Asiana 747F missing?

[kiwiandrew]

It is being reported on Anet that an Asiana 747 F is missing apparently on a flight from ICN to Shanghai.

The only news link so far is in Korean, which I can't read, and google translate makes a bit of a mess of it ( although the gist of it seems to tie in with what the poster said.

Has anyone else heard anything?

edited to add: there are now unconfirmed reports that wreckage and an oil slick have been sighted.:(

[Jorge Newberry]

(URGENT) Asiana Airlines' cargo plane crashes in waters off Jeju Island

here

(URGENT) Asiana Airlines' cargo plane crashes in waters off Jeju Island | YONHAP NEWS (http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2011/07/28/0200000000AEN20110728000800320.HTML)

[Nickdj]

Here the report with text:

Asiana Airlines cargo plane crashes off Jeju | YONHAP NEWS (http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2011/07/28/0200000000AEN20110728000700320.HTML)

A/C departed at 03:05 a.m. from Incheon bound for Pudong.

[ARNSpoty]

Reg - HL7604:(

[japanam]

MSNBC is reporting that the Captain was 51 and First Officer 44. No names.

S. Korean cargo jet crashes; 2 dead - World news - Asia-Pacific - msnbc.com (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43918493/)

[747newguy]

Fire on-board.
AFP: Two dead as cargo plane crashes off South Korea (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gXP5AV-zTh0FUWOgC5a2B_qG9GTA?docId=CNG.b8ddcd45fb4de7570a444013d5b8 e3ad.1061)

[I'mbatman]

This has got to stop. Why is nothing being done about this!! How are we certifying aircraft without fire suppression on the main decks of these aircraft! IALPA needs to start serious lobbying. As long as 'only' freighters are affected, nothing will change. Why do I even bother reading a NOTOC with 20 tonnes of batteries? Its an uncontrollable bomb that I'm 'hoping' doesn't detonate.

Rant over.
IB

[DMN]

I totally agree. As long as it's ONLY CARGO AND ONLY 2 ''ANONYMOUS'' PILOTS who gives a damn, right? I do believe that Fedex is one of rare airlines that does have fire ext on the main deck of MD11, not sure about other ac in their fleet.

[akerosid]

Asiana has issued this quite detailed press release:

July 27, 2011
OZ Flight 991 Press Release

1. Accident Details

A. Time: July 28, 2011 (Thu.) 04:11 AM
B. Location: Approximately 76 miles southwest of CJU Airport.
C. Flight: OZ991 (ICN-PVG)

Departure Time: 02:47 AM, Estimated Time of Arrival: 04:33 AM

D. Crew

- Captain: Sang-Gi Choi (Born: January 25, 1959)
- Employed at Asiana since July 2, 1991
- Assigned to B747 since July 3, 2001
- 6,896 hours of flight time in B747
- 14,123 hours of total flight time

- Co-pilot: Jeong-Woong Lee (Born: August 12, 1967)
- Employed at Asiana since April 2, 2007
- Assigned to B747 since November 4, 2010
- 492 hours of flight time in B747
- 5,211 hours of total flight time

E. Freight: 58 Tons

- Freight Contents: More than 90% of the freight was standard cargo and IT products. The remainder was comprised of liquids (e.g., paint, resin solution, etc.)
- All cargo was loaded in accordance with IATA regulations.

F. Aircraft Specifications

- Registration Number/Aircraft Type: HL7604/B747-400F
- Owner: AAR
- Manufacturer: BOEING
- Manufacture Date: 2006.02.15.
- Operational Date: 2006.02.23

G. Details

- At 04:11 AM (Korea Standard Time) flight OZ991 reported control problems at an altitude of 7600 feet and was diverted to CJU when contact was lost with the aircraft.
- 04:11KST – Contact is lost with the aircraft at 7,600 feet when it reports control problems and is diverted to CJU.
- 04:15KST – Contact initiated by Republic of Korea Coast Guard and Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC)

JetPhotos.Net Photo » HL7604 (CN: 29907) Asiana Cargo Boeing 747-48EF(SCD) by Rufenach [www.fraspotting.de] (http://jetphotos.net/viewphoto.php?id=7019369&nseq=13)

[notadog]

"The plane carried 58 tonnes of cargo, including 0.4 tonnes of potentially risky materials such as lithium batteries, paint, amino acid solution and synthetic resin, he said."


Pretty much says it all right there.

LI batteries need to be banned from all aircraft until such time that they devise a way to inert them for shipment.

[camel]

As long as a/c can be insured when carrying lithium batteries etc then they will continue to be shipped by air..unfortuneately no one gives a damm about freight pilots ...'safety is our first priority' yeh right !

Unless one happens to crash on a major city causing hundreds of casualties:ugh:

[firepoint]

It's really hard to ban all the Li-ion battery in the air transport. Right now, most electronic devices containing Li-ion battery as a complete package and need to be transportted by air. The cargo carrier will not say NO to such bussiness even few aircraft accidents happened which Li-ion battery is involved, e.g. UPS accident in Dubai,2009 and the Asiana accident today. The big boss of cargo carrier has to secure the business unless all the cargo carriers say NO.

[matkat]

Guy's the fire suppresion debate is interesting as it is not even mandated in EU registered pax aircraft I looked into this when I was a QA consultant for a well known Dutch MRO and it became clear that aircraft of a certain vintage (think F100 age) did not have to have either smoke detectors or fire suppresion systems in the lower baggage holds! it was a situation that I found incredible even after more than 30 years in this business some things just astound you as IMO all aircraft either pax or cargo should be mandated to have both.

[cwatters]

Perhaps improve the packaging..

LipoSack Fire Retarding Lithium Polymer Battery Charging & Storage Safety Bag

LipoSack Fire Retarding Lithium Polymer Battery Charging & Storage Safety Bag: Amazon.co.uk: Toys & Games

[GBV]

Condolences to the collegues and their families...

It would be interesting to know if the batteries were carried in the main deck (like in the UPS crash) or if they were in one of the class C compartments and even the fire extiguishers were not enough to put the fire out. If that's the case, lithium batteries should be banned until another way of packing them or different fire extiguishers are tested and certified.

[Flightmech]

DMN,

Currently MD-11 only. First 777 installation currently in progress (N858FD)

[John Boeman]

Post no.8
Fire on-board.
With link.

[emil011]

Silberfuchs,

Crash: Asiana B744 near Jeju on Jul 28th 2011, fire in cargo hold (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=44062b99&opt=0)

[WillDAQ]

If that's the case, lithium batteries should be banned until another way of packing them or different fire extiguishers are tested and certified.

Once they go that's pretty much it, they require no external oxygen to burn and will resist just about all attempts to extinguish them.

[DGR]

There is no hard eveidence on the cause of the crash, or even any confirmation that lithium batteries were part of the cargo, yet everyone has jumped to the conclusion that lithium batteries were the cause.

To my knowledge there has not yet been an incident involving lithium batteries in cargo that were prepared in compliance with the regulations. All of the lithium battery incidents to date involving cargo shipments have been as a result of untested batteries or badly prepared packages where the battery terminals could short causing a fire.

So how about we wait to see what comes out of the investigation, or is that expecting too much??

[moosp]

DGR, AFP are reporting lithium batteries as part of the cargo. It is reported in the thread above.

[6000PIC]

DGR , respectfully , when something in your safe , earth based office could go BOOM and kill you and your desk and chair I am sure you would want that item removed too. We don`t care how it`s packed , just get it off the damn aircraft.

[Tank2Engine]

How are we certifying aircraft without fire suppression on the main decks of these aircraft! IALPA needs to start serious lobbying. As long as 'only' freighters are affected, nothing will change.Once they go that's pretty much it, they require no external oxygen to burn and will resist just about all attempts to extinguish them. Correct, so retrofitting the main deck with active fire extinguishing equipment will most probably not solve the problem for a runaway battery fire while at the same time the current fire suppression equipment works satisfactory for all other fires.

IF (!) an uncontrollable battery fire indeed was the cause of this accident, then IMHO perhaps the handling, storage, packaging and transporting of electronic devices with Lithium batteries should be reviewed, not the fire fighting/suppression equipment.

[EX91]

The Ap is reporting that the captian yelled fire. Is that enough evidence of a fire?

Official: Pilot on crashed South Korean cargo plane reported fire in final moments

By Associated Press, Published: July*27 | Updated: Thursday, July*28, 3:33*AM

SEOUL, South Korea — A pilot aboard an Asiana Airlines cargo plane that crashed Thursday in waters off a southern South Korean resort island reported a fire just before losing contact with air traffic workers, an official said.

The pilot yelled “Cargo fire!” and “Emergency!” about 10 minutes before the plane disappeared from radar screens, according to an air traffic official who declined to be named because the investigation was ongoing.


Official: Pilot on crashed South Korean cargo plane reported fire in final moments - The Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/yonhap-news-coast-guard-says-2-killed-after-skorean-cargo-plane-crashes-off-southern-island/2011/07/27/gIQAHW8adI_story.html)

[Mariner]

Sad news.

If it turns out to be a replay of the UPS6 crash, it means we have not learned from it - a lost opportunity.

A thought; if you have a true cargofire (not a false warning, but with real noticeable smoke), the airplane is a write off from that very moment. Even if you land it within minutes, it will almost certainly burn out.

So there's no need to save the plane, just it's occupants.

If there's not an airport in the immediate vicinity, put it on any flat piece of land or ditch it.

17 minutes is the average survivable time with a cargo or cabin fire. Anything over that and you're on borrowed time.

[maggot738]

Have to agree with Mariner. Ditch it as quickly as possible. In fact, since the Hudson river splash, ditching (both time available and minimum time available) has been included in our cyclical sim program.

Maggot

[GBV]

Well, ditching could be an option, but don't forget that land on a river during daylight with nice weather is one thing, ditching a B747 into Pacific on the dark and with smoke in the cockpit is completely different, little chance of surviving...

[Master Caution]

After having read the available albeit limited information so far,

the following relies on memory so those of you with charts may have more accurate distances.

1. They were in contact with Shanghai Control when the fire was detected.

2. This means they were past FIR Boundary waypoint LAMEN. LAMEN is 150 nm from ZSPD ( Shanghai - Pudong )

3. Even if they were exactly at LAMEN they were 210 nm ( via airways) to RKPC (Jeju)

4. Therefore it seems they did not divert to the nearest airport - no idea of WX/ NOTAMS at the relevant airports.

5. They reported control problems at 7600' i.e. Less than 5 mins to landing in an emergency. I haven't flown the B744 in years but I remember some control cables run along the roof of the cargo compartment.

6. I acknowledge that emergency diversions into mainland China are not an attractive proposition and that Jeju was an online and probably maintenance base for OZ but IF(!) the above assumptions are true then once again all these cargo fire incidents say that you must have the airplane on the ground or water in 15-17 mins..

7. Not trying to to be a Monday morning quarter back and second guess the Captain as I wasn't there. Condolences to the families

[711]

Sully was very very lucky, I reckon the odds of surviving ditching at night on open water are pretty slim actually.. I say ban Lithium now and wait for the investigation.

[overmars]

Had a chat with a few colleagues. Ditching an aircraft in the middle of the Atlantic or the Pacific is almost a death sentence. If you even survive the ditching, you will now face the prospect of drowning or freezing or starving in the middle of the huge ocean.

We threw around some ideas and one of the ideas was to stay up high, depressurize the aircraft (if main deck fire, as per the checklist), and PRAY that the fire will go out from lack of oxygen. Like I said, in the middle of the ocean, you must be very lucky to have an airfield within 17 minutes. Even then, Asiana lost contact within 11 minutes.

[Spitty42]

Starving???

[Tank2Engine]

A thought; if you have a true cargofire (not a false warning, but with real noticeable smoke), the airplane is a write off from that very moment. Even if you land it within minutes, it will almost certainly burn out.

So there's no need to save the plane, just it's occupants.

If there's not an airport in the immediate vicinity, put it on any flat piece of land or ditch it.
17 minutes is the average survivable time with a cargo or cabin fire. Anything over that and you're on borrowed time. I tend to agree if you're dealing with an uncontrollable (battery related?) fire, but how do you know whether you're dealing with a 'normal' fire or an uncontrollable battery fire when a fire warning sounds?

Investigating the cause of the fire (uncontrollable battery fire or not), decision making, finding suitable terrain/water and subsequent ditching from a normal 744 cruising level within 17 minutes would be totally unrealistic IMHO.

[overmars]

Well yeah, I am gonna grab that bottle of mineral water before jumping off! :ok:

[Fr8t M8te]

I wonder if the presence of a suitably trained loadmaster would make any difference to a main deck lithium fire - if he got to it quick enough.

Thoughts?

[Flightmech]

If it was lithium batteries then they must go the same way as chemical oxygen generators.

[MrMachfivepointfive]

Put your old laptop- or mobile battery on a BBQ and see what happens. It's a hellfire - better than magnesium.

[Less Hair]

Check this FAA-Demo please:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gcd34tt8YPU:eek:

[Master Caution]

They reported control problems at 7600' i.e. Less than 5 mins to landing in an emergency

I know that's what the airline said, but I wonder if they meant 7,600m given that it's Chinese airspace. Doesn't make sense to be down at 7,600ft halfway to Shanghai.

I'm guessing they were 7600' on decent during their emergency diversion to Jeju. Perhaps if they had kept going to Shanghai they would have already been on the ground if the assumptions in my previous post were correct.

[Less Hair]

Sounds like the UPS. As you descend into thicker air the fire turns violent.

[GlueBall]

Had a chat with a few colleagues. Ditching an aircraft in the middle of the Atlantic or the Pacific is almost a death sentence. If you even survive the ditching, you will now face the prospect of drowning or freezing or starving in the middle of the huge ocean. We threw around some ideas and one of the ideas was to stay up high, depressurize the aircraft (if main deck fire, as per the checklist), and PRAY that the fire will go out from lack of oxygen.

There were no "death sentences" for any of the USAir A320 occupants who had ditched in the Hudson river. Some people didn't even get their feet wet.

The B747s that I'm flying are equipped with life rafts. With today's GPS position accuracy, rescue services would find your ELT equipped, bobbing life raft before you'd "starve to death."

During an over ocean uncontrolled fire I will not pray; I will make a controlled ditching after 15min emergency descent while I can still read some instruments ...BEFORE being completely smoked out and subject to an uncontrolled crash. :ooh:

[Patty747400]

GlueBall

Forget the Hudson in daylight. Ever seen "deadliest catch"? Imagine being over the Pacific in December at night with 30 feet waves.

"I will make a controlled ditching"

Good luck!

I will descend to 25000 feet, depressurize the aircraft since that will at least kill everything that burns around the batteries and keep my cockpit smoke free. Like that I will continue to an airfield and then make a high speed descent and landing.

[swh]

I know that's what the airline said, but I wonder if they meant 7,600m given that it's Chinese airspace.

I would agree 7600m/FL250 would tie in with the fire checklist.

[Tank2Engine]

Whether to depressurize to 25000' and continue or to ditch: in either case you're flipping a coin and taking your chances.

In both cases you'll be in no-mans-land, but the distinct difference with the ditching is that IMHO you'll be better able to judge your chances (day vs night, choppy ocean vs calm waters etc) instead of hoping and praying that the fire doesn't damage any vital components while you're counting down the minutes (or hours!) to the nearest diversion airport.

Those are going to be veeeeeery long minutes (or again, hours) sitting on top of an uncontrollable fire in the middle of the Pacific, Atlantic or the more uninhabitable parts of this planet. :eek:

[Hedge36]

I admit I don't really "get" the notion of trying to ascend in order to asphyxiate the fire in the back... at some point you're going to have to descend again, and the entire way down I'd be sweating bullets about a reflash. You'd have to spend a considerable amount of time at altitude hoping that a) the fire's out and b) the surrounding Class A combustibles aren't still smoldering, ready to light back off when the oxygen levels rise again.

No thanks. Head for the water while you've still got control.

[overmars]

I said "almost", so, no death sentence for the guys in USAirways, but aye for the guys in Ethiopian Airlines off the Comoros Islands.

Anyway, the point I'm trying to put across is, before deciding to ditch, perhaps some thought should be put into whether you are actually gonna survive the ditching. In the simulators or LOFTs, a lot of guys are under the impression that, hey, ditching is no big deal. We'll ditch, land smoothly parallel to the waves, then we'll hop on to the back and grab our life raft, torch, first aid kit, ELT. Oh, and maybe some water and chips will help. After which, we will jump off the stricken plane into the sea, swim towards the inflated raft, dry ourselves off and wait for help to arrive.

Then again, we all know that nothing is all nice and dandy in real life.

So, just throwing around different ideas before deciding to take a dip in the sea.

[J.O.]

All this talk about ditching vs staying high to starve a fire is largely a waste of time. We're talking about putting a single layer of gauze bandages on a severed jugular vein.

[kbrockman]

J.O. All this talk about ditching vs staying high to starve a fire is largely a waste of time. We're talking about putting a single layer of gauze bandages on a severed jugular vein.

Undoubtedly true however,

If you're going to have to choose between certain death and possibly almost certain death, than still the second option is the best.
There have been numerous crews and single pilots that ditched all around the world in WWII, a lot of them survived, even in the arctic ocean and without the possibility for immediat rescue like we have in present days.
there have even been pilots that survived jumping out of a burning plane over land, without a parachute.
There has never been a flightcrew that survived while staying in a burning plane so the choice is simple really (in hindsight !! ).

That's the whole dilemma; when to decide that something so drastic as ditching is better than try to keep on going, a split second decision that most people are not able to make quick enough.
That's where Sully excelled.

[6000PIC]

... exactly , the point also to be made in a similiar ( sic ) vein is that you should never , ever juggle razorblades. If it is found out to be Lithium Ion batteries as a cause in this horrible incident , we are all test pilots.

[Teddy Robinson]

The stuff has to go seafreight.. end of.

[captplaystation]

As a humble, short haul bod flying in Europe (well kind of, but never over oceans) carrying pax & occasionaly DG in the hold, this confirms that A - I don't wanna do long haul (the swimming pool " ditching" is more than enough for me ) & also, that I don't wanna be a "Freight Dog".

Those of you who are have my admiration, an occasional night-flight is OK but I am not a vampire, and carrying God -knows -what in the back with the only guarantee being your trust (? :ooh: ) in the Freight Forwarder doesn't do it for me.
If the batteries are the prob, I hope that the fact this happened a long way from FAA/JAR territory doesn't stop the powers that be saying N.F.W. (No . . . . . . . Way ) to future carriage of these nasty little devices.

Sure all the pax (& crew, never mind electronic flightbag I mean personal) aboard , have at least 1 or 2 Batts, but that is not 400 kg of the b@stards.
"Bad things happen in threes" must not be allowed to prevail in this case, that is now two young 744F's operated by reputable companies barbecued in the descent, there must NOT be a third ! ! :=

[henra]

The stuff has to go seafreight.. end of.

In reality it is quite a dilemma.
If you ban anything containing LiPO Batteries from Air Freight a SIGNINIFCANT percentage (read >20%) of the Cargo Crews might loose their jobs given the percentage of electronics in Air Freight.
If you continue as it is today Cargo Crew are exposed to a disproportionate risk compared to their Pax brethren.

The minimum would be to drastically increase regulation for shipping of these things.

Back in the UPS thread I proposed to regulate the charge state of Lithium Bettries for air Freight.
They carry their own ignition source with them only if they are charged to more than 10-15%. Below that level they are cimbustible but not capable of self ignition, which is the main difference to most other combustible freights.
where I'm still not sure is the question if you can't extinguish a LiPo Fire.
Having seen a short circuited LiPo 500g battery myself it could be kept in check by putting it into water. There were some bubbles but that was it. No fire, no glow, no sparks, nothing fancy.
The Lithium content of a 150g Battery is about 0,5g. It might contribute to the fire but it is not the main combustible. The main fuel is the alcohol based chemicals inside which form the separator. That's highly flammable alcohol and propably 30 - 50 times more than the Lithium.
On the other hand I'm not sure if 25.000 ft is really a good idea. If not ditching I would say fly as high as you can. and get cool thin air in the Cargo compartment. I don't get the rational behind the 25000 ft.

The problem with extinguishing a LiPo fire is that the main tactic to stop the chain reaction is to cool them. That will stop the progressive short circuiting inside the battery. I'm not really sure what will happen without oxygen but without cooling. I would tend to say the fire would extinguish at least mostly but I haven't seen it fisrt hand so I don't know for sure.

[EX91]

If Rep John Mica (R-FL) has anything to say about it, the regulating will be left to the ICAO. He introduced an amendment to His own FAA Re-Authorization Bill that expressly prohibits the FAA from issuing any regs that are "more stringent" than the ICAO. H.R. 658 SEC. 814.

"....Mica rejected Democratic fears of increased fire hazards, and said failing to limit the FAA on this issue could be costly for companies.

"If we didn't have this provision in there, there's be a $1.1 billion dollar impact on industry," he said. 'This is a good provision. It needs to be in the bill.'"

Lithium battery air transport a point of contention in FAA debate - The Hill's Floor Action (http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/153181-lithium-battery-air-transport-a-point-of-contention-in-faa-debate)

Glad to know where his loyalty lies. The UPS F/O was his own constituent and this Amendment was put into the bill after the crash.

This prohibition is not in the Senate version of the bill.

[Abbeville]

Do cargo airlines charge a premium for this kind of cargo?

Freight Dog mate of mine told me he was carrying 50+tons of goods with lithium batts in them the other day.

[atakacs]

Folks

Any firm evidence that lithium batteries had anything to do in this fire ?!

They might be suspect but seems a bit premature ...

[NSC]

premature is almost an anagram of temperature, there are no such things as coincidences

[Intruder]

The stuff has to go seafreight.. end of.
A fire on a ship at sea is almost as bad, and has the potential to destroy even more cargo, kill more people, and sink a much larger vessel.

[MIGHTY 8]

I wonder if the presence of a suitably trained loadmaster would make any difference to a main deck lithium fire - if he got to it quick enough.

Thoughts?


Considering the volatility of these substances, this additional crewmember would most certainly mean just an added fatality to the mess at hand.

[nitpicker330]

Airbus/Boeing and the Airlines need to get serious about preventing or fighting this kind of Fire.

1/ Better fire detection systems
2/ Live Video of the Cargo hold available to the crew of Pax and Cargo Aircraft
3/ Always have a Third crew member available to check/fight the fire in a Cargo only Aircraft.
5/ Provide the crew with the plastic clear view bubble to wear so the can see the instruments if Smoke becomes thick in the cockpit.
4/ Stricter controls over the handling/acceptance of DG's.

It can be done, it's just down to.......DOLLARS.

[captplaystation]

Tombstone Imperative won't work here as we are only killing 2 at a time.

The best bet is that the insurers get p1ssed at paying out for very young 744F's being trashed , only money (a force mainly for bad ,& occasionally good ) can save this.

If the insurers say "enough", some legislation ,vis a vis the batteries, will arrive. . if not ? don't be a freight-dog, no simpler solution.

[lomapaseo]

Are we talking about next years problem or today's problem :confused:

If it's today's problem you better figure on working it at the carrier level of how you prepare shipments (packaging, cargo locations, etc.)

The cargo airline safety departments need to be working this. They should be a lot more effective than regulators and Pilot chat forums.

[judge.oversteer]

Agree with most of the posters here, this madness has got to stop, first UPS6 and now Asiana.
How many more disasters before authorities ban these batteries, in commercial quantities, from being air freighted?
My outfit regularly carries them out of IAH, so I have a vested interest.

JO.

[MLHeliwrench]

Store them with the seafood?

[barit1]

Several posters have commented that it's the alcohol together with ambient oxygen that support the fire.

It would seem to be a step in the right direction if the batteries were shipped in a container devoid of oxygen. An inert gas, in a container w/ expansion chamber perhaps, would deprive the fire of an oxidant.

RIP an experienced crew, undoubtedly prepared for anything but this.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

As a chemist, I've seen lithium Grignard reagants just "go" in inert conditions. No free oxygen, but within a carbonyl or alcohol environment.

The only way you can put these kind of fires out is either to use a specialist copper/nitrogen extinguisher, or to use sand to take the energy away.

The only other way to do it would be to pack the batteries with a chemical pack above them to stop the chain reaction, maybe an alkyl amino compound. But can you honestly see shippers paying for the extra weight?

[Hedge36]

A fire on a ship at sea is almost as bad, and has the potential to destroy even more cargo, kill more people, and sink a much larger vessel.


A ship has a pressurized fire main, usually a decent firefighting crew, and the ability to flood the burning compartment, if all else fails, without throwing away every ounce of its stability.

With the type of hazards we're discussing here, the slow boat is the safest way to go.

[Intruder]

Have you seen a container ship lately? MUCH of the cargo is carried well above the main deck, and there is little (if any) access to much of it. Also, I doubt individual containers have fire detection or suppression, so a fire would be detected only after a container was fully involved.

Fire mains and crew are fine in the engine room, but would be ineffective in the stack of containers above the main deck. They would also likely be of marginal effectiveness below the main deck.

I think it is significant that there are VERY few instances of electronics simply catching fire, even if you include the rash of bad laptop batteries a few years ago. I really believe there is something in the [lack of] packing and/or the quality of the batteries involved...

[Hedge36]

Okay, fair enough - but ponder this: assume, for the moment, that a fair number of overwater cargo shipments contain lithium batteries. Plenty of fancy electronic bits are packed into conex boxes and brought into ports every day.

Now ask yourself when you last heard of a major shipboard fire that was caused (or at least suspected of having been caused) by the cook-off of lithium batteries.

Then ask yourself why there might be a disparity between the two methods of shipment.

[LGB]

Apart from banning lithium batteries in these amounts, from cargo aircraft, the only way to really do something effective is EARLY DETECTION.

We need a video surveillance system for critical places. This system MUST include thermal imaging cameras. There are several options -

One can be to take a snapshot when doors are closed, then compare it to just before take-off. If, despite packs running, there is a substantial increase in temperature anywhere in the area where the cameras are pointing, it can be investigated, before taking off.

Also, a gradual rise in temperature even in tenths of a degree can easily be spotted with thermal cameras - automatically. The technology is here, but these cameras are not cheap. But what is the price of each freighter crash - apart from loss of lives and the grief involved? Albeit expensive, the weight of the system would not be that much - compared to the protection offered.


It seems in the lithium case, the batteries are somehow triggered on ground - too high temperature when handling them? In Dubai, they were not even declared as dangerous goods, as far as I know. Leaving them in the Dubai blistering heat might have been enough to start a chain reaction. Might the same have happened in Incheon?

Even though early detection might not have helped over the middle of the Pacific, it would still be better to know that something is going on - which should NOT be going on.

How else would we know if a pallet is a ticking fire bomb, preparing for an inferno within minutes or hours?

Some fires makes lots of smoke, right from the start, others take a while before the smoke starts. And the smoke needs to get to the smoke detectors.

Thermal imaging with automatic temperature change monitoring would enable us to spot these issues, way before they get to this point. And hopefully even before we get airborne ...

Thinking of the crews of the Asiana and the UPS - let them not have perished in vain. And let there not be other crews to follow. Please.

[Teddy Robinson]

now lets get this straight .. the question we all have to start asking is how would we feel as 400kg of these things is loaded onto OUR aircraft, as yet the evidence that these were the ignition source is speculative, but an awful lot of people, myself included are drawing conclusions.

IF there is no means by which to inert these items for transit, then they have no place on a civil air cargo manifest. IF special conditions are required to ship them by sea, so be it, there would have to be a cultural shift by the manufacturers, and freight agencies alike, but consolidation would take place of consignments, and if they are required to be shipped as deck cargo only, once again, so be it, the industry has to adapt to new challenges.

I accept the fact that the worst scenario on a vessel is a fire, at least the option exists to get the offending container over the side, and the crew at least have the option of taking to the lifeboats, to date I am unaware of a Martin Baker seat option for the B747F.

Our objective ( as the flying community) has to be to prevent these accidents occurring, there is no caveat "if financially expedient". there cannot be. Until there is a method of preventing these fuses randomly igniting, bringing down aircraft, killing crew and putting those on the ground in peril ... they have no place on the manifest.

To accept them makes the crew passengers, we can no longer assess or control the risk to our aircraft or guarantee our personal safety.

[Akali Dal]

Safety Regulatory enforcement are always mouthing safety niceties in public but do their utmost to help freight companies avoid costly measures. I believe they will just increase the hours flight crew spend on Dangerous Goods ground training; before long all the hoo ha about this trgedy will be forgotten.

[pax britanica]

This another very sad event afetr the harrowing story of the UPS freighter in Dubai.

Are Li batteries alowed as hold cargo on PAx flights , I am lead to believe that a large proportion of airfreight travels in the underfloor holds of widebodies rather than specialsied freighters and flying across an ocean or remote wasteland ontop of a few tons of these is really scary thought . If they are permitted it would seem literally a catastrophe waiting in the wings, although wasn't SAA 747 brought down years ago in the Indian Ocean by a cargo hold fire with large loss of life?

And please don't get me wrong I am not for a second suggesting it only matters that these potentially dnagerous devices are kept off Pax flights, I think it is a tragedy that two crews have already lost their lives and do not think any more aircrew should be put at risk for comemrcial expediency

PB

[contractor25]

It's interesting to read arguments about ditching in the ocean (at night).


BUT, if you watch the FAA video about laptop fires and you understand the fireextinguishing process in a cargohold then you will quickly realise the efforts are futile.
It is evident from the video that the batteries need sustained cooling to avoid another fire due to thermal runaway.
Th extinguisher will put the fire out, but doesn't cool the pack. The same goes for depressurising the hull, if you are high enough it might put out the intial fire, but doesn't cool the batteriepacks, resulting in a secundary fire, as these fires appear to be fully dependent on thermal runaway it is the fairly safe to assume the batteriepacks of the same type in the direct vicinity of the fire will also ignite, thus resulting in a chain reaction and a subsequent uncontrollable fire.

It leaves only two possible options open to avoid repeats in the future,
1. ban said cargo from aircraft and in addition restrict appliances on
passenger aircraft(the latter is virtually impossible, think laptop, phones
2. In order to give aircrew a way out, either retrofit with ejectorseats or
provide a means that aircrew can bail out if it comes to the worst.
For example the escapeshute as fitted to concorde protypes.

[Less Hair]

Or carry DG only in truly fireproof containers that keep any fire inside without hurting the a/c. Thinking of the space shuttle's lightweight foam tiles as insulation here. Add some monitoring system and powerful extinguisher system with every container and you could feel at least a little safer than today.

Check tile demo pic:

ImageShack® - Online Photo and Video Hosting (http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/442/nstaumtile.jpg/)

[711]

Question: are Lithium batteries CAO or do they get loaded on pax a/c as well?
If they are CAO, why can they get loaded on cargo a/c taking into account that in case of a fire the crew can't do anything about it?

[The Ancient Geek]

although wasn't SAA 747 brought down years ago in the Indian Ocean by a cargo hold fire with large loss of life?




It was a 747SP Combi. There was a long government cover up with the usual conspiracy theories, eventually when apartheid ended the Truth and Reconcilliation Commission confirmed that the aircraft was carrying a secret shipment of solid fuel rocket propellant for a missile project. Interestingly this could not have been the original cause of the fire because it would have destroyed the aircraft in seconds rather than the time that they flew an attempted diversion. It is likely that a minor fire spread slowly until it reached the dangerous cargo.

Google for "Helderberg disaster" if you have a few hours to spare wading through the crackpot theories.

[marsipulami]

Some explanation regarding the carriage of lithium batteries on aircraft.

http://www.bureaudg.com/brochures/50rev03EN-Lithium.pdf

[4PW's]

I like what nitpicker330 suggests.

Equally, from what others have suggested there is very little chance of sending Li batteries to their destination via the sea lanes, and no other. At least not yet. Commercial pressures abound. They are a greater force at work, but it seems an immediate solution could be to depower the batteries before shipment which removes their flammability. Added to that, shipment in a fire-proof container as an interim measure. I'd reckon Asiana will be doing something like that given they lost a bird. Others might take longer to come around, but it won't be long.

How long does it take to mandate this stuff once it's all figured out as necessary, desirable and, perhaps more importantly, cost effective? Waaaay above my pay grade, so back to mitigating the effects of a fire, should it break out, as interim measures.

On the subject of ditching: tough decision. Sully's case was not repeatable in this instance. At night, over land, on fire, no Hudson in sight...Sully's engines not working made flight an impossibility, unless they lit up again, to which Skiles worked tirelessly. Meanwhile, continued flight was a reality forced upon them. If we're questioning ditching, well, if it's a question that's only because the situation's not yet terminal.

Does being on fire mean you ditch? Only when you know you know further flight isn't an option. And there's the thing: you get a fire warning at altitude over water. You spend at least, AT LEAST, 10 seconds perceiving, analysing and acting in a co-ordinated manner. Now we're talking AT LEAST here, as any fiar dinkum pilot knows. To say otherwise is just not true. Do you spend eight to 15 hours of every flight on the edge of your seat waiting for the air molecules to just stop holding the airplane up?

No way, not unless you're Japanese. You don't sit there strategizing every minute of every flight, so a fire warning, any warning, will come as a surprise and you'll need time to analyse "wtf is this" before you act. That all takes time, so I reckon 10 seconds is a bare minimum for the circle to start with perception and end in action.

After that you divert immediately. But unless you're constantly strategizing and analysing your in-flight options, nearest airport, weather en-route, traffic to the left or right, who has the radio and why the **** Bloggs chose this moment in time to take a piss, then you're going to have to spend another minute, at least, be real, don't bull**** yourself, figuring out what dynamics have changed, where the traffic is, below, above, left or right; where is the nearest airport, no longer the nearest suitable; can we make it; should we put her down (land or sea), and then, "****, you mean we have to ditch?"

I have never ditched, but I've thought about it long and hard, as genuine posters here are doing. I would want to honor the Asiana guys by suggesting they were not panicking; that they were doing their level best to keep it all under control while they got their checklists done in a rapid but orderly fashion before deciding on what options were available. Sadly, it didn't work out. Nor will it work out in future if the same happens in another cargo airplane (no, Li batteries are not permitted in the lower cargo hold of passenger airplanes, or any hold of a pax plane for that matter, so don't worry 'bout that, poster).


Good luck if it's you.

[Heathrow Cargo]

"no, Li batteries are not permitted in the lower cargo hold of passenger airplanes, or any hold of a pax plane for that matter, so don't worry 'bout that, poster)."

You sure?? !!!

[Rice power]

There are 3 types of Lithium Ion batteries for cairrage :
ICAO codes ELI and ELM are exempted items able to be carried on pax a/c
the other ain't and is a CAO item (cannot remember the code-hey it's Friday and the Shiraz was great !)
Regardless, when casting a cursory eye over the NOTOC I consider all an ignition source. I take rare comfort to those placed in the lower hold (extinguishant avail) , the main deck ALWAYS gets inspected before doors close.
Route 2 is always programmed and I will divert at a wiff, that said the majority of my time is spent Asia ANC bound so ditching in the winter with 30 ft seas often at night is an option but hardly pallatable. End of the day never surrender and if that means sending both FO's aft to fight the fire then that is all that we have left. Have never seen Shemya even on a clear day but by Christ I am going to do my damdest to put her down.... or ?
RPwr

[DGR]

Rice Power, I'm afraid that you're not correct on a number of points. The codes "ELI" and "ELM" are not ICAO codes, they are IATA Cargo Interline Message Procedures (IMP) codes. ELI = excepted lithium ion batteries and ELM = excepted lithium metal batteries. There are also two other cargo IMP codes for lithium batteries, RLI = fully regulated, i.e. Class 9 lithium ion batteries and RLM = fully regulated lithium metal batteries.

Both types, excepted and fully regulated may be carried on both passenger and cargo aircraft, except that all lithium batteries are prohibited to, from and within the US when shipped as just batteries.

For some up to date information please read
Lithium Batteries - Guidance and Packing Instructions (http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/cargo/dangerous_goods/Pages/lithium_batteries.aspx)

[Mr Angry from Purley]

Just a quick question/s from a non expert humble apoligies if stupid ones

Both the UPS and Asiana accident so soon after take off from hot destinations. Any trend?

Would the batteries be the source of the fire or just add to it.

Why no ban surely?

God bless the crew

[2footlong]

I don't know if anyone has suggested it before but I think it should be mandated that a load supervisor be included in the min crew whenever DAC is carried. I'm sure there are other tasks they could help with, chivi-ing the loaders etc as well. There are plenty of Air Stewards/esses that would volunteer for the extra role.

Seems like the ideal solution to me...

[ray cosmic]

Henra,
On the other hand I'm not sure if 25.000 ft is really a good idea. If not ditching I would say fly as high as you can. and get cool thin air in the Cargo compartment. I don't get the rational behind the 25000 ft.

As far as I know this is a physiology thing. Somehow the body cannot handle the low pressure above 25000 ft, even while having an oxygen mask on with 100% oxygen. Above 25000ft, there would be a need for pressure suits and pressure oxygen. Anyone able to confirm this for a fact?

[ZFT]

Quote:
although wasn't SAA 747 brought down years ago in the Indian Ocean by a cargo hold fire with large loss of life?


It was a 747SP Combi. There was a long government cover up with the usual conspiracy theories, eventually when apartheid ended the Truth and Reconcilliation Commission confirmed that the aircraft was carrying a secret shipment of solid fuel rocket propellant for a missile project. Interestingly this could not have been the original cause of the fire because it would have destroyed the aircraft in seconds rather than the time that they flew an attempted diversion. It is likely that a minor fire spread slowly until it reached the dangerous cargo.

Google for "Helderberg disaster" if you have a few hours to spare wading through the crackpot theories. Interesting that you should bring this accident up because I was only thinking about the parallels (or lack of them) today. It wasn’t an SP it was a -200 Combi.

I viewed the reassembled wreckage of the Helderberg in the old SAA apprentice hanger at Jan Smuts some 20 odd years ago and a very somber experience it was. More so because I had drunk more than a beer or 2 with a member of the flight crew on numerous occasions. (Hanger 5 anyone!!!)

Although the investigation left a lot to be desired and there are too many conflicts of interests to clearly establish the true cause and exactly what happened in the final moments, the reassembled fuselage clearly showed that the control cables had been torn apart as opposed to being damaged by the fire and there is no doubt that this was a very significant fire.

The heat within the cabin was so intense that the top of the reassemble fuselage which should have been white was discolored brown and the fire damage aft of the rear most galley had to be seen to be believed.

What I find surprising is that with both the UPS tragedy and now Asiana, it appears from reports that quite early on control problems were experienced, however from what we know of the Helderberg disaster, they didn’t experience any.

The CVR also gave no indications of control problems up until the point when the airframe apparently failed (IIRC Boeing disputed this).

My question therefore is – are the B744F control runs and/or protection significantly different to those on the B742? It seems odd that the 742 experience a massive 1000C+ fire for a similar if not longer timeframe than the B744Fs yet the integrity of the controls appeared to be maintained.

[kbrockman]

As far as I know this is a physiology thing. Somehow the body cannot handle the low pressure above 25000 ft, even while having an oxygen mask on with 100% oxygen. Above 25000ft, there would be a need for pressure suits and pressure oxygen. Anyone able to confirm this for a fact?

Pressure suits are not needed , oxygen masks will do just fine.
Only above 60.000ft a absolute need for a constant pressure suit becomes an issue.

[Teddy Robinson]

These materials should not be on aircraft in commercial quantities. Does it really need a third accident for that to happen ?

[kiwiandrew]

Parachutes and ejector seats may sound great in theory, but they are not a lot of use if the emergency happens in the middle of a 10 hour overwater flight. The priority (IMHO) really needs to be on preventing the fires from occurring in the first place.

[Langkasuka]

Is it the lack of understanding about the mechanics and dynamics of such battery fires or that freight/airline company choose to ignore the facts?

We have seen videos of battery fires in our DG safety classes and it is patently clear that the festering heat remaining even when the fires are extingushed can keep reigniting when the correct conditions reappear. The thermal runaway can only be contained by sustained cooling.

[FR8R H8R]

Sadly, no one cares that a "CARGO" aircraft crashed. Only 2 fatalities. That's not enough to interest the general public. But, thankfully, management always puts safety ahead of profits. :ugh:

Why can't they ship these damned batteries on boats?

Ejection seats on freighters? Get a clue. Have you ever sat in an ejection seat for a 1 hour sortie? You sure as hell do not want to fly a long-haul sector on a seat with nearly no cushion, no means of reclining and no armrests. Besides the fact that management would disarm them all permanently the first time a crew punched out and lost millions of $$$ of profits.

[armchairpilot94116]

Lithium Ion batteries being certainly a great candidate. With the plane under water, I wonder if they will be able to establish the source of the blaze? Maybe it wasnt the li-on batteries? Are these batteries no danger if not charged? IF so that solves that problem in future.

[barit1]

If we're being creative here, how about a RPV a la Global Hawk to carry DG?

Or maybe more bizzare, a towed cargo glider with autoland after it's cut loose? It could be a blended wing-body for minimum drag; no need for a pax version which would need windows.

[Graybeard]

Somebody suggested shipping Li-ion batteries in discharged state. Here's from wiki: Prolonging battery pack life



Depletion (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/depleted) below the low-voltage threshold (2.4 to 2.8 V/cell, depending on chemistry) results in a dead battery which does not even appear to charge because the protection circuit (a type of electronic fuse) disables it.[97] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li-ion_battery#cite_note-batteryuniversity.com-96) This can be reversed in many modern batteries, especially single-cell ones, by applying a charging voltage for long enough to make the cell voltage rise above the low-voltage threshold; however this behaviour varies by manufacturer.

GB

[SMOC]

Pressure suits are not needed , oxygen masks will do just fine.
Only above 60.000ft a absolute need for a constant pressure suit becomes an issue.

Out of interest are you a test pilot?

Reason being I flew with a test pilot who also happened to be a doctor (damn overachievers) anyway he said prolonged flight unpressurised above FL200 is not a good idea.

[747newguy]

Quote:
As far as I know this is a physiology thing. Somehow the body cannot handle the low pressure above 25000 ft, even while having an oxygen mask on with 100% oxygen. Above 25000ft, there would be a need for pressure suits and pressure oxygen. Anyone able to confirm this for a fact?"

"Pressure suits are not needed , oxygen masks will do just fine.
Only above 60.000ft a absolute need for a constant pressure suit becomes an issue."

Wouldn't recommend going above 25,000 feet unless you have been on pure O2 for an hour to purge the body of nitrogen. If you don't, nitrogen can be released into the blood stream causing all sorts of nasty problems with your body/central nervous system.

[Wingswinger]

If my memory serves me correctly, from my military days:


Oxygen (air/O2 mix in proportion increasing with altitude) above 10,000ft.

Unpressurised flight up to 25,000ft. As an aside, British fighter types had a cockpit pressure schedule of "half altitude +2" so a fighter at 40,000ft would have a cockpit altitude of 22,000ft.

100% O2 from 25,000ft.

O2 under pressure above 33,000ft.

Only Lightning, Starfighter, U2, SR71 and Aurora pilots needed pressure suits (60,000 - 100,000ft).


I stand to be corrected.

[stallspeed]

Let's pretend we know already that Lthium batteries might be te culprit in this and the UPS crash as well. Notices about so-called 'thermal runaway' reactions on Li-batts have been circulated fairly early. The Dangerous Goods Regulations have been extensively rewritten on that subject too...
Yet, remember the cellphones of the early days ? Weighed you down and even fresh off the charging unit they barely made it through the day - in stand-by mode. Today you're usually good when you hook it up maybe twice a week. Means that manufacturers are cramming ever more oomph in ever smaller space, one wonders if the regulatory powers are able to keep on top of this fast paced development.
I have some - only some - doubts about the notion that the manufacturers getting cut some slack due to heavy lobbying, because insurance companies are sitting on the other side of the fence and they have a vested interest to keep risks at a level where they collect premiums instead of coughing up serious money. It's cheaper to pay a few more cents for packaging then settling for a whole aircraft with cargo. Also, two people died; can't really put a price tag on a human life, IMO.
No amount of money can't undo that...

So, if there is a feeling that the current regulations aren't sufficient - look them over, rework them.

Then there's smoke detectors. They detect just that - smoke. Smoke means that the contents of the package(s) has already developed eough heat to torch the packaging. So much heat actually, that it might be too late...

Thermal imaging hardware used to be heavy, cumbersome and hideously expensive. Today, a thermal imaging camera fits in the palm of your hand.
Why not install a few of these in the holds? Could tell the crew of any cargo growing a 'hot spot' long before the smoke detectors would come into play. Possibly early enough to intervene or buying you more time. Time that could make the difference between coming in or going down...

Too expensive ? Heck, then stick temperature controllers in the boxes. Pharmaceuticals, perishables, most of that stuff travels already with temperature sensing and recording devices (mainly to figure out whose butt to kick when it gets spoiled). shouldn't be too much of an engineering challenge to hook them up with some kind of alarm device...

[MetoPower]

Might be irrelevant, but having myself put one of these mob. phone under a hammer (I know.. what for??? long story following an impressive phone bill by my 16 yo kid), I was surprised by the heat produced by the dammaged lit. batt.!!
Therefore, packaging might be an issue, one has to consider (summer heat on the apron in Dubai ... may be??), but also very adequate handling between factory all the way to the aircraft??? We have all seen some of the loaders operating (inluding with pax suitcases!!)

[Teddy Robinson]

Dayglo painted shipping containers mounted on a set of rollers on a dedicated deck area of the ship with hydraulics to push em overboard in the event of ....

Why fly them in the first place ?

[alistair®]

Look what's being printed here :ooh:

BERNAMA - Missing Asiana Airlines Pilot Took Out Huge Insurance Policies Before Crash (http://www.bernama.com.my/bernama/v5/newsworld.php?id=605078)

[ray cosmic]

Interesting twist to the story, however: stallspeed's post about thermal imaging sounds very appealing!

[overmars]

Alistair - Now I need to be sign up on insurance policies in a timely manner. Preferably right at the start of my annual leave.

[ap08]

Only Lightning, Starfighter, U2, SR71 and Aurora pilots needed pressure suits (60,000 - 100,000ft).
Does Aurora really exist? I thought it was a myth...

[brown757]

Just hearing that a Singapore Airlines 747-400F has landed after reporting a main deck cargo fire?

source?

[alistair®]

More likely he was worried about what he was flying round with?

[poorjohn]

unfortunately thermal imaging 'sees' the temperature of the first non-transparent surfaces in its field of view so the engineers will need to come up with some gadget that's more intimate with the battery cargo that can get the "it's getting hot in here" message to the crew.

Without that hydraulic injector any heat alarm might not buy much more time, though. My gut feel is that by the time any practical device notices the temperature rise of a sizeable mass of batteries, the reaction is well established. OTOH, if there's a suitable flat surface nearby an extra minute's warning is no doubt praise-worthy.

[B-HKD]

from avherald.com

A Singapore Airlines Cargo Boeing 747-400 freighter, registration 9V-SCA performing freight flight SQ-7866 from Taipei (Taiwan) to Tokyo Narita (Japan) with 4 crew, was enroute near Okinawa Island about one hour into the flight when the crew reported they had a fire alert on board and decided to divert to Naha (Japan) on Okinawa Island. The aircraft landed safely at Naha Airport about 30 minutes later, attending emergency services found no trace of fire.

The runway was closed for about 20 minutes. The cause of the fire alert is under investigation.

Note: This is SQC's first and just recently converted BCF (ex. 9V-SPA). Not the first time I hear of false cargo hold fire warning's on the BCF.

[Tinribs]

Air is a mixture of components the proportions of which change only slightly with altitude. For humans the two most significant in the short term are oxygen and carbon dioxide, oxygen makes the systems work carbon dioxide has control influences

The proportions may considered as having partial pressures in accordance with their fractional volumes. Normal air mix provides sufficient oxygen partial pressure up to about 10,000 ft although some reduction in body functions are detectable above about 8,000 ft. Above 10,000 ft increasing percentages of oxygen are required to be the equivalent partial pressure of air at 10,000 ft. Above 25,000 ft the equivalent partial pressure of even pure oxygen is insufficent because the overall pressure is so low that is less than the partial pressure would be at 10,000ft

The answer is to breath pure oxygen at increased pressure. This is called pressure breathing and is available to military crews who fly at these altitudes for short periods should the cabin pressure fail or the pressure hull be penetrated by enemy fire. In combat it is common to reduce the pressure setting to a lower level to reduce explosive damage from hull damage and the severity of cabin altitude change should it happen.

There are systems in place to allow crews to use high pressure oxygen but they involve carefull individual fitting of specialised equipment and are not practical for commercial flights. Pressure breathing is very tiring and ordinary oxygen masks don't work because the pressure makes the throat swell. The whole head must be encased.

There were other RAF aircraft using these systems but sadly they are gone. Those were the days

[Airbubba]

Pressure suits are not needed , oxygen masks will do just fine.
Only above 60.000ft a absolute need for a constant pressure suit becomes an issue.

Connie Kalitta tested this theory in a DC-8 a while back, it didn't work so well:

NTSB Report (http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief2.aspx?ev_id=20001206X00986&ntsbno=NYC94LA062&akey=1)

[oceancrosser]

A lot of strange things seem to have been tried at Kalitta...

[Passenger 389]

Any rough estimate yet on the ocean depth around where the plane likely went down? (i.e., ease or difficulty of conducting a proper investigation.)

[ChristiaanJ]

Amazed there were no comments on the Greenies now trying to deprive us of Halon as one means to deal with in-flight fires....

[787PIC]

Hardly a blip on the media radar screen here in the US!
Same as with the UPS crash in DXB.
A couple of "freight dogs" crash in a far out place. Sadly no one gives a damn!
Now, if a bunch of civilians had died and happened to be a slow news day, we would perhaps hear a little more!

Captain Ross "Rusty" Aimer
(UAL Ret.)
CEO
My Aviation Expert, LLC
Los Angeles, CA

[Airbubba]

A couple of "freight dogs" crash in a far out place. Sadly no one gives a damn!
Now, if a bunch of civilians had died and happened to be a slow news day, we would perhaps hear a little more!


Very true. The standards do seem to be different. As one of the major U.S. cargo outfits has proven, you can have a hull loss every three or four years and the public has little awareness since there is 'no significant loss of life'. And the feds don't shut you down.

Has FedEx ever made it five years without a hull loss in the past couple of decades? Much larger pax carriers like United, American and Delta certainly have as I recall.

[japanam]

New development on the Asiana accident.

Chosun Online is reporting that an insurance policy taken out by the Captain of the doomed aircraft is arousing suspicion, and an official investigation has been put into action.

Seems like the Captain signed up for life, medical, and accidental coverage, with payout totaling $3040089 USD in case of death. To make things worse, it seems the Captain signed up for all these policies in late May/June, thus had only paid into this policy for one month before the accident.

A new conspiracy begins......

[rubik101]

Sorry if this is thread drift, butas the subject has arisen...Some years ago, a colleague of mine in his late 40s took out LOL Insurance, paid one premium and then went for his bi-annual medical. Whilst on the dyno-bike gizmo his heart began to flutter, the test was stopped and he was rushed to hospital with an incipient heart attack. Never flew again! These things happen.

[Airbubba]

These things happen.

Very true. Captain Tsu Way Ming took out large insurance policies before he crashed Silk Air 185 in 1997. Before that, FO Auburn Calloway bought insurance policies payable to his children before he tried to hijack and crash FedEx 705 in 1994.

It certainly may just be coincidence. Or, maybe not.

[400drvr]

Connie Kalitta tested this theory in a DC-8 a while back, it didn't work so well:

And the Captain never flew again from what I heard.

[free at last]

You bloggers are a joke, crew had a cargo fire, airplane quits flying at altitude and you call it insurance scam, YOU should be ashamed of you'r self.:=:=:=

[japanam]

@ free at last

Nope, just sharing hardcore facts that was readily available on the net. ;)

Asiana pilot have taken out 7 insurance policies Asiana Airlines crash may have been a suicide - eTurboNews.com (http://www.eturbonews.com/24333/asiana-airlines-crash-may-have-been-suicide)

Would you care to share a FACT, not your BS intuition?? But before you do, learn to spell you YANK:ok:

[Tank2Engine]

You bloggers are a joke, crew had a cargo fire, airplane quits flying at altitude and you call it insurance scam, YOU should be ashamed of you'r self. :=:=:=Good to see that at least one other (;)) blogger has his brain switched ON here! :rolleyes:

Come on people wake up!

It's been about 4 full days since the accident, the wreckage, the bodies and CVR haven't even been fished out of the ocean yet, and only one blogger is smart enough to know the exact accident cause already?!

There's room for improvement here... :hmm:

[free at last]

Not a Yank, but more respect for the crew than you will ever learn in you'r lifetime.:=

[IGh]

From a few slots above, a news story repeats the usual post-mishap rumor:

"... it may have been suicide ..."

So, here it is again. Same old rumor. How many of our Respected Pilot Gossips will tell this rumor to friends & relatives -- who later repeat it, "SUICIDE! An airline pilot told me."

And once spoken by an airline pilot, he will forever defend his rumor, for decades.

[TeachMe]

Just SLF but also have lived 12 years as an expat in Korea. There may be lots of 'issues' here regarding management of Korean companies, to the point that I will not fly a Korean airline - BUT the insurance thing notes above is not an issue as it is common for Koreans to buy insurance (which are really just a kind of savings plans that have a tiny insurance portion so that they can legally be sold by insurance companies). Basically, the captain buying insurance is a lead to be checked, but most likely nothing unusual.

[F111UPS767]

UPS6 and AF447 both had automatic status and failure messages sent from the planes. Hopefully, the same is true here, and there will be some early information.

[ankh]

http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/04-26.pdf DOT/FAA/AR-03/44 and www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1193.pdf "Halon 1301 is ineffective in suppressing or extinguishing a primary lithium battery fire ...."

[ChristiaanJ]

ankh,
Thanks for the info.

[zerozero]

(Note to self: Don't take out anymore insurance policies.)

[Patty747400]

00

Why not? If you don't have any plan to kill yourself within the next month or so it shouldn't be a problem.

I doubt that this crash was suicide. No pilot can be so stupid that he doesn't realize that the FDR and voice recorder will tell if there's been a fire or not. However, I don't get upset because the investigation will look into the matter. Coincidences like this are rare and will of course be subject to speculation.

[IGh]

Observation, just above:
"... I doubt that this crash was suicide. ... don't get upset ... investigation will look into the matter...."

In decades past, sometimes, a core-group of "accident" investigators embraced a rumored scenario -- "pilot suicide", sabotage, the "Boeing Scenario", the missile scenario.

Investigator-err does happen: the investigators NEVER study investigator-err. [But they want you to study pilot-err.]

The main idea for investigators should be to focus on the direct evidence (trail of debris, examination of wreckage, recorded data, observations of witness-crew); discard or suspect manufacturer's created-scenario, "analysis", simulator trials. Accident investigators are not "crime" investigators.

[ap08]

No pilot can be so stupid that he doesn't realize that the FDR and voice recorder will tell if there's been a fire or not.One can speculate that a pilot could have started the fire himself. This would make the accident look authentic to investigators, and it can be done by one pilot without the cooperation of another, which makes the conspiration theory a little bit more believable...

[Airbubba]

More details on the Captain's very recent multiple insurance policies from the Korean press:

The Financial Supervisory Service, the nation’s top financial watchdog, held a short briefing yesterday to explain financial regulators’ position regarding the Asiana pilot’s insurance policies.

The media has reported that an Asiana pilot surnamed Choi [Sang-ki, the Captain], one of two pilots whose cargo plane crashed near Jeju Island on July 28, was found to have taken out seven insurance policies including two annuities and five nonlife insurance policies that could amount to some 3 billion won ($28.6 million [sic]) in payouts from six different insurance companies in the space of some three weeks starting in mid-June.

The FSS said that a blind spot in the existing cross-checking system shared by all local insurance companies could be involved and will be addressed.

Because an insurance company screens a prospective customer’s ability to pay monthly insurance payments, including income and expenses like subscription to other insurance policies, before issuing a policy, industry insiders say that it is unlikely that insurance companies would have approved all seven insurance policies to a single individual within the space of three weeks.

However, although data of all finalized insurance contracts are available on the industry-wide system, policies were not tracked during a period of roughly two weeks between a customer subscribing to a policy and an insurance company’s final approval.

“The insurance company is on the hook to compensate any insured accidents if the policyholder has made a single insurance payment, no matter whether the contract was finalized by the company or not,” said FSS Deputy Governor Kim Soo-bong.

INSIDE Korea JoongAng Daily (http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2939658)

I doubt that this crash was suicide. No pilot can be so stupid that he doesn't realize that the FDR and voice recorder will tell if there's been a fire or not. However, I don't get upset because the investigation will look into the matter. Coincidences like this are rare and will of course be subject to speculation.

Quite possibly just a coincidence in timing and I'm sure it will be checked out.

[Airbubba]

Another potential clue to the cause of the crash in this morning's Seoul paper:

Signs of fire on Asiana crash debris

August 03, 2011

Signs of fire were found on debris recovered yesterday from the July 28 Asiana Airlines cargo plane crash off Jeju Island.

“We do not know if it was an explosion or a blaze that started at a particular point and spread,” said Cho Tae-hwan, head of the committee in charge of the investigation. “But there are signs of fire on the pieces that we have.”

INSIDE Korea JoongAng Daily (http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2939727)

[GlueBall]

(Helderberg) It was a 747SP Combi.

Never heard of the shorter "SP" airframe being configured as a Combi.

[Carbon Bootprint]

The Helderberg (ZS-SAS) was a 747-244B Combi, not an SP.

[747400CA]

I see that the revised procedures for FIRE MAIN DECK have been released by Boeing in an Operations Manual Bulletin

Among the changes is this:

"Expedite a climb or descent to 25,000 when conditions and terrain allow. Plan to stay at 25,000 for as long as conditions allow. After the descent has been started, do not delay the approach and landing"

Presumably this procedure is based in part on a 2009 FAA Fire Safety Highlight

"CARGO FIRE CONTROL BY DEPRESSURIZATION"

which compared the effectiveness of cargo fire suppression by depressurization with that of an extinguishing agent (Halon 1301), to wit:

"...Series two test results showed that although depressurization reduced the initial burning, the fire intensity on decent was greatly accelerated. The highest depressurization altitude evaluated (25,000 feet) produced the best initial results but the largest fire on decent..."

Clearly, remaining at altitude for as long as possible before effecting a minimum time descent to approach and landing is indicated

Setting aside for now the very legitimate questions of possible structural damage, or whether an 'immediate landing' (downwind, overweight, off-airport, or ditching) may be warranted, my questions (related to the Boeing OMB and QRH change) are these:

1) Preferred 'min time' descent profile from FL250 to sea level 'clean' or 'dirty'?; that is,

- extend speed brakes and descend at Vmo/Mmo, or

- extend speed brakes, decelerate in level flight to 270K / .82M, extend gear, descend and accelerate to 320K / .82M

and

2) Approximate 'no-wind' time and distance required for each method

I would book some sim time and try it myself, but will be at home on vacation and days off until late in the month

Very interested in to hear your responses and opinions

WIth thanks to all

[lomapaseo]

Very interested in to hear your responses and opinions

WIth thanks to all

This was also discussed in the SR111 thread (fastest way to get down and land)

[big white bird]

Fastest way to get down in the 744 was to lower the gear and use the speed brake during the descent. Issues to consider were the rising min manoeuvre margin (yellow line) on the speed tape.

The answer for me was to lower the speed brake (stow it) as you get near the gear out speed, lower the gear and simultaneously start the descent in FLCH to build up speed. You needed to get momentum as once that airspeed started to bleed off, it was hard to get it back.

Once the descent was underway and the speed building up, pop the brakes out to 'flight' and sink like a stone.

Any turning would see rising of the min manoeuver margin on the tape, but that was ok as actual airspeed would build up during the descent beyond the min manoeuvre and gear extension speed (extend speed was above extension speed).

The above action was for a rapid depressurization, not a fire in which you might not give a toss about the gear extension speed in the first place. It was also found unfavorable for the depress case and, soon after I joined that company, the procedure was removed from the QRH as an option for Rapid D descents.

Given we're considering depressurized flight at 25,000' after a fire warning in a cargo aircraft while motoring at best speed towards a landing zone (preferably a suitable airport, but not essential if still ablaze), then I guess there is a lot to be said for:

1. follow checklist
2. depressurized flight at high speed to a landing 'zone'
3. if actually on fire, flames confirmed, time since warning +10 mins
4. big call, but must get on ground or water asap
5. if not confirmed on fire, fly to landing zone at FL250 fast as you can go
6. on reaching TOD for selected landing, slow down
7. lower gear
8. simultaneously speed up and descend
9. when suitable margin exists beyond min manoeuvre margin, extend speedbrakes, dive toward airport, extend flaps on schedule or land flapless.

Tough call.

Whatever happens, there'd be no need to keep it pretty.

[EX91]

The Korean Times is reporting that the investigating authorities have located the plane in 80 meters of water.

Body of crashed Asiana cargo plane located

"The Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board that is investigating the case has identified the locations of 39 parts of the aircraft," Kim Han-young, an official from the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, told reporters.
"They (located parts) including the plane's tail, which will likely contain the aircraft's black box," he said.

...

"Meanwhile, the ministry official dismissed suspicions the crash may have been intentional as one of the two missing pilots was said to have taken out a number of life and property insurance policies totaling more than 3 billion won (US$2.8 million), just a month before the accident."


Body of crashed Asiana cargo plane located (http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/08/113_92939.html)

[&&&]

Fastest way to get down in the 744 was to lower the gear and use the speed brake during the descent. Issues to consider were the rising min manoeuvre margin (yellow line) on the speed tape.

No it's not. Look at the Boeing FCTM. From normal cruise speed clean is the fastest way.

[B737NG]

The wreckage of an Asiana Boeing 747-400 Freighter that crashed into the waters off South Korea has been found almost three months after the incident.

South Korean and Asiana officials said that rescue teams retrieved the bodies of the two pilots on Saturday, and brought them to shore on Sunday morning.

The search for the cockpit data recorder and the voice recorder continues, they added. There was no information on the state of the airframe.

The aircraft, with the registration HL-7604, went missing off Jeju Island on 28 July while en-route from South Korea's capital Seoul to Shanghai's Pudong International airport.

[jcjeant]

Jeju's Maritime Police reported the wreckage and the bodies of the two pilots were discovered on the sea floor 104km west of Jeju Island on Sunday noon (Oct 30th) by a private salvage team hired by Asiana. The bodies were subsequently recovered from part of the fuselage which is believed to be the cockpit.

Crash: Asiana B744 near Jeju on Jul 28th 2011, fire in cargo hold (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=44062b99&opt=512)

[F111UPS767]

Why no news!!

Wouldn't the Asiana 747 send ACARS reports of malfunctions (or lack of malfunctions...) as the UPS cargo fire aircraft did?

[jumbojet]

No news, no loss of face!:ugh:

[1a sound asleep]

Wheres the Boeing investigation?
Why was it up to Asiana to retrieve the bodies?
Where's the FDR/CVR?
Where's the ACARS data?
Whats the truth behind the $29 M insurance policy and suicide rumour?
Where is the NTSB assigned accredited representative preliminary report?

Seems to be a LOT of missing information and news. Typically when this happens there is something very suspicious?

[Spooky 2]

The Boeing investigation continues. Asiana is contracting with the same compaony that discovered and raised parts of the AF aircraft from the S. Atlantic. Visibility is extremely poor in these waters and the actual continuence
of the recovery effort for the black boxes will resume in a few months when conditions improve.

[1a sound asleep]

Sad that because this was a freighter that the world's media is paying it no attention.....

[CargoFlyer11]

Crash: Asiana B744 near Jeju on Jul 28th 2011, fire in cargo hold (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=44062b99/0012&opt=0)

Don't know if this has been posted before, but this caught my eye:

'The aircraft had been carrying 39,331 kg of cargo, 18,934 kg of which were loaded at Incheon Airport. A total of 2,092 kg was declared as dangerous goods, loaded near the left cargo door on the main deck. These goods consisted of flammable liquids, corrosive liquids and lithium-ion batteries, the shipment consisting of 198 cells rated at 25Ah at 3.65V. All dangerous cargo had been placed onto 2 palletes and had been loaded without problems, no observation of damage or leakages. The goods had been previously stored according to regulations. The captain had supervised the transport from the warehouse and loading of the two palettes onto position ML and PR on the aircraft.':confused: Seems especially strange in light of speculation about possible suicide of the captain...

[bvcu]

seems an odd statement , 'Captain supervised transport from warehouse and loading' !!! Never heard of this before, maybe check that its loaded correctly etc when on main deck .

[ZimmerFly]

Interim Report available here:

Ç×°ø¤ýöµµ»ç°íÁ¶»çÀ§¿øȸ (http://www.araib.go.kr/)

"http://www.araib.go.kr"

(There is an English option but the .pdf may take a couple of attempts to download correctly):8

[ZimmerFly]

I think some misinterpretation of the report is responsible for the statement.

The report says:-

The captain escorted the two dangerous goods pallets as they were loaded in ULD positions ML and PR.

It is not unusual for the Captain or F/O to observe the loading of DG pallets next to the main cargo door. Part of the normal pre-flight inspection involves a walk around all accessible areas of the Main Deck cargo area after loading is completed.

(Total cargo weight was 65,938kg)

[SMT Member]

Report I've seen quoted mentions main area of fire damage to be around the main-deck cargo door, with sooth traces running all the way forward to around the CL/CR position. This indicates the fire was strongest at the PL (door) position, but it does not necessarily follow that's where the fire started - though it is likely to be the case.

The report states two pallets with DGR, including flammable liquids (Class 3), corrosives (Cl. 8) and Li-Io batteries (Cl. 9), were loaded on MR and PL, but it does not state how the DG was spread over the two. According to IATA separation criteria you can load Cl. 9 with anything, and there's no requirement to keep Cl. 3 and 8 separated. There's a nice 2.2 tons cocktail for you to ponder, and it's worth mentioning that those separation criteria apply equally to pax and cargo aircraft. And while such a thing as "Cargo Aircraft Only" shipment does exist, what makes a particular substance liable to that restriction is governed largely by quantity per package. Thus if you need to ship 200kg of "nasty" you could do it in 2 x 100kg packages and that would be CAO, or you could do 100 x 2kg packages and that would be acceptable on a pax aircraft.

Still, the biggest danger is not the declared DG but all the unknown and nu-declared shyte we're unknowingly carrying. My position has always been that no cargo carrying aircraft, be it full cargo or lower-deck on a slave boat, departs without some kind of nu-declared DG onboard.

[Mariner]

The fire started on the main deck near the side cargo door. Which is where two pallets with DG were loaded in position ML & PR. The pallets contained, among other DG; lithium batteries and photo-resist/IC, a highly flammable fluid.

I question the practice of loading lithium batteries on the maindeck, which is a class E compartment on the B747. Firefighting in a class E compartment is by depressurizing it to 25.000 feet. The FAA has reported that depressurization is ineffective in extinguishing lithium fires. The bellies of a B747 are class C compartments, with halon fire extinguishing. The halon may not put out the lithium fire itself, but it will certainly help to keep the fire down in the surrounding packaging material such as cardboard boxes, plastic sheeting and other flammable material.

And smoke from a lower belly fire would take longer to reach the cockpit.

An added advantage of stowing Lithium batteries in the lower belly would be the extra distance from the vulnerable flight control cables, which run above the ceiling of the main deck.

In the UPS B747 crash at Dubai pitch control was affected within mere minutes of the fire warning. The Asiana crew did not report loss of rudder control untill 12 minutes after reporting a cargo fire, possibly because the fire started much further aft. Allthough from the altitude graph it appears their altitude varied quite a bit.

All this could buy the flight crew extra time to divert, ditch or make an off-airport landing.

ASAP.

[SMT Member]

I know of one cargo carrier (B777F) who has banned lithium batteries from the main-deck, consigning them to lower-deck Class C compartments only. A rather prudent step, if you ask me.

In an ideal world these batteries should, perhaps, be subject to an outright ban. But if you do that you might as well turn the lights out for air cargo. Thus a more safe way must be found to transport these units, and Class C compartment only is one component of a risk mitigating strategy.