Airworthiness & Safety Post Haddon-Cave [Archive]

15th May 2011, 19:44

Princess - if you are for real then the main effect of MAA is a massive increase in staff-work which still doesn't address the problems of airworthiness.

If an airworthiness issue is highlighted then either money has to be spent to fix it so the risk is reduced to ALARP, or someone has to have the cojones to accept that risk.

The new MAA means that if a senior officer has the cojones to accept the risk (as he did in the past), he will now find himself in court if something goes wrong - strangely that is a fairly unpalatable choice.

Now the airworthiness issues are passed up and down the chain of command, bounced back by the various PTs, placed on ever more meaningless lists of risk and mired in red-tape.

So the actual process of getting anything done about aircraft faults has not improved one jot - in fact it would seem that the very worry of having to address issues on some platforms has meant they have been removed from service under the guise of SDR.

Staff officers find themselves juggling the lists of faults and prioritising them in a way that the actual operators certainly wouldn't agree with.

All in all MAA promised a lot but doesn't seem to have delivered anything.

Really annoyed

15th May 2011, 20:29

Edited by Mods

Okay lets give Airborne a chance here. Please give us your feelings on how the overall airworthiness and safety of our platforms has been affected by these changes, based on your current experience of how the aircraft are used in all of our theatres of war and during training as well and how the various engineering squadrons are currently run in the RAF.

Airborne Aircrew

15th May 2011, 20:35

Edited by Mods

I was attempting to assist Princess_Lala if she had a legitimate reason for her question. If I hadn't been asking the questions you'd have been bitching at someone else... Because no-one was going to answer the question until some level of legitimacy was established.

As to whether I am qualified to discuss the current changes in airworthiness and safety improvements under Haddon Cave - you're right, I cannot speak with any authority whatsoever. But I'm still, almost certainly, the first and only person to tell the RAF that I would not fly on one specific aircraft type based entirely on that type's lack of airworthiness but was quite happy to go to any other type anywhere they wanted me to go. I'm probably the only one that the RAF decided that I must be mentally unstable for doing so and sent me to a Trick Cyclist in London to "convict" me only to have him send me back with a rating of "perfectly sane". :E At which point, with no leg to stand, on the RAF and I parted ways.

It is little wonder I follow threads regarding airworthiness with some interest. Personally, I hope she is who she says she is. I'm looking forward to the responses.

tucumseh

16th May 2011, 05:45

So the actual process of getting anything done about aircraft faults has not improved one jot - in fact it would seem that the very worry of having to address issues on some platforms has meant they have been removed from service under the guise of SDR.

It is 20 years since the RAF, in the guise of AMSO, ruled that Engineering Authorities should not even bother raising a MF760A upon receipt of a MF760, because funding to investigate had been chopped. Princess, ask if the overarching process has been fully funded and resurrected and gaps filled. (Best of luck; the only Def Stan dedicated to it was cancelled 3 years ago having been declared obsolescent 20 years ago. That single act tells you all about the anti-airworthiness ethos fostered by AMSO/AML in the 90s). If not, then no Safety Case can be proven valid.

The last part is absolutely true. One of the problems during SDSR was that a re-assessment was required when it was suggested airworthiness funding be chopped even further. Just think about that for a moment. Even after Haddon-Cave, MoD still had senior staff officers who thought the subject a waste of time and money. They were in posts with authority to directly affect airworthiness yet knew nothing about the subject. People like that have no place in today’s MoD.

All in all MAA promised a lot but doesn't seem to have delivered anything.

I think we expect too much from them. 25+ years of deliberate neglect cannot be resurrected overnight, especially when some of those who took this deliberate action remain in MoD. It was obvious what was going to happen, and predicted on the Nimrod thread. Project Teams that had inherited decades of neglect and had few if any staff trained on the subject, automatically lobbed any airworthiness problem, or what they thought may be remotely connected to airworthiness, in the MAA’s direction. The MAA should take a stand (they already did on the above “savings” proposals). They should reply to PTs saying it is incumbent upon them to employ experts in the field and if they don’t have sufficient competence, either train people or get shot of them and employ those who are suitable.

What real authority does the MAA have? I suspect they are sat in the middle between PTs and top level committees (those who failed in their management oversight duties over the years) and simply act as a post office on many issues. Have they the authority or even the expertise to identify the gaps created over 25 years and approve amelioration plans and funding? I don’t think so.

Go back and read the Nimrod and C130 threads. Read the on-going Chinook thread. Same people, same policies, same result. What could have prevented all (which is the whole point)? Implement the regulations. That takes resources and good quality staff. Always bear in mind that Haddon-Cave was nothing new. His report is a simplistic top level skim through numerous similar, more detailed and infinitely more damning reports since 1988. Until MoD accept this simple fact, the correct action cannot be taken. What does it need to ram this home? My opinion is that clearing Air Cdre George Baber on the grounds that he inherited 15 years of systemic neglect and could not possibly be expected to resurrect Nimrod airworthiness in a 2 year tour, would really flag this up. Then the true scale would be known – at the moment Mod are still in denial. Also, the time taken to pursue this case against Baber is, I believe, hampering the MAA. It may actually be the Mull of Kintyre Review that is the catalyst because of course the same names crop up there.

Finally, I notice a concentration of effort on front line maintenance activities. There is still a tendency to confuse serviceability and airworthiness. You have to get the basics right and that is what has been ignored over the years. If the basics aren’t there, then front line’s excellent engineers are still hamstrung. Crab has mentioned MF760s, but another common failing noted in many BoIs is poor publications. Take either one of those examples, map out the mandated process and see where the breakdown occurred. Same every time. The basic lesson that has not been taught in MoD since 1992 is that key airworthiness activities are not volume-related. They cost the same whether you have 1000 or 1 aircraft. Understand that one, structure the resources (mainly funding) accordingly, and you automatically have everyone thinking airworthiness again, if only because PTs will notice and welcome the change, and perhaps ask why.

Hope this helps. PM me if you have any questions.

A and C

16th May 2011, 08:48

I would take a guess that the end result of the MAA will be much more paperwork (& cost) and less real inspection of aircraft.

The result of EASA part M on the civil GA sector is that I have to spend much more time in the office pushing paper and so am only on the hangar floor when required rather than being able to have the time to take more of an overview of the work being carried out.

IMO this is a backward step as about 50% of the paper I deal with is not aircraft safety related , it is about people covering their six.

I would take an educated guess that if you talked to the guys who are fixing aircraft on a day to day basis you would get the same answer about the introduction of the MAA.

VinRouge

16th May 2011, 13:57

THe one flaw I see with the system, and its pretty indicative on here with the trades posting, its too engineering centric imho. Haddon Cave said it himself - airworthiness involves the operation of aircraft as well as maintainance. I think we need to be careful in ensuring the MAA is shaped across the entire flight safety piece and not just the findings of the nimrod enquiry, no matter how big an impact that report had.

Its all well and good talking about airworthiness, but unless those up top see th importance of it and more importantly want it, we will not see full spectrum of safety improvements that are possible.

engineer(retard)

16th May 2011, 18:35

VR

I believe the operational safety case is incoming to the FLCs. They'll need all the help they can get

regards

retard

Small Spinner

16th May 2011, 19:45

I decided to post a new thread in reply to one that disappeared

QuoteA and C
More paper, less inspection
I would take a guess that the end result of the MAA will be much more paperwork (& cost) and less real inspection of aircraft.

The result of EASA part M on the civil GA sector is that I have to spend much more time in the office pushing paper and so am only on the hangar floor when required rather than being able to have the time to take more of an overview of the work being carried out.

IMO this is a backward step as about 50% of the paper I deal with is not aircraft safety related , it is about people covering their six.

I would take an educated guess that if you talked to the guys who are fixing aircraft on a day to day basis you would get the same answer about the introduction of the MAA.

Isn't the role of a Part M organisation (CAMO) the monitoring, auditing and approvals of what the 145s do, so I would expect nothing less than what you say is causing you problems. As a CAMO you have access to numerous Quality monitoring processes, releasing you to make the paperwork intensive, but vital airworthiness decisions.

As tucumseh has pointed out the training and ability of those people in the PTs responsible for airworthiness decisions are the areas that need to be addressed asap.

Others have pointed out how its very scary making airworthiness decisions, but Accountable Managers in the civil sector make them daily, so what makes it so traumatic for those responsible in the PTs (as long as they have the appropriate training).

Communication between 145 organisations and 1st line (RAF / forward organisations) is where there is major potential for, or real problems, both in cultural approaches and normalisation (thats the way we have always done it)

Rigga

16th May 2011, 21:06

Airworthiness decisions aren't scary! - it's the sudden realisation, by those that previously played at it, that they are now to be held responsible for their decisions that they find scary.

As the MOD is so used to cherry-picking from practicle and proven regulations, and sensible reports and recommendations it is obvious they have done the same with the EASA regulation set - only choosing the bits they think can cope with and disregard the 'difficult' or seemingly unsavoury bits. I recently heard a senior officer saying the use of a F731 was a mistake too. - Wow! Bring on the Mil Form One!

Line and Base organisations can only ever start to "work together" if they work to the same rules...It appears that someone doesn't play Cricket and refuses to look at the rules.

Wholigan

16th May 2011, 21:31

The thread has now - as you see - been re-opened. It will stay open for as long as you don't bitch and whine at each other and discuss the matter in a civilized manner.

kiwibrit

16th May 2011, 22:25

It is 20 years since the RAF, in the guise of AMSO, ruled that Engineering Authorities should not even bother raising a MF760A upon receipt of a MF760, because funding to investigate had been chopped......

Hmm. I did a short spell in an EA in 1997. So 14, not 20 years ago. We followed up F760s.

A and C

16th May 2011, 22:38

You are half correct in that what you discribe is half the picture.

Part M is devided into subparts, the ones you are talking about are subpart F & subpart G

Subpart F is the the approval for the maintenance of aircraft.

Subpart G is the continued airworthiness management (CAMO)

It is not unusual to have both types of companies in the same building run by the same people, the result is a lot more paperwork to do the same job as under the old BCAR M3.

EASA 145 is just a more of the same but with uprated Quality managment within the company and so EASA 145 is the required standard for AOC maintenance.

My personal opinion is that Subpart G is well over the top in terms of airworthiness managment for light private aircraft ( after all BCAR M3 delivered a light aircraft accident rate that was one of the lowest in the world).

As for EASA 145 it is only slightly excessive for an AOC operation and has a number of business advantages and so that is why we dropped the Subpart F & G and went EASA 145. However I still dont have the luxury of enough time just walking around the hangar floor and looking over aircraft with no particular inspection in mind because of the level of paperwork.

I guess the important message for any safety system is to keep the paperwork burden to a minimum and keep it aimed firmly towards the primary task. With EASA I am sure the primary aim of the paperwork it to keep down the level of unemplyment in Cologne NOT aircraft safety.

Rigga

16th May 2011, 22:47

Re-read the thread...

The "Continued Airworthiness" of your aircraft - all of them - has not improved one bit...YET. But in the next few years they will...if YOU follow the rules!

If you carry on, as you did before, expecting some magic wand to cure all your faults, there will be no progress nor improvements made and those in the nimrod, chinook, seaking and herc (and all mentioned on these threads) will have died for no reason whatsoever - and only bits of granite will eventually keep them remembered.

The bits of "admin" you are required to conduct now are no worse than the hassle of Met Checks or NOTAMS when they were first introduced. (no, I wasn't there)

Get used to it - it aint going away!

...and I suspect there is a lot more to come.

Rigga

16th May 2011, 23:03

A&C,
If your trying to equate EASA to the "MAOS" system - dont bother. There is no ARC at the moment (though a sort of Review is being mooted), no Form One and no Part 66.

Without any of those things completing the airworthiness review loop, the military "system" can't quite work.

Having worked under CAP360, JAR and now EASA I find their system is now quite good - but I haven't used my B1.2 for some years now, just my B1.1 and B1.3 on CAT.

WPH

17th May 2011, 04:04

It's a few years since I worked in an EA but in my opinion Engineers no longer made airworthiness decisions but finance did. I say this because we (engineers) went to great lengths to investigate problems with the manufacturer and assess the risk that a problem presented. We could then (relatively scientifically) prioritise the airworthiness risk based on probability of failure and consequence. Logically, those managing this would then set a level of risk above which would not be tolerated and call it ALARP. However, the ALARP decision was purely based on the cost of rectification of each problem, thereby making ALARP purely a financial decision. Some lower risks were picked off because they were cheap fixes but sometimes more expensive higher level risks were considered ALARP because they were too expensive to do anything about.

tucumseh

17th May 2011, 04:38

kiwibrit

We followed up F760s.

The points I make on various threads are;

1. We took 28% cuts in each of the first 3 years of the 90s. (Far deeper cuts than the 5% per year for 4 years General Cowan and ACM pledger were criticised for implementing from 1998, by Haddon-Cave). These cuts were independently verified, and complained about, by the RAF's Inspectorate of Flight Safety.

2. While the funding levels were resurrected a little after that, the 3 years of tasks not being undertaken was never retrospectively corrected. In the late 90s you will have noticed some work being done but the 760 (e.g.) logs will also have told you many were outstanding from that earlier period. Such gaps equate to risks. The status was and remains variable to say the least. Some aircraft offices insisted on bringing their build standards up to date, others completely ignored it (thus rendering their Safety Cases progressively invalid). Their approach depended largely on the background of those responsible. That is the link everyone must always be aware of. MF760s being progressed to completion (as that is the example being used here) are vital to a maintained Build Standard. A maintained BS is a pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case. And the Aircraft Release, under whatever system (CAR/MAR/GARP etc), must be based on both.

3. The regulations require continuous contractual cover. The way funding was organised at the time (i.e. the beginning of what is called "stove-piping"), one aircraft/range of equipment may have had the odd underspend, so in that year their work may have been done reasonably well. Others suffered at the same time. This scattergun approach was a direct result of centralised specialist units being closed down in 1992-3. The loss of these HQ units meant instead of a small group working 100% of the time on maintaining airworthiness, ensuring consistency and sensible use of what little money they were allowed, the work became a minor task for many. This was exacerbated, certainly in MoD(PE), by CDP's 1996 announcement he did not want engineers managing engineering projects. Hence, wholesale loss of Corporate Knowledge and Experience - which are mandated airworthiness components. This was formally notified to DPA's 3 Star Deputy Chief Executive in January 2000. He took no action. (A piece of evidence H-C ignored).

It is a simple chain and, as Rigga says, not in the least bit scary if you are properly trained. And we've been personally liable since the repeal of Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act in the early 90s. The "sudden realisation" will only be sudden to those who have not been trained ... come to think of it, that will be most MoD recruits since 1996, especially civilian "engineers". Put another way, if this realisation is "sudden" to anyone in MoD today, then I'd say they need a lot more training before receiving their letters of delegation.

[email protected]

17th May 2011, 14:24

Airworthiness, like Flight Safety, costs money and you will only get as much of either as you can afford.......MoD is broke:{

John Purdey

17th May 2011, 14:35

There is some highly esoteric stuff appearing here, and it might help the uninitiated to see definitions of (a) Airworthy, and (b) serviceable. Any takers?

Mandator

17th May 2011, 15:58

Oh dear, oh dear! I think the post from JP perfectly illustrates the point made by Tuc - many people cannot distinguish airworthiness from maintenance. My day job is airworthiness, acting as a Type Certificate Holder for some 15 Type Certificates with a worldwide fleet of 1,200 active aircraft (light civvy of course, but I did do 34 years in the mob).

Here is a scenario. We are contacted by the owner of a light single who has had his maintenance organisation fit an additional electric fuel pump to his engine to provide a back up should the mechanical engine-driven pump fail. He thinks this is a good idea. We are sent some details of the work carried out on the aircraft and a load of photographs and we are asked to "put a mod into the CAA - I would like to fly tomorrow". The system as fitted by the maintenance organisation worked - ie, it was serviceable - but there was no supporting design investigation, no certification plan, no electrical load analysis, no flight manual supplement, no maintenance manual supplement etc etc.

The new system fit might have been serviceable (ie the pump worked when the pilot ackled the switch), but it was not airworthy. A quick look at the schematic showed that a failure of any of the new flexible hoses would have the engine driven pump dump all its fuel overboard, presenting the pilot with at best an engine failure, at worst an airborne fire.

Many will say that the process of approving this 'good idea' is time consuming and expensive. It is, but better that than the installation being found to be unairworthy when it counts most - when there has been an airborne failure.

John Purdey

17th May 2011, 18:02

Mandator. Oh Dear! I asked the question in the hope of clearing the air for the uninitiated, of which I am certainly not one!

Rigga

17th May 2011, 21:16

As a likely mug for these things - I'll have a stab at it...

Airworthiness - from design and manufacture to delivery (entry into service) to the customer - To ensure the aircraft is capable of sustaining the designed performance parameters without hazarding life property or the environment and to support the integrity of that product throughout its life cycle.

Continued Airworthiness - from entry into service to permanent withdrawal from service - all of the processes ensuring that, at any time in their operating life, all aircraft comply with the airworthiness requirements in force and are in a condition for safe operation.

Serviceable - a condition for safe operation of an aircraft that may include some loss of levels of redundancy from safety critical systems without seriously hazarding life property of the environment

Terms that cover civil aircraft...unless you can better them? (which I doubt!)

Airborne Aircrew

17th May 2011, 22:25

I'll simplify/expand on that if I may...

Serviceable: A transient event where all the systems on an aircraft are functioning in the manner they were "advertised". Serviceability changes from second to second. At any moment during any flight items may change from serviceable to unserviceable. The effect on overall safety of the aircraft and crew should be mitigated by other systems or procedures on an airworthy aircraft.

Airworthy: A permanent state within each modification state of an aircraft. All systems function exactly as expected at all times and there are no unpredictable, unmitigated events. Airworthiness does not change during a flight but only with modifications to the aircraft or it's components.

Un-Airworthy: A state of build or modification that has known areas of failure or potential failure that are ignored, avoided or remain unmitigated that will have catastrophic consequences for the aircraft or crew.

Criminal Negligence: A state were men and women who place their trust in their superiors are knowingly expected to fly aircraft that have known, unmitigated and unaddressed problems that might result in the loss of the aircraft and it's crew, (see Un-Airworthy).

The forces is a dangerous game. Everyone who joins to be at the pointy end knows that and understands that they might die a premature death even during training. It's the nature of the game. But to place additional, unnecessary dangers on those fine young men and women because it costs a few shekels to save them from dying unnecessarily is worse than criminal. It's time to start treating our servicemen and women the way they deserve rather than treating them as "Tommy".

Distant Voice

18th May 2011, 15:31

JP. In basic terms, Nimrod XV230 was serviceable but not airworthy.

DV

kiwibrit

18th May 2011, 19:14

Well, I had a letter of delegated authority. I took the responsibility seriously; so did my colleagues around me at Wyton.

Rigga

18th May 2011, 20:02

...but, Kiwibrit, you don't say what that was for? Pencils? typewriters? Nimrod?

Crab said:
"Airworthiness, like Flight Safety, costs money and you will only get as much of either as you can afford.......MoD is broke"

"Airworthiness" costs a lot of money - but you'd be surprised how cost effective playing to "Continued Airworthiness" rules is. But you do have to play at it properly for a while to get the benefit.
See Post 26 for clarification

...nice to see your casual dismissal of flight safety too. (What's the point if there's no money, eh?) May as well fly without it.

[email protected]

18th May 2011, 20:42

(What's the point if there's no money, eh?) May as well fly without it. not really what I said is it? You can claim a Flight Safety positive culture by having FS officers, meetings, training et al; but, if a FS issue is highlighted by the operators (a dangerous failure mode of a piece of equipment for example) and you won't spend the money to address it because someone high up is happy to 'manage' the risk (even though the actual risk is being taken by the operators) you have created both a FS and an airworthiness blind spot.

Rigga

18th May 2011, 21:33

As you say last, you don't need a committee for Flight Safety to work. But if you're spending money in the wrong areas your operation is bound to fail in some way due to that lack of funding.

In EASA-world (which is slightly emulated in MAOS) the Accountable Manager (or from 1st July, the AOA ODH) has to be able to place funds where they are most needed to keep their operation going SAFELY. If your "Fund Holder" is incapable of placing that money in the right place, he is not really the AM but a mere budget code holder. Your DDH should be able to help in making that decision too. Your Staish (DDH) and Base Maintenance OC should have publicly available AOA LoD by now, stating their Continued Airworthiness duties to them and to you.

As weak as this reads, I hope this helps to get your message to the right place.

The power of the MAA's incestuous "Duty Holder" network has yet to be challenged by anyone - but unfortunately it may take yet more fatalities to change attitudes to care about more than personal careers.

Airborne Aircrew

18th May 2011, 21:36

Ahhh... "Managing risk"... Back when the Falklands Chinook went in that included ordering people not to discuss the probable cause with the bereaved lest it embarrass Boeing.

Alright, it wasn't an order as in "is to/are to" but everyone clearly understood that there were dire consequences for doing so... That's an order in my book, that fact that it was stated in the way it was makes it even worse.

kiwibrit

18th May 2011, 21:57

Rigga, I don't say because I don't want to get involved in detailed discussion for years to come. But briefly, electrical and some electronic systems on a specific aircraft.

Rigga

18th May 2011, 23:02

Kiwi...
Thanks. We all(?) hide our idents here, but we give some idea of our experience if not background.

I was a Rigga...a while ago.

tucumseh

19th May 2011, 06:19

In EASA-world (which is slightly emulated in MAOS) the Accountable Manager (or from 1st July, the AOA ODH) has to be able to place funds where they are most needed to keep their operation going SAFELY.

That was the case in MoD prior to funding being transferred to AMSO in the early 90s. The person holding airworthiness delegation was able to allocate / prioritise funding as required, across his range of responsibilities. He may not have always had enough funding, but it was generally spent wisely.

AMSO withdrew this authority to make decisions based on engineering judgement (despite it being mandated by SofS and PUS) and gave it instead to suppliers, who henceforth were encouraged to over-rule engineering decisions based on cost. (The thrust of the Haddon-Cave report, although he ignored the evidence as to when this started, claiming 1998). In simple, but very real terms, "airworthiness" does not have a Ref No, it is an intangible and does not generate a "due-in" on the stock computer; therefore must be a waste of money. The written evidence supporting this is with Lord Philip and was given to Haddon-Cave.

As I said, the situation gradually improved as those responsible got promoted as reward for generating such efficiencies (i.e. savings at the expense of safety and aircrew lives). It only took a few with an eye on the greasy pole for the system to run down. I'd say that, with about 10 years hard work, proper funding and judicious culling, MoD may just get back to their pre-1988 baseline. Of course, this could be brought forward and the task reduced somewhat if whole fleets were retired early. But that would merely serve to hide the problem and provide an easy solution for the beancounters. They wouldn't do that, would they?

phutbang

19th May 2011, 16:33

The other thing is what effect has it had on the external agencies? BAES and QQ were also implicated…but what about the processes by which these private companies operate? DAOS/MAOS or not have they and others been vetted? And what about the accountability of the overseas supplier?

Small Spinner

19th May 2011, 18:30

Where are we at the moment with the Duty Holder v Rank v competence?

I know they are not properly in place, but is the senior rank the suitable person to hold the position of Duty Holder?

Perhaps outsourcing all military aircraft to a civilian Part M organisation is ultimately the way to go? Comments?

Do I need to take cover?:O

Chugalug2

19th May 2011, 20:43

Princess Lala, you asked the question, so what do you think of the answers? You could perhaps suggest to your boss that it might be as well to wait for Lord Philip to present his report later in the year, to get a real take on "where now?" for UK Military Airworthiness. There again you might just decide to go ahead and make it all up as you mentioned. In which case why not go for the totally off the wall solution that will have your boss's jaws agape with incredulity? Not without risk for you of course, but airworthiness is a poison chalice for anyone employed in the MOD or HM Forces right now, so why not suggest that the solution could be to move UK Military Airworthiness Provision and UK Military Air Accident Investigation outside of those organisations to independent and separate authorities? They could be called something like the MAA and the MAAIB for example. They already exist? Maybe, but they are not separate and independent of the MOD, or even of each other, are they? No, really, they are not, and that is the problem. The fundamental reason for the Mull Chinook, the Iraq Hercules, and the Afghanistan Nimrod tragedies as well as host of other Airworthiness Related Fatal Air Accidents is that the Military Operator, Regulator and Investigator are one and the same, aka the MOD. It is not by chance that they are independent and separate in civil aviation but of necessity. That necessity extends likewise to military aviation.
Well there you are, Princess. Unacceptable, impossible and unworkable no doubt, but the incestuous setup that presently exists does not work and it kills, as we all know.
Feeling lucky? Then go for the unmentionable, independence! See where it got that nice Mr Salmon! :ok:
And now a word from our sponsor:
Self Regulation Never Works and in Aviation it Kills!

Rigga

19th May 2011, 22:11

Phut,
You just wouldn't believe the learning curves and Risk Register entries!

SS,
Rank may have its privileges but it certainly does not provide competency in all fields... Does that mean "incompetence" in some fields?

Tuc & Chug,
Luvvit. Keep it up. Independance is the way forward

Having a fine old night with the Teachers...

Squidlord

20th May 2011, 11:45

How do we feel the overall airworthiness and safety of our platforms has been affected by these changes [in response to Haddon-Cave]?

Whilst I agree that it's possibly too soon to assess any real change (that would require years of monitoring for incidents and accidents), I am getting very depressed at the number of times, post-Haddon-Cave, I have conversations that can be characterised like ...

Me: The Safety Case is flawed, it doesn't demonstrate the aircraft is safe.

Person in authority: Yes, but you don't know it's unsafe, do you?

Me: No b-b-but but-b-but ...

Person in authority: Case closed.

Me: :{

The biggest change I have seen is in the number of MoD Safety Managers who have left or want to leave their posts. And the difficulty in replacing them.

Small Spinner writes:

As tucumseh has pointed out the training and ability of those people in the PTs responsible for airworthiness decisions are the areas that need to be addressed asap.

Others have pointed out how its very scary making airworthiness decisions, but Accountable Managers in the civil sector make them daily, so what makes it so traumatic for those responsible in the PTs (as long as they have the appropriate training).

I have long held a view that MoD PT Safety Managers are at too low a grade. If safety is so important, as the MoD tell us (excuse my mild cynicism), I'd start by making the Safety Manager post a higher grade and paying commensurately with responsibility. I'd be interested to know how PT Safety Manager pay compares to those that Small Spinner refers to in the civil sector.

Most if not all of the MoD Safety Managers I have known have been very well-motivated and worked incredibly hard. But a number of them have just not been that competent unfortunately. Conversely, in my opinion and based on the limited scope of my interaction with them (i.e., safety!), most of the more senior technical people in PTs have been well-motivated, worked incredibly hard ... and been very competent. I'd like to see some of them in a properly remunerated and respected Safety Manager role and I think that would have a very positive effect on safety of the relevant aircraft.

Rigga

20th May 2011, 17:54

The trouble with the MOD is that they don't appear to believe in safety, or recognise its value as a tangible commodity for prolonging their aircraft's lives.

All MOD know is that they've been told to "do it", by H-C et al, and now they have to find yet more money for some pink-and-fluffy MAA-type safety idea that no-one in charge really wants to do. (they're probably way to clever for that anyway..)

Pity. It could have been so good with all that military will-power working away so hard - trying to improve someone else's lives!

Squidlord - Safety Managers for Airlines - £90K+ - and they say NO when they need to.

Airborne Aircrew

20th May 2011, 21:22

The problem is based, primarily, in the fact that those tasked with airworthiness have no vested interest in it's success. They need to be teamed with pilots and fly their charges close to the edge regularly. Then safety and airworthiness would have meaning to them rather than just being a list of pounds that need to be spent.

Small Spinner

20th May 2011, 22:35

AA
The problem is based, primarily, in the fact that those tasked with airworthiness have no vested interest in it's success. They need to be teamed with pilots and fly their charges close to the edge regularly. Then safety and airworthiness would have meaning to them rather than just being a list of pounds that need to be spent.

You don't have to fly in it to make sound judgements on items or components installed on an aircraft, or make sound judgements on a corroded part, you just need to ask the right questions of the SMEs (designers), if you don't know yourself. You also have to be able to divorce yourself from the financial implications (sometimes more difficult to say than to do), and you have to have ownership / authority to tell the bean counters that this is the way it will be. Training is a pre-requisite.

One of the best quotes from H-C is sadly this:

A process-dependent, paper-reliant, ‘box-ticking’ safety culture has developed in the MOD. Any large, complex, hierarchical ‘top-down’ organisation which measures itself by strict adherence to procedures can become a slave to process and paperwork, and ﬁnd false comfort in compliance and complexity. The MOD has not been immune from these pathogens. A process-dependent and paper-reliant culture has developed, particularly within DE&S and IPTs, which led to a shift away from proper risk analysis and ownership towards a ‘box-ticking’ approach to the management of safety and Airworthiness. Compliance with process and form-ﬁlling has taken the place of sound judgment.

It can also be the last bastion of any company, forced into compliance, but cutting costs across all areas.

woptb

20th May 2011, 23:42

It isn't only the high level problems,the safety culture within Squadron & line maintenance is way off kilter.
The engineers have been tacitly encouraged for so long to break & bend the rules that its the norm.Speaking to engineers of all ranks below ENGO,the response in the main is " if we followed procedure it would never get off the ground";So what ! In maintenance the belief has been fostered that 'Can Do' just means get it done.Eng's attitude to the "Can Do Safely" campaign is pretty cynical.

Rigga

21st May 2011, 17:29

WOPTB,

That you for that statement - it sort of confirms what my friends say - about the sort of ethos, born in the "war-effort" styled line operations, that is now seen to be contaminating the very organisations that are supposed to correct those 'work-around' errors - the contracted base maintenance organisations. Apparently, a Harrier was once given a BDR-type electrical repair, done by a serviceman on a major maintenance check. (Instead of being repaired properly IAW the AMM - and all that...)

Although, to be quite honest, those companies are so "in-bed" with their sole customers that they too don't know what good looks like and are too worried about career and business reputations to look elsewhere for inspiration.

As SS says, the tick-box "safety" systems only give minimalist lip-service to the intentions and don't help anyone in the long run - except to tick boxes!

It has long been thought that Line Operators only go for getting the next hour's flight ready, and not to worry about how the aircraft is degrading in the slightly longer term. Simply put...a 15 minute "Do something" fix to get the crate turned around , and not the 4 hour remedy to get rid of the problem.

I'm also told the above is not helped by crews holding back faults until the end of flying or, dare I say, the weekend (?) This is also indicative of crude and slack safety management affecting the crew enough to grow the "we'll manage it ourselves" attitude in their mis-belief that they are still flying-Gods.

[email protected]

21st May 2011, 21:08

No, it is indicative of the pressures to maintain availability of aicraft when poor spares provision inevitably means an aircraft waiting U/S in the hangar when it could still be flown with some operational limitations.

In some fleets, the poor skygods get so little flying when not on ops they are far more likely to carry snags rather than lose a whole day's flying to a minor fault.

Rigga

21st May 2011, 21:38

But is the reason for the lack of spares (apart from diversions to other Operators) because the real faults are being hidden, delayed, deferred, robbed and the quick "fixes" are being done time and again, leading to the wrong spares being procured?

VinRouge

21st May 2011, 22:04

No, it was down to a process called "lean", a 2* logistician that removed 25% of the spares budget, and who can forget that little wonder called resource account budgeting.

Rigga

21st May 2011, 22:53

25% less only accounts for the Bulk of things you purchase.

And Bulk doesn't matter if your just buying the wrong things - the things guys are hiding the snags with - rather than the items needed to fix the fault.

If there's no orders placed for replacement/repaired parts - production could stop and Lead Times increase...

...and I've read Haddon-Cave too. In fact I now have my fellow employees read parts of it as an HF lesson!

Cpt_Pugwash

21st May 2011, 23:00

VR,
"and who can forget that little wonder called resource account budgeting."
Well, at least the Cost of Capital Charge (COCC) element is no more, abolished by a recent FI.

Clearedtoroll

21st May 2011, 23:43

I don't think spares shortages are particularly to do with problems being 'hidden'. Any ADFs due to spares shortages should (!) have an associated demand placed... At least any I signed did, admittedly in the knowledge that some bits might not turn up for six months or more. Spares shortages are as old as the hills, and could obviously be solved by stocking shed loads of everything at every site. But that's expensive, so we do it less and less. Increasingly, availability or capability gets compromised as a result... But not convinced I ever saw spares shortages directly affect airworthiness. It might have cost lives because we didn't have a frame for the task when no amount of bodge tape would put Humpty together again and enable a safe ADF or Lim, but that's a different argument.

Airborne Aircrew

22nd May 2011, 01:55

SS:

You don't have to fly in it to make sound judgements on items or components installed on an aircraft, or make sound judgements on a corroded part, you just need to ask the right questions of the SMEs (designers), if you don't know yourself. You also have to be able to divorce yourself from the financial implications (sometimes more difficult to say than to do), and you have to have ownership / authority to tell the bean counters that this is the way it will be. Training is a pre-requisite.There is nothing that focuses the mind like fear. Make them fly them regularly like the men who are tasked to. One days flying a month isn't too much to ask from a bean counter. Let's see them fly what they pay for. It's not unfair, unreasonable or illogical.

As to "corroded parts"... If they are getting corroded that quickly then someone didn't order the stuff from someone reputable... Back to making the bean counters fly what they pay for... If the useless bastiges won't fly them then the crews don't have to... Then the point might finally hit home at MoD and we won't waste so many useful lives on the dimwitted decisions of useless wasters sat in nice safe offices in London.

pulse1

22nd May 2011, 07:54

As to "corroded parts"... If they are getting corroded that quickly then someone didn't order the stuff from someone reputable.

I know for certain that, at least in the 80's, the majority of military connectors acquired by BAe were not plated to specification.

The cadmium plating on aluminium connector shells required a minimum of 7.5 microns to give the required protection. The main supplier was not making sufficient machining allowance on the threads so that any parts plated with the specified thickness would not fit together. When my company tried to secure that business the manufacturer refused to introduce the allowances and we turned the business down. Most other connector manufacturers did make proper allowances.

Compared to modern automotive plating specifications the DEF specs for electroplating are a joke in that they allow too many defective parts.

tucumseh

22nd May 2011, 08:23

The airworthiness regulations, quite rightly, require capital and resource to carry out all activities.

That is, lack of resources always directly affects airworthiness. In the first instance, to attain airworthiness, materiel and financial provision must be made and the initial spares procured to the correct specification in the correct quantity. In seeking authority to proceed through each project phase (never mind signing the airworthiness Release), one must demonstrate the ability to support the fleet and maintain airworthiness through-life.

The process then moves into the “maintaining airworthiness” phase and the provision and procurement (two entirely different things) of these spares is constantly refined based on experience. The lack of a given spare does not render the aircraft or fleet unairworthy, but it is indicative of a key failure in the system. It becomes a Risk and the Risk Manager must ensure mitigation is in hand. If the mitigation fails, or is too slow, then the Risk is escalated. In parallel, he must consider cumulative effect of numerous such “minor” risks. The higher risks associated with spares are poor specification, quality assurance/control, cheap and nasty cheapest is best and so on.

Of course, by far the biggest risk here is the Risk Manager (or anyone) flagging these problems and being told to shut up, **** off and find another job. (An ethos practiced by MoD regimes throughout the last 20-odd years and condoned by successive Ministers).

Airworthiness comprises 4 pillars; Safety Management System, Standards, Compliance and Independence. The above example knocks all 4 on the head straight away, leaving MoD’s airworthiness system rocking inelegantly on a fulcrum of perfectly balanced incompetence.

Small Spinner

22nd May 2011, 13:43

Tuc
Airworthiness comprises 4 pillars; Safety Management System, Standards, Compliance and Independence. The above example knocks all 4 on the head straight away, leaving MoD’s airworthiness system rocking inelegantly on a fulcrum of perfectly balanced incompetence.

Beautifully put.:ok: Though not a message to inspire anything other than dread.

tucumseh

22nd May 2011, 15:12

SS

Though not a message to inspire anything other than dread.

What should really fill people with dread is the fact I have a briefing paper to (a former) PUS telling him I am the only person in MoD who believes it right to implement mandated airworthiness and financial probity regulations. (I know I'm not, but I'm still in the minority).

With each change of Minister I seek a statement, through my MP, that they either reject this notion or continue to agree. The last 6 have stated, in writing, they are content with previous rulings; most recently last month.

I pity the MAA. This is the ethos they have to fight against every day. I believe they are horrified at what Personnel say in these briefings. (Yes, they forgot to redact the paper when it was provided to my MP). As for the Ministers who can't see the effect this is having on their Department.....

Rigga

22nd May 2011, 17:59

Tuc,
Well presented as always and then...Wow!

Mandator

22nd May 2011, 20:16

Small Spinner said:

"One of the best quotes from H-C is sadly this:

A process-dependent, paper-reliant, ‘box-ticking’ safety culture has developed in the MOD. Any large, complex, hierarchical ‘top-down’ organisation which measures itself by strict adherence to procedures can become a slave to process and paperwork, and ﬁnd false comfort in compliance and complexity. The MOD has not been immune from these pathogens. A process-dependent and paper-reliant culture has developed, particularly within DE&S and IPTs, which led to a shift away from proper risk analysis and ownership towards a ‘box-ticking’ approach to the management of safety and Airworthiness. Compliance with process and form-ﬁlling has taken the place of sound judgment."

This problem is endemic in the CAA today. It has been reduced to slavish box-ticking against a set of internal procedures. Idividual surveyors are not allowed to apply sound judgement, based on appropriate skill, knowledge and experience. The only good thing is that they are independent, and they will not accept lack of money as an excuse for not doing a proper job.

Rigga

22nd May 2011, 21:11

Mandator,
Agreed, the CAA has moved to a Box Ticking system, but so many companies are so used to doing the 'right thing' themselves they have not dropped the standards required and are sensitive to the current lack of commom sense from the CAA. I believe this is due to a lack of Surveyors, the transfer of some duties to EASA and the standardisation of EASA's NAA routines.

However, the CAA is still able to withdraw / suspend approvals and mandate corrective actions if required. And they still do suspend operator's / organisation's approvals in the name of safety and non-compliance.

VinRouge

22nd May 2011, 23:40

YouTube - ‪Lec 15 | MIT 16.885J Aircraft Systems Engineering, Fall 2005‬&rlm;

Watch from 1H 9 Mins onwards. Lots of crossover I would suggest (as per usual) from one major accident to another.

tucumseh

23rd May 2011, 04:34

The video (from 2005) is like sitting through old MoD training lectures. They started with the question "Is an aircraft a system?". (No). The next 10 minutes were the most vital 10 minutes you ever listened to as an engineer and project/programme manager. Trying to implement that learning was also the biggest career killer!

NASA’s attitude “Just keep flying until foam shedding becomes regarded as normal” and “Treat it as a planned engineering test” is precisely the attitude you see in MoD. It should be required viewing for those in MoD who still maintain a system need only be physically safe, but not functionally safe - despite Nimrod, C130, Tornado, Sea King (etc) BoI reports.

Chugalug2

23rd May 2011, 11:07

...very insular organisation...wanted to conduct an accident inquiry into its own accident...vehicle designated operational thus no longer needing experimental oversight...what a condemnation of the MOD following the Mull accident! Oh sorry, she was speaking about NASA and the Shuttle loss on re-entry!

Birds of a feather it would seem, so let us hope that the MAA becomes truly independent before the RAF really does attempt to live up to its Motto!

woptb

24th May 2011, 10:01

To nick a phrase from Nancy Reagan " Just say no".
I've had many conversations regarding MEMS,AEMS,DAEMS with people who feel that if they tried to address all the problems they could'nt do the day job.
The short termism habit is ingrained in the military "we who have done so much withh so little blah,blah effing blah.....
This is the way we do business,overseen (in the majority) by senior officers with no cojones & only interested in their next promotion.
We are our own worst enemies,behavioural & attitude changes can't be imposed they must come from within.At some point we must learn to say NO,STOP we can't do it!
I'm winding my self up - off for a brew & a fag!

Squidlord

26th May 2011, 12:57

Rigga, thanks for the info. on civil airline safety managers pay ("Safety Managers for Airlines - £90K+ - and they say NO when they need to"). I know the roles and responsibilties are different between MoD PT Safety Managers and airline safety managers but it does kinda bolster my view that the MoD Safety Manager role is undervalued.

Couple of random MAA snippets.

1. One of Haddon-Cave's criticisms was that MoD aviation safety regulation was in a confused state. Work to rationalize it (the JSP 55x series, JAP100A, AvP67, a few Def Stans, etc.) into a more coherent and usable whole is ongoing. The new version is due to be issued in the Summer. If they get it reasonable right, which is not certain given it is such a huge monstrous mess at the moment, I think it will have a significant positive effect on safety.

2. A fairly senior member of the MAA threw the following, almost randomly, into an email to me (about other things).

MAA is independent of the MOD and reports direct to 2PUS

Seems an odd characterisation, not least since the MAA is part of the MoD! The only justification I can see for it is the independent reporting. Perhaps this is a line that MAA members are being told to spin out!