the country, and not those who worked to make it fail for the percieved good of their service, having by then risen to the higher levels of command and brought their experience to bear.:ok:

Echoing Engines sign off, best wishes to all doing the job in harms way.

[glojo]

Is the Joint Force F-35 project more likely to succeed because both parties see a real need for this asset?