Rejected takeoff after becoming airborne...or a "Go and Touch"? [Archive]

S76Heavy

3rd Dec 2011, 14:17

Land as soon as practicable..when you have lots of runway to spare right in front of you, why not?

As a helicopter pilot (V/STOL :8) when taking of from runways, we do it all the time; why struggle with an aircraf with problems if you can simply land safely on what happens to be the same runway you departed from?

These guys obviously knew their machine and its performance, so well done.

Two's in

3rd Dec 2011, 18:50

Landing after V1 not that unique...

From March 1998 at Stansted involving an HS 748.

ASN Aircraft accident British Aerospace BAe-748-378 Srs. 2B G-OJEM London-Stansted Airport (STN) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19980330-1)

...The HS-748 was cleared for take-off with full dry power; At an airspeed of 111 kt the aircraft became airborne. Less than five seconds after the 'rotate' call, at an airspeed of 115 kt and a height of between 30 feet and 100 feet agl, the no. 2 engine suffered a catastrophic failure resulting in a sudden loss of power and an immediate substantial nacelle fire. The aircraft yawed 11deg to the right of the runway heading, the crew were told by the senior cabin attendant that the right engine was on fire. The aircraft was in the air for a total period of 27 seconds before it touched down. The aircraft ran off the end of the runway at 62 kt...

captjns

3rd Dec 2011, 21:42

Landing after V1 not that unique...

Possibly not, but stopping on the concret remaining is.

Teddy Robinson

3rd Dec 2011, 23:05

obviously what we all need are non limiting eternal runways. .. it would make life much easier

blue up

4th Dec 2011, 08:59

obviously what we all need are non limiting eternal runways. .. it would make life much easier

A tarmac conveyor belt?

Fangio

4th Dec 2011, 09:22

This was an identical engine failure to the HS748 at Stansted

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada report number H90001, Quebec Air F27B Rolls Royce Dart engines, CF-QBL Flight No 255
Quebec City Airport, 29 March 1979

The flight lasted 1min 12secs after lift off.
Fourteen passengers and three crew died in the crash.

"At time 36 seconds after brake release there was a loud bang from the right engine as it disintegrated and a severe fire developed. The aircraft was at approximately 103 kts and 40 feet above the runway.

At time 42 seconds, The captain started the engine failure/fire emergency drill.

At time 45 seconds, the tower controller who had noticed flames from the right engine advised flight 255 that the right engine was on fire and authorised them to land on any runway.

From time 50 seconds to 1 minute 05 seconds the crew attempted to raise the landing gear which never came up.

The aircraft climbed to about 120 feet above the runway elevation and started a right turn, apparently in an attempt to complete a short circuit, remain visual and execute an emergency on the airport.

At time 1 minute 14 seconds the captain called for the propeller to be feathered. Up to this point the crew did not know that the right engine had separated at the first stage impeller and the forward section of the engine along with the forward section of the engine along with the propeller and some cowling had fallen onto the runway

At time 1minute 24 seconds the No 1 fire bottle was fired and the aircraft continued in a right turn at about 100 feet above the terrain at a very low airspeed. The engine fire continued.

As the aircraft approached the College de Sacre Coeur, the angle of bank increased and the aircraft started to descend until impact.

Impact occured in a nose down, right wing low attitude at approximately 80 kts.

A fierce fire broke out and most of the fuselage forward of the wing was consumed by fire."

The Rolls Royce Dart engine had suffered an uncontained failure.

riverrock83

4th Dec 2011, 11:13

A little different from flying a spam can from a big runway.
At Prestwick I normally take off from Mike which is half way along 13/31 (9800 Feet long) and in doing practice EFATOs I can get back down onto the same runway or cross over to 21 most times if I'm still below 300 Feet. Mind you - that has assumed that my "donkey" has "stopped" fairly soon after leaving the ground...

smith

4th Dec 2011, 11:32

Fangio

I don't see the releveance of your post to this thread, I think we are talking about landing straight back on here, not doing a circuit to land.

I am pretty sure the LoganAir Twotter pilots using long runways such as Campbeltown have a "committed" call on their take off checklists where they will commit to a circuit in the event of an EFATO, however if the EFATO is before the "committed" call and they are airborne they will attempt to land straight back on the remaining runway.

Fangio

4th Dec 2011, 11:44

I think you have missed the point here.

Please refer to the HS748 post above,
Do you continue with the take off after a catastrophic uncontained engine failure or, do you continue with the take off having suffered the catstrophic failure, aware that there was still some runway available ahead.

The F27 captain chose to continue with the take off with disastrous fatal results. The HS748 captain decided to land back on the same runway with no casualties. Same situation, but different decisions.

Checkboard

4th Dec 2011, 11:48

I think Fangio's point was: "Here's an example of a failure at 40', in which the crew elected to continue when perhaps a landing ahead (even with an overrun) would have realised a better outcome."

Having said that - from the little bit posted - it looks like a stall/loss of control accident rather than a direct result of engine failure.

smith

4th Dec 2011, 12:42

Apologies Fangio, I get it now :ok:

WHBM

4th Dec 2011, 18:28

Is it not true with a small type and a long runway that gear up is not "when airborne" but when "no prospect of landing back" ?

pigboat

5th Dec 2011, 00:35

I knew the guy flying the QB F-27, he was in the class at QB behind me. They took off on R06, at the time 6500 feet long, and attempted a visual return to R30. The accident occurred at night in conditions of low ceiling and visibility. Debris from the disintegrating compressor had entered the DC electrical panel behind the co-pilot's seat and the electrical connection between the gear selector and the panel had been severed, thus the gear would have never come up anyway. The lower engine cowling had come unlatched and air loads had jammed it against the MLG drag strut creating even more aerodynamic drag. The final nail in the coffin came when the stewardess moved the passengers from the right front of the cabin to the left rear, putting the C of G of the airplane outside of limits. While I can see where Fangio is coming from there is very little comparison between the two.

757_Driver

5th Dec 2011, 10:07

sounds like good airmanship to me. Which is,of course, why we need professional airmen (and airwomen!) in the flight deck, not lowly paid button-pusher-monkeys.

Airbanda

5th Dec 2011, 11:24

IIRC the Stansted 748 pilot was offered the opportunity to go from an intersection. He declined and took the whole runway.

The aircraft was carrying the Leeds United team home from a fixture in London Very nearly a second Munich in footballing terms.

fmgc

8th Dec 2011, 18:19

I am surprised that everybody is so quick to praise this crew.

Had they continued the flight would they have not been able to fly a safe circuit back to land?

How did they know for certain that they had enough room to come to a stop? They were in a grey area and were lucky this time. Next time they might not be.

The failure that they had was not catastrophic so the potential downside didn't not warrant such a major deviation from SOP and risk.

Such a massive deviation from SOP and foray into such an unknown area should only be done if the alternative is certain crash, in this instance I do not believe that was the case.

Lord Spandex Masher

8th Dec 2011, 19:02

Agree with fmgc,

What all you "good show" types don't know is if this was the result of a well thought out action or the result of total over reaction plus panic plus lots of luck.

Ballymoss

8th Dec 2011, 22:27

Had they continued the flight would they have not been able to fly a safe circuit back to land?

Who knew at the time?

How did they know for certain that they had enough room to come to a stop?

Who knew at the time? (but you'd have some idea)

The failure that they had was not catastrophic

Who knew at the time?

Strict adherance to SOP/"Good airmanship" has removed a number of good
individuals from our community.

Personally, I'm not one to judge (even after final report), preferring to learn
along the way in the hope the old grey matter will act as required when needed.

The Ancient Geek

8th Dec 2011, 22:43

For goodness sake - LOOK AT THE FACTS.
They had plenty of space and then plenty more to spare.

captjns

9th Dec 2011, 00:46

At the end of the day... it was a crap shoot that paid off:ok::D. Sometimes actions taken in the heat of the battle pay off and well. sometimes they don’t:{:=.

There were only two people in the cockpit at the time the event took place. The two present in the cockpit were the only ones aware of their current situation along with their abilities. The rest of us on this thread are just speculators and second guessers... those who agree and those who disagree.

Let’s suppose their decision were to continue with the takeoff with a disastrous outcome. Then upon the review of the DFDR, which is eventually shared with the public, was determined that the failure occurred at the exact point. Then what would the comments be from the arm chair quarterbacks:hmm:?

LeftHeadingNorth

9th Dec 2011, 02:18

Agree captsjns... Also, many RTO briefs states that after V1 you only abort for eng fires/failures or A/C is unable/unsafe to fly. Well, If I got a stick shaker at rotation with plenty of rwy ahead of me I would personally have done the same. A stall warning is probably as unsafe as it gets....

Crashdriver

9th Dec 2011, 02:28

11,000 ft is plenty of runway probably even for a CRJ to do the same thing (Speculation alert!). I really don't blame the pilots for breaking SOP. Especially in a Dash with the gigantic airbrakes haniging from the wings, if everything is controlable on the ground but as soon as we leave the ground things go bonkers, I'm going back to the ground.

The Ancient Geek

9th Dec 2011, 09:24

Standard Operating Procedures are exactly what they say, standard procedures to follow when something standard happens.
Dealing with non-standard emergencies is called airmanship and is the way that a captain earns his keep. If the captain make the right decisions he gets to live and fly again another day.
In this case there was plenty of runway to land straight ahead and then plenty more left over for a good safety margin so the decision was easy.

In other circumstances it might have been a choice between the cabbage patch at the end of the runway and a hillside several miles away. Guess which one the crash tenders would have got to first.

Fangio

9th Dec 2011, 11:35

Are you refering to the Dash 8 or the HS 748 incident?

757_Driver

9th Dec 2011, 12:12

Standard Operating Procedures are exactly what they say, standard procedures to follow when something standard happens.
Dealing with non-standard emergencies is called airmanship and is the way that a captain earns his keep. If the captain make the right decisions he gets to live and fly again another day.

Exactly - and it even says that in the front of the QRH and the manuals for most aircraft.

Unfortunately in these days of blind adherance to SOP's to suit the lowest common denominator such 'airmanship' is frowned upon my many.

757_Driver

9th Dec 2011, 12:20

Also, many RTO briefs states that after V1 you only abort for eng fires/failures or A/C is unable/unsafe to fly. Sorry old chap - After V1 you would never brief to abort for an engine fire failure - V1 is calculated based on having sufficient performance to continue in the event of a failure.
However I agree with the unsafe to fly bit! But you are off the charts then so you gotta think on your feet, use a bit of experience (i.e "that looks like plenty of runway to stop on"), and hope for a bit of luck.

Well, If I got a stick shaker at rotation with plenty of rwy ahead of me I would personally have done the same. A stall warning is probably as unsafe as it gets....Agree 100%

Schiller

9th Dec 2011, 13:12

If I remember the HS748 incident correctly; as a result of the catastrophic engine failure, the cowlings peeled back to make a very effective airbrake. It was determined afterwards that the aircraft probably would not have been able to climb away.

However, sticking to the SOP is usually the best solution whatever the problem. You might be lucky trying to second-guess the system, but making an ad hoc decision while still in ":mad:mewhatjusthappenedthen" mode is probably not the best way to come to the right decision.

fmgc

9th Dec 2011, 14:14

Fangio, I refer to the Dash 8 incident.

Those of you who think that ignoring SOPs for anything other than MAJOR unforseable events are an accident waiting to happen.

In this incident, where does plenty of runway ahead turn into just about enough runway ahead and then turn into not enough runway ahead? It is a grey area well worth avoiding.

How did the crew know for sure that there was enough runway ahead? They were in the realms of guesswork and personal judgement.

11,000 ft is plenty of runway probably even for a CRJ to do the same thing (Speculation alert!).

This comment sums up my point with the pertinent term being PROBABLY!

It is very rare for an accident/incident to occur when SOPs had been adhered to, but quite common when SOPs had not been followed.

The Ancient Geek

9th Dec 2011, 15:52

fmgc:

Are you really stupid or just trolling ?
There is NO STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE for what happened in this case. Faced with an unpredictable and clearly unsafe condition the captain used his common sense and his Mk1 eyeball to deduce the safest solution to a potentally fatal situation.

He did the right thing in the circumstances which faced him and landed safely with no damage and no injuries to his passengers.
I just hope that you are not so bull-headed when something similar happens to you.

fmgc

9th Dec 2011, 16:10

the captain used his common sense and his Mk1 eyeball to deduce the safest solution to a potentally fatal situation.

Did he? Or was he just lucky that there actually was enough runway ahead.

Tell me Ancient Geek, what were his probabilities of crashing had he continued the flight?

If they were high then he did the right thing.
If low then he should have continued the take off.
If we don't know then you can't argue that he did the right thing as much as I can't argue that he didn't.

There is NO STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE for what happened in this case.

The lack of SOP for this particular failure doesn't justify a breach of other SOPs.

There are many situations that we deal with that are not covered directly by SOP but abandoning a take off after V1 let alone Vr is a major deviation.

I just hope that you are not so bull-headed when something similar happens to you.

If you read my posts I don't discount deviation from SOPs if the circumstances warrant it BUT and it's a big but they really do have to warrant it.

It seems to me that too many Captains use the standard disclaimer in the manuals about his right to deviate from SOP and the Rules of the Air too lightly because they arrogantly think that they know better, when in most circumstances, they don't.

Just because this incident thankfully ended safely does not mean that the Captain can be vindicated for what is a very risky course of action.

MathFox

9th Dec 2011, 16:56

Let's assume the flight crew was professional and behaved professional... That would mean that they would not have started the take-off run without performance numbers (minimum runway required).
So they would have known that V1==VR and how many spare feet of runway they had. With that knowledge it is easy to come to the conclusion that landing straight ahead will be safe. :8

fmgc

9th Dec 2011, 17:01

But V1 & Vr are speeds that on a given day will equate to a position on the runway.

You do not know the actual distance of runway left. (Unless you have some sophisticated performance system).

In any case once you have reached 50' you don't know how much runway you are going to use to put the aircraft back down and come to a safe stop, so know how much runway you have left after Vr is irrelevant.

The Ancient Geek

9th Dec 2011, 18:52

Have you ever flown a DHC8-100 ?
Do you understand what STOL means ?
Which part of "There is no SOP for this failure" do you not understand.

Clue :- Takeoff run at MGW = 2625 feet
Runway lenth = 12000 feet
Therefore they were less than 1/4 of the way down the runway when they aborted.
Landing straight ahead was a no-brainer, they had room to do this and still have half of the runway to spare.

ReverseFlight

10th Dec 2011, 00:36

A decision to reject a takeoff immediately after V1 must not be taken lightly. My worry is that in the inquiry afterwards, some smart investigator is going to cross examine you as to the meaning of V1.

Smart-S: You made the decision to continue the takeoff at V1, didn't you ?
Pilot: Yes.
Smart-S: And then you did something totally contrary to your decision, didn't you ?
Pilot: I had enough runway and no one got hurt.
Smart-S: Answer the question. You ignored your own decision, didn't you ?
Pilot: ... :sad:

barit1

10th Dec 2011, 01:10

Smart-S: You made the decision to continue the takeoff at V1, didn't you ?
Pilot: Yes.
Smart-S: And then you did something totally contrary to your decision, didn't you ?
Pilot: I had enough runway and no one got hurt.
Smart-S: Answer the question. You ignored your own decision, didn't you ?

Pilot: I decided I'd rather put up with your stupid line of questions, than (if lucky) testify at the coroner's inquest. :rolleyes:

(Thinks: DHC8, 12k r/w, isn't V1 sorta academic?)

V1... Ooops

10th Dec 2011, 09:05

Take-off run at MGW = 2,625 feet

Runway length = 12,000 feet

Therefore they were less than 1/4 of the way down the runway when they aborted.

Landing straight ahead was a no-brainer, they had room to do this and still have half of the runway to spare.

I agree with The Ancient Geek. Anyone who is familiar with the Dash-8 would recognize the 'plain old-fashioned common sense' that the crew applied to the decision-making process in this situation.

Patty747400

10th Dec 2011, 10:56

"Such a massive deviation from SOP and foray into such an unknown area"

Unknown? DHC-100 with 12000 feet of runway? Maybe unknown for someone who so blindly leans on the concept of SOP (which is not even applicable in this case) that they don't dare to use their own judgement.

If you are 100 % sure that you can stop but only 80 % sure the aircraft will fly, which is the best decision?

Lord Spandex Masher

10th Dec 2011, 11:02

Now hang on a minute. They noticed an intermittent stall warning light before rotation yet continued the take off only to reject after they became airborne!

Why not stop when you notice the warning light instead of getting airborne and then stopping?! After all, they had 12000 feet of runway to make a decision didn't they.

In the modern vernacular WTF?!

The Ancient Geek

10th Dec 2011, 14:51

Think about it.
An intermittent flickering warning light is probably not a big problem.
When the wheels come off the ground the stall horn starts bleating and the stick shaker tries to shake your teeth loose - time to sit up and take notice.

Lord Spandex Masher

10th Dec 2011, 15:30

An intermittent flickering stall warning light! Would that not make you think before you got airborne? Would you not sit up and take notice before you took off!?

An erroneous stick shaker is also not a problem.

V1... Ooops

10th Dec 2011, 22:57

No, not necessarily. The stall warning system can flicker on some types of aircraft during the take-off roll as a result of wind gusts momentarily operating the lift detector, or de-ice fluid residue being displaced onto the lift detector at the start of the take-off run. I have experienced both of these causal factors in my career.

If the stall warning system began to continuously operate during the take-off roll, then yes, that would provide reasonable justification to reject the take-off. But, for a flicker (implies momentary operation that then stops)? I don't think there are too many pilots who would elect to reject for a flicker.

Lord Spandex Masher

11th Dec 2011, 13:28

Nor would I. Sitting up and taking notice does not equate to rejecting a take off.

In 1200 hours on this type I never saw an intermittent/flickering stall warning. However, if I had and elected to continue then I'd be less than surprised by stick shaker activation when we got airborne because there was obviously something not quite right with the system.

One malfunctioning stick shaker (and it's a bit pathetic anyway) isn't a big deal. The aircraft will still fly without a problem.

Two's in

11th Dec 2011, 18:36

SOP = Standard Operating Procedures

NSOP = Non-Standard Operating Procedures = The decisions made by the Aircraft Commander as a function of Captaincy

RHKAAF

20th Dec 2011, 10:36

Fifteen years ago we were operating SuperKingAirs out of Kai Tak. Because of the imminent Chinese takeover of HongKong,we were made to come under the Civil Aviation Department and follow their rules. Whereas we had always used common sense and had followed the idea that if an engine failed or a potentially catastrophic event occurred on take-off we would land back on if sufficient runway was available--bearing in mind that this could be 10,000ft at Kai Tak--- we were forced to accept that after V1 we had to get airbourne regardless. This could have led to a "harbour circuit" on one engine ,possibly on fire instead of dealing with things at rest halfway down the runway. I did suggest that decisions in such cases were best left to the pilot but was labelled a "Dinosaur" which bucked me up somewhat!