4th June 2010 B737-800 rejected takeoff after V1 Report is out

[Nightrider]

Also all escaped very luckily, food for thoughts... read (http://news.aviation-safety.net/2011/06/26/report-b737-800-rejected-takeoff-after-v1/)

[con-pilot]

Well, I guess this says it all.

The aircraft was halted before the end of the runway and the aircraft was subsequently taxied back to the terminal. The aircraft sustained no damage and no passengers or crew were injured.

[hetfield]

Well, one should have a very good reason to do that.

Anyhow, rejecting above v1 doesn't necessarily mean you will end up in the grass....

[Locked door]

Only a Captain can initiate a rejected takeoff at FR?

Says a lot about the company and its recruiting policy.

Where I work the F/O can call stop for any fire, engine failure confirmed by two parameters (one internal), red warning, predictive windshear, serious handling difficulties or an obviously blocked runway. They treat us like adults!

[hetfield]

Only a Captain can initiate a rejected takeoff at FR?

Says a lot about the company and its recruiting policy.It's not only with FR. SOP im many airlines.....

hetfield
-not flying for FR-

[captplaystation]

If you were really an adult you would understand fully the enormous difference in terms of responsibility between "pilot handling" & "pilot in command".

Given the low experience level of many F/O in RYR do you really find it so absurd that the company has decided that Bloggs in the RHS is not permitted to abort a take off, when on this occasion he seems to have found it acceptable to do so after V1,indeed after VR in this case, for something which could not be found during investigation, after merely "feeling something wasn't right".
If I had been sitting left of him I would be mightily p!ssed off, not only is it completely contrary to SOP's, it is also, in many cases, likely to result in a very high speed exit from the runway end.
I trust he is no longer in the employment of Ryanair.

[fireflybob]

Where I work the F/O can call stop for any fire, engine failure confirmed by two parameters (one internal), red warning, predictive windshear, serious handling difficulties or an obviously blocked runway.

What, even after V1?!

Locked Door. depends on what you understand by "initiate" - only the Captain (ie the LHS) can action a rejected take off (am assuming nothing extraneous such as suspected pilot incapacitation) - I believe this is also Boeing procedure.

I think you are being somewhat disingenuous in suggesting that this is a factor in "recruiting policy" and being "treated as adults" in this respect.

[BOAC]

I trust he is no longer in the employment of Ryanair. - indeed, cps, and dear 'old' Locked Door might be pleasantly surprised one day to find he had then got into his airline (by being a 'Captain for the Future' at the interview) and was sitting alongside him and PF for take-off - oh what fun he could have flying with this 'adult'.

FFB - in BA, at least while I was there a while back, the F/O could also conduct the abort. Great situation actually - F/O reacts (or makes) STOP call, closes throttle, ensures RTO function or begins braking. Captain applies reverse (over the top of the tightly clenched 'adult' F/O's hand which he forgot to remove from the throttles). One used to pray for a lady F/O...................:)

[Daysleeper]

Did Ryanair discipline the first officer?

I trust he is no longer in the employment of Ryanair


...because they would be great examples of Just Culture at work! FFS get out of the 1940's and grow up.

[daikilo]

"There is no specific guidance from the operator or manufacturer on dealing with control issues at the time of rotating the aircraft.

Specific guidance on rejecting a takeoff exist in case of an engine failure.
Review of past statistics and studies show that pilot training and requirements focus on rejected takeoffs due to an engine failure. Studies and statistical information show that this accountsbfor less than 25% of the reasons for rejected takeoffs. Thus 75% of the reasons the reject a takeoff is not trained for."
Last paragraph is an interesting statement. Guidance for the future?

[ATCast]

Link to the report (http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/rapporten/2010040,_EI-DPX_ENG.pdf) by the Dutch Safety Board (in English)

[Spitoon]

this was a serious breach of sops and was a highly dangerous action that endangered many lives. What should have been done?
Find out what allowed it to happen!

[Locked door]

Bluepilot,

Yes this individuals actions seem questionable from the information released.

A flight crews actions under stress are a combination of that individuals talent levels and the training he/she has received from his/her employer(s). Assuming the recruitment process at FR is robust questions need to be asked of the training department, not the individual.

Removing the mistake maker may be cheaper, but not fairer. With good training this sort of incident need not happen so in this case I would hope a few sim details were the solution, not termination.

[Daysleeper]

I have to ask if this had ended up a smoking wreck with significant loss of life what the reaction would be to this pilots actions?

Er the reaction would have been to try to figure out why it happened and to find the problems with the system and fix them to stop it happening again...

(by system I mean the whole thing which would include crew selection and training, sops, aircraft equipment and so on)

[MountainBear]

Er the reaction would have been to try to figure out why it happened and to find the problems with the system and fix them to stop it happening again...

For someone whose join date is 2003 that's a remarkably naive comment.

The actual reaction would have been at least 22 pages by PPRUNE's resident pop psychologists blathering on about the pilot's 'survival instinct'. The blatant hypocrisy is astounding: when the aircraft crashes people complain about the lack of the pilot's 'survival instinct' but when the pilot rejects the take-off and everyone lives then the pilot's is a weakling who didn't follow procedures. It's a great shell game where the poster is always correct no matter the outcome.

Thankfully, the Dutch investigators are better than that and wrote what is an excellent report. My own reaction is that if the pilot flying even spends one second in the sim, let alone be fired, for this incident an injustice was done to him.

[angels]

They've left no stone unturned.....

the takeoff of an aircraft is a critical phase of flight

[Locked door]

Air France did it in a 777 at Lagos a while back after the Captain inadvertently engaged the autopilot during the T/O roll and then found the controls locked at Vr.

Luckily it wasn't going far so was quite light and Lagos has a long runway, I believe the result was multiple tyre changes.

[p7lot]

If your a heavy commander/Fo and MTOW and you decide an RTO is appropriate with your nose in the air I would suggest you wont be on the deck for much longer.

[GlueBall]

Most SOPs emphasize that your hand will be removed from the thrust levers by V1. It's an elementary, instinctive reaction as there is no longer a decision to be made.

For a flying pilot to have a "feeling," seconds after V1, that the airplane won't fly is imaginary. . . and to discontinue the takeoff after rotation is suicidal.

[d105]

Thankfully the runway at EIN is sufficiently long and Mr. Boeing fits some damn good brakes to his aircraft.

What annoys me most about this accident, aside from the endangerment of people's lives, is the absolute "sweep it under the rug" attitude Ryanair adopts to this accident, as it does with many others.

I've been in the sim for two consecutive RST's since this took place. In the last one, we spent 20 minutes trying out a new garbage SOP.

Perhaps those 20 minutes, and many others, could've been spent more efficiently one might think. :*

[Che Xindamail]

The total experience level was actually quite low in this cockpit.

With lots of time on a specific type one tends to recognize what feels "right", "not right" or what can probably be disregarded. But rejecting after Vr? Someone has seriously not understood the concepts of a balanced take-off or V1. "Decision" being the keyword.

Someone will now come along and claim that 3000 hours is a lot.
Don't embarrass yourself.

[Lonewolf_50]

GlueBall, was it a feeling? :confused: It is interesting to note the points raised by the FO. From the report:
At around 140 knots the pilot flying observed a speed trend vector in the negative direction.
Did he effectively communicate that info to the Captain? :confused: That information may remain in house at the company.
The goal of the investigation was to answer the investigative questions as desribed in chapter 1 paragraph 1.2.2 with the facts that are available. The takeoff roll was described using the available information from the flight data recorder and the statements made by the crew during interviews. Because the Cockpit Voice Recorder was not available there was no factual evidence available that would allow the assessment of the cockpit crew co-ordination. To asses the cockpit crew co-ordination based on statements alone is insufficient.

The captain stated that at the same time he observed a large trend vector in the positive direction.

The captain did not find this discrepancy an issue and made no comments about this. As the airspeed reached V1, the ‘V1‘and ‘VR’ calls were made and the captain removed his hand from the thrust levers.


According to the first officer when the aircraft reached the V
1 speed the control column was moving aft without the application of force. The first officer stated that he experienced back pressure from the column and the aircraft rotated on its own.

At this time he had the feeling that the aircraft was unsafe to fly and pulled back the thrust levers. {My thought: Is this a case of "what's it doing now?" leading to a decision?}

The auto brake system and speed brakes were automatically activated and a rejected takeoff was initiated.
Also interesting ...
The pilots informed maintenance that there was a airspeed indication problem. Therefore troubleshooting and maintenance actions focused on finding the cause of the unreliable airspeed.



First, an inspection for unreliable airspeed without disturbing the aircraft systems and components was carried out. The result of this test was an airspeed indication disagreement between the left and right side.




Next the unreliable airspeed procedure was carried out according to the steps described in the Fault Isolation Manual. To fulfil the requirements and complete the unreliable airspeed test the right hand angle of attack sensor (alpha vane) required adjustment. The result of the test wassatisfactory and no airspeed disagreement between the left and ride side was found.
Pages 18 through 20 were the most interesting part of the report, to me.

[blind pew]

BA lost an aircraft at Bilbao after the captain thought he lost an engine - turned out that he hit a puddle.........................

[Locked door]

Worth mentioning that you're talking about a Trident in 1975, not recently. The aircraft left the side of the runway and slewed sideways during the reject after the captain intentionally steered into the grass to avoid going off the end. There were no injuries or fatalities.

[hetfield]

Someone has seriously not understood the concepts of a balanced take-off @Che

How do you know the take off was "balanced"?

Obviously there was some extra stop margin left.

[757_Driver]

There may have been a technical issue with the aircraft, but I'm sorry RTO with the nosewheel already in the air is suicidal. Unless the aircraft is disintegrating in flames around you there is absolutely, 100% no excuse for such an action.
Speed trend vectors, airspeed disagreements etc are NOT causes for RTO. Boeing publish an entire unreliable airspeed section of the QRH and sudden speed changes on rotation is covered by a windshear escape manouvre (or manover if you're from over the pond!)
My point being that whatever happened at rotation is covered by SOP, is already covered by memory items and manouvres all of which SHOULD be known and trained, this wasnt a one-off 'think outside the box' incdent.
Instinct is a fine thing and I certainly do not advocate blind obedience to SOP's regardless. But with the nosewheel off the ground for 2 seconds is not the time to go off the reservation.
The only thing that saved them was a long runway, they were Waaaaaaaaaay outside the envelope.

[Mikehotel152]

Is this a case of an FO who has far more 'faith' in his own intuition than understanding of the basics of JAR25 aircraft takeoff performance calculation? Perhaps as early as he felt the autobrake engage, even he knew he had reacted incorrectly.

[Craggenmore]

Air France did it in a 777 at Lagos a while back after the Captain inadvertently engaged the autopilot during the T/O roll and then found the controls locked at Vr.

Wow. This is possible in a Boeing 777..?

[brother rice]

During last recurrent sim there was training provided to crews, if I remember "go/no decision making" then 5-6 different takeoffs some leading to RTOs.

[d105]

During last recurrent sim there was training provided to crews, if I remember "go/no decision making" then 5-6 different takeoffs some leading to RTOs.

In that case I retract my statement. To my remembrance no particular extra training was conducted during my RST, perhaps due to time constraints.

[PLovett]

Gentlemen, before continuing, I do understand the importance of V1 and SOPS', however, in many cases where there is a long runway, the V1 call is rhetoric (yes, I know its importance) because the rotate call is 1 knot beyond that. In other words, the rotate speed has been reached before the critical point on the runway where there is insufficient length left in which to stop. Obviously, that was the case in this instance.

Perhaps that may have influenced the PF in this case? I know it shouldn't have but that is another matter.

[V1... Ooops]

What PLovett said.

[Aldente]

Regardless of airspeed disagreement, speed trends in opposite directions, whatever :-

with both engines still developing T/O thrust, Pitch and Power would have got the aircraft airborne SAFELY.

Or don't they teach F/O's that any more ?

:ugh:

[Cloud Bunny]

To my remembrance no particular extra training was conducted during my RST, perhaps due to time constraints.
Time constraints? Wouldn't have thought so - it was the first thing on the 'list' of things to get done.
Short runway, max crosswind component, numerous major and minor faults requiring action from the crew in either a go or no go sense. 3 each, 6 in total - surely it's ringing some bells??!!:confused:
I remember it well, it was done very well in my session.

[Checkboard]

There may have been a technical issue with the aircraft, but I'm sorry RTO with the nosewheel already in the air is suicidal. Unless the aircraft is disintegrating in flames around you there is absolutely, 100% no excuse for such an action.

... so you get to Vr, pull back on the controls and find them heavy. REALLY heavy - MUCH MUCH heavier than you have ever even considered being normal.

Reject or not?


2205 ʞɾ ʇɥƃılɟ ɹıɐuɐds ɥʇıʍ pıɹpɐɯ uı pǝɹɹnɔɔo sɐ - ɥsɐɹɔ lɐʇɐɟ puɐ llɐʇs ɐ uı ʇlnsǝɹ plnoɔ ǝʇɐʇoɹ oʇ ʇdɯǝʇʇɐ uɐ ˙(ƃuıʞɹoʍ ʇou ǝɹɐ sƃuıuɹɐʍ ǝɥʇ ƃuıɯnssɐ) ɟɟo-ǝʞɐʇ ɹoɟ ʇǝs ʇou ǝɹɐ sdɐlɟ ǝɥʇ ʇɐɥʇ uoıʇɐɔıpuı ɹoɾɐɯ ǝɥʇ sı sıɥʇ

[d105]

Time constraints? Wouldn't have thought so - it was the first thing on the 'list' of things to get done.
Short runway, max crosswind component, numerous major and minor faults requiring action from the crew in either a go or no go sense. 3 each, 6 in total - surely it's ringing some bells??!!:confused:
I remember it well, it was done very well in my session.

No, like I stated earlier no particular training was conducted during my RST. We did have some issues with the sim which limited our time available.

Regardless, I already retracted my statement. Case closed.

... so you get to Vr, pull back on the controls and find them heavy. REALLY heavy - MUCH MUCH heavier than you have ever even considered being normal.

Reject or not?


Continue in my book.

My experience is far from extensive and I have never experienced an RTO in my career. If it were up to me, I'd stick to the book in these situations. I will not partake in the blaming game so I'm not judging what happened here. But if it were me, yes, heavy flight controls after Vr is still a continue.

[Tee Emm]

Find out what allowed it to happen!

Maybe this is a wake up call with regard to the SOP of leaving the throttles unguarded after V1 is announced. While the incident in question is one of those extremely rare events (statistically improbable) it would not have happened if the captain had kept control of the thrust levers until at least gear up selection.

[fireflybob]

Maybe this is a wake up call with regard to the SOP of leaving the throttles unguarded after V1 is announced.

Be careful when you fix one problem that you don't generate a load more. If you were to change this procedure I would suggest you risk an unnecessary stop after V1 even more!

My feelings on this incident is that it was an extremely lucky escape from disaster - a shorter runway and the outcome would have been much worse.

We obviously don't really know precisely what was going through the first officer's mind to cause him to reject the take off. However, safe aviation is based on certain disciplines, many of which have stood the course of time and are based on some very hard experience. In short, if it ain't broke don't fix it!

I only wish 411A was still around - I can imagine what he would have to say!

[ETOPS240]

Its better to have rejected and and wish you had not - Than to have not and wished you had!

If I'm understanding you correctly, then that's a pretty concerning statement. Boeing, Airbus and all of their operators disagree with you in this context.

Let us work this example, using a shorter runway (the only reason that this wasn't a catastrophe) -

1. Crew notice there is an anomaly on scanning the ASI after V1. Crew rightfully continue. Once in the air, the QRH is referred to, and necessary action taken. If needs be, the aircraft can be safely returned to land. Crew think to themselves "Oh, that was a pain to deal with, it would have been nice if I had noticed the anomaly before 80kts, ideally."

or,

2. Crew notice there is an anomaly on scanning the ASI after V1. Crew abort the takeoff, and the aircraft goes sliding off the end of the runway, through obstacles, and winds up as a burning metal sculpture. Crew think to themselves "better to have rejected and wish I hadn't rather than..."

Oh wait, no they don't. They're dead.

Hope this helps.

[SASKATOON9999]

In the same context, If we could ask the crew of the Air France Concorde crash if they would have still taken the aircraft into the air or rejected? Oh no we cant, there dead! Overrun, significant damage and death all distinct possibilities, but the chances would be in favour of staying on terra firma!
Aero Peru 757 crew - Im betting the same. This said, every situation is distinctly different and the parameters are almost impossible to measure against each other.
Boeing, Airbus and all of their operators disagree with you in this context - I've never heard either company say that you should take an unflyable aircraft into the sky if you susspect a major control problem to have occurred?

[lomapaseo]

Its better to have rejected and and wish you had not - Than to have not and wished you had!


catchy play on words if I could remember it by rote without getting tongue tied :)

But it does miss the bigger picture and that is more accidents occur by rejecting than by continuing a takeoff with a badly damaged plane.

It boils down to decision making in seconds. We can't tell you ahead of time what's right and wrong all we can do is provide you training to make decisions. You have to decide what's right and wrong. And after you make your decision the rest of us will analyise it for days

[as17]

I am sure I remeber watching a Boeing video at some point where the resounding message was- If in doubt, GO!

[larssnowpharter]

For a flying pilot to have a "feeling," seconds after V1, that the airplane won't fly is imaginary. . . and to discontinue the takeoff after rotation is suicidal.

Well, clearly it wasn't suicidal! :ugh:

A 'feeling' or 'hunch' or an 'intuition' is one of the ways our imperfect brains make decisions. Research shows it to be a pretty accurate one.

At the time of rotating the aircraft to takeoff, the pilot flying decided to reject the takeoff because he believed the aircraft was unsafe to fly.

If that was what he truly felt, he made the right call. Bear in mind that he has some idea of the runway length.

Twice in my career I have had 'hunches' and acted on them as though they had been confirmed by hard data. Many of us will have had experiences like this. In both cases the 'hunches' proved correct.

[Checkboard]

Because they calculated the performance on Golf, and taxiing a bit further is faster than running the numbers again?

[Lonewolf_50]

Checkboard, crew might also believe in the old adage:

Two thing that do you little good are
The Runway behind you (when on the ground)
The Altitude above you (when in the air)

Crew's decision seems a prudent move: use as much runway as you can (runway in front of you) whenever you can. More pavement in front of you adds to safety margin on takeoff, doesn't it?

[IGh]

Perhaps coincidentally, today the NTSB released this "final" about DCA08IA019 (http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20081003X62958&key=1)"... During takeoff, the flightcrew performed an emergency high-speed aborted takeoff because the captain felt a control anomaly during rotation.... inspection of the elevator control system components revealed that both left and right elevator control rods had fractured completely, rendering the elevator system inoperable. The elevator control rods fractured when the elevator surfaces repeatedly moved off the rear elevator stops due to wind gusts [overnight]...."
Another post V1- investigation was CHI01FA104 (http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20010319X00608&key=1)

Another high-spd FLT CONTROLS abnormal:
AAR 71-12 JFK TIA / 8Sep70 DC8-63CF N4863T. Shortly after takeoff aircraft pitched up 60 to 90 degrees then crashed. Chunk of concrete had jammed/lodged in the junction of the horizontal stabilizer and elevator--adversely affecting the pitch controls.

[p7lot]

YouTube - ‪RTO Considerations/Reasons To Abort - Boeing‬‏ (http://youtu.be/b9QhAYAupys)
Quote:
IF YOU HAVE NOT APPLIED THE BRAKES BY V1 YOU HAVE MADE THE GO DECISION

[Checkboard]

More pavement in front of you adds to safety margin on takeoff, doesn't it?

In airline operations, only if you subscribe to the "I might decide to stop after V1" crowd. Generally More pavement just means a higher flex temp (lower engine thrust) for take-off.

[DownIn3Green]

First of all, I strongly support the "Commander" (PIC) makes the go/no go decision...input from the F/O or F/E is fine but in the final result it is his/her decision...

Second, and I speak of the 727 specifically, but I'm sure there are other A/C as well, the reason V1 is equal to or less than Vr is because of FAA certification regs, dating back to the "Golden Era" of the propliners...i.e. V1 HAD to be less than Vr...

In other words, an aircraft could possibly attain Vr+5 and still reject safely...I speak of the 727 again...

As for the fully fuelled "jumbo" heading off over the Atlantic, I'm surprised no one has yet mentioned the TWA L-1011 at JFK many years ago that actually got AIRBORNE and then rejected...The jet was totalled, but everyone lived...And the report found the Captain's decision to put it back down "reasonable" under the circumstances...

[sabenaboy]

I'm surprised no one has yet mentioned the TWA L-1011 at JFK many years ago that actually got AIRBORNE and then rejected...The jet was totalled, but everyone lived...And the report found the Captain's decision to put it back down "reasonable" under the circumstances...

I looked at the report of this crash (www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR93-04.pdf).

I read on page 67 as probable cause:
" ...and inadequate crew coordination between the captain and the first officer that resulted in their inappropriate response to a false stall warning."

[Algy]

IgH´s link to DCA08IA019 (http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20081003X62958&key=1) is extremely interesting I think. (Though surely that report was not issued yesterday, three and a half years after the incident???)

More to the point, what a strange document it is. Another Vr RTO, but with a narrative lasting exactly two sentences! But then a lengthy description of the regulatory process and who issued which SBs, when, with what result. I may well be wrong, but to me this is entirely consistent with the outbreak of AD/SB compliance obsession, over safety commonsense, in the US over the last two years.

Not for one moment suggesting that they´re not crucial mechanisms of course but, as this thread demonstrates, there is huge interest in the lessons to be learned from this other incident, and it seems to me that this report does not help air them.

[ETOPS240]

Ops manuals the world over outline what is an "abortable" offence. It can't be exhaustive, of course.

The fact remains, that far more fatalities have occurred as a result of aborting a take-off than taking the problem into the air.

In this instance, there thought shouldn't have even crossed the crew's minds...

[The Ancient Geek]

Interesting stuff but FWIW this reminds me of an incident many years ago when the twotter just "felt wrong" as soon as the wheels left the ground.
Turned out that the CofG was way out of limits due to a loading problem.


Cutting the power and landing straight ahead was a no brainer in that case with a STOL aircraft at FVHA which has one of the world's longest runways. In other circumstances the result could have been very nasty.
Would it have been safe to take off and go around ?, I will never know if I did the right thing. Some memories are the stuff of nightmares.

Yes I know, I should have paid more attention and not trusted the local idiots to do their job.

[the wheel of justice]

Leeds United's Emerald Air 748 at STN is another that springs to mind, he got airborne before puting it back down, everybody lived.

[RevMan2]

Has anyone looked at the Boeing chart (http://youmustbefromaway.wordpress.com/2011/06/30/if-this-is-boeing-quality-ill-stick-with-airbus-thanks-very-much/) on Page 5 of the report.

It's a shocker

[Madbob]

What would be interesting to know is how that actual stopping distance in this very high speed RTO compared with the numbers in the book. i.e. given the actual field conditions, dry runway, good braking action, wind direction, ac loading etc. The calculated accelerate-stop distance for an RTO at V1 was probably a ground roll of less than 2,000m. (An educated guess on my part.)

If this is the case then the crew might then have felt that an aborted take-off even 5 knots over V1 could still be achieved safely even if the figures were not "in the book".

This incident shows that there was still plenty of runway left (500m) when the ac stopped and so it was not even close to being an over-run. All this means that the crew probably knew that there was a safe margin and so had the confidence to do what they did knowing that, whilst not being the normal course of action, it was also not a totally reckless decision either. 20:20 hindsight is great of course but sometimes the rules can be "bent" though had this been a different field, different ac, different weather then it might have been a different story.

The moral? Don't even think about an abort above V1 if operating close to the limits (eg Gibraltar:yuk:) but don't rule it out in more "favorable" situations...

MB

[Hedge36]

Has anyone looked at the Boeing chart on Page 5 of the report.

It's a shocker


Per the blogger's own words, if one takes the time to actually read the labels on the chart, it's not all that shocking.

[BOAC]

the crew probably knew that there was a safe margin - you need to edit that to read 'the F/O may have known'? There was no 'crew' decision.

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

But in thoses events, how was V1 calculated ?
For me, V1 was the speed over which you cannot RTO without overrunning at the end of the RWY... Methink that if you didn't overrun (good for you), then your V1 was not really a V1.

[BOAC]

Remember V1(max) =Vr (normally!), so if the runway is a long one, V1 no longer might be the 'stopping' limit.

[aviatorhi]

What the above post said, and under dry conditions reverse thrust isn't taken into account. Not suggesting you should abort after V1 with confidence, but it's useful to know what the numbers are telling you.

On another note, the jet operations I've seen typically allow either pilot to call for an abort but the CA will take over the controls to perform the abort.

[pattern_is_full]

I thought the concept of V1 was primarily linked to "balanced field length."

Balanced field takeoff - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balanced_field_takeoff)

- so, as some have said, if there was room to stop, then by definition the speed called out as "V1" - really wasn't.

With a runway long enough (say, 33,000 ft/10,000 m), one might reach Vr and V2 long before reaching "V1" for that particular runway and any particular aircraft weight.

But that raises the question - how was "V1" for this particular takeoff calculated? Since it doesn't appear to have fit the definition of V1.

[PLovett]

pattern_is_full, I am sure someone far more knowledgeable than myself can express it more eloquently but V1 is more than just balanced field length where there is excess runway length. It also marks a transition from takeoff to flight; a point where it is no longer a rejected takeoff but a form of touchdown and landing that would follow in the event of closing the throttles.

[BOAC]

As PL says.

Pif - read the first para of your reference again. The balanced field merely says the two distances are equal. With shorter runways this limits V1.

Long runway, smaller (737 type ) a/c

Vr is achieved well before the end of the runway. This defines the take-off distance required (allowing for an engine failure at 'V1' which will always be above Vmcg). Start with Vmcg as your V1. Long runway - a/c can accelerate from Vmcg on 1 engine and safely get airborne at Vr with room to spare. Can it stop from Vmcg in the distance available? Yes.

Now push V1 up towards Vr (V1 is limited by VR since we do not normally try to stop when airborne). Check the a/c can both accelerate from 'V1' to Vr AND stop from Vr in the remaining runway - yes. Thus V1 is equal to Vr.

V1 (normally) always represents the speed at or above which the take-off will be continued. It is important therefore to continue annunciating it in a crew since mind-sets change at that point and hands are removed from throttles (to prevent an inadvertent/incorrect stop). The call will be "V1/Rotate".

IN your case you are right, V1 is NOT the limiting stop factor. It is, however, normally the limiting 'go' factor' since at that speed you 'do aviation'. No-one says you will not be able to stop at Vr (or above) on a long runway. There have been instances where it has worked, many where it has failed. It is just that there are very few situations where it is desirable, eg double engine failure, jammed controls, a particularly dangerous a/c condition where the a/c would not successfully fly to a controlled landing to name a few.

[aterpster]

pattern is full:

With a runway long enough (say, 33,000 ft/10,000 m), one might reach Vr and V2 long before reaching "V1" for that particular runway and any particular aircraft weight.

With a light aircraft and a reasonably long runway this often happens. Where I worked V1 and Vr were the same in those cases. Otherwise, for us at least, VR set V1 in those circumstances.

[Teddy Robinson]

http://http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7VumXN8RNO8&feature=related

Scheduled performance is covered up to V1 stop/go, after V1 airborne, there is no data for stopping after V1, ergo, one is no longer protected if one decides to abort post V1.

[lomapaseo]

Scheduled performance is covered up to V1 stop/go, after V1 airborne, there is no data for stopping after V1, ergo, one is no longer protected if one decides to abort post V1.

seriously you are only protected if the pilot has sufficient skills and reactions to stop. The data shows that this is true in only 95% of the abort stops above 100kts.

[Tee Emm]

All this means that the crew probably knew that there was a safe margin

Try again. The copilot acted impulsively and there was no way he would have been certain the aircraft could have pulled up safely. The captain didn't have a clue what the copilot was going to do until it was too late for him to prevent the copilot's idiotic action.

It would be instructive for the investigation to have closely examined the copilot's history during his time with the operator. A highly dangerous impulsive action as was demonstrated sometimes means he has had problems during his type rating and line training. Not always of course but this behaviour is usually not isolated.

The Dutch incident report is notable by its addition of a large amount superfluous technical references to various manuals and other similar authoritive data. Very little of substance came out of the report.

[IGh]

Tee M mentioned (just above):
"... captain didn't have a clue what the copilot was going to do until it was too late for him to prevent the copilot's idiotic action...."

I've got a file full of such HF failure-interactions -- the hazard is much the same while accelerating on the RWY, and during the initial CLIMB-out. F/O can be your major distraction, and the CAPT must firmly correct these mis-steps, very quickly. Maybe the CAPT should KEEP his RIGHT HAND backing the Throttles after V1. [In other cases it was the Captain who incorrectly responded to a Takeoff DISTRACTION, and the F/O had to intervene.]

In other T/O upset mishaps, the F/O became the distraction, drawing attention to some irrelevant issue during a critical interval just after T/O. There were numerous Stall Warning events (hull loss) just after Takeoff -- where the Capt should have intervened to prevent F/O's abrupt response to that nuisance-warning.

During the F/O's Takeoff, it is difficult to COMMUNICATE the nature of a subtle concern (scrubbing NLG tire, rudder-pedal failure, rudder-pedal forces, erroneous airspeed indication, Seat rollback) -- there are too many cases to easily summarize the variety of Takeoff DISTRACTION that deserved quick action by the Captain.

[Rananim]

No matter how shallow the cockpit gradient,I am a firm believer that the RTO is always the Captain's decision,never the co-pilots.

[MountainBear]

There have been instances where it has worked, many where it has failed. It is just that there are very few situations where it is desirable, eg double engine failure, jammed controls, a particularly dangerous a/c condition where the a/c would not successfully fly to a controlled landing to name a few. The difficulty BOAC is that the conditions upon which an aircraft will not fly after V1 are subject to interpretation. Sometimes the precursors to dangerous conditions are subtle. For me, the whole discussion boils down to an issue of professional judgment. And where there is professional judgment there is by definition discretion. And where there is discretion there is by definition a gray area, a range of behaviors where reasonable professionals can disagree.

Just because you would not do the same thing in the same situation as this F/O is irrelevant. That's not the standard I would use to judge the PF behavior. For me, the standard is whether of nor there is a rational basis for the F/O doing what he did. And the report by the Dutch authorities clearly demonstrates that there was, in fact, a rational basis for his behavior: there were in fact data anomalies (three times) recorded on the FDR. His behavior was not capricious, it was not whimsical; it was based upon fact. Interpretation of facts is the embodiment of what professional judgment means.

That's why I can't agree with Tee Emm's post that the F/O behavior was 'idiotic' or the claim that stopping after V1 is 'suicidal'. Such comments go too far. Disagreement among professionals is fair enough; outright condemnation is wrong.

[lomapaseo]

Rananim


No matter how shallow the cockpit gradient,I am a firm believer that the RTO is always the Captain's decision,never the co-pilots.

We have been through this over and over on this board month after month with similar arguments for and against with all kinds of "what if"

The middle of the road suits me fine and that is the crew brief before the takeoff what roll they will take in the decision.

[Sunnyjohn]

The captain didn't have a clue what the copilot was going to do until it was too late for him to prevent the copilot's idiotic action.

The Dutch report stated that the CVR was not operating. Therefore there does not appear to be a record of conversation during the aborted takeoff. Unless I missed it somewhere, I don't see how we can be sure about this without a record of the flight deck conversation.

[euroflyer]

I wonder what the f/o would of done on a short runway out of CIA...
Had he done the same then it would be a different outcome so how can some people on this forum actually think his actions were correct?!
I think he had no idea if they could stop safely after v1, it was just pure luck they stopped in time, the guy obviously had concerns about the aircraft but at that speed after v1 his actions were totally unsafe.

[Herod]

Does anyone have a link to a report on the accident in post 68? It seems the nose was raised for some considerable time; wonder why it didn't fly?

[Land and Hold Short]

Maybe they should change their SOP'S to if the Capt is the PM, the F/O sets 40% N1, Capt Calls engines stable, F/O presses TOGA advances the Thrust Levers and Capt then Has the Thrust Levers.

Therefore any decision to STOP or GO is solely the Capt's decision. No way for the F/O as PF or PM to abort a T/O. But he can Call STOP or ABORT!!

Just my 2 cents.:cool:

[The Ancient Geek]

For $diety's sake, why do we need so much nitpicking.

The PF realised that something was wrong. He had plenty of room to stop.
He aborted and stopped safely. Well done that man.
Having been in a similar situation, albeit in a Twotter with more than plenty of room, I can assure you that it is not a nice experience. There will be a crease in the seat and a change of underwear may have been required.

Fast reactions combined with familiarity with both the aircraft and the field all contributed to a safe outcome. Would the aircraft have been safe to fly if he had continued ?, on balance it probably would, but he had no way of knowing that in the available decision time.

In other circumstances the outcome could have been very different but IN THIS CASE experience and fast reactions saved the day.

[bubbers44]

My airline SOP is the captain makes the abort decision so he has the throttles once set by the FO. It eliminates any question about who aborts. I have taken off on 13,000 ft runways when we only needed 5,000 ft so knew the V1 speed was a legality, not a safety speed. I knew after V1 I could stop with just reverse as in a normal landing and have no brake problems. I also knew I would have a lot of explaining to do even though I cleared with minimum braking with 5,000 ft left. Sometimes it is easiest to follow the rules even if they don't make sense.

[HidekiTojo]

SOP's are right and correct 99% of the time. The other 1% anything goes and if the outcome is successful then so be it. I don't see the huge deal here. As pilots we usually know when we have room to stop or not. Dash 8 at Paris can go through V1 twice and stop.

The FO was faced with a very strange situation here, had he continued and impacted in a cabbage patch 1km away what would people here be saying then?

[pattern_is_full]

Thanks for the replies - obviously there has to be a go/no-go point, and V1 is the logical (and usually inarguable) choice.

Bust it and succeed, and you'll have some splainin' to do.

Bust it and fail as per video, and you'll have even more splainin' to do (if still around to do so.)

[RevMan2]

From the perspective of graphic design, the purpose of which is to display data in visual form to facilitate understanding.

The Boeing chart doesn't do that.

[BEagle]

Advice we used to give new pilots on a 4-engined type was that the only occasion which would merit an attempted abort above V1 would be if there was genuine doubt that the aircraft would successfully become airborne. Such as a massive loss of thrust following a multiple birdstrike or some form of structural failure. In other words, if the consequence of the high speed abort would be more likely to be survivable than an attempt to continue with the take-off.

But there were absolutely no guarantees.

A colleague had a co-pilot suddenly do the unexpected on him during take-off in a Vulcan. Fortunately before 'decision speed' (as we termed it then) had been reached. At around 100KIAS, the co-pilot suddenly whipped the throttles to idle and yelled 'aborting'! They carried out the drill instinctively, streamed the chute and came to a safe stop on the runway, whereupon he asked the co-pilot:

"Would you care to share the reason for the abort with us, co.?"
"I left my DV window open"
A voice from the lower deck then asked "Will you hit him, captain, or shall I?"

It was perfectly possible to close the DV window in flight at normal speeds, unless the seal was knackered.

The days before CRM, TEM or whatever huggy-fluffy terminology is currently in vogue!

[fireflybob]

The days before CRM, TEM or whatever huggy-fluffy terminology is currently in vogue!

Well said,Beagle - flying is really quite simple but there seem to be a lot of people around now who are trying to make it incredibly complicated!

[aterpster]

Beagle:

A colleague had a co-pilot suddenly do the unexpected on him during take-off in a Vulcan. Fortunately before 'decision speed' (as we termed it then) had been reached. At around 100KIAS, the co-pilot suddenly whipped the throttles to idle and yelled 'aborting'! They carried out the drill instinctively...

My company learned the hard way with a F/O 707 abort in the late 1960s to have the captain always handle the throttles on takeoff.

[Checkboard]

The whole discussion is down to two points:
Is it ever appropriate to abort after v1?, and
If so, did this event provide enough indications to justify the decision?


To the first point - V1 is the speed which ensures that you have enough performance to either stop, or continue with a single engine failure. Any time you are not talking about a single engine failure V1 has limited use.

Double engine failure, control problems, incorrect flap settings, greatly out-of-balance and greatly out-of-trim situations are all valid reasons to stop after V1, the trim/balance/flap situations often only become apparent when you attempt to rotate the aircraft[/i] - ie. they are almost always decisions to be made after V1.

The only use V1 is, in considering if you have sufficient ability to stop, is that after V1 you may, provided the performance calculation hasn't been annotated "brake energy limited" or "runway limited". However in situations requiring a stop after V1, the point is moot - you are stopping because the GO option is unacceptable, even considering a likely overrun.

So, stopping after V1 is a valid decision, in some circumstances.

Item two - did the FO have solid, material information pertinent to a stop decision? Yes, he did. Was it a "reasonably sufficient" amount of information - it's a subjective, professional decision. You may make a different one, the Captain may have made a different one - but it wasn't "wrong" for the FO to make the decision, given no training guidance on the matter, and insufficient experience.

[hetfield]

@Checkboard

Spot on!

Very well said:ok:

[BOAC]

The Dutch report stated that the CVR was not operating. - anyone know any more on this?

[Jippie]

In the dutch report the only state on page 11 that: "De (CVR) was niet beschikbaar voor het onderzoek."
Which would translate into: The CVR was not available for the investigation.
No reason is given why, something I'm curious about.

[The Ancient Geek]

Double engine failure, control problems, incorrect flap settings, greatly out-of-balance and greatly out-of-trim situations are all valid reasons to stop after V1, the trim/balance/flap situations often only become apparent when you attempt to rotate the aircraft[/i] - ie. they are almost always decisions to be made after V1.




Precisely - now add in the pressure.
You are around halfway down the runway at around 130 knots feeling relaxed for another routine flight when it all goes suddenly wormy.
Buttucks clench, sphinctor pulses, adrenalin floods in.
The remaining runway is getting shorter very quickly, you have maybe a second to choose stop or go. You might die. Decide now.

[fireflybob]

The whole discussion is down to two points:

1. Is it ever appropriate to abort after v1?, and
2. If so, did this event provide enough indications to justify the decision?


Checkboard, I would respectfully suggest we add:-


3. Should the FO elect to initiate a STOP when the SOPs say this is only to conducted by the Captain?

The Dutch report stated that the CVR was not operating.

Maybe the c/b was not pulled after the incident so the cvr was left to run and then 2 hours later you've lost it?

[Tee Emm]

Some pilots unions do not permit the regulator in that State to download a CVR if there were no fatalities. While the union is there to protect the interests of the crew by fair means or foul, any flight safety lessons learned from the incident are lost to other pilots.

[jayc004]

Locked door

I have to say this is quite possibly the most stupid thing I have ever heard.
Assuming the recruitment process at FR is robust questions need to be asked of the training department, not the individua.
You can not stop someone acting on impulse. It is called "fight or flight". It is just how that person reacts. It can be trained for and you can condition yourself, but just as when you fall over, the first instinct is to put your hands out to try and stop the fall.
My point being, if this person has done it once, it will most likely happen again because that is his natural reaction.
Unfortunately it is not possible for anyone to know how they will react to a situation. People spend years in the Armed Forces working with people that they consider will protect them and look after them, and then in the heat of battle when bullets are flying all over the place, that person you thought you could rely on might just freeze, and become a liability to themselves and everyone in the section or unit. It has happened before, and it will happen for the rest of time. That is why we are human.


Removing the mistake maker may be cheaper, but not fairer. With good training this sort of incident need not happen so in this case I would hope a few sim details were the solution, not termination.

Again, I would like to agree with you. You can train someone to do what they are supposed to do in a tin box when your life is not at risk, but when it becomes real, I think that person might well react the same way again. As far as I am concerned, the MANDATORY rejection brief you have to do at the start of EVERY DAY should have been enough to drill into that FOs head that he is not to reject the takeoff, and NEVER AFTER V1, regardless of whether his curry from the other night was making his ring-piece twitch.

The fairest thing to do for the safety of the whole operation and the 189 PAX and 5 other crew on board the next potential aircraft is to seriously look at the training history and, if there are other issues consider removing the person who might well not be suited for the job.

I know it is a harsh thing to say, but if your wife and young children were on a plane that you knew the pilot had almost killed 190 odd a few weeks previously because he did not do his job properly or do what he had been trained to do, would you be happy to wave them off at the airport.........?

[jayc004]

Tee Emm

Some pilots unions do not permit the regulator in that State to download a CVR if there were no fatalities. While the union is there to protect the interests of the crew by fair means or foul, any flight safety lessons learned from the incident are lost to other pilots.

Have I missed something? Ryanair now has a Union??

[hetfield]

...the pilot had almost killed 190 Hhhm, did he?

[aterpster]

Checkerboard:

So, stopping after V1 is a valid decision, in some circumstances.

Nonetheless, it may result in the end of your life.

[euroflyer]

The aircraft was perfectly flyable so either stop the aircraft at the beginning of the take off roll and before v1 (if you feel the aircraft is unsafe, captain would of noticed something no?) or continue with the take off after v1 but do not make your decision at rotation!
The airspeed disagree might of been unsafe but passed v1 you have to deal with it in the air, the aircraft had no elevator or flight control problem it seems so it was a wrong decision...

[zerotohero]

Land & Hold Short

That is the SOP, guessing the F/O moved hand back onto the thrust levers again

[Checkboard]

Nonetheless, it may result in the end of your life.
Of course - those are the decisions pilots are paid for. Sometimes getting airborne will end your life.

"The CVR was unavailable."

When CVRs where first proposed for aviation cockpits, in order to better understand accidents and how to prevent them, there was a great concern in the pilot community about having a constant "big brother" monitoring their workplace.

There were concerns that management would routinely monitor cockpit conversations, and more or less private comments made "off the cuff" in a casual workplace setting could be used in industrial actions against individuals. There was also concern in the right (in the US at least) not to incriminate yourself, certainly in misdemeanours. Balanced against that was the pilot's understanding of the immense benefits to understand why some accidents occur.

The solution (formalised in Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_International_Civil_Aviation)) was that the pilots would allow the cockpit to be recorded, however in return legislation would be enacted to ensure the CVR would never be available for less than the most serious accidents. Thus in incidents without injury, the standard line "the CVR was not available" always appears.

Have I missed something? Ryanair now has a Union??
It was pressure from the Unions which influenced the protection from disclosure of all records, which is listed in Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_International_Civil_Aviation) (including the cockpit voice recorder [CVR], CVR transcripts and witness statements) and includes disclosure to judicial authorities during and after a safety investigation.

Most countries around the world are signatories to the Chicago convention, and thus CVR tapes are not released for incidents like these.

[lomapaseo]

[quote The CVR was not available for the investigation.
No reason is given why, something I'm curious about. ]

Some pilots unions do not permit the regulator in that State to download a CVR if there were no fatalities. While the union is there to protect the interests of the crew by fair means or foul, any flight safety lessons learned from the incident are lost to other pilots.


In this case I believe we are not talking about unavailibity to a regulator, but instead an investigating agency. I doubt very much that the investigation can be prevented by anybody except a court citing a higher law.

Typically unavailability refers to a CVR that was overwritten by continuing to leave the power on in continued operation. This often happens where the incident is not necessarily immediately reportable to the investigatng authorities albeit might be reported to the regulator. It's a fine line and usually not an offence although there might be some hard feelings :)

[aterpster]

Checkboard:

Of course - those are the decisions pilots are paid for. Sometimes getting airborne will end your life.

If all is properly attented to before takeoff, and if everything is normal at 80 knots, I believe becoming airborne is far less likely to end your life than aborting above V1 in typical circumstances.

[before landing check list]

I have DC8 and 9 time and I know about V1 procedures and echo just about what everyone here has said. However let's visit the AF Concord situation. IF the fire developed after V1 and IF the crew new about the situation do you think the captain would have continued THAT takeoff and if not do you think the outcome would have been not as bad? What would you have done? Food for though eh?

[amos2]

Why not simply adhere to your companies SOPs? ;)

[before landing check list]

Good blanket question/statement. We are all sticking with company SOP's because that is what we do right? However if you think SOP's can cover everything in black and white terms....

[aterpster]

before landing check list:

have DC8 and 9 time and I know about V1 procedures and echo just about what everyone here has said. However let's visit the AF Concord situation. IF the fire developed after V1 and IF the crew new about the situation do you think the captain would have continued THAT takeoff and if not do you think the outcome would have been not as bad? What would you have done? Food for though eh?


Many years ago an Old Continental 707 had an engine on the left side (I think #2, have an uncontained engine failure at LAX. They had just rotated. Debris from # 2 bounced off the runway and took out engine #3. It was hairy but they were able to climb out and return for landing.

Then again it was a fan-powered 707.

[amos2]

"Good blanket question/statement. We are all sticking with company SOP's because that is what we do right? However if you think SOP's can cover everything in black and white terms...."

...Yes I do...and if you don't, pray tell us what your words of wisdom are to us mere mortals.

What additions would you like to complement our companies SOPs?

What qualifications do you have to make these recommendations?

Are you a Captain?...are you an F/O?

Are you a Chief Pilot?

Do you write the SOPs for your current company?

Do please tell us mere mortal, highly experienced airline captains, whence your superior knowledge comes from!? ;);)

[before landing check list]

Amos

I do not have "superior knowledge" and never said I did and my apologies if I came across that way. However if you do think SOP's will cover ALL situations and are black and white and you do not think pilot experience does not or will not come into play in those grey situations that most of us have seen then I would venture to say maybe you are slightly naive. However not knowing you one can only speculate. To answer your question I was only an FO on those aircraft. However for what it is worth and it is not worth much I have FAA Dual ATP's, CAA RW ATP and typed in the C550, LRJET, B212/412, S61 and 70. Now chill out dude and take a breath

[alf5071h]

Re the three issue to consider (#87, #91).
Should the FO elect to initiate a STOP when the SOPs say this is only to conducted by the Captain?
Is it ever appropriate to abort after v1?, and
If so, did this event provide enough indications to justify the decision?
1. How a rejected take off is conducted is a Procedure as in ‘SOP’. As to who makes the decision / conducts the reject, is a matter of Policy.
An RTO is an event/time critical situation; some operators may judge that either pilot as PF will have sufficient experience to decide and conduct the reject; others might restrict the decision and action to the Captain. The latter adds risk due to the potential for missed communication, confusion, and delay. The formulation of policy must involve risk assessment and is interlinked with the quality (content) of the SOP and level of training.

2. The V1 concept is primarily concerned with engine failure and aircraft control / performance; thus any discussion on the procedure – the decision and activities of a rejected take off (abort), should be restricted to these matters.
The more recent addition ‘if unable or unsafe to fly’ to RTO training has added considerable scope for confusion.
Making such an assessment before V1 (as originally envisaged) is an evaluative process, opposed to the more general if-then assessment of an engine / system failure. Thus this requires considerable knowledge and experience; it may increase decision time, and potentially involve higher risk.

Some operations even make this evaluation after V1 (in an RTO context) with significant increase in risk and almost inevitably with an accident outcome.
After V1 it should not be necessary to differentiate between unable or unsafe to fly, the latter implies that flight is possible but the circumstances questionable (unsafe). Yet these circumstances should have been identifiable beforehand – a few seconds before at V1, and logically, a few more seconds earlier at low speed / before take off.
Thus the extremely unlikely situation requiring the aircraft to stop after V1, is because the aircraft will not fly. Any evaluation at this point is whether to stop from VR or attempt to rotate at a higher speed. This is a judgement issue dependent on how the circumstances of the situation are perceived.
In other circumstances above V1 the certification risk-probability assumes that the aircraft will be safe enough to fly and the crew can evaluate any problem in flight.
Before the ‘what if’ replies are posted; consider what the operational and certification aspects assume to be detectable and avoided before take off, and those which the aircraft can withstand. Few if any RTO procedures can accommodate double failures, particularly those involving earlier human (mis) judgement or irrational thought.

3. In the vast majority of RTOs the decision has been correct for the situation as perceived by the human operator at that time. Judgement of these decisions in hindsight adds little to safety unless the circumstances are fully understood and evaluated.
This event appears to have been complicated by a poorly considered SOP with respect to the issues above, and where weaknesses in industry-wide training and ill advised use of modern technology (speed trend) added further complexity.
Operators (industry) could consider why ASIs are crosschecked – what could be detected (does the aircraft have a comparator system); what is the relative importance of speed / speed-trend miscompare towards continued safe flight in a commercial aircraft with dual and St-By systems (http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-emergency-response-planning/379780-computers-cockpit-safety-aviation-5.html#post6550181).


Re #93 You can not stop someone acting on impulse. :ok:

But you might be able prevent the human being in a situation or having to evaluate circumstances where impulse should be avoided.
Philosophy, Policy, Procedure, Practice.

“We cannot change the human condition. But we can change the conditions under which humans work”, Professor James Reason.

[JW411]

SOPs cover most known happenings. However, they simply do not, nor can they ever cover everything.

The closest that I (and my crew and the contents of the aeroplane) ever got to dying was in a situation which was neither covered by SOPs, nor was there a procedure in the Emergency Checklist (I think you call it the FCOM nowadays), nor did I have time to do extensive reading, nor was there a precedent to fall back upon.

Fortunately, I was trained to think outside the box and so it was that we all survived.

SOPs simply cannot ever cover every eventuality.

[heavy.airbourne]

The Concorde crashed after a pity tyre failure - the engineer's dream and a pilot's nightmare.:E

The B737 can become airborne to 500' and still land on the same runway, within 4000m:ok:; V1 is no factor for non-beancounters.

(Been there, done that.)

[Aldente]

4000 m ?

Luxury ! (said in a flat Yorkshire accent, for those who remember the Pythons)

Take Belfast City for instance - 1829 m !

You need to be quite "go minded" for that one ....

:ooh:

[amos2]

"Amos

I do not have "superior knowledge" and never said I did and my apologies if I came across that way. However if you do think SOP's will cover ALL situations and are black and white and you do not think pilot experience does not or will not come into play in those grey situations that most of us have seen then I would venture to say maybe you are slightly naive. However not knowing you one can only speculate. To answer your question I was only an FO on those aircraft. However for what it is worth and it is not worth much I have FAA Dual ATP's, CAA RW ATP and typed in the C550, LRJET, B212/412, S61 and 70. Now chill out dude and take a breath"

You're right, your experience is not worth much! Actually, it's worth nothing!
Go away! Play with your toy aeroplanes and come back when you're a grown up!! :=

[BOAC]

Purely out of interest, are there any stats available for successful (Cat A) aborts above V1 where the aircraft would not have been able to fly and re-land safely? I think the only one I am aware of is the 748 at Stansted where I believe the Captain was told 'unofficially' by the investigators that in their opinion his wing would probably have burnt through downwind.

I suggest we leave out any '100% engine failures' where the decision is made for you.:)

[Denti]

The B737 can become airborne to 500' and still land on the same runway, within 4000m

Sure it can, but then, if you use everything boeing provides you cant. Ambling along with a leisurely 73% N1 while waiting until that 169kts V1 rolls around which lets you rotate within the last 300m of those 4000m is a very real boeing proposed takeoff profile. Certainly would not love to see a past V1 rejected take off on that one.

@alf5071h re you point 3. Boeing posted us an advise that any IAS disagree message in the high speed phase of the take off run (past 80kts) is no reason for a take off abort. Take it in the air, deal with it and come back if needed. It was given again after a V1 reject caused a runway overrun.

And that was about a real IAS DISAGREE message, not some perceived speed trend vector anomaly during rotation.

As you are probably aware boeing, the same as airbus by the way, advises pilots to be go-minded and only a very small list of reasons for a high speed reject.

[Meikleour]

BOAC: Perhaps you can remind me but with the 748 incident do I not recall correctly that the damaged engine was NEVER in fact shutdown therefore the fire damage was possibly the worse for it?

PS shades of `WE at LHR when the LP valve was never closed. The B707s were later modified I think.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

However if you think SOP's can cover everything in black and white terms...."

...Yes I do...and if you don't, pray tell us what your words of wisdom are to us mere mortals.

Do please tell us mere mortal, highly experienced airline captains, whence your superior knowledge comes from!? ;);)

Standard Operating Procedures are just that.

I take it in your experience that you have never encountered a situation that has not been covered by either SOPs, the normal checklist or the ECL?

Well, one day you will. Please tell us other mere mortals and relatively experienced airline captains what you are going to do then?

I would also suggest that having had to think and act beyond the protection of SOPs etc. is a more useful experience than never having had to do such a thing. The same hour a thousand times...

What qualifications do you have to make these recommendations?

TRE/Fleet Standards Captain/Previously responsible for developing new checklists and SOPs for the introduction of a new type.

Your shot.

[BOAC]

Meikle - not sure, but that is not relevant to what I understood. It was the intensity of the fire that was the concern and I'm not sure the fire could have been extinguished in the air - I think once the disc had gone into the tank it was fuel burning, not the engine..

As LSM says, a situation 'outside SOPS'.

[before landing check list]

You're right, your experience is not worth much! Actually, it's worth nothing!
Go away! Play with your toy aeroplanes and come back when you're a grown up!!

Amos dude, you do lend quite a bit of levity here, keep up the fine work please.

Anyway enough of this, let us press on with the discussion shall we? I would suggest some note taking.

[bubbers44]

Remember the AA DC10 at KORD? They were fine at V2+15 when their engine fell off taking out the hydraulics to the LED's. What killed everybody is the crew followed AA SOP at the time and slowed to V2. Now their SOP is if they are at V2 to V2+15 hold the higher speed, don't slow to V2.

What would you have done? Follow SOP and slow to V2 or stick with what was working at V2+15? Reading some responses here I see some who wouldn't be with us any more if they had been on that crew.

[Rananim]

Why not simply adhere to your companies SOPs?

If only life were that simple wouldnt it be great?Someone advocating SOP's as the definitive answer to any problem you're faced with as a flyer is seriously misguided.

[ZBMAN]

...Yes I do...and if you don't, pray tell us what your words of wisdom are to us mere mortals.


Chilling reading, showing how an "experience airline captain" can fail to understand the purpose of SOP's.

SOP's aren't a recipe to cope with any situation, this is NOT what they are there for. This is however a common misconception, especially in management circles, as turning us into robots blindingly following the SOP program is a recurring wet dream. Some situations require action outside of the SOP framework, in extreme cases deliberately ignoring SOP's is the only course of action in order to ensure a succesful outcome. What's left then is common sense applied to aviation, ie airmanship. I think a certain Quantas crew would agree.

[FalcoCharlie]

SOPs are the bare minimums. In said company with so many cadets and such rapid expansion, SOPs are I dare say the only thing thoroughly instructed. Airmanship and common sense are hinted upon but the real emphasis is on SOPs. This has however rapidly created a whole group of pilots who think nothing exists outside SOPs and everything that is not covered does not exist/should not be done - see well known problem with Flemish speaking pilots. However, the aircraft itself does not know that all you know are SOPs and so does the surrounding environment (weather - passengers etc.). As expected there are some rude surprises along the way plus the perfect SOPs are so perfect they go through major annual changes. Need, not optimisation created the SOP religion in the first place until pilots get the necessary experience to know that there is more out there.

That day even SOPs were not followed. Also Company cadets are never taught they in some cases they can abort after V1 and stay in the runway - any runway, they just don't get any training on that. For an F/O to abort with the nosewheel in the air something was not right with the relationship with the Captain on the other seat. I cannot speculate more on this but maybe the combination was not optimal that day. This could be the missing link on what we do not understand.

[Ct.Yankee]

Remember the AA DC10 at KORD? They were fine at V2+15 when their engine fell off taking out the hydraulics to the LED's. What killed everybody is the crew followed AA SOP at the time and slowed to V2. Now their SOP is if they are at V2 to V2+15 hold the higher speed, don't slow to V2.

What would you have done? Follow SOP and slow to V2 or stick with what was working at V2+15? Reading some responses here I see some who wouldn't be with us any more if they had been on that crew.


Bubbers44 is absolutely correct.
I was an F/O at the time and the discussions around our crew rooms agreed that if the Capt. had let the F/O, who was doing a good job of handling the emergency, instead of taking the aircraft and flying by Company SOP's, which are a good guide, AA191's crash would have not happened.

[goldfish85]

aterpster,

Many years ago an Old Continental 707 had an engine on the left side (I think #2, have an uncontained engine failure at LAX. They had just rotated. Debris from # 2 bounced off the runway and took out engine #3. It was hairy but they were able to climb out and return for landing.


Wasn't that a National B-727 at DCA?

[goldfish85]

We need to keep what V1 really means. It is solely based on a single engine failure. If I might quote from FAR 1

V1means the maximum speed in the takeoff at which the pilot must take the first action (e.g., apply brakes, reduce thrust, deploy speed brakes) to stop the airplane within the accelerate-stop distance. V1 also means the minimum speed in the takeoff, following a failure of the critical engine at VEF , at which the pilot can continue the takeoff and achieve the required height above the takeoff surface within the takeoff distance.

If you look at the number of RTO's, most engine failures occur relatively early in the TO roll. Late in the TO role, other problems seem to arise -- wheels, brakes, tires, and flight control problems. I'd say that V1 is only guidance for non-engine failure cases.

Several years ago, there was an RTO caused by all of the glass going dark. As it happened, it was night and the pilot rejected the takeoff. My boss at the FAA said "Never ever reject above V1." I suggested that it depends. On a clear day at KPHX, I'd go every time. On the proverbial dark and stormy night at KSEA, I'd probably take my chances and stop.

Aside from engine failures, V1 does not apply.

PS, in these late aborts, I think only the PF can make the decision.

I know I'm going to get it now.

[BandAide]

It's OK if you all die but were adhering to procedure. No one can criticize you.

If you reject after V1 and survive, especially with aircraft damage, you're going to get put through the ringer. But you're alive, eh?

We brief fire, failure, fear, shear.

V1 is my guideline and I adhere, but on many occasions V1 occurs with room to stop and then some. I think about that, too.

I also strongly believe the V1 and climbout charts were based on data from new airplanes and engines flown by test pilots, and I know from experience, catastrophic engine failure at 600' after takeoff and not being able to maintain V2 in level flight, much less climb out, that older airplanes and engines will not give you charted performance, but something less. Odds are most takeoffs hit the real V1 hundreds of feet before the charts (therefore the boxes) said they did.

The best thing you can do is keep your mind spinning when the unexpected happens, go with your instinct, and fly the bastard. We can talk about the rest on the ground. When I was faced with the once in a lifetime, I kept thinking to myself, "I'm NOT going out this way!"

[bubbers44]

I don't think a plane that can't at V1 accelerate and climb at V2 is legal to fly with an engine failure at V1. However using your judgement in dealing with near V1 failures should consider what is at the end of the runway, a cliff, or rising terrain. You don't at this point worry about legalities, you worry about survival.

[before landing check list]

The Merlin Metro(?) with RATO bottles comes to mind.

[aterpster]

goldfish85:

aterpster,

Many years ago an Old Continental 707 had an engine on the left side (I think #2, have an uncontained engine failure at LAX. They had just rotated. Debris from # 2 bounced off the runway and took out engine #3. It was hairy but they were able to climb out and return for landing.


Wasn't that a National B-727 at DCA?

Don't know about the 727 at DCA. I clearly recall the Old Continential 707 at LAX.

I can't imagine a 727 flying out of takeoff on one engine.

[aterpster]

bubbers44:

I don't think a plane that can't at V1 accelerate and climb at V2 is legal to fly with an engine failure at V1. However using your judgement in dealing with near V1 failures should consider what is at the end of the runway, a cliff, or rising terrain. You don't at this point worry about legalities, you worry about survival.

The OEI takeoff flight path is far more a critical operating procedure than a legality. Aborting after V1 has a terrible record. It was even worse until the industry agreed in the 1960s to reduce V1 to the minimum that performance would allow.

[lomapaseo]

aterpster

{quote] Don't know about the 727 at DCA. I clearly recall the Old Continential 707 at LAX.

I can't imagine a 727 flying out of takeoff on one engine. [/quote]

Wasn't the Continental at LAX in 68 and a B720?

[The Ancient Geek]

Aborting after V1 has a terrible record.


There are good reasons for this.

Most late aborts happen because something has gone very wrong which was not detectable (or sometimes not noticed) until after rotation. Nasty surprises with little or no time to make a proper analysis of the problem. In many cases the aircraft is simply unflyable and an incident is inevitable.

Reduced power takeoffs are fashionable nowadays but IMHO are daft. The runway behind you is always useless. Safety compromised to save a few bucks.

Incorrect flap settings are a recurrent cause, this should not happen, unflyable as configured.:ugh:

Unexpected control responses can have many causes, recent cases include improper or no de-icing, incorrect weight&balance, overloading, and maintenance issues such as several cases of incorrect rigging of B1900 controls. Most of these are either unflyable or dangerous to fly.

Multiple engine failures are rare after v1, usually caused by bird strikes, but again the aircraft may or may not be flyable.

V1 is only appropriate to single engine failures, it is simply irrelevant in any of the above cases.

My survival guide is simple, always be prepared for the unexpected. Know your airfield, does it have a cliff, hotel or cabbage patch at the end of the runway ?. Have a plan ready, keep a running assessment of available stopping distance until safely airborne. The crash tenders are going to reach you a lot sooner in the cabbage patch than 5 miles after takeoff.

And just hope that when it happens to you you get lucky and have 4000 metres of runway left as I did.

[aterpster]

lomapaseo (http://www.pprune.org/members/48942-lomapaseo)
Wasn't the Continental at LAX in 68 and a B720?

Sounds about the right time-frame. And, it certainly could have been a 720.

[SpaceBetweenThoughts]

I have been watching this thread develop with considerable interest.

I have no criticism of the FO who was doing the best he could with the resources he had available at the time and the experience, training and system which he had been exposed to preceding the incident.

But what I do criticise is the ethos and system which has produced this result. Flying is not an academic exercise but definitions of matters such as "V1" are. Many accidents and incidents in previous aviation history have proved that high speed stops are quite risky - lots of "M" and masses of "Vsquared" gives boatloads of energy to dissipate in one form or another - whereas continued take off at speeds close to V1 are usually much safer (hey why not use that energy to go flying?!). Does that mean I think you should never stop after V1 - NO! (but I'd have to have a damn good reason to do so!).

I would like to focus on another issue though. Over recent years we have seen a progressive attempted degradation in the authority of the aircraft Commander almost to the extent that decisions on the flight deck are made by consensus. Does this mean that I think the role of the FO is inferior? Of course not - a good commander will, when time permits, listen to the comments of the FO and if necessary act upon them to ensure safe operation. But we now have words such as "Advocacy" being banded about which lead some FOs to think this gives them licence to almost run the operation. This on top of all sorts of "touch feely" buzz words/phrases and acronyms to cover almost everything except how you walk out to the aeroplane is leading many newbies to think that flying is a "book" exercise and that the old codger in the left hand seat has to be pitied because actually "I know best because I've had all this amazing training" - in short, I see lots of overconfidence based on a system which attempts to codify and simplify what, in many cases, can only be learned from years of experience. Does this mean I think we shouldn't have procedures? No BUT it's the thinking that this breeds that everything is "cut and dried" - in short, I see much overconfidence.

In this case where the SOPs (in common with most other operators) specify that the Commander (left hand seat pilot) is the sole person who will action a rejected take off, he was probably in a better position to make the correct decision anyway as he wasn't actually flying the take off so he had more spare capacity to watch what was happening. He might have seen an airspeed trend arrow near V1 misbehaving but (rightly) decided not to call same since this would be an unnecessary distraction close to V1.

In closing, I have to say I find this incident very disturbing. I repeat that I have no criticism of the FO who "believed" he was doing the right thing but the system which has allowed this to happen.

In other circumstances this could have been a serious accident with the loss of many lives. The final question I would ask is, in this case who would have been liable? The a/c commander would have, in my opinion, a good case for saying that his authority and responsibility for the flight had been taken away the instant the FO elected to reject the take off.

[safetypee]

SBT, well said.
Overconfidence in part; elsewhere a disturbingly low understanding of the factors involved in safety and certification, encouraging bias and opportunity for poor judgement, both at the sharp end and blunt end of operations.

Some evidence of an “I know better” syndrome, almost to the point of reversion to the pre CRM, ‘P1’ only days.

Safety culture, national culture, professional culture?

Similar problems in a related subject, here:-
Winter Operations, Friction Measurements and Conditions for Friction Predictions - Executive Summary (http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/content/bookDetails.php?bookId=1492)

[MountainBear]

Over recent years we have seen a progressive attempted degradation in the authority of the aircraft Commander almost to the extent that decisions on the flight deck are made by consensus.

The case at hand is a bad example of this, however. If there is any blame for bad CRM in this case it falls squarely on the Capitan and/or the SOP of the company.

The captain also interpreted the feeling as engine asymmetry. Therefore the captain performed an additional engine cross check during the takeoff roll. However, no difference in engine indications was observed. Nor was the cross-check communicated to the first officer who was flying, this was however not mandated either.

So let me get this straight. The PF and the Capt both formed a similar mental model of the take-off. The captain then got additional information that changed his mental model of the take-off and never informed the PF of this. And that's OK with everyone because the Capt is the boss and who the hell cares what the PF is thinking? Is that really what CRM is all about? Haven't we learned anything from Tenrife?

Then there is this gem:

In the operators guidance and rules it is written that the captain is the only one with the authority to reject the takeoff. For this reason the hand of the captain is near engine controls in case of a decision to reject the takeoff. In the event of a controllability issue it is very likely the pilot flying is the crewmember who experienced and is faced with the problem, in this case it was not the person authorised to make the rejected takeoff decision.

So we are supposed to believe then that the person who is faced with the immediate task of securing the safety of the flight is the person who has no authority to do anything about it. Right. (sarcasm) That's outstanding SOP's guys (more sarcasm). What the hell does "Pilot Flying" mean if one has no actual authority to fly the plane.

This case isn't a good example of a F/O undermining the Captain's authority. It's a good example of how an arrogant Capitan and backed up by the thoughtless SOP of a company make a mockery of the notion of a safety culture. :ugh:

[lomapaseo]

In closing, I have to say I find this incident very disturbing. I repeat that I have no criticism of the FO who "believed" he was doing the right thing but the system which has allowed this to happen.

In other circumstances this could have been a serious accident with the loss of many lives. The final question I would ask is, in this case who would have been liable? The a/c commander would have, in my opinion, a good case for saying that his authority and responsibility for the flight had been taken away the instant the FO elected to reject the take off.

I'm a supporter of a brief before T/O of the abort call. If agreed the captain may delegate that repsonsibility (seen it done)

So I may have missed something here in all these pages, did the FO undermine the Captains authority or just act out his decision role?

If the later we're spending way too much time second guessing decisions made in seconds, leave that to the chief pilot who has access to all the inputs

[Adhemar]

Couldn’t agree more with SBT’s observations.

@ Mountainbear: “And that's OK with everyone because the Capt is the boss and who the hell cares what the PF is thinking? Is that really what CRM is all about?"

Yes indeed, the captain is the “boss” of the aircraft (if you feel like using the word “boss”). Despite how much some individuals like to see it, the flight deck is not a democracy. Captain holds final authority and responsibility. Get over it.

In Ryanair, where the incident took place, it is captain’s decision to abandon a take off. FO´s in Ryanair are, to my knowledge, not even trained the RTO actions. This partly explains why the FO in this particular case just closed the thrust levers and left the remainder of the RTO actions for the captain. A likely scary situation for the “arrogant” captain.

A little more on CRM: CRM is about making optimum use of all available resources i.e. equipment, procedures and people with the final goal of promoting/enhancing flight safety. An excellent concept that in recent years clearly has improved flight safety and, as a side effect, created a pleasant atmosphere in the flight deck. The concept of CRM has also resulted in a culture where inexperienced FO’s learn much faster as they are more included in the general decision making process. People progress much faster if they are not limited to “just watch and copy” practices/culture. However, IMHO, too often CRM is seen by inexperienced and over SOP-ed FO´s as “my sector, my flight, my decision(s)”. That is not how CRM works.

Any sensible captain will take into account what the FO, Cabin Crew, dispatcher, ATC (and, in some cases, even passengers), … have to say (why those who advocate CRM are so often stuck in their Capt vs. FO box and forget about the valueable info that might come from ‘ the ground’ or ‘the back’?). That is what CRM is all about : maximising your recourses and then make a sensible decision. Yet, at V1 the decision to go has been made and a take off is continued.There is no room/time to have a little chat on how save/unsave is it to continue the take off near, at or after V1. In plain English: only one person is and can be in charge.

[amos2]

Hmmm! ...I must remember that!
The next time I face an abnormal or an emergency situation I shall make a PA and seek assistance from the great unwashed down the back! ;);)

[Ridge Lift]

I think SBT has hit the nail on the head - there will always be a tension between SOPs and common sense. Attempts to "codify" expertise are not just found in the airline industry - Jeffery Pfeffer authored "The Human Equation" which contains a chapter entitled "Why Smart Organisations Sometimes Do Dumb Things".

He notes that the problem occurs in demanding accountability for a decision or judgement "process" rather than the outcome of that decision. When forced to account for and explain decisionmaking in ways legitimate and comprehensible to a wider audience (e.g. PPRUNE or the regulator) the expert will have to forego any insight or intuition that can't be articulated and will be forced to rely, instead, on the same data and decision process as anyone else. In doing so the expert loses virtually all the benefits of their expertise.

It seems those responsible for the SOPs necessary for operational consistency and regulatory compliance must also recognise and ensure that they protect wisdom, knowledge and competency in their organisations. A tricky but valuable balancing act.
RL

[Adhemar]

@ Amos2: CRM: use the available recources. One of your pax could be a another pilot or engineer. A recent incident in a South European country springs to mind where one of the pax told cabin crew during taxi that they just hit another aircraft with their wingtip. Turns out the pax was an engineer. Turns out he was right. Turns out the crew was not aware.
I wouldn`t go as far as making a PA though in every abnormal or emergency. Most likely the info from “the great unwashed down the back” will come to you without a PA. Some of it might be valueable.

[amos2]

...err, ridge lift,can you translate that into simple english for us mere mortals! ;);)

[before landing check list]

Hmmm! ...I must remember that!
The next time I face an abnormal or an emergency situation I shall make a PA and seek assistance from the great unwashed down the back!

For the sake of your passengers I do hope you are kidding and/or taking copious notes.

[Admiral346]

Pininstauld:
The runway was 3,000 metres and his judgement was proved correct because it came to rest half a kilometre from the end of the pavement.
I am sorry, but the outcome does not prove or even say anything about the judgement. During the takeoff roll, I am certain, there was no way for the FO to calculate ( or even estimate profoundly) the remaining rwy in relation to an increasing energy state and therefore towards stopping margin. His judgement was not proven correct, it was pure luck and chance. Aborting after V1 means you have completeley left the calculated, controlled operation of an aircraft and the outcome is depending on luck.

The roulette wheels came up with the right result this time because there were no casualties - and that's really all that can be said.
Now that I can agree with - exactly what I mean.
I just don't understand how you can write the first sentence I quoted and then follow it by this one closely after.

I find this abort hairraising, potentially desasterous and ignorant of risk factors involved.

[Checkboard]

Aborting after V1 means you have completeley left the calculated, controlled operation of an aircraft and the outcome is depending on luck.
Rubbish. :hmm: The stop is not an event controlled by random chance ergo by definition luck does not play a role.

It is an event the outcome of which can be estimated (obviously not as well as it can be calculated.).

[lomapaseo]

checkboard

Rubbish. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/yeees.gif The stop is not an event controlled by random chance ergo by definition luck does not play a role.



Slight quibble

The ability to stop .... is not an event controlled by random chance .... etc.

However the outcome appears to be based on pilot skill e.g. 95% sucess

[SASless]

Whatever happened to the concept of "Thinking" while you are set there in the front end? Rote following the SOP's/Emergency Procedures kills folks just as dead as failing to follow them.

Case In Point....Chicago, American Airlines...engine departs the wing takes out forward edge lift devices....Crew adheres to the procedure...Altitude over airspeed....on a very bright clear blue day with no obstructions anywhere near them....result....a very dramatic crash fatal to all aboard.

You pin heads that cannot differentiate between a reasoned decision based upon the circumstances extant and some silly argument about SOP's, Seniority, Rank, and who is the damn Boss....just need to wake up and smell the coffee.

If you become slave to a checklist....you are not an Aviator...just a high paid button pusher.

[bubbers44]

I totally agree with that statement but sadly the new generation of pilots think automation is the answer and SOP's will take care of any abnormal or emergency situation.

[twochai]

Case In Point....Chicago, American Airlines...engine departs the wing takes out forward edge lift devices....Crew adheres to the procedure...Altitude over airspeed....on a very bright clear blue day with no obstructions anywhere near them....result....a very dramatic crash fatal to all aboard.

Unless my memory is mistaken, the ultimate cause (amongst a long chain of contributory causes) of the AA DC-10 crash at CHI, was the uncommanded retraction of the leading edge slats on the side of the failed (departed) engine, attributed to hydraulic system architecture design shortcomings.

[iceman50]

SASless

You pin heads that cannot differentiate between a reasoned decision based upon the circumstances extant and some silly argument about SOP's, Seniority, Rank, and who is the damn Boss....just need to wake up and smell the coffee.

Tell me where the reasoned decision was made by the FO in this case because there is NO evidence in the report that it was "reasoned". This thread, unfortunately like a lot of threads these days on PPRune, has turned into a waste of bandwidth with so called experts saying you do not need to follow SOP's etc etc. LUCK played a HUGE part in this INCIDENT not becoming an ACCIDENT with lives being lost. The person in question obviously did NOT have huge experience if he was confused by some minor "atmospheric phenomena ".

[Admiral346]

Iceman, I agree.

Checkerboard, how are you going to estimate that? With energy increasing exponentially and brake performance staying linear while moving at 140kts? How many aborts have you done to have a box full of experience to draw from? If you`ve flown for 20 years statistically you had 2. Probably on different types and certainly with variing environmental factors (temp, weight, surface,...).
Now maybe you did more than 2, maybe you are a 20.000h test pilot.

But that FO had some 2000h under his belt, that comes to 3 years of flying and, statistically, zero aborts. Maybe he even got 1500h of his experience on some light twin or so, that would hint towards this descision.

So maybe you estimate your takeoff performance, your fuel required, your dutytimes, wether that engine is still ok...

I make certain. "Maybe"s or guesses are not what I run the operation of an airliner under.

And I do maintain that aborting after V1, even if necessary very rarely, puts you in the grey area where you are only guessing. It might work out and it might not, but a fortunate outcome does not prove your ability to estimate the outcome, it proves that you got lucky.

Nic

[Admiral346]

Whatever happened to the concept of "Thinking" while you are set there in the front end?

Well, SASless, whatever happened to it?

You are going to tell me that thinking: "Oooh, I`ve got an airspeed anomaly! Oh my god, whattodo, whattodo? I am past V1, past Vr, so I better get that nosegear back onto the RWY and pull 'em to idle and let the old man handle the rest. My profound judgement assures we will stop before the concrete ends and desaster starts..."

is better than thinking: "Oooh, I`ve got an airspeed anomaly! Oh my god, whattodo, whattodo? I am past V1, past Vr, so I better pitch up to my usual 15 deg, get some air under my keel and then consult with my colleague on how to solve the problem!"

You decide.

Nic

[alf5071h]

Admiral346, you are develoing a good point. However, in this incident the airspeed anomaly was just one of the concluding factors in the pilot’s assessment, which resulted in the belief that the aircraft was unsafe to fly.

The puzzle is what other factors or strength of belief contributed to this assessment. Was it previous knowledge, erroneous belief - either from training or industry wide information, misperceived cues with rational evaluation, or just irrational thoughts (subconscious influences).
I have investigated similar incidents and in the majority of cases the person cannot fully explain the rationale used, or weigh the effect of influencing factors. In most accidents there are many factors and thoughts which come together at a critical time.
One individual in very similar circumstances (RTO > V1) reported that the decision would have been different on a shorter runway, but neither of us could determine why the thinking would have changed, suggesting that the original decision was not rational. The pilot had not experienced any similar situation in his career, which also implied that the issues had not been thought about beforehand.

These are problems of tactical decision making; this can invoke human weaknesses which can result in error.
Thus there is an important need to think about situations beforehand; it must be part of the strategy – strategic thinking, strategic decision making (without prejudging situations).
Thinking about a range of issues generates knowledge, which might eliminate some confusion from time-constrained assessments. Also, having a ‘Go’ mindset above V1 provides a greater safety bias to our thoughts than might an on-the-spot evaluation.

[The Ancient Geek]

You are making the common mistake of assuming that V1 is relevant.
V1 is simply a variant of Vmc, the speed at which it is safe to takeoff following a failure of one engine assuming no other damage.

V1 tells you nothing about the available stopping distance, nor does it have any relevance whatsoever to any failure other than the failure of one engine.

Everyone trains in the simulator for an engine failure on takeoff until the response is (hopefully) instinctive but once again this training is irrellevant and indeed can be misleading in the event of some other failure.
Other failures can, and do, occur.

The prudent pilot maintains a running mental picture of the remaining stopping distance until the aircraft is safely airbourne because control problems can occur which are not obvious until the wheels leave the ground.

[before landing check list]

Greek, I agree with you as to what V1 is really for. However all the sims (Airplane) the Capt would brief what he would stop for and after V1 we were going flying. I know there is know way to train for every eventuality however we never did train for 2 engine failures on the 8 after V1. We never had a catastrophic fire after v1 (as the Concord did). I think we are so ingrained in the same old training we do not think outside the box anymore.

[HundredPercentPlease]

Aborting after V1 means you have completeley left the calculated, controlled operation of an aircraft and the outcome is depending on luck.

Not exactly. Whenever we* prepare and enter our performance data, the software tells us how much runway will be left after an abort at V1.

Often it is 3m.
Sometimes it is 900m (even when using a flex/assumed temp).

Obviously this is due to the limiting segment, but knowing this data can help the Captain make an informed decision if the whole plot suddenly enters new and untrained territory. A decision to stop after V1 might be based on these numbers, and not just a guess and subsequent luck.

* not FR, and I don't know whether FR crews have this data. And the thought of the FO initiating a surprise stop after V1 gives me the willies, either way.

[Aldente]

In this case, no-one will ever know whether the pitot tube (dented out of limits, according to the 38 page report) was about to condemn this flight to become a smoking pile of junkyard scrap.


Let's out big sigh......

Pininstauld (and others):-

As I've already said earlier on this forum, Selecting an appropriate pitch angle and power setting, even without any airspeed indications at all, will keep an airplane flying at at any stage of flight.

Hardly a matter of converting the aircraft to "a smoking pile of scrapyard junk"

:ugh:

[before landing check list]

Hardly a matter of converting the aircraft to "a smoking pile of scrapyard junk"

It sure is if all they know is to blindly follow automation to the bitter end.

[d105]

This has however rapidly created a whole group of pilots who think nothing exists outside SOPs and everything that is not covered does not exist/should not be done - see well known problem with Flemish speaking pilots.


Exactly what is that well known problem with "Flemish" speaking pilots? Flemish isn't a language by the way.

[Admiral346]

100%:
Not exactly. Whenever we* prepare and enter our performance data, the software tells us how much runway will be left after an abort at V1.

Often it is 3m.
Sometimes it is 900m (even when using a flex/assumed temp).

Obviously this is due to the limiting segment, but knowing this data can help the Captain make an informed decision if the whole plot suddenly enters new and untrained territory. A decision to stop after V1 might be based on these numbers, and not just a guess and subsequent luck.


We use a similar tool on our laptop, and going out of my homebase with 4000m RWYs there`s always a lot of margin shown, even in winter.

But this does not mean I can safely abort above V1. At 140kts your aircraft runs some 75m per second. If it is not an A343 it will gain around 5 to 10 kts per second. So the next second it might be running 85 meters. So with an average time of becoming aware of a problem, assesing it, and taking action of some 5 seconds how far have you travelled down the RWY? How much is left? Consider that you are now at much higher energy than the calculated V1 abort.
Don't tell me you can calculate that, not even give a good guess, especially not while in the cockpit and not at a desk with a calculator and all the time you need.

V1 tells you nothing about the available stopping distance, nor does it have any relevance whatsoever to any failure other than the failure of one engine.

I am sorry, but V1 tells me that if an abort is executed at precisely that speed and I have good brakes and tires I will get the machine stopped on the pavement.

The closer I get to V1 the less likely I will abort for some tire problem as my braking might not be what went into calculation. I am already guessing here as the factors involved are not known.



I recommend reading this report:

http://www.nlr-atsi.nl/eCache/ATS/15/694.pdf
Title "REJECTING A TAKEOFF AFTER V1…WHY DOES IT (STILL)
HAPPEN?"

It really changed my view on takeoff aborts, and on how little margin I am willing to accept, and when do I call "GO".

Nic

[The Ancient Geek]

I recommend reading this report:

http://www.nlr-atsi.nl/eCache/ATS/15/694.pdf
Title "REJECTING A TAKEOFF AFTER V1…WHY DOES IT (STILL)



Interesting.
Firstly the report only considers 'accidents' and 'serious incidents' which means that it does not include cases where the aircraft stopped safely on the runway with no damage or injuries. It is probably safe to assume that this implies that the decision to reject was incorrect but safe in such cases.

In the cases considered between 1994 and 2008 31.9% of the aborts were justified, 44.4% not, and 23.6% unknown. This does not seem unreasonable given natural human survival instinct and the need for a very rapid decision.

The critical problem here is the available decision time. Slow decisions are very dangerous due to rising speed and rapidly reducing space. Given that almost a third of the aborts were justified we must assume that a high proportion of these would have been fatal or highly dangerous if not aborted.

The important question that the report does not address is simple :-
We know that any delay in deciding to abort is dangerous.
Is it safer to make a snap decision to abort or to go, given the strong possibility that in almost a third of cases the aircraft may be unflyable.

How many fatalities have resulted from avoidable 'go' decisions compared to those from abort overruns and how many of the overrun fatalities are attributable to slow decisions and action.

[Postman-LEJ]

[...] actions under stress are a combination of [...] talent levels and the training he/she has received from his/her employer(s).

Oh Tosh, Locked Door!
without talent, you should not have wasted your money for ATPL training.

BTW, what talent do you need if you want to prevent loss of crew communication, misinterpretation and misjudgement of priorities combined with a "bare-ar+ed" breach of safe practices and law



It was either that or a simple brainfart.

[...]Assuming the recruitment process at FR is robust questions need to be asked of the training department, not the individual.

It is also not the employers fault if trained standards are not executed properly by individuals. It's your personal responsibility to do so! Captain, FO, FA or Mech....no matter.

Removing the mistake maker may be cheaper, but not fairer. With good training this sort of incident need not happen so in this case I would hope a few sim details were the solution, not termination.

Sorry brother, but when's the last time you have experienced genuine fairness in aviation for the last time? You try to obey all the rules and not step on anyones toes. I was grateful for the time when the overall resposibility was not mine. The sim training he received seems sufficient for most others. The captain had the wits not to fight this wrong decision with the remaining runway being long enough. He was not trained for naughty things like that, either. And he "only" had 1000 h or so more experience.

In all "fairness" I can at least understand the removal.

[cavortingcheetah]

Not a very experienced crew then but not that inexperienced on the B737.

The captain, at the time of the event, had 3628 hours total flying experience with 2061 flying hours on type (B737).
The first officer, at the time of the event, had 2300 hours total flying experience and 1170 hours on type (B737).
The nine recommendations that might have been mentioned before can be found in here.

http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/rapporten/2010040,_EI-DPX_ENG.pdf

[bubbers44]

Even though after V1 aborts are not recomended because of no data to support stopping distance it is still allowed if in the pilots opinion the aircraft may not be flyable. We don't know what would have happened if the Concorde had aborted after hitting debris on the runway. We saw what happened by continuing the takeoff. Who knows what those pilots knew about what was happening. Sometimes you know why things are going wrong, sometimes you don't.

It is hard to fault a pilot who in a split second has to decide which way to go. Blindly following the after V1 go vs I still have over a mile of runway left and do I really want to be in the air with this fire burning my right wing off decision.

Sometimes V1, if used, blindly as a go, no go speed can hurt you.

Once in a B727 I was over 10 knots below V1 when I lost a generator on #1 engine on a wet rainy morning out of Barbados with about 1,000 overcast at max TO wt. I told the engineer to take care of it hoping he would download a pack. He selected essential to #1 and of course we lost all essential power. I told the FO flying to keep going, he would fix it. Now we were at V1 and rotating at Vr. I'm sure our story would have been a lot more interesting if we had aborted at the time we lost #1 generator. I'm sure somewhere in that abort on a wet runway with no essential power we would have lost our antiskid.

As it was he switched essential back to #3, shut a pack off until we got our flaps up and put it back on, just as we could have dispatched with two generators.

[GlueBall]

It's unsettling and outright scary to learn of so many new-school pilots who find it acceptable to abort after V1 ....based on "runway remaining."