S76 crash Myanmar

[malabo]

Today's press
Helicopter crashes in sea off Myanmar, killing 3 - Forbes.com (http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2011/07/11/general-as-myanmar-helicopter-crash_8558801.html)

YANGON, Myanmar -- A helicopter carrying crew from an offshore drilling rig crashed into the sea off Myanmar, killing three people on board. Eight were rescued.

An oil company employee, speaking on condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to release information, said co-pilot Ohn Thein, a retired air force officer, and two Myanmar employees died in the crash Monday.

The aircraft was carrying staff of the Malaysian oil company Petronas from the Yetagun offshore gas field in the Andaman Sea.

The oil field is operated by Petronas Carigali of Malaysia, PTTEP of Thailand and Japan's Nippon Oil company. Petronas also operates a cross-border gas pipeline to transport gas from Yetagun to Thailand.

Anybody know who operates there these days?

Google is your friend, looks like it was Heli-Union with a French captain.

3 Killed in Yetagun Copter Crash (http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=21670)

[Outwest]

Tragic news.......but I doubt it is an S76.

[malabo]

Tragic news.......but I doubt it is an S76.

I admit the "French built SK-76" threw me at first too, but then ASN Aircraft accident 11-JUL-2011 Sikorsky- Keystone S-76C-2 (http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=137366) seems to identify it as an S76C++.

[Outwest]

The reason I say that is that the US gov has an embargo on Myanmar and will not allow the use of US built a/c there. That is why CHC was forced to pull out.

Maybe that does not apply to French companies ;)

[rigrat]

I work for an energy company in Myanmar (Burma)
The majority of aircraft operating in Myanmar are USA built. We fly a Bell 412. Sanctions issues are hugely misunderstood. There are no restrictions whatsoever to having a USA built aircraft in Myanmar. Some USA and Canadian companies may choose not to operate here, but many do.
The chopper was a Heli-union S76 C++ on contract to Petronas and coming off the Floating Storage and Offtake vessel in the Yetagun field. The aircraft took off, cleared the heli deck and was climbing away when it went down quite suddenly. The stories going around Yangon are that they lost an engine. this is of great concern to everyone in the oil and gas business here as we have always been assured that the C++ could translate from take off to flight and either continue to destination or return and land on one engine and compensation for the loss of one engine was 'automatic'. i would love to have some knowledgeable person here give an opinion.
The co-pilot, and two passengers drowned, the rest were able to exit the aircraft. The aircraft is currently being salvaged.
My thoughts are with the families of my colleagues who perished.

[Outwest]

The majority of aircraft operating in Myanmar are USA built. We fly a Bell 412. Sanctions issues are hugely misunderstood. There are no restrictions whatsoever to having a USA built aircraft in Myanmar. Some USA and Canadian companies may choose not to operate here, but many do.

OK, that may be the case in CHCs' instance. However, I do seem to remember a time when CHC operated in Iran and the US gov and Sikorsky said that if they continued to operate there they would cut off parts supply.

[unstable load]

CHC left Myanmar because at the time they were listed on the NYSE and as a consequence to that could not continue operations. Had they not been listed they probably could have continued there.

[JerryR]

Tragic News for sure. It was a S-76C++ operated by Heli-Union

[industry insider]

Rigrat

The C++ should have been able to fly away on one engine if the take off weights were correctly calculated. Heli Union are a good operator with good procedures and many years experience. The C++ is a reliable aircraft and is in use worldwide.

Of course one can always be proved wrong but the balance of probabilities would suggest to me that this is unlikely to be just a staightforward simple engine failure. They are statistically rare, especially to occur at such a critical stage of flight and should not result in a crash.

Do you know if the floats were inflated?

[zalt]

Does Heli Union have a local partner who provides cojoes?
Do they get sim training and CRM?

[Peter PanPan]

HU Crew plus 9 onboard, aircraft taking off from a FSO... Tragic news :(

It will be interesting to read both Turbomeca and Sikorsky's reports.

Just had a quick glance at the Thai Met Dept and here's the general situation for today Jul 13th at 4am: The monsoon trough remains across Myanmar, Laos and upper of Vietnam while the rather strong southwest monsoon prevails over the Andaman Sea, Thailand and the Gulf of Thailand. Scattered to fairly widespread rain is likely over the country. Isolated heavy rain is expected in the Northeast, the East and the South west coast, people in the areas should beware of heavy rain. The wind wave in the Andaman Sea and the eastern part of upper Gulf of Thailand is intensifying. All ship should proceed with caution and small boats in the Andaman Sea should keep ashore during 13-16 July, 2011.

[rigrat]

The deceased co-pilot was an ex-Myanmar Air Force Pilot.. Floats were inflated on the aircraft. Unsubstantiated rumours are that the aircraft went upside down almost immediately.

[albatross]

Sad news - Ohn Thein was a true gentleman.

[Chopper76C]

Your right;

Ohn Thein was a good hearted man. I have met his family also on numerous occasions. I worked with him for 7 years with CHC. Played several games of Golf with him also.
Sad news for sure.

This industry now has gone Safety crazy,but at the end of the day What happens.. happens and there is nothing we can do about it.

Pray this does not happen again.

[JimL]

Chopper76C,

That is not a view that I, and many others, would accept.

There is a great deal that can be done to avoid unnecessary accidents without having to subscribe to a no-accident utopia.

Fatalism rarely encourages progress.

Jim

[Icer3]

Re engine failures during take off or landing offshore, there are rarely any operational regulations that require engine failure to be accounted for and very few helicopter types have certificated Flight Manual procedures for offshore use. The only rules I know of are the JAR OPS 3 PC2e rules that require safe reject onto the deck, deck edge clearance and staying above the sea for the continued T/O or Go Around, plus safe landing on the helideck for the approach case, in the event of an engine failure at any time. These are not generally applied even in Europe because JAA is dead and EASA has not taken over fully yet. In fact there are many in our industry who are arguing that accounting for engine failure is not required (low probability of occurrence) and are trying to get the JAA/EASA rules removed/changed. If you truly account for engine failure, the payloads that come out of a CAT A or PC2e take off and landing procedure are not always very good for many helicopter types and the vast majority of helicopter offshore operations are at higher weights, with the associated risk periods in the event of an engine failure. If that is how we want to operate then fine, but let's not kid ourselves that all types at all times will survive an engine failure. We need much more installed power than is normal to do that.
Hopefully the facts from this sad accident, engine failure or not, will become availble for all of us to use to help improve safety in the future.

[peterperfect]

Ref Icer3..................JimL, "you have control Sir" !!!

[rotorjay]

Oh what a nice guy he was. I flew with and trained Ohn Thein while working for CHC working out of Yangon for 2 years.
He was a great golfer also representing the military at tournaments.
Alot of my fellow pilots are going to be so saddened.
God bless ya buddy!!

[malabo]

Any prelim info on this accident yet?
Unlikely an engine failure, unlikely a failure would have caused a ditch - a C++ with fuel for Yetagon to Kanbauk and 9 Burmese on board should have been 1000 lbs under MTOW, multiply those two remote probabilities together and there isn't much left. With auto floats, push out windows, external rafts, jettisonable doors, Huet training, even a ditching should have been no more drama than the Bristow 332 in Nigeria.

WTH happened?

[bell4can]

Any news 2 weeks after the accident?

Bell4can

[Shell Management]

Be patient, proper investigations take a long time.

[rotorbrent]

Yes I agree

you would not want to do like one oil company did after a S-76 crash

Like stop flying the aircraft all together without even a hint of the accident cause

Make unresonable demands as to the accident cause the day after accident.

Require 100's of hours of test on aircraft systems which were totally unrelated to the cause of the accident.

Made every attempt to smear two fine war veterans and professional pilots who were at the controls before the investigation was finished

create even more rules I mean "procedures" for the aircraft before the accident investigation was finished.

yes I agree it would be best to let the professionals work on finding the cause.

Unlike that one Oil company acted at the last S-76 crash.

I believe that those board room accident investigators their name started with a "S" or something

[bb in ca]

Any new information out on this one is Heli-Union and the other stake holders all going to bury it?

[unstable load]

Last I heard was that the seismic guys were out trying to locate the wreck.

[ambidextrous]

Be patient, proper investigations take a long time!
They certainly do in the more backward areas of the world. A night medevac Bell 212/412? still lies at the bottom of the Bight of Benin c/w with crew & patient since 2003!:ugh:

[IntheTin]

That's horrible to think that it's still down there :(

[unstable load]

Apparently the seismic crew have located the wreck.

[Shell Management]

Great news, patience pays off:) After a month the batteries on the sonar beacon would have failed making a search with active sonar essential. Just look at the time to find Af447.

[DauphinDude]

I know COHC have ops in Myanmar, I believe they have a few S76 is their fleet.

EDIT: Google tells me it was a Heli-Union with a french captain.

..and please take everything I have written with a few grains of salt.

[unstable load]

Indeed.....

[peroni]

Indeed............what?

All this time later, do we know what happened apart from an engine failure!

[unstable load]

peroni,

Indeed, it was a Heli Union with a French captain.

I don't think it's been salvaged yet, so anything else is speculation at this point.

[Peter PanPan]

Here's the BEA Final Report concerning HU accident in Andaman Sea:

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2011/f-cs110711/pdf/f-cs110711.pdf

[Sir Korsky]

Good report. Shame it was needed. :( I wonder how many times those guys had been through that exact event in the sim.

[Mars]

Am I the only one who was intrigued by this report?

When this accident occurred, because it was a fatal, most of us were reluctant to comment - deciding instead to await the accident report. Having now examined the accident report including: the picture of the Yetagun FSO and platform; the traces; and the CVR commentary, I am somewhat surprised at the lack of comment in the report (and on PPRune) on the take-off procedure and direction.

Here are some questions:

(1) Why take off into a sector which appears to contain a crane and which limited the departure direction?

(2) Was the take-off direction effected by the direction of the Yetagun platform?

(3) Why accept a departure with a tail-wind component?

(4) Why take off to the port side of the FSO when the starboard side provided an obstacle-free into-wind departure?

(5) Why take-off with a starboard wind component which would draw more power from the tail-rotor?

(6) Why did the aircraft climb vertically at less than Delta power?

(7) Why wasn't the published TDP used?

In the CVR recording, the FO states "Yes, the take-off is PC1, 10870 pounds"; did that not signal that the published PC2e procedure should have been flown?

The S76C++ graphs appear to indicate that had this take-off been flown as published, a fly-away could have been achieved.

It is particularly noticeable that the vertical acceleration resembled more that published for the EC365 than that for the S76. Was that something to do with previous training, or habit, or was it a feature of the Heli-Union OM.

Have the Heli-Union procedures been amended since the accident?

Are we not intrigued that the accident investigator does not understand the nature of exposure? It covers a period when an engine failure will lead to a hazardous or catastrophic event. The only thing that can be done is to limit exposure by using minimising strategies.

If there is a real choice between operating to a CAT A (or PC2e) procedure or accepting exposure (even if the choice is marginal) shouldn't the consequences of that choice be emphasized in the OM.

Yes this has been written in hind-sight but isn't it true that there are lessons to be learnt here.

Mars

[Peter PanPan]

Mars, at last someone commenting on this! I was surprised too that this final report not only went unnoticed but also only got a single Pprune comment describing it as a "good report"!

[Mel Effluent]

I am also intrigued by the statement that all the occupants successfully got out of the aircraft and were rescued within an hour, but the copilot and 2 passengers "drowned to death".

The contact with the sea was rather hard but the ditching took place without any problem. At that time the swell was approximately 2 meters and the wind resistance was approximately 90° right of the helicopter. Consequently after ditching, the helicopter capsized onto its left side. At that moment the roof windows were opened and water poured into the cockpit. The crew and passengers opened some jettison doors and got out within a few minutes by helping each other. All the life jackets and two life rafts were inflated and the PF managed to help his co-pilot and passengers. The person on the FSO threw life buoys and positioned a ladder. Approximately 30 minutes later, the field standby boat assigned to Yetagun field, which was
localised between FSO and the platform, arrived and continued the rescue
operations. After approximately 60 minutes, all crew and passengers were onboard. Co-pilot and two passengers drowned to death and other two passengers were seriously injured.

The lack of detail in this account leaves me wondering:
1. Whether the survivors actually managed to board the life rafts.
2. Why no rescue boat was launched from the FSO.
3. How did the deceased come to drown?

There are surely lessons for everyone in the oil and gas industry to be learned here.

[Peter PanPan]

Mars,

Couple of points:

(1) Why take off into a sector which appears to contain a crane and which limited the departure direction?
Wind was from 215° @ 13kt according to the report, the Captain chose 125° as a departure direction (Port side of the FSO) which was 90° to the Yetagun FSO fuselage (Ship's heading was 215°) while keeping the obstacles on his side assuming he was seating on the right seat. The starboard side of the FSO might have indeed been a clearer departure path.

(2) Was the take-off direction effected by the direction of the Yetagun platform?
Most likely since they couldn't take off into the wind and had to accept some cross wind component. The decision to go for the port side of the FSO was probably in order to keep the obstacles on the PF side which was the commander at the time.

(3) Why accept a departure with a tail-wind component?
They had a right cross wind component since they departed on a 125° heading and wind was coming from 215°. Again had they chosen the Starboard side of the FSO they could probably have had less of a cross wind component.

(4) Why take off to the port side of the FSO when the starboard side provided an obstacle-free into-wind departure?
Quite agree on that one.

(7) Why wasn't the published TDP used?
Isn't that pretty common amongst Operators though? I believe CHC uses 20 feet for its Rotation Point on its Global Ops manual, HU was apparently using 25 feet. Is anyone using 30 feet which is the published RP?

Notice though on the Analysis part of the report : "The Héli Union operations manual, approved by the DGAC, makes no reference to the TDP nor to the rotation point in its description of the procedure for engine failure during takeoff from a helideck. However, the illustration indicates a height of 20 feet above the helideck. The references and values in the operations manual should not be lower than those certified by the manufacturer. The absence of any cohesion in the definition of the reference points and associated values leads to the development of erroneous procedures, source of confusion for crews."

On the pilot testimony part we can read 30 feet which is what Sikorsky has published on its Manual, the HU Ops Manual refers to 20 feet, the PNF announced 25 feet according to the CVR transcript.

It appears from the CVR transcript that there were some communications issues between the crew (Language barrier for both sides?) as well as unclear procedures (Lack of standardization?), the FO is not assertive and responds "Yes, Yes" most times, as you mentioned the take off should have been a PC2 procedure and the Captain responds "Go ahead no problem" to the FO "Yes, the take-off is PC1, 10870 pounds".

Heli-Union unclearly describes PC2 procedure where the Vy is designated as DPATO instead of Vtoss, the exposure time between the RP and the DPATO is not depicted on the manual graph.

The final conclusions section of the report is intriguing to say the least: "All crew members and passengers evacuated." followed by "Two passengers and the co-pilot drowned."

Now the HP turbine blade failure phenomenon had been identified since 2007, corrective action was current through the TU166 modification, shouldn't F-HJCS have been retrofitted by July 2011 or already retrofitted at the factory since it was built in 2008?

Also confusing: "The captain evacuated through the right pilot’s door while the passengers and the co-pilot evacuated through the window of the right sliding passenger door." I understand the helicopter tilted over 180° onto its left side according to the pilot's testimony but is the window of the right sliding door the fastest way out for a pilot on the left seat?

[AnFI]

All those hours of carting around a spare engine, gearbox and fuel - and when the great day came it was pointless....

Report says engine failure cause known - 7 occurrences so far - if the other cases were not accidents (were some?) so that's at least 1in7 fatal...

[Mars]

Thanks Peter - my questions were rhetorical to highlight the decision to take one course of action when a safer one might have been called for.

ANFI,

This is a point that should be addressed at the operator.

In the Alert Bulletin that has been issued by SAFRAN it is stated that:"Subject to Service Bulletins Mo. 292 73 2166 and No. 292 73 3166, modification TU 166 is currently applied to new engines and upon first return of module M03 to a Repair Center on all ARRIEL 2 variants.

Modification TU 166 (SB No. 292 73 2166) is applied to the ARRIEL 2 variant upon receipt of parts sent to the operator during replacement of the HP turbine and an approved technician or upon first return to a Repair or Maintenance Centre.

Application of modification TU 166 is mandatory on the ARRIEL 2 single-engined fleet. We remind you that modification TU 166 on single-engine helicopters is overseen by our NORIA teams and is subject to Mandatory SB No. 292 73 3166 which requires TY 166 to be applied before November 18, 2012..."

There is an implicit assumption in this message that twin-engine helicopters operate with engine-failure accountability. If that is not the case, and it was not in this accident, isn't there an obligation on the Operator to apply the modification as though it were a single or to ensure operations are flown in PC1 or PC2e?

There is a hint of this in the report when it questions why the Approval to operate with Exposure was not withdrawn when the failure rate showed an alarming trend (probably exceeding the 1:100 000 reliability rate). That would have been rendered unnecessary with the application of TU 166.

The engine failure was the main cause of this accident; however, there is a chain of human factor precursors that turned what should have been a heart-stopping moment for crew and passengers into a fatal accident (to crew and passengers).

When the IHST and EHEST started their work on re-analysing accidents, it confirmed the fact that the largest proportion of accidents were Human Factor related. That is the reason why EHEST integrated HFACS into their list of contributory causes.

I'm still astounded that this is a sleeping thread; is it because it is easier to comment on a R22 rescuing a radio controlled plane than read an accident report and question matters which are germane to continuing health in offshore operations.

Mars

[Treg]

Regarding the “drowning” confusion after “rescue”, an areato consider may be secondary-drowning?

The report identifies that lifejackets worked, but this maybe specific to the inflation component only. Another important part is thespray-hood which is pulled over the face to prevent saltwater inhalation. Ifthese were not fitted, or couldn’t be deployed on the lifejackets used, thehour in the water until rescue could have been significant with regard to "drowning"?

[HeliTester]

The accident report, in the Conclusions/Causes section, states that “the take-off procedure in performance class 2 with exposure time (in all take-off/landing conditions) does not guarantee a safe emergency forced landing.” Mars points out that it appears a fly-away could have been achieved if a PC1 take-off procedure had been followed.

There is another thread called PC1 Operations Offshore (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/496643-pc1-operations-offshore.html) that was active for a brief period during September and October. That thread included some discussion about PC1, PC2, and PC2e. The accident report mentions PC1, but it wasn’t used? It seems like the requirement to operate PC1, PC2, or PC2e has been somewhat fluid over the past several years. During that time period the PC2d (Defined Limited Exposure) concept was introduced. On the PC1 Operations Offshore thread I asked if anyone had heard any more about PC2d, but there was no response. Anyone know what the current law of the land is regarding offshore operations?

[malabo]

Depends on the "land". PC2 is standard. Contrary to the authors of the report, a safe forced landing is expected on water. Witness the unfortunate EC225. Most customers want some kind of exposure mitigations, like HUMS, track-record reliability of engines, maybe training. Some thinking that limiting the exposure may sell, hence the PC2de concept with exposure from 0 to 9 seconds- pick your payload and take your chances. Much easier to sell PC1 in the North Sea with constant wind, low temperatures, than in the tropics with zero wind, hot, and a PC1 payload of pingpong balls. This takeoff had the potential of a zero exposure, but the pilot elected otherwise possibly for the reasons tha PC1 is very difficult offshore - obstructions, shifting wind, consideration for skill of copilot, etc.

[industry insider]

PC2 DLE is a smoke screen put up by the OEMs to somehow make industry feel better about being continually sold under powered helicopters by the very same OEMs. The regulators and the oil and gas industry should get together to make PC1 mandatory by 2015 where it can be achieved while maintaining some operational payload viability and by 2020 globally.

New engine technology with proper "super contingency" ratings, even if it resulted in the rejection of the good engine after returning to base, would be a great improvement on today's old engines with a bolted on FADEC being "sold" as new.

[Mars]

Before this degenerates into a bun fight we need to scotch the notion that this is a call for PC1 offshore. The PC2e thread has covered that in extensive detail and explained why it just isn't possible. The reference is to the CAT A Helideck profile and not operating in PC1 (yes there is a difference).

In another thread there has been a reference to risk assessment and 'necessary risk' as opposed to 'un-necessary risk'. We often discuss these issues in analogy but rarely do we have a chance to examine case histories. It would appear that we are now provided with an opportunity.

Risk Assessment 1 - EASA and FAA:

The turbine burst problem on the ARRIEL 2 has been know for some time and, in 2010 EASA issued an AD calling for the implementation of modification TU166. The FAA followed with their own AD in 2011. The mindset of the airworthiness autorities is summed up by the decision to apply the AD only to SE helicopters in spite of the phenomena being seen in twins:

Several cases of Gas Generator (GG) Turbine Blade rupture occurred in service on ARRIEL 2 twin engine applications and recently one on a single engine helicopter. For the case occurring in flight on a single engine helicopter (ARRIEL 2B1 engine), the pilot performed an emergency autorotation, landing the helicopter without further incident.

Clearly, EASA and the FAA had conducted a risk assessment which led to the conclusion that there was no urgency with twins because they could sustain an engine-failure without incident. That would imply that there is a false assumption among Authorities that twins always operate in PC1 - this despite the fact that:

(a) the FAA have no requirement other than a soft rule in Part 29 which prohibits flight into the HV diagram (which therefore requires the helicopter to apply CAT A procedures) thus ignoring operations in the GOM; and

(b) EASA has provisions for the Approval of operations with Exposure.

There is clear a lack of understanding that these twins are primarily used for offshore operations in which exposure is accepted. Coincidentally, EASA replaced this AD with another in April 2012 which has required all ARRIEL twins to be modified by today.

Risk Assessment 2 - the Operator:

As was previously stated, the Operator must have been aware of the issue with respect to ARRIEL 2 engines; they could have either implemented the modification (which had been available for several years) or restricted their operations, with helicopters that had ARRIEL engines fitted, to PC2e (Sikorsky had provided these). At the very least, they might have put out a training directive that all pilots were to be made aware of the issue and that the PC2e Helideck procedure were to be part of the OPC. In addition, there should have been a pilot education programme on minimising exposure - as was required in ACJ-2 to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.517 sections 4 and 5:

4. Include take-off and landing procedures in the operations manual, where they do not already exist in the Helicopter Flight Manual.

5. Establish training for flight crew which should include the discussion, demonstration, use and practice of the techniques necessary to minimise the risks;

Risk Assessment 3 - the Pilot:

As this has already been set out in a previous post, there is no need to repeat facts surrounding the decision that was made - it was a matter of a simple risk assessment and aeronautical decision making. However, it is accepted, as has been hinted at by 'Peter' and 'Malabo', that the crewing might have had an impact on decisions made. If that is the case, then the Operator has to examine what might have to be done to ameliorate this issue so that operations can be conducted to an acceptable level in the future.

So there we have it; three major holes in the Swiss cheese - and all related to Human Factors.

Mars

[212man]

PC2 DLE is a smoke screen put up by the OEMs to somehow make industry feel better about being continually sold under powered helicopters by the very same OEMs.

I'm not sure you need to use the plural of OEM there.....:ok:

[Soave_Pilot]

Whats the difference between PC1 and PC2?

thanks

[paco]

The PC determines what happens after an engine fails in terms of obstacle clearance, etc.

PC1 includes a guarantee that if an engine fails at any stage of the flight you can either land or carry on under control without damaging anything inside or outside the aircraft. The problem is that the standard also includes the size of the landing site, the weather and even the data provided by the manufacturer, not just the engines.

PC2 is a hybrid of PC3 which morphs into PC1 when the pilot judges that enough speed has been gained to comply with the standard. This is where the exposure time comes in. However, to provide maximum protection, machines operating under PC2 must be certified in the Category A airworthiness standard.

So does this mean that, if you are sitting on a rig in a PC2 machine (i.e. the 212) and you have enough of a headwind to stop you having to dive for the sea if an engine quits, that you are automatically PC1? No, because the guarantee isn't there.

Phil

[Geoffersincornwall]

This whole PC issue could be boiled down to a simple equation based on Mass Management.

At one end of the spectrum we see those who operators that mandate Cat A WAT use offshore. They believe, often mistakenly, that this is the silver bullet. They believe that Cat A will deliver 100% safe ops but as has been inferred already, the offshore environment if full of trips and traps that make using the WAT weights a good step in the right direction but in those cases where the turbulence, turbine exhausts and obstructions make even the WAT Mass too much to manage safely it will be necessary to limit the Mass further. In mature markets where this is understood there is a voluntary code (called the IVLL or Installation & Vessel Landing Limitations) that provide decrements to the WAT Mass according to defined circumstances. This removes from the market place the temptation for one operator to take on a task that another has refused on safety grounds related to mass management.

At the other end of the spectrum we see markets distorted by oil companies that are so focussed on the payload that they even encourage operators to strip their aircraft of vital equipment in order to maximise payload, they expect a 12 seat helicopter to carry 12 pax at any time of day or night in any conditions all year round. Needless to say the Transport Managers in these organisations could not even spell Cat A let alone understand it.

Clearly there is a lot to do to educate the market but in very simple terms if I was given a magic wand and invited to change one thing in our world I would make it impossible for a helicopter to take off above the Cat A WAT Mass.

G.

[paco]

"they expect a 12 seat helicopter to carry 12 pax at any time of day or night in any conditions all year round. Needless to say the Transport Managers in these organisations could not even spell Cat A let alone understand it."

Ain't that the truth.

Phil

[Soave_Pilot]

Thanks for the clarification PACO!!

they expect a 12 seat helicopter to carry 12 pax at any time of day or night in any conditions all year round.

hmmm doesn't that sound just like the executive/corporate flying... What a small world! :}

[Geoffersincornwall]

Why stop there, in the world of Private ownership it has been known for the 12 seat helicopter to be in 8 seat configuration and STILL carry 12 pax - (13 actually, there was one in the co pilot's seat).

Fortunately there was no one counting when they disembarked at Battersea, and no, it wasn't me chief.

I believe they were operating within the WAT though - it was a short flight and a few kids.

G.

[JimL]

Just a slight correction to PACO's commentary: an aircraft is certificated in Category A or B (or in some cases both); it operates in Performance Class 1, 2 or 3 in accordance with the Operational Requirements of the State (if they have them).

There is no such thing as a Performance Class 2 helicopter!

From ICAO:

Operations in performance Class 2. Operations with performance such that, in the event of critical engine failure, performance is available to enable the helicopter to safely continue the flight to an appropriate landing area, except when the failure occurs early during the take-off manoeuvre or late in the landing manoeuvre, in which cases a forced landing may be required.

The subdivisions of PC2 are all about what is permitted to happen when the engine fails "early during the take-off manoeuvre or late in the landing manoeuvre".

However, this is a diversion from the thread which is, in my humble opinion, about the potential consequences when risk assessment is not performed to a professional standard.

Jim

[Soave_Pilot]

Why stop there, in the world of Private ownership it has been known for the 12 seat helicopter to be in 8 seat configuration and STILL carry 12 pax - (13 actually, there was one in the co pilot's seat).

Oh yeah.... I remember a few years back I read about a R44 accident w/ 5 fatal in some eastern europe country... Guess no matter where we run, we'll always be facing these situations.