617, Blue Steel and Cuban Missile Crisis

[Squirrel 41]

A question to the ex-Blue Steel bods out in Pprune land if I may. I understood from Humphrey Wynn's book that 617 had 4-6 live Blue Steel ALCMs and operational aircraft in November 1962, rising to a full squadron's worth early in 1963, at which point the press were allowed in to see the operational squadron.

What Wynn doesn't cover is whether the Blue Steel equipped aircraft were part of the alert for the Cuban missile crisis in mid-Oct 1962? As it was nearly 50 years ago now, can anyone cast any light on this please?

Many thanks,

S41

[Pontius Navigator]

I'll ask a friend.

[Squirrel 41]

Many thanks, PN.

[Pontius Navigator]

Squirrel, memories are fading but there is some evidence that 617 was not operational with Blue Steel but that some crews were operational with Yellow Sun. They were brought to RS15 but there is no direct statement whether they were BS or YS armed.

There is other evidence to suggest that they did not have an operational BS capablity.

Finally I know that initially the BS was LimOp for ballistic release only.

As aircraft we converted to the BS role FF aircraft would be withdrawn for modification. The only way to cover the assigned targets would be for the BS aircraft to be immediately LimOp.

Bit vague at the moment but still looking. Hope that helps.

[tornadoken]

There is much in Wynn if you read very slowly cross-referencing multiple entries. Do that and: when Press were shown hastily camouflaged Vulcan 2, 2/63, some Blue Steels were visible. 6 were formally taken on charge by the Scampton Wing 28/3/63 as acceptance trials vehicles. Clearance was given to carry them inert. On 16/4/64 CA Release was given to drop live at high level, initially 617 Sqdn, 27 Sqdn mid-1964, 83 Sqdn, late-64; in February,1965, to release at 12,000ft.; later, Vulcan 2, lower (Wynn,P.460).

8 Finningley SSA Yellow Sun 2 were available to Scampton Wing Vulcan 2 from 7/61 to early-63.

So: no, no Blue Steel involved in October,1962.

Wynn at one point implies BS was never cleared for QRA, but Pontius, in a long gone post, suggested eventually it was. Heating, HTP, pain.

[Pontius Navigator]

Tornadoken,

Holding QRA with BS I cite the following:

Back in 68 as OC 83 at Scampton was the then Wg Cdr John Pack. Other Ppruners will probably recall the incident with the QRA vehicle. He didn't park it in the right place and after the alert the car was some 100 yards behind the aircraft having rolled several times.

The BS sqns, unlike the FF, only practised increase in readiness to 05 or Start Engines. The FF aircraft could also advance to RS02 where they would taxi on to the main runway, No 1 at 1000 feet down, No 2 at 500 and No 3on the threshold. When RS02 was called Scampton and Wittering crews would come to cockpit readiness and start engines.

BS crews used to fly hot missiles from time to time, unarmed of course. There were emergency HTTP offload pits near the thresholds. In one instance a fireman accidently fell in to the pit and was immediately and explosively ejected from it; I beleive he was shocked but otherwise unhurt.

At Waddo, as a Master, they had an emergency HTTP offload area but no pit. In, I think 1966, a Scampton aircraft landed and did an emergency offload. Subsequent correspondence requested Scampton to supply a quantity of grass seed.

Compared with the YS2 the BS may have had a better chance of penetration but was a liability in generation. Whereas the YS2 force could be fully generated in around 8 hours or less, we managed 4hr 55 min once, the BS aircraft could take 24 hours or more. At Wittering for one Micky Finn the last aircraft took 72 hrs (I don't know how serviceable the aircraft was at startex).

So yes, they did hold QRA, with with hot missiles.

[Squirrel 41]

Gentlemen, thank-you very much. It solves a debate about how the UK nuclear force in Oct 62 would compare with some of the current states of concern - and I thought that we were streets ahead based on the open source, but was unsure whether there was an emergency BS capability at that point.

Thanks again,

S41

[COCL2]

If the answers not classified.....but how much peroxide did a Blue Steel carry?
Using the stuff in on a kilo-scale pilot plant used to scare me. Sitting on a missiles-worth seems a damned risky habit

[Roadster280]

Ah the irony! Sitting on a megaton nuclear weapon, no problem. Sitting on some unstable chemicals? Er, no thanks!

[Pontius Navigator]

Roadster, one was stable and one was not. At least the BS was cleared to Service unlike YS1's little brother.

[Ron Cake]

In the early days of Blue Steel at Scampton, there was a a dearth of flying hours. So often, if the aircraft was serviceable, the missile was not and vice versa. And there were endless problems getting both systems aligned. The result was that much of routine flying consisted of TPF (Training Profile) sorties. This meant flogging 'round the bombplots doing 2A attacks much as our colleagues at Coningsby were doing.

Almost all Blue Steel trips were with the training round (BSTR). Trips with the 'wet rounds' were rare. The presence of HTP on board sharpened the wits - temperatures were monitored with eagle eyes. In two full tours at Scampton I did only eight BSWR trips and one of those resulted in a hasty diversion to Wittering with rapidly rising HTP temperatures. On another occasion we bravely took a 'wet round' to the MBF dispersal at Bedford for a week. I think we took extra fire tenders and crews but I'm not sure RAe, whose airfield it was, knew what was going on.

P-N You are right; the Blue Steel force did not normally taxi at Readiness 02. But I seem to recall one exception. It sticks in my mind because, knowing we weren't going anywhere (pajamas under flying suit rig), the pilot let me have a go at taxiing. The experience engendered a new respect for Vulcan pilots - the thing was impossible to keep straight!

.......one final comment about the Blue Steel role in those days. My two Sqn tours covering 1963-68 produced only 1865 hours total. I bet the Coningsby lot got at least half as much again with their annual junketts to the Far Eas tand the the like.

[Pontius Navigator]

Ron, on flying hours you got over 300 hours per year. You were ahead of the game!

The SD98 rate was 300 hours per crew per year. Sqn Cdrs had the ability to vary this within crews and you may recall the training stats for more experienced crews, Select and Select Star, were tighter but also fewer.

For instance a Combat crew may have required 10 eq 2 attacks with a 50% cep of 600 yards whereas a Select Star crew may have required a 50% cep of 400 yards from 6 attacks. Accordingly the hours allocated to a Combat crew were around 320 hours per year and only 280 for a Select Star crew.

As a Combat Star crew I got 135 hours in 6 months. In the next half year as a Select crew I got 130 hours. In the following year as Select Star I got only 120 hours. In the next 6 months we dropped to 93 hours and won the Sqn efficiency trophy. The criteria for winning seemed to be to fly the least hours, most overseas trips (we only got a weekend in Gardermoen that half year), and fail to complete your stats.

In contrast on my tour on Sunshine Airways we averaged 12 hours per month but it were rough - Gan, Singapore, New Zealand, Kenya, Iran, Turkey, Masirah - but someone had to do it.

[Exrigger]

My father used to work on BS as a propulsion tradesman then as a Crew Chief he went with XM571 on an Eastern Ranger from Scampton between the 10/05/65 to 19/05/65 not sure which base these were at or more than one of Goose Bay, Offutt AFB or Webb AFB.


http://i299.photobucket.com/albums/mm286/MLH55/Dads%20Photos/PICT0054.jpghttp://i299.photobucket.com/albums/mm286/MLH55/Dads%20Photos/ScannedPhotos2109.jpg

[Ron Cake]

PN - The Standard Vanguard CAT 5 incident you mentioned was a 617 Sqn triumph c. 1967

At Scampton the Nav Radar was the designated driver for exercise EDOM. I think it was because he had least reason to climb immediately aboard and so had time to park the car. Anyway a particular Nav Rad on 617 was known for his dynamic, thrusting and highly competitive approach to life. Late one windswept rainy night he was at the wheel for a routine call out. Hurtling round the threshold of Rny 05, as near on two wheels as is possible in a Vanguard, he was determined to beat the 27 and 83 lot to the QRA dispersal. And he did.

But unhappily, he parked the car up the jet pipe of No 1 engine (well almost). Came the call for 'start engines' and the powering up of No 1 for crossfeed, the inevitable happened. The Vanguard was last seen cartwheeling over the Lincoln edge.

On recounting this story, I'm sometimes asked the identity of this devil-may- care Nav Rad. Well, I'm not one to name names. But I somtimes wonder if M.k. B..n..d has ever felt the need to reflect on the events of that day.

[mike-mercury]

I can shed some light on this, my late father was 'chiefy' on 617 at the time of Cuban Missile Crisis. He was adamant had the call to arms been given the crews on the squadron that's had evaluated and trained with Blue Steel, would have been sent on their merry way with the weapon. It is now recognised that the squadron ORBs were sanitised and cannot be relied on as true and absolute historical record.


However, their main frustration was they not dispersed as per all their training.

[mike-mercury]

Urban myth methinks. unless it was absolutely at the extremity of the Western end of Scampton's runway it would be impossible to send anything over the Lincoln edge, then it's a further quarter of a mile, do the math.

[Courtney Mil]

I think you just replied to a two-and-a-half year old post. But your point is well made.

[Pontius Navigator]

M-M, IIRC I saw a photograph of the wreck about 100 yards behind the aircraft.

[Squirrel 41]

Mike, many thanks!

S41