Low altitude mixture cuts in twin training still occuring despite CASA warnings

[A37575]

The latest ATSB Aviation Short Investigation report has just been published. Issue 6 AB-2011-077. On page 35 is the ATSB report on a Twin Commanche crash at Camden on 23/12/2010.

Aviation Short Investigation Bulletin: Second Quarter, Issue 6 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2011/ab2011077.aspx)

The highly experienced instructor cut the No 2 Mixture control just after take off to "simulate" an engine failure. Control was lost when the student mis-identified the engine failure and the aircraft went into an incipient spin. The instructor did a sterling job of recovering from the spin but the aircraft hit the deck wings level and no one was hurt.

There was a similar scenario at Camden several years earlier where the 35,000 hour instructor died of his burns after control was lost and the aircraft (a Duchess) belly landed. In that accident the instructor also cut the mixture shortly after take off and the aircraft clipped trees and landed ahead wheels up. Fire broke out instantly

I thought CASA had banned mixture cuts on take off following the earlier Duchess crash? Either way, that technique is fraught with danger of mishandling by either the instructor, the student or both. These two crashes and others before them prove that instructors should not risk the lives of their students with dangerous practices in attempts at realism.

[Kharon]

Merged: The multi engine debate.
Quote:-

One well informed gentleman in other posts has mentioned both CAAP 5.23-2 (0) and the FAA Airman's Handbook as valid multi engine training references.

The question "do they read their own material? " was asked. (Good one). I have been fairly reliably informed that certain operators have been told (nothing written) to remove briefing notes (FAA manual and CAAP) relating to safe OEI operations from operations/ training manuals?.

Seems the FAA have no idea about OEI and the associated methods of teaching same.

The on going PA 31 saga would clearly indicate they do not read their own material; but this gets better. Apparently, this was the third go around of training these blokes have gone through. Seems that there was no "evidence" that "correct" asymmetric training was given during both the first and second lot of training. This is despite about a dozen blokes being recalled to ensure that asymmetric training was conducted and completed "to the satisfaction of" the instructor pilot, after the first training sessions were declared invalid.
It is rumored that the final instructor pilot asked for directions on exactly what was meant, then politely but firmly declined the invitation to conduct mixture induced engine cuts at low speed and height. Bravo that man or woman.

It seems that the use of a humble "Elite AT11 – I" was deemed as satisfactory for this exercise. There is nothing wrong with the Elite, neither the manufacturer or operator make claims that this device is any thing else except a very good, valuable training aid within it's certified limits.

The idea that it can accurately represent a PA 31 at MTOW weight with OEI is beyond a joke.

The notion that this exercise was any thing else but "negative training" borders on both reckless and negligent. IMHO I doubt that the exercise could even be legally claimed toward a type rating. Would they knock back a type rating conducted in this manner. You could just about bet the house on it.

My bold - Fair dinkum. I ask you

[thorn bird]

Low altitude mixture cuts in twin training still occuring despite CASA warnings?????.
Mate its CASA FOI's insisting on this sh...t, not discouraging it!!, and worse..ie full shutdowns in the circuit in turbine aircraft!!!. sorry I dont get paid enough....

[PA39]

Well to incite an argument....over 35 years I always used the mixture for engine cuts.....but i will reiterate, low level cuts using either method is fraught with danger and the instructor MUST be proficient and prepared for the unexpected, and, after the student has continuously demonstrated a high proficiency standard of handling such emergencies at altitude. That particular TC in question was one of my previous birds and it was fitted with a contra rotated engine after the original owner suffered an EFATO !

[john_tullamarine]

I don't think that the problem is so much whether one can physically do a simulated faillure in a lightie.

Rather, as with all exercises, the real concern is whether the IP can rescue the situation from whatever foul up eventuates - whether that be due to the aircraft's lack of performance or the student/pilot under test's error.

ICO simulation at low level just trims your risk fat down to nothing.

Why not do the exercise at 1000 or 1500ft ? When it all goes pear shaped (as it will from time to time) you get a bit more time to catch it and fix the problem before you hit the hard bits. No guarantees .. but the odds improve greatly.

I got around the problem for all tests etc simply by making it VERY clear to the testing officer that a simulated failure below (state a height for the situation that I chose to nominate) WOULD result in both throttles being closed and the aircraft landed ahead.

Strange .. was never put to the test .. and they knew that I wasn't about to muck about.

Stupid stuff ends up, sooner or later, with embarrassment or worse.

Two very experienced test officers I knew well and with whom I periodically flew (including the one cited by A37575 who died of burns after the Camden prang) both were very skilled but ran out of steam when they simultaneously ran out of height, speed, and ideas.

The ADF materially changed a lot of ways it did business following a few very visible prangs, including the dreadful B707 crash off the Victorian coast.

Hero stuff is for simulators .. generally the worst that can happen is that the other guys get to have a good belly laugh at the pilot's errors.

The only folk who have to tread into the boundaries are the certification TPs and they tend to do things very conservatively these days.

Two areas are stupid if travelled without great care .. low level OEI operations and Vmca simulations.

On the latter matter, I recall the way a good colleague would handle the excesses of GA instructors when forced to do an endorsement, say, to complete an IR renewal ... he just applied a counter load on the rudder so that the obtained static Vmc was some considerable margin above the value for full rudder .. had a number of instructors scratching their heads .. "it went a lot slower than this last time ... ?

Having known A37575 for many years I can attest that he is both a very competent and conservative instructor. One would do well to heed his greybeard observations.

[A37575]

and, after the student has continuously demonstrated a high proficiency standard of handling such emergencies at altitude.

Could you give more detail to the words "continuously demonstrated". How many practice engine failures at `altitude` would you say were needed in order to demonstrate ` a high proficiency` Maybe five, ten, fifteen or even twenty? In fact there is no figure, is there? If the student does a good job of it two or three times then he is competent and has demonstrated high proficiency.

If he then shows the same proficiency when conducting a practice engine failure shortly after take off then there is no point in thrashing him time and again with practice engine failures after take off. You are wasting his time and money. There are those instructors who simply love cutting engines after take off until such times the student makes one cock-up on identification or procedure and the instructor says "GOTCHA BY THE BALLS THAT TIME MATE" And that is the excuse he needed to do more and more engine failures until the next mistake and so on.

As one Ppruner replied the sequence of engine failure after take off is fraught with danger (unless it is in a flight simulator). If the sequence is conducted with the usual precaution against mis-handling it is not `fraught`with danger anymore than crosswind landings are fraught with danger. Having said that I agree that cutting the mixture to simulate engine failure after take off is indeed fraught with danger since a real engine failure has been deliberately induced rather than a simulated failure caused by throttle closure. Big difference and one which has caused loss of lives.

[PA39]

It all depends on each individual. We are not knocked out like sausages and each studend should be judged on his merits and ability. A GOOD experienced M/E instructor (not a 200hr pop out) would have the expertise to determine when the student has reached a SAFE standard. Yep some "guns" don't need much repetition and some not so gun need more training.

I have been there, EFATO at night at 250' with a 300' hill straight ahead with beacon flashing. I thank God that I had been taught by the likes of Jim H, Treva W and Ray B on how to maintain the 3C's (cool, calm, and collected). When it happens for real, unexpected it could all go to putty real quick.

Getting back to our case study where the student misidentified the failed engine.....where was the verification? Personally I think that students rush through their drill and phases in an emergency.......the MOST IMPORTANT thing is to FLY the AIRCRAFT. Lets face it most light twins have a near zero or - ROC on one donk at AUW and the numbers preached in the FM are/were for certification purposes only, on a new aircraft with new engines flown by a factory test pilot. The cemetries are full of highly competent pilots who did everything by the book and still ended up a hole in the ground. Students had to explain to me thoroughly what they are going to do in the case of EFATO, not just parrot talk..... choices, close it down and land straight ahead, clean up and continue on, do a left or right circuit, box or oval (over a built up area?)...what altitude? If they can't explain exactly without hesitation on the ground, then they will struggle if it happens once airborne.

[Di_Vosh]

A37575 I'm not sure what you're getting at.

You've titled the thread Low altitude mixture cuts in twin training still occuring despite CASA warnings

and then quote

Control was lost when the student mis-identified the engine failure and the aircraft went into an incipient spin.

So which is it? Did the aircraft lose control because of the method in which the instructor simulated engine failure, or did the aircraft lose control because the student mis-identified which engine failed?

Or did the accident happen simply because the simluated engine failure (regardless of how it was simulated) was conducted below a safe height?

These two crashes and others before them prove that instructors should not risk the lives of their students with dangerous practices in attempts at realism.

Agree totally. I've been told that there are more deaths from simulated EFATO's in light twins than there have been in actual EFATO's in light twins.

As others have said, I think that the practice of simulated engine failures in light twins shouldn't be allowed AT ALL below a certain height.

DIVOSH!

[A37575]

So which is it? Did the aircraft lose control because of the method in which the instructor simulated engine failure, or did the aircraft lose control because the student mis-identified which engine failed?

Apologies - not very well worded. Suggest a good read of the two ATSB Camden reports - both of which are indicated by links in the initial recent ATSB publication I referred to. Mis-identification can occur whichever simulated engine failure technique an instructor decides to use. The danger lies in the mixture cut at low level since not only has the instructor have to swiftly juggle a closed mixture and a closed throttle and then re-open the ` failed` engine but he also has to take over in case the student has made a major cock-up.

If the `failed` engine does not pick up when the mixture is moved from cut-off to rich then the situation becomes grim indeed as that engine is now dead and the prop windmilling. if you think the chances of that happening (engine not picking up) is just about zero in real life, then look at it this way. When training on single engine aircraft on practice engine failures on climb out after take off, why don't instructors cut the mixture control on those single engine types to `simulate` engine failure? After all the engine types are usually similar.

No instructor in his right mind would seriously consider cutting a mixture in a single engine trainer after take off. Well, why not? The answer is simply because the aircraft would be left with no power if the mixture was moved from cut-off to rich and nothing happened for whatever technical reason. Down goes the aircraft... Same principle applies to cutting the mixture on a twin and the engine may not always start when the mixture is moved back to rich. It is always a gamble.

[Unhinged]

If the `failed` engine does not pick up when the mixture is moved from cut-off to rich then the situation becomes grim indeed as that engine is now dead and the prop windmilling.

the aircraft would be left with no power if the mixture was moved from cut-off to rich and nothing happened for whatever technical reason

Sorry A37575, your argument is not specific to mixture cuts. If you use throttle to simulate engine failure and the engine doesn't pick up when you move the lever back up, then you still have no useful power. The mechanics of the throttle linkage and the mixture linkage are very similar, and neither is any more likely to fail than the other. Power is returned just as quickly whether you use throttle or mixture in the simulated failure. The gamble (as you put it) is exactly the same one, with exactly the same odds of losing.

There are two things that do give me the heebees in asymmetric training - Simulated failures at low level, and using fuel shut-off valves to do the failure. Low level failures have been thoroughly thrashed here and elsewhere, and using fuel valves to stop the fuel means an extended and indeterminate delay once fuel is turned back on before fuel will be returned to the engine: That is the really bad choice in all of this.

[Avgas172]

Sorry A37575, your argument is not specific to mixture cuts. If you use throttle to simulate engine failure and the engine doesn't pick up when you move the lever back up, then you still have no useful power. The mechanics of the throttle linkage and the mixture linkage are very similar, and neither is any more likely to fail than the other. Power is returned just as quickly whether you use throttle or mixture in the simulated failure. The gamble (as you put it) is exactly the same one, with exactly the same odds of losing.


There is in fact a considerable difference, in one case the engine is completely shut down & requires a restart & windmilling only assists the restart, in the other the engine is simply idling under no thrust power & will return to full power on application of the throttle.

[PA39]

Well said CM :ok:

[Unhinged]

a considerable difference
The two approaches intuitively feel different, but they are not - The result is the same when you consider them objectively; The engine is producing minimal or zero power, because one of the necessities for combustion has been substantially reduced or removed. The engine continues rotating, and the restoration of sufficient air, fuel and spark will see it accelerate to normal speed.

the engine ... will return to full power on application of the throttle.
Anyone who believes that statement as a certainty, and operates aircraft that way, will eventually find out just how hard an aircraft can bite, unfortunately.

If you use the throttle to simulate the failure, a tired throttle accelerator pump may allow the engine to stumble when you push the throttle open, or very low power settings on a running engine may allow plug fouling. Where's the full power at a critical moment now ? Neither of those problems would have occurred if the mixture had been used to simulate engine failure.

There is no perfect answer, but we need more light and less heat in the discussion. Here's a couple of quotes from Lycoming. I suggest reading the whole article.(http://www.lycoming.textron.com/support/tips-advice/key-reprints/pdfs/Key%20Operations.pdf)
Big radial piston engines with short, stubby crankshafts could tolerate the abrupt technique. However, flat-opposed piston engines with their long crankshafts and attached counterweights could not as readily take the abuse of suddenly snapping a throttle shut, particularly at takeoff or climb power. Use of the latter technique would tend to detune crankshaft counterweights and could possibly result in a nasty engine failure.
...
Since it was common technique by flight instructors to terminate power abruptly to simulate an engine power loss, we had to protect the engine. As a result, we published in our Engine Operator’s Manual and in Service Bulletin No. 245, the recommendation that if the power was abruptly terminated, it must be accomplished with the mixture control. Of course, this was intended for the higher altitudes where a complete engine shut-down could be conducted safely.
...
In our publications, we then explained the reason for using the mixture to abruptly terminate power. By putting the mixture control in idle cutoff position with the throttle in a normal open or operating position, the pilot merely cut off the fuel, but allowed the air to continue to fill the cylinders with resulting normal compression forces that are sufficient to cushion the deceleration of the engine and prevent the detuning of the crankshaft counterweights.

However, any practice of simulated engine-out condition at low altitudes should be best accomplished by a slow retardation of the throttle in accordance with the NTSB recommendation.


Lastly, there are important instructional principles involved in using mixture rather than throttle to simulate the failure. When I slide a map between throttle and mixture levers, I'm signalling that this is a practice engine failure; The student doesn't know when the failure will occur or which engine it will be, and they get normal cues about the engine failing. Nothing has changed in what they are required to do, or when, or what should trigger their actions. If I use throttle, they immediately know exactly what's happened, but even more importantly, they know it from non-normal cues - The gear warning horn and the throttle lever position. I've taught them a falsehood.

In accordance with the Lycoming and NTSB documents, I do use smooth throttle retardation where appropriate, but I rarely practice asymmetric engine failures at heights where that is applicable anyway.

[Old Akro]

My main argument against mixture cuts is that (especially for turbocharged engines) its not a very kind thing for the engine. There is no need for the simulated power loss to be total & sudden. Its unlikely to occur in a black & white sense like that in real life. A gradual power reduction using throttle then simulating zero thrust instead of feathering is much more kind to the cylinder heads.

As for low level training - one of the best learning experiences I've had was a simulated engine failure at about 50 ft. I don't think it needs to be part of the recurrent training regime, but as a one off experience as part of the multi endorsement it was gold. However, the caveat is that it was a country airport with no traffic and flat paddocks in front of us. It has no place in any other environment. I couldn't tell you how the instructor did the cut. I was fully absorbed with other activities. And he never restored the power. We climbed up to circuit height at about 100 fpm. The flying precision required is indelibly etched in my mind. I don't think you'd learn the lesson any other way.

Each month when I do a sim session I cut an engine (I use mixture here!). Typically midway in an instrument procedure. But here I think the main point of the training is memory reinforcement of the checks and making the initial actions automatic. Whatever SIM the club has does a reasonable job of simulating asymmetric trust.

[BrokenConrod]

My main argument against mixture cuts is that (especially for turbocharged engines) its not a very kind thing for the engine. There is no need for the simulated power loss to be total & sudden. Its unlikely to occur in a black & white sense like that in real life.

It isn't ??

I have had engines quit on two occassions on singles and three occassions on twins when the loss of power was both total.........and sudden !

BC :cool:

[VH-FTS]

Old Akro,

That's a strange way of thinking. You don't like being unkind to the engine by cutting the mixture, but you think a simulated engine failure at 50ft is gold. Sorry mate, that's not gold but bloody stupid. You'll end up being more unkind to the engines when you end up as a smoking hole in your flat paddock. Level terrain means nothing when you lose control.

Unhinged's post debunks the theory many hold about being unkind for many engines. Regarding your turbocharged engine, pulling the throttle would have to be done gradually over many many seconds anyway not to cause damage. However, that could be your strategy if you're trying to simulate a gradual failure rather than an instant one.

There is in fact a considerable difference, in one case the engine is completely shut down & requires a restart & windmilling only assists the restart, in the other the engine is simply idling under no thrust power & will return to full power on application of the throttle.

Avgas, hopefully you've read through some of the posts after yours, which included advice from the engine manufacturer. Pulling the mixture, in most training aircraft since about 1960, does not shut down the engine at all. If the prop stops spinning, which will prevent the reapplication of fuel creating power due to no spark, there's a good chance you've lost control anyway as the speed has dropped below Vmc.

I was a member of the 'cut-the-mixture' club and would most likely do so again if I went back to multi-engine instructing. However, I armed myself with info from the manufacturers, engineers and experienced pilots about the type I was flying and didn't go into it blindly. Together with a risk vs reward strategy when it came to student training, I was never put in a dangerous situation. Maybe one day it could have come, but I significantly reduced the risks. I never simulated an engine failure below 400ft, I considered the effect of crosswinds on OEI landings (and therefore which engine to 'fail'), and never shutdown (feathered) an engine below 2500ft. Plus all failures were in day VMC.

One CASA source said to me the CAAP's claim about using the throttle was misleading and the author had spent too much time in turbine engines, forgetting what really occurred in piston engines. Before the rotten tomatoes come, this source had 5000 hours conducting such training and knew his stuff.

[A37575]

Pulling the mixture, in most training aircraft since about 1960, does not shut down the engine at all.

I am getting a bit slow in my dotage and for that reason could you run that by me again? if you cut the mixture the EGT and CHT drop sharply (CHT more slowly of course). The aircraft yaws sharply depending on the power being applied to the second engine. The `dead engine propeller windmills at a rotation rate caused by the indicated airspeed at the time and for all intents and purposes the engine is dead. And now you are staying the engine is operating? :ugh: Try as I may I cannot understand your statement that the mixture cut does not shut down the engine.

[27/09]

A37575

No instructor in his right mind would seriously consider cutting a mixture in a single engine trainer after take off. Well, why not? The answer is simply because the aircraft would be left with no power if the mixture was moved from cut-off to rich and nothing happened for whatever technical reason.

I'm not sure I agree entirely. I cannot answer why engine failures are done this way in singles, except for the fact that Cessna singles like the 152 and 172 have a dirty habit of breaking mixture cables at times.

To me there is a lot of sense to simulate engine failures on singles by "Pulling the mixture". So often when the engine is asked to respond at the end of the exercise, even with normal engine warming/clearing procedures, it can be slow to respond or run rough usually due to plug fouling, something that cannot happen with a lean mixture. Also the chance of carb icing is reduced because there can be no evaporative cooling taking place.

So long as the engine is windmilling all that is needed to restart is advance the mixture.

There will be exceptions but I don't think there is any more risk in using the mixture in a light twin than the throttle to simulate engine failure. One big thing for me in multi engine training is, as has been stated by others, that the mixture cut most closely simulates a real failure and confirmation cannot be obtained from the MP or RPM guages. EGT and fuel flow need to be checked.

P.S.
I agree entirely with you about the stupidity of simulated engine failures at low level.

[Kharon]

Neither the ATSB report or any of the real issues here have bugger all to do with how 'you' as a professional elect to simulate an EFATO in a FAR 23 certified aircraft.

There is requirement, under the CAO to conduct the procedure, like it or lump it.

The real point is, in the past (mixture or throttle) the engine failure occurred at height and speed which ensured (at instructor discretion) that Bloggs did not plough it into the bricks. Good sense, good airmanship and COMMAND discretion from the instructor ensured that 'Bloggs' and his sorry arse arrived back on the ramp, in one piece.

This is not the current argument being flogged around the GAAP airports, 'to the letter of the law' says the resident 'type specialist', do them, or use the Elite, or your brief will be pulled.

'The PIC must be satisfied' etc. (CAO 40.1 - God luv it) part is no longer applicable according to the 'experts' from the bastion of all things irrelevant to aviation safety.

Forget the bloody endless, pointless puerile mixture/ bloody throttle argument. Look at the 'real' cause of the Camden prang, and praise the very experienced man who saved 'em. Both.

Selah.

[VH-FTS]

Try as I may I cannot understand your statement that the mixture cut does not shut down the engine.


The propeller has not been feathered, there is still a source of ignition. Enrichen the mixture on your standard twin trainer, i.e. the Duchess, and power will be restored in less than a second. Doesn't sound shut down to me.

Due to there being no risk in using the mixture to simulate the engine failure, lets consider the other benefits of using this technique. The trainee now gets the benefit of using the throttle to verify the failed engine (i.e. check that changing the throttle setting doesn't cause any yaw). They also get to practice closing the 'failed' throttle and using it as a flag when shutting down other systems. You can't get those training benefits if the instructor closes the throttle.

[VH-FTS]

A37575, going back to your opening statement:


I thought CASA had banned mixture cuts on take off following the earlier Duchess crash? Either way, that technique is fraught with danger of mishandling by either the instructor, the student or both. These two crashes and others before them prove that instructors should not risk the lives of their students with dangerous practices in attempts at realism.


What does using the mixture have anything to do with the student losing control? The same thing would have happened if the throttle was closed. I'm sure you've got some very good experience and teaching techniques, but you're arguing the wrong point here.

[PA39]

VH-FTS used to be a 58 Baron owned and operated by Fennings Timber and flown by Barry Abbott.......a few moons ago now!

[Avgas172]

Avgas, hopefully you've read through some of the posts after yours, which included advice from the engine manufacturer. Pulling the mixture, in most training aircraft since about 1960, does not shut down the engine at all. If the prop stops spinning, which will prevent the reapplication of fuel creating power due to no spark, there's a good chance you've lost control anyway as the speed has dropped below Vmc.



Yes I have, and always happy to abide by the engine manufacturers operating handbook or the aircraft POH, however that is not the point I made. An engine needs spark, air & fuel all at the same time to be considered to be operating. Remove any one of the three and it is in fact shut down. An aero engine windmilling is no different to a car engine braking down a hill with the ignition off (or out of fuel), the engine is not 'operating', in the same scenario with all components of combustion present the car can be said to be coasting, even if the throttle cable had broken the engine is still operating (although unable to supply thrust) as opposed to having no fuel in which case it has 'shut down' .

Kharon, for the first time ever I agree with you.

[Centaurus]

The "Lycoming Flyer" newsletter is a reasonably authoritive source of engine handling information. The last edition of Lycoming's "Key Reprints" 2002 made the following point under the heading of National Transportation Safety Board Warning on Simulated Engine-Out Maneuvers. .

The fatal crash of a light twin in which a flight instructor and an applicant for a multi-engine rating were killed prompted the NTSB to issue an urgent warning to all pilots simulating an engine-out condition on multiengine airplanes. The Board's investigation revealed that some flight instructors do use the fuel selector or the mixture control to shut down an engine to test a multiengine applicant.
Although this is a recommended procedure, the urgent warning was aimed at flight instructors who were using this procedure at altitudes too low for continued safe flight.

The NTSB observed that use of such procedures at traffic pattern altitudes may not permit instructors enough time to overcome possible errors on the part of the applicant. The recommendation by the NTSB means that all simulated engine-out operation at the lower altitudes should be accomplished by carefully retarding the throttle and this should be done slowly and carefully to avoid engine damage or failure. This careful technique will protect the engine and at the same time provide for instant power if it is needed.

I am sure an aviation lawyer would make good use of this statement if needed in a civil case against an instructor involved in an accident such as both Camden accidents referred to in the initial post.

[LeadSled]

The NTSB observed that use of such procedures at traffic pattern altitudes may not permit instructors enough time to overcome possible errors on the part of the applicant.Folks,

And pattern altitude means 1000' agl ---- but, Hey!! What would the NTSB (or the FAA for that matter) know, compared with our "experts".

By the tone of this thread, the fatal twin training accidents at Camden, Bankstown, Archerfield,Tamworth etc. will continue ---- as CASA individuals FOIs make it clear to instructor that "engine failure" means engine failure, none of this whimpy zero thrust nonsense.

After all, "compliance" is the watchword, non-compliance is a strict liability offense. (Creamie --- don't get all pedantic on me --- you know what I mean)

And the instructor/ATOs haven't got the courage and common sense to tell them where to go!

It is a simple fact that we have killed a steady stream of candidates and instructors with EFATO training, compared to the very rare fatalities from "real" engine failures.

This is what contributes to the fact that we have a lousy record for air safety outcomes, compared to the US.

Tootle pip!!

PS: The "student" who was the last fatality at Camden was a Captain with an American airline, with significant and recent GA experience, the instructor asked too much of an aircraft not certified for what he tried to do.
As I recall, the instructor (who has a well deserved reputation for frightening students fartless with his EFATO practices, died the following day.
His poor bloody victim took months to die of his injuries. Dying of massive burns is not a nice way to go.

[VH-FTS]

CASA individuals FOIs make it clear to instructor that "engine failure" means engine failure, none of this whimpy zero thrust nonsense.


Just to wrap up discussing my method, once the failed engine had been identified, verified and the student touched the appropriate pitch lever (calling feather left/right), zero thrust would be set. This involved at MP and RPM setting with the mixture set back to rich. From memory about 10" MP, 2200 RPM or something like that.

Avgas and others, I guess we'll agree to disagree that the engine was shut down. As mentioned previously, power was immediately available once the mixture was restored. This method was different to that of some pilots who used fuel shut offs etc to kill the engine. That is an entirely different kettle of fish that I don't support as a delay could be expected restoring power using such an approach.

[JustJoinedToSearch]

27/09

When I did my inital multi, I was taught to identify the failed engine using the 'dead leg, dead engine' technique, and the confirm by slowly reducing the appropriate throttle and noting any change in the yaw etc.

Surely looking at the guages instead of outside/AH trying to ascertain which engine has failed would do nothing but cause problems?

[Tinstaafl]

You need to check the gauges as well.

If the yaw that you're using to decide if there's a failure event is instead caused by an increased power output on the *other* engine you will have the same symptoms ie a yaw away from the most thrust side, even though the 'yaw towards' side is running normally. Also many failures aren't a clean 'stop'. The failing engine coughs & farts & surges then repeats - causing lots of repeated left & right yawing.

Both of the types above need the pilot to check the gauges to ascertain which is the causative engine. In some cases you'll need to watch the gauges for a bit to see a pattern, including checking for the correct readings on the 'good' engine.

[Avgas172]

Forget the bloody endless, pointless puerile mixture/ bloody throttle argument. Look at the 'real' cause of the Camden prang, and praise the very experienced man who saved 'em. Both.


Clinton, that bit, btw anyone know WTF is selah? :E

[osmosis]

Which Throttle's Frozen?

I'm having difficulty accepting students in twin endorsement training are having trouble identifying a dead engine. How can this be? In either visual or (simulated) IFR conditions, identifying a dead engine on a traditional twin is such a primary task, and I believe a very simple one, I am surprised it keeps coming up on here. How can a student bugger up identifying a non-powered engine, particularly after thorough pre-flight briefings? Almost rhetorical question: Are the latter not conducted anymore?

[PA39]

My observation has been that some instructors become a little complacent at times. Late afternoon sorties are a typical scenario. I am guilty of this and learned the hard way. You alwyas have to expect the unexpected. I note many posts refer to the loss of control....thats exactly what it was, a loss of control due to mishandling. So many students/candidates do not carry out the most important requirement....fly the aircraft......stop the yaw....control your airspeed. Airspeed and Altitude, if you've got one of these you have half a chance, but if you have neither, no chance.

[VH-FTS]

Regarding checking instruments - this needs to be treated with extreme caution.

In most light twins, during the take-off and initial climb it is likely the engines are generating their max power anyway, so it is unlikely a further increase could occur. Possible, such as a prop runaway, but unlikely.

The instruments on a dead engine can seem very live. What's the MP pressure on an engine providing no power? Somewhere around 29-30" depending on the conditions. Unless feathered, a prop could still be providing 22-2300 rpm while it windmills. These two indications can make the engine look like it is providing power during the heat of battle.

A PA31 incident at Archerfield many moons ago proves this. The pilot believed he was still generating power based on what he saw on the instruments and elected not to secure the failed engine. It took him around 12nm to climb to 1000 odd feet, but hey, he must have been generating power right? Subsequent investigation found he saw close to what I spoke about before.

While an increase in power can lead to misidentification of a failed engine, one needs to pick the time and place to start feeding this info to fresh, overwhelmed minds.

In any case, moving the throttle through its travel, and checking there was no change in yaw or noise, should allow you to identify whether there is a problem and avoid securing a perfectly good engine.

[PA39]

Agreed! Never go to your instruments initially. If unsure of which donk has failed or which way the nose has yawed.....look at the ball on the turn coordinator, kick the ball to the centre square!

[LeadSled]

Just to wrap up discussing my method, once the failed engine had been identified, verified and the student touched the appropriate pitch lever (calling feather left/right), zero thrust would be set.

VH-FTS,
And the point of my comment is that individuals in CASA will cancel your twin training approvals for this ----- as, in their current view, it does not conform with their "legal" interpretations that the engine must be "failed", to "simulate" an engine failure.

As to the views about the last Camden accident, the instructor did a good job??? Please explain??

Tootle pip!!

[Unhinged]

If the yaw that you're using to decide if there's a failure event is instead caused by an increased power output on the *other* engine you will have the same symptoms
I have yet to fly a GA piston twin which had any serious chance of suffering from increased power on any engine - even more so during the take-off sequence.

need the pilot to check the gauges to ascertain which is the causative engine
The gauges on a dead or dying piston engine which is windmilling give very similar readings to the working engine. In the workload of a single-pilot asymmetric departure, with an aircraft that's barely staying in the air let alone managing to climb, misreading the gauges is a very high likelihood.

Unless you're in IMC, your eyes should be outside the aircraft. Gauges are a cross-check, but they should only confirm what you already know.

[Avgas172]

quote: WTF is selah?

Selah (Hebrew: סֶלָה‎, also transliterated as selāh) is a word used frequently in the Hebrew Bible, often in the Psalms, and is a difficult concept to translate. (It should not be confused with the Hebrew word sela‘ (Hebrew: סֶלַע‎) which means "rock.") It is probably either a liturgico-musical mark or an instruction on the reading of the text, something like "stop and listen". "Selah" can also be used to indicate that there is to be a musical interlude at that point in the Psalm.[1] The Amplified Bible states Selah as "pause, and think of that".


answered with google ....
cheers
A172

[VH-FTS]

LeadSled,

Not in my neck of the woods. In fact, it was a CASA FOI who changed my technique from throttle to mixture.

But I guess there lies the problem. No consistency from them, some strange ideas about how things should be done, yet they expect instructors to know the square root of the pickle. One of the major reasons I had to get out of instructing.

Lead, regarding your last comment asking whether the pilot did a good job, not sure if that was aimed at me or someone else. I wouldn't have a clue about that particular case, but I wanted to join in the debate about multi training. There was some strange stuff being posted, which needed balance in case any new or aspiring meta instructors were reading.

[osmosis]

May I put another foot in the water and ask what's the current acceptance and/or procedure for single engine approach and landings in a conventional twin? It was done in my day, I have no idea now.

[Unhinged]

I do. At the very least one full feather-shutdown-secure-and-landing in an endorsement, and preferably two or three. Also at least one gear failure and manual extention. And any other emergency that I can safely demonstrate in the aircraft.

[VH-FTS]

If CASA want you to shutdown and feather the prop to simulate the failure, they're going against their own documentation. From the CAAP, feathering not recommended:


Propellers should never be feathered in flight during training below 3000 ft above ground level (AGL).



Finally, CASA strongly recommends that, when practicing asymmetric flight, an aircraft should never be landed with the propeller of a serviceable engine feathered. The risk far outweighs the minimal benefits, with abundant examples of such unnecessary risks proving fatal. If a landing with a feathered propeller on a serviceable engine is contemplated, a
comprehensive risk assessment should be made and a clear plan developed. The plan should include weather, traffic air traffic control and any other factors


But nothing says you can't use the mixture to simulate the failure. It only talks about the throttle being kinder to the engine, which has previously been proven incorrect.


5.5.2 Instructors must emphasise that during a practice
engine failure, when the throttle is closed and the propeller is
windmilling this replicates the situation of high propeller
drag that exists until the propeller is ‘simulated feathered’,
when zero thrust is set. Slowly closing the throttle is
probably one of the methods used to simulate an engine
failure. Although selecting idle cut-off may be kinder to an
engine, the engine or aircraft manufacturer may not permit
it, so slowly closing the throttle to idle or zero thrust is
unlikely to harm the engine and allows for immediate
restoration of power. When setting zero thrust (only after the
student has completed the simulated feathering), throttle
movements should not be rapid, and of course the student
should have been briefed about your actions.

[Avgas172]

But nothing says you can't use the mixture to simulate the failure. It only talks about the throttle being kinder to the engine, which has previously been proven incorrect.


FTS ..... proven?

[Unhinged]

Proven, documented and published by Lycoming. For some mysterious reason I find them a more authoritative source than CASA when it comes to matters of engine handling.

If a landing with a feathered propeller on a serviceable engine is contemplated, a comprehensive risk assessment should be made and a clear plan developed.

As if a competent instructor would do it any other way.

[Tinstaafl]

Who's just talking about pistons? Turboprops fit in the lightie category for certification ie FAR23. I flew a Cheyenne 1 the other day. PT6s can have a failure that causes a massive power increase on the affected engine. In that instance, 'dead foot, dead engine' is also likely to be 'dead pilot'.

Anyway, a failed engine isn't necessarily the clean stop, black & white process that tends to be what happens in training. A surging, rough running piston engine also needs gauges to be checked. Not just for the suspected problem, but also to find the *good* engine . Random (or semi-random) yawing back & forth isn't really amenable to a simple 'dead foot, dead engine' philosophy. You can find yourself dancing on the rudder pedals to hold a heading.

As for confirming what you already 'know': Better would be '...what you *suspect*'. Lots of accidents where the pilot made the information available fit his or her preconception. It's important to look for contradictory evidence too.

[thorn bird]

Around, around, around she goes...and where she stops....??
Well old Macca can go on risking his and his students necks for all his worth.
Me???..past it now, dont like sitting there sucking up leather these days..besides I sort of want to enjoy the grandkids.
Used to be a real "Gun" in my early instructor days..leave my students white faced gibbering wrecks!!...until enlightenment, and getting the crap frightened out of me, then I realised a rational "Safer" approach achieved the same result..which is "Competence"...can take a little longer...but a hell of a lot safer, you just have to build a scenario and make it believable, with lots of air between your ass and the rocks...and to hell with the "regulator"..one of whom thinks a microsoft bench top simulator will give a student a realistic demonstration of assymetric performance.
No browney points for killing your student guys.
Oh!..and for those that subscibe to full feathered approaches..Technically with an engine shutdown and feathered you are in an emergency situation.
Until such time that the engine is restarted and the prop unfeathered.
Do you declare an emergency when you feather one?

[Unhinged]

Who's just talking about pistons?Everyone else. Your point about turbines is well made, but I never saw a mixture control in the cockpit of a turbine aircraft, and that's been the guts of much of the discussion. Sorry, I have no idea about FAR23, or what it might mean to this thread.

Technically with an engine shutdown and feathered you are in an emergency situation.Are you saying that as personal opinion or regulatory requirement ? In either case I don't agree with you, and nor does CAO 20.6 or anything else in the Regs that I know of.

[Centaurus]

Quote:
Technically with an engine shutdown and feathered you are in an emergency situation.
Are you saying that as personal opinion or regulatory requirement ? In either case I don't agree with you, and nor does CAO 20.6 or anything else in the Regs that I know of.
Unhinged is online now Report Post Reply

In light twins with their characteristic lack of single engine performance, landing with a prop feathered - whether a practice or due to engine failure - is worthy of a PAN call to alert ATC. In any case, deliberately feathering a prop for a "practice" single engine landing is bordering on reckless behaviour by the instructor since there is no regulatory requirement to do so. The handling of the aircraft with prop feathered or with the `dead` engine set at zero thrust is practically identical. Zero thrust landings are clearly good risk mitigation - while the former is high risk if numerous relevant accident reports are anything to go by.

[VH-FTS]

Engine failures in turboprops are slightly different. Yes, an increase in power can occur. However, the engine instruments provide much more insight as to what is going on, when compared to a twin piston.

Verifying the failed, or failing, engine usually involves checking the engine instruments rather than using a power lever through its range.

[Avgas172]

Proven, documented and published by Lycoming. For some mysterious reason I find them a more authoritative source than CASA when it comes to matters of engine handling.

Or mis-handling more correctly, however the debate is not about whether the engine gets damaged or not, it as I understand, about the safety of the aircrew during the drill.

[VH-FTS]

Mis-handling was not the result of what method of 'simulated engine failure' was used. I highly doubt there is any link at all between mixture cuts and loss of control in asymmetric training.

In every light twin trainer I flew instant power was available once the mixture was restored to rich.

Not that instant power is going to do a lot once control has been lost. Increasing power is not a Vmc-loss of control recovery technique.

[kimwestt]

as I understand and was taught, the ONLY way to identify a problem engine in a turbo prop is by "TORQUE, TEMP, and FUEL FLOW". In the case of an overspeed governor failure, sometimes you might need to take your feet off the rudder pedals (but not too far) and see where the ball goes. Sometimes a bit hard to read a couple of percent on the on the gauge.
To repeat earlier, dead foot - dead engine in a turbo prop can very quickly lead to a dead pilot.:ok:

[john_tullamarine]

One observation I don't think has been noted in the thread -

For an OEI feathered landing on an aeroplane with big wind wallopers there is a significant yaw due drag on the operating engine(s) which won't be seen with a zero thrust situation as all engines go symmetrically to idle at the flare. I've only seen this on the L188 (4 x 4000 HP as I recall) and it certainly gets the pilot's attention if he/she is half asleep.

I don't really think that this problem necessarily warrants real OEI landing practice and, in general, such aircraft usually will have access to simulator training. However, folk should be aware of the problem so that they don't get caught out when the throttles are closed.

Can't say that I've ever noticed any yaw on lighties, though.

[VH-FTS]

John, good point.

The yaw I experienced during a feathered landing with the chief pilot was noticeable, even in a light twin. The biggest thing is the lack of drag - when selected to idle power the windmilling prop would normally be creating a large amount of drag.

The 'opposite' yaw during the flare wasn't huge, but a float could be experienced. I would pre-flight brief the student that during the landing they could reduce power on 'their' engine only - the good one. I had control of the 'dead' engine. I would ensure a small amount of thrust was being generated by the dead engine to simulated feathering.

It was also briefed that if the approach or landing turned to crap, both engines were available to the student. Since the mixture had been returned to rich when setting zero thrust, a go- around setting could quickly be achieved on both engines.

Back to the feathered landing, a review of the ops manual showed intentional feather approaches were not permitted. I wasn't impressed the chief had failed to know this, but to be honest I should have picked it up as well. With all of the risk and stress involved in conducting this sort of approach (for ATC as well) I wasn't keen to do it again.

[PA39]

CAAP 5.23-1 (1) is a great publication. All M/E Instructors should read this thoroughly and then read it twice more. The biggest problem I think is ineperience and complacency. Gee I always demonstrated and observed full feathered landings. Remember you ,the instructor, knows this (the m/e trainer) aircraft like the back of your hand. Yep, sure many times there were "goof" ups but nothing you wern't expecting nor could get out of.

[LeadSled]

Folks,
I would have thought (how naive of me) that the number of fatalities we have on record during EFATO training, alone, would be enough to illustrate we have a serious problem.

A quick and dirty analysis says we kill more students and instructors in dual twin training than dual single training ??

Obviously, many of you on this thread still haven't joined the dots ??

As to the most recent accident at Camden, read the ATSB report, and then decide whose description of events was the more credible.

The ATSB leaves that up to you!

Although (curiously) not mentioned in the report, eye witnesses reported that the Twin Comanche's right engine was feathered, and in the pics in the report this seems to be so ----- was this smart ??

Was this training flight in conformity with the CAAP?? - NO

Was this flight in conformity with the "informal compliance instructions" of CASA YSBK?? - YES

Was this a great display of airmanship and CBS (aka common bloody sense) - What do you think??

The pilot (instructor) must be the greatest pilot since Pontius, from 400', stalled, rolled through 120 degrees, spun, recovered vertical nose down and recovered (with full tips) to wings level and almost "normal" attitude --- all in 400', in a Twin Comanche ---- or anything else, for that matter??

It's only a short report (sadly), make up your own mind.

Isn't it about time we stopped killing people "practicing" maneuvers for which the aircraft is not certified --- and often contrary to the AFM -- AFM compliance which is required by law --- despite anything said to the contrary by CASA FOIs.

Tootle pip!!

PS 1: -FTS, no, I wasn't referring/alluding to you ------ but please ignore the "recommendation" of a ratbag FOI ---- and just do as the NTSB/FAA says, anything more is a lousy risk/reward equation --- but rational risk management has never been Australian aviation's strong point ----- as born out by the record, there for all to see.

PS 2: Another ripper from CASA YSBK was "demanding" that the stall/attitude warning and stick pusher on Metro III/23 be disabled and the aircraft pulled into a full stall, to "comply with the CAO". It took a very strongly worded letter from the aircraft manufacturer to pull the plug on this suicidal nonsense.

PS 3: I worked for an airline whose rules suited me just fine --- shutting down an engine (except in a genuine emergency --- and before you ask, this was before simulators better than the Link IV ), was prohibited below 3000', and then only in daylight, VMC. Given said airline's reputation for training excellence and safe operation, is there a message here?? ---- all their aircraft ARE certified to continue after an EFATO at V1 or after.

PS 4: Craig Butson's ( Polar Air) troubles all started after a refusal to operate to the instructions of an FOI --- instructions that were contrary to the CAAP and all the other CASA recommendations about precautions to be taken during any asymmetric training.

[Tee Emm]

Gee I always demonstrated and observed full feathered landings. Remember you ,the instructor, knows this (the m/e trainer) aircraft like the back of your hand. Yep, sure many times there were "goof" ups but nothing you wern't expecting nor could get out of.

After the war many newly graduated RAAF pilots who had only ever flown Tiger Moths and Wirraways, were given their initial multi engine training on the four-engine Lincoln bomber at Amberley, Townsville and some at East Sale. Keep in mind this big bomber was a wartime tailwheel design. The conversion course included practice feathered prop landings and go-arounds.

Several of these aircraft crashed (two at Townsville alone) during asymmetric training with prop feathered. The flying instructors of these aircraft were highly experienced pilots yet they stuffed up. RAAF HQ realised they were losing more Lincolns to practice feathered landings than in day to day normal operations and directed that in future practice feathered landings were prohibited. Zero thrust approach and landings were substituted instead. The same applied to all RAAF multi-engined prop aircraft. The accident rate went to zero.

Draw your own conclusions.

[Henry The Octopus]

Hi there Leadsled,

Well done yet again for demonstrating (yet again) that you do not know what you're talking about - particularly with the Butson matter....

What's that saying? "Better to keep your mouth shut and be thought of as an idiot than to open your mouth and remove all doubt". Yep, that sounds like you...

Cheers.

BTW it's CLARK not CRAIG - before sprouting off about things you know next to nothing about, please get your facts straight!!

Tootle pip!!

[Avgas172]

Looks like it's gonna get nasty ...... :mad:

[Up-into-the-air]

EFATO - Simulating an engine failure

The old report is useful reading:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3460925/ab2011077.pdf, which in part says:

“An article published in the July-August 2004 edition of Flight Safety Australia ‘Engine out’ stated that:

‘Accepted practice at most flying schools is to simulate engine failure by cutting the mixture control, resulting in failure of the engine due to fuel starvation, or to close the throttle.’

While the use of the mixture control provides a more realistic representation of an engine failure situation, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) states that moving the mixture control to the idle cut-off position to simulate an engine failure should never be used at low altitude as it may compromise the ability to restore power to the failed engine promptly.

This accident highlights the critical importance of conducting the appropriate response actions following both an actual or simulated engine failure in a multi-engine aircraft; and the inherent risks of using the mixture control to simulate a failure at low altitude.”

Question is:

What is casa’s current practice and pass/ fail by the FOI’s???

[PA39]

CASA FOI's should practise what they preach!!..maybe!!

[Up-into-the-air]

Be a few less of them - no doubt!!!!!

[601]

I have yet to fly a GA piston twin which had any serious chance of suffering from increased power on any engine - even more so during the take-off sequence.

What would happen in a turbocharged light twin if the waste-gate controller failed to the closed position.

Overboost with a yaw away from the "failed" (overboosted) engine?

[MakeItHappenCaptain]

Similar event to a wastegate failing open. If you retard the throttle and the noise changes (similar to misidentifying a failed engine), leave it alone. MP check will show up the issue VERY quickly and corrective action can be taken. If it is a failed open scenario, any thrust is better than a feathered engine. A wastegate failing open will still produce around 75% power at sea level in a PA-31.

Overboost is simply controlled by reducing throttle. With the Diff Pressure and Dens. Alt. controllers on a 31, they allow oil to bleed out of the system to open the wastegate. Excessively cold oil can produce an overboost (too thick and unable to leave the system). Even experienced it once, control change nowhere near the degree of a severe power loss failure, though.

[Up-into-the-air]

The Brasilia in Darwin [EFATO]:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3546615/ao-2010-019.pdf

[A37575]

A student recently completed an initial multi-engine endorsement at a Moorabbin flying school. The grade one instructor simulated engine failure after take-off on several occasions by cutting the mixture control, rather than closing the throttle.

Some years ago, CASA produced a CAAP after several fatal accidents involving simulated engine failures using the mixture control? The following extract from CAAP 5.23-1 amplifies this by stating:

“Do not simulate an engine failure using procedures that may jeopardise the restoration of power. It would be folly to simulate an engine failure at low level by selecting the mixture to idle cut-off or turning the fuel selector off. These procedures would be more appropriate at higher altitude”.

The above case involves just one senior one instructor at Moorabbin. But it makes one wonder how many other instructors deliberately disregard the sensible advice published in the CASA CAAP? In addition, if CASA is aware of this continued practice, why hasn’t it taken appropriate non-compliance action?

Surely the risks involved with mixture cuts after take-off, as well as the safety message published in the applicable CAAP, should be emphasised during the CASA approved multi-engine instructors’ course. On the other hand, there are doubtless some instructors who, in their over-confidence in their own abilities, refuse to change their ways in this regard. Maybe CASA needs to get its collective fingers out and fix the problem before another accident like the fatal Duchess accident at Camden occurs.

[Checkboard]

Turning off the fuel would be foolhardy ...

but there IS NO SAFETY DIFFERENCE in simulating engine failure by pulling the mixture to idle cut-off, compared to pulling the throttle to idle. :rolleyes:

[Aimpoint]

http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-general-aviation-questions/463536-low-altitude-mixture-cuts-twin-training-still-occuring-despite-casa-warnings.html

A37575, you started the above thread as well which provided robust discussion. Why start another thread unless you've got an axe to grind with said senior instructor...

[emeritus]

Turning off the fuel would be......stupid

Turning theMixture to Idle Cut Off would be ......foolhardy

Pulling the Throttle to zero thrust would be........good airmanship

Emeritus

[Horatio Leafblower]

It's pretty scary... every time I loop a C152, or a Chipmunk, or a Citabria, the engine stops.

I had no idea that I was in such danger. :rolleyes:

[Josh Cox]

There is no mandated requirement on mixture or throttle.

So it is basically a preference thing.

Pulling the mixture on a piston for EFATO training will not make the wings fall off.

It is far more realistic than a throttle cut, throttle cuts will not give you the assymetric yaw required to properly demonstrate what you would see in an actual engine failure.

I personally would not shut down a turbine whilst conducting EFATO training with the condition lever / Stop and feather or fire wall shut off.

Some believe a throttle cut may be safer ( I do not agree, if you mess up either and VMCA into the ground its the same outcome, watch the airspeed and adjust as required, restart the other engine if the fecal matter is going to hit the fan ).

if CASA is aware of this continued practice, why hasn’t it taken appropriate non-compliance action? Which piece of legislation would you suggest these instructors are in breach of ? ( noting : CAAPS are not legislated ).

I have been tested by the CASA FOI's many times, to the best of my recollection, every time they used the mixture.

Emeritus, what makes you so certain of what is and is not good airmanship ?, re-inventing the wheel are we ?.:)

[Old Akro]

Probably a higher risk of carby icing from taking the engine to idle than a mixture cut. In both situations the rpm is about the same, so the engines are pumping about the same amount of air ao the same temperature. For the minute or so that the engine is shut down the residual heat of the engine probably means the engine temps are pretty similar. But, at idle you still have the effect of evaporative cooling from the fuel spray in the carburetor cooling the carburetor venturi which doesn't exist if the mixture is cut.

Maybe there is an argument that mixture cuts are safer after all?

[Josh Cox]

Old Akro,

I have never conducted multi engine training on an aircraft with a Carby engine, but what you've spoken of is a very real threat in my mind.

With the training I've conducted, unless you feather the prop, the prop is still rotating due to the airflow, if the engine is needed at short notice, which does happen on occasion ( that's why its called training ): take over, lower the nose, mixture rich and the engine fires back to life instantly.

I will never never never feather a prop when conducting EFATO training, as soon as the pilot in the LH seat correctly identifies the failure, I will set the mixture to rich ( or there abouts ) and set zero thrust ( circa 12-14 inches ).

I would also never feather a turbine, zero thrust also. With condition lever at high idle the prop will still take +10 seconds come out of feather and start producing TQ ( clearly does not apply to Garretts ).

Restarting a piston engine with a prop in feather is a PITA and does not always restart.

Most legislation finds it's genesis in the many and varied accidents the industry experiences.

[A37575]

Probably a higher risk of carby icing from taking the engine to idle than a mixture cut

I doubt if carb ice would form to a significant degree in the less than 15 seconds it takes to close the throttle to simulate engine failure, have the student identify which engine has `failed` and for the instructor to then add a little power on that engine to simulate zero thrust (nominally around 12inches of manifold pressure).

Following the Air North Brasilia fatal crash at Darwin where the check pilot pulled back the throttle to simulate engine failure shortly after lift off, CASA mandated that all future emergency training in certain types of aircraft (practice engine failure on take off), must be conducted in an approved flight simulator. This mandate recognised the risks involved with any deliberate low altitude engine failure practice.

The history of these type of accidents due to mis-handling of practice engine failures in multi-engine aircraft, goes back many decades. Indeed, a fatal crash at Camden in a de Havilland Dove in the 1950's was caused by the then common practice of not only pulling the mixture but actually feathering the prop. A senior DCA Examiner of Airman was killed in that crash while the instructor lost an eye. Clearly the instructor took the chance that everything would work out OK and tragically it didn't.

Let's not be coy about all this. Pulling the mixture fails the engine dead and the prop immediately windmills creating drag that will prevent a positive rate of climb. That is why the feathering propeller was designed in the first place. So the instructor has created an immediate serious emergency when there was nothing wrong with the engine in the first place.

If the instructor is so enthusiastic as to create a real emergency shortly after lift off in order to show off to his student how realistic the situation has become, maybe he should spare the time one day to speak to the relatives of those who have lost their lives in the push for realism. I doubt if he would receive much admiration from them for his actions.

Of course asymmetric training is a requirement; but I would have thought that common sense (good airmanship) would dictate caution when dicking around with practice engine failures near the ground, where the room for error is small. There will always be macho personalities among certain types of instructors who, in their misguided and even reckless enthusiasm, will risk the lives of their students in order to demonstrate realism. Wiser heads will have learned from the lessons of the past and realise there is a limit to realism, beyond which is sheer idiocy. Some may argue mixture cuts at low level fall into the latter category.

[Josh Cox]

Let's not be coy about all this. Pulling the mixture fails the engine dead and the prop immediately windmills creating drag that will prevent a positive rate of climb. That is why the feathering propeller was designed in the first place. place. So the instructor has created an immediate serious emergency when there was nothing wrong with the engine in the first place. I disagree, the situation is a very real and scary situation you could find yourself in the middle of, having some quality hands on training is valuable for actually dealing with the situation in real life.

Sure, its entails a greater level of risk than flying around on two engines, but when the instructor is both well trained and experienced, the risk can be greatly reduced.

A multi engine aircraft with EFATO, using the correct technique, is capable of climbing.

Its the application of the correct procedures, drills and technique that allows the aircraft to fly away from the ground, not whether the instructor retards the throttle or mixture.

Of course asymmetric training is a requirement; but I would have thought that common sense (good airmanship) would dictate caution when dicking around with practice engine failures near the ground, where the room for error is small. There will always be macho personalities among certain types of instructors who, in their misguided and even reckless enthusiasm, will risk the lives of their students in order to demonstrate realism. Wiser heads will have learned from the lessons of the past and realise there is a limit to realism, beyond which is sheer idiocy. Some may argue mixture cuts at low level fall into the latter category. A37575, do you have a personal agenda ?, sounds to me like you dislike this instructor and are not willing to vary from this mindset.

[Up-into-the-air]

What is the AFM?? and what does it say:

The real issue here is what the Aircraft Flight Manual [AFM] says - which is the only legal way the aircraft can be operated.

In the case that I have used, which is relevant to the PA-30 "caused prang" at Camden.

The flight manual is as below and it says that simulated engine failure should be performed at an altitude that will allow for enough room for safe recovery (5000FT min. terrain clearance is recommended) should control of the aircraft be lost.

The AFM for a PA30-160 [A,B and C] is below.:

http://i1175.photobucket.com/albums/r623/soilmaster/pa30-emgproc.jpg

We must read and obey the AFM.

It is there for our safety, otherwise we are entering the world of a "test pilot".

[LeadSled]

A multi engine aircraft with EFATO, using the correct technique, is capable of climbing.

Josh Cox,
With all due respect, that statement is simply not true for a FAR 23 piston twin.

Under some circumstances, it will, or maybe not, excepting aircraft certified to the "Commuter amendment", it's all in the AFM for the aircraft.

Unless somebody wants to correct me ( I wouldn't want to make the heinous and earth shattering mistake of confusing the first names of my two friends "Butson" again) I don't know of a type of twin commonly used for initial twin training in Australia, which is certified to continue after an engine failure on takeoff.

I would also read CAR 138 carefully ---then read the AFM for whatever you are flying --- if you live after the bingle, CASA may not be your greatest problem ---- it could very well be the insurance company/aircraft owner.

Frankly, I would have thought that the steadily rising death toll from practices that should have been abandoned years ago, was argument enough.

Tootle pip!!

PS: Polar Air --- I would prefer to believe the description of C.Butson, Esq. as to the genesis of the audit that proved so disastrous for Polar Air, than alternative histories. But, hey, it's a free world, you can believe in Chemtrails, if you are so disposed.

[Aimpoint]

A37575, let it go, you're like an OC dog who won't stop chasing that tennis ball...

You're confusing many things bringing the Air North crash into it yet debating mixture cuts at the same time. Who gives a flying f$&@ whether you use the mixture or throttle in a piston - the killer, literally, it the circumstances whe the simulated failure occurs. Mishandling at low level or slow airspeed kills people, not the fact the mixture was used. Guess what, in every light twin I simulated engine failures in, riching the mixture would instantly provide power. Not saying this will happen for every twin in the world, but I did the research and it worked for the light twins I flew - which probably make up 90% of the twin training market.

Go up in your typical twin trainer and experiment mixture vs throttle and the rubbish you're talking about windmilling. The prop will 'windmill' no matter the technique until a zero thrust setting is used. The mixture has to be richened for this setting even if the idle cut was originally used.

Go back and re-read the informed posts on the previous pages which explain why pulling the mixture isnt 'shutting down' the engine.

Then go have a beer, chill out and worry about yourself instead of trying to change everyone. If you want to stick to throttle cuts, go for it, but don't crucify those who use mixture cuts after considering the engine, aircraft type and how they'll set zero thrust as per the AFM. And if CASA's FOIs all have different opinions about 'how' to simulate the failure, what chance do us mere mortals have?

The topic that should be debated is 'low level simulated engine failures' In general - leave the initial failure technique out of it.

[Josh Cox]

Captain Sled,

Under some circumstances, it will, or maybe notNo argument from me.

I was not referring to certification status of said aircraft, generally speaking, two pilots onboard, two hours fuel, capital city airport, ISA + 10 with ten knots of head wind, the "general training environment", most, if not all aircraft will have some form of positive performance when correctly flown, which as a part of the training environment offers some really good lessons to the trainee pilot. ( poorly described by me, but that was my general concept )

A C402B, with fours hours fuel, 6 POB at YBMA on a 42 degree day, from my experience, does not climb...........................

Up-in-the-air:

The word "recommended" and "should" does not mandate a requirement ( different to "must").

The words: can, should, must, recommended, prohibited etc etc all have very different meanings.

Try reading the Jepps, looking very closely at these words. It changes to meaning of many things quite considerably.

[seneca208]

A good read this thread, for anybody who flies twins!

From a students point of view however, I've never had any problem with having the mixture cut on simulated EFATO. I've never felt unsafe, but of course I've never experienced a problem restarting the engine when the instructor is setting simulated feather. I personally don't see it as a big issue, as there's certainly a multitude of other problems that COULD happen, unrelated to the engine, that would stop the aircraft from climbing/maintaing height.

Does having the mixture cut as opposed to closing the throttle have any affect as to how the student would see and respond to a real life scenario? In my scenarios, the instructor has always used his other hand to shelter my eyes from the mixture, leaving it up to me to decipher which engine has failed as per instruments, visual clues or whatever it may be. Additionally, I personally felt a slight urgency to learn and conduct my checks accurately with the mixture cut as opposed to being able to immediately apply climb power if I stuffed anything up.

[Aimpoint]

Additionally, I personally felt a slight urgency to learn and conduct my
checks accurately with the mixture cut as opposed to being able to immediately apply climb power if I stuffed anything up.


In your typical light twin i.e. PN68, Duchess, Seneca etc., by increasing the mixture back to rich you will have full power available again within about 1 second. Never had any hiccups using this technique in over 1000 hours of piston multi-engine training.

[seneca208]

In your typical light twin i.e. PN68, Duchess, Seneca etc., by increasing the mixture back to rich you will have full power available again within about 1 second. Never had any hiccups using this technique in over 1000 hours of piston multi-engine training.

Ah, I completed my initial multi training in a Seneca. Makes sense.

[Tee Emm]

take over, lower the nose, mixture rich and the engine fires back to life instantly.What beautiful confidence. It was only a few years ago when a Seneca 3 crashed and caught fire at Tyabb. The instructor cut the mixture on one engine while joining the circuit with a student on her initial twin endorsement.

However, instead of restoring the mixture to rich after the student had correctly identified the engine "failure," the instructor purposely left the mixture at idle cut-off and told the student to fly the asymmetric circuit with the propeller windmilling with lots of drag. He told her to assume the prop would not feather.

On final, he told the student to conduct a touch and go on two engines, because after touch down he would place the mixture of the failed engine to rich so the student would have full power available on both engines for the touch and go.

After touch down the instructor placed the failed engine mixture to rich and the student advanced both throttles. The Seneca yawed strongly into the previously "failed" engine and left the strip. The instructor took over control from the student but was unable to control the yaw. The aircraft hit an obstacle in long grass near the strip and caught fire after coming to a stop. Apart from some minor burns to her skin the student was unhurt nor was the instructor. But the instructor felt a bit bloody stupid.

By allowing the propeller of the `failed` engine to windmill all the way around the circuit the injector lines were starved of fuel and when the instructor opened the mixture control to rich after touch-down for the touch and go, there was fuel starvation.

take over, lower the nose, mixture rich and the engine fires back to life instantly? :ok: Well that may have been the plan but it didn't work that time:E.

[Josh Cox]

take over, lower the nose, mixture rich and the engine fires back to life instantly? http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/thumbs.gif Well that may have been the plan but it didn't work that timehttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/evil.gif. They didn't have a windmilling prop, the prop stops windmilling at airspeeds lower than I'd personally be prepared to be in that configuration.

With the prop RPM close to or at zero, placing the mixture to rich will not restart the engine.

Does a Seneca 3 have impulse coupling or starter vibrator ?.

By allowing the propeller of the `failed` engine to windmill all the way around the circuit the injector lines were starved of fuel and when the instructor opened the mixture control to rich after touch-down for the touch and go, there was fuel starvation. No, I don't think so.

I will not criticise the instructor you have spoken of above, with confidence I can say:

* I would not put myself into that situation, and,
* to date, I have not had a problem conducting multi engine training, using the time old tried and proven methods taught to me.

You are not comparing apples with apples are you, the situation you have described would suggest someone didn't think through the situation.

That accident appears to have more to do with the touch and go than the EFATO training.

The EFATO training was a great success, the continuation of circuit training after delivering the aircraft safely to the runway went poorly.

Also note that at RPMs below 1000 odd you may not be able to feather the prop.

Quote:
take over, lower the nose, mixture rich and the engine fires back to life instantly.
What beautiful confidence.How so ?.

[Aimpoint]

Yes, but carby icing or plug fouling could have provided a similar result by closing the throttle for an equal period of time. A poor exercise that didn't consider the risk vs. training reward.

[27/09]

Both methods can have their downsides in the wrong circumstances. However for me the mixture method is the best way for two main reasons.

The RPM and manifold pressures guage indications realistically match a real engine failure.

The process of opening the throttle to verify the dead engine also acts in the same manner as it would on a real failure.

The student sees and experiences actions that very closely mimic a real failure which cannot happen by closing the throttle.

The situation described above re flying the windmilling prop to the ground then doing a touch and go is very risky by leaving it to the last minute to see if the engine will respond whether or not it's done with the throttle or mixture and is taking a scenario too far IMO.

[Oktas8]

However, instead of restoring the mixture to rich ... the instructor purposely left the mixture at idle cut-off and told the student to fly the asymmetric circuit with the propeller windmilling....

Australian ME training is in a worse place than I thought. If this kind of thinking exists in GA (and with a touch and go off the approach as well!), the problem has gone well beyond which lever to pull.

I think it is probably unreasonable to expect CASA to stop this kind of stupidity. Mixture vs. throttle, yes, CASA can make rules to settle the debate from a legislative point of view. But people, surely you can see that many of these accidents were just plain ignorance and stupidity? Can't legislate against those.

[Tee Emm]

From The Lycoming "Flyer" page 49 under the sub heading of National Transportation Safety Board Warning on Simulated Engine-Out Maneuvers

The fatal crash of a light twin in which a flight instructor and an applicant for a multiengine rating were killed prompted the NTSB to issue an urgent warning to all pilots simulating an engine-out condition on multiengine airplanes.
The Board’s investigation revealed that some flight instructors do use the fuel selector or the mixture control to shut down an engine to test a multiengine applicant. Although this is a recommended procedure, the urgent warning was aimed at flight instructors who were using this procedure at altitudes too low for continued safe flight.
The NTSB observed that use of such procedures at traffic pattern altitudes may not permit instructors enough time to overcome possible errors on the part of the applicant.
The recommendation by the NTSB means that all simulated engine-out operation at the lower altitudes should be accomplished by retarding the throttle, and this should be done slowly and carefully to avoid engine damage or failure.
Many flight instructors down through the years used the technique of abruptly cutting an engine with a multiengine candidate to test his emotional reaction and judgment with this extreme technique. Big radial piston engines with short, stubby crankshafts could tolerate the abrupt technique. However,
flat-opposed piston engines with their long crankshafts and attached counterweights could not as readily take the abuse of suddenly snapping a throttle shut, particularly at takeoff or climb power. Use of the latter technique would tend to detune crankshaft counterweights and could possibly result in a nasty engine failure.

Since it was common technique by flight instructors to terminate power abruptly to simulate an engine power loss, we had to protect the engine. As a result, we published in our Engine Operator’s Manual and in Service Bulletin No. 245, the recommendation that if the power was abruptly terminated, it must be accomplished with the mixture control. Of course, this was intended for the higher altitudes where a complete engine shut-down could be conducted safely. The student was to identify the dead engine by retarding that throttle to about 12" MP to simulate zero thrust, or similar to having the prop feathered. At that point, the instructor could immediately return the mixture to an engine-operating condition, and power would be available
if needed.
In our publications, we then explained the reason for using the mixture to abruptly terminate power. By putting the mixture control in idle cutoff position with the throttle in a normal open or operating position, the pilot merely cut off the fuel, but allowed the air to continue to fill the cylinders with resulting normal compression forces that are sufficient to cushion the deceleration of the engine and prevent the detuning of the crankshaft counterweights.
However, any practice of simulated engine-out condition at low altitudes should be best accomplished by a slow retardation of the throttle in accordance with the NTSB recommendation. This careful technique will protect the engine, and at the same time, provide for instant power if it is needed.

The above information from the engine manufacturer is in marked variance to what many in Pprune have written on this thread. Time for those concerned to step back and reflect on their folly?

[Josh Cox]

That's great Tee Emm,

And I am certain there are other manufacturers "recommending" mixture cuts, exactly like Lycoming still does, their recommendation is exactly that, a recommendation and this piece of literature is written by a Lawyer after someone killed themselves.

If it was such a big issue, as opposed to the response to an accident, they would have used the word "MUST" and changed all flight manuals to reflect this change.

Slowly retarding the throttle does not give the desired yaw rate or engine indications.

The recommendation by the NTSB means that all simulated engine-out operation at the lower altitudes should be accomplished by retarding the throttle, and this should be done slowly and carefully to avoid engine damage or failure.The next step would be to prohibit EFATO training......

As a result, we published in our Engine Operator’s Manual and in Service Bulletin No. 245, the recommendation that if the power was abruptly terminated, it must be accomplished with the mixture control. Of course, this was intended for the higher altitudes where a complete engine shut-down could be conducted safely.So its not about the engines, mixture cuts are better for the engines, its just poor instructors level of training perhaps ?.

By putting the mixture control in idle cutoff position with the throttle in a normal open or operating position, the pilot merely cut off the fuel, but allowed the air to continue to fill the cylinders with resulting normal compression forces that are sufficient to cushion the deceleration of the engine and prevent the detuning of the crankshaft counterweights.Mixture cuts safer yet again.

However, any practice of simulated engine-out condition at low altitudes should be best accomplished by a slow retardation of the throttle in accordance with the NTSB recommendation. This careful technique will protect the engine, and at the same time, provide for instant power if it is needed.Slow retardation of the throttle is IMO not a realistic training environment.

This mixture versus throttle is a personal preference, until CASA mandates one or the other, it will remain a personal preference.

Those that enjoy getting on their soap boxes and proclaiming that throttle cuts are safer, legal, better for the aircraft engine etc etc need to understand that it is not a black and white issue. Throttle cut are: not a legal requirement, it's not better for the engine and many, myself included do not feel mixture cuts are a safety issue ( its managed risk ).

I have had ATO's turn fuel taps off during instrument renewals, and I'm still here to talk about it, it was again, managed risk.

Every aircraft flying involves a very complex managed risk profile, pilot experience, pilot training, pilot SOPs, well designed aircraft, well trained engineers maintaining with quality controlled spares, airspace to suit risk, appropriately designed airports with fire services etc etc.

The complete flyer is here: http://www.lycoming.com/support/tips-advice/key-reprints/pdfs/Key%20Operations.pdf

If you're worried about pilots killing themselves during EFATO training, petition to have it banned, but be aware there will be other consequences, possibly far worse than the one you are trying to protect against.

Safe aviation is an industry where aircraft are concreted to the ground, anything else is an aviation industry with managed risk.

This is a part of the reason pilots are so under valued, the general public has been programmed to believe that aviation is safe and we are just bus drivers.

Driving our buses which take the form of a pressurised aluminium tube, several miles above the ground, secured to two wings with very strong titanium bolts, with several thousand litres of flammable liquid in the wings, being pulled/pushed along by two or more very very hot fires in an environment so harsh that both the outside temperature and air density would not sustain human life...............doesn't sound so "safe" now.

[MakeItHappenCaptain]

And I am certain there are other manufacturers "recommending" mixture cuts, exactly like Lycoming still does,

The topic of the thread being low altitude failures, please elaborate who still does this? Proof talks, "I'm certain" walks.

Lycoming, no
Of course, this was intended for the higher altitudes where a complete engine shut-down could be conducted safely.

Have you actually ever had an engine failure?
Slow retardation of the throttle is IMO not a realistic training environment.

In my experience, not opinion, three failures, and none were a sudden catastrophic failure.

Using the mixture provides a better confirmation that the student is identifying the correct engine (they have to play with the throttles and the wrong selection is immediately obvious), but why not do this at 2 or 3 thousand feet, where there's enough height to counter an actual failure?

[Josh Cox]

MIHC,

Have you actually ever had an engine failure?Luckily only two, both were inflight and happened with plenty of warning or altitude.

But this is not what we are discussing, we are discussing whether it is unsafe to do mixture cuts during EFATO training, I do not believe it is ( and this is from actual experience ) and its has not been outlawed.

Using the mixture provides a better confirmation that the student is identifying the correct engine (they have to play with the throttles and the wrong selection is immediately obvious)No argument. This is a situation a well trained and experienced META pilot should be able to recover on any given days training, if not, they do not deserve to be there.

but why not do this at 2 or 3 thousand feet, where there's enough height to counter an actual failure? Why do EFATO training on take off at all ?. The answer to that question is obvious, its one of the highest risk scenarios that could happen, and it is globally accepted that it needs to be trained and practiced.

So the issue is not mixture versus throttle, it close to the ground versus not close to the ground.

Use the throttle and have an unrealistic training scenario, perhaps less risk, depends on the cut of the instructor ( if it is unrealistic training, why do it at all ? )

Use the mixture and have a realistic training scenario, managed risk with a well trained and competent instructor.

The topic of the thread being low altitude failures, please elaborate who still does this? Proof talks, "I'm certain" walks.Quite obviously a good proportion of the industry, as many have said above, myself included, the CASA FOIs I flown with, do mixture cuts on take off / at low level, all managed risk.

As to your proof talk statement, even the lycoming flyer does not mandate a requirement over the Service Bulletin 245.

SB 245 recommends mixture cuts as it is safer and better for the engine.

The flyer recommends "slow" throttle cuts because some numpty killed himself.

Do you see the difference ?.

IMHO the issue really comes down to the training and competency of the current batch of META instructors.

[Sarcs]

MIHC said: but why not do this at 2 or 3 thousand feet, where there's enough height to counter an actual failure?

That's the real issue here, why even go there? :ugh: People are sick of friends and family being needlessly injured or killed in these so called required low level training accidents!:{

Soon it will be outlawed in aircraft with 10 or more pax, or greater than 8,618 KG MTOW, so I think you'll find it will also eventually be outlawed or with severe regulation control for anything under 8,618kg. Synthetic Trainer manufacturers are about to experience a mini-boom.

Civil Aviation Safety Authority - NFRM 1007OS (http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_100941)

Finally Oz aviation industry may be dragged kicking and screaming to worldwide best practice in the use of simulators/STDs for all EPs and checks other than LOFT and some approved upper level EPs.:ok:

Good pick up by the way Tee Emm!:D:D

[sheppey]

If you're worried about pilots killing themselves during EFATO training, petition to have it banned, but be aware there will be other consequences, possibly far worse than the one you are trying to protect against.


Isn't that why CASA are in the process of mandating the use of simulators for engine failure training in certain type of aircraft?

[Old Akro]

Going back to "Up in the Air's" post. Generally I agree with the statement to follow the POH. However, it should be noted that they vary a lot. I think if you look at a training twin like (say) the Travelair POH it is completely different on this subject.

One of the deficiencies of this debate is that it hasn't acknowledged that there are different types of twin engine engine failure training.

At one level, recurrent training is about re-inforcing the checks and establishing the mechanical routine required in an engine failure. Simulators can do this pretty well and should be part of the strategy.

Statistically, the most likely scenario is an engine shutdown in flight. But in this instance there is plenty of time and its not so critical. You can pull out the POH checklists. This is where you need the feathering exercises. It proves that the aeroplane will continue to fly very happily on one engine.

The two most critical situations are engine failure in an instrument procedure towards the MDA involving a missed approach and engine failure after take-off.

Engine failure after take-off (or indeed go around) is critical because if you don't act swiftly, decisively and precisely then some twins won't climb on a single engine. Its also a high workload situation where the pilot is most likely to mis-diagnose the failed engine. I'd suggest that the new multi-pilot's first experience of this ranks with the first solo as a memorable experience. This cannot be replicated in a simulator. But proving that if you get everything right you can climb for a circuit at 150 fpm is a very big lesson.

EFATO may be an exercise which carries risk, but so do many other things. The issue is how one manages the risk. I would argue that an EFATO exercise that requires the pilot to go through the checks feather the engine (ie the instructor set zero thrust) and establish a climb is an exercise best done at a country airport with flat terrain. If the objective is to identify the dead engine and do the checks before the instructor restores the engine, then the circumstances in which this is done is less important.

I'm part of the school that still thinks stall / spin training is important. Ditto, I think the experience of a simulated EFATO at low altitude done once is indelibly etched in the memory and an important part of multi training.

But, after the first experience the check rides are about re-inforcement of the correct routine. Every time I do a sim flight I fail an engine on myself. I'm going to hit any instructor who pulls one of my turbo engines at full power on first take-off and like most turbo engine owners we avoid circuits. But pulling an engine toward MDA in an instrument approach after the engine has been at low power for a while is much kinder on the engines and still lets you do the climb transition in the go-around at 1,000 ft or more above the ground.

[sheppey]

Use the mixture and have a realistic training scenario, managed risk with a well trained and competent instructor.


The instructor involved with the Duchess practice engine failure (mixture cut) fatal crash was quite experienced with over 30,000 hours and the Boeing 767 Air Canada captain in the left seat of that Duchess undergoing the instrument rating renewal was less experienced with only 16,000 hours...

So now about this "realistic training scenario, managed risk with a well trained and competent instructor"?:rolleyes:

[Josh Cox]

The instructor involved with the Duchess practice engine failure (mixture cut) fatal crash was quite experienced with over 30,000 hours and the Boeing 767 Air Canada captain in the left seat of that Duchess undergoing the instrument rating renewal was less experienced with only 16,000 hours...Was that at Camden at night and bad weather ?.

How do you know it was a mixture cut ?, by my recollection the ATSB didn't know, how is it you know ?.

Investigation: 200300224 - Beech Aircraft Corp 76, VH-JWX (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2003/aair/aair200300224.aspx)

Either way you wont find me doing that at night ( mixture or throttle ).

I'm part of the school that still thinks stall / spin training is important. Ditto, I think the experience of a simulated EFATO at low altitude done once is indelibly etched in the memory and an important part of multi training. 100% agree.

[A37575]

Was that at Camden at night or in really bad weather, do we know whether he used the throttle or mixture on this occasion ?.

Weather was fine and conditions just after dark. ATSB report avoided mention of whether throttle or mixture used to simulate engine failure. Surviving pilot told ATSB investigators the mixture was cut, but ATSB elected not to mention this in their report. Possible legal ramifications?

[Sarcs]

The instructor involved with the Duchess practice engine failure (mixture cut) fatal crash was quite experienced with over 30,000 hours and the Boeing 767 Air Canada captain in the left seat of that Duchess undergoing the instrument rating renewal was less experienced with only 16,000 hours...

So now about this "realistic training scenario, managed risk with a well trained and competent instructor"?:rolleyes:

Well said sheppey, that is also reinforced by this comment in Annex A of the Mandatory Simulator NFRM/NPRM, by none other than the regulator:


COMMENT 1.2
Some respondents proposed adding wording to allow training and checking to occur in the aircraft provided the exercise had been conducted by all pilots in a simulator in the preceding 12 months.
CASA Response
CASA is firmly of the view that where a qualified STD is available for aircraft of this size, this should be used for all training and checking activities. The ATSB has reported that the training captain of the aircraft involved in an accident in Darwin in March 2010 had undergone training and checking in a flight simulator, however the actions by the training captain in simulating an engine failure in the actual aircraft during the accident flight was not consistent with the training received during the simulator course. This suggests that doing one session of training and one check per year in an STD (with the subsequent session/check in an actual aircraft) does not satisfactorily address the risk of conducting non-normal exercises in an actual aircraft.


.....and this


COMMENT 3
One respondent believes that mandating simulator training for check and training captains but not for recurrent line pilot training recognises that, check and training captains who are simulator recurrent in recovery from non-normal exercises in a simulator can be expected to handle non-normal exercises in the aircraft better than pilots undertaking an initial endorsement. The respondent believes the safety risk case is very strong to support the above.
CASA Response
CASA is firmly of the view that where a qualified STD is available, this should be used for conversion training. The ATSB has reported that the training captain of the aircraft involved in an accident in Darwin in March 2010 had undergone training and checking in a flight simulator, however the actions by the training captain in simulating an engine failure in the actual aircraft during the accident flight was not consistent with the training received during the simulator course.
Contrary to the respondent’s view, this suggests that having only training and checking captains undergo simulator training does not satisfactorily address the risk of conducting non-normal exercises in an actual aircraft.

[Oktas8]

Night or IMC don't preclude asymmetric training. I have done it where it was considered acceptable. The key was to increase safety margins according to risk. E.g. No EF below MSA in some cases.

By day or night, it is unacceptable to leave the student or candidate in control if things don't go to plan. Aircraft doesn't climb? Take control. Drills incorrect? Take control. Many of the accidents listed here occurred after the student made errors. Continuing in order to 'prove a point' is high risk but is associated with inexperienced instructors.

[Josh Cox]

Surviving pilot told ATSB investigators the mixture was cut

How could you possibly be certain of this ?, is there proof ?.

That said, is it relevant in this accident ?, mixture or throttle, would the outcome have been different either way with any certainty ?.

[Old Akro]

Throttle cut or mixture cut is irrelevant to this accident. The ATSB laid the blame at the feet of the ATO for initiating the exercise "when a safe outcome could not be assured"

The ATSB quote a CASA guideline not to do asymmetric below 1500ft after dark.

Further, I would suggest that it was not conducted "just after dark" since the ATSB say they did not take off from Bankstown until 16 min after last light. They then flew to Woollongong then Cambden. So it was properly dark. And anyway, dark is dark. Its a binary state after last light.

Its a bit unusual for a 16,000 hour ATPL to be getting an initial issue MECIR. One wonders if the ATO overestimated the candidates experience in these circumstances - especially since this was the first and only flight the ATO had with the pilot under test. Which is another risk management warning flag the ATO ignored.

This accident is about poor practices by the ATO, not mixture cuts, throttle cuts or even really asymmetrics. It has no more logic than cutting power on a single in the same circumstances. Its about not clearly understanding how to achieve the training objective in a low risk manner.

[LeadSled]

Night or IMC don't preclude asymmetric training. I have done it where it was considered acceptable.

Octas8,
A large body of well informed opinion would totally disagree with that statement. One large and very long standing Australian operator bars any engine shutdown ( and that would include mixture cuts), except in VMC, daylight, min. 3000 AGL.

As for asymmetric training ---- zero thrust only --- and the training manual mandatory requirements meant that night operations were severely limited. On pistons (a la FAA) "slowly retard the throttle".

All risk assessment based (although those were not the words used when the policy was established in the 1940s) with the assessment that night training hugely increased the risk --- hence the very tight night limitations.

Not surprisingly, this same operator was an early adopter, a pioneer even, of flight simulation --- long before a mandate for their use.

We kill more people asymmetric training than as a result of actual engine failures, but it is clear that the message is lost on "the survivors".

Tootle pip!!

[Josh Cox]

Captain Sled

We kill more people asymmetric training than as a result of actual engine failuresWhilst that is sound logic, if we provided no asymmetric training what so ever, I think real engine failures would kill many more pilots than it presently does, probably with passengers onboard.

[Sarcs]

JC I think your cherry picking what Leadie said, he definitely wasn't implying no assys, more how and where you do those assys versus the risk involved! :=

You might be the 'gun' instructor with META but there are individuals out there who let their 'perceived' abilities affect sound judgement and risk assessment to the point of the accident!

LeadSled: but it is clear that the message is lost on "the survivors".



If you read back over the posts in this thread I think you will see that Leadie's concerns are well founded.:rolleyes:

[Josh Cox]

SARCs,

I am a "gun" nothing, least of all a "gun" META instructor, any knowledge or skills I have, were taught to me by mentors and instructors.

It was not my intent to cherry pick Captain Sleds post or disagree with what he/she has said, just trying to provoke intelligent discussion on the point raised.

I also believe we do kill more people in EFATO training than from actual engine failures whilst flying the line.

So that might lead one to question why we do EFATO training at all.

Imagine for a moment the state of our industry if there were pilots out there without any initial or recurrent EFATO training and with passengers onboard.

Would it be fair to say, we would kill a lot more people with no initial and recurrent training on EFATOs.

SARCs, you've worked under a CAR217 organisation many times, how many dozens of time have you been beaten with V1 cuts and EFATOs on take off ?.

My opinion as posted in any of my posts above is in no way an alternate or contrary opinion to that of Captain Sleds statements, infact he/she questioned the accuracy of one of my statements, and rightly so.

Noting that my pseudonym is not a pseudonym and all reference to leadie has been that of the utmost respect.

[Oktas8]

The particular asymmetric training I conducted was in accordance with UK CAA expectations. It was not asymmetric circuits for example. The UK CAA has quite a good reputation for safe practice. But given Australia's recent accident history, sure, discouraging or forbidding may be appropriate at this time.

I don't have any accidents to relate. But perhaps these TEM practises would have helped the accidents above?

Has the examiner placed feet to physically prevent wrong rudder input? Will the examiner take control immediately the safe outcome is no longer assured? Will the examiner discontinue the exercise if performance isn't immediately satisfactory for any reason at all? Has the examiner quietly reviewed the intended flightpath to prevent loss of SA if distracted? Is there any terrain ahead or abeam the aircraft? If not day VMC are there two independent attitude indicators in plain sight, and is the aircraft at relatively high speed and low power, to mitigate yaw & roll, and are the height buffers even bigger than normal?

Apologies to Leadsled & other experienced pilots - this kind of thing is already done by many experienced pilots and I don't mean to imply otherwise. But obviously not all pilots.

[Sarcs]

SARCs, you've worked under a CAR217 organisation many times, how many dozens of time have you been beaten with V1 cuts and EFATOs on take off ?.



Josh I know you've been through the ringer a round or two with some pretty dubious Checkies. Checkies that probably shouldn't have a licence let alone a check pilot approval. You know the type that slam the power lever back to the flight idle stop just as you rotate and then call "auto feather failed"!:ugh:

However these cowboy types somehow keep managing to escape all the checks and balances put in place and continue to put the fear of life into even experienced drivers...so if there is a better way with less risk..then we should be promoting that.

And Josh I wasn't alluding to your posts mate!:ok:

[Josh Cox]

However these cowboy types somehow keep managing to escape all the checks and balances put in place and continue to put the fear of life into even experienced drivers...so if there is a better way with less risk..then we should be promoting that.

Agreed in it's entirety.

Cheers,

Josh

Are you still in FNQ ?, Red Beret Friday night ?.

[Hugh Jarse]

If you want to see the result of poorly conducted (and arguably illegal) V1 cuts at night - google VH-NEJ crash at Tamworth. This resulted in the unnecessary and negligent deaths of two young, up-and-coming pilots.

I witnessed (and attended) that occurrence post-crash, and am astounded that criminal charges weren't forthcoming.

Take a read of the CVR transcript. The RHS trainee was spot-on questioning the legality of V1 cuts at night. The rest is history.

Rest in peace Messrs. Chomley and Smith. Piss on you Tamair!

[LeadSled]

Folks,
As an example of how not to do it, read the ATSB report on the last one at Camden, a Twin Comanche, and study the photographs carefully. Read the whole report carefully, it is one short.

Credible eyewitness reports said the aircraft never got above 100-200ft.

Does the prop. on one engine look feathered to you!!

Consider the widely differing reports from the student and the instructor as to what actually happened, and what the aeroplane did, and figure out for yourself what "most probably" really happened.

In your considerations, take account of the AFM note about the fact that recovery from a spin is unlikely with full tip tanks.

Is it probable, given the verifiable facts, and the witness statements, that the CAAP was followed?
What action has CASA taken in this matter??
What pro-active action has ATSB taken, to find out why these accidents keep happening???
What action has ATSB taken to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, further similar fatal crashes --- I will not call them accidents????

Please, anybody, don't suggest I am saying "no asymmetric training", but let's drop the (I was almost going to say macho, but then I realised I know at least two female instructors who also indulge in the seriously risky practice of pulling the mixture "just off the ground") unnecessarily dangerous practices, to almost eliminate the chances of recovery, on the day it all turns to custard.

I was on the aerodrome at YSBK the day of the last fatal. That is not the only similar one at Bankstown when I have been on the aerodrome. Not long after I stated flying, I actually witnessed an Apache crash on an asymmetric missed approach, the PIC was the Piper agent Chief Pilot, fortunately, both lived. Not long after, a Heron crashed on the same airfield, same deal, attempting a physically impossible missed approach, all died, then a best mate died in yet another twin training accident.

I had a blazing row with the pilot responsible for the last fatal at Camden, about two weeks before that accident. The subject of the row was a very close go, virtually a rehearsal for the final fatal crash. We all know the PIC was a high time instructor, but he was an accident looking for somewhere to happen. Finally, it did.

Several people on previous posts have said that the accidents we have had have been inexperienced instructors ---- in every accident, of which I have all too direct knowledge, that was not the case, but all high time and "highly respected" "professionals". There was no shortage of experience on the flightdeck of the Braz at Darwin.The laws of physics and aerodynamics, underlined by real world "human factors" have no respect for hours in log books or popular reputations.

I never cease to be amazed at the ignorance of some very high time instructors of close acquaintance , all Grade 1s, three are ATOs, who, quite frankly, simply do not understand just how un-safe their "SOPs" actually are.

Just because you are still alive doesn't prove your practices are "safe".

The FAA recommendation on the subject make worthwhile reading, but in certain quarters in this country, FAA recommendation are treated with disdain ---- we know better ---- an attitude thoroughly discredited by our actual record.

A quote:

Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.

Tootle pip!!

[Josh Cox]

Here: http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3460925/ab2011077.pdf#page=39

[Oktas8]

Well, we all think "we know better" Leadsled. It's human nature. I think it, and quite obviously you think it too. Tricky bit is to get the regulator to state publically and enforce-ably what "better" is, so it's no longer a matter of opinion.

- No mixture cuts below 3000', and then only for demonstrating the feathering procedure;
- Never fail an engine "creatively" - e.g. fuel selectors;
- No feathered operations below 3000' or it's an emergency;
- No surprise failures ever, everything briefed beforehand even for tests, and failures done methodically;
- No multi-engine training at non-towered airfields;
- Touch-and-goes off a simulated asymmetric approach are undesirable but not forbidden (special risk management applies);
- Training for META is expensive and difficult and requires substantial ME experience;
- Training for examiner approvals also expensive and difficult;
(edit)

None of these are my ideas. They are all the UK way of doing things in the single-pilot multi-engine part of the training industry. I think it's uncontroversial to say that they are safer than Australia in this segment.

Some more:
- Creative use of a flight simulator is positively encouraged;
- Almost any "professional" simulator is acceptable for training credit in a flying school, approval relatively easy to get, to encourage their use;
- Mixture cuts in the circuit are discouraged although not forbidden;
- Feathered propellers at low level are forbidden, unless it's an emergency.

That's the NZCAA.

The FAA publishes those commonly circulated documents already mentioned by others. Whilst I don't have a strong opinion on mixture vs. throttle personally, the bulk of the respectable world says "no" to mixture at low level, so I don't do it any more.

There's quite a bit of stuff out there but it's not always easy to access, unfortunately.

[Horatio Leafblower]

The laws of physics and aerodynamics, underlined by real world "human factors" have no respect for hours in log books or popular reputations.

I never cease to be amazed at the ignorance of some very high time instructors of close acquaintance , all Grade 1s, three are ATOs, who, quite frankly, simply do not understand just how un-safe their "SOPs" actually are.

Just because you are still alive doesn't prove your practices are "safe".

Lots to think about there, and every word of it true. :ooh:

[LeadSled]

Oktas8,
Like the FAA, the UK CAA put out some excellent material, we ignore such wisdom at our peril. Which is exactly what we all too often do in Australia, ignore, because "we" know better.

The one thing I would take issue about, in your last post, that to "know better" is human nature. In my experience it is commonly a mixture of lack of maturity (unrelated to chronological age) and lack of training at an early stage.

One of the great problems of changing entrenched attitudes is what could loosely called the "you can't teach and old dog new tricks" problem --- but even that is possible to overcome, and the organisation that should take the lead is CASA ---- but, is that going to happen --- where do the FOIs come from???

Some of the worst example of absolutely un-safe practices come from the "informal" demands of some FOIs.

As far as I can see, the only potential circuit breaker is ATSB, they now have the power to investigate systemic safety problems.

If this problem is to be solved, it is going to be political pressure on ATSB to exercise its power --- and without political pressure ATSB will not move, that is already clear.

So, folks, create the political pressure --- it's all in the power of the pen.

Tootle pip!!

[Centaurus]

Quote:
Surviving pilot told ATSB investigators the mixture was cut
How could you possibly be certain of this ?, is there proof ?.

Just to clarify the above comment. It's a long time ago now but I interviewed the survivor by phone to Canada after he had been following earlier Pprune discussions that followed some time after the accident. He contacted me by Pprune PM service; hence follow up phone discussion. Yes! Pprune OZ is read in Canada, too.

I had a blazing row with the pilot responsible for the last fatal at Camden, about two weeks before that accident. The subject of the row was a very close go, virtually a rehearsal for the final fatal crash. We all know the PIC was a high time instructor, but he was an accident looking for somewhere to happen. Finally, it did.

The very close go? Was that in a Cessna 310 where the navigation light on the wing tip was shattered with contact with a tree or bushes during a very low level mixture cut also at Camden? There was no incident report filed as far as I know but it was a mighty close call.

Another incident I recall was written up by Mac Job in the former Aviation Safety Digest. Chieftain departing out of Port Lincoln at night with PF under training. The check pilot cut a mixture after take off but never got around to opening the mixture again in order to set the throttle at zero thrust to simulate a feathered prop. The aircraft was unable to maintain a positive rate of climb because of the excessive drag from the windmilling prop and the crew never saw the gently rising terrain they flew into.

Looking now on the bright side of this discussion of mixture cuts versus throttle closure to simulate engine failure after take off in a twin. I note that to date, 6863 Ppruners have viewed the posts since September 2011- as well as the usual suspects who have contributed their views. If nothing else, it means a lot of pilots have now seen both sides of the argument, which is a good thing.

[LeadSled]

The very close go? Was that in a Cessna 310 where the navigation light on the wing tip was shattered with contact with a tree or bushes during a very low level mixture cut also at Camden?

Nope, not that one, but it probably proves there are some very slow learners, aren't there??

Of the 6000+ lookers, I hope somebody has been persuaded to change their ways ---- think of it as the 90:90 rule, if you stick with the FAA/UK CAA guidelines ( they manage quite well without having to "mandate" everything) ----

You can get 90% of the training value but eliminate 90% of the risk associated with the (very dubious) remaining 10%.

Tootle pip!!

[Up-into-the-air]

A lot of the discussions here have to do with words and definitions in the training environment. One that has come up regularly is "recommended" and I show this below.

Most people rely on part 2 "........as a course of action" for the definition, but I believe that in the flying arena, part 1 is the most applicable.

recommended - past participle, past tense of rec·om·mend (Verb)

Verb:


Put forward (someone or something) with approval as being suitable for a particular purpose or role;
Advise or suggest (something) as a course of action.

More info » (http://www.google.com.au/search?hl=en&client=firefox-a&hs=poV&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&q=recommend&tbs=dfn:1&tbo=u&sa=X&ei=OxPET5-gBdGTiQeMtrWvCg&ved=0CHEQkQ4)Merriam-Webster (http://www.google.com.au/url?q=recommend&url=http://www.merriam-webster.com/netdict/recommended&rct=j&sa=X&ei=OxPET5-gBdGTiQeMtrWvCg&ved=0CHIQkg4oAA&usg=AFQjCNEd66xc5ZTgAnOawRi_PocH6IB_mw) - The Free Dictionary (http://www.google.com.au/url?q=recommend&url=http://www.thefreedictionary.com/recommended&rct=j&sa=X&ei=OxPET5-gBdGTiQeMtrWvCg&ved=0CHMQkg4oAQ&usg=AFQjCNGhyX1CFzgIBfdGHv8ZIlN-fY2luQ)