Fedex Tokyo MD-11 Update

[Shore Guy]

Crash: Fedex MD11 at Tokyo on Mar 23rd 2009, turned on its back while landing in gusty winds (http://avherald.com/h?article=416e7619/0014&opt=0)

[ironbutt57]

The airplane is a piece of crap......full stop:ok:

[Huck]

It ain't that simple.

It just requires some respect, and that you bring your A game every time.

I wish it were easier, but it is what it is.

[bearfoil]

I was impressed with the after crash photos of the LG. Instead of piercing the top surface of the wing's skin, the wing came off. This company built a/c for the Navy, and they were very stout. The engineering of the LG is extensive, and it seems (perhaps just a useless observation) that the LG can survive just about anything. But, why should it? That mammoth Beast can 'Bounce' ? Even the Nose Gear remained in position. Did anyone catch that last Bounce on the NG? Criminy.

[Huck]

The MLG are directly attached to the aft spar - no substructure that can give a little. So 3g+ landings are going to fracture the spar. Watch the video - BOTH wings were broken, the other one folds over the fuselage as it rolls.

But any heavy aircraft is going to get creamed in such a scenario. The MD11 just does it alot more spectacularly.

[lederhosen]

The reduction in size of the horizontal stabiliser (versus the DC10 to save weight) has been discussed at length on this forum together with the electronics that were supposed to compensate. Given the regularity of landing accidents one wonders what went on during the original flight testing. I cannot believe the test pilots had no inkling.

Then again I know people who flew the diva (as she is sometimes called over here) without incident for years and were very surprised by the statistics showing the amazing difference in accidents between the MD11 and similar jets. I remember being ridiculed for highlighting this disparity on Pprune some time ago, until a very helpful gentleman from Finland pointed out that the statistics were published by Boeing, who have no interest in trying to make the MD11 look bad, as they took over the company.

[aterpster]

The view of some is that the DC-10 was a piece of junk to begin with.

[Flightmech]

eagerly awaiting the arrival of Stilton:E

[Doors to Automatic]

It seems odd that no other commercial aircraft (to my knowledge) has ended up on its back but this one has done so on several occasions - especially as there are/were so few in service.

[lederhosen]

It is hardly a surprise that almost everyone has stopped flying them with passengers. The irony is that due to the nature of the cargo business most will now be touching down close to max landing weight exacerbating the speed and handling problems.

[BRE]

It is interesting to not that

a) The MD-11F has only about 60% of the range of the passenger versions, so it probably has a higher MLW.

b) All of the landing / bouncing accidents were F

[Gretchenfrage]

Not wanting to appear boasting, but I flew the MD11 13 years and had no problem with it.

Look at the statistics and you will realise that during the initial years of operation there were very few incidents. The reason is that the crew came mostly from DC10 or MD80, they were well experienced in pitch and power management and a rather steep climb of the speed/drag curve below Vref.

Once seniority started shifting pilots from the new generation of A320 aircraft, where pitch and power and trimming is no longer really emphasized, the problems started.

The reaction of MD/Boeing was implementing more and more input inhibits as to counteract the loss of piloting skills, they only aggravated the situation by castrating the controls.

I am not saying that the MD11 was the best aerodynamical achievement, although it has the by far best cockpit layouts and logic, it was an aircraft that was manageable for a properly trained pilot. The Boeing bulletin now tries to achieve just that.

The problem is that too many of todays pilots came through the new automation religion and are simply lacking the basic skills of flying. A simple bulletin, a sim session or two and some well intended but cheap words of a chief instructor will not suffice imho.

The MD11 is out of our time. But I loved it.


(by the way, the bounced landing crash in Hong Kong by ChEa WAS a passenger airplane)

[Noddys car]

BRE
Believe the one in Honkers was a pax version

[PENKO]

Gretchenfrage, that's an interesting claim you make. Do you have any indication that the crew flew Airbus aircraft before they were rated on the MD11?

[kbrockman]

Not that I'm debating overall current basic piloting skills but I fail to see
where this is relavant with the MD-11's history of repeated tendencies
to flip on its back after a hard TD.

As far as I'm aware the 2 FX crews and the Mandarin airlines flight where all old school pilots comming of the old bus and the 727.

[RATpin]

my understanding is that the design was compromised by the launch customer(Delta) shortening the wing span to fit the then new maintenance hanger.Ultimately leading to the aircraft having very high Vref speeds.
Out off the hands of the test pilots.

[Huck]

I work for FX and have flown the Mighty Dog "F" for 7 years total at two different companies.

In both of our MD11 hull losses I can assure you that pilot experience was not a factor. The pilots were well-rounded with plenty of heavy, high-performance time, as well as a fair amount of MD11 time.

The KEWR hull loss occurred back before the software change, when LSAS kicked off below 50'. The captain set up an excessive sink rate then lacked the pitch authority to arrest it adequately.

Much speculation follows - no word from the Japanese yet:

The RJAA hull loss involved a huge wind gust at touchdown, a big bounce and (I believe) a first officer that thought he was on the ground when he wasn't. This is all speculation but if you look at the pitch control inputs it does look like he was trying to derotate and "stick" the aircraft on the runway. His pitch-down input set up rotational inertia in pitch that could not be overcome, causing the nose-down touchdown. The second touchdown was at less than one g until ground contact, causing a whipsaw effect on the wings, right at the MLG attach point.

One cannot forget the overwhelming fatigue they were suffering from at that point. They left the Philippines the night before, stopped at Guangzhao for a few hours then arrived at Narita well after sunrise. This with a two-man crew that had started in Anchorage just a few days before. I've been in that type of situation, and intellectual agility is not available. You're hanging in the straps, just waiting for the pain to stop at the hotel room.....

[Gretchenfrage]

I did not specifically pretend that the crews involved were former AB pilots and inexperienced.
I described a trend that led to the MD11 being decried difficult.

The tendency to flip on its back after bounced landings originates due to the partial deployment of the spoilers after wheel spin-up (first contact). If this occurs hard and a bounce follows, the aircraft hangs in the air with mostly quite high pitch and thrust idle. As I mentioned, the MD11 has a particularly steep rise of the speed/drag curve below Vref, therefore stalling rapidly in this situation. One wing does this first (mainly downwind) and a marked banking occurs and the wing touches the ground leading to the flip.

Remedy was to select one notch less flaps (still landing configuration) or keep the Vapp, or even Vapp+5 down to TD. This is however not always desired, as the Vapp were already very high with full flaps. Not really what you'd like especially on shorter runways (i.e. the one in NRT), those less than 2500m were not very appreciated with this bird.

Another very important remedy is a ultra strict flight path adherence on short final. This assured a much more constant pitch and trim configuration. You needed to assist/override the AT to keep a precise approach speed adherence, less to the upper side, but absolute to the lower. That is exactly where Airbus pilots were less precise (in my experience), their former birds (I have flown them as well) are much less delicate in this respect. The speeds were lower, they mostly flew fixed throttles and the Airbus' are less traitorous when slightly below Vref.

[Locked door]

Wrong.

The tendency for it to flip on its back is due to the undercarriage being anchored directly into the main spar so a hard landing rips one wing off. The situations you describe are probably true but they account for the hard landings, the subsequent roll overs are due to one wing falling off due to the hard landing.

Look at the BA777, bits of u/c everywhere including up through the wing but both wings are still firmly attached to the a/c. Now look at all the MD-11 roll overs, you'll find one wing a long way from the rest of the wreckage in all cases.

[kbrockman]

Not really what you'd like especially on shorter runways (i.e. the one in NRT), those less than 2500m were not very appreciated with this bird.

FX80 crashed at NRT on 34L, a 13000ft+ Rwy.

[bearfoil]

There is no better tutorial for LG issues than the Narita deal. Watch the video as often as it takes to watch the airframe sacrifice integrity bit by bit around the attach/join of the mains (and especiaaly the NLG).

Both wings snapped at the LG attach. She rolled due to the conspiring physics of drag and no attached wing on one side and rapidly increasing lift on the other. Dwell on the ironic picture of her on her back with her Landing gear pointed skyward, complete with tires (!).

Pay particular attention to the last "Bounce" on her nose gear.

It is an interesting corporate history that features such stout legs. Wing loading, touchy finals, and gear that would support an aircraft carrier 'landing'. Wait.......

[jrmyl]

Gretchenfrage,

Although I've never flown the MD-11, I agree with the points that you have made. I would like to correct you on one thing though. The accident runway in NRT is not the short one. Rwy 34L is 13,100 ft (4000 m) long. Definitely not a short runway.

[SMOC]

34L has a displaced threshold, the GS leaves you with a useable length of 9,534'.

[kbrockman]

10,500ft me thinks, anyway, purely academic, more than enough to safely land
any large AC, even at or near MLW.

[latetonite]

to SMOG: landing distance available is calculated from 50`over threshold. Your ``useful landing distance beyond glide slope`` is quasi irrelevant.

[Gretchenfrage]

The aircraft crashed in HKG had both its wings still neatly fixed, and it was a bounced landing with subsequent flip.

Look, the wings breaking and the gear collapsing are secondary effects. The one that leads to the bounce is the initiating problem. The second hard landing, or wing scratching just increases the damage already done.

If you want to do something against such accidents, it would be pi$$ing into the Mississipi if you'd attach the gear differently, or less rigidly.

Try with training the pilots first NOT to do the hard landing leading to a bounce in the first place.

[kbrockman]

that's not really true Gretchen, from Wiki, but basically an excerpt from the accident report;

At about 6:43 P.M. on 22 August 1999, B-150, a McDonnell Douglas MD-11, was making its final approach to runway 25L when Typhoon Sam was 50 km NE of the airport. At an altitude of 700 feet prior to touchdown a further wind check was passed to the crew: 320 deg/28 knots gusting to 36 knots, while maximum crosswind component limit for the aircraft was 24 knots. The crew neglected this and continued the landing. During the final flare to land, the plane rolled to the right, landed hard on its right main gear and the No. 3 engine touched the runway. The right wing separated from the fuselage. The aircraft continued to roll over and skidded off the runway in flames. When it stopped, it was on its back and the rear of the plane was on fire, coming to rest on a grass area next to the runway, 1100 m from the runway threshold. The right wing was found on a taxiway 90 meters from the nose of the plane.[2] As shown in photos of the aircraft at rest, the fire caused significant damage to the rear section of the aircraft but was quickly extinguished due to the heavy rain and quick response from rescue teams in the airport.

You're right about the initial reasons being pilot judgement related rather than
just design related.
Still, a somewhat shoddy design IMHO.

[alph2z]

EDIT: OK you're referring to a different crash.

IGNORE: It's left not right for roll, LGear, engine, and wing.

[SMOC]

Latetonight, yea mate about as irrelevant as saying it's 13,000', point is this is where following the GS puts you, what air distance the md-11 uses from the threshold I don't know, especially since they had a CAS of about 170kts you assume they crossed the threshold at 50'.

The third touchdown where it breaks is between 2,500 & 3,000' with a CAS of 150kts, where does that fit in your 50'?

[grounded27]

The problem is that too many of todays pilots came through the new automation religion and are simply lacking the basic skills of flying. A simple bulletin, a sim session or two and some well intended but cheap words of a chief instructor will not suffice imho.

The MD11 is out of our time. But I loved it.



Amen, fact is that there are many pilots who have expectations based on flying other modern (and a few older) jets who just do not have the aptitude to operate this fine machine that was the end of a legacy because most of their experience was on airframes that need less from them to operate saftely. Sadly a bad situation and a bit of complacency (training and judgment) results in disaster.

[greg47]

Gretchenfraqge i agree 2200rs Pic MD11 after a background on Tristars and years before DC3s and C185s

[pax britanica]

Sticking my neck out as SLF . Experience of MD 11 limited to one LHR-RIO round trip on VARIG.

Read all these comments and on other threads with great interest and had a couple of questions
1 How did the MD 11 get approved by the FAA if as seems a common thread it can be a handful for?
Inexperienced pilots
Tricky weather –especially wind shear/shifts low down
Someone having an ‘off day’
I do not in the least want to impugn any ones professionalism because people do have below par days in every profession and job and indeed have great admiration for the airline pilot community doing a job that can be very very very different from almost all other professions when circumstances combine badly.
Isn’t a ‘fail safe ‘ approach something intrinsic in the design and acceptance process and approving an aircraft that apparently needs a seemingly higher level of skill/care/awareness than other comparable aircraft seems to be something of a risk when compared with all the other efforts made to make modern airliners the reliable safe machines they are.
However surely the Certifying authorities and indeed Chief pilots of companies that assessed/bought MD 11 had a duty to flag up the fact that the MD11 has some quirks that seem just not to be there on 747s 777s 330/340 series. Or was this a situation again where traditional pilot skills (and concerns) were just not given sufficient weight in a no doubt very commercially driven process.
Sorry to intrude on the debate just a view from ‘down the back’-where of course it is somewhat limited anyway
PB

[stilton]

Dodgy Aircraft.



Unfortunately we don't always bring our 'A Game'




A Civilian Jet Transport should not require above average levels of skill from it's Pilots.



We all have bad days, fatigue, jet lag, poor scheduling and many other factors can combine to produce less than stellar performances on occasion.


In a Boeing or Airbus, however the result is not usually fatal.

[golfyankeesierra]

Having spoken to a MD11 qualified pilot about these issues, he said (and that was before the LH and FedX accidents) there is one golden rule for the MD11:

Bounce = go around and try again. Period.

And they train wave-offs in the sim.

It seems that all the accidents are loss of control after a bounce.
But then again, loss of control is rapidly becoming nr1 cause for accidents, and not only on the MD11.

[Gretchenfrage]

Answering to the last three posts:

It is a fact that the MD11 is less forgiving than the recent Airbus and Boeing models. Having said that, we could simply ban the Maddog and live happily ever after. But .....

It was controllable for the more specifically trained and experienced pilots, or those having flown DC10 or MD80, in general older models with more hands on requirements.

If we settle for the more gentle aircraft of today and accept the more limited pilot skill level as to fly those, we will most probably continue down the automation/protection road. The new pilots being operators, good ones, but only operators. The newer generation models will be even more forgiving and protected and their pilots even less required to have any rear side skills no more.

We will all be fat, dumb and happy, however ......

As we discover more and more, even the highly developed automatics have their bumps and programing every possible event is impossible. As we see, automation when it senses errors or no data, simply throws the aircraft back to the pilots. That's per design!!

In recent incidents we unfortunately detect, that many pilots seem unable to cope with such situations.

Either we achieve an absolutely foolproof design, or we have to keep the pilots up to speed, as to be able to at least stabilize an aircraft that momentarily goes into manual with sometimes erratic displays.

The choice is simple and coming back to the MD11 example, we are already in a catch 22 with this model.

Either train the pilots and let them get experience, or scrap the model.

But again, we will be back to square one in a few years with the minimalistic and way too synthetic training we give our successors.

[Huck]

The answer is simple, really, if you want to improve aviation safety.

Pay enough money to attract the right talent.

Insist on top-shelf flying skills or fire them.

We cannot engineer out the need for first-class flying skills. The recent AF A330 accident proved that.....

Just last week I completed my six-month simulator ride on the 777F. The last maneuver was a hand-flown closed circuit following a V1 cut with a fire that wouldn't go out in HKG. Complex engine-out procedure, heavy weight, initial climb rate was 300 feet per minute, dodging the ships. Went around Lantau island and rolled out on a 5 mile visual for an overweight landing at 190 knots, using most of the ~13000' runway. No way to fake it, no way to sneak through without the requisite talent.

At the end of the day, somebody onboard's still got to have some skills.

[Willit Run]

The FedEx folks seem to have a fairly cushy contract.
Do they fly enough hours every month to stay proficient; not legal, but proficient ?

that may have been a mitigating factor??

[GlueBall]

A whopping 4.9 degrees nose down input after the last bounce must have been a case of momentary insanity, especially in a transport category airplane.

Elementary flying skills learned from day one in flight school had taught most of us that after a bounced touchdown, if not initiating a go-around, then we would add a touch of power, level the pitch for a second flare and touchdown.

Never ever to dive the nose into the ground as these FedUp guys had done. :ooh:

[bearfoil]

Given the physics involved, do we know if the pilots were even conscious after the first 'impact'?

[lederhosen]

Huck I am confused, are you saying FX training has improved as a result of the Narita accident or was it always excellent? I appreciate you are now on a different aircraft, but presumably you still have an insight.

If I understood you correctly you earlier said that experience also did not play a role with the Narita crew. If we rule out training and experience it looks like the average pilot on a bad day in the MD11 may simply be unable to cope with what would be no big deal on most other aircraft.

The two recent accidents, LH and FX we have been discussing, happened to airlines who are well up the league table in terms of pay and conditions. Maybe the aircraft needs to be treated like Concorde with additional selection and presumably rewards for those who are above average within the company.

By the way the guys at BA who failed the Concorde course did not get fired they just went back to their previous aircraft.

[filejw]

In reading this report I noted the autopilot was on till 2 or 3 hundred feet. I have found over the years in many different a/c that hand flying from say 1000 ft gives me better performance and results. Many a/p systems just can't keep up in such strong winds.

[Huck]

This is only my personal opinion, but-

- I think it was a good crew in NRT.

- I think they were very very tired.

- The first bounce was very survivable, 1.7 g or something like that.

- I think the pilot flying thought he was on the ground and wanted to get the nose down, when in fact he was in mid-bounce. Too late he realized his error.

- Training since then has focused more on basic skills, no doubt about that. FX has developed a bounce recovery curriculum that is becoming the industry standard. Some of the simulator exercises are interesting - we turn off the auto-spoilers, make a VFR approach and then attempt to make multiple touch-and-goes by slightly adding power after touchdown. I could make four in one pass - the record is eleven. All to teach finesse and stability in the flare.

In reading this report I noted the autopilot was on till 2 or 3 hundred feet. I have found over the years in many different a/c that hand flying from say 1000 ft gives me better performance and results.

My philosophy exactly. If you're going to play piano or guitar, you want to warm up a little first. I cannot comprehend why pilots want to grab the controls at 200 feet.

[FlexibleResponse]

Some of the simulator exercises are interesting - we turn off the auto-spoilers, make a VFR approach and then attempt to make multiple touch-and-goes by slightly adding power after touchdown.

Huck, Are you sure this is a good technique to teach for a bounced landing?

[Huck]

It's not a recovery technique.

The recovery technique is to hold 7.5 degrees of pitch and hit the TOGA button.

The touch and go exercise just gives pilots more time in the backside of the flare, to develop muscle memory for that last crucial few seconds. We learn by doing - and this gives pilots more time very close to the ground.

[caiman27]

Given the physics involved, do we know if the pilots were even conscious after the first 'impact'?

Just SLF but this is a bit relevant - the transcript did not show any cockpit sound other than impact related.

[bearfoil]

caiman 27

When I saw my first 747 climbing out of Honolulu in 1970, I said to myself, That a/c is going to crash, it is moving too slowly.

The MD11 is also a massive a/c, and watching it land in Narita, I had to remind myself, "Imagine the accelerations the Pilots are feeling." Slow is relative, and small things move "faster".

[executive chauffeur]

After twenty years of operation, the handling qualities of the MD11 are still a hot topic. There's really only two posiblities; you either love this aircraft or you hate it. For some reason people with experience on previous Long Beach products seem to have less problems with this airplane.
Huck I think you're dead right. :ok:
The secret to making decent landings in an MD11 is to disconnect the AP & AT at 10000' and FLY & FEEL the airplane. That way, even if things go south due to reasons beyond your control, you're in the loop and you have time correct the situation; e.a. 7.5 pitch & TOGA, get the hell out of dodge.
However, If the prospect of hand flying an approach in this airplane scares you, please put in a bid to go on airbus....

[BigFootDriver]

Wow this was a weird bit of flying. The PF reminds of a trick a captain showed me many years ago when just before touchdown, he slammed the yoke forward! Scared the crap out of me but the airplane made a smooth touchdown.

So this idiot at Fedex does the same thing. Look at the dfdr data where he pushes the yoke forward at 4 feet RA.

How the hell is anyone supposed to recover from that? he tries desperately moving the yoke fore and aft but doesn't know what to do and PIO blamo. Piss poor flying. Lucky he didn't take out any innocent bystanders.

And yes I flew and loved the md-11. It had nice handling qualities, landed very smoothly. Only thing I disliked was the 158 knot ref speeds. Took a lot of runway even on a good day.

BFD

[Flightmech]

BigFootDriver,

Very disrespectful:=:ugh::mad:

[Capn Bloggs]

When the airplane descended through 500 feet AGL 70 seconds after the landing clearance, the captain remarked that the approach was stable (editorial note: the report does not mention, who is pilot flying, though this and another remark suggest the first officer was pilot flying).

6 seconds later the first officers calls "Sheeee!"

Another 14 seconds later the autopilot disconnect sound is recorded by the cockpit voice recorder.

8 seconds later the automated "100" call is sounded,
filejw and executive chauffeur, I agree. Too much automation these days. Get it out early and get the feel. Boeing recently amended our FCOM to recommend that, on a good day, the AP be taken out at 500ft AGL and the aircraft hand-flown. Keeps you current (well, more current than you would have been had you always disconnected at 100ft).

[Huck]

If it's VFR, it's off at the marker for me. Can't come up with a reason not to, save laziness.

[bugg smasher]

Can't help but noticing Huck, the report says the captain had ca 8000 hours total time, the F/O something similar, at 54 years old. Normally, at this age the flying experience should be in the mid to high teens, what's up with that?

Single seat fighter guys?

What was their previous experience?

[Gretchenfrage]

Flight hours and age are not the only indicator for experience.

It greatly depends on

- What equipment are the hours flown on.
- How much training has been given to the pilot, sim and real time.
- What are the sop's of the companies. Are they the a$$ covering as much
automatics as possible and AP off at minimum, or something more hands on
- How many hours on what seat

8000 hours don't seem few, but not many either. Give it for example 5000 as FO, thereof 4000 on a RJ, then 1500 on a RJ again as Captain, suddenly it doesn't look bright.
Or give it a ME career for locals, 6000h as long range FO with 1 landing every 20 days, then a guaranteed upgrade to long range again, the cycle experience is very dim.

Going along with all your age and flight hours, you need cycles and exposure to all the different environments and experience on similar types of airframe if you want to be called "experienced".
You also need a adequate syllabus of training and retraining within the company (rare these days where the only worship is for the doe).

Incident reports rarely give us the total information.

[filejw]

Bugg I think its the nature of flying at Fed EX. They start with just domestic flts and would fly only 3 hrs a night.

[MPH]

Attitude...Attitude/ Pitch and on wheel spin-up bring the nose down firmly. If you bounce, attitude/pitch let it touch again and bring the nose down. As in most A/C a stable approach generaly ends up with a good landing. Don't forget a lot of company's use A/T till touch down in this plane it retards/idle at 50'. The spin up creates a nose up attitude hence the nose/pitch control.

[MoodyBlue]

MPH,

Please consider the quote below before "firmly bringing the nose down on wheel spinup":

The NTSB therefore issued these safety recommendations to the FAA:

Require Boeing to revise its MD-11 Flight Crew Operating Manual to reemphasize high sink rate awareness during landing, the importance of momentarily maintaining landing pitch attitude after touchdown and using proper pitch attitude and power to cushion excess sink rate in the flare, and to go around in the event of a bounced landing. (A-11-68)Yes, the nosewheel should be on the ground and chances are that you will need a nose-down input for that on the MD-11. You may even need a nose-down input just to maintain the landing pitch attitude after main gear touchdown.
However, one of the common factors coming out of the seminars on MD-11 landing incidents/accidents is a too-aggressive derotation after main gear touchdown. This has resulted in the recommendation to maintain the landing pitch attitude for one or two seconds ('momentarily') after main gear touchdown and thén starting a controlled derotation.
Your TM will have all the information from the seminars.

[grounded27]

The two recent accidents, LH and FX we have been discussing, happened to airlines who are well up the league table in terms of pay and conditions. Maybe the aircraft needs to be treated like Concorde with additional selection and presumably rewards for those who are above average within the company.



Many airlines have operated this aircraft sucussfully, no need for above average skills. Just a respect for the aircraft. FDX operates the largest fleet of type. A pilot's job is to know how his/her aircraft fly's. FDX performs more takeoff's and landings in the MD-11 every day than any other airline. Hope I have drilled the fact home that any complacent pilot is subject to disaster and that odd's are that "**** happens"!

A large contributing factor to pilot error with the MD-11 is pilot's who expect it to perform like others they have flown, the main one here was a pilot who did NOT respect his aircraft and pushed it's limits over the edge......

[grounded27]

- I think the pilot flying thought he was on the ground and wanted to get the nose down, when in fact he was in mid-bounce. Too late he realized his error.

This statement negates the sentements preceding, W/S in a bounce. PF was determined to land the aircraft, it was later that he realized his erorr.

[wingview]

I think that both were not aware how high the bouce was and over derotated. It didn't look like a hard landing to begin with.

[bearfoil]

Back to the Physics involved. From the video alone, one is shown remarkable accelerations up and down @ the flight deck.

Can one eliminate the possibility that one or the other or both of these pilots were unconscious, and depending on shoulder restraint fit, may have been pummeling the column with body slams that had no relationship to formal input?

We're looking at transits of 70-80 feet in less than one second. Hands on column throughout?

bear

[MPH]

MoodyBlue.

By firmly, I mean on intitial touch down maintain attitude and then fly the nose down. Did that for almost 6000hrs on this bird and like most A/C each one has it's own peculiarity.

[MoodyBlue]

MPH,

Put this way: By firmly, I mean on intitial touch down maintain attitude and then fly the nose down. we completely agree - and I'll raise you a 1000hrs! :ok:

[HarryMann]

Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the way the landing was flown... is 3.06g really enough to break this bird's spar like that :oh:

JTSB says largest bounce was 16ft, frst impact about 2.0g