Puma Crash Sentence

[STANDTO]

RAF Flight Lieutenant Robert Hamilton Given Suspended Sentence Of 16 Months | UK News | Sky News (http://news.sky.com/home/uk-news/article/16132055)

[Fareastdriver]

The last thread that brought this up was pulled. Please pull this one too.

[MG]

I don't see why it should be pulled. It is of genuine military interest and as long as the comments stick to the rules, the thread itself is valid.

[Sun Who]

I think MG is right.

The topic remains of interest to many on this forum, let's just please recognise the sensitivity of the subject and be respectful of all effected by it.

Sun.

[Pontius Navigator]

I have my views, but the point of the thread is . . . ?

[alfred_the_great]

like the point of many threads, it tells us what's going on.

[MG]

PN, I suppose you're right in that, once the link to the news of the sentence is given, any further discussion is probably unnecessary and invariably inflammatory. If it can be kept respectful and constructive, then carry on. I fear that will be difficult to maintain!

[P6 Driver]

If comment is appropriate, I can't see a problem. Sometimes, web threads cover subjects that are less palatable than others.


Edited to add;

"PN, I suppose you're right in that, once the link to the news of the sentence is given, any further discussion is probably unnecessary and invariably inflammatory. If it can be kept respectful and constructive, then carry on. I fear that will be difficult to maintain!"

If that's the case, the thread/s concerning the Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash would also have been locked early.

[MG]

Drawing comparisons will certainly encourage the thread to degenerate, let's try to avoid that, shall we?

[xenolith]

I don’t think that 'threading ad nausea' about the subject will achieve much however, there are wider implications that are worthy of discussion. Please correct me if I am on the wrong track but it would appear that there is a collective crew responsibility; so had the crewman been the sole surviving member of the crew would he have faced similar charges?

[Bismark]

Far East,

The fact that a member of military aircrew is sentenced to prison (suspended or otherwise) makes the thread valid. The right sympathy etc needs to be observed to those bereaved and injured but as this was one of the worst errors committed by mil aircrew in recent times means there are lessons to be learned by other aircrew.

Discuss on...

[charliegolf]

had the crewman been the sole surviving member of the crew would he have faced similar charges?

For the answer to that to be 'no', I would theorise that his protestations would need to be on the tape. He wouldn't be able to do much more, would he?

CG

[STANDTO]

Apologies. Hadn't realised there had been a previous thread. Only posted as a news item, and not seeking comment. As with other incidents, it has happened, we learn (hopefully) and move on.

[Airborne Aircrew]

He wouldn't be able to do much more, would he?


The fire axe isn't just for use _after_ a fire you know...:E

[Dengue_Dude]

The information is in the public domain.

Leave it alone.

Crewmembers who are involved and deemed culpable do not have 'special rights' to anonymity. They deserve no special consideration at all - however sorry they might be.

Who knows, if they spoke up at the time there would be three less bereaved families this Christmas and each one since the accident.

Do I have sympathy - that'll be a NO then.

[Pontius Navigator]

I think Standto had it right as a simple pointer to the Sky News item although it had been in the papers yesterday IIRC and was thus old news.

However the issue of collective responsibility is possibly worthy of discussion.

I can think of at least 4 instance, three where I was on the crew, where the Auth, also on board, had either condoned or instigated flying indiscipline or done nothing to counter it. The Auths were 3 sqn ldrs (one was the captain) and one was the sqn cdr but not acting as captain. In only one of the cases did we stop the captain (auth) from his course of action.

These were all before CRM was born.

[ralphmalph]

PN,

"I can think of at least 4 instance, three where I was on the crew, where the Auth, also on board, had either condoned or instigated flying indiscipline or done nothing to counter it. The Auths were 3 sqn ldrs (one was the captain) and one was the sqn cdr but not acting as captain. In only one of the cases did we stop the captain (auth) from his course of action."

Were this to happen today, there would be a very swift and unpleasant end for those involved. The regular and deliberate collection of data by DASOR now means that the ability for individuals to "stretch the auth" and get away with it is very severely diminished (and quite right too) People are very aware of the fact that they will be culpable (RTS limitations, FOB rules and the Catterick crash spell that out clearly)

When there are junior aircrew; conducting complex tasks at the limit of their ability, the only room for the HQ is to regulate, to ameliorate any lack of experience.....thats what we see today.

You will find very controlled risk being taken in JHC, but no stomach for cowboys or a "**** me that was close, I learnt from that" attitude. In the case of the latter, if any blame can be laid as to why the near miss happened....then stand by if it is right "of the red line"!

[althenick]

I dont usually comment on air accidents but as a guy looking in from outwith the mil I feel compelled to say a few things...

Firstly - My heart goes out to those grieving families. It was a terrible and needless loss of life.

Secondly - That young fellow that survived, is wheelchaired, and just been through the judicial process and taken his conviction - While I cant condone HIS PART in this tradgedy, I feel that he has been through the mill and will be mentally tortured for life by his own part in a few moments of stupidity, How many of us have done stupid and potentialy fatal things? - avaiation related or not - and got away with it. This Fellow didnt get away with it and made his plea in court acccordingly. Had the Pilot survived I wonder if things would have been different?

[Tiger_mate]

The precidence that has been set will have far reaching consequence forevermore. The sentence being suspended means that it may be seen by some as lenient. That the individual is suffering his own sentence; however bad that is, should be set-aside. In the big picture of life, it will make people think twice before being reckless; or condoning it without question, in the future. For most; we can count our lucky stars that it is not us being discussed here today.

The whole affair is far from palatable, but I suspect much good will come from it. I only hope that there is no supervisory overswing that makes military flying lacking in capability.

[Airborne Aircrew]

Let me be the person to see the bright side in this...

If he doesn't fly an aircraft into the ground for the term of his suspended sentence then he's free and clear... Bonus :D

[rmac]

AA, from my point of view the good news is that the manufacturers built the cab so strongly that even though the accident killed 2 crew and seriously injured the third, it only killed one of the pax.

[SASless]

it will make people think twice before being reckless; or condoning it without question, in the future.

Keep dreaming Mate!

As long as there are Pilots...and helicopters....there's gonna be these kinds of tragedies!

If you are going out and do something silly....do it by yourself and not with a load of passengers who are not part of the scheme.

At least then if you kill yourself....someone is out just an aircraft and a knob....but no innocent bystanders.

[Trim Stab]

SASless - agreed.

I can understand that in aircrew-only aircraft a culture like that could perhaps have been tolerated, but I'm still astounded that there could be such sloppy training in the RAF that any pilot could even dream of flying in such a disgraceful way with pax in the back.

[Horror box]

There are so many failures in this chain with the crew just being the final one. As SASless said, these tragedies will happen, but by putting a very junior, inexperienced crew together on a det with self-auth is certainly not reducing the risk. So many things have been missed in the training and supervision that to simply try and allocate a large part of the most public blame on the one surviving crew member really is scapegoat tactics, and I do have a certain sympathy for Flt Lt Hamilton. I am not saying he is without blame, but perhaps he never should have been there in the first place. I do believe lessons have been learnt, and I would like to believe that his wouldn't happen again - but I don't.

[Hovermeter]

Horror Box: I agree with you in some ways in your argument but by putting a very junior, inexperienced crew together on a det with self-auth is certainly not reducing the risk. However a simple trooping task over a couple of days used to be bread and butter in my time on the Puma....and a way of LCR/new CR crews gaining experience and confidence. Maybe the defining difference is we had enough flying hours on the aircraft per month (vice simulator) to actually be good at handling it and ensuring we didn't get into such trouble.

I can't think of any crews who haven't let the horns come out now and then but the CVR tape sends chills down my spine every time I hear it.....I can't think anything the system would have done in auth checks would have made a difference, its like they had a death wish!

[CrabInCab]

I could stomach a lot of the poor Bobby H and crew comments made here had it not been for the fact that some 30 secs prior to killing himself, his crewman and the pax; Dave Sale had a similar near miss clearly audible on the CVR. Yes we all have made mistakes, I most certainly have but to have carried on after that initial scare just puzzles me and can't really be claimed to be a mistake.

A very sad affair that has irrevocably damaged the reputation and standing of a fine force that I am proud to be a member of.

:sad:

[Horror box]

I could stomach a lot of the poor Bobby H and crew comments made here had it not been for the fact that some 30 secs prior to killing himself, his crewman and the pax; Dave Sale had a similar near miss clearly audible on the CVR. Yes we all have made mistakes, I most certainly have but to have carried on after that initial scare just puzzles me and can't really be claimed to be a mistake.

I agree. However, I would very much doubt that there had been no previous signs. Perhaps even during training. As you mentioned - one near miss many would call a warning, and would back off. Why was his confidence so high that he did not heed that? Of course hindsight is a wonderful thing, but I am sure there would have been some who had harboured concerns. During my time as a flt commander I was made very aware of the "ones to watch" and we did everything to monitor closely who they flew with. This was very often borne out of inexperience and youth, and after some close supervision and a few harsh warnings along the way they would calm down - not always though. Those who don't should have been weeded out earlier.

[chopabeefer]

Tigermate, unfortunately this will not stop people being reckless, as by it's very nature, reckless behaviour is unlikely to be carried out with forethought. What this shows is that if you fly in the manner that this crew did, and murder innocent people in the process, you will get away with it. Suspended sentence - political speak for 'got away with it' I am afraid. A very very sad day for justice and makes the RAF a more dangerous place.:ugh:

[Easy Street]

I don't think he 'got away with it'. Given the choice between 16 months in the slammer (reduced to 8 months or less with good behaviour) and the remaining 60-odd years of your life in a wheelchair, I'd take jail every time. The judge said as much in his sentencing. Don't forget also that the primary culprit lost his life - and that, surely, is far more of a deterrent to any copycat activity than any prison sentence could ever be?

[glojo]

In the real World how easy is it for a very junior co-pilot to challenge the actions of the pilot in command?

I might be more sympathetic towards this young man, if they had been possibly more forceful with their comments during that flight. If they felt uncomfortable about speaking out then they should at the very least have insisted on correct radio procedure and ordered the whooping and hollering over the radio to stop. I would suggest that these comments were adding 'fuel to a raging fire'.

It is wrong to blame a service for the actions of an individual but from what I have read this was not the first time the flying 'style' of that pilot has been highlighted?

Sentencing the co-pilot to a term of imprisonment sends out a very clear message BUT ....

In theory it is easy to say the co-pilot should have spoken out, that is an easy thing to say but in the real world how does this work?

Aircraft tasked with mission to collect a group of soldiers in atrocious conditions, during the flight the co-pilot is not happy and suggests they should abort. The co-pilot is adamant they are right and makes a stance because they have been told they have the right to speak out!!

A pilot decides to pick up more soldiers that the rules allow, co-pilot points out his actions are in contravention of regulations and again digs his heels in.

Some pilots may well treat this as part of the learning curve for newly qualified personnel, but another officer might not feel so charitable??

Please note these are questions and certainly not statements. Mistakes happen and 'cowboys' get through the net, but when these cowboys break rules in such a way as they endanger lives then do we have a duty to speak out? My own thoughts are that it is possible that the system as it stands works perfectly, but only a fool believes the 'system' is perfect.

A terrible, terrible incident that has caused embarrassment for the RAF but more important, a life sentence of pain and suffering for the victims all because of the actions of one idiot.

'There but for the grace of God go I'. Is a statement I respect but seriously question... Yes I TOTALLY accept some of us take risks (http://www.buckinghamcovers.com/shop/signer.php?signer_id=418) that see us break or perhaps ignore rules, but do we really endanger the lives of innocent young children\teenagers in the manner being discussed??? I very much doubt it. BUT..... I am certain some of us (me included) have given a finger to rules that prevent us from pushing ourselves to perform to the highest of levels? Carrying 16 passengers instead of four in total white out conditions!! :ok::ok: Respect to that man.

Can the RAF learn from this? You bet they can and before we all go apoplectic, I will very quickly add that every armed service MUST learn from this and ensure we all enforce those relevant rules that are already in place to stop this type of very sad incident from taking place.

I for one feel compassion for the co-pilot and wish him well, what has happened has happened and no prison sentence will alter that.

The pilot let himself down, he let the RAF down, he killed a valued crewman and took the life of a young Army recruit.... No sympathy, no compassion.

Apologies for the ramble :uhoh::uhoh:

[charliegolf]

In theory it is easy to say the co-pilot should have spoken out, that is an easy thing to say but in the real world how does this work?



No, it's not easy, unless you are an abrasive sort who couldn't care less about how you are viewed by others. (I'm not) When I worked on Pumas there was no CVR, so everything was subsequently going to be hearsay.

Only once* did I say, "I'm not comfortable with this, Skip." He stopped straight away. What he stopped doing was trying to fly down fire-breaks on Otterburn Range. He asked why, I told him: any brown job could have strung wire across from one tree to another. He accepted that. Now did he do the same with other crewmen afterward? Dunno. Did I get crap for it? Not that I am aware.

George Blackie may have told me to .... off, would probably have made cracks at my expense in the crewroom, maybe refused to fly with me again. Who knows. But I'm guessing he would have stopped too.

The Catterick guy had the CVR, and had he made a statement along the same line, he might have been exonerated.

CG

* I recall asking someone, " Are we auth'ed for this?" Same effect, but can't recall the circumstances.

[Airborne Aircrew]

The Catterick guy had the CVR, and had he made a statement along the same line, he might have been exonerated.There were three people on intercom on the aircraft. I pointed out before that someone, (I know not who), appeared to have begun questioning the pilot because the CVR had someone clearly saying "Permission to say that was a little bit low Captain", (or words very close to that). Logically it was not the Captain himself which means that either the Co or the Crewman said it. It is commensurate with someone who is uncomfortable with what is going on and is also not comfortable directly challenging a "superior" trying to "complain" without openly appearing to do so. I firmly believe someone in the crew had become concerned over the way the flight was being carried out and had begun the process of challenging the Captain. As I say, I don't know who it was, but the inquiry should have known.

[charliegolf]

AA I know the reference, I seem to recall it too. My post was not meant to be a hindsight special- rather a response to the, "Is it that easy to challenge the captain?" question raised earlier. I accept it's NOT easy. The board/court maybe felt that the 'Blackadder' style response was not enough.

CG

[rotormonkey]

Logically it was not the Captain himself which means that either the Co or the Crewman said it.

I'm afraid AA, logic may not apply in this case.

[Chinny Crewman]

How easy is it to question a fellow professional's judgement?

It's not but if you do not have the moral courage to do so then you are in the wrong job.

[Dengue_Dude]

It's not but if you do not have the moral courage to do so then you are in the wrong job.

100% correct.

We're all fallible, but the team can save us (if only from ourselves), we have but to listen.

How many times, when you hear/see CRM Training do you think, those as believes in it are doing it anyway (before it had a plethora of fancy titles), and those that don't, aren't?

There is nothing new under the sun . . .

[Airborne Aircrew]

I'm afraid AA, logic may not apply in this case.

Really??? :ugh:

[sidewayspeak]

I feel a certain degree of sympathy for the Co-pilot. The military system is not good at allowing people to criticise our 'seniors' and it is a brave man that stands up to one's captain.

It happens on the ground too. I worked for a complete t%ss$r on a Regt Sqn when I was a junior Off. That Sqn Cdr came into the ops room in the Falklands and demanded ammunition. He wanted to go down to Teal Inlet and shoot the seals that were taking his fish and spoiling his fly fishing. I should have told him that was illegal and refused. But I handed over the ammunition as I knew that if I didn't my life would be even worse.

Same boss bullied all his Jnr offrs - caddying for him when playing golf, making a Flt Cdr do 4 houly ammunition checks following a range practice the boss thought was ilegal (but was perfectly legal if you were qualified field firing) etc etc. But none of us stood up to him, even the 2i/c.

As I look back, I can see the system was not there to support the junior officer. I wonder if the same sort of issues arise in the flying world where individuals are just too afraid to speak up for fear of the consequences - senior people can screw you over in many ways that are 'legal'.

Anyway, I appreciate that people died and the crew should have spoken out, but feel sorry for the crew member who was left alive. Pity the pilot wasn't alive too to face the music.

[glad rag]

:D sideways.
All this "he should have done this, that, the other" BS
He would have had no support from either his superiors or peers if he had spoken out, seen the same with an Engo [and his serving wife] being blackballed from the officers mess by a campaign led by a middle level Sqdn manager.
I do hope that things have been formalised these days, but I doubt it.:sad:

[Just This Once...]

I'm not here to comment on the actions of that crew as I just don't know enough about the circumstances to comment - but I will speak out against anyone who announces that bad things always happen to those that speak out.

Back when I was a JO I walked in to a flt cdrs office and explained as reasonably as I could where I thought his flying was going. Well over a decade has gone past and he left the RAF a number of years ago but we are both still alive and still friends.

Speak out when you need to - you may even be thanked for it.

[Chugalug2]

sidewayspeak:
The military system is not good at allowing people to criticise our 'seniors' and it is a brave man that stands up to one's captain.
How very true, and yet that is exactly what he/she must do should the situation demand it. A Co's job is not just to "Pull up the gear, drop it and standby to feather" as the refrain has it; but to learn, to monitor, and if need be to challenge. Physical courage is one thing, but moral courage is perhaps a far more demanding quality. It is required by all ranks and at all times. Everyone from Airman to Air Marshal is charged, for example, to disobey an illegal order. Not only to disobey, but to report it up the CoC. Yes, glad rag you are right, it's a pound to a penny that the CoC will close up, back the one who gave the order and victimise the whistle-blower. Tough! Illegal orders can mean that people die, for instance those from 2*'s instructing subordinates to suborn the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations. Some 62 people to date, and counting. The moral of this sad thread is think on now and decide what you will do if faced with a similar dilemma. If it is nothing, then I suggest you are in the wrong job.

[charliegolf]

All this "he should have done this, that, the other" BS
He would have had no support from either his superiors or peers if he had spoken out, seen the same with an Engo [and his serving wife] being blackballed from the officers mess by a campaign led by a middle level Sqdn manager.


Translation: Three lives is a small price to pay for a good mess life. Seemingly.

CG

[glojo]

Contrary to predictions of threads getting out of control it is refreshing to see the two sides of a coin being debated in a constructive manner. Lets change that :uhoh:;)

We are privileged to have a number of retired senior RAF, Fleet Air Arm and possibly Army Air Corp pilots that frequent this forum and my question to them is:

How many very junior pilots entered your office with a formal complaint in writing to complain about the dangerous flying of a pilot they were flying with? Following on from that did you then put that complaint into the system for further action?

I am certain folks go into the boss’s office and have an unofficial chat and suggest they were unhappy or would prefer not to fly with ‘x’ or ‘y’, but to me that is NOT making an official complaint, in fact it is possibly delegating the responsibility to someone else.:uhoh: The person we complain to was not present during that flight and has no real idea of just how bad things were. By having a quiet word all that might happen is you may, or may not be allocated to fly with that pilot whilst in that posting.

The commanding officer may or may not then have a quiet word with the pilot being complained about but in my personal opinion this may work…. It may not but it is a World of difference from crossing the line and making the complaint official! That type of complaint is something I have never witnessed but I am guessing the officer making the complaint will not be the toast of any mess! Will making an official complaint stay on the pilot's record even if a board decide there is no case to answer?

if you do not have the moral courage to do so then you are in the wrong job.

How many times have you made an official complaint? Words are cheap and one person’s definition of what is dangerous may well be another person’s definition of getting the most out of their equipment.

Could I make an official complaint about the deeds of a fellow officer?? I doubt it unless the act was so bad as to be criminal.

I have had a number of men and women complain about the way I worked. I had their bosses telling me about the complaints but did it change me? These same bosses were also regularly dealing with requests from other folks to come out on patrol with me (go figure) and no, I never changed, but having said that not one person EVER put pen to paper to make any type of official complaint.

Is flying a helicopter along a fire-break in a forest a big no, no? Been there, got the ‘T’ shirt and felt quite comfortable BUT I do accept that others may feel uncomfortable with this type of flying and may well voice their concerns.
Different folks, different strokes! Click (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/362335-heli-chopping-trees-down-vietnam.html#post4720891)RESPECT to those brave young men.

IN NO WAY AM I DEFENDING the pilot of this specific aircraft, but I do have a degree of sympathy for the co-pilot, although I am not privy to what this person may or may not have done on that tragic day.

[Pontius Navigator]

Back when I was a JO I walked in to a flt cdrs office and explained as reasonably as I could where I thought his flying was going.

And therein lies the rub.

In the cockpit you have that testerone charged wall. If you speak up in front of others, especially non-crew, then people often react contrarily. Have you never told the wife that your driving is perfectly safe when, in your heart of hearts you know you made a mistake?

Had JTO gone instead to the boss then the outcome may well have been different.

[MG]

There's either some huge conspiracy theorists or some very cynical ones on here (what, on PPRune, surely not?!). I don't know what it's like in the heavy world or in other services but the SH force does still have the culture where you can criticise your seniors. The captain of the ac is just the one nominally in charge for that sortie; the next day it could be the other chap, so there isn't so much the cross-cockpit gradient until you get differing ranks. Even then I would hope and expect that anyone can shout up and say that the senior bod was in the wrong. Anyone who has worked with SH crewmen know that they're usually not afraid of speaking their mind!

Of course, there are always those who will not listen and those who will not speak up, whether it is through fear or ignorance of seeing any wrong-doing. It is for the others around to try to recognise that and encourage a change, not matter how small.

Right, I'll leave my utopian world now and go and visit planet Earth!

[Chugalug2]

I hope that your utopian world is very much the real one these days, MG. If the RAF has not yet fully embraced CRM, FDM, or whatever the title is this week, then it really needs to get on with it. The time and place "to sort things out" is the here and now, not the boss's office or by some formal reporting system. That is a last resort and after the damage is done, even if it be merely the breakdown of proper crew co-operation.
The more formal course that I alluded to in a previous post was the parallel scenario of receiving an illegal order, more likely sitting behind a desk than a control column. It would seem that has become more of an occupational hazard since my day, so no I haven't knowingly given or received an illegal order, but I remember being very impressed in training when the concept was explained. We weren't that far away time wise from when a whole war had been fought by our enemies on that basis. Perhaps it's time to get the history books re-opened!
Finally, and on a lighter note, here is the Oscar Brand Co-Pilot's Lament. The whole point is that this is not the way it should be done, in case there is any doubt and no, I am not referring to the modern aircrew filmed to illustrate it:-
The poor Copilot - YouTube

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

the primary culprit lost his life - and that, surely, is far more of a deterrent to any copycat activity than any prison sentence could ever be?

Disagree - my point being that if the other members of the crew had voiced their concerns, the primary culprit (and everyone else) would probably still be alive. Therefore there needs to be a clear signal sent out that sitting there quietly and choosing not to say anything, for fear of damaging one's reputation/personal standing, is not an acceptable course of action. Is a suspended sentence a clear enough signal?

[oggers]

Okay, a suspended sentence may seem a bit lean but we have to remember that the guy already lost his job as well as the use of his legs and he wasn't even the skipper.

If pure self preservation wasn't motive enough for the crew to speak up and end the madness I'm not sure there's any deterrent sentence that could.

[Sun Who]

Oggers said:

If pure self preservation wasn't motive enough for the crew to speak up and end the madness I'm not sure there's any deterrent sentence that could.
I think that's an interesting point. If being scared doesn't motivate you to speak up, to what extent will anything else?

Experience, or lack of, played a large part in this tragedy.

Sun.

[Thomas coupling]

I was in the mil for 17 yrs, flying full time.
I then left and flew in civvy street for 14 yrs.
I now teach mil pilots in a mil environment.
Guess what, CRM is still an alien concept in the mil even though they all attest to it, they don't:
(a) understand it.
(b) contribute towards it.
It's a top down philosophy which is long overdue and will take several more innocent "bystanders" with it before it is fully embraced, as it is in civvy street.

Perhaps there is room for it within the MAA, but someone has to shout this from the rooftops and it won't be coal face workers doing the shouting either :ugh:

[woptb]

Some of the "there but for the grace....." type comments are counterproductive; although ultimately an error led to the loss of the aircraft, by their reckless violation of procedure, they hugely increased the risk of an error occurring.
The enabling culture which should easily (AND without recrimination) allow people to raise concerns is not present across all military aviation. To say an individual lacks moral fibre if they don't feel able to speak up indicates a lack of awareness of the sometimes insidious nature of the issues. Simply teaching people about CRM isn't enough; more people need to walk the walk.
The idea of the 'quiet word' can also be dangerous; sometimes there are people we don't like to fly with. The starkest example I can think of is Bud Holland who was able to continue flying, until he stalled his B52 at Fairchild AFB in 1994.People had spoken out regarding Holland’s previous behaviour, but successive commanders had had a 'quiet word' & taken no formal action.
The aviator who doesn’t make errors and ‘always’ follows procedures has not yet been born and we don’t as yet have a perfect safety culture. Without a greater recognition and will to address wider cultural issues, the idea of the ‘bad apple’s’ is perpetuated, acting as a disincentive to efforts to improve the overall safety culture.

[Yozzer]

A scary bit for me is that all my "There but for the grace..." moments have pretty much been within auth and legal! I seemed to have an affinity with electricity and was 'lucky' to never get involved in an incident. I know of another with similar tales who does not know if the aircraft went over or under HT wires whilst overseas!

Sat in the left hand seat of a Puma up the Eastern Branch River once and was scared sh..less! I voiced my concern as there were no escape routes from that low and got thoroughly brow beaten from the two operating crew members, yet that to was legal and within auth.

'Train to fight' has its baggage on occasion. "Taken on risk" are the buzzwords nowadays. Until it goes pete-tong, for then you are on your own.

[Chugalug2]

woptb:
Without a greater recognition and will to address wider cultural issues
It took the tragedies at Manchester and East Midlands for the airlines to take their Road to Damascus. Cabin Crew members were aware of what the Flight Deck crew were not. That an engine fire was burning its way into the cabin due to the aircraft being stopped crosswind off the runway. That the PA being made by the Captain about a faulty engine seemed to refer to the wrong engine. In neither case was their concern transmitted to the Flight Deck, for fear of challenging them. People died or were dreadfully injured. Thus Flight Deck Management mutated into Crew Resource Management. Cultural resistance was overcome because the cost of it was too great. So it is with this tragedy, for who can say that the cost should be borne still?
You make a good point, Yozzer. Military Flying, whether training or operational, is for war. There is an inherent risk that makes it different from Commercial Aviation. All the more reason then to stay within your Authorisation risky though it may be, and not add to the risk unnecessarily. The idea is to train to go to war, not to not go to war because crew, pax, and aircraft have been lost before getting there! CRM increases our military potential, just as airworthiness does. High time that the RAF adopted both fully!

[MG]

Chug,
I think the difficulty in the military comes when you fly with someone who has an influence on your career, such as your flt cdr. If you take all of those out of the cockpit then I suspect that comes closer to your average civilian cockpit. Therefore, in this respect, the military does embrace CRM and is on a level with any operation you care to compare it with, so don't get or give the impression that the military are behind because I truly don't think that is the case.

If, however, you add in the cross-cockpit gradient, then there will always be those who prefer not to speak up, believing that either 'the flt cdr knows best' or that it would be detrimental to their next report. On the other side, there are those in power who think they know better or who were better when they were younger and won't or don't recognise that. That still exists but not nearly in the same way as it did even 5 years ago. I don't think we're far from getting there and the accident to which this thread refers has nothing to with positions of power, just a junior crew who didn't have time to grow up, sadly.

[Chugalug2]

If, however, you add in the cross-cockpit gradient, then there will always be those who prefer not to speak up, believing that either 'the flt cdr knows best' or that it would be detrimental to their next report.
For "flt cdr" read fleet manager, training captain, or simply captain, and the sentence could just as easily apply. But it is those very people who should encourage such "speaking up" because they encourage and promote CRM. If RAF Flt Cdrs don't then I suggest there is a problem. CRM isn't just a morning of lectures, it is a complete culture. If it is not adopted by all, senior and junior, Flt Deck and Rear Crew, left and right seats, there is a problem. From what has been written in this thread it would seem, in certain parts of the RAF at least, that might well be the case.

[A and C]

From what I have seen your message is spot on.

[MG]

Chug,
Read my previous posts; I do believe that flt cdrs, trg captains, and all others involved in bringing the capabilities of their charges along, understand the absolute need for crews to work in harmony together to get the best results. You only have to look at some of the great efforts expended daily in Afghanistan to appreciate that we're not that bad really. There will always be the odd poor apple on both sides, as I have said, and I think that some of the comments on previous posts reflect that, but please do not get the impression that we are that far behind, nor, probably more importantly, that the civilian world is significantly better.

[Two's in]

Unfortunately death, injury or prison is not usualy a deterrent for those who fly recklessly. In their world, there is no comprehension that what they are doing is even wrong, let alone something you could be punished for.

Interesting points about CRM and cockpit gradient, remembering the AAC have had SNCO aircraft captains responsible for commissioned pilots for years now and seem to have reached a thoroughly professional level of crew cooperation outside the normal bounds of rank and seniority. So in that environment it is incorrect to assume the senior (in rank) pilot will call the shots.

The most dangerous flights are, and will continue to be, when Mate A and Mate B go for a jolly and to all intents and purposes, nobody is command of the aircraft. It is also the responsibility of Authorising Officers to recognise the potential for complacency with such flights, and provide an appropriate breifing with the authorisation.

[MG]

Two's in,
A good point that I had forgotten about. To a much lesser degree, in the RAF, it is far from uncommon to have a flt lt captain with a more senior officer in the operating crew. I've done it and I don't think it has too much of a detrimental effect. As I said, there are always exceptions to the rule and I don't think others should get the impression that rank and positions of power are always a bar to good CRM and general airmanship. Things have changed exponentially, certainly in the past 5 years.

[ShyTorque]

I can't agree that CRM wasn't working in the RAF some time ago (iirc, Charliegolf was allowed to be stroppy years ago). But having read the report on this tragic flight, it seems to me that things might have gone somewhat backwards since my time on Puma SH almost twenty years ago.

I never personally found the "upwards seniority gradient" as a barrier to flight safety issues. I once severely bollocked a senior officer for a major transgression of his authorisation. I subsequently told my Sqn Cdr I would not ever auth. that particular individual again. I was never latterly required to.

[Tiger_mate]

backwards since my time on Puma SH almost twenty years ago.


Twenty years ago there were plenty of sand bags being pulled up beneath swinging lampshades. Then the good guys all left (& mostly became civvies at MSHAFT) and a dilution rate of 85% first tourists took over. It followed that lessons were learnt (again) rather then taught. The exodus to the airlines if a fast jet crossover was not to be, inflamed the dilution rate; and PVR strategy was the talk of every bar and crewroom.

To compound the issue, the days of career Flt Lts were also gone and replaced by 'career focused individuals' who assume that Sqn Ldr and beyond is a right. The SLUT (Sqn Ldr Under Training) was born; and it is the nemesis to Flight Safety and to a point +Morale. I have known awesome pilots change into right plonkers with an illuminated career caption.

Finally the Puma accident rate in which the Fuel Control Unit played its part cannot be swept under the carpet. In short, the situation we find ourselves in is a great many ducks falling into line; and individual personalities are the minority. The 'system' contributed to the downfall far more then most will admit.

[SOSL]

Hi, TM. Didn't quite get your drift. What are you getting at?

[SOSL]

Ok. Well done mods!

[Tiger_mate]

The point I am getting at is that the sage advice of the old and bold is absent in todays military and without this the logical errors erased in a bygone era are being repeated. Dont get me wrong; the days of old had some horror stories born of arrogance and culture; but the good bits were essential and are now missing. ....also that (in my opinion,) learning to fly (& operate) the aeroplane efficiently and with finesse are more important than jumping through the next promotion hoop or brown nosing the CoC.

[ShyTorque]

Finally the Puma accident rate in which the Fuel Control Unit played its part cannot be swept under the carpet. In short, the situation we find ourselves in is a great many ducks falling into line; and individual personalities are the minority. The 'system' contributed to the downfall far more then most will admit.

The Puma always had the same FCU from day one. We taught the type with emphasis on the potential "trap" of the lack of engine response from low N1. I was quite disappointed to read a previous accident where a pilot got caught out by this whilst merely re-positioning the Puma on an airfield, crashing and killing the co-pilot.

Other known problems were the high C of G / narrow track undercarriage, wrong pedal take off issue, the yaw roll divergence tendency. We emphasised them all on the OCU. And my own "gotcha", demonstrating how the baralt hold would drop out when reducing below 80kts, whereupon the old girl would nod her head very slightly then slyly descend into the ground if left to her own devices.

A great shame if any of this "hard learned" teaching didn't continue later on perhaps with quite the same emphasis. :(

[glojo]

This observation is so true in all walks of life:

There will always be the odd poor apple on both sides, as I have said, and I think that some of the comments on previous posts reflect that, but please do not get the impression that we are that far behind, nor, probably more importantly, that the civilian world is significantly better. However we would be fooling everyone if we tried to say that show-boating to a reckless level is extremely rare!! Rare YES, but by no means extremely rare. There are any number of links on this forum that may or may not show aircraft being flown in what might be described in a reckless manner?

Would we describe this as reckless (http://www.youtube.com/watch?src_vid=mVNOmP0QIAQ&feature=iv&annotation_id=annotation_286756&v=PLXhPoxytsM)?

No doubt the authorities will try to locate the pilot but how many times has this been performed BEFORE it was filmed? Has anyone that was present at this event complained? I would suggest no and that would probably apply to all the other footage that has been filmed,

I am NOT trying to take this thread off topic, I am trying to suggest all nations have examples of this type of behaviour even in multi-crewed aircraft and I would suggest this problem is not specific to any one service. The B-52 at Fairchild may be considered the most horrific example but is it? (Youtube link deliberately NOT applied) This example is possibly a far worse example EA-6B Prowler (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/338616.stm) Hind sight is a useless gift and with the above two examples the pilots were not angels but no one ever made an official complaint!!!

This is NOT an RAF issue and the RAF are certainly not behind the ball when it comes to trying to eradicate this type of behaviour. The pilot show boating over the soldier was lucky, that he was not facing a manslaughter or even a murder charge!! Was that act any less serious than that of the Puma apart from the consequences?

Was it a real video clip? :uhoh:

To suggest the RAF lags behind in any type of CRM training is wrong and very unfair to the very highly trained, highly respected personnel that both fly and crew that aircraft. Respect to all members of the 'Light Blue' and respect to all those that have been effected by this tragic event.

Merry Christmas everyone,
John

[A and C]

I dont think that the younger members of the RAF are lagging behind the civil aviation in CRM culture but some of the older upper management are far less inclined to enbrace the culture.

Rather than have an open investigation into an inccident there is still rush to find someone to blame and pretend that nailing someone with a lower pay grade to the wall will make the situation go away.

In a civilan airline that I worked for one (ex RAF) pilot made a mistake, this was not seen by the management as requiring any more than a little extra training aimed at adressing the issue. Unfortunatly the pilot in the face of overwelming evidence would not admit that he had made an error, this left the airline managment with no option but to dismiss him.

I think this guys refusal to admit to the error was partly due to his background and coming from a culture were admitting to the error would have him put on a charge.

The RAF is not yet free from the blame culture but the faster the culture changes and admits that pepole make honest mistakes the better for all involved, with wise oversight it will be clear were an honest mistake stops and negligence starts so I see no problems for those who might see this to clash with maintaning military diciplinery system.

[NutLoose]

A and C the civil sector isn't as transparent as you make out, if it was we wouldn't have the Whistleblower, Chirps and confidential reporting.... to protects oneself is Human nature....... Especially in this day and age where the world operates a blame culture and there is no such thing as an accident. Dismissing crews or engineers who have had an incident also in my eyes can have a negative effect, knowing that one blot on another wise squeaky clean career can destroy it and your future employment just serves to make those involved clam up. what do we learn from that, we don't because those involved are less likely to report any incident for fear of retribution, hence the reporting systems mentioned above.

I have read through the whole thread and one cannot help feeling sorry for all those involved, in a way it reminds me of the Puma incident out in Zimbabwe.

My feelings are that where is the public interest in prosecuting the guy for not speaking up..... where is the justice in that? did he set out to Kill anyone? NO.. Is he suffering because of this incident A definite YES, and I should imagine he will be reliving this tragedy for the rest of his life ..
Can one hand on heart say he never intended not to say something about it on landing, but never got the opportunity, a lot of people have talked about people having discussed with flight commanders etc after flights about concerns..... you appear to have been the lucky ones as you got that far, and it was post flight.....

A headstrong personality can be a damn difficult thing to speak up against in all walks of life, I had one cock up in the RAF, brought totally about by peer pressure and being rushed to complete a task by the pilot, and I learnt from it, did I report it afterwards? NO, simply because I knew that rather than the RAF seeing it for what it was and learning from it, I would probably have been tech charged (I left a drop tank pin in, ( which had no flag on it) It was also missed by the final check man too. ) I never allowed a Pilot to ever put me or themselves in that position again.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

My feelings are that where is the public interest in prosecuting the guy for not speaking up.....


On top of the reasons already discussed on this thread, the other aspect is "What message would be sent if he wasn't prosecuted?" The only conclusion that people would draw, if he wasn't prosecuted, is that it's AOK to turn a blind eye to one's colleague risking people's lives (even his own FFS!) rather than speak out, and this surely is not the desired take-home message from this whole sorry mess?

[A and C]

I have seen the civil system from the inside of six company's the best of these had no CRM problem with the policy overseen by a very good Chief pilot ( who ironically in terms of this thread was ex RAF)

The other five company's have failed to to meet these high standards, some by a small amount and others .............well by a bit more.

[Airborne Aircrew]

I have a question...

From the "bottom of the pile"... Crew only... No Captains allow to respond please - the thread has done well so far in sticking to the subject, this question is crucial to the debate.

How was it at the bottom of the crew "pecking order"? How easy was it to "pipe up" and tell the boss he was screwing up? Were some Captains easier to talk to while with others you felt it was impossible? If you did express apprehension were you listened to, ignored, ridiculed or what?

Please answer any or all of the above questions...

I'll start by saying that on the one occasion I expressed discomfort the Captain pulled up to a more comfortable height and the issue was never discussed. We flew on numerous other occasions, we flew low and fast and close to my point of discomfort, (note that when I complained I was sat in an open door facing backwards, very low over water - only crewmen are likely to understand the difference between being in the cockpit and facing backwards), and I was never again put in the position of having to express discomfort. I have the greatest of respect for that Captain.

[Trim Stab]

I have a question too -

So far, all comments have been about the RAF. Is there any difference in attitudes to CRM in the other services?

[Wrathmonk]

Is there any difference in attitudes to CRM in the other services?

Or, for that matter, in other RAF fleets. Is it worse between two pilots in RW/ME (clash of the ego...) than it is between pilot/nav in FJ?

[charlies angel]

In the British civvy world the BMI Kegworth accident is generally held to be the moment moderm CRM was embraced as a credible concept which can "catch" errors in an error chain.
It is regularly discussed at annual recurrents and lessons are always learnt as the numerous errors are pointed out to less experienced crews.
The outcome is always a feeling of empowerment and determination to never let such a sad thing happen again.The net result in a modern airline is that ALL people involved in the day to day operation are completely at ease to report ANYTHING they feel uneasy about without fear or embarassment or nervousness.
When it comes to safety there is no authority gradient on my aircraft.Everybodies opinion/input is valid and is duly noted.
Perhaps this sad sad Puma event should become the Services watershed moment.

[Pontius Navigator]

AA,

The answer is it depends. Some individuals were planks on the ground as well as in the air and impossible to strike up a rapport.

I flew a crew check on one individual and have full confidence in the following tale. (I have names).

The Nav called the Captain with a major heading change in two minutes. He was told to be quiet as the Captain was trying to think. At the turn point some distance to the north west of the Hebrides he called the turn. The Captain exploded, told him he had been told to shut up and went back in to his study.

The Nav duly shut up. Some while later the Captain asked reasonably what the Nav had wanted. "Nothing much, just wanted to give you the new heading." He then told him the heading was no use now. When asked where they were the answer was Iceland. They just had sufficient fuel for a direct recovery to base.

I don't recall the ultimate outcome but I don't think that Captain progressed much further.

If your Captain is a good egg then you will feel less inhibited in speaking out.

PS, they were both flt lt but one was a selected member of the 2-winged master race.

[jayteeto]

Let us be honest here..... The Puma, Wessex and Chinook Forces had their fair share of Wazzers. In the 90's you could put everyone in isolation and ask them to make a list of the pilots who would do exactly this type of thing. I would put my wages on the lists all having the same few names. Some people were just d##kheads when away from base. However the difference is.... why are we having these accidents now? And why does history seem to show Puma Puma Puma?
The simple answer does not require a £million study by experts. The Puma bites the unwary and when it bites it is a bitch to recover. I remember a role disposal board at Shawbury sending a bloke to Puma because he was a weak candidate and SK/Wessex/Chinook would have been too difficult for him!! Sorry about upsetting egos, but the Puma required the best candidates. I did just ok at Shawbury and really struggled to make the grade on the OCU/Sqn. My first year was definitely probation, I got through with the help of the crewmen and a select few old and bold instructors. Jack R/AJ/Geoff Young/Al Bishop/Billy Kidd. This was because the pure handling of the helicopter demanded much more than other types. Engine response and divergance gotchas were SO SO easy to discover on a daily basis. Just look at how many ex 72 wessex pilots on 2nd tours screwed up........

The lack of mentorship, experienced crews and operational tempo have all added to the problem. Commanders are scared to get rid of wazzers because they would not get a replacement in the short term, overloading those left behind. Traditionally, supervision is difficult when your pilots are spread all over the world. These problems are common to all types, but it seems to be Pumas that keep on crashing. Commanders..... Look at the aircraft before you condemn the aircrews. The upgrade is a step forward 30 years too late.

I will stick my neck out and say that this accident might not have happened in a more forgiving aircraft??????????????????????

[Tiger_mate]

I had a similar tale to that (PN post) when Low Level in Wales. The front crew were the OC of the OCU that I was a student crewman on. (operating solo on a pilots training navex) The student pilot was a highly respected member of the Royal Navy (Stds) embarking on an exchange tour with the RAF. Several miles after overshooting a turn point we went off my map, at which stage I folded the said map and enjoyed the view. We had plenty of fuel and my Nav inputs had fallen on deaf ears.

At a beer call at the end of the day, the OC stood up in front of everybody and recited the tale, with a most public apology and a statement that everybody should learn from 'our' story.

Respect to both front enders. For the curious; the OC was GC and the RN exchange officer Fred. (circa 1986)

I must be quite lucky for in 5000 rotary hours including flying with such (notorious) icons as the late George B, I have never been ignored by any Driver Airframe since para 1 above.

AL1: JT - All comments seconded.

Earlier in the thread, Yozzer said:
I know of another with similar tales who does not know if the aircraft went over or under HT wires whilst overseas!


That was me. 1987 in Portugal. Unmarked wires strung between two vertical cliffs (canyon) with no pylons above surface to indicate potential disaster; and having crossed a dam moments earlier, we (2 crew) were looking for wires.

[Brian 48nav]

In my short RAF flying career I experienced both sides of speaking up.

In the Herc there was a single ADF with 2 control boxes; one at the nav' table and one on the consol between the drivers. There was a takeover button on the middle of the box.

While on the OCU (as a very green 20yr old Plt Off) we were about to get airborne from Thorney to carry out an NDB letdown at Tangmere. If I performed OK the nav instructor would get out back at Thorney and I would be solo.

I tuned the TG NDB ( 401 IIRC) , idented the beacon and off we went. This involved flying the standard departure toward Selsey Bill and then turning left to the TG Hold. There was a strong NW wind and I didn't twig we were flying about 15degrees further left than was expected. WE had been in cloud since passing through about 1000'. While in the descent on the inbound leg of the procedure Thorney ATC suddenly yelled what is your position? We have an unknown contact on your heading just E of the Thorney NDB. ( This was on the Southdowns and in line with 19 at Thorney). We of course immediately climbed to safety altitude, I received a thump in the head from the instructor, I relistened to the ADF and it was coding TI - the Thorney NDB.

It was established that the co-pilot had selected the TI after take-off, without telling anyone he pressed the takeover button.

We went back to base and filled in a report and were complimented by higher authority for our honesty. This young man learnt a lot about that:-1. From then on I insisted that only I would operate the ADF, and
2. Whatever letdown we were doing,I had the aural button selected and listened to the ident, even for an ILS, until we had safely landed. Something I knew no other nav, to my knowledge, did.

A year or so later on 48 we flew from Changi to Hong Kong, tasked for a turnround that involved picking up a load of troops, and then straight back to Changi. Having dip' clearance for S Vietnam we would fly the airways in both directions, feeling smug that we were miles above the war going on below

On the way up we experienced problems with the pressurisation system, which meant unless it was fixed at HK we would have to return not above 10,000', because of our pax. The captain insisted we would not stop at HK, ok I said I'll redraw the route to avoid the mainland. No, he said, we'll go back down the airway at FL100. We can't do that I said, one, that level is below the RAF Safety Altitude and two, pointing at the RAF en-route chart, it quite clearly states flying at less than 7,000' above ground level is not advised due to the risk of ground fire.

He insisted that we would fly as he proposed, the co-pilot kept out of the argument and I was in a dilemma.So off we went. 2 or 3 years later, with much more experience and even better, the benefit of Flt Lt rank, I would have said you're going without me, and found someone senior at Kai Tak to report the situation to.

This particular captain was an exWW2 bomber pilot, a complete loose cannon ( I have several other stories to back this assertion) and regarded me as a coward because we had once argued about the Vietnam War, which he supported and I said was a complete waste of American lives.

To think he later became a Training Captain with Malaysian!

[woptb]

Ideally the 'planks' should be filtered out during selection. A big part of selection in my present organisation (after initial hoop jumping), is the 'beer test', would you of your own volition want to socialise with this person. A bit rough & ready but it works, good bloke can mean different things, but generally someone you’re comfortable with.
Feeling comfortable communicating a concern is the nub, ether via choice expletives or more formal phraseology. Fostering a comfortable environment is a difficult trick, there can be no martinets. With those who choose an autocratic approach, education is the first avenue. If education does fail, then a more draconian approach is warranted. Would you want to fly with someone you consider reckless?
There should be no relearning of the wheel, whilst difficult to teach, experiences can be shared, documented & added to the ‘book’. There should never be an excuse for this loss of corporate knowledge; hopefully this is an area that the DAEMS should assist with.

[ShyTorque]

I spent two tours as a staff QHI on 240 OCU (with time off in between for good behaviour). The Puma can bite the careless or over confident very hard but as I said before, her bad habits have always been well documented.

Many of the pilots who did seem to have trouble adjusting to the Puma were ex-first tourist, NI Wessex.

They were used to a tailwheel aircraft which could be stood on its tail and stopped quickly when asked. The Wessex also had excellent engine response, and was far more capable when OEI. It was also relatively docile in a handling sense and considerably slower than the Puma. Not only that, the NI theatre, once learned, was flown largely on local knowledge and pilots became less adept at pure navigation, without realising it.

Also, having done a three year operational tour (albeit their first and only, some of it as co-pilot), some of them were slightly, how shall we put it... "cocky" with it. Nuff said, it could be a steep learning curve for some. ;)

Tiger mate, We've flown together, I was on the staff when Fred went through (but I'm not GC!).

[Shell Management]

In the civvy world the BMI Kegworth accident is generally held to be the moment moderm CRM was embraced as a credible concept which can "catch" errors in an error chain.

No it was the United accident in Portland, Orregon,

[charlies angel]

:ugh:This discussion is UK/RAF oriented.
However have changed the post to read "British"

[Tiger_mate]

Tiger mate, We've flown together, I was on the staff when Fred went through (but I'm not GC!).

We have; & I know who you are :ok:

17 Nov 86 XW212 1:35 LL Nav with the dark menace as mentor.
Again the following day for some dry winching in XW200.

[ShyTorque]

T_M, I can confirm who the student pilot was (name beginning with M G) but I didn't have enough room in my logbook on those four man OCU syllabus sorties to record the student crewmen - sorry! :sad:

However, a P.M. from your good self, with another clue, would be very welcome! :ok:

[Big Pistons Forever]

There is and always will be a difference between Military and Civilian flying. What is "reckless behavior" in peace time will sometimes be the difference between life and death for those your aircraft is supporting, in war time.

This inherent conflict will always exist. There was a very cogent point made in an earlier thread about how if everyone was asked to write a confidential list of "dangerous pilots" the same names would keep coming up. I don't think that will ever change in a military culture.

The B52 airshow crash was a huge deal for the USAF with all the Generals saying the "culture that contributed to this accident will never be allowed to develop again"; yet 10 years later a C17 crashed in Alaska and all the same factors applied. The AC was a known risk taker, the aircraft was deliberately flown well outside its envelope some crew members were concerned but did not speak up etc etc.

I think at the end of the day this is not something the "Brass" can fix. It is up to the guy/gal sitting in the aircraft to speak up. Easier said then done I know, but for every tragedy like this one there are many that have been averted when in the excitement of the moment you have let your ego over rule good judgement, but somebody has spoken up before a potential tragedy happened.

On one day I will never forget, my career and maybe the lives of everyone I was responsible for was once quite likely saved by a very junior crew member blurting out "Sir, what are you doing ? "........

[glojo]

Hi Big Piston,
You raise some very good points and if I may play devil's advocate I would like to ask a few questions and PLEASE note I TOTALLY agree with both yourself and other experts that have made exactly the same very valid points:

There is and always will be a difference between Military and Civilian flying. What is "reckless behavior" in peace time will sometimes be the difference between life and death for those your aircraft is supporting, in war time I totally agree about the 'difference between life and death' but are we expected to accept that these pilots pull this type of flying 'out of a hat', or is it a skill they have developed during their peacetime flying?

Let me cite an example that is way out of centre field.

In flight refuelling
Would we expect a new pilot to successfully and confidently engage with a basket 'fluttering' all over the sky, or will it take practice? Will the pilot practice this 'dark art' :) (quote from a certain journal) and gradually improve until it becomes second nature? Likewise with the exploits we are both discussing, they are skills that need developing. Hopefully you can understand my thoughts and where I am coming from?

This inherent conflict will always exist. There was a very cogent point made in an earlier thread about how if everyone was asked to write a confidential list of "dangerous pilots" the same names would keep coming up. I don't think that will ever change in a military culture. Another excellent point but... In a time of hostilities let us imagine a pilot is required to perform a mission that is high risk, and requires extremely low flying; who would we want to fly that mission? Mr Plod who has never contravened any regulations in their lives, never flown lower than the allowed minimum height and has always cancelled a mission the instant any type of malfunction is suspected? Or would you look at the little list we have of pilots that have annoyed your local residents with their mischievous low flying escapades?

I accept we would not want a glory grabbing idiot that only sees medals in front of their eyes. Please accept that in NO WAY am I defending the conduct of the individual that is being discussed.

I am of an age where we had individuals who were deemed as 'characters'... You might not want this type of person to go out with your daughter but when the chips were down, they would be the type of person we would look to.

I have a saying, 'When the going gets rough, the rough get going!'

Having read all these posts I fear that some folks are perhaps demanding, or at the very least expecting a flight deck to be a democracy where a newly qualified, inexperienced pilot can criticise the flying of someone who may be an extremely qualified person. Judging if flying is 'dangerous' is not perhaps as black and white as we all may like to think...... Aircraft flying low over the desert that fly quite literally within a few feet of the ground!

Aircraft flying so low over the sea it is ripping up spray.... Neither example uncommon but both are within 'inches' of needing more than 'T cut' to carry out the repairs.

Train hard, fight easy..

As an aside what type of reaction would there have been from someone like Guy Gibson if his co-pilot were to criticise his flying during a TRAINING exercise? Words similar to..... ''There's the door, get out and leave your parachute on the seat!" come to mind!

I would hate to think we are trying to get rid of the characters that I so loved and admired.

I guess I am taking this stance simply because of this much quoted, 'There but for the grace of God' m'larky although this thread is about someone who went a step too far.

[Courtney Mil]

Joglo,

What an interesting an refreshing take on the issue. I thought you said you couldn't write!?!? Your words formed another thought in my head, which I know some will see as me stating the bleedin' obvious again. If we need people in war that are characters in peacetime (BTW, I resemble that remark!), does it mean that our peacetime training rules are too restrictive? At best, the flyers in GW1 and GW2 had done OLF, but that was nothing like the altitudes flown over the desert, as you say.

So, yes, what you say is right and also points up the quandary of training rules. As you say, we should train as we intend to fight.

[jayteeto]

There are characters and there are idiots. I would choose a person who is brave, loyal and not a risk taking thrill seeking idiot

[Courtney Mil]

Oh. Maybe I was a brave, loyal idiot then.

[jayteeto]

Don,t go there. A character is a character. I mean idiots

[Courtney Mil]

Sorry. I agree, of course.

[glojo]

There are characters and there are idiots. I would choose a person who is brave, loyal and not a risk taking thrill seeking idiot

I think you might be taking my post too literally and hopefully those that want to will see where I am coming from. I personally would back the 'brave loyal, and possibly risk taker???? to the enth degree. I would not tolerate having an idiot anywhere near me. I have highlighted 'risk taker' because the minute we play our games we are surely always going to be taking a calculated risk... It is all about judgement which I guess is very much a personal or individual quality. The 'idiot' is the fool that is incapable of correct risk analysis. More about this later.

My thoughts here are that the training appears to be more than adequate but clearly only a fool will think the system is perfect. Hopefully we will always have individuals that are prepared to go that extra mile, but to try to raise the bar of our training may well be asking too much of the average recruit. Again PLEASE do not read into this what is not there.... by 'average' I mean just that.

I am never and will NEVER condone the conduct of an idiot hence in every post (or most posts) I have always made it clear I am not condoning the actions of the pilot...

I am tempted to nail my colours to the mast and maybe stand by this co-pilot... He has paid an awful price for POSSIBLY being in the wrong place at the wrong time????? I say possibly because of that CVR....

Training should nurture the student, training should be all about developing skills that will stand pilots in good stead for a career that others can only dream of. It should not however be reckless or encourage risk taking ....

Other side of the coin...

It is a pitch black night in hurricane force winds... The wind is a blowing and the seas are high. we are on a small frigate close to the Artic circle, the decks are covered in ice and the commanding officer has requested the helicopter be launched for an urgent flight...

The ship is rolling well in excess of thirty degrees and going up and down faster than an express lift, the flight commander takes one look at the conditions and correctly decides his wasp will be staying in the hanger. It should be noted that prior to launching and when being recovered handlers need to both release and attach four canvas strops to the aircraft which prevent this aprocrita from sliding off the deck. Operating on an icy deck is not for the faint hearted especially in the conditions described.

The flight commander was summoned to the bridge where he had to justify the reasons for the refusal which he duly did. The C\O then sent a signal to the Squadron leader (Senior officer in command of the group) stating they were unable to launch the aircraft because of the prevailing conditions...

To cut a long story short, the helicopter from the senior frigate was launched and carried out the required flight, same type of ship, same type of aircraft, same conditions.

I am NOT criticising EITHER pilot, but lives depended on that flight, but I also accept lives were also put at risk... It is all about risk assessment and to me both pilots made exceedingly brave calls. When we sign up to wear the Queen's uniform then are we not signing up to a life where taking calculated risks is all part of our daily activities?

I have 'wittered' on here solely to highlight 'risk' assessment. Each pilot knew when to say no and each pilot's stance was respected.

Respect to ALL our brave service personnel

[Courtney Mil]

Glojo,

Your argument is well thought-through. I notice it is also carefully worded - becoming a vital precaution around here at the moment! I think the point that I take most from that is your concept of calculated risk. And, in my opinion, stepping outside the rules does not always incur risk. Indeed, I have seen situations where sticking too rigidly to them has created greater risk than occasional excursions.

I'll deny this in court, obviously, but there may have been the odd occasion when I transgressed the letter (and maybe the spirit) of the law as written in the holy book of GASOs, but it was always done with careful thought and the agreement of my back seater. Maybe that eroded the margin for error and clearly cannot condone what may have done, but I stand by my decisions and am still here to tell the tale after thousands of flying hours.

As for idiots. Well, how can anyone argue with your reasoning? And, Jayteeto, I do agree with the point you made about the difference.

Courtney

[Mach Two]

I don't share the insight that many have into the particular accident in question that many of you here clearly have, but I am interested in the discussions around discipline and ability.

It was many years ago that we had to start (re?)introducing categories of combat readiness for the reasons glojo eludes to. Basic combat ready status was achievable by most of the new guys we were getting from the OCU and they were perfectly adequate and safe in the roles that entailed. But, these more "average" aircrew were nowhere near ready for the more advanced stuff. I would even say that some were, in jayteeto's words, idiots, most dangerous because they failed to recognise their own limitations while the characters around me were pushing outside of the envelope in relative safety.

Thanks for an interesting discussion here. I hope I haven't dragged us too far off thread and that I cannot offer even an opinion about the real subject here. I simply do not know enough about it.

[cazatou]

Jayteeto

I know exactly what you mean!

When I was instructing at the School of Refresher Flying at Manby (later the Refresher Flying Squadron at Leeming) we had one QFI who attracted a lot of criticism from his Students for unbriefed (and unauthorised) manoeuvres and ultra Low Level Flying.

He eventually killed himself some years later whilst attempting to fly visually at low level in IMC.

[glojo]

I am not the fastest of writers and I note the last post by Jayeeto :ok:

I guess the termology 'character' is one I should have used.;)

Jolly John from sunny Torquay

[BEagle]

Interesting views, Courtney!

Back in 1977-ish when I was flying HM's Tin Triangles, the Rules were so constipatingly repressive that they were frequently ignored. But the views of the Group Flight Safety guys were that what was going on was actually safer and more productive than the stupid rules themselves! For example, co-pilots weren't allowed to land the Vulcan unless they were with their 'constituted' captain. Many did so though - and gained greater experience and skills as a result.

But this led to a culture of ignoring the rules completely. The crew I flew with was quite comfortable at 80ft a.g.l. over the North Sea hiding from fighters, or manoeuvring aggressively at low level - none of which was allowed by the rules. Eventually, after 'saying goodbyeee' to RAF Honington's Open Day rather low and rather fast, we had a crew change. Not for the low pass (which had been approved by their OC Ops Wg, although he probably didn't realise it...:E), but because the captain had failed to heed a temporary restriction in the F700 - which he hadn't told the crew about....:= The next crew (incidentally, the AEO was the mustachioed Scotsman on your Henlow course - small world!) stuck to the rules more, but lacked the 'operational' urgency of the former.

There's a balance to be struck - OLF pre-GW1 was essential for the Tornado mates, but illicit low-flying by a ham-fisted VC10K crew certainly wasn't. I've no idea what happens today as the RAF has few aeroplanes left - and with so much operational flying going on for real, there's probably less likelihood of 'peacetime cowboys'?

By the way - that's a cracking website of yours!

Edit - Caz, as we've noted before, more than one SORF QFI had his own unorthodox views on low flying.....

[Courtney Mil]

Thanks very much , BEags. What you say is absolutely correct. Except the bit about "hiding from the fighters". Oh, you think so, do you? ;)

That is the problem with poorly written rules, rather than characters stepping outside them. Especially when the powers stop enforcing them because they know they are not fit for purpose rather than rewriting them. History repeated itself a number of times there!

Courtney

[BEagle]

Well, Courtney, hiding from Lightnings was relatively easy. But when it came to the F-4, we simply didn't know what we were doing. For example, we had no idea of the capability of the AWG12 / AIM7 weapon system. A lot of our so-called tactics might have worked against an Atoll-equipped MiG-17 or a Hunter, but would have been useless against a PD-equipped jet. We thought if we heard the PD lock 'break' on the RWR that we were safe - PD search attacks came as quite a surprise to me in later years. It was only when I had my brief spell on the F-4 that I realised how abysmal had been the general level of our tactical knowledge when flying the Vulcan. We might have known how long the snatch cords for the all-electric bucket of sunshine were, or the threat range of the Fiddler / Ash system, but as pilots we hadn't a clue about the black arts practised by our lower-deck navigation team, let alone the off-boresight capability of the AIM9G or Atoll!

Some old, familiar faces on that excellent website of yours!

I don't know about your experience, but I generally found that the worst rule breakers were 'frustrated fighter pilots' who'd never had the benefit of 4FTS or TWU training. One such (ex Victor) cowboy arrived at Chivenor one (unusually) dank day in Autumn 1980 in his Finningley JP5 with rather a quiet navigator. He then boasted about having flown across at low level. We had flown a few ACM trips, but the weather was pants for LL. "Don't they teach you lot to fly in this?", he bragged. One of our holding navs (later to become an F3 boss) found out from the nav student that the sight of sheep going past at eye-level during one of the letterboxing events of the trip down had scared him fartless......

[Courtney Mil]

PD was what made the F4 so special in its day, although it's probably safe to say now that the old AIM7 was quite the death ray that many assumed it to be. The stats from Vietnam really weren't that great. All that said, I was very surprised the first time I did affil against a big aircraft. With careful crew coordination, triangles and Hercs could make it very hard for us to get a shot away, epsecially with the rear-hemisphere 9G.

Oops, the thread police will be coming!

[Fareastdriver]

But when it came to the F-4, we simply didn't know what we were doing.
As a brand new offshore helicopter pilot flying an AS330J in 1978; my licence had been issued on the basis of the 2,000hrs I had got on the AS330C (RAF Puma). I was flying, at night, between the 37/4 and the 36/22 enroute from the Ekofisk field to Teeside when I was advised by a radar service that I was being intercepted by Air Defence aircraft. In front of me on my weather radar were the returns of innumerable trawlers, (this was in the days when we had a fishing fleet), so I dived down to 100,ft radalt and circled until the threat had departed.
I did that three times in that month.

I fear that some folks are perhaps demanding, or at the very least expecting a flight deck to be a democracy where a newly qualified, inexperienced pilot can criticise the flying of someone who may be an extremely qualified person.

That really sums up the whole point of this thread.

[Courtney Mil]

If your tactic worked, they must have been Lightnings, then. Mind you, if you were getting near Teeside, they must have tanked to get there. ;)

[Fareastdriver]

Naw, they must have been Tombs; the Lightnings had all crashed.

[BEagle]

But when it came to the F-4, we simply didn't know what we were doing.

Although I thought it would have been blindingly obvious, what I actually meant was 'when it came to defending ourselves against the F-4, we simply didn't know what we were doing.'

There were indeed target misidents though. As the Yuk-air F-27 crews inbound to Narr'ch via the Bravo / Charlie Juliets would no doubt attest. Or the C-130 / HH-53 AAR formation Bluntishead once vectored us onto during some 2v2...... The odd airliner was tapped during Coffee Charlies - but probably never knew!

Back to the topic of rules, low level visidents against lights out targets at night (phase 3 VIDs) required very specific rules. Probably some of the most tricky (and sphincter-puckering) intercept work we did, but statistically quite safe. No-one would have dreamt of ignoring the rules for phase 3 VIDs, for to have done so would probably have caused a mid-air.

[Courtney Mil]

Phase 3 VIDs were indeed a challenge. Two reasons not to break the rules:

1. If you didn't follow the sequence, including the stabilize/break-lock/relock, you could smack into the target.

2. They were all filmed on the KD41.

The Lightnings actually had it worse because with no PD they had to fly below their lights out, low level, night time target, flying the jet and looking into their B Scope. Good job the old Soviets had a copy of the (then) 11 Gp ASOs so that they knew not to evade!

Courtney

[BEagle]

Courtney, old horseman, I presume you mean the initial intercept caused the Lightnings more grief without PD? Shirley even the most god-like MCS fightergator wouldn't have used stern PD for phase 3 VIDs....???

Most times we just widened from battle, then in-place 90 port and clear close for VID in the heart of the envelope. Repeat as oft as ye shall have need, then home for tea and medals. But there was the odd (very) keenie who expected each run to include a full PI, terminating in a VID. One such was the infamous 'Thrombo' (aka 'AWF' - Avocado With Feet) who you might have encountered in the early days at Stanley? He gave my long-suffering nav and I one Ph3 VID at about 450 KIAS and 1000ft, the next at FL lots and stupidly low IAS....:mad:

[Courtney Mil]

Correct. My bad (I hate that expression). Unless you wanted a really fast VID (not for me at night, even lights on) the Vc would have lost the target in the MBC notch (edited because of stupidity error) - NO, F0 NOTCH. So the WIWOLs had to run their intercept from low enough to be able to separate their target return from the surface reteurns (not necessarily from below). But being below the target in the stern meant that didn't have to spend so much time worrying about scanner elevation to break it out from the waves.

But didn't we do PD search sterns? And didn't the navs love man track 1 and 2? If I ver got grief for my tanking/landings/doggers (which would have totally unjustified, obviously) I would always offer the opportunity to prove their worth in that tricky little activity.

What was this thread about again? Sorry everyone.

Courtney

[Wwyvern]

BEagle,

Check your PMs

[jayteeto]

Back on thread, I find it difficult to blame the Nav here. Ok, he had a responsibility to speak up, but as a new boy (LCR?) he may not have had the experience to know what to do. Ultimately the captain is where the buck stops. Whatever encouragement he is offered, he must be the one to say no. That is why he is made a CR Captain for gods sake!

[Mach Two]

Jay,

You are right in theory and, in an ideal world, practically. You are, more than likely, right in this case - I don't know enough about it to comment. But I would say that this is not always the case when it comes to the crunch. There are times when the captain isn't always given the last say - or, prhaps, doesn't feel like he/she has the last say. Examples might be a young fg off pilot with his flight commander in the back seat. The heady days of the mighty Nimrod where the captaincy sat otherwhere than the front left seat. Make up more of your own scenarios.

I don't think I can fault your logic in this case (from what I've read here), but what I'm saying is that it isn't always that simple. And I'm not even daring to takle "cross-cockpit gradient".

M2 signing off.

[BEagle]

The heady days of the mighty Nimrod where the captaincy sat otherwhere than the front left seat.

A weird coastal aberration. No doubt the fisher-folk will be along shortly to justify their alien concept.

A colleague once described a trip they'd flown back to Kinloss in rotten weather after several hours of eating and throwing sonobuoys out of the beast. They'd had a fleeting glimpse of the lights as they went around from the first approach, so then had another stab. This time they saw absolutely nothing, so went around for a second time. Up spoke some coffee-sipping wireless operator from the back, the so-called 'captain', who asked "Couldn't you go a bit lower next time?".....

A flurry of straps and fury from the left hand seat was then followed by a comment of "The seat's all yours then, Captain!"....:uhoh:

Needless to say, they diverted!

[jayteeto]

Quite correct of course, I meant the aircraft captain (pilot), not the mission captain or whatever the terminology is. :ok:

[Tankertrashnav]

I remember as a brand new navigator doing a low level course on JPs we were transiting to a low level area (remember them?) and pointing out to my pilot that he had descended below safety altitude in IMC. The situation was not remotely as dangerous as the events which are being discussed in this thread. The pilot, a very experienced and respected QFI immediately thanked me for pointing out his error and climbed back above safety altitude. Not everyone in his position would have taken kindly to being corrected by a sprog navigator, but its the difference between a professional pilot and a cowboy in my book.

[charliegolf]

There's a lot of tortuous scenario-spinning going into this thread! Would the sentence be the same if the co had said, on tape, "ok mate, tht's too much. Let's calm it down eh."

On the kipper front: I was told by a flt eng on nimrods, and have no reason to disbelieve him, that he once called PNR, or PLE or somesuch off intercom. A few minutes later he tried again. The third time, he went on intercom (and cvr) and called it pointedly, "PLE plus ten, captain". Skipper narked, eng still alive.

So might Pte Tait be eh?

CG

[Airborne Aircrew]

but its the difference between a professional pilot and a cowboy in my book.

... and probably the reason he was a QFI...:ok:

[woptb]

'Rules is rules’, is counterproductive. If rules aren’t fit for purpose there must be a means to effect change. As someone already commented, bad rules breed rule breakers.
Inherently if a procedure is fit for purpose & you don't follow it, you’re increasing risk. There are very obvious risks in training & operational flying; although I doubt you'd be carpeted for overstressing an airframe, whilst avoiding something nasty approaching you at high speed!
If the raw material was well selected, the training appropriate & people are still behaving like dicks; you must look to the culture. Some hard calls need to be made. Military maintainers have had their epiphany & are making great strides in embedding an open reporting culture & a fair & just culture to allow this to function.
Unfortunately civil law is nether fair or just. If you have an organisational culture in which people can speak out & concerns are listened to (& very importantly are addressed professionally), fewer people may find themselves in the Puma crew member’s terrible situation.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Train hard, fight easy..

As an aside what type of reaction would there have been from someone like Guy Gibson if his co-pilot were to criticise his flying during a TRAINING exercise? Words similar to..... ''There's the door, get out and leave your parachute on the seat!" come to mind!

I would hate to think we are trying to get rid of the characters that I so loved and admired.


I think care needs to be made when looking at WW2 practices. Since more pilots were killed in training crashes then in combat I am not sure there is a lot to be learned when compared to todays aircrew training challenges.

I think a more relevant example is air ops during the Falklands war. There were many examples where quite appalling risks were taken in order to get the job done. The difference between those risks and what the Puma crew did was Operational Necessity. From my reading (I was not there) the crews in general knew very well the increased risks they were taking and made a conscious choice to accept them. None of that applied to the situation the Puma crew was in.

I think it also points to the well documented fact that the vast majority who serve are not inherently reckless, yet will step up to the plate when it matters on real world ops, including taking risks that would be unacceptable in a peacetime training scenario.

[Spot 4]

The significant difference between your Falklands scenario and the peacetime Rodeo is forethought.

The Falklands tasking that you mention would have been pre meditated and calculated. Most are confident that MSD & MSC can be reduced when the option is to wear a SAM up your chuff.

The Rodeo antics is/was/will be spontaneous. Human nature, especially when applied to the type of people we recruit (Failed Aviator DVD) pretty much mandates that when we 'get away with it' we push a little further next time. The buffers usually come from when you scare yourself or in this case kill yourself. I am quite sure the Wright brothers were exactly the same.

No excuses offered; simply my take on an explanation. FWIW I believe that in a three man crew, the LHS is 33% responsible, the Crewman likewise, and the Captain 34% unless protests are made at which point individual responsibilty is handed over to the Captain.

Puma in Portugal off on a sight seeing tour with insufficient fuel. (2 man crew) The Nav/Crewman had protested, even leaned on the collective, before transmitting to the world on HF that when the aircraft eventually crashes, he was having nothing to do with it. The aircraft did crash (albeit an impressive engine off onto a parade square) and the Nav was true to his word in the BoI afterwards. I believe the Captain now sells insurance.

[teeteringhead]

And (allegedly!) Spot 4, said Nav very nearly attacked the pilot with the fire axe after the EOL .......

[Fareastdriver]

Sitting there watching somebody do a Zero Zero EOL with a Puma into a parade square was probably the last straw.

[charliegolf]

TH

What was the damage to the cab?

I'm reminded of the ocu film reel of (?) Paul Meyer doing pfls to the runway at idle power. Is that film on line?

CG

[ShyTorque]

CG, Paul Meyer....do you mean Martin?

It's probably twenty years or so since I saw it, but the later film (plastic blader trials at Boscombe Down) also showed the tail stinger touching the ground, iirc. And doing the usual thing to the tail rotor...

I don't know the full story but recall that the "Portugal incident" Puma was being taken back home for repair when someone fire-bombed it.

[Airborne Aircrew]

Shy:

I was on 33 when this occurred... The EOL was good but not good enough. The tail boom broke at the point where it joins the fuselage. I saw a photo of it on the parade square once... I don't believe the tail rotor contacted the ground because, IIRC, the boom landed on the "hockey stick" and remained upright.

For the record I flew with that pilot often, (I think I came through Shawbury with him too but I'd have to check my logbook for that). I always found him to be a deliberate, reserved captain who always remained well within the auth. I still cannot fathom this aberration on his part. It struck me back then and I still believe it to have been utterly out of character.

I knew the Nav/Crewman quite well too, (spent a tour in Belize with him too). He was of equal rank to the captain and was also many years older. He was generally not particularly excitable... His actions that day do not surprise me though... :ok:

[glojo]

Good afternoon Big Pistons,:ok:
I fear you are taking me far too literally and no matter what we say, our words can be dissected and given a completely different meaning. There have been examples on this thread of idiotic flying that have quite correctly been criticised, no defending the guilty and certainly no votes for their crass behaviour.

I think it also points to the well documented fact that the vast majority who serve are not inherently reckless, yet will step up to the plate when it matters on real world ops, including taking risks that would be unacceptable in a peacetime training scenario. How will this pilot know they can do what is being demanded of them? It is way outside of any situation they have experienced?

Thinks back to Aden when asking for support one service says 'No' conditions too dangerous and yet within the hour a different service save the day!

100% agree with your reckless comment

Reckless: utterly unconcerned about the consequences of some action; without caution

I have ALWAYS made it abundantly clear I would NEVER condone stupidity or 'idiotic' flying but.... I stand by all my statements, if you have a pilot that has never contravened a single regulation in their life and in an extremely stressful, life or death environment, you then ask this person to do a type of flying they have never done before, never experienced before, and perhaps strongly objected to, then may I respectfully suggest they just might be way, way outside their comfort zone?

I have also tried suggesting that what one person defines as dangerous another would be perfectly happy with, and again I will stand by that.

To legislate where every single pilot has an equal ability and dismiss those that cross a line, is possibly wrong.

Who here has volunteered for a position\squadron. and been turned down or failed because their flying does not reach the required level for that specific duty?

I think care needs to be made when looking at WW2 practices. Since more pilots were killed in training crashes then in combat I am not sure there is a lot to be learned when compared to todays aircrew training challenges.Not sure of your point here as we can never compare their training or with that of the 21st century.... 'There's your Spitfire son, jump in and take it away'... No two seater training in that type, no modern simulator just get up there and fly. Those magnificent men deserve the UTMOST of respect and I would NEVER, EVER criticise or compare their war time training conditions to those we have now. I would however like to think that we will always have characters that have a certain type of je ne sais quoi :O:uhoh:

My own very personal opinion regarding training.........

It should ALWAYS be evolving.

There should always be continuation training for operational\experienced pilots and every situation experienced in combat should be considered to see if it is suitable for inclusion during this advanced training.

Hopefully this is where we are and there is this type of ongoing training which should take place regularly through an operational pilot's career.

BUT this training MUST always be evolving. Has history shown that we sadly tend to train for the last war and not the next!! We should be stretching our experienced personnel and never, ever believe we have a given right to be the best! Young pilots fresh from combat MUST be listened to, their thoughts, their observations treated with the respect they deserve.

After listening to these valuable of inputs the officer in of training should consider if training programs need to be adjusted, modified or improved.

Train hard, fight easy.

Just like most of us I come from an environment where we had ongoing refresher training and this training was hopefully as close to the real thing as possible, could this type of refresher training help wheedle out the reckless, the idiot, the dangerous?

The most competent will still shine, will still out perform us mere mortals, but they will not perform outside their comfort zone, nor will they ever be reckless.

Instructors that raise flags about the performance of their pupils during continuation training have to be listened to and their recommendations respected.

Who here has applied to join a specialist department\squadron that required a different style of flying? A department that may require you to learn new skills where in the first stages the palms of the hands are swimming in a sea of sweat, your suits soak up the copious amounts of body fluid as you try to master skills that are completely alien??.... As the hours of tuition go by the things that at first appeared impossible, start to become second nature; but for some this transition just does not happen. They are competent pilots, they are highly skilled, highly motivated pilots but that step into an area of expertise is a step too far. My point being that the only way they know it was a step too far was when they volunteered for the course, plus their is no one standard fits all.

This might well apply to the pilot asked to perform something in combat they have never attempted in training and yes a thousand times yes that may well still arise for even the most experienced pilot, but at least they will have experiences beyond Mr Plod who is going to be in pastures new.

The commanding officer of the Blue Angels was clearly a highly experienced, dedicated officer but was he trying to go that one step beyond his ability?

This is his words, they are not from a different era, but are from the here and now:

"With deep personal regret … I will be voluntarily leaving the greatest flight demonstration team. I performed a maneuver that had an unacceptably low minimum altitude. This maneuver, combined with other instances of not meeting the airborne standard that makes the Blue Angels the exceptional organization that it is, led to my decision to step down."

PLEASE, please a thousand times please, please do NOT think I am being critical of this officer but thank God there were no casualties as a result of what this man had done. He clearly thought he was good enough for the role he volunteered for and more to the point his log book justified consideration for the appointment.

Final and hopefully last point... As a freshly qualified pilot who here has been in awe of their more senior colleagues and perhaps muttered, 'I could NEVER do that!'

Are we expecting these young officers to criticise pilots for making them feel uncomfortable?

It is such a fine line to walk and I FULLY accept reckless will always be reckless but I say again one person's view on danger is another person's view of 'occupational hazard'


Whewww More beer

Apologies for my Tolstoy type posts and if they are getting OTT then please feel free to speak up.

What we MUST ALL remember is we have highly skilled, highly motivated pilots and sadly this time it was the turn of the RAF to come under the spotlight.... Next time it may well be another service.

Respect to all our highly professional service personnel no matter the colour of uniform.

Train hard and make the fight easier ;);)

[ShyTorque]

I was on 33 when this occurred... The EOL was good but not good enough. The tail boom broke at the point where it joins the fuselage. I saw a photo of it on the parade square once... I don't believe the tail rotor contacted the ground because, IIRC, the boom landed on the "hockey stick" and remained upright.

AA, My reference to CG's post and the tail strike was about the film made of the Boscombe trial EOLs. :)

Regarding the Portugal EOL, the pilot was one of my students (Gazelle, early '84) and I agree with your observations about him; I was very surprised the incident occurred in the way it did. I was told the tale first hand from JH, the Nav/crewman. He did mention the fireaxe.

[Mach Two]

glojo,

Apologies for my Tolstoy type posts and if they are getting OTT then please feel free to speak up.

I would like to speak up because I think you are utterly wrong. In fact you couldn't be more wrong. Your posts are NOT OTT and you speak a great deal of sense. You concepts of aircrew training are, to my mind, completely valid. If that's Tolstoy, I may have been misunderstanding my history.

Mach.

[Fareastdriver]

Soon after the very first trials with Zero Zero EOLS for the Puma; I believe the pilot got the AFC for it; I was shown the technique by the squadron QHI. This was on the old metal blades so I am sure, having flown both types that present day aircraft would not react in the same way so DO NOT TRY THIS AT HOME.

On the squadron we had a CAAP (Componants Accelerated Aging Program) aircarft that required 100 hrs (shock, horror) a month flying to advance the gearbox and others bits overhaul life past 800 hrs. It was fitted with two internal full overload tanks and off we went.

An early Puma would not autorate properly so there was always some input from the engines unless you were heavy; ie two overload tanks. This gave us at 80 knots about 275 Rrpm. At 80ft on the radalt the cyclic was pulled hard back and held to bleed off the speed. The aircraft actually stopped quite well and as you came to about 20ft you levelled the aircraft at about zero airspeed.

You had one pull at the lever. For the benefit of the exercise we didn't land it; just brought it into a low hover and let the engines recover. Everything would go well until just before the aircraft stopped descending. That was when the Rrpm decayed through 240; that was when the alternators tripped off; that is when one found the the autopilot was no longer keeping the aircraft straight; and that was when one discovered that the Yaw/Collective interlock had belted on full right yaw input.
To overcome these slight variables one had to apply full left pedal as the lever was raised to cancel out all the things that were going to happen. This would normally result in a fully controlled hover.

The two Turmo IIIC4s would then wake up and crank the RPM back up to normal. Torqumeters weren't fitted but experience with Pumas that did have them indicated that there was nothing astronomical.

Some people would describe this as reckless flying. I know that if I was forced to land without engines in a confined space I would have a chance of getting away with it because I had done it before.

[Brewster Buffalo]

Just a thought that someone may be able to answer.

In the Catterick accident there were automatic "low height" warnings given just as in the C-17 Alaska accident there was a stall warning given.

When these warning are sounded are they logged electronically allowing post flight analysis of why they were given? If not would it be a good idea, in terms of flight safety. for them to be recorded?

[ShyTorque]

The "Low Height" warning is triggered by the aircraft descending below the radar altimeter height, as set by the pilot. It wouldn't prove much to record it unless the bug setting was also recorded.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

Big Pistons and CG (post #114),

Hear hear - I couldn't put it better myself so I won't try!

Glojo,

I agree with much of what you say, but a couple of thoughts:


How will this pilot know they can do what is being demanded of them? It is way outside of any situation they have experienced?


They may well not know if they can do it, because the situation may be well outside what they have experienced. But that's where flexibility and skill come in! Seeing as you can't prepare for every situation that may crop up in times of war, even if you got rid of all the training rules/restrictions, the best way to win the war is to make sure your people actually get there in the first place ie don't let them come a cropper in training.


This might well apply to the pilot asked to perform something in combat they have never attempted in training and yes a thousand times yes that may well still arise for even the most experienced pilot, but at least they will have experiences beyond Mr Plod who is going to be in pastures new.


Fair enough - but I, perhaps naively, tend to regard training rules and regs as being written by people older and wiser than myself and being intended to preserve me, my colleagues and the aircraft, rather than just to spoil our fun! Therefore I don't think it's for me, as a junior scrote, to choose to ignore the rules and regs just because I think my ability might allow me to do so! Which I don't, as it happens...maybe I am in fact your Mr Plod, but at least I and those who put their lives in my hands when airborne are more likely to survive the sortie than if I award myself Lord Flasheart status and kill us all by wazzing around outside the rules "because we might have to do this on ops" (or just because I think it's fun).


To legislate where every single pilot has an equal ability and dismiss those that cross a line, is possibly wrong.


With respect, this is too much of a generalisation: there would need to be analysis of why a pilot crossed the line into indisciplined/illegal flying. If it was through lack of skill and/or awareness, then give them guidance and extra training if appropriate, but if it was done for the sole reason of showing off and thrill-seeking then I would say that yes, they need to be dismissed. This may seem unpalatable to many, but the alternative is more tragic episodes like the one we're discussing.


Are we expecting these young officers to criticise pilots for making them feel uncomfortable?


Bluntly, yes - but in the interests of good CRM, one would start (unless in immediate danger) by 'gently raising one's concerns', and 'criticising' would only come later if one's concerns had been ignored. In this case, both pilots were of similar age and the same rank anyway, which somewhat negates - in this instance - your point about an awestruck FNG being afraid to say anything to a supposedly godlike senior colleague.

Do I have any bright ideas which will guarantee that more lives aren't lost in the same way in future? Sadly not. But the only thing worse than what has happened would be if something similar happens again in a few years, in the same way that the USAF are currently experiencing...one obvious way to help guard against a repetition is to use this example to highlight the importance of any crewmember (regardless of rank/trade/hours) raising their concerns if a pilot/the pilot appears to be taking unnecessary risks.

[Airborne Aircrew]

Bluntly, yes - but in the interests of good CRM, one would start (unless in immediate danger) by 'gently raising one's concerns', and 'criticising' would only come later if one's concerns had been ignored. In this case, both pilots were of similar age and the same rank anyway, which somewhat negates - in this instance - your point about an awestruck FNG being afraid to say anything to a supposedly godlike senior colleague. Just out of interest how would/could good CRM work with a highly experienced Flt. Lt. pushing a Puma to it's limits, (safely), work with a Wg. Cdr, who is really on his first flight or two in a Puma? What would happen if the gradient went the other way? Can the captain ignore the Wg. Cdr. with a "watch this" or would a scared left seat trump the experienced captain?

[charliegolf]

The Winco might not be experienced on the Puma, but he will have a good deal of experience generally, and airmanship specifically. (He or she is aircrew, or it's not CRM!) When he or she says, "Mmm, that was a bit sporting....", the Flt Lt should:

get the message, or

say, "Not at all sir, let me walk you through it".

Either exchange should satisfy flight safety and honour/pride/pecker contest etc.

[ShyTorque]

Once had my Wg Cdr Boss (Wessex/Chinook pilot, with very few Puma hours) say first thing one morning:

"ShyT, I'm out of currency but I need to go to a very urgent meeting at Shawbury. I'll authorise the flight, I'll fly it as a low level navigation exercise, but you'll have to be captain. Btw, I haven't got time to plan the flight....just draw us a route and we'll be away."

En route the weather at Shawbury went well below instrument approach limits due to the sudden onset of unforecast fog (i.e. airfield weather went RED). As did our only reachable airfield diversion, and as it turned out, also the whole central part of England. The Puma was always short of fuel, even on takeoff so we had few options and none for an IFR climb. After a quick crew discussion, I took over the navigation (map crawling on a 50,000 local area map) and we finally got there "VFR" after an interesting last few miles of flying at hovertaxy speeds. I remember saying "We've got about two hundred yards to go, when you see the tall airfield approach light poles ahead, turn 90 degrees right and follow them to the runway".

We found the runway threshold and hover taxied along the runway but we had great difficulty finding dispersal after we landed because the fog got very thick indeed. ATC didn't see us go past the tower at all but gave us a spot number to park on. We had no chance of finding it so after we found a runway turn off we just shut down on the first spot we came to. After shutdown I went outside to see which one we were on, then rang ATC from Station Ops to let them know.

We worked as a crew, no rank gradient issues at all. Even so, had the unthinkable occurred the subsequent BOI would have been quite interesting... :uhoh:

In retrospect we should have just put it down in a field, found a phone box and asked for ground assistance.

[Tiger_mate]

I suspect that many if not all SH mates read that story and recite: Been there, done that.

My own version was a 2man crew (Me + Mr French fries joiner) on a VIP sortie from HQ RAFG to Laarbruch. Whilst crawling up from the south in identical (fog) weather conditions, the other 'member of the crew' the TANS said go right: T_M said "Go left ignore the TANS", Mr French fries said "Are you sure", I said yes (he turned left) and seconds later "That'll be Laarbruch then", VIPs happy and DCO without medals.

I do not think that anyone has mentioned the hours spent 'training' monthly for such events. Which raises the question; has the 'war(s) gone on for so long that academic flying which promotes finesse, and experience in a wide scope of scenarios and external factors, been degraded to the point that crews expertise is lacking in key areas. The rest of BritMil has become too Afghan centric rather then operationally capable in all environements. Would an AMF exercise be a total disaster? Are there more (logical) accidents in waiting because of 'progress'?

[PTT]

I, perhaps naively, tend to regard training rules and regs as being written by people older and wiser than myself and being intended to preserve me, my colleagues and the aircraft, rather than just to spoil our fun!That was once the case I am sure, but now I, perhaps cynically, tend to regard a number of the training rules and regs as being written by people who are covering their a**es and would rather we spend time doing paperwork or a random time-expired currency to ensure that, should the worst happen, they are absolved of blame rather than have us actually doing some useful training to try to prevent the worst happening in the first place.

That's not to say they should be ignored, more that they serve no useful purpose for actual flight safety.

[jayteeto]

Train hard/Fight easy......... What a get out statement for cowboys. On 33 Sqn we trained hard, very hard. None of your fly at exactly 1000'/100kts rubbish either. We hit multiple targets on time, with not ABOVE heights and with multiple scenario inputs. Aircraft advanced handling was encouraged, under supervision. To throw a Puma around at low-level (in balance) required large pedal inputs and was a real potential banana skin to the unwary. We did regular max AUW sorties with weights fitted to the cabin floor and I certainly experienced engine response scenarios. I scared myself once or twice, however the QHIs TAUGHT us the limits. Supervision, remember that? I have flown around Catterick many many times with young trainee soldiers on board. They experienced some pretty advanced low level manouvering as well :ok:. What they didn't get was the cockpit scenario we experienced here. This Nav was hard done by in my opinion, however I don't agree that we need to fly like this to be good at war. The problem is that every time we have an accident like this one, more rules and regs are put in place to make things even harder.
Gratuitous wazzing is not training hard

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

written by people who are covering their a**es


PTT,

You are absolutely right that there is an increasing amount of this creeping in (flooding in, some would say!), but there is still (to me at least) plenty of fun flying - and, more importantly, good training - to be had within the rules. Because of this, I stand by my point that, from my position on the shop floor, I'm not prepared to flout the training rules & regs without very good justification.

[glojo]

Good morning Torquay of the Devil,
I think we are possibly singing from roughly the same hymn sheet on a number of those issues you have raised and it is probably down to me to be more detailed in my explanations, although there may be a few points we disagree on but that is what discussions\debates are all about.

To jayteeto
Train hard/Fight easy......... What a get out statement for cowboys

I understand your point and there must never be a 'cop out' or 'get out'. NEVER do anything we are not happy about doing (poor wording again... happy = confident)

To me advanced training or refresher training call it what you will is all about making us more proficient and possibly pushing ourselves to improve our skills. That is what I mean by 'train hard' and DEFINITELY not about being silly, stupid or even reckless.

If this advanced training (for current operational squadron pilots) is simply flying off to a foreign land to perform the same old exercises, doing exactly the same old laid down procedures in exactly the same locations then what do we achieve apart from more flight hours plus a few beers and pleasant company.... When or if we ever have to go and fight for real then who will find it easier? (not the best of words)

Please do not take my examples too literally, I am merely trying to explain myself regarding train hard fight easy...... Should I say:

Train easy, the fighting will be harder?

None of us have more than one life and there are no second chances.

Apologies if this does not make much sense as I've been awake all night and my keyboard appears to have forgotten how to spell

Take care one and all and if you are too drunk to walk home, then do NOT try to fly home!! :=;)

[Courtney Mil]

To follow on from Glojo's post, the "Train hard, fight easy" statement has nothing to do with being a get out for cowboys and what Glojo has said about it is right. I would add that what it realy means is practising the really hard stuff in demanding conditions, making the training as hard as possible. That does not, necessarily, have anything to do with operating outside the rules or what is safe.

Courtney, gamekeeper or poacher? You work it out.

Happy New Year to you all.

[cazatou]

To put this in perspective, just before I left the RAF in 1996 I asked IFS how many Aircraft Accidents (Cat 3 or above) there had been in my 31 years in the RAF.

The answer was:- 764

[PTT]

I'm not prepared to flout the training rules & regs without very good justification.Absolutely agree. I guess my gripe is more about the stance those who write the rules have taken rather than the rules themselves. The times I have questioned a rule (i.e. asked the purpose of it to see if it can/should be changed because it is, on the face of it, detrimental to our purpose) I've been met with brick walls at all levels of the chain of command.

Regarding "train hard fight easy" I've always considered sorties with people of greater experience than me to be the opportunity to push my own boundaries. At the time I was a junior mate a report wasn't generated for every sortie with a QHI/TC, and I wonder if the culture nowadays which requires writeups for just about every sortie with a QHI/TC (in order to bulk out the paper trail for the BOI :rolleyes: ) means that sorties with senior fliers are viewed as potential chop rides. This would encourage the junior mates fly well inside their limits on those sorties and only stretch themselves when flying with each other. If so, that's bass-ackwards to me.

[jayteeto]

Agreed totally, I might have been with QHIs because I was useless!!

[Courtney Mil]

The answer was 764

That's a hell of a lot, isn't it? I guess we don't know the circumstances or how many people were hurt. But it's a lot of bent hardware. I would like like to add, none was mine.

[cazatou]

Courtney

Only one was mine - a Cat 3 Birdstrike at Low Level on a Saturday morning (we were behind on the Training task). Bird was Cat 5!

[Courtney Mil]

Oh, yeah. I forgot about the birdstrikes I had in a Hawk, a Phantom (x2, one on the ground, honestly) and an F3. Again, the birds lost the bet, but I think the jets survived OK. I still duck in my car when a bird comes at me. Strange conditioning we all have. That would be an interesting thread.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

I might have been with QHIs because I was useless


Or maybe they were with you because they were the useless ones...bl00dy beefers eh, never met one I liked:E

Happy New Year to one and all, and may the banter flow freely in 2012!:)

[cazatou]

Courtney

Xmas 1979 Op Corporate

Flying our VIP Andover at "Not above 100 Feet" at 5000+ Feet AMSL (OAT +30 C) full of "VIP's" when we met a very large flock of extremely large birds who were determined to protect their "Airspace". That was a very interesting 15 minutes!!!

[Wrathmonk]

Caz

Genuine question ...

Xmas 1979 Op Corporate

Did Op Corporate mean something else prior to the 1982 fisticuffs in the South Atlantic or was it also the contingency codeword for an op to recover the FI?

[Pontius Navigator]

The times I have questioned a rule (i.e. asked the purpose of it to see if it can/should be changed because it is, on the face of it, detrimental to our purpose) I've been met with brick walls at all levels of the chain of command.

I managed to get a Flying Order rescinded. As you say, hard work. As a result of an incident the FO was issued requiring a certain course of action.

About 4 years later the FO was still in place but the law of unintended consequences was coming to fruition and the FO precaution was leading to increasingly high and increasingly costly mechanical failures.

I managed to find the signal paper trail of 4 years previous and set out the train of events. After the FO had been issued there had been NO follow up staff work to identify or quantify the potential risk of repetition. Fortunately I got on well with the appropriate staff officer at Group and he was prepared to cancel the FO.

It is however always easier to say NO than to say YES and even easier to not change the NO.

[ShyTorque]

Xmas 1979 Op Corporate

??????????????

Op Agila, maybe?

[cazatou]

ST

Yes, you are correct - I got my Ops mixed up. Too much Christmas Wine!!

[teeteringhead]

And speaking of Op AGILA .....

.... two quotes (without comment) from Flight magazine on the Puma crash of December '79 on the Kotwa Road...
The crash investigation team found that the Puma had hit a set of steel-covered telephone wires where they crossed the road at a height of 18'.
No evidence of either technical malfunction or hostile action could be found. As there were no survivors from the crew, it was not possible to determine why the Puma was flying so low.

[ShyTorque]

The Puma hit those 18' high wires with its rotor mast. The rotor mast of a Puma is approximately 16' up. We lost Archie Cook, Mike Smith and Bob Hodges.

A C130 had suffered small arms damage the previous day.

[cazatou]

ST

I remember a Sqn Ldr rushing around the Airport Terminal yelling that the "Bar Stewards" had shot down one of our aircraft!!!

[Could be the last?]

http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/9E13E050-EEC6-4DD3-8881-63DA3DE01869/0/20111201_redacted_puma_za934_si.pdf

At least it acknowledges the Op pressure the Sqn and the Puma Force was under!

[xenolith]

At least it acknowledges the Op pressure the Sqn and the Puma Force was under!

It is interesting that both this SI and the Strategic Review of the Puma Helicopter Force (available via Google) acknowledge the Op pressure that the Sqn was under and describe the lengths to which the Sqn brought the issues to the attention of JHC who apparently did nothing. It’s almost as if the top end of JHC were in some sort of denial about what the Puma Force was doing! If ever there was a reason for never, under any circumstances, transferring the SH Force to Army, this whole sorry episode would seem to be it!

[alfred_the_great]

Apart from JHC was being run by a Rear-Admiral. And frankly, I suspect that UKSF Group didn't really care if the Puma force were being 'run hot'. If the Puma Force were that concerned I've no doubt they would've gone to CAS or one of his 3*s.

[CrabInCab]

X dude: JHC, head in the sand, never!

:}

You'll be telling me that bears poop in the woods next.

To this day it does seem very odd to me that for all of the reviews, studies or BOIs / SIs that have been conducted in connection with BH incidents not one seems to have scrutinised JHC in any great depth.

[CrabInCab]

Alf. JHC was defo commanded by a Pongo 2*, Maj Gen Gary Coward at the time of these incidents; TJB just dealt with the fall out!

:=

[alfred_the_great]

My mistake. Still stands, CAS had, and continues to have, Full Command of Puma Force. If the RAF cared that much, they would have done something about it.

[ShyTorque]

As an ex Puma operator, including 2 separate tours as an OCU staff QHI, all I can say is:

WHAT a total mess is revealed by that report. Not just the tragic and wholly avoidable accident itself, but the whole sorry organisation (or lack of) of the Puma force in the period leading up to it.

I'm very glad I was well out of it some years before.

The Puma HC1 was always well known to bite the inexperienced, the unwary, the over-confident or the careless. I knew that even as a Shawbury student, prior to gaining my wings in the 1970s. It was re-inforced to me during my Puma OCU training when 33 Sqn lost an aircraft in Norway and on joining my first Sqn (230) when we lost the aircraft in Rhodesia almost before I had my own locker.

One very telling thing revealed in the report, IMHO, was that both the Puma flight commander and the boss of the OCF (his Boss) had "PVR'd" during the period leading up to this.

However, as always, the buck is seen to rest with the pilots on the day.

[Could be the last?]

Alfred,

You are showing your ignorance on a number of levels.

As already pointed out, at the time Cdr JHC was an Army 2*; therefore, you must be a new boy or not from the SH Fleet. Then you go onto say that if the Puma Force was that concerned it should have gone to the CAS or his 3*, but in a separate post you state that 'if the RAF Cared' they should have done something about it........ make your mind up. But if you were involved in any of this (which I doubt) then you would have also been aware that the higher levels of light blue didn't really give damn about what was going on, the Sqn/Stn was a bastard child that no one really wanted to pay or take responsibility for.....Fact!

Also, as has been pointed out, all of the enquiries have been outward looking from JHC, maybe they should have gone down to the QM's and signed out a mirror!!!! Moreover, were they objective in their findings..........? I suppose it depends on which side of the M4 you were reading them!!

Ultimately, feel free to read all of the reports and be aware of the facts before posting!!

:ok:

[alfred_the_great]

Mate, I use helicopters, and frankly couldn't give 2 ****s about the internal politics of JHC. The RAF has Full Command of the Puma Force, which means they have the ultimate responsibility for their actions. The CoC flows both ways, and I would presume there is an entire cell/desk/empire within the Air Staff that deals with the Puma. The fact that the RAF didn't see fit to take up the complaints of the Force, nor did the Force expose those complaints (formally, if not in-formally), shows that both have some level of fault.

To blame the 'big bad Army' for this is to sidestep the RAF's responsibility. If the RAF want to trigger a BoI/Investigation/whatever, all CAS has to do is write to HQ Land. Or, take the nuclear option and withdraw from JHC.

If the Puma Force is the bastard child no-one wants it should be disbanded immediately, and the funds placed into other SH.

[I'm Off!]

Nobody made these guys fly that way...

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

Not sure where the SI got the idea that OC Puma OCF had PVR'd and was on terminal leave, as he most definitely hadn't!