Melbourne Tailstrike final report

[Sacked by TCAS]

Download animation and report here:

Investigation: AO-2009-012 - Tailstrike and runway overrun - Airbus A340-541, A6-ERG, Melbourne Airport, Victoria, 20 March 2009 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2009/aair/ao-2009-012.aspx)

[misd-agin]

Commentary states that the lack of performance wasn't realized 'until late, if at all'. Max power wasn't applied until it was obvious they would not get airborne...

Also, I wonder if AF 447 would have occurred if the PFD's displayed the stick inputs (upper right display in automation)???

[Sqwak7700]

Also, I wonder if AF 447 would have occurred if the PFD's displayed the stick inputs (upper right display in automation)???


It would, but it would be a huge political loss to Airbus. Airbus has many good ideas and innovations, but they got the whole control feedback issue deadly wrong, and it has caused many accidents - who knows how many incidents.

The flight controls and engine controls should move - period. Many Airbus pilots will give you the old line that "you get used to it". That is not a good enough reason. You can get used to eating feces for dinner every night if you do it for long enough, that doesn't mean it is a good idea.

They can design systems to compensate, like the one you suggest about showing the stick position on the PFD, but that is just compensating for poor design. The problem with Airbus is that they are deeply committed to their current setup, it is in all of their aircraft (except the A300/310 series of course).

To go back to a control system that moves and provides feedback to the pilots would be a huge loss of face to Airbus and I doubt they would do it. But it is the only way forward to avoid further loss of life.

[ReverseFlight]

Aside from the FMGS inputs they got wrong that day, I think a vigilant captain might have seen the end of runway markers coming up and just applied TOGA before rotation. That might, and I emphasise might, have avoided the tailstrike.

From the animation, TOGA was applied too late. After several attempts at stick back for rotation, actual rotation commenced about 600m from the end of the runway. TOGA was not applied until about 160m from the end of the runway, well into the course of rotation, and immediately after the instant of the initial tailstrike contact.

[WilyB]

but they got the whole control feedback issue deadly wrong, and it has caused many accidents - who knows how many incidents.

Care to back that up with some numbers?

[A-3TWENTY]

Quote:
Also, I wonder if AF 447 would have occurred if the PFD's displayed the stick inputs (upper right display in automation)???
It would, but it would be a huge political loss to Airbus. Airbus has many good ideas and innovations, but they got the whole control feedback issue deadly wrong, and it has caused many accidents - who knows how many incidents.

The flight controls and engine controls should move - period. Many Airbus pilots will give you the old line that "you get used to it". That is not a good enough reason. You can get used to eating feces for dinner every night if you do it for long enough, that doesn't mean it is a good idea.

They can design systems to compensate, like the one you suggest about showing the stick position on the PFD, but that is just compensating for poor design. The problem with Airbus is that they are deeply committed to their current setup, it is in all of their aircraft (except the A300/310 series of course).

To go back to a control system that moves and provides feedback to the pilots would be a huge loss of face to Airbus and I doubt they would do it. But it is the only way forward to avoid further loss of life.

Fully Agree !!

[Schnowzer]

I suspect I'll get flamed for this but I still cannot understand how a crew could accept 74 Flex, a 40% reduction in thrust when confronted with a 13hr ULR flight at close to MTOW.

I am sorry I don't buy the HF speak variability of performance figures argument. Not too convinced about crossed out numbers in documentation either. I can happily subscribe to the 'there by the grace of god go I' argument but not in this case. It seems to me GIGO and no thought from the crew about what any of the numbers actually meant.

What do you guys think?

[iceman50]

Sqwak7700

What a complete rubbish!

[Sqwak7700]

Care to back that up with some numbers?


As previously mentioned AF A330, Tam A320 in Sao Paolo. And as I said, those are the ones that ended tragically. Who knows how many incidents have occurred that resulted in embarrassment or dirty shorts, but no loss of life (like this Emirates accident).

Look, don't mistake me for a Boeing nut just bashing Airbus. There are plenty of things Boeing gets wrong and there are many design features that Airbus has spot on - but this isn't one of them.

It is a poorly designed system by engineers saving a buck without thought to the human interface. Like I said before, you can train people to get used to it, but that doesn't make it good.

[fo4ever]

Schnowzer:

I understand why you don't understand. If it was easy to understand it would be an easy fix. Just sack the pilots that do things that is so obvious to you and the problem will go away. Just like EK did in this case.

You might wake up one day and find that you missed something extremely obvious to others and you might have a diff. view on HF.

Cheers

[Wizofoz]

Aside from the FMGS inputs they got wrong that day, I think a vigilant captain might have seen the end of runway markers coming up and just applied TOGA before rotation. That might, and I emphasise might, have avoided the tailstrike.


They had applied TOGA significantly BEFORE rotation.

You might try reading the report before making (uninformed) comments on it.

[BitMoreRightRudder]

The TAM 320 wasn't caused by anything other than bizarre thrust lever handling, I don't see how you can pin that accident on airbus design philosophy. Thrust lever movement and "conventional" control yoke feedback didn't save the THY crew at AMS. We could compare Boeing and Airbus crashes all day and call it a dead heat, as has been mentioned Human Factors have more of an impact on the incidents you mention than aircraft/flight control design philosophy. That was certainly the case with the report above.

[Capt Scribble]

Schnowser, I agree. Some guys just don't look at what they are doing but are slaves to the 'putr.

[haughtney1]

Slight thread drift but..
Thrust lever movement and "conventional" control yoke feedback didn't save the THY crew at AMS.
Is a nefarious comparison, automation complacency and poor airmanship killed people on the THY 737 at AMS. A simple understanding of N1 settings for basic configs would have solved this..along with a hand on the thrust levers.

With respect to the report, I read the same thing as Wiz, TOGA was applied before the DER, but this statement in the report explains an awful lot to me..

All four flight crew reported that their perception of the aircraft's take-off acceleration was typical of a heavy A340, particularly a heavy A340-313K. The operating flight crew reported that they did not realise there was a problem with the aircraft's acceleration until they had nearly reached the end of the runway, and the red runway end lights became more prominent. Both operating flight crew reported that during operations from some runways at other airports, it was common to see the red runway end lights as the aircraft lifted off.

[BizJetJock]

Wizofoz
I think maybe you should try reading the report. It quite clearly states that TOGA was applied 1.5 seconds after the first tailstrike.

[Ramrise]

Schnowzer and Scribble,


Given the right circumstances we might all be capable of catching garbage numbers. That is, no other ongoing tasks and with no disturbances. I have it, on good authority, that the period leading up to departure in MEL was very busy and presented several disturbances.

Now, I have been in the business for years now and I have seen my share of well managed departure processes. And I have also seen my share of poorly managed departure processes. The point is that it can happen to any one of us, given the right(wrong) circumstances. Just praise yourself lucky that its not your departure thats being investigated.

The challenge, of course, is to come up with the perfect and foolproof way of the operating airplanes. Personally I find that an unachieveable goal as humans are not perfect and we are the ones designing and building airplanes.

[fo4ever]

Here is a few points from the report:

"The crew’s lack of awareness of the low acceleration until towards the end of the take-off roll meant that, by the time the captain selected Take-off/Go-around (TO/GA) thrust, a runway overrun was inevitable. The increased thrust from that selection increased the aircraft’s acceleration and resulted in the aircraft becoming airborne and climbing away from the ground much earlier than it would have otherwise. The captain’s selection of TO/GA therefore reduced the likely significant adverse consequences of the runway overrun.

Well they saved the folks on board

"Without a specific method for comparing the actual acceleration to that required, flight crew must rely on comparing the ‘feel’ of the takeoff with their previous experiences. Because the reduced thrust takeoff optimises the takeoff for the local runway conditions and the aircraft’s weight, the acceleration for the aircraft can vary with each takeoff. Due to the variations in runway conditions and weights experienced by flight crews in civil transport operations, that variation can be quite large, and not necessarily directly related to the aircraft’s weight. Therefore, flight crews cannot reliably detect degraded performance until there is something more obvious, such as approaching the end of the runway without lifting off."

"A crew’s assessment of aircraft performance during the take-off roll is based on monitoring the airspeed to determine when V1 has been attained. Flight crew are not trained to monitor the distance travelled or time taken to attain that airspeed, nor is this information displayed in any way in the cockpit. The crew are therefore unable to objectively quantify the aircraft’s acceleration between setting take-off thrust and the aircraft attaining V1."

"There was significant variation in the take-off performance parameters during the 2-month period examined, and the erroneous parameters used during the accident flight lay within the range of values observed during that period. Furthermore, the following points were noted:
•There was no direct correlation between an aircraft’s weight and the FLEX temperature.
•Although the take-off reference speeds generally increased with increasing weight, the variation was not linear and the correlation was very weak.
•The take-off reference speeds experienced by the crew varied by more than 50 kts.
• All four flight crew had experienced take-off parameters in the A340-541 that were very similar to the erroneous values used on the accident flight."

"Without a quantitative method for assessing the actual acceleration attained during the take-off roll, or having a ‘reference’ acceleration to compare with the actual acceleration, the flight crew could only judge the aircraft’s acceleration in comparison with their previous experience. All four flight crew reported that they ‘felt’ that the aircraft’s acceleration was consistent with a ‘heavy’ A340, specifically an A340-313K and were not alerted to the low acceleration."

"All four flight crew members had encountered a large variation in take-off performance due to: the use of reduced thrust takeoffs; operating a variety of aircraft with significant differences in take-off weight (due to differing routes and passenger/cargo loads); and differences in runway lengths and ambient conditions. The result was that there was no experience-based acceleration ‘datum’ against which the crew could measure the takeoff. That was consistent with the recorded data, which showed that there was no direct correlation between acceleration and take-off weight. For example, the take-off weight for the previous flight from Auckland to Melbourne was 8% greater than the flight from Melbourne to Auckland, but the acceleration was about 80% lower."

"In the previous 2 months of operations, the flight crew were exposed to take-off weights that varied from about 150 to 370 tonnes. This large variation probably affected the conspicuity of the erroneous first ‘2’ in the take-off weight that was displayed in the EFB as it, in itself, was not abnormal. Both the captain and the first officer had operated the A340-541 with take-off weights in the 200 to 300 tonne range, and observing a take-off weight of 262.9 tonnes would not have been sufficiently conspicuous to alert the crew to the possibility of the data entry error.
The crew’s experiences of differing take-off weights would have been further complicated by their mixed fleet flying. Exposure to large take-off weight ranges makes it difficult for flight crew to form an expected ‘normal’ weight, and has been observed as a factor in other erroneous take-off performance incidents and accidents."

[M.Mouse]

"Without a specific method for comparing the actual acceleration to that required, flight crew must rely on comparing the ‘feel’ of the takeoff with their previous experiences. Because the reduced thrust takeoff optimises the takeoff for the local runway conditions and the aircraft’s weight, the acceleration for the aircraft can vary with each takeoff. Due to the variations in runway conditions and weights experienced by flight crews in civil transport operations, that variation can be quite large, and not necessarily directly related to the aircraft’s weight. Therefore, flight crews cannot reliably detect degraded performance until there is something more obvious, such as approaching the end of the runway without lifting off."

While hesitant to cast a stone from within my glasshouse my immediate reaction watching the animation was that if that passed for 'normal' acceleration then that variant of Airbus A340 is more underpowered than I have heard it to be. The acceleration was pitiful.

[M.Mouse]

That was my (badly put across) point. How an experienced on type crew could sit through that painful acceleration and not realise something as amiss is, from the comfort of my armchair, something I cannot comprehend.

[Kuchan]

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1358013/ao2009012_prelim.pdf

There were 3 crew members in the cockpit still overlooking that the weight and balance input was wrongly not for 500 series but for a 300 series and hence reduce the take-off weight performance.

The aircraft scrapped the tail skid so bad that it warranted a write off as the frame 80 etc was so badly damaged beyond economical repair.

To maintain a clean image of Emirate no fatal record, the aircraft was extensively and costly repaired to a airworthy condition.

[M.Mouse]

The aircraft scrapped the tail skid so bad that it warranted a write off as the frame 80 etc was so badly damaged beyond economical repair.

To maintain a clean image of Emirate no fatal record, the aircraft was extensively and costly repaired to a airworthy condition.

Is that conjecture, rumour or fact?

[Andu]

There were 3 crew members in the cockpitI think you'll find there were four crewmembers in the cockpit.

[NigelOnDraft]

To all those who persist in "blaming" the individuals, with an air of "anyone with that experience would surely notice..." or "not do that" :ugh:

A relatively quick read of the report will reveal that this type of accident (and similar incidents) is far from rare, and affects numerous experienced pilots.

Yes - it is surprising that such things are not noticed, but the facts are clear - they are missed, and without analysing and putting in place steps to try and prevent them, they will continue to do so.

The aircraft scrapped the tail skid so bad that it warranted a write off as the frame 80 etc was so badly damaged beyond economical repair.

To maintain a clean image of Emirate no fatal record, the aircraft was extensively and costly repaired to a airworthy condition.Only comment would be it was back in service ~8 months after the event - given the time to analyse / investigate aircraft, plan what to do, ferry to Toulouse, repair and back in service, it does not seem a massive task?

[Wizofoz]

Appologise, my understanding over the sequence of events was faulty.

The reason TOGA was not selected before the first rotation was that at that point the crew did not realize there was a problem.

[Wizofoz]

THIS however:-

There were 3 crew members in the cockpit still overlooking that the weight and balance input was wrongly not for 500 series but for a 300 series and hence reduce the take-off weight performance.

The aircraft scrapped the tail skid so bad that it warranted a write off as the frame 80 etc was so badly damaged beyond economical repair.

To maintain a clean image of Emirate no fatal record, the aircraft was extensively and costly repaired to a airworthy condition.

Has more errors per word than just about any post in History.

There were four crew, not three, the erroneous figures had nothing to do with 300 vs 500, and how the hell does writing off the aircraft effect the number of fatalities (which was zero)?

Could you please supply the cost/benefit analysis you must have access to to make this claim?

[Dream Land]

It would, but it would be a huge political loss to Airbus. Airbus has many good ideas and innovations, but they got the whole control feedback issue deadly wrong, and it has caused many accidents - who knows how many incidents.
7700, Can you explain if Airbus has it so wrong, how the crew of the 757 out of the Dominican had the same result with one pitot tube inop?

There are good indications on the fd when more than one pilot is trying to operate the controls at a time, I don't think this issue was even a slight factor to this accident, been in the bus 13 years. :ok:

TAM was not related to flight control feedback.

[Dani]

Instead of crying out loud against Airbus' automation philosophy I rather would demand an accelleration alarm, giving clues to an aircrew when an aircraft is not getting speed fast enough. This is missing in Airbus and Boeings alike, only seeing it rarely on top-end business jets - where there is never lack of accelleration anyway.

It would be dead simply to imply such an acceleration alarm, be it based on FMGES performance data base or with the RIPS or ROPS or other systems.

[glofish]

Instead of crying out loud against Airbus' automation philosophy I rather would demand an accelleration alarm, giving clues to an aircrew when an aircraft is not getting speed fast enough

Please not another lady shouting at me at the most inappropriate moment!

There are way too many systems shanihaniganging between me, the aircraft and basic airmanship anyway.

It is somewhat inherent to the Airbus fraction that after each incident, especially those involving an Airbus, they are demanding even more automation and protections to help the already implemented automation, just a much as the involved pilots.

To me, Jazz hands has got it dead right:

Contained in the report is the FAA's response to the idea of developing a take-off monitoring system designed to prevent similar accidents:

It has "found the idea of these systems, with all of their inherent complexity to be more problematical than reliance on adequate airmanship".

This statement could be enlarged to the whole Airbus design.

Sure enough it is not the principal factor leading to the MEL incident. However the MFF concept with models with such a variety in performance, number of engines, fuel tanks, system and checklist variations simply increases the risk of a stuff up. The statements of the pilots concerning the acceleration feel is quite symptomatic.

The MFF concept is very integrated in the Airbus philosophy, therefore my criticism.

[The Real Pink Baron]

If you do not know anything, please do not post!
If you have flown an A340/500, do post.

[Kuchan]

This thread is probably started by some one having a grudge against Emirates to re-open the deep wound just about to be forgotten.

It is more than 2 year old history and any legal documents would be buried deep into the sand dunes.(2 years max safe keeping).

The rumor came from the epic-centre of the volcano in Dubai.

2 operational crews, 1 observer in cockpit.

Strangely, airmech had a better infor/rumor than the pprune here with rumors more than facts. That was 2 years ago.

Needed a longer runway? - Aircraft Engineers Bulletin Board (http://www.airmech.co.uk/forums/showthread.php?t=9549)

May be the engineer (airmech) is more down to earth (ground engineer) than the crews dreaming (flying) in the sky.

[Wizofoz]

No,

Two operating crew, two augmenting crew in the cockpit. Would you like their names?

[J.O.]

It would be dead simply to imply such an acceleration alarm, be it based on FMGES performance data base or with the RIPS or ROPS or other systems.

One of the problems associated with putting such an alerting system in place is that they would still require a human input into the system so that the nominal acceleration rate could be computed. It would still be possible to mis-program the FMGC to the point where the alert wouldn't be effective.

The best SOP I've seen to prevent such gross errors is an independent check by two or more crew members, where both do the calculation independently. In addition to comparing their computed results, the crew also must compare the calculated TOW with the one on the operational flight plan. Discrepancies must be investigated and resolved prior to takeoff.

[tdk90]

Captain flew 98.9 hrs in last 30 days.....wow

[helen-damnation]

This statement could be enlarged to the whole Airbus design.

Sure enough it is not the principal factor leading to the MEL incident. However the MFF concept with models with such a variety in performance, number of engines, fuel tanks, system and checklist variations simply increases the risk of a stuff up. The statements of the pilots concerning the acceleration feel is quite symptomatic.

Which is also true of the "MFF" on various Boeings. Presently flying 6 variants of 777 with different weights/speed limits/engines and vastly different takeoff and landing speeds to boot.

Then there's the 757/767 rating and 737 variants.

Before I get flamed, I'll acknowledge the general systems commonality, but I don't believe that's an issue in this or similar incidents.

Captain flew 98.9 hrs in last 30 days.....wow

When you're tired, the obvious suddenly isn't so obvious after all.

[Andu]

Captain flew 98.9 hrs in last 30 days.....wowYou can drop the 'wow' - as we speak, just about every Emirates captain, and every FO as well, is clocking ~98 hours per month - and that's after "factoring".

[Chu Chu]

Being SLF, I may be asking a stupid question, but what about a system that measures the position of the landing gear oleos and sounds an alarm if there's a significant discrepancy from the weight entered by the crew?

[exeng]

Captain flew 98.9 hrs in last 30 days.....wow

Try that in a mostly shorthaul environment - thats Nigeria!

[CONF iture]

Chu Chu,
In this event the erroneous weight was entered in the Electronic Flight Bag not in the Flight Management and Guidance System.

[Mahatma Kote]

It appears here that the problem is using a derived figure to calculate thrust based on aircraft mass and runway length.

Surely it's easier to enter known figures - runway length and local windspeed and direction - and let the thrust control system manage the accelleration to achieve a takeoff in the available runway?

This will handle all sorts of situations, such as mistaken TOW as well as factors such as rainfall.

[Green Guard]

but since when you are 100% sure that nobody will ever make a mistake in correct Rwy length ?
Besides the wind will certainly not wait for you to do a TakeOff in order to change itself..:ugh:

[Mahatma Kote]

I made it more complex than required. The only figure required is runway length. The system can read ground speed and airspeed itself.

The system can also tell what the take-off mass is by measuring the accelleration vs thrust. This will allow it to call the rotates as well.

[Gulfstreamaviator]

In Corporate this is the latest toy in our toybox.

We get distance remaining.

With a slight software enhancement, using the IRS acceleration, a GO NO GO point can be computed, withour reference to FMS computations.
Even give a warning TOGA NOW GUYS......

Say:100kt point from RAAS, compared to CAS 100k compared to FMS predicted 100k.

Just my 1 aed input....

[Denti]

Chu Chu,
In this event the erroneous weight was entered in the Electronic Flight Bag not in the Flight Management and Guidance System.

In that case my lowly 737 FMC would have alerted me to the issue. It shows computed QRH values for V1/Vr/V2, if the there is a big difference, especially to the negative, i certainly would question my own performance calculation. Only if i put in the wrong ZFM in both the EFB and FMC i would have a real problem.

[error_401]

1 cent worth:

First:
I'd like to have a "dry empty mass" sticker somewhere, even better as a basic figure in the FMGS. Would sometimes greatly help to have very basic figures. DRY + LOAD + FUEL = TOM

I do insist in separate calculations on EFB and never read the ZFM od TOM from the loadsheet or flight plan to the captain but hand him the paper to have him enter it himself. Then I crosscheck from FMGS to flight plan/load sheet and my calculation on EFB.

Has saved my day already couple times in 10 years...

Second:
Why not have mass sensors on the wheel legs? Could that work?

[Airbubba]

Why not have mass sensors on the wheel legs? Could that work?

This has been done several times in the past, here's one earlier example:

http://www.pprune.org/aviation-history-nostalgia/289473-anyone-remember-stan.html

Didn't some L1011's have a similar technology?

[Basil]

Both B747-200 and B747-400 freighters have the option of a total mass readout.
The -200 was allegedly troublesome to maintain but the -400 system worked well AFAIK.

[Ten-miles final]

Today's assumption is when error happened we try to invent new procedure or device to trap such errors in future. In this particular case i can hardly imagine what kind of further improvement may be found, and, the most important, why even we need it. There are enough predictions and crosscheks established to confirm grossweight - OFP (shows clearly 362 t TOW), loadsheet and previous experience. It was just error followed by inadequate crosscheck. Dramatic difference of 100t definitely should draw crew attention, but...
All of these were discussed above, don't see any appropriate remedial actions in general, such kind of mistakes will be done many times in future but hopefully without so severe consequences as 100t error is really very improbable.

[Akali Dal]

All the wonder ideas on how to trap such lack of airmanship and understanding of aircraft performance. All kinds of excuses for this screw up; why? Is he one of the skygod breed?

Any flex above your environmental envelope for a long haul flight should have raised all the red flags and warning bells. A cross check of your GMS gross weights against your loadsheet figures would have..........sigh:ugh:

[nojwod]

To those who think the crew should have noticed the lack of acceleration:

I recently flew TG from BKK to SYD in an A340-600 and being a keen SLF observer of all aspects of my flight I was a little worried as the takeoff roll commenced without any appreciable g-force apparent.

However, the flight rotated well within the runway margins and off we flew, admittedly conservatively in the climb department.

Comparing that takeoff sensation to the previous A300 takeoff (moderate g-force) and the Dash8 Q400 departure (significant g-force) I can well understand crews who regularly experience flex takeoffs know better than to rely on apparent acceleration.

[canadair]

nojwod:
apparent acceceration may be a sensation or feeling not to be taken as a constant, but Thrust vs weight vsspeed vs distance ceratinly are fact.

And a very simple check which can be used as a gross error check is timing to speed.
30 seconds - 100 kts.
If after advancing the thrust levers and starting the clock at brake release this parameter is not met then it can be assumed something is incorrect,
ie not the correct thrust for weight, dragging brake, etc.
and it can then be taken that you may never reach V1 in the remaining distance.
Not to say if you reach 30 seconds and are not at 100 kts that you reject, but it is a guide, if you are at say 95 kts, accelerating, then the parameters have been met, but as in the MEL EK flt, they were so far beyond this from a timing point, that such a check would have been a huge wake up call.
why 100 Kts? have a look at brake energy charts, 100 kts is usually close to the top where wheels should stay intact at MTOW rejects.

Not to suggest this works for all types, but it seems to work quite well for most larger types. Boeing developed this very basic check over 40 years ago for the 747, and it is a great gross error check.

[Ten-miles final]

Canadair
...Boeing developed this very basic check over 40 years ago for the 747, and it is a great gross error check...

Is there any reference to original Boeing document or research papers available?
Would be great to read that.

[Capn Bloggs]

It's not totally clear in the report what the SOP response actually was, but to my way of thinking the Green Dot check should be a readout, from both pilots, of their GD speeds, not one read it and the other say "checked". If one is forced to read the number off somewhere, there is a much better chance of the check actually working. On more than one occasion I've said "checked" out of habit but not actually done it.

The other aspect/check that I thought was prone to failure was "both crewmembers to silently verify..." I would class that as a purely an airmanship check and not part of a robust procedure.

The other part of the report which was fascinating was that on Distraction Management. A huge threat, IMO, and hardly ever covered.

[patrickal]

This is a question, not a comment. After running off the end of the runway (although it appears the main gear had left the ground) and striking at least one ground object as they departed, was it wise for the crew to raise the gear, not being sure if anything had been damaged? Just asking.

[NigelOnDraft]

...was it wise for the crew to raise the gear, not being sure if anything had been damaged? Just asking.With 20:20 hindsight, it might have been better to leave it down, in these exact circumstances.

However I (as a current airline Capt) cannot think of any circumstance, bar Windshear GA, where one is pre-briefed to leave gear down. To therefore "leave the gear down" in other situations requires:

1 or more Flt Crew to suggest not raising the gear
The other Flt Crew to understand this interjection in time before gear is raised
The crew to interact (CRM, DODAR, analysis) as required and decide not to raise gear
All the above to occur at a flight critical phase of flight and delaying whatever else needs to be done
Bear in mind any "performance" issue assumes the gear is raised (typically engine failure).

So my view would be that yes, they were correct to raise gear, and I cannot see "how" a decision making process could work that would result in them not raising the gear that did not ask other "what ifs?".

[Akrapovic]

Does anyone know what happened to the crew involved?

I heard some rumour that the augment crew were reprimanded also?

[J.O.]

They were offered the opportunity to resign. :hmm:

[TangoUniform]

Within 48 hours.......in order to receive their end of service benefits.

[fo4ever]

They were forced to resign with "gross negligence" charges from DSVP Flight operation (TCAS) 6 days after the accident.

The order came from the top (local owner of the airline)

End of story and problem solved.

[kinteafrokunta]

Poor sods were unlucky; with the right spin they could have been made heroes saving a crippled plane load of pax. Remember the Canadian Air Transat A330 crew who screwed up fuel leak management and got rewarded for dead stick landing at Lajes!

[Ten-miles final]

Is it described somewhere in manuals augmented crew must check performance calculations done by active crew? I suppose "Take off and landing crew" only is responsible for those calculations?

[Dani]

with the right spin they could have been made heroes saving a crippled plane load of pax.

If you ask me, that's exactly what they did. Hard to imagine what outcome could have been better than the real one once you realize that you will never make it into the air within the runway given...

[helen-damnation]

Remember the Canadian Air Transat A330 crew who screwed up fuel leak management and got rewarded for dead stick landing at Lajes!

Wrong! The checklist was ambiguous and changed as a result of the incident.