A319 CDG go-around nearly goes down Sept 2009

[eagle21]

Report: Air France A319 at Paris on Sep 23rd 2009, go-around nearly goes down (http://avherald.com/h?article=4319fdab&opt=0)

An Air France Airbus A319-100, registration F-GRHU performing flight AF-2545 from Moscow Sheremetyevo (Russia) to Paris Charles de Gaulle (France) with 85 passengers and 6 crew, was performing an ILS Category I approach to Charles de Gaulle's runway 27R in fog, visibility of 3000 meters below scattered cloud ceiling 200 and broken cloud ceiling 300 feet, autothrottle was engaged and the autopilot had captured both localizer and glideslope at 3000 feet. Subsequently both autopilot and autothrottle were disengaged, the flight director remained engaged in approach mode and the approach was flown manually by the captain (pilot flying). Descending through 2170 the gear was selected down and full flaps deployed. When the airplane descended through 400 feet AGL the flight director modes changed to LAND, airspeed was 132 KIAS (Vapp 128 KIAS) and pitch angle 0.7 degrees nose up. At 200 feet AGL, the decision height, the captain did not see the runway ahead and decided to go-around. When the airplane descended through 150 feet AGL at 132 KIAS the thrust levers were placed into the FLX/MCT detent, the engines spooled up from 45 to 85% in about 5 seconds, the airplane pitched up to 5.6 degrees nose up, the flaps were selected to 3. 4 seconds later the pitch angle had reduced to 4.6 degrees nose up, the autopilot 1 was engaged - autopilot mode was still LAND - and the gear was selected up. At that point the airplane had reached 170 feet AGL at 145 KIAS. 5 seconds later the thrust levers were placed into the CLB detent, the airplane is still at 170 feet AGL and the airspeed was 161 KIAS, the nose pitched down 0.6 degrees nose down. 2 seconds later the height reduced to 127 feet at 169 KIAS, the attitude had reached 3.9 degrees nose down. The autopilot gets disconnected, a ground proximity warning "Sink Rate" is issued. At the same time the crew communicated their decision to go-around to the tower, the controller cleared the airplane to 3000 feet and to continue on runway heading. The crew did not read back, the tower repeated the instructions two times before he received the read back. The airplane descended further to a height of 76 feet at a speed of 182 KIAS, the aircraft pitched up to 8.1 degrees nose up producing a vertical acceleration of 1.65G, the airplane begins to climb and the ground proximity warning ceases. 1 second later the pitch increases through 9 degrees nose up with an airspeed of 184 KIAS and the master caution activates probably because of maximum flaps speed being exceeded (185 KIAS). The thrust levers are retarded to a position close to IDLE while the airplane climbed through 650 feet AGL at the maximum recorded speed of 192 KIAS. 15 seconds the autopilot gets engaged, the nose pitches down to 2.5 degrees nose up, the thrust levers are placed into the CLB detent, then the autopilot gets disengaged again and the pilot flying pulled the stick. 13 seconds later the thrust levers are placed to IDLE, the pilot monitoring selected an altitude of 4000 feet into the master control panel. When the airplane climbed through 1600 feet, the pilot flying called for the autopilot and placed the thrust levers into the CLB detent. The autopilot again pitched the aircraft down and is disengaged after 2 seconds. Flaps were now selected to 1 and the flight stabilized. The crew subsequently performed an ILS Category III approach and completed a safe landing.

The French Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses (BEA) released their final report in French concluding the probable cause of the serious incident was:

Loss of altitude due to
- the use of the autopilot in an inappropriate way
- the non-activation of go-around mode due to the thrust levers being placed into wrong detents
- lack of monitoring of pitch angle by the crew

Contributing factors were:

- inaccuracies in the wording of the documentation of the procedure
- deviations from the procedure regarding operating limits

The captain (53) had 14230 hours flying experience thereof 3800 on type and 3627 in command on type. He was certified for CATIII approaches.

The first officer (42) had 4176 hours flying experience thereof 684 on type. He was certified for CATIII approaches.

The BEA analysed, that the autoflight system remained in LAND mode all time because the thrust levers were never placed into the TOGA detent. Only TOGA cancels all previous modes and activates the go-around mode.

The autopilot mode therefore continued to descend the aircraft while the changed thrust setting increased the speed. The desire by the captain to engage the autopilot suggests that he wanted to reduce his high workload. The recommendations by the operators also suggested the use of the autopilot. During normal operation the TOGA detent is very rarely used. After placing the thrust levers from nearly IDLE into the FLX/MCT detent (which is a long way the BEA annotates) the engines reacted as wanted, following the autopilot activation the crew was surprised however about the reaction of the aircraft. It is likely that the crew focussed on the speed and the pending flap overspeed and did not notice the flight mode announciations. The crew attempted three times to engage the autopilot while still in the wrong flight mode.

According to the Flight Crew Operating Manual by Airbus a go-around from manual flight control should be done by advancing the thrust levers into the TOGA detent and according flight control inputs. Once a positive climb is established, the crew should read the flight mode announciators and verify the modes.

The operators manual did not mention that the flight mode announciators should be read and verified, however, general guideline required every change in the flight mode announciation should be called out.

The BEA analysed that in the phase of a go-around the pilot flying is focussed on the trajectory of flight and work memory checklist items therefore has reduced capacity for verifying the flight mode announciators. The changes would be more easily seen by the pilot monitoring, the standard operating procedures did not distribute the tasks appropriately taking the work load and capacities of crew members into account.

The BEA listed another similiar incident during which the crew placed the thrust levers into the FLX/MCT detent instead of the TOGA detent, see Report: Jetstar A320 at Melbourne on Jul 21st 2007, descends towards runway despite go-around initiated. In September 2006 the crew of an Airbus A320 commenced a go-around at 50 feet AGL following a precision approach but failed to spot the autopilot had disengaged. In March 2007 the crew of an A330 initiated a go-around at Abidjan but failed to control the altitude and pitch angle resulting in a sharp nose down rotation and a ground proximity warning.

[blind pew]

inaccuracies in the wording of the documentation of the procedure

what they need is the manuals translated into Frog:ok:

[Me Myself]

what they need is the manuals translated into Frog

All AF Airbus maunuals are already in frog !

[captplaystation]

Almost as good as the one on 22/10/93 where they forgot to raise the gear subsequent to cleaning up the flaps after T/O, and due to the excessive aerodynamic noise and buffeting Monsieur le CDB shut down both engines ? ? ! ! @ 4500ft. :eek: Difficult to confuse start levers (or whatever Airboos calls them) with gear handle, but well, got to get rid of the damn noise Eh? bet the noise from the RHS was even louder & more insistent after that stunt :=
Well, the engines were restarted by 1600ft and they WERE going to Lourdes, so i guess that is alright then.

Would these Air inter (& ex Air Inter? ) pilots be the same ones whose union was clamouring to have everything translated into French.

[Huck]

"Live another day,

check your FMA...."

[captplaystation]

How many times in the last few years would that have saved the day? Kenyan ? Ethiopian ? Turkish? Flash Airlines? TAM ? etc etc

[A4]

Why do we continue to read about Airbus go-arounds that are so mismanaged? How difficult is it to push the thrust levers all the way forward till they won't go any further and pitch to follow the FD's? :rolleyes:

The Capt had close to 5000 hrs on type and 14000 total time - you'd think that he would have a reasonable idea that when < 200' agl it is rather important to ensure you're going up in the event of GA. The actions on the thrust levers are also rather alarming.

I'm sure all the Airbus bashers are going to come out the woodwork - but a GA in a Bus is NOT difficult.

A4

[Right Way Up]

"Live another day,

check your FMA...."

& may I add in this case increasing pitch attitude.

This is a scenario I often demo in the sim to impress upon the crews the feeling of climbing due to acceleration. It seems from my own observations that we are so busy during the go-around that we concentrate on everything apart from our primary flight instrument!

[misd-agin]

Here's the future operating in the present day -

"G/A"

at 170'

"A/P on" :eek::ugh::{:uhoh::yuk::(:bored::\:ooh:

Then "gear up"


Aviate, navigate, communicate. ABC, 123, baby you and me (with apologies to Jackson Five fans)

[chimbu warrior]

A remarkably similar scenario to an Australian A320 that executed a go-around in Melbourne.

[PLovett]

A remarkably similar scenario to an Australian A320 that executed a go-around in Melbourne.

Thinking that myself Mr CW.

Perhaps due to the same cause, a management change to SOPs to save money but contrary to the recommended procedure as laid down by the manufacturer. :=:uhoh::mad:

[Huck]

This is a scenario I often demo in the sim to impress upon the crews the feeling of climbing due to acceleration. It seems from my own observations that we are so busy during the go-around that we concentrate on everything apart from our primary flight instrument!


See discussions starting at page 68, also page 101:

USAir Flight 1016. (http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR95-03.pdf)

[Right Way Up]

Thanks Huck.

[sharpclassic]

Category I approach.... in fog, visibility of 3000 meters... scattered cloud ceiling 200 and broken cloud ceiling 300 feet

Now, is it just me, or is this really NOT the time to do a no autopilot and no autothrust approach?!

Automation is there to reduce workload in situations like this, not to increase it as seemed to happen in this case.

Leave the automatics in and if at DH you're not visual, slam the thrust levers all the way forward, get the gear and flap up and the aircraft will pretty much do the go-around for you.... leaving you as the pilot the capacity to monitor what is going on.

Complete loss of situational awareness caused by a totally unnecessary increase in work load.

[neilki]

//disclaimer: not A3xx rated//
wouldn't the gear retraction trigger a "don't sink" call from the EGPWS?
with all manner of visual cues (classic vestibular-acceleration is something we all experience and learn to overcome...?) ii have to agree with the 'basic airmanship' comments thus far..
neilki

[misd-agin]

Sharpclassic - almost 2 miles vis and 300' ceiling, and you want to mandate autopilot approaches?

Obviously I'm not a fan of the 'new' way of thinking that mandates every increasing use of the automation.

[sharpclassic]

Misd-agin,

When the cloud base is 100' above your minima, flying into an airport as busy as CDG, I would absolutely use the automatics every single time. The whole point of automatics is to take the workload off us and enable us to step back and monitor the whole situation better.

At the time of the G/A, the PF was obviously so overloaded with the flying that he forgot to put the thrust levers into the TOGA gate.

Don't get me wrong, I love a bit of manual flying whenever I can and I practice it as often as I can, but only when the weather is decent. We're paid to make decisions. Making the decision that this was a good time to practice some manual flying wasn't a great one.

[misd-agin]

"as busy as CDG". That was good for a laugh. I've been there. 'Busy' is obviously a subjective term, especially to U.S. flyers.

Obviously not the sharpest knives in the drawer. Flying performance, and attempting to engage a/p at very low altitude, IMO support my POV.

[sharpclassic]

How does their attempts to engage the A/P at low altitude support your PoV exactly?

[misd-agin]

In the midst of a G/A, at 170' AGL, I'm of the opinion that flying the a/c is more important than trying to engage automation.

I've yet to see a G/A procedure that inserted 'auto pilot - on' before the 'gear up' command. :sad:

[sharpclassic]

And that's my point... they should never have been in the situation where they felt like they had to put the autopilot on. It should have already been in from when they started their approach.

I don't want to divert this into another discussion about the mindset of using and not using automatics.

My point is that when the weather isn't top notch, as in this situation, use whatever means you have at your disposal to keep your workload to a minimum.

[captplaystation]

I have lost count of the number of times (particularly at airports shall we say "less than major") where I have been given actual wx as being close to , but not at, limits, be it CloudBase or vis, only to have the hotshot next to me question why I have mandated an autopilot approach to an autoland assuming not prohibited on the particular approach plate.
I have also lost count of the instances where, at minima, we have on same occasions, seen enough to ascertain our position, but not enough to comfortably disengage the autopilot and wrestle the beast onto the ground, whilst trying to correlate the limited visual cues with some semblance of spatial orientation sufficient to prevent an awesome "arrival".
I have been in this situation often enough that my justification now is simply "it is much better,believe me" and cannot fathom why an experienced guy would wish to increases his workload in such weather, at such a major airport, what was he trying to prove, and to whom?
One thing he certainly proved beyond doubt was his total inability to make best use of the resources at his disposal. "Top Gun" isn't what is required, and wasn't what he achieved.

What is it again ? "a superior pilot is the one who uses his superior judgement to avoid circumstances where he may be called upon to demonstrate his superior skills" QED.

[misd-agin]

IMO the question is did the authorities 'cull the herd'?

[NigelOnDraft]

captplaystation actual wx as being close to ... question why I have mandated an autopilot approach to an autoland assuming not prohibited on the particular approach plateI would agree with your reasoning provided LVPs were in force.

If LVPs are not in force, then I would not "mitigate" the poor weather by doing an autoland - since I need to "monitor" the autopilot in poor vis. I'd rather do as trained, and monitor myself / colleague doing a manual landing. I'll leave autolands for, as trained, LVPs or "practice" ones in good weather.

I've seen enough "practice" autolands frighten me, largely I suspect due protected areas infringed, in good weather to not wish to play the same game in marginal CAT 1.

So I have lost count of the number of times (particularly at airports shall we say "less than major") where I have been given actual wx as being close to , but not at, limits, I agree is an issue - fly a coupled App to Manual Landing from DH and if the references are not comfortably visible at DH, GA and tell ATC to implement LVPs - I'd suggest don't take part in their game and do Autolands without the appropriate protection ;)

NoD

[Phantom Driver]

SC.


When the cloud base is 100' above your minima, flying into an airport as busy as CDG, I would absolutely use the automatics every single time. The whole point of automatics is to take the workload off us and enable us to step back and monitor the whole situation better.

At the time of the G/A, the PF was obviously so overloaded with the flying that he forgot to put the thrust levers into the TOGA gate.

Don't get me wrong, I love a bit of manual flying whenever I can and I practice it as often as I can, but only when the weather is decent. We're paid to make decisions. Making the decision that this was a good time to practice some manual flying wasn't a great one.

Absolutely. I wonder when some folks are going to accept the fact that Commercial Air Transport flying is no longer what it used to be and also thank God for the greatly reduced accident rate that has resulted from the brilliant work done by the engineers. (They are the real heros; we pilots just get paid to have fun (arguably!)

Face the facts, guys. Todays aircraft are NOT designed for manual flying as we used to know it. There is far too much MCP/MCDU/AP/AT work involved for it to be comfortable in anything but the most benign of ATC/WX environments. The PM is usually overloaded, dealing with MCP/ATC/config changes etc etc, and is mostly out of the loop as far as monitoring what the PF is doing. (Several accidents are proof of this). Worse still is the fact that the PF is usually so busy concentrating on his (rusty) flying that he has little capacity to monitor what the PM is doing (did he set the correct requested FD heading/altitude/mode change? Did he execute LNAV? Did he select the correct waypoint to execute ( must be confirmed by both). Who is calling the FMA? (Critical, and yet often missed, with dire consequences, as we know). In the old days, basic scanning was straightforward, but it's a different ballgame now.

All this should be, and usually is, no problem on nice sunny days in the local environment, but as professional pilots, this is not where we spend a lot of our time. We are usually taking off or landing around the Midnight Hour when fatigue is an issue and performance is probably not at it's best.

So why not load the dice in your favour by using the equipment as it was designed to be used? No macho at stake here, no egos .Just do a safe job. But above all, we have to "Fight like crazy against Complacency", especially the automation kind, i.e by trying to understand as best as we can (not easy!) the ins and outs of these wonderful gizmos that we have been gifted with.

Eroding flying skills? Well, I always say--head down to the local flying club (Redhill?), climb into a Pitts special and prove to yourself (if so inclined), that you still have the Right Stuff.

But please don't try it when you have 400 or whatever customers riding down the back, (including maybe your wife and kids). You'll probably find you're not as hot as you should/used to be.

Nobodys fault really, and especially for we old timers-.("The older I get, the better I was"). Today, the market demands that some of us fly ultra long haul, which means maybe one or two handling sectors a month. So I'm for max use of automation on the line, but at all times trying to "Mind the Store", i.e keeping the basics in mind. With Big Brother watching your every move these days, (unstabilised approaches, etc, etc, etc), who wants tea and biccys with the Chief Pilot? I rest my case.

(p.s no comments please from the short haul/lo co guys. I am sure you fellows are well in the groove. Flight Director? What's that!)

[FatFlyer]

After the melbourne similar incident, Airbus changed the go around procedure to call out FMA after initiating a go around "MAN TOGA, SRS, GA TRACK" so that if you have not gone to TOGA it should be picked up straight away.

[Maurice Chavez]

We don't need more use of automation, we need less, so pilots are actually proficient in handflying!Amen brother! :ok:

[Dan Winterland]

''After the melbourne similar incident, Airbus changed the go around procedure to call out FMA after initiating a go around "MAN TOGA, SRS, GA TRACK" so that if you have not gone to TOGA it should be picked up straight away''

And we've got a step further in that the PM checks and calls "Thrust Set'' as a belt and braces system. It not something we do often, the safety net needs to be in place.

[blind pew]

53 year old pilot flying a manual approach down to minimums with punters on board?

When he can't cope with the go around he engages the auto pilot?

Reminds me of my younger days flying with WW2 pilots who couldn't cope with a swept wing jet approaching way on the back side of the drag curve.

Manual throttle was banned except in the case of an engine out.

Landings were often controlled crashes.

There were a few who due to "ageing" and loss of visual accommodation couldn't read the warning panel and would ask what the warning was while they were trying to manual fly.

My third employer (also "flag carrier") wouldn't allow us to fly manually (we were allowed to fly CWS but when I first tried around 5 grand on approach after an atlantic crossing it was promptly re engaged by sir).

I realized in my late thirties that I my performance was degrading so tailored my use of equipment to my physical condition (night flight, fatigue, etc).

In my last company if I had tried to fly a manual approach to minimums on a check I would have failed.

We did practice raw data as well as FD approaches but only when neither pilots were tired and never with weather below 500ft.

The simulator is the place to play heros.

On the age thread I seem to remember reading that the skipper on AF Rio flight wasn't in the cockpit when it crashed - presumably in the bunk.
If he couldn't remain awake to fly through the most dangerous weather zone on this planet then perhaps he shouldn't have been flying the route.

My third employer flew very differently to my first two, we had to learn a table of configuration+attitude+power= performance.
I initially pooh - poohed the system but realize that they were ahead of their time.

BA only taught that system on Concorde at that time (see Mike Riley's book -stick and rudder).

Apparently prior to the Rio accident AF did not have a simulator exercise at cruise level to cope with loss of air data (Aerlingus did).


And what was a 46 yr old doing in the RHS and not doing?
Command failure or ex military? Seems rather old to be in that seat in AF.

The decision was foolish to fly a manual approach to minimums with punters on board - even if he could. He obviously, on this occasion, had a deficiency in his abilities in managing and understanding the automatics.

My point is; is it a culture and training problem in Air France?

[donpizmeov]

misd-agin I see that cdg is listed as the 5th busiest airport in the world (10th Jun 2010 listings). With two from the states, LHR and one from Japan above it. So it would appear misd out on that one as well!:ugh:
If you ask nicely next time the capt may let you sit up the front for landing and you may get a better understanding of what the other fellas on this thread are discussing.

The Don

[Goldenbawls]

CDG no 5?

Uhm.. no? Check those stats again, or provide source please. CDG is typically around number 7 or 10 depending on what year (as well as 2010), with pretty much everyone above being American airfields.

[Bengerman]

Un peau de thread drift?

Ref calling FMA modes...yes it is important, but less important than making sure the aircraft is doing what you want rather than the modes saying what you want them to say!

If you are flying le bus manually and you select TOGA you will get all ther correct FMA's but you still have to pull the stick back to point the aircraft upwards, it will not do it itself!

[misd-agin]

donbdense - CDG is high on the list. Sorry, it doesn't feel as busy as some of the others on the list. Maybe it's having two landing runways/3 parallel runways vs. the single arrival runway ops, or intersecting runway configuration, that some of the 'busier' feeling airports are limited to.

World's busiest airports by traffic movements - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World%27s_busiest_airports_by_traffic_movements)

Been to 25 out of the top 30. Just short of 19,500 binocular hours with another 1000+ monocular hours. Probably enough to have an opinion.

[jurassicjockey]

"Busy" can be pretty subjective. I've flown into 16 of the top 20, but LGA at 26 generally "feels" busier than all of them. It all comes down to runway configuration and departure/arrival procedures. How's that for some thread drift.

[cosmo kramer]

sharpclassic
And that's my point... they should never have been in the situation where they felt like they had to put the autopilot on. It should have already been in from when they started their approach.
If you fly Boeing it doesn't matter, since the auto pilot disconnects as soon as you press toga. A go-around is always flown manually unless you are doing a dual channel approach (autoland). With a single channel approach, the auto pilot is not able to perform the go-around. Doing a dual channel approach with a manual landing is a very bad idea, since the autopilot will then trim the stabilizer quite a lot nose up by 370 feet. This pitch up, you do not what to deal with when you disconnect at 200 feet in poor vis. Doing an autoland when LVP not in force and no protected TDZ, may also not be the best idea, for the reasons given by NigelOnDraft. All in all no auto pilot go-around available, in the above situation.

This leads to this question; when every Boeing pilot has to do a manual go-around, how come that Airbus pilots absolutely should leave the autopilot on? Like already said, it's not that difficult to shove in a handful and pull the nose up.

..or are the manual flying skills deteriorating that much when flying Airbus?

Studi
We don't need more use of automation, we need less, so pilots are actually proficient in handflying!
:D

[Ex Cargo Clown]

"it's not that difficult to shove in a handful and pull the nose up."

I don't think it's just Airbus that have a problems with G/A

Thomsonfly 737 stalled on approach says UK accident report (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/05/21/326834/thomsonfly-737-stalled-on-approach-says-uk-accident.html)

[solitaire]

If you fly Boeing it doesn't matter, since the auto pilot disconnects as soon as you press toga. A go-around is always flown manually unless you are doing a dual channel approach (autoland). With a single channel approach, the auto pilot is not able to perform the go-around. Doing a dual channel approach with a manual landing is a very bad idea, since the autopilot will then trim the stabilizer quite a lot nose up by 370 feet.

Not sure what model of Boeing you're talking about (377??) , but this certainly doesn't apply to any modern one!! They are all perfectly capable of flying automatic go-arounds.

[sharpclassic]

Cosmo,

We do it that way because that's the way that Airbus designed the aircraft to be flown. As Phantom Driver said, love it or hate it, modern aircraft aren't designed to be flown the old fashioned 'Atlantic Baron' way.

If a G/A is done by hand in a Boeing, then you do it by hand as that's the way that Boeing designed it to be done. As a result, the way that you were trained to fly your Boeing (I assume) would teach you the method and mindset of doing a G/A manually.

As the Airbus is capable of doing the G/A automatically (once we have put the thrust levers in the TOGA gate) we are trained to do it this way, especially when the weather is marginal.

It's not an Airbus vs Boeing thing, it's just the way the two different types have been designed.



Going back to my original point, we talk about the 'Swiss Cheese' Model in CRM..... this incident could have been stopped as far back as ToD when during the brief the PF had said something along the lines of... "As the weather isn't great, I'm going to leave the autopilot in till we get visual. If we don't get visual, I'll hit TOGA, get the Gear and flap up and the aircraft will fly the missed approach which is in the FMGC"

[Sprite]

Solitaire...the b737-800and 400 will have autopilot disconnect when the TOGA switch is pressed. So, yes...modern aircraft do require manual go-arounds. The 737-800 is a modern aircraft but will not do an auto go-around like the 747.

[cosmo kramer]

sharpclassic,
As the Airbus is capable of doing the G/A automatically (once we have put the thrust levers in the TOGA gate) we are trained to do it this way, especially when the weather is marginal.
...and...
this incident could have been stopped as far back as ToD when during the brief the PF had said something along the lines of... "As the weather isn't great, I'm going to leave the autopilot in till we get visual. If we don't get visual, I'll hit TOGA, get the Gear and flap up and the aircraft will fly the missed approach which is in the FMGC"
But that is the case in point. Thrust levers were not put in the Toga detent. So how would the autopilot have helped in this situation?

Instead of the usual "use the maximum level of automation" brigade going to work, I think it would be rather more appropriate to look at the cause for not being able to execute a simple maneuver without struggling to connect the auto pilot, instead of monitoring aircraft flightpath.

You are right, it's not Airbus versus Boeing, since there are numerous examples of this being a problem across all fleets. For Boeing the most outspoken with the Turkish crash in Amsterdam.

Nevertheless, I feel it's troublesome if Airbus pilots only have the mindset to do an automatic go-around and that the emphasis of their training is to do so, as you say. It should be in their mindset to get the aircraft to a safe altitude, before completely unnecessarily messing around trying to engage the auto pilot (Boeing made sure about nobody doing so by making a minimum use height of 400 feet for the 'Atlantic Baron' NG). To me it says that this is a more pronounced problem for Airbus crew.

Your reasoning is completely false in my opinion:
Engage the autopilot (leave it on in the first place) to ensure safe flightpath.

Rather that:
Ensure a safe flight by using you skill obtained from your training and regular practice, then engage the magic to reduce your workload.

My point is, this is not an incident primarily caused by underuse of automatics, rather than perhaps poor skills and training. This should be addressed rather than allowing the management to say "Ok boys, we know that you are no longer able to safely fly the aircrafts, so please use the autopilot at all times".

[sharpclassic]

Cosmo,

I do agree with you with the mindset of the issuse but what I was trying to convey was that had the AP been engaged during the approach, the PF most probably would not have become so overloaded that he forgot to put the thrust Levers into TOGA...

[cosmo kramer]

sharpclassic,
I understand the point, but it's not really addressing the underlying issue - why he could become so overloaded from performing a standard maneuver.

One thing is not "getting in". Of course the approach can be conducted at a greater ease with auto pilot engaged, better overview and capacity to look out, then disconnect and land. But from the start of the go-around all this is history, and the point is now only to get the aircraft away from the ground. It's a new maneuver, a new task and the fact that he didn't land but initiated the go around should have been a reset point. And then a maneuver that is quite simple - pitch, throttle, breathe and take it easy. Only those two things are really important. As long as both engines are operating it will get away from the ground even with landing flaps and the gear down.

Then how could the go-around get so messed up. That is the issue to uncover, rather than to blame it on underuse of automation.

Was it training? fatigue? or... what was the reason? Or perhaps it was none of those and simply the one time in the career where the curtain goes down on an otherwise skilled pilot - Then how come the co-pilot didn't react? Training? fatigue? the same questions over again.. plus some new ones, like culture? hierarchy? etc.

If the reason is found it can, perhaps, be corrected.

[solitaire]

Solitaire...the b737-800and 400 will have autopilot disconnect when the TOGA switch is pressed. So, yes...modern aircraft do require manual go-arounds. The 737-800 is a modern aircraft but will not do an auto go-around like the 747.

I stand corrected. Not flown the 737 but even the 747-100 did auto go-arounds so assumed that more modern aircraft would too.

Back in my box now.

[odericko2000]

The 737 only does auto go-arounds on condition that you are performing a dual channel approach, on hitting TO/GA one auto pilot is knocked off and the remaining autopilot takes over the go around, on single channel approaches when you hit TO/GA the autopilot flying the approach at the time is knocked off and the PF has to take over the go around....manually that is:}

[cosmo kramer]

The 737 only does auto go-arounds on condition that you are performing a dual channel approach, on hitting TO/GA one auto pilot is knocked off and the remaining autopilot takes over the go around
Actually both AP remains engaged in pitch mode until missed approach altitude is captured or another roll mode is selected. Both provided that sufficient time has passed for the stabilizer has returned to normal trim, otherwise - oh god - the pilot has to fly the aircraft manually! A dangerous beast such a 737, not suitable for modern day Commercial Air Transport, since "Todays aircraft are NOT designed for manual flying as we used to know it." :E

[odericko2000]

Thanks for pointing out my mistake cosmo,:\ it's true both AP stay engaged in pitch. But selecting another roll mode jus gives you singleAP roll mode operation the pitch still remains in TO/GA dual AP control, everything else you pointed out is dead accurate

[CONF iture]

I don't know if it has been posted before but here (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-hu090923/pdf/f-hu090923.pdf) is the BEA report.
Some interesting comments but I could not find an English version.

[Graybeard]

So, if you are expected to use automatics all the time they are available, the only time you hand fly is when something is broken..

9,000 hours watching George fly a fully functioning airplane, and a total of five hours hand flying a cripple in that period.. What could go wroing?

GB

[rigpiggy]

I hand fly every approach in the wigglepig, @ 300-1 we do a pma, not because I need to but our SOP's require it. 300-2 is easy peasy, PMA's are done down to 200-R1200. Don't forget you are pilots people, not monkeys as HR/Accounting/Flt Ops want you to be. Fly the GD Airplane


Sharpclassic - almost 2 miles vis and 300' ceiling, and you want to mandate autopilot approaches?

Obviously I'm not a fan of the 'new' way of thinking that mandates every increasing use of the automation.

[Airbrake]

Rigpiggy, we all agree manual flying skills are being eroded by automation, and regular practice is important. However, doing a manual approach in marginal CAT1 conditions is probably not the best time to do it.

At the very least a go around costs you 15mins of fuel and time, which in a typical short haul schedule is going to compress the rest of your day and probably delay several hundred passengers.

Explaining to them that you fancied a bit of manual flying as the reason for their delay would be met with a certain amount of irritation. Our Airfrance colleague made a poor decision and showed that he had given even less thought to his go around than he had to his decision to fly a manual approach.

[Huck]

The moral: you can hand-fly a Cat I, but you better not screw it up......

[Nubboy]

Just had a quick scan at the beginning of the report in french.
14,000 hrs, TRI on type, 3,800 on type. Elected to hand fly with manual thrust . Fully configured and stable at 2,000' agl. Immediately following an A330 which got in. However a previous AF had just missed. A new METAR showed 1000 m vis, scattered 1500', broken 230'. Decided at 200', put power on to FLX/MCT and pitch to 5deg at 150' agl. Reduced flap to config3, engaged AP1 and called for gear up. Watched aircraft level off and start descending. Disconnected AP and pull hard ish. Missed Go around instructions from ATC. Master warnings audible ove the R/T link. Min height of 76' agl.

Seems like a lot of dubious decisions and poor airmanship here. I wonder who was head down and looking in, and head up and looking out. 50 foot height difference between decision and commencing the go around. Not pushing the thrust levers all the way to TOGA. Not reading the FMA and seeing LAND gren still illumintated. Not pitching to at least 10deg nose up one engine inop, or preferably 15 with both engines working. Going for the autopilot before climbing safely away from the ground.

Sometime ago we had a series of events in the poor vis sections of our sim training. The instructor would fail the GO AROUND mode after inducing a low level go around due to another failure or winding the vis/cloudbase right down. Even if you selected TOGA, the FMS was stuck in LAND mode. You had to disconnect the autopilot, ensure TOGA thrust and hand fly away from the runway. Any crew that didn't would find the box on legs heading downhill, with the thrust rolling back. Not pretty.

Lessons for us all here I think.

[hetfield]

Sometime ago we had a series of events in the poor vis sections of our sim training. The instructor would fail the GO AROUND mode after inducing a low level go around due to another failure or winding the vis/cloudbase right down. Even if you selected TOGA, the FMS was stuck in LAND mode. You had to disconnect the autopilot, ensure TOGA thrust and hand fly away from the runway. Any crew that didn't would find the box on legs heading downhill, with the thrust rolling back. Not pretty.


Sounds familiar... Sometimes longer de-briefing.....

[wiggy]

I stand corrected. Not flown the 737 but even the 747-100 did auto go-arounds so assumed that more modern aircraft would too.

Back in my box now.



Just to be clear there's no need to get back in your box, you're not far wrong.

If you opt to fly a coupled approach in a genuinely modern Boeing product such as the rip roaring up to date 747-400 :ooh: or the 777 you will, by default, be flying a multi channel approach. If you hit the TOGA switches with the Autopilot engaged you will do an automatic go-around.If TOGA is pressed the power should run up to Go around power, the aircraft will pitch to fly a 2000' ROC and the aircraft will hold the current ground track..the autopilot certainly shouldn't disengage.

[Huck]

The instructor would fail the GO AROUND mode after inducing a low level go around due to another failure or winding the vis/cloudbase right down.

My kind of instructor.

[CONF iture]

The leading idea for the captain was to proceed with a 'smooth' go around by slowly applying thrust. By doing so he inadvertently stopped to the second detent he met which is MCT but does not trigger the all go around logic.

Following an earlier event of dubious go around maneuver, Air France had decided :

To practice a go around exercise on all engines with low level capture.
To modify how teaching go around maneuvers to ensure that the reading of FMA in the initial phase of the procedure does not occur at the expense of the control of pitch and thrust, the monitoring of the primary parameters remains a priority in all circumstances.

Following the incident of September 2009, the company has reminded all pilots :

The thrust levers must be forwarded to the TOGA mechanical stop.
Any alteration of the procedure in order to obtain a smoother go around must be prohibited.
Pitch control is paramount.
AP should be engaged only after the trajectory has been stabilized and the FMA is coherent.
A return to basic principles of flight and appropriate training are necessary.

[waddawurld]

It seems to me that while its already been discussed that when flying an approach to weather minimums crews should have briefed both the approach AND potential missed, and that the PF should at least have mentally gone over the missed approach (go around) procedures--memory items et al, but the idea that you disengage the AP at minimums (or near) or that you engage it at the start of the missed IMHO is, at best, poor practice, and I would hope, contrary to SOP's. It was for us. You want to fly the approach manually-- disengage at the IAP not the DH(A), and if you miss, you stay in the mode of flight you were in during the approach until you have a stabilized go-around established. I'm just sayin...

[p51guy]

Going into Atlanta one day in turbulent IFR conditions at 300 ft my MD80 autopilot shut down. We were still in the clouds so had to do what we could to salvage the approach. We did a recovery and landed but it was not what we planned. Sometimes you don't get what you expect.

[A4]

So the Capts a TRI on type......... ok :hmm: That's even more worrying. He wanted a "smooth" go-around - ok, once it's going up just come back to the CLB detent if you don't want/need TOGA - the important thing is to make sure it's going UP! This aircraft got within half wingspan of touching down....

I'm an advocate of maintaining handling skills - but there's a time and a place and marginal LVP's is not the time. There are serious questions about decision making and situational awareness here.

I know we can all make mistakes but how can a TRI make such a fundamental error?

A4

[misd-agin]

Following an earlier event of dubious go around maneuver, Air France had decided :

To practice a go around exercise on all engines with low level capture.
To modify how teaching go around maneuvers to ensure that the reading of FMA in the initial phase of the procedure does not occur at the expense of the control of pitch and thrust, the monitoring of the primary parameters remains a priority in all circumstances.
Oh, that's really exciting news. A focus back to flying the airplane FIRST. Geez, where'd we lose focus on THAT?

[Max Stryker]

First and foremost I apologize to all the senior colleagues for rearing up my head, being a just an MD-80 SFO, and being mostly a lurker on this forum. I read the posts here regularly, trying to learn from the mistakes others make but this thread is really starting to miss the point IMHO.

I truly do not understand this Bus vs Boeing discussion developing - the AF guys departed all procedures and common sense, and would have, in my opinion, have done the same, had the airplane in question been a C172. Full use of automation in marginal weather is, at least for me, common sense. I handfly every approach below 10000ft, when the airport environment is calm and the weather is fine, with fatigue within reasonable limits. Adding workload at CDG is just poor judgment. Especially since a possible GA will mean most probably not flying the published procedure, but being vectored half a dozen times within a few minutes, and handed off to several different frequencies, as we have all been in the past. Secondly, Boeing, Airbus, or my relic-class MD, a GA is a GA, throttles in the firewall / GA detent, pitch up. TOGA-tap is just...silly. GAs ate not meant for passenger comfort, but for getting out of a bad place, and fast.

Fly it automatic, fly manually, but fly it. Pitch down and 70ft clearance is not an Airbus issue - that's a very serious proficiency issue.

Just my 2c. Ready for my whipping now.:E

[p7lot]

"Fly it automatic, fly manually, but fly it. Pitch down and 70ft clearance is not an Airbus issue - that's a very serious proficiency issue."

My kind of SFO.....right seat me anyday:ok:

[Heathrow Harry]

Well said Max

Weren't we all taught

"FLY THE B***** AEROPLANE"

And worry about everything else later??

[LEXAN]

One of the AF particularities is that flying an approach with A/THR engaged is considered as abnormal. Why ?

After the Habsheim disaster, the confidence in the Airbus 320 was “low” among AF pilots.

Despite the fact that the A/THR was one of the most reliable system on this aircraft, some ayatollahs were spreading the idea that this automatism was dangerous and never to be used on landing.

I remember almost killing a captain after using A/THR until the flare.

And now, even if it’s not clearly written in the SOPs, it is well admitted for AF crew that AP OFF means A/THR OFF.

And it’s still difficult to have an FO performed an automatic approach with AP disconnected at MDH if the weather is poor.

[CONF iture]

I wonder why he wanted a 'smooth' go around at minima.
Page 11
"The captain explained that a 'smooth' overshoot was linked to the low elevation gain as the missed approach altitude was limited to 2000 feet and to the risk of spatial disorientation. That is why he advanced the thrust levers slowly and believed to be in TOGA"

[RoyHudd]

TOGA is required for all go-arounds on the 320/330/340 series. After TOGA has been selected, to cycle the G/A flight phase, one can then go back to the CLB gate for a slower rate of climb. Woe betide those who attempt the soft go-around without TOGA being selected.

[EMIT]

Quote from post 63

... when flying an approach to weather minimums crews should have briefed both the approach AND potential missed, and that the PF should at least have mentally gone over the missed approach (go around) procedures ..



Uhhm, shouldn't you always brief and be prepared for a missed approach, right down to the moment of touching down successfully in the touchdown zone?

Many posters seem to prepare themselves for a Go Around only when the weather is close to minimums, or are they just a little unclear in conveying their ideas?

[Deep and fast]

Did the crew get dismissed?

D and F :8

[arearadar]

As an ATCO I have seen the results of the FMS.
I won`t bore you with details but, essentially, the aeroplane ended up where it should not have been. I realised what was happening and, as it was not busy I gently moved the conflicting traffic out of the way...just to see what the clearance buster would actually do.
Eventually I said Kes....XXX what is your position? What is your altitude ?.........What was your clearance?

Oh sorry London, the FMS got it wrong.

Reply: Who is flying this aeroplane.........you or the FMS ?

Dave :confused:

[TriStar_drvr]

Weren't we all taught

"FLY THE B***** AEROPLANE"



Actually, I was taught to "FLY THE D*** AIRPLANE"

I swear, the training from one side of the pond to the other has got to be standardized (or standardised) ;)

[p51guy]

Pilots just need to be pilots. Doing a go around is very simple. It shouldn't require training. Taking off, landing and go arounds are so basic no pilot should need any instruction in these areas once he has soloed. Pilots have been doing it just fine for 107 years without special training.

[A4]

Arearadar, there is nothing wrong with allowing the FMS/FMGC to fly a missed approach. That's why we brief exactly what "the glass" is going to do and compare it to the paper version. Allowing the autos to do it whilst being carefully monitored is probably preferable to trying to handfly the go-around when a) out of practice and b) in busy airspace with a high workload.

What concerns me here is that there is regular evidence of guys just not understanding what their aircraft is about to do and they're left hanging on by the fingernails. This is simply unacceptable from today's crews in the busy airspace we fly in.

Automation complacency? Too lazy to study? Training deficiency? Take your pick.

A4

[Gi Dem Dub]

Not hand flying the go around because of a lack of practice ? :yuk:

So in what case exactly would you hand fly a go around again given the relatively rare occurence of GA's .... which leads to the said "pilot being out of practice"

Do you mean "let the A/P do it cause you -human- can't" ?

GA is one of the critical manoeuvres that saves your life. You should be able to manually execute it whenever needed. NO reason should excuse a pilot for not being able to do it manually.

For all phases of the flight where ground proximity is a factor, it's the pilot job to be prepared and skilled enough to take over automation immediately when things don't go according to plan

[A4]

GDD

I think you have mis-interpreted my reply to arearadars post. He alluded to the fact that he has seen totally mismanaged go-arounds where the aircraft heads skyward straight through it's missed approach altitude which he put down to "the FMS". The FMS cannot "think" - it will do what it's told to do.

The point I was trying to get across is that, provided the missed approach coding in the FMS has been checked against the plate and the correct MA altitude set in the FCU/MCP then "the FMS" should make the MA a straightforward event - be it AP flown or manually flown (follow the FD's). The initial part of the GA should, of course, present NO problems to ANY pilot on the line but once safely in the climb with the gear up, what's wrong with engaging the AP? What are you trying to prove by hand flying the whole thing?

In busy airspace (e.g. CDG) it's better to let the autos fly the aircraft whilst you monitor...... Why load your colleague up even more than necessary but having him have to monitor you as well as clean up, RT, c/lists etc

There is repeated evidence that GA's are screwed up because some guys out there do not understand what their aircraft is about to do (or is doing). Couple that with trying to handfly and, with some guys, you have the potential for a total breakdown of SA with workload going through the roof...... Level bust...... Flap overspeed etc. How else would you describe the A319 GA which initiated this thread? A total breakdown of technical and non-technical skills.

I'm an advocate of keeping the basic handling skills in tune but there is a time and a place. Many airlines have a pretty restrictive automation policy which can lead to the erosion of these skills...... which has the potential to be counter productive when you actually need them at short notice.

Hope that clears things a bit for you,

A4

[Gi Dem Dub]

A4,

I understood your point and globally agreed with it. I am not an anti automation pilot.

My comment was focused on your mention of "lack of practice" (amongst other valid reasons) as a reason for giving priority to automation. It's simply wrong. I'll leave it to your jugdment to figure out where this kind of logic can lead us if pushed far enough.

And I did not imply that hand flying ability was about trying to "prove" anything. It's merely a case of being skilled enough to take over automation at the right time and with confidence when the AP tend to deviate from the expected plan for whatever reason.

Indeed automation can fail.
Or, can be mis-used. You quote some of the possible reasons:

"Automation complacency? Too lazy to study? Training deficiency? Take your pick."

Why focusing on the "blame" mindset thus forgetting other possible factors such as fatigue or simple mistake due to our human nature ? These automation interfaces can involve a number of parameters each of which being a potencial source of entry error leading to an unwanted behavior of your aeroplane. So error will always bite you one day or another and it's not necessarily a case of poor training or lazyness.
That's why a pilot has to be able to rely on solid handflying skills as an ultimate life insurance

[Phantom Driver]

A4


In busy airspace (e.g. CDG) it's better to let the autos fly the aircraft whilst you monitor...... Why load your colleague up even more than necessary but having him have to monitor you as well as clean up, RT, c/lists etc

There is repeated evidence that GA's are screwed up because some guys out there do not understand what their aircraft is about to do (or is doing). Couple that with trying to handfly and, with some guys, you have the potential for a total breakdown of SA with workload going through the roof...... Level bust...... Flap overspeed etc. How else would you describe the A319 GA which initiated this thread? A total breakdown of technical and non-technical skills.

I'm an advocate of keeping the basic handling skills in tune but there is a time and a place. Many airlines have a pretty restrictive automation policy which can lead to the erosion of these skills...... which has the potential to be counter productive when you actually need them at short notice.



Well said.

[Dream Land]

Yes, well said and Sharpclassic spot on, there's a time and place, unfortunately where I'm at, the cadets seem to be trained to switch off the automatics at 1000 FT on every approach. :ugh: