Surviving the Fulda Gap

[Ewan Whosearmy]

I was recently reading a post on another forum by a crusty old A-10 driver.

He stated that the view among his community, should the balloon ever go up, was that most of them were not going to come back from the Fulda Gap.

What was the view of the Jag, Phantom, Tornado and Harrier mates? And in the case of the latter, how sustainable was it really going to be to operate out of dispersed sites in the event of war?

Sometime ago, I was also in conversation with an F-15 pilot stationed at Bitburg during the 1980s. He said that they were confident that East German Intelligence knew the names and addresses of every pilot in his squadron, and that the first indication of a pre-emptive attack by the Soviet Pac would be a bullet through the head as they slept at home. As such, USAFE would try and get the pilots on base as soon as there was any intelligence to suggest that something was in the offing. Did RAFG units view things similarly?

[BOAC]

He stated that the view among his community, should the balloon ever go up, was that most of them were not going to come back from the Fulda Gap. - he was probably right, but there were other choke points

What was the view of the Jag, Phantom, Tornado and Harrier mates? And in the case of the latter, how sustainable was it really going to be to operate out of dispersed sites in the event of war? - I reckon the Harrier would have probably been the last thing flying out of RAFG. The dispersed sites were pretty-well camou'd and practised.

Sometime ago, I was also in conversation with an F-15 pilot stationed at Bitburg during the 1980s. He said that they were confident that East German Intelligence knew the names and addresses of every pilot in his squadron, and that the first indication of a pre-emptive attack by the Soviet Pac would be a bullet through the head as they slept at home. As such, USAFE would try and get the pilots on base as soon as there was any intelligence to suggest that something was in the offing. Did RAFG units view things similarly? - crews were expected on base PDQ but that would not prevent what you describe, and I think that was a 'little' melodramatic (you did say 'F-15 pilot':)). 'They' certainly knew who we all were thanks to the RAF News, BFBS and station 'civilians' etc

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

I remember when our F3 squadron was given a secondary role of AD over Central Europe, and our life expectancy was apparently 24 minutes in the event of a 'big push'. That's progress I thought, 4 minutes better than WWI in 70 years.
I also remember that a Harrier engineer I knew wasn't worried about using supermarket diesel in the bona jet. It only gave the engine 10 hours life I think, but they didn't think any of the aircraft would last that long.

[aw ditor]

Is that where "Mind-the-Gap" came from?

[The Helpful Stacker]

Forget the conventional aspects of the balloon going up, digging anymore than skin deep into the scaling for COLPRO etc was quite enlightening.

Had things turned seriously hot most of those responsible for getting the a/c into the air would have had little access to anything more protective than an S10 and some CARM chucked over a 12x12.

Few of us TSW lads, due to the light scales we were supposed to operate our TART and APFC equipped FRPs to, would even have had use of some CARM."Self-service on this pump" would have been the order of the day no doubt...

[ShyTorque]

Bearing in mind that the Soviet Union was aiming to get as far as the channel PDQ, (36 hours?) I don't think much would have been left either side of the gap.

Our dispersed SH sites were observed by Soviet folk, even in peacetime. As a helicopter pilot, the thought of going into the melee of WW3 in a completely unarmed aircraft didn't fill me with much hope about my chances of going home outside of a box, if ever.

[c130jbloke]

The opinion on 230 in the late 1980s was that if 50% of the Sqn were still around at hooter +1 week, then were doing pretty well :(.

[airborne_artist]

Some of us had cosy little lairs pre-dug, close to the IGB and handily placed for the main E-W routes and no plans to return to Blue-held territory ;)

[ShyTorque]

The opinion on 230 in the late 1980s was that if 50% of the Sqn were still around at hooter +1 week, then were doing pretty well

How pessimistic was that! I've survived Hooters plus many weeks. :E

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Who didn't have a personal out plan?
I still remember a lot about small airstrips in remote areas of Europe!
Heard a fighter pilot telling a tanker crew he'd let them him hear the growl of his 'winder,and order 'take me to Bermuda!'. Tanker mate was only too pleased. 'Great. I get to escape too, and I can claim I was protecting a valuable asset in the unlikely event we win, whereas you will face a firing squad."

[racedo]

'Great. I get to escape too, and I can claim I was protecting a valuable asset in the unlikely event we win, whereas you will face a firing squad."

Dunno

Figure if he has the wherewith all to get to Bermuda unharmed then he would have a plan B.

In event of big nuke fight the fact he was still around may get his actions overlooked especially as he says he was ordered by Station to get assets out of harms way and officer was X where only communication with will be via a Medium.

Dead officers tell no tales.

[moggiee]

Our dispersed SH sites were observed by Soviet folk, even in peacetime.
But surely the actual sites were different from the training sites (we didn't use "real" locations for the GR3s in peacetime).

[Pontius Navigator]

One analysis I remember had a rather different scenario with the 36 hrs to the Channel coast certainly an objective.

It suggested that they would punch one air corridor through the FEBA which would see that the SAM belts on a narrow front were shot out or neutralised. The follow on forces would ensure that any resupply was ineffective and others, such as Fencer, would flow through that gap and attack the rear echelons from the west.

This would mean that front line AD units remote from the central penetration route might simply be out of the game and air assets held against a change of axis.

[India69]

Quote
One analysis I remember

A lecture by a visiting American who told the gathering that within 5 years of a neuclear exchange the USA would be back to 50% of peace time industrial production !! During the moments of derision that followed( even the Boss didnt buy this ) I realised that THEY thought THEY could win and that UK was the decoy !!

sorry chaps thread creep

[Thelma Viaduct]

What would either force be actually fighting for???

Why would you want to 'win' land obliterated by nuclear weapons???

I bet a politician came up with the idea.

It would be like going to watch chelsea play football, a pointless horrible exercise.

[ShyTorque]

But surely the actual sites were different from the training sites (we didn't use "real" locations for the GR3s in peacetime).

It would have made little difference. My point was that the USSR had the ways and means to find us wherever we went. It was a bit obvious, to be honest...

[AR1]

It would be like going to watch chelsea play football, a pointless horrible exercise.
And look who's running them.

Understandably there were allsorts of scenarios being projected with regard to combat life, but after GW1 I would have thought that cast serious doubts on the ability of Red Kit to perform. Even if it was in better hands.

[ExRAFRadar]

Probably urban legend but I recall reading a quote that a NATO officer gave, when asked what is the average distance between West German towns.

"About 5 kilotons" came the reply.

[Whenurhappy]

One thing that the West largely was ignorant of (or chose to ignore) was the level of paranoia amongst the plethora of Soviet (and satellite) intelligence services.

Legals and Illegals operating ourt of Soviet Missions were so concerned about filing reports that were against the prevailing orthodoxy that INTREPS and resulting ORBATS were heavily inflated and assessments of force generation times (and COAs) were wildly optomistic - and in complete agreement with the prevailing factions(s) within the Politburo. This came to a head in 1983 when the Soviets mobilised theatre nuclear forces and armour when they mis-read the intentions of NATO's annual ABLE ARCHER exercise (For clarification, read 'Defence of the Realm by Chris Andrew - or anything by Socviet defectors, for that matter).

Thus, had a conflict started (and the Politburo under Brezhnev and Chermanyenko were convinced that 'The West' would intiate conflict) the overage or ordnance would have been massive and NATO would have been in a degree of disarray, especially on the issue of Nuc Ops. However, it was also clear by c 1980 that most of the WARSAW PACT would have been reluctant to have taken part (and were scaled obsolescent equipment, accordingly); the majority of fighting would have been conducted by the 3rd Shock Army and follow-on Russian forces. Logistics modelling, however, showed that their mobility would have been severly hampered by lack of re-supply. Soviet plans called on advancing forces to forage for food and fuel. The West Germans had a sophisticated denial plan that would see fuel and munitions dumps destroyed, along with commercial depots, petrol stations and strategic infrastructure - often with pre-placed charges.

Now let's hope those have been removed...

[LFittNI]

Interesting thread, this.

Elsewhere in this forum I've described the post-Berlin-Wall-coming-down circumstances which led me to be sitting in the cockpit of a Mig-21, being briefed by a Czech Air Force Colonel who just wanted to practice his English (pretty chaotic military and political environment at that time.)

I was actually more interested in the technicalities of the aircraft, but he did say that, yes, it would have been the Russians who would have been leading the thrust westwards (he mentioned three specific routes, as I recall).

Satellite state air forces would have been shoved around all over the place--in his case, his unit expected to be sent either south to cover Austria/Italy, or north to join Polish units "on the Baltic coast". He thought the satellite forces would be just used for "mopping up", and seemed totally confident that the sheer weight of the Russians would have been sufficient, which it probably would have been.

His opinion of Russian tactical nukes' usage was very high--as a compensation for poorly trained personnel elsewhere. The assumption was that NATO would have had to go for first-use in face of the overwhelming numbers, and that he and his satellite chums would have been happy to keep as far away as possible.

He mentioned that he hoped to be able to see Amsterdam at some point--hopefully not smoking too badly!

[Blacksheep]

36 hrs to the Channel coast Ho-hum! Whatever happened to the trigger line? You know. The one where if the reds reached it we'd start firing off the sunshine?

In the end it would have been all out nuclear war with something like 60,000 or so nuclear detonations. The view of myself and my comrades in arms, serving as we did at the time, on a primary target, it would have been better to be instantly vapourised in a first strike than to survive the holocaust. And don't forget that our generation actually believed that it was definitely going to happen.

[racedo]

He mentioned that he hoped to be able to see Amsterdam at some point--hopefully not smoking too badly!

Is that before / during or after his visit ?

Interesting its about war but he just interested in doing as lots of red blooded males do and getting to Amsterdam.

[Geehovah]

The hooter went off every week at Wildenrath in the late 70's/early 80s so we spent most of our lives locked in on base. Jokes aside, we would have been pulled on base at the drop of a hat if tensions had risen.

I guess survival chances will always be speculation. There was an interesting book called "Inside The Soviet Army" written by a soviet Army Officer, Victor Suvorov published in the early 80s. He talked strategy:

Phase 1 - 30 mins - Pre-emptive Nuclear strike on the NATO C2.
Phase 2 - 90-120 mins - Mass air attack by frontal and LRAF units
Phase 3 - 30 mins - Follow on missile attack
Phase 4 - 10 to 20 days - Offensive operations across all 3 major fronts. This would be the push to the Channel Ports and 3 days sits well in my recollection.
Phase 5 - 7 to 8 days - 2nd Echelon attack into NATO rear areas.

Most of the cold war warriors will recognise phases 1 to 3. Interestingly, none of the exercise scenarios ever followed that plot. We always had 2 days of a "nuclear free zone" before the inevitable happened and the AR5s came out.

I guess individual survival chances would have depended on location but anyone on a base would have been working in NBC conditions and subject to multiple attacks.

One thing about soviet kit is it's rugged. Given spares it'll go on for ever and a day, unlike our own kit in the 70s/80s. If you look at the numbers game at the time, it was truly horrific how outnumbered we would have been.

My view as line aircrew at Wildenrath in the late 70s? FWIW I'd have given us about 48 hours before we ran out of jets, NBC suits and ideas and walked home.

I can recommend an old BBC documentary filmed at Wildenrath in 81 and broadcast on the "Man Alive" series. Its still around on the internet in places. Some of the ground play is hilarious by todays standards but the individual interviews are quite illuminating.

[c130jbloke]

There was another line of thought at Gutersloh in the 1980s which was that when they got to the west bank the Weser then we would let them have a bucket of sunshine.

Was still absolutely no use to us though :uhoh:

On top of this, there were all the standard horror stories about 3rd Shock Army, ie they took no prisoners and would cut your balls off first etc.

[racedo]

In conflict scenario everybody assumes that enemy will always get their 5hit together quickly and we mess up rather than the general cock up theory which is who ever "wins" (define what that means) just had the roll of the dices go in their favour.

[moggiee]

I have a mate who's an ex-BAOR tank commander and has just returned to the UK after living in Ukraine for a number of years.

His Ukrainian ex-military mates had an interesting scenario for day one of the war. They confidently expected the Soviet conscripts to shoot all the officers and desert en-masse!

Who knows who's right? Thankfully we never had to find out.

[Canadian Break]

Moggiee - I thought that you, Spag, Ody, Soaks and Co had another plan. Take the Ruskies to a Schoolies party and load them up with Soak's martinis - in a pint glass - they'd never have found the Channel Ports after that!:D

[Chris_H81]

I was recently reading a post on another forum by a crusty old A-10 driver.

Any chance of a link, please?

[Cows getting bigger]

I think many of us didn't think too hard about the war strategy, merely accepting that instant death was highly likely. For me life was work hard, play hard, spend hard, drink hard. Oh the halcyon days of Kellar bar, schoolies, Mally girls, bratty wagon and excellent craic. :)

[Evalu8ter]

LFittNI,
I had a similar conversation with a Polish SU22 pilot whilst sat in one on a Polish airbase. His take was that they were totally untrusted by the Sovs and would be sent "up front" to soak up the AMRAAM shots before the PVO and EGAF took over. They were left in no doubt that they would have been shot down in the blink of an eye by the Sovs/E Germans if they showed the slightest sign of weakness. He shrugged and said that most of his crews would have probably ejected before the front - they had no interest in fighting the UK or US. He then described a recent exercise against Dutch F16As when his entire regiment had been "killed" for no loss and wryly smiled that ejection was better than a 'winder in the face or an atoll in the a**!!

[Mungo5]

His Ukrainian ex-military mates had an interesting scenario for day one of the war. They confidently expected the Soviet conscripts to shoot all the officers and desert en-masse!


I've heard this more than once too. The story being that the US greatly exaggerated the capability of the Sov's just to keep the Cold War rumbling on - of course in an effort to keep the mighty US defense industry going..

[Geehovah]

I don't think any of us worried about quality until Fulcrum and Flanker appeared but numbers worried the heck out of everyone. Any nuclear option, which was buried in Sov doctrine, was the killer.

[hum]

Moggiee - I thought that you, Spag, Ody, Soaks and Co had another plan. Take the Ruskies to a Schoolies party and load them up with Soak's martinis
Or perhaps a Baron Special?? --- Who has the recipe these days??:}

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

I recall being told that their fighter/bomber radars wouldn't last too long as the mechanics were partial to drinking the coolant - mostly (or at least sufficiently) alcohol. Maybe a myth but has a ring of truth. I think the Suvurov book stated that the West ought to invade on New Year's Day, then after a pause stated that actually they were no less drunk on most other days.....

[fantom]

I remember very well our target and how to get there; I don't remember being told what to do next...

[Bevo]

I well remember 1975 setting nuclear alert in USAF F-4s at RAF Lakenheath with one B-61 on the center-line and two wing tanks. In the map case was one eye-patch to be worn over the eye of your choice so that you would have one good eye after the first nuclear flash you inadvertently saw. In addition we had our trusty 38 revolver (we always thought to be used after witnessing the second nuclear flash). In general the targets we were hitting were weapons storage facilities and it was not uncommon to be the third or fourth weapon targeted against the facility. The first two were generally missiles.

Of course as we flew through the German countryside we were assured that all our compatriots were going to make their time-on-target within the established 3 minutes to assure de-confliction along the route. And of course we had to plan for a radar delivery when we knew that the first nuclear detonation would provide so much interference that we were very unlikely to see anything on our radars.

We also wondered about some “agent” with a hunting rifle setting off the end of the runway on common ground simply knocking us off as we taxied for take-off. But at least we could get our jets in the air in 15 minutes. And yes we did have a few “contingency plans”.

[Pontius Navigator]

we were assured that all our compatriots were going to make their time-on-target within the established 3 minutes to assure de-confliction along the route.

So were we.

Except when I became targetting officer I discovered 5 aircraft on the same target and the time spread betweenn TOT was no more than 10 minutes not including the +/-3

One would have been 4 miles out as another was going bang, given the +/-3 is could have been the other way around and they would never know.

At least it was a pretty good way of dividing the defences even if it was planned murder of our own crews. I tackled the planner and he said it was what he found when he took over and he was planning deconfliction.

Later I did find two identical routes/targets with 10 between then or a minumum of 4 minutes between bangs which was fair.

[Whenurhappy]

It is a common assumption that the Soviets would be the first to make use of tactical and sub-strategic nuclear weapons, yet as I pointed out above, historiography indicates otherwise.

it appears that the Soviet leadership expected that the US and NATO (near simultaneously) would be the aggressors. This was backed up by debrief reports from defectors (eg Oleg Gordievsky in the early 1980s) and the sheer US overage of tactical nuclear weapons (8:1 overage) and strategic weapons (c 6:1) in the mid 1960s. (see Marc Trachtenberg's 'A Constructed Peace').


The 1968 NPT was effective in stopping state-led proliferation (except, as it happens North Korea) and the 1972 ABM treaty between the US and Russia delayed deployment of ABM systems by about 5 years. SALT I and SALT II did impose practical limitations on strategic nuclear weapons in the 1970s and 80s (respectively) but each of these well-meaning gestures were scuppered by peripheral conflicts such as Angola, Nicuaragua, Afghanistan etc.

Technical advances - such as reducing both yields and the CEsP meant that by the 1970s, the crude and inflexible function of the deterrent gave leaders fresh options and thus lowered the 'nuclear threshold'.

The worry of senior politicians (eg Sir Geoffrey Howe) and the security services was a mis-reading of intentions. Thus Soviet (and a lesser extent US) paranoia conflated with a range of 'precise' tactical weapons could have resulted in a 'pre-emptive' strike by USSR (in the correct legal sense) as they believed that NATO was about to attack them. This came to a head during the NATO CPX ABLE ARCHER in 1983, when the "Centre" under terminal-ill Andropov issued bizarre instructions to its Rezidentz to garner information on diverse subjects as late-night working in government buildings, increase collections at blood-banks, and the flight of bankers and clerics to 'safe' areas. (See Chris Andrew's tome Defence of the Realm pp 720 et seq).

Soviet target set information was briefly available in the mid 1990s however archives are well and truely locked down now, although some Western historians managed to gain access, such as Haslam. The theft of KGB archives by Mitroyken in c 1991 also give an indication that Russian J2 was sadly lacking, with long-closed facilities and infrastructure being targetted by Spetznaz and by tactical weapons - conventional and nuclear.

So, in sum, we could have expected some troop concentration areas and airfields being targetted by tactical nuclear weapons - but targetted doesn't always equate to be hit. The Russians had major problems with guidance and fusing systems - partly because of the fear of engineers and technicians to report problems and faults with systems. Now imagine you are on TACEVAL and your IED inject is a Soviet UXN...'Cordon Party: establish a safe perimeter of, oh, 10 miles...'

[noprobs]

Hum,
Despite all this loose talk of war plans and contingencies, remember that the recipe for the Baron Special is [I]really [I] secret. This fact was stubbornly adhered to at the rotary mate's court martial when the JP entrusted with the formula refused to divulge it. Presumably the answer now resides in Lincolnshire.

[racedo]

I can remember Tony Geraghty commented in his book on BRIXMIS about the number of occasions they were highlighting or not as the case maybe when things were looking like spilling over based on distant readings of the situation.

Guess one of those situations where people see intent in a couple of separate unconnected actions could set someone off even though they unconnected...............maybe something like a Soviet Tank Division transiting out of East Germany and train breaks down close to a dispersal area with apparent massing of forces. At same time another loco with incoming unit does something similar while some Airbases start showing lots of activity and base work prior to arrival of new boss. Do something quickly and they assume you knew of the transit and it being a targeted weakness etc or have some patience and 24 hrs later situation back to as normal as paranoia allows.

[Pontius Navigator]

WUH, agree, in one CPX we were quite surprised when SACEUR went for a first use demonstration. Now a demonstration was on the cards however he went for a massive demonstration just to show intent rather than a toe in the water.

It signalled endex after the predictable response.

[Whenurhappy]

Yes, definitely a case of 'Whoops - Apocalypse!'

I attended a Australian CPX in the late 1980s concerning the age-old enemy to the North - 'Musoria' - who seems to have copied the Indonesian ORBAT. The story surrounded an off-shore drilling rig in international waters. The overburden from the drilling established a small tidal islet which the Musorians then annexed. The Australian MFA had demarched the Musorians, giving them 72 hours to vacate the platform and islet - and then to seek international arbitration. After 48 hours the ADF launched everything they had against the Musorians, destroying most of their naval and air assets. The Musorians then responded with a small fission device over Darwin. Endex - and the ADF Cdr resceived a severe telling-off from the Defence Minister for pre-emptive action.

[sisemen]

And we knew pretty much about their guys too.

I well remember a Comsec presentation at Wittering which started with a recording of a Russian voice and the presenter then proceeding to tell us all about this particular Russian pilot, his home life, and his squadron activities.

[monkeytennis]

Very interesting thread guys. As a child of the 80s who lived next door to an RAF station and had watched 'Threads' :eek: I didn't fancy my own chances much but can't imagine what it must have been like to think you may have to pilot several tons of metal on an almost certain one-way trip.

Please keep the anecdotes flowing :)

[Whenurhappy]

There was a massive expansion of Britain's nuclear capability under Harold Macmillan (although it is alleged that in an effort to produce sufficient plutonium and tritium, safety procedures were cut resulting in the Windscale Diasater). However, what we now know as the 'nuclear chain' was a bit patchy. If the Prime Minister was travelling by car (and therefore out of easy radio communication - and long before mobile phones, of course) and there was a requirement to bring the deterrent to readiness, or God forbid, release it, the Cabinet Office would contact the AA, who would contact their patrolmen to wave down the PM and get him to authorise release over the AA's radio and telephone network. Simples!

Also, unrelated, is an interesting quote (albeit from Wikipedia):

On Macmillan's advice in April 1982 Mrs Thatcher excluded the Treasury (http://www.pprune.org/wiki/HM_Treasury) from her Falklands (http://www.pprune.org/wiki/Falklands_War) War Cabinet (http://www.pprune.org/wiki/War_Cabinet#Falklands_War.2C_1982). She later said: 'I never regretted following Harold Macmillan's advice. We were never tempted to compromise the security of our forces for financial reasons. Everything we did was governed by military necessity.

[Stubenfliege 2]

A little off topic question:

Any book or internet resource suggestion about this Topic? I have read some time ago this Hackett book (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Third_World_War:_The_Untold_Story)

and I know this website:

Cold War Forum - Bunker, Militäranlagen, Basen & Relikte (http://www.cold-war.de/)

Growing up near the German / German border in the cold war, I´ve being just curios about "What, if....."

Thanks in advance,

Stubenfliege

[Yellow Sun]

I recall that we believed that one of the first indications of the outbreak of hostilities would 51 Sqn going down to 2 aircraft.

YS

[AR1]

Slight thread creep, more cumberland gap than Fulda.. But anyway.
During one training exercise in the UK, we (Me + 1) captured a 'Spetznaz' operative who was considerably bigger than either of us. I agressively commanded him to yeild to my search, and he was terribly compliant while I frisked him. All the while, the monster just stood there grinning at me. I am under no illusions that had it been a Blue on Red he would have killed me.

I vowed to myself that should that scenario ever happen for real, then I'd shoot him first, and frisk him later. Assuming of course he didnt shoot me after my first 7.62 round flew 20 feet over his head.

It didnt't help that we were buddied up for defence purposes by trainees from a nearby School of Tech Training, who's service was measured in days or weeks and survivability measured in seconds.

[Pontius Navigator]

It didnt't help that we were buddied up for defence purposes by trainees from a nearby School of Tech Training, who's service was measured in days or weeks and survivability measured in seconds.

Reminds me of the annual security exercise in Cyprus when Opfor had the run of the base for a couple of weeks, withdrew and then intruded. Commando types simply disappeared in the bundo, probably in the various caves, and emerged to create a very quiet sort of havoc.

Every year we would lose all the aircraft or all the aircrew.

One aircrew year a SAS officer camped on the Mess roof for a few days before the exercise. When the bar doors were opened to release the heat he swung in, handgrenade in one hand, SMG in the other, dagger in his mouth.

He was instantly disarmed with a pint of beer.

Meanwhile the mess was being patrolled by aircrew and being picked off every couple of minutes as the patrolled around the fence :uhoh:

[Tashengurt]

These tales remind me of being on the mobile defence force at Leuchars. Essentially made up of sprogs who were of no use to their normal trades, we tore around in stripped down landies armed to the teeth with SLRs and LMGs.
Creeping round the northern HAS after intruders one dark night it all felt very Rambo until I felt a hand over my mouth and a whispered Gotcha! in my ear. I was led round a HAS to find the rest of the patrol looking sheepish under guard.
I think the Scots guards were the intruders.
They let us capture them the next day though.

[Whenurhappy]

Inspite of the overbearing seriousness of the Cold War and the threat of near-instantaneous emolation, aren't the stories of this era now rather quaint and naive compared with what we now do in Afghanistan - and other theatres?

Common Core Skills now focusses on life or death first aid decisions on the battlefield, rather than finding someone who has fallen off a ladder or has burnt themselves with a kettle. Resistance training is no longer a 'Jolly Hockeysticks' romp and insistence on sticking to the Big 5. Pre-deployment training involves some pretty horrific videos and realistic training. We have an Air Force, well at least certain parts of it, that arguably have more combat experience (albeit different) than WWII veterans. Most personnel who have served in Afghanistan have been under fire and directly seen the effects of modern - and not so modern -weaponry. Imagine how the troops would react if we returned to the old-style, TACEVAL oriented collective training...bodge tape and plastic COLPRO, mine tape shelters, rediculously ludicrous casualties, the LMF airman...

[Winchweight]

I returned from my 3rd tour (rotary aircrew) in Afghan to be posted to Shawbury. Very nice thinks I, but I was immediately dragged kicking and screaming into Ex Green Tiger, a Taceval-esque exercise aimed at trying to get some of the career blunties to accept that they might not always be sat in an air-conditioned office in theatre. One rather fat female ATC officer collapsed on day 2. We then found out that she refused to eat Compo, preferring her diet chewy bars to actual food!

We still made bashers and bivvys, patrolled looking for Afghan Spetsnaz and shot down Harrier mates, cooked on a camp fire etc (no ging, gang, goolies mind you).... All very quaint. Despite another aircrew mate and I trying to explain to the other players (LAC to S/L, none of whom had ever deployed), they resisted any idea that things had changed since the Cold War. It was a nice idea, but missed the point.

Many people still do not accept the idea that, although you might be an air traffic controller, you might well find yourself repelling Jonny Taliban in a sangar at a remote LZ, or riding top cover in Snatch or Saxon. Even after all this time in Iraq and Afghan! :ugh:

The business of war fighting is still completed primarily by the Army and very few members of the other Services. Indeed a tour in theatre for most is still a pleasant trip to Butlins Kandahar, or topping up your tan whilst waiting for your go on the internet before a pizza and a Green Bean coffee.

I agree that CCS has improved massively and PDT is better than ever. But still very few of us actually get involved in the pointy end of conflict.

[hanoijane]

You could - and perhaps you should - look at the issue the other way around. How long does an army / air force / whatever retain the skills they've learnt in combat? Before training drifts into the less demanding world of 'exercises' again?

[Wwyvern]

We seem now to be recalling exercises. In the late 60s, a staff officer colleague of mine had been RAF Commanding Officer of a USAF base in East Anglia. The RAF CO was a Sqn Ldr. although the USAF commander was a Colonel or higher. The USAF threw an exercise which included all USAF personnel climbing into anti gas kit. The RAF CO had a staff of one NCO and a civilian typist. The lady typist was clattering away on her typewriter by the open window of her office, when she was approached from outside by a large American in NBC kit, including gasmask. He said something which she could not hear or understand, and requested that he repeat it. He looked around sheepishly before sliding the bottom of his gasmask clear of his mouth to tell her, "Ma'am, you're dead." She replied, "Don't be silly, I'm British." He replied, "Sorry, Ma'am" and went off.

[Whenurhappy]

Winchweight - you have my sympathy.

My Branch in old money - Admin - is about as blunt as it gets when you look at Wg Cdrs and above. Yet I am on my second row of campaign medals but there are colleagues of mine with only the Jubilee Medal and perhaps an MBE for 'charridee' - and get promoted because they've stuck to low-career risk core admin stuff, rather than my rather eclectic (read interesting and exciting) career. Luckily there is a good clutch of younger Flt Lts and Sqn Ldrs who no nothing but direct support to operations who, I hope, will re-energise the Branch.

I am a firm believer that conduct on operations is the true test of someone's performance - and I have done my fair share of high-profile staff tours as well. Hanoi Jane - retaining this knowledge and experience will be a major problem post c 2015, when our presence on the ground is substanially reduced. This will be particularly acute in the FP role becasue of the rapid turn-over of RAF Regt personnel.

[c130jbloke]

Inspite of the overbearing seriousness of the Cold War and the threat of near-instantaneous emolation, aren't the stories of this era now rather quaint and naive compared with what we now do in Afghanistan - and other theatres?

Oh FFS :yuk:

Why then don't you pull up a sandbag for your AFG stories and do tell.

As for the combat comparison, ( and I am NOT dissing anybody ) WWII Bomber Command = average of 6% per mission. Total Herrick losses to date expressed as an average against total number deployed ?

Bullets are bullets, war stories are just that - war stories. But you are spot on with the reference to deployment performance. The US Army learnt that one pretty quick before the Iraq surge.

[Whenurhappy]

Clearly playing round with plastic and bodge tape to make COLPRO was, well, amatuerish, to say the least. Apart from 'peripheral' conflicts and NI, most ex RAF personnel have few war stories from the Cold War - ie, when guys were actually shooting them.

The point I am making now is that the training those serving receive is considerably more realistic that in those halcyon, static days. No doubt our collective war stories for Iraq and Afghnaistan will be as quaint and naive when our Servicesa re engaged in 'speed of light' cyber war, and our weapons are morphing Nth degree polynomials!

[c130jbloke]

IMHO the (undeclared ) cyber war with China / Russia / Iran / N Korea / AQ + special guest stars started about 3 years ago. I would love to hear those stories, though I would probably not understand a single 1011001010010100101 of it :8

[sisemen]

A quick story from way back in a different part of the sandpit - Aden. As a very young 19 year old it was quite a sobering experience to be out at night, on guard, on your own (yep, they hadn't really learned about the buddy system then) with the possibility of facing real bullets.

When it was your turn for your 2 hour stint you collected your .303 from the arms storage area and a clip of 5 rounds. I remember walking the bund surrounding the oil tanks at the power house at Khormaksar and doing what probably every other airman had done since the emergency started - I took out the magazine and removed the bullets to make sure that I still had the 5. It was somewhat of a surprise to find that the copper pointy bit readily came out of the brass blunty bit with not a skerrick of powder to be seen!

[exMudmover]

Whenurhappy

Cold War training quaint and unrealistic? I can assure you that whatever the blunties got up to in those days, Fast-Jet aircrew had to train seriously hard every day in the difficult and dangerous business of Low Level Ground Attack and Recce, and this led to a lot of casualties, with no gongs to show for it, apart from the occasional AFC. Just flying around at Low Level in UK and RAFG in the prevailing cruddy weather, trying to dodge the bounce and get to the target led to a lot of casualties, quite a few from mid-air collisions. Remember, we had no sophisticated Navigation Aids or smart weapons, everything was Map and Stopwatch and Mk 1 Eyeball. You had to rely on pure piloting skill and airmanship to avoid creaming yourself (and your Nav) on any given sortie.

I was instructing at a Fast Jet OCU in the 70s and in one 6 month period we had one third of the Staff killed off in flying accidents – all related to Low Flying.

Whenurhappy. I suggest you take a look at how many Fast Jet Casualties there have been since GW1.

[Geehovah]

Not sure I'd say our training was unrealistic. It was certainly the worst conditions I ever flew in.

Heres an old clip from a BBC documentary that I mentioned. The F4s were getting airborne for a low level north departure to operate in the low flying areas. Not sure the "Rooskies" would have been down there in the clag but if they had been, the will and skill was there on our side. You'd struggle to find crews capable of operating in those conditions without TFR/FLIR/gogs nowadays. Not a criticism, just a fact.

http://www.flickr.com/photos/61510979@N07/5598169065/ (http://www.similarsites.com/goto/www.flickr.com)

[AR1]

I'm glad I never found out if ours was realistic or not.

What I can say was it did improve in regards the equipment we had. - 1979 a tin hat so big you looked like a drawing pin, a rubber suit and a pick-axe handle.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Night low level visidents, on a target with no lights, before they invented NVGs.
That was veeery interesting. :eek:

I remember one "comms" recce target I was given turned out to be an RAC phone box in a steep, wooded valley. I challenge current aircrew to find that with gps.

To my recollection, the peacetime loss rate was slightly higher, per flying hour, than the loss rate in the Falklands War, and it was only slightly lower than GW1.

So I think the aircrew training was hard enough.

Can I add that I had no complaints with the efforts of admin branch, etc, who were honorary Squadron members. Excellent value in taceval or normal ops.:ok: Takes more than aircrew to get a jet airborne.

[Flap62]

F3WMB

I challenge current aircrew to find that with gps.



I know where you're coming from but not sure that I'd totally agree with you there. Current aircrew are no better or worse than the past - just different. I'm fairly sure that current operators could quite happily point to a number of skills that they have that would have blown your minds back in the day. With the training you had I'm sure they could do what you did and vice versa.

[Whenurhappy]

My references were to collective training.

However I also spent the first 4 years of my career in maritime, looking for all manner of Soviet vessels and operating on CASEXs, low level at night and being horribly, horribly airsick. It is clear that there has been some skill-set fade, yet cold war tactics agasint Saddam in GW1 (who had, frankly, a Soviet IADS) were shown to be wanting, at least initially.

[exMudmover]

Flap 62

My point about the difference between Fast-Jet flying nowadays and during the Cold War is that it was bloody dangerous then, even though it was ‘peacetime’ . Nowadays everything is much safer, both in training and on operations. People just don’t take the risks we used to in the old days - we had to in order to get the job done with some of the lousy equipment we had. I’m not saying that’s good or bad – it’s just a fact.

As an example, how many Fast-Jet operational sorties these days continue on task with no radio or HUD (in poor weather)? We were doing that in the Falklands War – it was SOP in peacetime training and if you’re desperately short of jets that’s the kind of thing you had to do.

Don’t get me wrong, I flew Fast Jets non-stop for 28 years, most of it Mudmoving and Recce, and I loved every minute of it. Had to bury quite a few old colleagues though.

[Jabba_TG12]

"These tales remind me of being on the mobile defence force at Leuchars. Essentially made up of sprogs who were of no use to their normal trades, we tore around in stripped down landies armed to the teeth with SLRs and LMGs.
Creeping round the northern HAS after intruders one dark night it all felt very Rambo until I felt a hand over my mouth and a whispered Gotcha! in my ear. I was led round a HAS to find the rest of the patrol looking sheepish under guard.
I think the Scots guards were the intruders.
They let us capture them the next day though."

Reminds me of a similar experience at Buchan in the mid 80's when 45 Commando came up to play as intruders. All manner of fun and games ending on the last day with them hovering a Commando Sea King about 5ft off the roof of the BiF, before storming the joint throwing flash-bangs around in most of the Execs offices. Bet that went down well.... :p

Have to say though, considering that most of the time we were more used to being intruded by the Lossie & Leuchars rockape Sqns (who in those days werent averse to giving one of us 'guins an SLR butt in the chops if they dared to try and resist capture), most of the station's guardforce learned more in those three days from 45 than we had done in years.

They fully debriefed the whole guard force at the end of each days play, which was something the Rocks didnt do (maybe figured it was up to the Station Regiment WO to pass on lessons learned instead) which went along the lines of: "This is what happened in this particular exercise inject; this is how you reacted and this was the end result; Now, this is how we think you should react in future, given your level of training and equipment." Top blokes. :ok:

Mind you, as has been rightly observed, most of, if not all of UKADGE would have been wiped out by AS4 strikes (or worse) in the first few hours anyway. Documents I remember seeing at the time were predicting raids of 5-7 regiments in size at a time. :eek:

How many Bears/Badgers/Backfires per regiment in those days?? :uhoh::ooh:

[The Helpful Stacker]

How many Bears/Badgers/Backfires per regiment in those days??

Probably a few more than the MFF could deal with.

[Heathrow Harry]

anyone want to mention the F-104G here - low level, bad weather strike training in a high altitude clear weather interceptor.................

[RAFEngO74to09]

The F-104G was the mainstay of many NATO air arms prior to being replaced mainly by the F-16. 35% of the 2,578 F-104G built for export (or manufactured outside the USA) were operated by West Germany (as was). West Germany lost 292 of its 916 F-104G claiming the lives of 115 pilots. During my time in RAFG, news of yet another F-104G crash, often in bad weather, seemed a routine occurrence.

[stumpey]

Never, ever, felt threatened by the Ruskies.









Some of OUR LOT, and especially the Yanks, EVERY EXERCISE!
(Still wish I was back there now though).

Please keep em coming!

[exMudmover]

Actually the F104G was very nice to fly at Low Level - especially in bad weather. Excellent non-HUD instruments (no obscuration of forward view), rock steady at high speed, a very nice ground mapping radar and Long Range - better than the Jaguar!

[Geehovah]

I had a trip in an F104. Great in a straight line. No radar worth talking about and made a lot of noise (and smoke). Sorry but by the 70s it'd had its day. Like the F4 in the 90s - and I loved flying the F4.

[AR1]

If you were the Stumpey I worked with, you were a bigger threat than the Yanks AND the Ruskies.. Scottish and Newcastle breweries loved you though.

[stumpey]

Could be, could be.
Years ago I used to be messed up on booze, but then I found God;










"And now I'm all messed up on the LORD"! :}

[Lookleft]

There were a couple of books written in the 80's about the advent of WW3 through the Fulda Gap. One of the books was written by BG Hackett of Bridge Too Far fame. I think it was called "The Third World War". He gave a very good assesment and suggested that the Warsaw Pact forces would achieve intial success but that superior tactics and weapons would eventually result in a NATO victory.

[exMudmover]

Reference Cold War flying risks:

During the Cold War I flew with ( and helped to train) quite a few American pilots on Exchange Tours with the RAF, many of them with Vietnam tours under the belt. In general they struggled to keep up to speed with RAF- style Low Flying, especially in poor weather. They seemed to be too accustomed to the wide open blue skies of the USA, plus their extremely restrictive rules on flying in poor weather.

For example: at that time American (and German) pilots were not allowed even to PLAN to fly Low Level anywhere the weather was forecast to go below Low Flying minimums. So they never gained experience of dealing with poor weather at Low Level. (In the RAF we were always allowed to get airborne, have a look and make your own decision on whether or not it was suitable.)

Back in the 70s and 80s quite a few American Exchange guys became casualties while flying with the RAF. I remember one of them saying to me at the end of his tour “ Surviving an Exchange Tour with the RAF in peacetime is harder than getting through a couple of tours in Vietnam.”

[India Four Two]

In the early 90s, I worked for a while on an oil-exploration project in the Komi Republic in Northern Russia. During a session of beer and vodka after work, one of our Russian hosts said quite seriously that they could never understand why anyone in the West felt threatened by the Red Army.

[wiggy]

our Russian hosts said quite seriously that they could never understand why anyone in the West felt threatened by the Red Army.


Ummmm, that reminds me. Not long after ceasing to work for Her Majesty, and still mindful of the stories of Regiments of Backfires and Fencers charging over UK's eastern horizon, no matter the weather, I witnessed the absolute shambles that was Sheremetyevo's ground ops on a cold icy,morning.......and have to admit wondered if the all weather aspect of the Soviet threat had been overstated.