Almost died in the Gulf of Mexico yesterday..

[dumboffshorehand]

Thanks for the wonderful experience!

Cold front blows through, pilot picks up passengers at platform, pilot takes off. 10 minutes into flight he is getting lower and lower and visibility is horrible. Pilot flies 150MPH into fog bank, pilot scares all passengers on board and banks helicopter about 30 feet off of the Gulf at high rate of speed. Death was certain but the retard turned back into the sun and regained his bearings somehow. But what do I know? I'm just a passenger.



I hope most of you considering working in the GOM reconsider ... you will be asked to do the impossible and take extreme risk in a single engine aircraft over open ocean with a full load of cargo and passengers. Pressure to perform to please the oil company, humans are the cheapest thing in the oil industry.

[Gordy]

Cue.....SM

[Tourist]

This does beg the question:

How do you know that you were near death?

[OvertHawk]

That guy has the writing style of a daily mail reporter!

does not sound nearly as exciting when you say - "Pilot encountered bad weather then turned back" does it?

"Death was certain"...... but somehow you survived?

:ugh:

[Horror box]

What type of aircraft were you in?
Could you read the instruments yourself from where you were sitting?
How do you know for sure the pilot was retarded?

[Jet Ranger]

.....and... you woke up! It was 8 AM.






:rolleyes:

[Aerobot]

Hey guys, let's slow down a little. Obviously this pilot scared his passengers. We're not allowed to do that. Sure, there was some hyperbole in the guy's report - he had been scared and that's how scared people write.

But instead of piling on the guy because he told on a pilot, let's take a minute to think about whether or not he was right to be scared.

[Epiphany]

Why am I not surprised?

[before landing check list]

Would having another engine helped in THAT scenario?

[darrenphughes]

I didn't realize I had accidentally stumbled onto JustHelicopters. Senior Pilot, can you please moderate this tripe off out of our "Professional Pilot" forum. It's degrading the integrity of our information haven to have idiots like this signing up new accounts just to trash one side of the industry.

[Decredenza]

I agree with Aerobot. One should look at it as a correctable error if the passengers are frightened, regardless of the inherent safety of the flight.

Its too bad that dumboffshorehand had that experience. One has to wonder if it was the first time and if there was any communication post event to try and make things better.

[n5296s]

This is a very disappointing thread. Here we are at 10 posts and nobody has bashed Robinson yet. Come on guys, wake up!

[Epiphany]

Would having another engine helped in THAT scenario?

Yes because the aircraft would probably have been at 3000 feet IFR with the pilots both drinking coffee and the passengers asleep.

[JimL]

Most reluctantly I post on this thread.

We need to cut this guy some slack; if he has just been a passenger in an inadvertent entry into IMC incident, it was likely to have been almost as traumatic an experience as the pilot's.

The response that he has received is quite amazing bearing in mind that he was faultless. Perhaps we need to take notice of the recent speech by Matt Zuccaro reproduced at this site:

HAI President Message – (http://www.helihub.com/2012/01/24/hai-president-message-%E2%80%9Cwhat-about-the-passengers%E2%80%9D/)

Epiphany is quite correct that there is a relationship between trying to fly beneath the weather and the number of engines.

It would be interesting to see if the pilot filed a confidential report.

Jim

[Islandcrazy]

If this guy was as scared during the flight as he is saying, he is going to tell everyone who will listen to him about his experience. It would be good if he could obtain a helpful and professional response to his enquiry/comment rather than attacking him. Otherwise he will just add this to his complaint / experience.

I am sure a local GOM pilot will be able to address some of his fears and concerns and make him feel a bit better about what happened, maybe even the driver who scared the &*^% out of him. He probably doesnt know much...... but he's giving us an opportunity here.

Lets play nice. :bored:

[EddieHeli]

darrenphughes - were you the pilot by any chance?

[darrenphughes]

No, I'm off right now. Going back on hitch on Friday.

I don't believe this event took place. Not that it couldn't take place. But I believe this guy is a troll of the type we see on JH. This is not the place to report this if he's for real. He needs to report it to his supervisor or the safety officer in his company and they'll handle it from there.





The original (edited) opening post included the operator plus the aircraft type, call sign and N number. I removed identifying details for obvious reasons, and checked the poster's details to verify his location is where he says.

Since this isn't JH, I hoped for a reasonable and structured debate: maybe you should respond along those lines?

SP

[EddieHeli]

Since this isn't JH, I hoped for a reasonable and structured debate: maybe you should respond along those lines?

I didn't realize I had accidentally stumbled onto JustHelicopters. Senior Pilot, can you please moderate this tripe off out of our "Professional Pilot" forum. It's degrading the integrity of our information haven to have idiots like this signing up new accounts just to trash one side of the industry.

Really !!!!

[darrenphughes]

The original (edited) opening post included the operator plus the aircraft type, call sign and N number. I removed identifying details for obvious reasons, and checked the poster's details to verify his location is where he says.

Since this isn't JH, I hoped for a reasonable and structured debate: maybe you should respond along those lines?

SP

So some random guy comes onto the forum with all that information and you don't completely delete the post??? Also, where was your little love note in the original post to show that you had at least done what little you did?

What is left to be discussed about the statement from a frightened passenger on the situation. This is a forum for professionals with informed and educated opinions and observations. This flaming post if it belongs here at all, belongs somewhere like Jetblast, or because the post maybe nothing but a bad attempt to draw out a single versus multi engine discussion, it should be dumped into the many similar topics I'm sure are lying around from a later date.

How could you possibly imagine a structured reasonable debate could come from such a loaded post?

[Aerobot]

I didn't get that out of it at all. The passenger is not some random guy - SP verified that if the guy is a fraud at least he's a well-informed one. Hard to believe that someone would go to the trouble to get a legitimate N-number and operator and post from an IP address in the proper region if he were creating an elaborate fraud intended to stir up trouble.

And I saw nothing in the passenger's post that had anything to do with a single-versus-multi discussion; he was talking about getting scared by a pilot's going IIMC.

I also don't think anything productive is being served by implying that he should not bother us here because he's not a professional with informed and educated opinions and observations. You've as much as said, "we're pilots, you're not, so you're not worth our time. Go away."

Obviously, SP thought that the passenger's concerns were legitimate enough to warrant inclusion in our august collection of educated, informed, professional pilots. I think the benefit of the doubt is in order.

[heloguy412]

How about telling the passenger "No Stick, No Vote".

[Aerobot]

We could try that. I don't know about what you do, but in my business it would shortly be followed by, "No Vote - No Flight."

And then by the hospital saying, "No Flight - no Contract," and the company saying, "No Contract - No Job."

But we could try it.

[darrenphughes]

My point is that if he is for real, he created a new account and came on here with the sole purpose of causing serious trouble for the pilot and operator in question, not to stimulate an informed debate. And, considering the legal ramifications of such claims, they should be handled through the proper channels. His post should never have been allowed on here considering that. Having seen some of the posts deleted by SP here before, I'm surprised something like this was not deleted without a second thought.


You've as much as said, "we're pilots, you're not, so you're not worth our time. Go away."

Taking into account the aforementioned serious trouble in the top paragraph of this post, that's exactly what I'm saying. This is a forum for professional pilots, is it not? During an investigation of an incident like this, it would be noted that a person's observations(including pilots) during times of stress or traumatic events can be drastically distorted, and would only account for a very small piece of a larger picture needed to piece together what actually happened. Claims such as "...and banks helicopter about 30 feet off of the Gulf at high rate of speed. Death was certain..." would be considered, but with a grain of salt. If it was one of the large operators they will have recording equipment on board to tell what really happened, even on the smaller ships. Once again, this is not the place for such claims before an investigation has taken place.

I have problems with this poster being given a voice on this forum on a few different levels. Including what I posted earlier.

[Jet Ranger]

And where did he dissappear now? Dumboffshorehand, where are you now...:D

[CNH12]

Should've took the boat then

[Brian Abraham]

Good on the OP for giving voice. What he relates goes on, and in places that would surprise you.

[Heliringer]

Do the machines flying in the GOM have tracking devices fitted?


If so having a look at the data will tell you if the fella who started the thread was justified.

[cl12pv2s]

This is a most interesting thread...

Both sides of the argument here are meritous, though their delivery may not be so.

Response to helicopter industry colleagues...

OP (Original Poster) has clearly been scared by the occassion, and this is not good.

The helicopter industry is 'traditionally' up against it. The art which we call 'Rotorcraft Flying' is to most people, simply, a black art surrounded by myth and fantasy. "Helicopters can't glide....when you lose an engine you fall out of the sky....it's as hard as making love to your woman whilst standing up in a hammock!'; that sort of thing. (Ok, I'll admit to using the last one myself as a chat up line...but you get my drift!)

Couple that with the fact that helicopter crashes are always spectacular fireballs in which no one has a chance in hell of getting out...at least, that's what Hollywood would have you believe.

To top things off, we have our continual struggle against the NIMBY's (Not-In-My-Back-Yard) folk, who contiually try to shut us down with noise complaints to the local authority, anytime we encroach on their section of the world.

Public perception of our industry is not that good.

In that case, as helicopter pilots, we should be doing everything we can to improve the public view of what we do. That is, in our daily routine with passengers, in the sky with the layman looking up at us, and in forums such as these, where any anonymous person can get an insight into the kind of people we are; our own actions serve to either perpetuate the 'doom and gloom' which shrouds or work, or clear up misconceptions; its our choice. A better image will make all our lives easier.

If someone thinks we fall out of the sky like a brick when the engine fails, explain why we don't. If someone complains of our noise when we evacuate a victim from the sea and transport them to a hosipital, remind them that we'd do the same for them. If someone gets nervous with the movements of the machine in the air, fly so they can't feel them.

Maybe OP's pilot could consider why his passenger was so unhappy with his performance...did OP's pilot understand his passenger's concerns...did he 'sell' our industry?

We know that most people's fear is because of their ignorance. Yet, how can we expect our passengers to not be ignorant? They've not had the extensive training we have had. What seems simple and mundane to us, may be the most frightening event to the untrained eye. Sitting in the back, passengers have restricted view. They might not see the horizon from where they are, whereas you can see it clearly. If they can't see anything out of the front, they get scared, unless they understand our capabilities. Fly with that in mind. Keep them in the loop. Assure them.

-----------------------------------

However...

The OP has described an incident, which on the surface would appear very alarming, and deserving of shock and horror. Yet, we can't verify what actually happened.

If this was Inadvertant IMC, then there are definitely questions the pilot / operator should be asking. We all make mistakes, and Inadvertant IMC is well documented as one which the best of pilots can get into. However, there are some operations which should not be getting close to that. Through company policy, support for the pilots, a 'No Blame Culture' and all those other things we learn in the CRM courses we go to, operators should be able to demand / expect / acheive almost 100% security against Inadvertant IMC. So to that pilot / operator...ask questions.

On the other hand, we also know from our training, is when encountering IMC which you don't want to be in, do as OP describes...make a 180 degree turn back towards the VMC. It sounds to me that OP's pilot did the right thing. Yet, OP still calls him a retard.

We can't read too much into a 'layman's' account of speeds and altitude, and even the actual conditions. Unless OP was a pilot able to see the instruments and / or a meterologist able to make accurate assessment of the conditions, I am not going to be too alarmed by his account. A fearful person sees the worst.

OP's account of the incident has the hallmarks of being dressed up, either out of emotion, or for the sake of excitement. Probably a little of both. Lacking credible technical reference (how was the altitude / speed / rate of bank, what type of aircraft and how is it fitted, what were the actual conditions), the account suggests that this is a layman's account.

This is a problem when laymen tell their story. What they see may not be what happened. Let's not get too fussed over this, until the events can be verified.

-----------------------------
So what is my point?



I guses if anything, I'm trying to say that we in the industry should regard seriously any occasion when our customers are not happy. We should conduct ourselves at all times as if we were trying to sell our product. Whether we be in the air or not. That's because we have to.

At the same time, we cannot jump to conclusions based on a layman's account of an event. Take everything with a pinch of salt. Sure, where there's smoke there's fire...but how much? It could be that the pilot was absolutely absolutely in control of the situation, operating within company and personal parameters, and was taking a fair and calculated risk within his capability to recover. Maybe OP simply perceived the situation to be worse than it was.

OP's account was not the best way to address what happened. Piling into a helicopter pilot's forum with such a story was inevitably going to be met with some pretty emotional responses!

-------------------------------

My response to OP is thus:

Mate,

There's a way of doing things.

If you were concerned by the conduct of this pilot, then you have the right (and should feel no guilt) in raising the situation sensitively and discretely to the right people, and through the correct channels.

As you do, reflect on the fact that your own perception of the situation may be warped due to a number of factors. Consider your own experience, your ability to see and observe the crucial factors, your knowledge of aviation and helicopter operations and consider whether you have all the information with which to make such allegations. Support evidence with facts.

If you raise your concerns responsibly and carefully, then you will (should) get an equally responsible and careful response from the right people. Sometimes an air of rhetoric enquiry works better than straight out allegation. With good 'people skills', you'll get what you want. Stamping feet and shouting doesn't usually work!

On the other hand, throwing allegations around a public / anonymous internet forum does not help your credibility, and certainly is not the way to expect changes. You certainly haven't alarmed or shocked me.

Lastly, if there is any ulterior malicious reason for your posting (to get at someone personally), then you need to take a good look at your own self first, and really have no business posting here.

Good luck!

Consider this: A passenger on the left side of a large aircraft. He can't see much forward...only sky out of the front if he can even see the windshields at all. Out of the left window, he can see a cold front ahead, and clear sky abeam and behind. He sees the horizon in the distance.

The aircraft goes through a few whisks of cloud, and the pilot decides to turn and bug out, before going IMC. So the pilot executes a right bank. A higher rate than normal, but still safely in sight of the horizon in front, and within the parameters of the aircraft.

The passenger, now is looking upwards into this wall of cloud. No horizon, and therefore no visual reference. If the pilot looks out of the cockpit, he might see some sea out of the right side of the cockpit. The green blue blur of the ocean is all that is visible out of the right windows across the cabin.

The passenger has NO visual references. Last sensation was that they were entering cloud.

As the pilot banks, he also reduces speed in a level decelleration.

What does our Human Factors training tell us about somatographic illusion? What will the passenger feel is happening?

Exactly, the passenger will feel a pitch down attitude, giving the illusion that the aircraft is in a descent, when actually it is simply flying level and descellerating.

What you see as a passenger, is not always what is happening.

[unstable load]

I guess he could have taken his info with call sign, reg and operator to the FAA instead......:ouch:

[HillerBee]

The pilot did a good job. Nothing happened apart from a steep bank, where in the regs does it say you can't make a steep turn! Obviously he should have flown into IMC, but he responded the right way.

[Epiphany]

The pilot did a good job. Nothing happened apart from a steep bank, where in the regs does it say you can't make a steep turn! Obviously he should have flown into IMC, but he responded the right way.

Some of the reactions here are amazing and show an ignorance level that is breathtaking. The point is that the pilot could not have flown into IMC because the aircraft was a VFR machine.

Having the benefit of seeing at first hand the operational standards in the GOM by one large operator who's target is zero, I can well believe this incident happened. Have none of you read the 'Another accident in the GOM' thread??

Why do you think that a passenger who flies regularly offshore cannot voice his concerns about an incident. This site, as is often stated, is a rumour network. If you don't like what you read Darrenphughes then I suggest you stop reading and go back to JH.

The passenger may well have filed some kind of occurance report with his company but any oil company that allows it's empoyees to fly offshore in tired, old single engine, VFR machines is not going to take much notice.

I can imagine the reaction of an offshore passenger in Europe being told to climb aboard a Bell 206 to get to work. None of them are particularly overjoyed at having to fly in a helicopter but at least they know that they have a very good chance of actually getting to the platform without being scared out of their wits in a small, underpowered helicopter that has to fly around weather and is flown by one pilot who does not have the option of IFR and is under pressure to get the job done.

[cl12pv2s]

The pilot did a good job. Nothing happened apart from a steep bank, where in the regs does it say you can't make a steep turn! Obviously he should have flown into IMC, but he responded the right way.

I wonder if HillerBee inadvertantly left out the crucial word 'NOT' in his sentence above. Kinda changes the meaning.

Epiphany,

I just want to reiterate my view, lest you should misunderstand where I'm coming from.

1. OP has every right to address his concerns, yet there is a right way and a wrong way. Simply stamping feet will not result in the UNIVERSAL sympathy and support he seeks. Especially not from those feet he's stamped on. Let's not hide behind the name 'Rumour Network' as an excuse to step outside normal social / proffessional boundries. Any big oil patch operator would have, as well as the administrator (FAA?), a method for reporting occurrences. I'm sure OP's own company and industry have their ways of dealing with problems, and if the worm was on the other foot(!) and the finger pointed at him, he'd hope the proper procedure be followed through.

2. The pilot / company / operator should maybe be reflecting on their practices, based on the fact that one of their passengers got scared. That might be to review minima, go / no-go criterea, aircraft choice...etc..etc.. I won't go there, since there are much more learned people to comment on that side of things.

3. OP's account may not be accurate, and therefore is simply information, rather than fact. Subsequent responses here should reflect that. It may have happened. It may not have happened. That's all.

4. Maybe the oil company is not the best place to file the complaint either (for the reasons you mention). Voicing concern in a place like this, COULD be a very fruitful platform to get people thinking about the subject (although its been done before with little effect). It would need a slightly different approach though. OPs post came across as an unsubstantiated gripe / whinge / moan to me. That, I can't take seriously.

In short, I agree with you. Most would I think. It's just the manner in which he raised it, which is possibly counter productive to his cause.

Still, its food for thought for everyone, eh?!

(FWIW, I agree wholeheartedly with the multi crew, multi engine concept for IFR ops.)

[tottigol]

Episodes like the one described in the original post happen almost on a daily basis in the GOM, it's unfortunate but it's true.
The reasons for these occurrences are due to the (still) individual nature of the job, as long as there are single piloted unrestricted VFR operations with WX minimums that border the marginal VFR these episodes are going to continue.
BTDT, I must add.
I am going out on a limb here and state that this was was probably a contract for a second tier "production management" customer with possibly contract passengers on board.
I have to agree with Epiphany on this, it's very unlikely something like this would have happened had the operation been conducted with a multi-pilot, IFR capable twin.

[Brian Abraham]

it's very unlikely something like this would have happened had the operation been conducted with a multi-pilot, IFR capable twin. The catch word there tottigol is "capable". One operator flies IFR capable machinery, but pilots, should they legally file IFR, will be in for a reprimand. It happened. So focused on budget are management, that incurring costs by way of air service charges for IFR are a no no. It's a VFR operation nominally, but the OPs post could easily be one of their pax.

[JimL]

SP has been really astute in removing the specific details of the flight and permitting the post to remain for discussion. Perhaps we can reward him for that, avoid the rhetoric, and provide a constructive discussion.

It does not surprise me that the main issues that are being discussed here are the ethics of the passenger in initiating this thread, and the actions of the pilot having encountered IIMC; the basis of a 'blame culture' which might result in these incidents being swept under the carpet (as has been recommended).

In one sense this is similar to a parallel and constructive discussion that is going on in the HEMS threads - trying to bring to the fore, and address, the serious problems of 'loss of control' (LOC) and 'CFIT'.

Perhaps the first thing we ought to do is to acknowledge the two elements that were in favour of a safe outcome: (1) the skill of the pilot in executing a reversal of track manoeuvre; and (2) a sizeable helping of luck.

Even though not resulting in an accident, the precursors to this incident would have been similar! These precursors would also be the same for a LOC or CFIT that occurred in any other segment of the industry. One mitigating factor in this case would have been the absence of obstacles that is a feature of offshore operations (but with a concomitant reduction of visual cues).

Perhaps we can move the debate on, examine these 'threats' and consider how to 'control' them. An examination of VFR operations will surface the following:

For a potential LOC (for offshore coupled with CFIT) incident/accident - one threat will be:

attitude cannot be maintained by reference to visual cues

The first control might be:

Dispatch only to approved weather limits

In that case 'threat escalations' could be:

Operating base does not provide an adequate planning system

Pilots do not meet minimum standards for offshore flying

There is pressure to launch below limits

Pilot self-approves flights below limits

Dispatch limits are not well understood

Dispatch limits are not enforced

Following a 'dispatch to approved weather' limits, if adverse weather is encountered, the following threats might be encountered:

En-route weather nears in-flight limits

En-route weather deteriorates below in-flight limits

With the following 'threat escalations':

The pilot does not understand the importance of visual cues

The pilot does not recognise the systems of degradation of visual cues

The pilot cannot estimate visibility in flight

The pilot does not understand the importance of minimum en-route altitude discipline

Having encountered weather below limits a threat control might be:

Crew elect to convert to IFR

With the 'threat esclations':

The pilot has not planned for an IFR recovery

The aircraft is not certificated for flight in IMC

The crew is not qualified, or have recency for flight in IMC

Although, the continuation of the process will result in at least one 'escalation control' for each 'escalation', that is left for the time being. Needless to say, these controls are contained within the broad areas of 'Operational Control', 'Dispatch Control', Safety Oversight', 'crew selection', 'crew training', 'crew discipline' all of which fall within the scope of SMS and culture.

One thing that needs to be emphasized is that encountering adverse weather en-route should be anticipated. This anticipation will consist of a process of monitoring the conditions and having an 'abort plan' (sometimes called an Operational Decision Point (ODP)) which can be brought into operation if the weather nears and then reduces below in-flight limits.

In the main, only the LOC hazard has been addressed here because for offshore flying LOC/CFIT correlate quite closely. For HEMS and onshore operations, CFIT will have its own specific threats, escalations and controls.

Jim

[Epiphany]

I have recent experience flying with experienced GOM pilots who were largely ignorant of IFR operation and procedures even though they were flying IFR helicopters. When I aked why they avoided clouds like the plague I was told that the only time they fly IFR is in the sim. The company discouraged any IFR flying due to costs and diversion fuel/weight penalties incurred.

The difference between North Sea and GOM offshore operations is enormous and I was staggered at the prevailing attitude in GOM. I also attended a CRM course there which lasted all of 30 minutes.

Re-equipping to multi-pilot IFR machines is not the cure-all either. The Bell 206 single-pilot VFR mentality needs to change too and judging by my experiences they have a very long way to go.

[Thomas coupling]

Give the Op a break for f**ks sake. He isn't (obviously) a happy passenger at the best of times, being thrust continually into the back of a cab crossing hostile territory, often in dubious weather. And then he got frightened by a dumb ass pilot.
Irrespective of whether the pilot actually flew to those extreme parameters, the pilot departed normal flight in the eyes of the pax and that is enough to set alarm bells ringing.
If I was the FSO on that rig I would want all pax to report all incidents to me so that I had a handle on how the operation was running. It may be something or nothing but give the guy cred - no smoke without fire etc.
And to those drivers out there who still think they are mightier than everyone else because they fly for a living - get real...you're just a glorified van driver with a view at the end of the day :ugh:

[topendtorque]

Hey Gordy,

I think 'your man' must be ill. Do you think we should organise for someone to trot around there with a nice warm water bag and a bowl of junket and make sure he's all tucked in nice an cosy?

Hate to see him get a chill and lose his voice.

regards tet

[FH1100 Pilot]

I flew in the GOM for PHI so I'll add my $0.02.

In the 13 years I flew "small ships" I often flew right down to PHI's cross-country minimums of 500 foot ceiling and 3 miles of visibility. But here's the deal: When the weather is bad, it is never "smooth." When it's "500/3" out, there'll be some areas that are a lot better...and some areas that are a lot worse. Some days you pick your way around, trying to stay in the good areas. Some days it's pretty hard, especially if you have a 50 or 60 or 80 mile flight. Meh- that's the nature of the job. It'd be nice if we all had two-pilot, twin-engine, IFR-capable helicopters, but that's just a fantasy of certain pilots who have no idea of how things work in the GOM.

Have I ever flown into deteriorating weather? Sure, lots of times. Has it ever really gone to hell in a hurry forcing me to make a turn into the sun and climb? Yup. Oh yeah. So...

Did the event as described by the OP happen? Probably. If so, it worked out other than (at least) one scared passenger. How close did it come to being an accident? We'll never know. Maybe "this close," maybe not close at all.

I'll surmise that the OP was sitting up front with a view of the gauges. Happens a lot in small ships; the oil company guys fight for the front seat. So he saw what was going on, knew they were low, knew they were "in deep sh*t" as we say.

Our #1 job is to fly the customer safely from here to there. But it's more than that, eh? Along with that our job is to not scare the customer. I get a feeling from the OP's post that he did not have a whole lot of confidence in the pilot. That was something I had to deal with when I first arrived in the GOM: Some of those oil company guys had many, many years of riding around in helicopters offshore. They knew what was up better than I did. I had to show/convince them that I knew what I was doing. So I'd bet the OP's pilot was a newbie or relatively so.

If I have one comment to the OP's pilot, I would say SLOW DOWN. I doubt they went from "clear/blue and 22" to "FOG!" in an instant - otherwise the pilot would have seen that they were approaching a fog/cloud bank. So he was "probably" bombing along in bad weather when..."Oops! This is bad. Can't go that way."

When it's crappy, we *have* to slow down. It's counter-intuitive sometimes, like when we're getting close to the destination and we really, really want to be there and get this day over with. You shouldn't fly into a cloud/fog bank at all, but if you do you REALLY shouldn't fly into one at cruise airspeed. And remember, a lower airspeed will require a shallower turn should a reversal be necessary.

I've gotten into some really, really bad stuff in the GOM. Anyone who's flown there for any length of time surely has as well. It's how you deal with it that makes the difference between a safe, professional pilot whose passengers have confidence in him and one who gets blasted in forums like this. We have not heard the OP's pilot's version of this event, but let's hope that he learned a lesson from it that he'll take with him into the future.

[js0987]

Let me posit one example of Gulf weather that can be a Gotcha. Its hazy, visiblity is 4-5 miles and there is a thick broken layer at about 1000 ft. It's bight and sunny above so the sun shining through the breaks reflects off the haze followed by dark shadows under the clouds. You're tooling along in your 206 for 50-60 miles, going from light area to dark area, when that light area up ahead looks a little funny. Whoa Horses! That's not light relecting off the haze, its a fog bank. Deceptive visibility combines with a certain amount of complacency about what you had been flying in, and, fortunately, a 180 was still possible. If you're VMC, beware of sunlight relecting off the haze - it may not be what it seems.

[Mars]

So there's nothing wrong with the system -all you can offer is palliatives and war stories.

No, we are not really interested in how pilots can cope and deal with the weather in what are, probably, IFR conditions but how to address the real fear of a passenger who has looked disaster in the face.

After reading this thread, I would advise 'dumboffshorehand' to consider using the redress procedure of his company; if that doesn't work, think about other options that may involve a more heavy-handed approach.

From reading the posts of many of the GOM pilots, I would say that the system will not change until there is recognition that something is wrong. It is the acceptance of a poor safety culture - evidenced by the blind adherence to the current practices - that is at fault.

Let me ask a question; what would have happened if this had resulted in a CFIT accident? Don't bother responding, I already know.

[skwinty]

If these statistics are not enough to change the situation in the GOM, then I doubt that one scared passenger will have any contribution to aviation safety.

Crashes Common Among Helicopters Used in Oil and Gas Operations (http://www.jhsph.edu/publichealthnews/press_releases/2011/baker_helicopter_gulf.html)

A new study by researchers at the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy (http://www.jhsph.edu/injurycenter/) finds that helicopters that service the drilling platforms and vessels in the Gulf of Mexico crash on average more than six times per year resulting in an average of 5 deaths per year. From 1983 to 2009, 178 crashes resulted in 139 deaths, including 41 pilots and 3 co-pilots. Mechanical failure was the most common cause, leading to 68 crashes (38 percent of the total), followed by bad weather (16 percent of the total). While the challenges such as bad weather and long travel distances associated with helicopter flights in the Gulf related to oil and gas operations are recognized, this study is noteworthy for examining the circumstances of the crashes. The article is published in the September issue of Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine.

[oggers]

Well, if a balanced discussion didn't follow I suspect it may be to do with the tone set by the OP. The assertion that the pilot was a "retard" for instance :eek: Just saying.

[Aerobot]

Certainly that didn't help facilitate a rational discussion, but in we can get past that. If a medical crewmember came to me and told me that one of my pilots scared them on a flight I'd discount the use of the word "retard" and try to find out what really happened. I would not discount the person with the unfortunate choice of words.

[ShyTorque]

I would agree that the best place for a frightened passenger (such as the OP here) to vent his spleen is via his company's officicial channels. But it should be reported, as all such incidents should be. Then at least it can be properly investigated and hopefully safety lessons learned by those that need to learn them, if that is actually what is needed.... obviously some passengers have a lower "adrenaline threshold" than others.

Posting such stuff here in this fashion never achieves much at all (except riling up a few overly-defensive, VFR only qualified pilots of VFR only helicopters).

[SASless]

Mars....a small objection!


how to address the real fear of a passenger who has looked disaster in the face.

Should read ...."How to address the real fear of a passenger who thinks he has looked disaster in the face."

We do not know if he did see a real disaster coming or merely imagined it was going to be a disaster.

As he is sat at his keyboard....it was not a disaster evidently.

As to the proximity to disaster the poor chap actually was....is anyone's guess.

Until it was investigated and the circumstances documented....it is just one man's opinion being voiced and that is certainly insufficient grounds to indict and convict a Pilot with any sense of fairness or impartiality.

[FH1100 Pilot]

Mars:So there's nothing wrong with the system -all you can offer is palliatives and war stories.

No, we are not really interested in how pilots can cope and deal with the weather in what are, probably, IFR conditions but how to address the real fear of a passenger who has looked disaster in the face.

Hmm, "IFR conditions," eh Mars? So...what? What minimums would YOU set for VFR offshore flying in small, VFR helicopters? 1000 and 3? Not much will get done. GOM operators cut the ceiling in half for us and give us 500 and three, which is still pretty generous.

It's simple. If you cannot see three miles ahead you don't go there. And when you're chugging along at two miles a minute it's not too hard, really, to judge three miles. Because if you have to ask, "Is this three miles of viz?" it's probably not. If you press on anyway, is that the machine's fault?

Or Mars, would you prefer that the oil companies and the operators not even use small, VFR ships at all? Should *every* passenger-carrying helicopter in the GOM be twin-engine, two-pilot, and IFR-capable?

It's nice to throw stones without offering alternatives or suggestions.

I've seen days when it's nice and VFR both offshore and on, but a line of weather hangs right along the beach. What do you do...shut down operations until the weather lifts...like ohhhhh, tomorrow or the next day? Or again, maybe we should just get rid of the small, VFR ships altogether?

The oil companies and operators have decided that using single-engine, VFR helicopters in the warm waters and relatively benign weather of GOM is an acceptable risk. So do the pilots who fly in that environment, evidently. Perhaps you don't agree, and this would not happen in your perfect world. Sorry we don't all live there :-/

The key to reducing the admittedly few weather-related or CFIT accidents in the GOM is to educate pilots more thoroughly about the peculiar weather patterns in play down there, and get them to use better judgment (yeah, I know, good luck with that one!).

As a 2200-hour pilot I thought I knew a lot about weather. Until I went to work in the GOM. But I had to learn on my own. And I'll tell ya, I spent many, many hours sitting in a lawn chair up on the heliport of the platform I was based on for nine years, studying the weather.

It is what it is. Small helicopters are not going to disappear from commercial ops just because some people would prefer that we all fly expensive, sophisticated machines in every task.

Had the pilot in the OP's post exuded more confidence *and* slowed down and turned around before he got to the really bad stuff, this whole thread would likely not exist. The only foul here is that a passenger thought he was having a near-death experience.

[Mars]

I'm not interested in a dog-fight but rather an admission that there is a problem and how to address it. Perhaps our perceptions of the issue are different; mine results from the international standard that is contained in ICAO Annex 6 Part III, Section II Chapter 2.3.5.1:
2.3.5.1 A flight to be conducted in accordance with VFR shall not be commenced unless current meteorological reports or a combination of current reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions along the route or that part of the route to be flown or in the intended area of operations under VFR will, at the appropriate time, be such as to render compliance with these rules possible.
I have no problems with the minima you quote - I might perhaps have distinguished between dispatch and in-flight criteria but it is a minor point. My reservations are with the principle that you can plan VFR at times when you have insufficiency knowledge of the en-route weather and, whether the flight can be completed in compliance with the Standard shown above (as evidence by the anecdotal report - and your own admission) - under circumstances where the onshore alternative of precautionary landing is not an option.

The point therefore is whether the criteria for dispatch can be met - or whether it is really an issue for operators in the GOM. It is a matter of Operational Control - i.e. management of safety.

As I have no problem with the minima you quote, clearly I have no problem in choosing to fly VFR when the circumstances permit it. (Well I do have one reservation and that is to do with mixing aircraft in an environment where VFR avoid criteria may be difficult.) I also have reservations about the carriage of VFR fuel if the criterion for dispatch does not meet a reasonable standard (what does the pilot do if encountering weather and being forced into a reversal of track when past the point of no return?). (VFR fuel does work when returning to base with an IFR-capable aircraft under circumstances where the base is clearly VFR.)

Why is it that when faced with opposition to the current system, some pilots immediately revert to the statement:
"Should *every* passenger-carrying helicopter in the GOM be twin-engine, two-pilot, and IFR-capable?
Yes, that would be a solution but not one that is being advocated. I would settle for either a VFR dispatch system (with appropriate operational control) meeting the stated standard, or the use of IFR capable aircraft with the associated protection that comes with ADS-B.

Oh yes, I would also like to see a change to a culture where denial (for any reason) is eliminated, and a move to an acceptable system that reduces the probability of such incidents/accidents.

[fly911]

dumboffshorehand, I'm sorry you were scared. I know how it feels. I get scared on roller coasters. Sometimes I think the the car is going right off the tracks! I have quite few thousand hours in helicopters and I can't tell when I'm 30 feet off the water. Sometimes I'm 100' and it feels like 30. Sometimes I'm 30' and it looks like 100. Passengers and pilots have different comfort levels. Passengers almost never have the comfort level of a pilot. So when you are scared, the pilot is just starting to be concerned. Some folks on an airline flight are scared all the way to their destination. Relax. The pilot made the right decision and you were fine. It happens more than you know. You have to trust somebody some time, so just relax and it will be alright. You're in good hands.

[Thomas coupling]

Fly911: that's the problem matey - he isn't in good hands, the GOM has the worst track record EVER in offshore oil activities (See skwinty's post:#42).
Catch up - based on this report, he was probably just short of snuffing it and adding to a growing stats list.
Having read the report, the boys operating out there need to get their act together, it seems. Dodgy place to be statistically :eek::eek:

[js0987]

Mars - Believe it or not the oversight system you advocate has gotten better. Granted it's taken way too long, but unlike the old days where every pilot made his own decision, often under pressure from the customer, the big operators now have a system of 'levels' based on reported weather. Lower ones are cautions promulgagted at the base and broadcast on the radio. Higher level means operations on a case by case, management decision. The highest level is to shut it down. Its not uncommon to hear over the radio that such and such base is closed. No more "let's give it a try."

Another positive these days is the company will back you up if you decide not to go. That wasn't always the case.

A few years back, one of the Gulf majors sold off over 50 206's and some 35 contracts. Granted it was a business - money decision, but a collateral reason was management was tired of being pressured by the customer who were pushing the pilots.

A little background to keep in mind. The shelf in the Gulf of Mexico is slowly dying. All the big money is deep water. The thousands of structures on the shelf are, with a couple of exceptions, owned by small oil companies. Its not uncommon to see a new job on the board for a company no one ever heard of. They need little ships to land on toadstools and will use single engine VFR machines everytime.

[darrenphughes]

How could you possibly imagine a structured reasonable debate could come from such a loaded post?

Well I suppose I'll eat my words now! Well done lads, this has turned into an interesting topic after all.:D

[Mars]

Firstly, this is not intended to be an attack on js0987; his post just has more information than others that preceded it.

It is accepted that the standards in the GOM have improved; however, it is not clear from js0987' post whether an adequate system of dispatch (operational control) is yet in place to show compliance with the ICAO standard (it is not compulsory to be in compliance but, if not, a difference should be filed):
2.3.5.1 A flight to be conducted in accordance with VFR shall not be commenced unless current meteorological reports or a combination of current reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions along the route or that part of the route to be flown or in the intended area of operations under VFR will, at the appropriate time, be such as to render compliance with these rules possible.
This reference in js0987' post is interesting:
the big operators now have a system of 'levels' based on reported weather. Lower ones are cautions promulgagted at the base and broadcast on the radio. Higher level means operations on a case by case, management decision. The highest level is to shut it down. Its not uncommon to hear over the radio that such and such base is closed.
I have no wish to be picky but the references in the text are to "a 'system of levels' promulgated at the base". My first question therefore would be; bearing in mind that the incident reported occurred on a flight from a platform, does this system provide adequate controls of the escalations (edited from the list in Jiml's post) at the remote site? - i.e.:
The first control might be:

Dispatch only to approved weather limits

In that case 'threat escalations' could be:

Operating base does not provide an adequate planning system

There is pressure to launch below limits

Pilot self-approves flights below limits

Dispatch limits are not well understood

Dispatch limits are not enforced
specifically, addressing the first escalation in the list; under conditions where a weather system is scheduled to cross the area of operations, are there planning facilities on the platform (or is a dispatch service available) to permit assurance that the flight can be conducted VFR and within limits?

Or; did the pilot succumb to one of the other escalations in the list - for which there were no controls?

Probably, a more direct question is merited; is there a system in place to monitor and control the escalations in this list?

Notwithstanding any answers that may be forthcoming to these questions, there is still the matter of the use of a VFR dispatch system under circumstances where it is not clear that VFR flights can be dispatched with a high probability that they will not meet adverse weather.

It would also be interesting to hear a view on my question about the use of VFR fuel under circumstances where (as seen in the initial report) a course reversal (after PNR) might place the pilot into other difficulties. We can of course speculate that the very system of fuel planning actually makes it more 'unlikely' that an abort call will be made - i.e. 'presonitis' is actually built into the system.
I've seen days when it's nice and VFR both offshore and on, but a line of weather hangs right along the beach. What do you do...shut down operations until the weather lifts...like ohhhhh, tomorrow or the next day?
Yes, or you put in place systems that can deal with this and other weather related issues.

[SASless]

management was tired of being pressured by the customer who were pushing the pilots.

Shall I translate that into simple language?

If the management "stood up" to the Customers...supported their Pilots "NO Go!" decision....the customers would take their business elsewhere and there would be some other operator which would gladly accept the business...and leaving quite a few aircraft setting idle.

As those Customers are still in business and thus flying with some Operator....you reckon they are still pressuring the Pilots and Operator...and still getting flown?

Now as I do not believe in "coincidence"....you reckon all those "sold" 206's found themselves flying the same ol' Customers?

Perhaps we might ask some of the Pilots who fly for the outfit whose name starts with R and ends with C.

[js0987]

SAS - Company management butting heads with customer management probably played a role in the customer allowing the contract to be cancelled an to go with another operator.

MARS - Gulf operators pay for specialized weather reporting available over the internet. Lets' say the weather is reported and forecast to be VFR to the southwest of the base and the weather is foggy and IFR to the east. The base manager would probably allow operations to the southwest while putting flights to the east on hold.

Offshore pilots have access to the same weather reporting system. Since they are their own dispatchers, they have to look at the weather and decide accordingly. It's not uncommon for the pilot to show the field foreman the weather and say "look what's coming - we'll wait." If the field foreman is still pressuring the pilot to fly, they are directed to call their respective base manager and let him deal with the foreman.

In summary, there are adequate planning materials and rules to follow, and as for your last four items - those are a ticket to getting fired.

Gulf weather is notoriously fickle. The strictest rules and the best technology can only go so far. For me - I always found a good rule to follow is always and I mean always have a place to run to.

[Savoia]

For the benefit of like-minded Rotorheads allow me to share my views in respect of the OP of this thread.

Anyone who starts a thread spouting what are (in my belief), unsubstantiated and spurious allegations and then fails to recognise the comments, advice and contribution of others (in most cases well-meaning professionals) is someone lacking in manners and ultimately sincerity.

Given Vaqueroaero's discovery of a similar tale on the American forum (posted within 24 hours of this thread) I would say that the chances of this being one and the same person are remarkably high. Assuming it is the same person I would go as far as to say (and I have seen this many times in this industry) that the OP quite likely harbours some form of resentment (perhaps fuelled by jealousy or some other lacking emotion) towards pilots. In opening this thread the driver in the story is a "retard" and on the American forum he "looked like a 14 year old". For me, such comments, combined with the OP's 'post and run' behaviour, substantially discredits him.

However, and notwithstanding the motivations and potential prejudices of the OP, I do recognise that there are bona fide issues surrounding GOM ops (and, as far as I know, always have been). If the NTSB say that US EMS accident rates are too high (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/346122-ntsb-says-ems-accident-rate-too-high.html), would they not be an appropriate body to address GOM ops also - perhaps spurred-on by those within the industry with concerns?

Finally, do 206's (as in JetRangers) really still bomb around the Gulf? What sort of useful load could they offer with a reasonable fuel load and baggage .. three pax max? I do realise there are some smaller installations out there but is that how they perform crew changes in the Gulf .. three people at a time?

[Mars]

savoia,

This has long ceased to be a thread exclusively about OPs post; as requested by the moderator, it is now dealing with concerns that are not dependent upon a single incident.

js0987,
Gulf weather is notoriously fickle. The strictest rules and the best technology can only go so far. For me - I always found a good rule to follow is always and I mean always have a place to run to.
It's not just Gulf weather - that applies to all offshore weather. Mostly, the weather reported by rigs is of reasonable quality; if there is a met. reporting station (AWOS or human) which is in the path of weather, the forecast improves; the forecasting of 'air mass' weather always has uncertainty unless it is based upon sufficient number of stations providing reports. (There are experimental systems fitted to fixed wing aircraft that collect and downlink met on routine flights - it has been established that this can improve forecasting by an order of magnitude.)

In some patches, a variation in the wind of 10º to 20º can result in widespread advection fog. Operators get to know the vagaries of the weather but no amount of forecasting or local knowledge provides a cast iron solution. The best solution is to remove en-route weather from the equation.

The number of incident/accidents could be reduced by a dispatch system which has real Operations Control; however, whichever way you cut it, the reduction of incidents/accidents will occur because the number of inappropriate flights will be reduced. Depending upon how well it is applied/managed, it will result in missed flights when the weather is marginal. If the marginal weather is extensive in area and time, eventually the rules will be bent and the bad practices will recur.

Launching of VFR flights offshore - where the regularity of the service is important - is anachronistic and inevitably lead to the type of incidents we are discussing. It is being done that way for historic reasons; if we were to start again, we would not do it that way.

The only way to beat en-route weather is not to be subject to its vagaries; the best thing about IFR system is that they are dependent mainly upon the forecast at either end of a flight - and the ends are subject to quality control (or should be).

[Savoia]

This has long ceased to be a thread exclusively about OPs post; as requested by the moderator, it is now dealing with concerns that are not dependent upon a single incident.

Would it not then be PRuDent to rebadge this thread GOM OPS?

[js0987]

SAVOIE - Yes 206's still putter around the gulf. Ane two or three people are usually all they need to carry. Reading a meter or doing some light maintenance work usually just needs a few people. Keep in mind that a lot of the manned platforms that used to house 20 or more people are now manned by a handful. For crew changes, some companies use 76's to take out crews that are then dispersed or perhaps the platform only needs to change out five or six people and two trips will get it done.

MARS - Granted offshore weather is fickle everywhere, but that, combined with the unique nature of the Gulf, thousands and thousands of stuctures requiring little ships, means rules taylored to the local.

The majority of field ship flights are local in nature, working the platforms in the field. Some form of centralized control by dispatchers a hundred miles away and looking at a computer will have a hard time convincing a pilot on a platform, looking at sunshine and his intended landing platform a mile away that he knows best.

Perhaps the Hopkins report, while somewhat skewed, has a point when it noted that since 2007 things have gotten better - since the very system I have been describing has been implemented.

[Soave_Pilot]

Almost died in the Gulf of Mexico yesterday..Come join me for a ride here in the amazon now in the raining season and you will see what's up:ok::ok:


Thanks for the wonderful experience!Were you gonna grab the cyclic and fly the beast?:ugh:


Pilot did a great job, turning back.:ok:

[HPIC]

Interesting thread. I have a couple questions about ops in the GOM. First of all, keep in mind this is coming from a 10k hour FW pilot with Comm/Inst RW and 500 hours.....so just enough to be dangerous. :)

1. Do the VFR helicopter in the GOM have basic VFR instrumentation, or do they have full IFR instruments but are only VFR certified? I assume they have full IFR instruments in case of inadvertent VFR into IMC. I have friends flying 206's in medevac roles that are full IFR equipped but only VFR certified, and the pilots have to do sim checks IFR every so often just in case. Am I correct to assume its basically the same for GOM operators?



2. Say a pilot departs in an IFR equipped but VFR certified 206 for a platform in minimum allowed weather. Along the way, the weather drops and he has to turn around....but the weather has dropped behind him as well. In my mind, the best course of action is to go on instruments and climb into it if you're boxed in with no place to land. Again, keep in mind, this is my FW mentality and the fact that I have nearly 1k hours actual IFR and feel 100% comfortable doing it. I know that many RW only pilots have very little to no actual IFR time and probably aren't proficient at IFR flying.

Is it recommended that if you are boxed in that you just climb into it and go shoot an approach somewhere? Obviously, I expect that if a pilot gets himself into that situation, he will be called in for a carpet dance....but is it likely to be more serious than just getting a talking to? I suspect repeat offenders will be handled differently. I'm referring only to the company here, not the FAA. We all know they can always get you with careless and reckless if they want to.


Thanks for any replies. I keep my eye on this section since I am considering making the move to strictly RW...but with 500 hours RW and no CFI(I have FW, but have not added on RW CFI) I'm a bit limited, and I'm thinking some VFR operations in the GOM may be my only shot for starting out.

[skwinty]

Perhaps the Hopkins report, while somewhat skewed, has a point when it noted that since 2007 things have gotten better - since the very system I have been describing has been implemented.

js0987,

Could you explain why the Hopkins report is somewhat skewed?

I hope that the situation improves in the GOM, however the noted improvement was qualified with this statement:

Following 2007, however, the researchers measured a decrease in crashes.

“While the apparent deterioration in safety over time is alarming, I am encouraged by the most recent data,” said Baker. “Only time will tell whether this is a temporary statistical blip or the beginning of a positive trend.”

[js0987]

SKWINTY - Based on Hopkins press release, (as a typical pilot I'm frugal - OK cheap - to the point of not wanting to spend $20 to download the actual report) there were two things that struck me. First was the use of the word "crash." That's an inflamatory word that undoubtedly includes successful autorotations that resulted in being classified as accidents due to post landing damage or sinking. The second thing that stuck me was classifying "crash's" by years instead of by hours flown. Just by the periods mentioned, the 1980's were slow whereas the 1990's saw a boom and the Gulf has hundreds of helicopters. Anyway, back to how things are now - they are a lot better and that's reflected in the current trend.

HPIC - Little ships (206's, 407's) have basic instuments including an attitude indicator, RMI, VSI, altimeter etc. They are not instument equiped or certified. The procedure taught in the event of inadvertant IFR is to keep wings level and climb straight ahead hopefully to VFR, or at 1000 feet begin a 180 degree turn back to where you came from or to a known clear area as shown on the GPS.

[darrenphughes]

Thanks for any replies. I keep my eye on this section since I am considering making the move to strictly RW...but with 500 hours RW and no CFI(I have FW, but have not added on RW CFI) I'm a bit limited, and I'm thinking some VFR operations in the GOM may be my only shot for starting out.

HPIC, just a heads up, you're gonna need a RW IR to get hired in the Gulf even if you're going for a VFR position.

[HPIC]

HPIC, just a heads up, you're gonna need a RW IR to get hired in the Gulf even if you're going for a VFR position.

No worries there. I have a RW Comm/IR. I obtained those ratings many years ago. I may do my RW ATP in the next few months, but it's not a priority for me right now.

[tcvennen]

This is a debate of neither the OP’s perceptions nor his proper redress. The question, to ALL helicopter pilots both onshore and offshore, is what do you do when you are nearing “MINIMUMS”.
I emphasize minimums because that is what they are. It’s not a point to decide if you should proceed, if you’re at minimums that’s as far as you can proceed, you should have been planning your next move 15 minutes ago. When it gets to minimums STOP! Yes, you can stop, you deviate to the nearest platform with an appropriate heliport, no, I don’t care if it’s your companies heliport, no, I don’t care if you REALLY don’t want to stop.
I’ve been operating in the Gulf for 31 years, more than 20,000 hours offshore. Don’t even suggest (other than night) you go inadvertent! You know damned well you’re below minimums. If your minimums are 500 and 2, fly at 450, when the clouds and or fog approach, you’ve gone too far. What moron flies into the clouds at 500’ seriously? If you’re coming into a foggy area, duh, slow down!!! Deviate!!!
The problem is not with our equipment, nor our minimums, it’s with me and you. Our egos make us push on when we know we should have stopped. Which is more often far beyond our company minimums!
31 years, NEVER gone inadvertent IFR during the day. I did go IFR on a night emergency, but, that’s another story.
Oh, BTW, lest you think I’m a VFR only pilot, CFI, CFII, former Pilot Proficiency Examiner (PPE), former 135 Check Airman, dual rated former U.S. Army Instrument Flight Examiner with well over 1,000 hours of ACTUAL instruments (not just on and IFR flight plan… LOL), all of those formers, are because as of next week I’ll be a retired offshore pilot.

[Jet Ranger]

@tcvennen

:D

[SASless]

Congratulations on your pending retirement!

Now roll up yer sleeves and get to work!

[HPIC]

Retirement? Time for a new set of golf clubs!

:D

[Thomas coupling]

TCVennen: the problem with your assessment is that those who skirt with disaster, do so because they have never been there before. By that I mean, they have never actually gone inadvertent IMC. If they did, they wouldn't want to do it in a hurry again. SO - my point is, they go right to the limit before backing out.
Secondly, the weather could so easily close in from behind making your '15 minutes' redundant. The decision should have been made before they got airborne in reality.
Pilots by their very nature are risk takers / experimenters. You won't stop the gambler in them until it's too late.
This sort of flying behaviour will go on and continue to take its victims annually. The trouble is - who do they take with them.........

[dumboffshorehand]

WOW! The reason I haven’t responded is that I knew before hand that I would be lashed for hyperboling my wonderful experience. Let me get the naysayers out of the way first. Some of your conspiracy theories about me trolling the internet just to “piss off pilots” is the dumbest thing I ever heard, why would I waste my time doing that? Also, suggesting that I’m posting on other helicopter forums is a bit much. Are you aware that there were other passengers on the flight? They could have easily been venting, there were tons of helicopters going in that day, it could have been a pax on one of those birds telling his experience, you guys don’t have the best reputation you know?
Some of you must work for the US government! Because you are trying to tell me what my eyes see and ears hear are not real. I have been flying in the GOM since 95’, I work on 4700VAC Solar turbine generators and program PLC’s for a living. So yeah, I can read a gauge! That was not my first time flying offshore. I have thousands of hours as a passenger and have flown with hundreds of pilots, heck I’ve likely flown with you before! I have seen you kill yourselves and I have seen you kill my friends, my run in the GOM has been long with little incident, I just want to make it to the beach in one piece, not a body bag. If we have to land on some nasty toadstool for the night, then so be it! I will buy you a case of beer when we get in.
As the economy deteriorates people start fearing for their jobs, I assume pilots are no exception. It amazes me the inability that pilots have to SAY NO in fear of retaliation. The bottom line is economics, and that is all that matters, my life is worth about 1million USD post crash, it’s cheaper to risk it and fly like a wild man I guess. I’m highly suspect of this latest Coast Guard crash, especially ending nose first like a dart on the bay floor ejecting flight crew out of seatbelts. Sounds like someone got disoriented on a foggy night.
Anyway, I’m not “sorry” for addressing you more properly or with “respect” in my original post, because when you knowingly put my life in jeopardy like that, I lose all respect for you. You are not “special” because you fly helicopters for a living, some of you gamble with lives on purpose when conditions are well below company minimums.
THANK YOU European pilots and GOM pilots who were able to understand my frustration and post about my flight that day.

[P1V1T1]

Take my hat off to this guy for speaking up .Something is clearly wrong when a passenger fears for their life.

[Savoia]

Take my hat off to this guy ..
Well I'm afriad I don't and I fear that the OP may have more in common with his username than he, or even we, would have wished.

The matter being broached (complete with slurs and prejudicial insinuations towards the pilot on the part of the OP) is somewhat imperative in nature but is diminshed by his aspersions as well as his rhetoric - both of which give the impression that he is more intent on communicating his 'belief' of the events than discovering the factors surrounding an encounter of this sort and in understanding the actions which might normally be taken in response.

Most of all, someone genuinely concerned with safety would raise this with the operator and not leave it to an internet forum which, after all, is an extremely informal way of addressing what is (as mentioned) a weighty matter.

Had he been someone with courage (or decency) he would have spoken in open and frank terms with the pilot after the event stating his concern and noting the pilot's response. The lack of any quotations from the driver by the OP makes it highly unlikely that the OP had such a conversation.

If the OP didn't have the gumption to speak with either the pilot or the operator then, given that these are anonymous forums, it wouldn't exceed the realm of possibility for the OP to have communicated a message to the pilot notifying him that he had started a discussion on PPRuNe and inviting the driver to respond to the details herein.

And this leads to my greatest conern of all; that what we are hearing is only one side of the story.

Not impressed.

[AnFI]

Savoia - Agree

[Brassed Off]

If the OP had not posted his concerns on here then there would never have been four pages of discussion about the event. Thats the reason PPRUNE exists, is it not?